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
CANADIAN
INSTITUTE FOR
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PEACE & SECURITY

STAR WARS & NORAD

*Canada's role
in the defence
of North
America*



David Cox, a Canadian defence analyst, foresees a shift in Canada's NORAD role if the US pushes ahead with Star Wars.

Tim Draimin, Central America specialist, is skeptical about the strength of the "new democracy" in Guatemala.

Paul Marantz, expert in Soviet foreign policy, warns against pinning our hopes on summit diplomacy.

In this issue:

■ This is the first issue of a periodical to be published at quarterly intervals by the Canadian Institute for International Peace & Security. The Institute is a Crown Corporation and is provided an annual grant by Parliament. Given the fact that the mandate of the Institute is to increase knowledge and understanding of issues of peace and security, it has been decided to publish information about and analysis of these issues in various forms, including background papers for the interested public, longer occasional papers of a more specialized nature, fact sheets, and this quarterly.

The quarterly will carry articles by invited authors on subjects which reflect our own research interests, as well as regular features intended to bring readers up to date about the public debate in Canada and abroad, and about our own activities. There are many other sources of informa-

tion and comment on peace and security questions, of course, especially from south of the border. But there is also a growing interest amongst Canadians to look at these matters from a Canadian perspective, and without taking the answers for granted.

The Institute is supporting the publication of magazines and conference reports by various groups in Canada. We could have decided to leave it at that. But just as we expect that the creation of a new Institute of this kind will lead over time to a more widely-based and also more reflective Canadian contribution to the search for global security and peace, so we look forward to this quarterly becoming a lively and continuing account of the debate over peace and security issues from a Canadian perspective.

Geoffrey Pearson
Executive Director

CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

307 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K2P 0P7
(613) 990-1593

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Geoffrey Pearson, Nancy
Gordon, David Cox

Editor:

Dianne DeMille

Design and Production:

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Translation:

Denis Bastien

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
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■ **David Cox** is Director of Research at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security; **Tim Draimin** is Central America Specialist at the Jesuit Centre for Social Faith and Justice in Toronto; **Paul Marantz** teaches Soviet Foreign Policy at the University of British Columbia; **John Walker** is a Journalist Fellow and **Jane Boulden** is a Research Assistant at the Institute. **Gregory Wirick** is a freelance writer in Ottawa.

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STAR WARS & NORAD:

Canada's role in North American defence. By David Cox

■ The times are changing in continental defence, and in Canada's long-standing partnership with the United States in NORAD.

■ That much virtually all the witnesses who appeared before the Standing Committee could agree on. But when it came to deciding what changes were taking place and how Canada should respond, the Committee, charged to advise the government on the NORAD renewal, faced a wide range of opinion. The range is from those who believe that Canada will lose influence and "miss out" if it does not find a prominent place for itself in continental defence to those who fear that we will be dragged into Star Wars if the Agreement is renewed.

In important respects these issues go well beyond the renewal of NORAD, but the timeliness of the renewal – coinciding as it does with the public debate in the US and elsewhere about strategic defence – suggests that, for Canadians, NORAD has become quite closely associated with the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). It may be useful, therefore, to separate some of the threads in the debate by posing the following questions:

What is NORAD and what has it done in the past?

What are the changes taking place that make its future a matter of considerable debate?

What is its likely role if the US deploys strategic defences?

What options does Canada have?

NORAD Past

When the North American Defence Agreement was first

signed in 1958, the principal strategic threat to North America was the Soviet manned bomber. More specifically, if US bomber forces were to be an effective retaliatory force in a deterrent posture, they needed warning of attack sufficient that they could fuel, arm, and take-off before the incoming attack arrived. At the same time, the US Air Force deployed extensive air defences with the intent of defending civilian populations. For both these purposes, the maximum warning could be obtained by placing radars as far to the north as possible. Hence, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line was strung across northern Canada, with long wings extended out to sea by means of picket ships carrying powerful radars.

Fundamental changes were taking place even while the NORAD Agreement was being negotiated. The rapidly emerging threat was the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a much more formidable weapon than the manned bomber, and against the ICBM the DEW line was of no value. To give warning of missile attack, the US developed the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), with warning radars based in Britain and Greenland. Soon thereafter, the United States also developed space-based warning systems, using infrared sensors and photography to identify missile sites and launches.

As these systems developed, the information centre continued to be NORAD, with its head-

quarters at Colorado Springs. But Canada, officially a full partner in the bilateral command, had no special role to play in the emerging space-based systems or in BMEWS. Conversely, as the threat from manned bombers became less important, so did the need for a large force of active interceptors. Consequently, after 1963, and essentially through to at least 1980 – some might even say to the present – active air defence has been kept to a prudent minimum: protecting sovereignty and guarding against isolated intrusions.

NORAD Present

By the 1980's, a powerful and diverse group of sensors had been assembled by the USA, all of which feed into NORAD. In addition to the space-based detectors of missile launches and BMEWS, large so-called phased array radars are deployed on the coasts of the United States, the primary purpose of which is to detect submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Other radars are sea-based. And against aircraft, the US intends to deploy two long-range radars (over-the-horizon/backscatter or OTH-B) which can detect and track aircraft as far away as 1500 miles.

With all these sensors feeding into NORAD, the Canadian role in detection is, relatively speaking, much diminished. Two cameras which were located in Canada for deep space surveillance are no longer required, and Canada makes no financial contribution to any of the systems described above. However, there is a continuing requirement for an aircraft warning system in the Canadian north, because the OTH-B radars are ineffective in

the peculiar atmospheric conditions of the North. The solution, an intermediate one perhaps, is the North Warning System (NWS).

A glance at the map shows the purpose of NWS: to seal off the remaining section in the curtain of early warning radars around the continental United States. NWS is an improvement on the DEW line, which was becoming difficult to maintain and notorious for the "gaps" through which hostile aircraft could, in theory, fly undetected into the heart of the continent. But NWS is probably the least capable of the new systems identified here. Despite the cost – of the \$1.3 Billion the US will pay 60% and Canada 40% for the completion of the system in 1992 – NWS will have only limited capabilities against air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. In an actual situation of crisis, airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS) would need to be deployed from the United States to exercise surveillance and control of the interior space of northern Canada. If technological developments, currently in the research stage, prove successful, it may be that just as the NWS is fully deployed in the early 1990's, the US will be close to the deployment of two space-based systems: space-based radars, and space-based infrared sensors, where the test of both will be their ability to image and track cruise missiles with small radar cross-sections and low heat emissions. If these developments are successful, NWS will become a redundant system, useful only as a hedge against the failure or destruction of its space-based counterparts.


Finally, the decision to develop NWS has encouraged the NORAD partners to place manned interceptors at northern bases. In particular, Canada intends to deploy a small number of CF-18s in locations which would, in principle, allow the aircraft operating on data from the NWS, or the DEW line for the time being, to intercept hostile cruise-missile carriers before they launch their missiles. As opposed to the principle, the practice would likely be quite different. Basic calculations of time, radar range and combat radius of the CF-18 suggest that interception would be extremely difficult using either DEW line or NWS technology. It can be reasonably supposed that, without improved capabilities, the present plan to deploy interceptors in the far north is more a gesture of determination than anything else, intended to indicate that the large-scale deployment of Soviet cruise missiles would elicit a defensive response.

There is perhaps a more general observation to be made about the present NORAD arrangement. In the USA the term is really used in two ways: the primary connotation refers to the nerve centre of the American strategic forces, controlling all incoming data and relaying this data to the strategic commands charged with responding to a nuclear attack; only secondarily is it associated with Canada as an agreement between two states operating an integrated command for purposes of air defence. And that distinction, of course, is understandable in the light of the development of NORAD as described above.

NORAD Future

Will NORAD become the nerve centre of a strategic defence system which involves both space-based and ground-based defence? And will those systems involve the use of Canadian territory? The answer to the second question, central though it is to

Canadian interests, lies some distance in the future. The simple reality is that although a number of weapons designs might plausibly be deployed to better advantage on Canadian territory, the record of SDI research suggests that promising systems rise and fall very quickly. As a conse-



Map showing coverage of Over The Horizon/Backscatter (OTH/B) radar sites and the proposed North Warning System.

Stephen Priestley

quence, there is not yet a system design for even a partial, let alone a comprehensive, defensive shield, and, even in the most optimistic view, there will not be one for several years yet.

In answer to the first question, however, it is inevitable that the current data and communication links of NORAD would be a part of a strategic defence system. This much is already clear from the American creation of a new Space Command, of which NORAD will be an integral part. The Canadian Government will therefore face some awkward choices. A simple way to avoid or limit participation in an operational strategic defence would be to announce in advance that no components of an anti-ballistic missile system, nuclear or otherwise, would be permitted on Canadian territory. Such a declaration, if made with sufficient determination, would undoubtedly affect American priorities in SDI research in that it would adversely affect the prospects of any defensive systems which required or benefitted from Canadian deployment. To resist such deployments while continuing to participate in NORAD would be somewhat anomalous, however, because any American ABM deployments would increase the threat from Soviet manned

bombers and cruise missiles.

This in turn would increase the importance of Canadian territory and Canadian participation in NORAD.

The Soviet Union has begun to deploy long-range cruise missiles on a modernized version of the Bear bomber. A sea-launched

long-range cruise from the same family may also be deployed in ice-capable submarines operating in the Arctic. Does this require a larger commitment to active defence?

In terms of strategic fundamentals, the answer could well be "no". Subsonic missiles fired from the Arctic do not affect the essential issues in strategic force deployments: they are too slow to be credible in a surprise, counter-force strike and they are too far away to deliver a decapitating strike. Increased Soviet capabilities, therefore, do not necessarily change the defence calculation. *Psychologically*, however, the response may be quite different, and there may be strong pressures, both political and military, to commit resources to the development of cruise missile defences. At this point SDI and air defence are closely linked. Without SDI, air defences will likely stay at a prudent minimum even if the Soviets deploy cruise missiles in larger numbers. With SDI, even in a modest form, defence against the manned bomber and cruise missile becomes essential.

Options for Canada

If it is correct that the major SDI decisions are not likely to be taken for several years, the Government may choose merely to keep a watching brief, moni-

toring and analysing the development of SDI but withholding judgement about its effects on Canada until the systems design options are clarified – a situation not likely until 1988 or even later. On the other hand, the Government might decide to preempt by deciding on the basis of available knowledge what would and would not be acceptable to Canadian participation, recognizing that in the end strict non-participation would be difficult to reconcile with continued Canadian participation in NORAD.

In the nearer term, however, there is another possibility. The immediate need is to develop a coherent Canadian policy on cruise missile deployments. In terms of active defences, this may well involve a decision about how seriously to take Soviet cruise missile deployments.

On the arms control front, cruise missiles figure prominently in the Geneva negotiations. The Soviets propose to ban all cruise missiles with a range over 600 kilometres. The Americans propose to limit long-range ALCMS to 1500 (which would mean about 150 cruise missile-carrying bombers in the Soviet case), and offer no limits on sea-launched cruise missiles. On the face of it, the Soviet proposal is more attractive to Canada than is the American proposal since it would effectively eliminate the threat via the Canadian north. Defining the Canadian interest on this issue, and perhaps pursuing the very difficult verification issues involved in banning sea-launched cruise missiles, may be just as important to Canadians as sending CF-18s to northern bases. Diplomatically and technically this would be a difficult, perhaps politically unpopular task. But to hazard a rough bet, the chances of securing arms control restraints on cruise missile deployments are not less than the chances that the CF-18s will shoot them down if they are ever fired.

GUATEMALA 1986:

The odds on Cerezo. By Tim Draimin

■ **The election will not bring an automatic transfer of real power to the president. There will be a handover of *formal* power. What are my chances of consolidating that power? Fifty-fifty. – Vinicio Cerezo, October 1985.**

■ Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo, the dynamic Christian Democrat presidential candidate, had just won Guatemala's elections. A few days later the tortured and brutally disfigured body of 26-year-old law student, Beatriz Eugenia Barrios Marroquín, was discovered 40 kilometres outside Guatemala City. Ms. Barrios had just been accepted by the Canadian Embassy in Guatemala to come to Canada as a political refugee.

In many countries a politically-motivated abduction and murder would be major news. In Guatemala it is only another numbing statistic – a daily occurrence – in the record of Latin America's most repressive military dictatorship. Today, as the international media focus on Vinicio Cerezo's new government, observers wonder whether Guatemala can overcome its horrific past.

Why, after holding the presidency for 27 of the last 31 years, is the Guatemalan military now turning the office over to a civilian? More importantly, what real possibility does President Cerezo have of democratizing Guatemala? The answer lies in a series of factors: the background of military dictatorship, the economic crisis, the military's response to the continuing insurgency, and the impact of the political model evolving in neighbouring El Salvador. An assessment of these

factors should inform the foreign policy toward Guatemala of Western allies like Canada.

Thirty Years of Dictatorship

In the early 1950s the democratically-elected government of Jacobo Arbenz began to tackle the country's fundamental problem, land tenure. The proposed expropriation of unused land belonging to the United Fruit Company triggered alarm bells in Washington. In 1954 Arbenz's reformist government was overthrown by a CIA-engineered rebellion. This intervention abruptly truncated Guatemala's political and social development, plunging the country into three decades of practically uninterrupted military rule.

Military dictatorship, mismanagement and unbridled corruption left a sorry legacy. Today 5 per cent of the population enjoys 34 per cent of national income, while 70 per cent survives on \$300 or less per year.

Guatemala's poor, including nearly all the 4 million Indians, suffer the hemisphere's second-worst index of malnutrition, affecting 82 per cent of children; half of rural children die before the age of five; literacy stands at only 47 per cent, dropping to 20 per cent in the countryside.

Economic Crisis

Guatemala is undergoing its

worst economic crisis since the Depression: declining terms of trade, an onerous government deficit, and 45 per cent unemployment. The foreign debt of nearly \$3 billion, composed mostly of short-term loans, consumes approximately half of the export-generated foreign income. The once-stable national currency, the Quetzal (Q), at par with the US dollar until 1984, now trades at three to one. Inflation topped 50 per cent in 1985.

Guatemala's disastrous human rights record left the country without foreign aid. In 1985 the US Congress approved \$90 million in economic and military aid conditional upon the inauguration of an elected civilian president and an improvement in human rights.

Counterinsurgency Warfare

Until 1981/82 military corruption and antiquated counterinsurgency tactics – mostly massive killings and crude terror – were no match for a rapidly growing guerrilla movement gaining widespread rural support. However, the 1982 coup of Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, signalled the predominance of younger officers espousing a coherent counterinsurgency strategy.

The younger officers were as prepared as their predecessors to employ state terrorism, but the role of terror now had a definite purpose: the dislocation of the highland Indians supporting the guerrillas. Before long, tens of thousands of indigenous people were killed, over 500,000 were internally displaced and 150,000 had fled to Mexico. "We have no policy of scorched earth," Gen.

Ríos Montt boasted. "We have a policy of scorched Communists."

As this process advanced the military reorganized and expanded its national command structure, defined regional "development poles" (areas of concentration for civic action projects which corresponded to the major areas of guerrilla conflict) and set up "model villages" (strategic hamlets) in the development poles for the Indians who had been forcefully displaced. Security and development were merged into a single coherent strategy.

However, Guatemala's sophisticated counterinsurgency programme is very expensive. President Carter's suspension of US military aid to Guatemala in 1977 forced the military to become self-sufficient. Guatemala now produces some of its own weapons, ammunition and armoured personnel carriers. But despite being able to purchase some military supplies from countries like Israel, there is a crippling shortage of spare parts for US-made helicopters and other advanced technology. In anticipation of renewed US military aid, the Army has already produced an extensive shopping list.

Civilian President Next Door

In El Salvador the presidency of Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte has brought the country unprecedented levels of military and economic aid from the United States and other countries. President Duarte has neither implemented significant land reform, nor put the conduct of the war under civilian control. Members of the security forces

have not been prosecuted for abuses against Salvadorean citizens. The Army's historic fear of Christian Democrat reformist rhetoric turns out to have been exaggerated, and this lesson has not been lost on Guatemala's senior military command.

Since 1982 Vinicio Cerezo, who comes from the progressive wing of the Christian Democrat party, has deliberately moderated his own rhetoric. Once a defiant critic of military rule (himself the target of at least four assassination attempts), he adopted his new approach following Gen. Ríos Montt's coup. He failed to condemn the President's complicity in widespread rural human-rights abuses. Since then the framework for a *modus vivendi* between the Army and the Christian Democrats has slowly evolved.

Return to Civilian Rule

In order to placate lingering military opposition Vinicio Cerezo made two far-reaching concessions: one in the area of human rights, the other regarding social reform. Speaking in October 1985 Cerezo said,

Alfonsín-style trials would be very difficult here, because the Guatemalan Army is not an Army in defeat like in Argentina. . . . We can't have an amnesty for the guerrillas and then put the Army officers on trial. If I did that, I'd be committing suicide.

As for fundamental social reforms, Cerezo discarded the options of land reform and tax reform (80 per cent of revenue comes from indirect taxes, only 20 per cent from direct taxes).

At the same time Cerezo is trying to dampen expectations. Before the elections he predicted:

My government would not be one of social reforms – which the Army would not allow – but one of transition to democracy. Only my successor could begin the social changes that Guatemala so desperately needs, including agrarian reform.

Any attempt to usurp military

control could provoke another Army coup. And there is little likelihood that the Army will voluntarily relinquish effective control over national life. A pre-electoral study of the Army's security and rural development institutions by two American anthropologists, Chris Krueger



HUNT

and Kjell Enge, *Security and Development in the Guatemalan Highlands*, concluded:

The military is well-positioned to maintain control of these institutions and programmes: pull out and blame failures on the next government which will face a highly polarized and traumatized society and an economy in crisis; or, maintain parallel institutions, operations and control of resources which in effect undermine civilian control of development activities.

The Future

The election of Vinicio Cerezo has certainly won Guatemala a positive turn in world opinion, but what are the prospects for President Cerezo's and Guatemala's future? Will Cerezo be able to make his promised contribution towards democratization?

The inauguration of an elected president now means that the US Congress will release its conditionally-approved \$10 million in military aid and \$80 million in economic aid. The new civilian government expects to successfully entice foreign aid donors, win greater sympathy on the part of foreign banks and the International Monetary Fund to renegotiate the debt,

and attract foreign investment.

The military intends that the transfer of formal power to civilians will serve twin goals: funds will be forthcoming for the integrated national security and development arms of counter-insurgency; and the inauguration of a civilian president, if popu-

especially military and militarized aid, cannot generate economic recovery and development.

Guatemala has long been treated internationally as a pariah. Canadian aid, for example, was suspended in 1981 due to the gross and systematic violation of human rights. In December, 1985, Canada co-sponsored a United Nations resolution which:

deeply deplore(d) the continuing gross violations of human rights . . . which are largely due to the failure of the military and security forces to conduct their activities with the necessary respect for protecting the human rights of all Guatemalans.

Before any country considers renewing bilateral aid, the following conditions should first be addressed:

- a definitive end to the systematic violation of human rights and the dismantling of the structures of repression;
- an investigation into the fate of the disappeared and the prosecution of those responsible;
- the establishment of civil rights and freedoms allowing open and uninhibited freedom of association;
- the implementation of both structural reforms (such as agrarian reform) and political reforms.

President Cerezo is an extremely adept politician. He will certainly last for months and might even survive his five year term. But will he have changed the structure and abuse of power in Guatemala? The international community, by stipulating that economic aid will be forthcoming only if structural reforms are implemented and human rights are effectively respected, would assist Guatemala in recovering political control over its nearly omnipotent military. A premature resumption of aid will merely strip an otherwise powerless civilian sector of any leverage over the Generals – and thus further postpone reconciliation and equitable socio-economic development in Guatemala.

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

Preparing for the long haul. By Paul Marantz

I sometimes wonder whether... a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin:...

he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath – in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat... You wonder whether it would not have been wiser for him to have taken a little more interest in what was going on at an earlier date and to have seen whether he could not have prevented some of these situations from arising instead of proceeding from an indiscriminating indifference to a holy wrath equally indiscriminating. (George Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* [New York: New American Library, 1951], p. 66.)

It is a sad commentary on the sharp decline in East-West relations during the 1980s that the November 1985 summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was greeted with such enthusiasm and excitement. Despite the almost total absence of substantive agreement at the summit, there was great relief that the superpowers were once again talking civilly to one another. However much we might agree with the sentiment that "it is better to jaw jaw than war war," it must be clearly understood that the superpowers have still

not advanced beyond the first tentative steps toward improved East-West relations.

Moreover, lest hopes for the next Reagan-Gorbachev summit reach unrealistic levels, we need to learn the hard lesson of recent history that summit meetings are a poor vehicle for furthering this objective. Beginning with the first postwar summit meeting in 1955, there have been no less than ten summit meetings between the American and Soviet leaders. And yet, as the present strained international climate demonstrates, none of these has brought about a true stabilization of East-West relations. In some cases, a momentary thawing of the international climate did occur. The 1955 summit produced "the Spirit of Geneva," and the 1959 summit resulted in "the Spirit of Camp David," but in each case fundamental disagreements on critical issues (such as the 'German problem' and the relationship of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union) soon brought a quick plunge back to the depths of cold war animosity.

The most successful of the postwar summits occurred in 1972, when President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and the first SALT Agreement. However, it should be remembered that these were not achieved overnight. They represented the culmination of more than two

years of patient and laborious negotiation (and it took another seven years before the second SALT Treaty was ready to be signed). Moreover, the improvement in Soviet-American relations that the 1972 summit produced did not endure for very long. By the end of the 1970s' detente was in tatters and cold war tensions had once again reached an acute level.

East-West relations, throughout the long decades since the Russian Revolution of 1917, have resembled an interminable roller coaster ride, with temporary high points giving way to sharp downward plunges. Why has it been so difficult to stabilize relations?

The first reason is that there are a number of fundamental conflicts of interest between East and West which are exceptionally difficult to resolve. Yet as long as they remain unresolved, they thwart a durable improvement in East-West relations. The four most serious of these are the arms race, competition in the Third World, the way in which Soviet control is exercised in Eastern Europe, and Western concerns about human rights in the Soviet Union. We in the West need to find ways to express our profound disapproval of those actions which we find morally repugnant (e.g., the repression of Soviet dissidents, the application of martial law in Poland, or the use of force in Afghanistan) without undermining the arms control negotiations that are needed to lessen the risk of a nuclear confrontation. We need to avoid shooting ourselves in the foot (e.g., by suspending

educational exchanges with the Soviet Union or by refusing to sell them goods that they can readily obtain elsewhere) whenever they engage in conduct of which we disapprove.

The second factor that has contributed to this repetitive oscillation in East-West relations from unrealistic hope to needless despair is the volatility and stereotyped quality of Western perceptions of the Soviet Union. We are ill served by unwarranted optimism at times of cordial relations and bleak pessimism at times of acute tension. George Kennan's melancholy reflection on how democracies approach foreign policy, which was cited at the start of this article, is as true today as it was when he voiced it at the height of the Cold War in the early 1950s.

We need to recognize that the Soviet Union remains a highly authoritarian political system and that there is very little that the West can do to alter this situation. One of the important lessons of the 1970s is that neither economic blandishments (such as trade and loans) nor economic pressures (through embargoes and sanctions) are capable of promoting fundamental change in Soviet practices. Although the idea voiced by President Reagan on the eve of the summit of attempting to lessen mutual mistrust through expanded people-to-people contact and large scale educational exchanges is a very laudable dream, we must soberly recognize that the Soviet leadership is determined to prevent such an opening to the West.

They oppose massive exchanges not out of ignorance or irrational fear, which we might be able to talk them out of, but because of a shrewd awareness of the demands for economic and political liberalization that such a process would inevitably promote and the threat that this would pose to the leadership's power and privileges.

Similarly, we do not promote clear thinking and a sober anticipation of future Soviet policy when we view the Soviet Union as being purely "defensive" in its policies. The Soviet Union has been active in such far flung countries as Cuba, South Yemen, Angola and Ethiopia not out of defensive necessity, but because the Kremlin's rulers believe that Moscow deserves to be recognized as one of the world's two superpowers, possessing all the rights and privileges (such as client states and military bases) which they believe the United States enjoys.

In attempting to expand Soviet power, the Politburo follows a policy of cautious but active opportunism. For this reason, the containment of Soviet expansionism requires both a stable balance of power and a clear demonstration that the Western alliance has the will and determination to resist encroachments on its vital interests. But we also must be careful not to exaggerate the nature of the Soviet threat, not to apply a distorting double standard in our appraisal of Soviet conduct, and not to impute grandiose and diabolical intentions to the Soviet leadership where other, more mundane factors might actually be shaping Soviet foreign policy.

All too often Soviet policy is discussed in an analytical vacuum devoid of any historical perspective. Throughout history, strong states have expanded and weak states have suffered. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries

witnessed the consolidation (and later the collapse) of European empires in Africa and Asia. The United States was actively policing Latin America in the early part of this century, long before the appearance of Soviet Communism provided an up-dated rationale for this policy. In



the past three decades alone U.S. troops have been used in the Dominican Republic and Grenada, proxy forces were utilized by Washington in Guatemala and Cuba, and attempts were made to destabilize Chile and Nicaragua. Without in any way attempting to justify Soviet imperialism or equating it with American actions, it is still necessary to take into account the way American power has actually been wielded – as opposed to the glorified self-image of U.S. policy that many Americans have – when trying to understand how the Soviet Union views the competitive struggle in the Third World. Moscow and Washington have very different conceptions of what constitutes a legitimate process of change in the Third World, and neither wishes to see its own freedom of action curtailed. For these reasons, their intense rivalry is destined to continue.

The long term challenge is to find ways of regulating this rivalry so that opportunities for self-determination by the nations of the Third World are maximized and so that it does not periodically threaten to escalate into a dangerous confrontation. The interests of the West are not advanced by either perceived weakness, which tempts the Soviet

Union to further adventurism, or by a panic-stricken over-reaction, which exaggerates the degree of menace to our security and may lead to direct military intervention in situations where our interests are better served by alternative responses (e.g., the use of economic incentives, support for

mutual disengagement, or patiently waiting for the combined influence of local nationalism and Soviet heavy-handedness to produce a more favorable shift in political orientation).

In attempting to understand better both Soviet perceptions of the world and the way in which our own analyses are sometimes deficient, it is worth trying to imagine for a moment what the reaction would be if it was a Soviet leader, and not the American President, who announced a massive program to create a missile shield in space, who insisted – in defiance of all previous strategic thinking – that defense and offense were entirely separate matters, and who attempted to allay fears that the nuclear balance might be disrupted by promising to share with other countries whatever technological breakthroughs were achieved (including advances in super computers, new software techniques, and high energy lasers). Such a stance would provoke scorn for the obviously untenable claims that were being made and would lead to much fevered speculation as to the "true intentions" of the Soviet leadership. Yet when it is the American leader who utters such words, his goals are accepted largely at face value. Even the critics of Star Wars have focused mainly on its technical aspects (i.e., on what

they see as its staggering cost, its impracticability, and its potential for destabilizing the nuclear balance). All this is not to argue that we should doubt American intentions, but rather to suggest that we should be careful not to engage unthinkingly in worst case analysis of Soviet policy, imputing sinister intentions to the Soviet leadership which are not necessarily supported by the available evidence.

That all of humanity lives together on a small and vulnerable planet was at least partially reflected in the summit conversations between Reagan and Gorbachev "I couldn't help but say to him," Reagan subsequently informed a group of high school students. "just think how easy his task and mine might be in these meetings that we held if suddenly there was a threat to this world from another species from another planet outside in the universe. We'd forget all the little local differences that we have between our countries and we would find out once and for all that we really are all human beings here on this earth together." (*The Globe and Mail*, Dec. 6, 1986, p. A15). What needs to be fully grasped is that we already face a clear and present danger, in the form of a fiery holocaust triggered by accidental or inadvertent nuclear war, which is no less urgent than an invasion of aliens and which cannot be solved by some sort of technological fix. As Einstein put it, we need to change our "modes of thinking." This means fully recognizing our mutual peril, learning the hard lessons of history, avoiding simplistic categorizations of Soviet conduct, recognizing that there are no easy and quick solutions to the problems and dilemmas we face, and beginning a sustained effort to put East-West relations on a more even keel. Six decades on a roller coaster is long enough.

LETTER ON CHINA *By John Walker*



**So very much has changed radically
but so much is still the same.**

You no longer need to lug your baggage across the Shum Chun bridge to the dreary Chinese customs building on the border with the Hong Kong territory.

The sleepy border village with its mud-walled houses, its fish ponds and terraced green rice fields, and its lychee orchards, has disappeared.

Five years of frenzied construction has produced Shenzhen, the open door to the new China. Rising from the lovely hill-bound valley is a forest of skyscrapers bounded by a web of broad avenues, a miniature Hong Kong complete with a massive new rail and customs station roofed in once forbidden Ching dynasty style.

It is a profound shock to one who spent three and a half years of the Cultural Revolution decade in the exciting but often depressing atmosphere of a China stagnating economically but boiling politically.

Shenzhen's 350,000 inhabitants are shopping in well-filled supermarkets, buying the latest Hong Kong tape decks, living in modern apartments, holidaying in the glittering Silver Lake resort, and even making more money than Beijing intellectuals.

But there on the boundary of their zone is the high barbed-wire-topped fence lit by floodlights at night that bars the rest of China from this pseudo-capitalist paradise. Economic freedom meets political repression, a recipe for instability in a Communist-run state.

In the busy port city of Canton, the entrepreneurial Chinese have

been unleashed. On the island in the Pearl River where foreign traders used to be confined in the emperor's time, a joint venture with foreign capital has produced a gleaming new hotel, just one of a dozen new tourist havens in China.

In the special free market streets of Canton, enterprising men and women are selling from tiny stalls everything from blue jeans and jewelry to radios and luggage. The food stalls are crammed with fresh meat, fowl, eggs and fish of a variety and quality never available in state-run shops.

Bright colors and lively atmosphere have returned to the grey-blue world of Maoist China.

Bright colors and lively atmosphere have returned to the grey-blue world of Maoist China. The cheery noise of streets crowds, the sprightly sound of bargaining, the raucous cries of hawkers are enlivening every city from Canton to Harbin, from Shanghai to Chengdu.

Music has come back into Chinese life. Not the message-laden operas of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, but the music of old China and the taped music of the West. In a rooftop dance hall in the old wartime capital of Chongqing, they are playing polkas, waltzes and schottisches, and drinking Coke on the outdoor terrace. In a tiny red-lighted hall in ancient Xian the sounds of Hong Kong jazz drifts out into the night air.

Ai Qing the poet and Mao Dun the novelist are no longer shoveling manure, but are officially honoured and their books readily

available again. In Shanghai in the institute where dunce caps once crowned intellectual heads, young writers express their relief at the "freedom of creation" they are now allowed. In a Shanghai art school, once frustrated painters are sketching the nude model again, trying their hand at abstract styles once banned as counter-revolutionary.

All this has helped to relieve some of the terrible tensions of the last unhappy decade of the Maoist era. Nearly everyone you meet is sick and tired of ideological campaigns, street demonstrations, public struggle sessions, and the instability and bloodshed that went with them.

It is a pleasure, in a month of travel, never to be subjected to

jobs performed for a decade by ill-educated peasants, who now are repairing the gap caused by a leadership that proclaimed "better Red than expert."

But on the dusty plains of Shaanxi province, where as elsewhere the commune has been abolished and peasants with private plots and other incentives are outproducing past records, you still see the basic poverty of the villager. There can be seen the sheer labour of traditional machineless farming, the timeless image of human beings yoked like animals to cartloads of rocks or lumber. You meet "rich" peasants now, but what of the "broad masses"?

Everywhere you hear stories of bureaucrats who cling to sinecures, party bosses who frustrate the modernization process for fear of their jobs or for ideological reasons, and corruption more widespread than ever in Maoist days.

All these forces, as officials in Beijing admit, militate against stability or change. Their looming presence in a vast and backward population makes predictions about the future of this "second revolution" in China rather difficult.

In a modern French-style restaurant in a lavish Beijing hotel, a Chinese economist talks of the spirit of change as being infectious and strong. It worries the ideologues, he says, even as far away as Moscow, where they are watching this experiment closely and perhaps nervously, as they too attempt to face up to change in a Marxist-Leninist environment.

John R. Walker was formerly foreign affairs analyst of Southam News and China bureau chief from 1973-76. He recently spent four weeks in China again.

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST *By Jane Boulden*



■ Geneva Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

On 15 January 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev revealed a new arms control proposal that offered to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The plan outlined three specific stages over a fifteen-year time frame.

Stage 1 would begin in 1986. The United States and Soviet Union would reduce the "arms that can reach each other's territory" by 50% and would agree to a mutual moratorium on nuclear testing. Both powers would also remove *all* medium-range missiles in the European zone, while France and Britain agree "not to build up" their nuclear arsenals. Most importantly, the United States and Soviet Union would agree to mutually renounce the development, testing and deployment of 'space-strike' arms.

Stage 2 begins in 1990 and calls for the other nuclear powers to join the reduction of arms, the ban on nuclear testing, and the ban on development, testing and deployment of 'space-strike' arms. The superpowers would complete their 50% reductions in this phase and *all* nuclear powers would eliminate their tactical nuclear weapons (those with a range of up to 1,000 km).

In Stage 3, beginning in 1995, all remaining nuclear weapons would be eliminated and a universal accord would be implemented to ensure nuclear weapons would not be built again.

There are a number of novel aspects to this proposal: a willingness to allow on-site inspec-

tions and to negotiate any other methods of verification; a new initiative on medium range missiles in Europe which comes very close to the American zero-option plan; and a willingness to have a medium-range missile pact *without* agreement on limiting SDI.

American officials have noted the above changes as positive steps but, as with previous offers, the overall Soviet proposal continues to hinge on stopping the American SDI program – a precondition the Americans still find unacceptable.

■ SALT II Compliance

On 23 December 1985 President Reagan sent a report to Congress detailing Soviet violations of arms control treaties. Of most concern are deployment of the mobile, single-warhead SS-25 missile and construction of a large phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk in the Soviet Union. The Americans charge that the SS-25 is a second "new" type of missile prohibited under SALT, and that the capabilities and location of the Krasnoyarsk radar violate the ABM Treaty. A decision on whether or not the U.S. will continue to comply with SALT limits will have to be made in May, when a new Trident submarine begins sea trials.

■ Disarmament Conference

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva resumed negoti-

ations on 4 February 1986. The newest Soviet arms control proposal, outlined by Soviet leader Gorbachev in January, advocated the complete elimination of chemical weapons and their industrial bases. Gorbachev also stated that such a ban would be subject to international on-site inspections. Verification methods have previously been a major obstacle to success in this area: methods deemed essential by the United States were seen as too intrusive to the Soviet Union. Officials involved in the CD negotiations expressed hope that these significant changes in the Soviet position would open the way to progress on a chemical weapons accord. Little progress was reported in other areas of the CD.

■ Stockholm Conference

The Stockholm Conference (Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe or CDE) opened its ninth session on 28 January 1986. Again Gorbachev's January 15 arms proposal offered some interesting changes and thus the possibility for movement towards some form of agreement. Gorbachev backed off a previous demand that prior notification of naval exercises be given and implied that the Soviets would be more open to verification measures. The issues of prior notification of air exercises and the disclosure of the loca-

tions of military forces in Europe remain as possible sticking points.

■ MBFR

A new Western proposal was announced on 5 December 1985, the last day of the 37th Round of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. It accepted the framework of the February 1985 Eastern proposal and, in a break from past Western positions, offered to go ahead with troop reductions *without* prior agreement on the current number of troops in the region. On that basis, the West suggested that there be an initial reduction of 5,000 American troops and 11,500 Soviet troops, within one year of the signing of an agreement. After initial reductions there would be a "collective no-increase" agreement which would last for three years, during which time negotiations would continue. Because of the lack of agreement on troop numbers before reductions, the West outlined comprehensive verification methods and suggested the establishment of a Consultative Commission to handle questions and interpretations of the agreement.

In his proposal of 15 January 1986, Soviet leader Gorbachev suggested that a framework for agreement was emerging in Vienna, and stated his willingness to agree to "reasonable verification" methods. The Eastern negotiating team has suggested initial reductions of 11,500 Soviet troops and 6,500 American troops, 1,500 more American troops than proposed in the Western plan. Although it is unlikely, after 13 years of negotiation, that agreement will be reached quickly, changes in positions on both sides suggest some form of agreement is more feasible than it has been in the past.

Early Warning

May 8	Fifth round of Geneva talks begins
May	Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference - Preparatory Committee meeting
June	Fifth round of Geneva talks end
June-August	Second half of the annual CD session
Summer/Fall	2nd Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, Washington, D.C.
September	Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference

REPORT FROM THE HILL *By Gregory Wirick*



Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence

On February 14, SCEAND tabled its final report, dealing with Canada-US defence cooperation and the May 1986 renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement. SCEAND recommended that the NORAD agreement be renewed for an additional five-year term (expiring in 1991). It suggested that the government, "consider inviting the United States to issue at the time of the renewal a joint declaration reaffirming both countries' commitment to deterrence and strategic stability, as well as their support for the integrity of the ABM Treaty and a negotiation process leading to verifiable reductions of armaments."

This recommendation seemed to be in response to the numerous calls by disarmament groups and other witnesses to reinstate the so-called "ABM clause" that had been a feature of the NORAD agreement between 1968 and 1981 when it was removed. That clause stated that the agreement would "not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence." The Committee concluded, however, that it did not accept any link between NORAD and ballistic missile defence, stressing that NORAD's mission was limited to airspace surveillance, air defense and ballistic missile warning.

This latest round of SCEAND hearings has not been smooth going. In December, US defence analyst William Arkin produced a list of titles of US-Canadian defence agreements that included eight titles deleted from the list given to Committee members. Although knowledge of the titles may not have made any real difference to SCEAND's deliberations, the deletions allowed the opposition to declare that pertinent information was being withheld from a responsible committee of the House of Commons. Their case was strengthened by the subsequent revelation that the eight titles had not been removed from the list provided to the same committee five years earlier during its 1980 review of NORAD.

Both the Liberals and the New Democrats were unhappy with the official SCEAND report and released unofficial 'minority reports' of their own. The NDP recommended: re-introduction of the clause precluding Canada's involvement in ballistic missile defence (BMD); a two-year, not a five-year, renewal of the NORAD Agreement; an end to the 'two hats' arrangement which made the Commander of NORAD also the Commander of the US Unified Space Command; and, full parliamentary consideration of any Agreement *before* it is signed. The Liberals supported the five-year renewal but recommended reinsertion of the BMD clause in order to show Canada's continued opposition to any participation in an active ballistic missile defence plan.

In the same report, SCEAND also called for a major re-equipment of Canada's maritime forces in the Pacific (and to a lesser extent in the Atlantic) and suggested the government consider negotiating with the US a

joint arrangement for the defence of the Arctic Ocean (such as underwater and other systems to detect submarines). In addition, it urged that the government launch "without delay" a Canadian space program to improve "the surveillance of our internal airspace, our land mass, and the oceans bounding Canada; our search and rescue capabilities; our communications and navigation systems; and to complement the surveillance, warning and communications capabilities of NORAD." This program would be "coordinated with other Canadian space initiatives under the general supervision of a Canadian Space Agency."

Joint Committee

The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House on Canada's International Relations continues its examination of the government's green paper on Canadian foreign policy. In the fall the Committee published six foreign policy themes in various newspapers and invited the public to submit their views by November 29, 1985. Based on these submissions, a series of hearings was arranged, beginning in Charlottetown on January 20 and continuing in Ottawa, Halifax, St. John's, Edmonton, Saskatoon, London, Toronto, Fredericton, Montreal, Quebec City, Vancouver, Whitehorse, Winnipeg, and Yellowknife. In each city, panels addressing specific topics were followed by testimony from those who had submitted briefs in the fall: there was, in addition, an opportunity for comments from the interested public. The Joint Committee's report is expected to be released by the end of May.

Reforms

The House of Commons passed in February a reform package which could fundamentally alter the way parliament works. Whereas in the past committee agendas chiefly reflected the government's concerns, future committees will be able to choose their own references, independent of government approval. Specifically, committees have now been empowered to review and report on:

- a) the statute law relating to the department assigned to them;
- b) the program and policy objectives of the department and its effectiveness in the implementation of same;
- c) the immediate, medium and long-term expenditure plans and the effectiveness of implementation of same by the department;
- d) an analysis of the relative success of the department, as measured by the results obtained as compared with its stated objectives; and
- e) other matters, relating to the mandate, management, organization or operation of the department, as the committee deems fit.

Among the other provisions of the parliamentary reforms, which came into effect on February 24, was the division of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) into two separate standing committees of between 7 and 15 members each: one on external affairs and international trade and the other on national defence. It is expected that, with the increased reach of these committees, committee chairmen will enjoy more influence than in the past.

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE

■ **John R. Walker**, former foreign affairs correspondent for Southam News, is the Institute's first Public Programmes Fellow. The fellowship programme will bring to the Institute, for short stays, distinguished individuals who have contributed to the field of peace and security. Fellows will pursue their own interest, but will also carry out tasks for the Institute. As well as the journalistic community, Public Programmes Fellows will be drawn from non-governmental organizations, the education system and the government sector. Research Fellows come from the academic community and government departments. There are two Fellows currently in the Research section, **Wytze Brouwer** from the University of Alberta and **Gilles Grondin**, formerly with the Department of External Affairs.

■ The Institute is charged by the Act both to conduct research in the areas of peace and security, and to foster the public debate. The latter function distinguishes the Canadian Institute from most international institutes. This dual mandate has affected the ways in which we have organized ourselves: we are divided into Research, Public Programmes, Information and Administration, with an Executive wing overseeing the entire operation. **David Cox** is the Director of Research, **Nancy Gordon** the Director of Public Programmes, **Leslie Wake** is the Librarian and **Philip Lemieux** is the Chief of Administration. The Executive Director is **Geoffrey Pearson**, who is also a member of the Board.

■ **Teresa Toten** served the Institute as Secretary to the Board and Assistant to the Executive Director, during most of 1985. A family move took her to

UPCOMING EVENTS

Date	Event	Sponsor(s)	City
April 17-18	'Conference on Air Defence'	University of Calgary Strategic Studies	Calgary
April 21-23	'Illusions and Realities in the nuclear age'	McGill University Department of Education	Montreal
April 24-26	Peace Festival and Symposium	End the Arms Race, The City of Vancouver	Vancouver
May 8-9	Conference: 'Sovereignty, Security and the Arctic'	York University Strategic Studies	Toronto
May 13	Seminar: 'Les scientifiques et la paix'	Association canadienne-française pour l'avancement des sciences (ACFAS)	Montreal
May 26-30	'Accidental Nuclear War: A Growing Risk?'	Science for Peace, University of BC	Vancouver
June 5-8	Conference: 'Fate of the Earth'	Fate of the Earth Committee	Ottawa

Toronto at the end of the year. When Teresa joined the Institute there were few staff members, systems were not in place, priorities had not been established. She was diligent and extremely patient in assisting both Board and staff in establishing programmes and processes. Replacing Teresa as Executive Assistant is **Fauzya Moore**, formerly with the Caribbean Community Secretariat in Georgetown, Guyana.

■ **UPDATE**, published in February 1986, and available from the Institute, contains information on the activities of our first year, 1985. We have also published three Background Papers, which can be obtained by writing to the Institute. The titles are: *Canadian Responses to the Strategic Defence Initiative*, by Gregory Wirick; *A Nuclear Freeze?*, by David Cox; and *Nuclear Winter*, by Leonard Bertin. We still have copies of the *First Annual Report* if readers wish to write for a copy. The *Second Annual Report* will be published in the summer.

■ Three Research Assistants are currently on staff at the Institute. Like the Fellows, Research Assistants are employed under a

short-term contract. Unlike the Fellows, Research Assistants do not pursue their own professional interests, unless those interests coincide with those of their supervisor. Assistants gain valuable research skills and knowledge; the Institute gains a dedicated work force, keen to perform all requested tasks. **Jane Boulden** from Queen's University, an arms control specialist, is the longest serving Research Assistant - she's been with us since early summer 1985. **Mark Neufeld** from Carleton and **Ian Burney** from McGill were Research Assistants at the Institute during 1985. Now in residence are **Steven Baranyi** from York and **Mary Goldie** from UBC.

■ The Executive Director, **Geoffrey Pearson** attended and spoke at student meetings at the University of Saskatchewan and at the University of Manitoba at the end of February and beginning of March. Earlier in February he addressed the UNA in Quebec City. In January he spoke to the Royal United Services Institute in Halifax and to a conference on Development and Peace at the University of Ottawa. In October and November, 1985, Mr. Pearson and **David Cox** tes-

tified before the Committee on External Affairs and National Defence when the latter were holding hearings on the renewal of NORAD. In December Dr. Cox visited the United Nations Disarmament Research Institute (UNIDIR) in Geneva, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Finnish Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) in Tampere, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki. The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament Affairs in Copenhagen, and the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO).

■ Just prior to his death in October 1985, **General E. L. M. Burns** donated a part of his library to the Institute. We are pleased and honoured to be the recipients of General Burns' collection of books and articles on arms control subjects. We house many of his books in a main floor meeting room which now bears the name "The Burns Room."

■ Deadlines for Grants for 1986 are as follows:
1st quarter - 30 May, 1986
2nd quarter - 22 Aug. 1986
3rd quarter - 21 Nov. 1986

BIBLIOGRAPHY

There is an abundance of material written about the arms race, arms control, disarmament, defence and international conflict, much of it written from an American perspective. It is the purpose of this bibliography to direct readers to the best US and European sources, but especially to highlight material which presents the Canadian perspective on the issues of peace and security.

US and European Sources:

Reference texts: There are two annuals considered by independent researchers to be the most comprehensive sources of data on world armaments: *The Military Balance*, produced by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the SIPRI Yearbook, from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). To order: *The Military Balance*, IISS, 23 Tavistock Street, London, UK. WC2E 7NQ. (US \$21.00). *World Armaments and Disarmament*, SIPRI, Taylor & Francis, Department B, 242 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106-1906 (US \$51.00).

Periodicals: The following periodicals are sources of consistently high quality commentary on international peace and security issues:

ADIU Report, Armament and Disarmament Information Unit, Brighton, UK. A British perspective on arms control issues, published by a non-partisan research group at the University of Sussex. Features an annotated guide to books and articles, listed by subject. Address: Science Policy Research Unit, Mantell Building, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, UK BN1 9RF (£12.00/year).

Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, Washington, DC. An authoritative monthly providing a balanced overview of the US arms control policy debate. "Arms Control in Print," a regular feature, is a unique guide to periodical literature, annotated and organized by subject area. Address: 11 Dupont Circle, NW, Washington, DC 20036 (US \$25.00/year; \$10.00/students).

Aviation Week and Space Technology, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York. Detailed, if somewhat overly optimistic, reporting on new weapons systems; research programs; and applications from foreign countries seeking US military assistance. Address: 1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020 (US \$60.00/year).

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Chicago, Illinois. A monthly founded in 1945 by scientists from the Manhattan Project; features the famous "Doomsday Clock", currently standing at 3 minutes to midnight. Articles provide concise and timely analyses of US defence and foreign policy, focusing primarily on nuclear arms control issues. Probably available in your public library, but if not, request that your librarian subscribe or obtain copies by an inter-library loan. Address: 5801 South Kenwood Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 (US \$22.50/year).

Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Peace Research Institute, Oslo. The goals of PRIO's bulletin are "to motivate research, to inspire future oriented thinking, to promote activities for peace." Because the articles are submitted from all over the world, BPP presents an international perspective on the issues of peace and security. Address: Universitetsforlaget, P.O. Box 258, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York 10533 (US \$46.00/year).

Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC. CDI is a lobby-group which "supports a strong defense [but] opposes excessive expenditures for weapons and policies that increase the danger of nuclear war." It advocates nuclear disarmament and a non-interventionist US foreign policy. Address: 303 Capitol Gallery West, 600 Maryland Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20024 (US \$25.00/year).

FAS Public Interest Report, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC. A well-researched and documented report on issues before the Congress in the US. Good summaries of technical advances. Address: 307 Massachusetts Avenue, NE., Washington, DC 20002 (US \$25.00/year).

Jane's Defence Weekly, Jane's Publishing Company Limited, London, UK. Provides up-to-date information on weapons technology, defence procurements, and military conflicts around the world. Address: Circulation Manager, 238 City Road, London EC1V 2PU (£70/year).

NATO Review, NATO Information Services, Brussels, Belgium. Put out every 2 months as a public service by the administration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; commentary on NATO-Warsaw Pact relations and arms control talks from a pro-West, pro-defence perspective. Address: Domestic Information Division, Department of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Canada K1A 0G2 (Free).

Quarterly Strategic Bibliography, QSB Publishers, Alexandria, Virginia. A useful guide to current articles on strategic affairs listed by journal, but with a subject index appended. Address: 1336 Kingston Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22302 (US \$105.00/year).

Canadian Periodicals:

Arms Control Chronicle, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa. The Centre, founded in 1983, seeks to provide Canadians with well-researched information on arms control and disarmament, emphasizing "Canadian interests and opportunities for diplomatic initiatives." Every month, the Chronicle expertly summarizes recent developments in international negotiations, new weapons deployments and on-going policy debates within Canada. Address: 151 Slater Street, Suite 710, Ottawa K1P 5H3 (free to members).

Behind the Headlines, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto. The goal of the CIIA is the "stimulation in Canada of a more informed opinion on international affairs and more particularly on Canada's international role and interests." The BTH series of monographs covers economic and social aspects of Canadian foreign policy, in addition to the political, diplomatic and defence areas. Address: 15 King's College Circle, Toronto, Ontario M5S 2V9 (Cdn \$6.00/year).

Canadian Defence Quarterly, Defence Publications, Toronto. From the editorial conviction that peace and security are maintained through military preparedness, CDQ covers developments in weapons technology, Canada's role in NORAD and NATO, and commentary on strategic and military thought. Address: 310 Dupont Street, Toronto, Ontario M5R 1V9 (Cdn \$20.00/year).

Canadian Spectrum, Toronto, Ontario. "Published twice a year as an educational and research review concerned solely with nuclear arms control issues." Presents opposing views on the nuclear arms debate, quoting experts in the field. Address: RR#1, Beeton, Ontario L0G 1A0 (Cdn. \$10.00/year).

Canadian Strategic Review, Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, Toronto. CISS "seeks to satisfy a need for a body of informed opinion on strategic and national security issues and... to enhance the knowledge of the Canadian public on strategic matters." CSR is an annual review, but CISS produces a variety of other publications, listed in their catalogue. Address: 4th Floor, 185 Bloor Street East, Toronto, Ontario M4W 3J3 (free to members).

Conflict Quarterly, Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick. "Dedicated to the promotion of peace and social harmony through study and understanding of international and internal conflict situations." A scholarly journal which can be found in the periodical section of most university libraries. Address: Fredericton, New Brunswick E3B 5A3 (Cdn \$15.00/year).

Disarmament Bulletin, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. A newsletter reporting on UN activities, international conferences, arms control negotiations, and Canadian initiatives. Address: Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa K1A 0G2 (free).

International Journal, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto. In each issue of this scholarly journal, all articles are focused on a particular theme. Available in most university libraries. Address: 15 King's College Circle, Toronto, Ontario M5S 2V9 (Cdn \$26.00/year).

International Perspectives, Ottawa. "A journal of opinion on world affairs." Contains a supplement called, "International Canada," from the Department of External Affairs. Address: P.O. Box 949, Ottawa K1P 5P9 (Cdn \$24.00/year).

Peace Magazine, Canadian Disarmament Information Service, Toronto. An evolution of CANDIS' newsletter, the Peace Calendar, with editorial contributions from many of the peace and justice activist groups across Canada. Address: P.O. Box 490, Adelaide Street Post Office, Toronto, Ontario M5C 2J6 (Cdn \$15.00/year).

Peace Research Abstracts, Peace Research Institute, Dundas. An extensive listing, published every two months, featuring short synopses (abstracts) of the current literature in the field of peace research. Available in the reference section of university libraries. Address: 25 Dundas Avenue, Dundas, Ontario L9H 4E5 (Cdn \$155.00/year).

Ploughshares Monitor, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Waterloo. "Quarterly newsletter of Project Ploughshares, a working group on disarmament and development, sponsored by Canadian religious and civic organizations." One of the best Canadian publications aimed at a non-expert audience. Address: Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G6 (Cdn \$20.00/year).

Thoughts on Peace and Security, Don Bates, Montreal, Quebec. "Offers concise information, analyses, and reflections on our quest for security in the nuclear age." Published every two months, this unique four-pager provides insightful, moderate, and lucidly reasoned commentary on Canadian foreign and defence policies. Address: P.O. Box 608, Victoria Station, Montreal, Quebec H3Z 2Y7 (Cdn \$11.00/year).

Nouvelles de l'Institut

Activités à venir	Date	Activité	Organisateurs(s)
	17-18 avril	Conférence sur la défense aérienne	Université de Calgary, Etudes stratégiques
	21-23 avril	Mythes et réalités à l'ère nucléaire	Faculté des sciences de l'éducation, Université McGill
	24-26 avril	Festival de la paix	End the Arms Race, Ville de Vancouver
	8-9 mai	Conférence: "Souveraineté, sécurité et l'Afrique"	Université York, Etudes stratégiques
	13 mai	Séminaire: "Les scientifiques et la paix"	Association canadienne-Française pour l'avancement des sciences
	26-30 mai	La guerre nucléaire par inadvertance: un risque de plus en plus grand?	Science for Peace, Université de la Colombie-Britannique
	5-8 juin	Conférence - Le destin de la planète Terre	Comité du destin de la planète Terre, Ottawa

M. John R. Walker, ancien-
nement correspondant de l'agence
Southam News pour les affaires
étrangères, est le premier membre
associé de la Direction des program-
mes publics. L'Institut accueillera
ainsi, pour de courtes périodes, des
personnes ayant fait leur marque
dans le domaine de la paix et de la
sécurité. Les membres associés
acquiescent à leurs propres affaires,
mais ils effectuent aussi des travaux
pour l'Institut. Ils proviendront des
milieux journalistiques, mais aussi
des organismes non gouvernementaux,
du secteur éducationnel et des
services gouvernementaux. Les
chercheurs appartenant au corps
conseilant et aux ministères. Deux
membres associés travailleront actuel-
lement au service de la recherche ;
ce sont M. Wylze Brouwer, de
l'Université de l'Alberta, et M. Gilles
Stromdin, autrefois employé au
ministère des Affaires extérieures.

Aux termes de la Loi, l'Institut
est chargé de faire de la recherche
dans les domaines de la paix et de la
sécurité et de favoriser des débats
publics sur ces questions. Par cette
dernière fonction, il se distingue
de la plupart des instituts interna-
tionaux. Ce double mandat a influé
sur la façon dont nous sommes orga-
nisés. L'Institut comprend les secteurs
suivants : Recherche, Programmes
publics, Information et Administra-
tion ; il a sa tête un administrateur
général. M. David Cox est Direc-
teur de la recherche. Mme Nancy
Gordon, Directrice des program-
mes publics, Mme Leslie Wake,
bibliothécaire en chef et M. Philip
Lemieux, Chef de l'Administration.
M. Geoffrey Pearson est l'Adminis-
trateur délégué et il fait également
partie du conseil d'administration.

Pendant une bonne partie de
l'année 1985, Mme Teresa Tolen a
exercé la direction du conseil et attachée
secrétariat du conseil et attachée
à la direction auprès de l'Administra-
teur délégué. Elle a démissionné avec
une famille à Toronto à la fin de l'an-
née. Lorsqu'elle est entrée à l'Insti-
tut, le personnel était réduit, les
systèmes n'étaient pas en place et les
priorités n'avaient pas encore été

Trois chercheurs adjoints sont
actuellement employés à l'Institut.
Tout comme les membres associés,
ils sont engagés pour de courtes
périodes, mais ils ne peuvent travail-
ler pour leur propre compte, sauf si
leurs intérêts coïncident avec ceux
de la personne qui les encadre. Ce
stage leur permet d'enrichir leurs
compétences et leurs connaissances,
et l'Institut bénéficie de l'aide de
gens consciencieux, tout dévoués à
leur tâche. Mme Jane Boudreau, de
l'Université Queen, spécialiste de la
limitation des armements, est la plus
ancienne de nos chercheurs adjoints ;
elle est en poste depuis le début de
l'été 1985. M. Mark Neufeld, de
l'Université Carleton, et M. Ian
Burney, de l'Université McGill,
nous ont prêté main-forte en 1985.
Nous comptons actuellement comme
chercheurs résidents M. Steven
Baranyi, de l'Université York, et
Mme Mary Goldie, de l'Université
de la Colombie-Britannique.


L'Administrateur délégué,
M. Geoffrey Pearson a assisté, à
la fin de février et au début de mars,
à des réunions d'étudiants de l'Uni-
versité de la Saskatchewan et de
l'Université du Manitoba, au cours
desquelles il a pris la parole. Dans
le courant de février, il a prononcé
un discours devant l'ACNU à Québec.
En janvier, il a fait un exposé au
Royal United Services Institute de
Halifax et il a participé à une confé-
rence sur le développement et la paix
à l'Université d'Ottawa. En octobre
et novembre 1985, MM. Geoffrey
Pearson et David Cox ont témoigné
devant le Comité des Affaires exté-

Juste avant son décès en octobre
1985, le général E. L. M. Burns a
fait don à l'Institut d'une partie de sa
bibliothèque. Nous sommes heureux
et fiers d'hériter ces ouvrages et des
articles de cette bibliothèque portant
sur la limitation des armements.
Une grande partie de ces ouvrages
se trouvent dans une salle de réunion
de notre rez-de-chaussée, qui porte
désormais le nom de M. Burns.

Les dates limites de dépôt des
demandes de subvention pour 1986
sont les suivantes :
1^{er} trimestre : le 30 mai 1986
2^e trimestre : le 22 août 1986
3^e trimestre : le 21 novembre 1986.

Condensé sur la limitation des armements

Par Jane Boulden



Le 15 janvier 1986, à la veille de la quatrième ronde de négociations sur les armes nucléaires et spatiales, le dirigeant soviétique Mikhaïl Gorbachev a formulé une nouvelle proposition sur la limitation des armements, dont le but est d'éliminer toutes les armes nucléaires d'ici l'an 2000. Le plan comprend trois étapes distinctes couvrant une période de quinze ans.

La première étape commencerait en 1986. Les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique réduiraient chacun de moitié l'arsenal des armes capables d'atteindre le territoire l'un de l'autre et conviendraient d'une interruption des essais nucléaires. Les deux pays élimineraient en outre de la zone européenne *tous* leurs missiles de moyenne portée, tandis que la France et la Grande-Bretagne s'engageraient à ne pas accroître leurs arsenaux nucléaires. Et, plus important encore, les États-Unis et l'URSS s'abstiendraient conjointement de créer, de mettre à l'essai et de déployer des "armements spatiaux de frappe".

La deuxième étape commencerait en 1990. Les autres puissances nucléaires seraient invitées à réduire leurs armements, à renoncer aux essais nucléaires ainsi qu'à la mise au point, à la mise à l'essai et au déploiement d'"armes spatiales de frappe". Les deux puissances s'achèverait d'éliminer la moitié de leurs arsenaux, et *moins* les dissuances nucléaires suppriment leurs armes nucléaires tactiques (celles dont la portée va jusqu'à 1 000 km).

Au cours de la troisième étape, qui commencerait en 1995, tous les armements nucléaires existant encore seraient éliminés, et l'on élaborerait un accord universel qui interdirait à tout jamais la réapparition de ce genre d'armes.

Cette proposition présente diverses nouveautés. Que les Soviétiques soient disposés à permettre des inspections sur place et à négocier d'autres méthodes de vérification

colitia nba ind représente un changement marqué par rapport à leurs positions antérieures. De même, la nouvelle initiative soviétique concernant les missiles de moyenne portée stationnés en Europe autorise un certain espoir. Elle s'apparente beaucoup à l'« option zéro » des Américains, que l'URSS avait jugée inacceptable jusqu'alors, et les Soviétiques ont exprimé le désir de conclure un pacte sans les missiles de moyenne portée pour s'assujettir à un accord qui limiterait l'IDS.

Les dirigeants américains ont tentés positivement à ces changements, mais ils soulignent que les détails de ce plan doivent être réglés à la table de négociations, et non publiquement, avant que des progrès réels puissent s'accomplir. Comme par le passé, les Soviétiques continuent de leur proposition à un arrêt du programme IDS des Américains, condition que ces derniers jugent toujours inacceptable.

Respect de l'accord SALT II

Le 23 décembre 1985, le Président Reagan a communiqué au Congrès un rapport détaillé sur les violations soviétiques des traités concernant la limitation des armements. Les principaux sujets d'inquiétude sont le déploiement des missiles SS-25 mobiles à une agivité et la construction d'un gros radar à antenne-réseau soviétique. Les Américains prétendent que le SS-25 est un autre "nouveau" missile interdit aux termes de l'accord SALT I et que l'érection du radar de Krasnoyarsk, vu les possibilités, viole le traité sur les missiles antimissiles balistiques. Les Américains décideront en mai, au moment où leurs premiers essais en mer d'un autre sous-marin Trident, s'ils doivent continuer de respecter les accords SALT.

Respect de l'accord SALT II

Conférence sur le désarmement

La Conférence sur le désarmement a repris ses travaux le 4 février 1986, à Genève. Dans leur nouvelle proposition sur la limitation des armements, présentée par M. Mikhaïl Gorbatchev en janvier, les Soviétiques se déclarent partisans d'une élimination complète des armes chimiques et de leurs bases industrielles de fabrication. M. Gorbatchev a précisé que des inspections internationales sur place seraient nécessaires dans un tel contexte. Les méthodes de vérification ont jusqu'à présent constitué une importante pierre d'achoppement dans ce domaine : pour l'Union soviétique, les moyens proposés par les États-Unis assuraient trop de l'ingérence. Des personnes liées participant aux travaux de la CD ont exprimé le souhait que ces concessions importantes de la part des Soviétiques favorisent la réalisation d'un accord sur les armes chimiques. Peu de progrès ont été constatés dans les autres secteurs de négociation.

brée des forces (MBFR)
Réduction mutuelle et équi-

■ Réduction mutuelle et équilib-

Calendrier	
10 avril	Début de la cinquième ronde de négociations à Genève.
Mai	Conférence de révision de la Convention sur les armes biologiques - Réunion préparatoire.
22 mai	Fin de la cinquième ronde de négociations à Genève
Mi-juin-août	Seconde moitié de la session annuelle de la CD.
Été/automne	Deuxième sommet Reagan-Gorbachev à Washington, D.C.
Septembre	Conférence de révision de la Convention sur les armes biologiques.

de Stockholm (conférence sur le désarmement et les mesures propres à accroître la confiance et la sécurité en Europe, ou CDE) s'est ouverte le 28 janvier 1986.

La encore, on a estimé que la position formulée par M. Gorbachev le 15 janvier sur la limitation des armements présentait des changements intéressants et offrait l'occasion de progresser vers la conclusion d'un accord. M. Gorbachev a renoncé aux exigences soviétiques concernant la notification des exercices navals et a laissé entendre que l'URSS serait davantage disposée à accepter des mesures de vérification. Pour ce qui est de la notification des exercices aériens et de la divulgation des endroits où les forces militaires sont stationnées en Europe, ce sont là des questions sur lesquelles les négociations futures risquent encore d'aboutir.

 Conférence de Stockholm

Dans sa proposition du 15 janvier 1986, le dirigeant soviétique Mikhail Gorbachev a estimé que le cadre d'une entente se dégageait peu à peu des négociations de Vienne, et il s'est déclaré disposé à conclure un accord sur des "méthodes de vérification raisonnables". À la table de négociations, l'URSS a proposé une réduction initiale de 11 500 hommes chez les Soviétiques et de 6 500 hommes chez les Américains (soit 1 500 Américains de plus que prévu dans le plan occidental). Il est peu probable qu'après 13 ans de négociations, un accord d'évolution qui se manifeste de part et d'autre permet de croire que la signature d'un accord est désormais plus possible que dans le passé.

sur un accord de "non-augmentation collective", d'une durée de trois ans. période pendant laquelle les négociations se poursuivraient. Étant donné qu'au départ, il n'existe pas d'entente sur l'importance numérique des troupes en place, les Occidentaux ont présenté des méthodes détaillées de vérification et proposé de créer une commission consultative qui serait chargée de répondre aux questions et d'analyser les inter-

Lettre de Chine

Par John Walker

Tout a tellement changé, et tout est



tellement pareil.

ment d'ériger un hôtel éblouissant dans la beauté et l'efficacité dépassent tout ce qu'on peut trouver en Union soviétique. Et ce n'est pas le seul : il existe en Chine une douzaine de ces havres pour touristes.

Dans les rues de Canton qu'on a réservées au marché libre, des hommes et des femmes audacieux, installés derrière de minuscules éventaires, vendent de tout : des bleu-jeans aux bijoux, en passant par les postes de radio et les valises. A côté, des plats débordent de viande fraîche, de volaille, d'œufs et de poissonnons introuvables dans les magasins d'État.

Les auteurs interviennent et révolutionnaire l'abstrait, jugé contre-révolutionnaire. Il n'y a pas si longtemps.

Tous ces changements ont contribué à réduire les terribles tensions que la Chine a connues pendant les dix dernières années de l'ère maoïste. La presque totalité des gens que l'on rencontre en ont par-dessus la tête des campagnes idéologiques, des grandes manifestations, des séances publiques d'autocritique ainsi que de l'instabilité et des bains de sang qui les accompagnent.

Quel plaisir, en un mois de séjour, de ne pas vivre une seule hantise idéologique, et de rencontrer des gens débordant de talent, d'imagination et d'État.

Les couleurs vives et l'animation
sont revenues dans le monde gris bleu de
la Chine maoïste.

Mais dans les plaines poussi-
 reuses de la province de Shaakou,
 comme partout ailleurs, on a aboli
 les communes populaires, adopté
 des mesures d'encouragement et
 confié aux paysans des indivi-
 duels dont la productivité a battu
 tous les records, la pauvreté des vil-
 lageois est encore flagrant. La
 point de mécanique agricole
 se pratique selon les techniques
 ancestrales, et l'on peut toujours
 voir des humains attelés à de lourds
 chariements de pierres ou de bois,
 comme des bêtes de somme. On
 rencontre aujourd'hui des paysans
 "riches", mais qu'en est-il des
 "masses" ?

Partout, on rapporte le cas de
 bureaucrates qui s'accrochent à leurs
 sinécures, de responsables du parti

Les conteurs vives et l'animation sont revenues dans le monde gris mauves et les militants purs et durs de la Chine maoïste. Le jeu de flatteurs et des pédants, les insupportables d'une recrudescence de la corruption, sans précédent pendant la période maoïste.

voix enjouées des marchandeurs et l'abandon de la toule, les éclats de rire et les cris rauques des colporteurs s'élevaient toutes les villes du pays, de Canton à Harbin, de Shanghai à Chengdu.

La musique, elle aussi, a été réhabilitée. Non pas les opéras à message de Xiamen, port de la province de Fujian qui a été interdit aux étrangers pendant une douzaine d'années. "Nous étions les pions de certains dirigeants", a-t-elle ajouté, en rappelant les cinq années de scolarité qu'elle a perdues pendant cette période mouvementée. Son cas est de la Révolution culturelle.

"Nous avons été les bons amis de la Révolution culturelle, les critiques de la Révolution culturelle, c'est tout", m'a dit une jeune femme de Xiamen, port de la province de Fujian qui a été interdit aux étrangers pendant une douzaine d'années. "Nous étions les pions de certains dirigeants", a-t-elle ajouté, en rappelant les cinq années de scolarité qu'elle a perdues pendant cette période mouvementée. Son cas est de la Révolution culturelle.

Beijing, militent contre la stabilité et contre le changement. Leur présence inquiétante au sein d'une population immense et arrêtée rend difficile à prédire l'issue de cette "seconde révolution" chinoise.

Dans le moderne restaurant français d'un luxueux hôtel de Beijing, un économiste chinois me dit que le vent de changement soufflant sur la Chine est puissant et contagieux.

l'immense conflit en salle de danse, on joue des rigues écossaises, des polkas et des valses, on boit du coca-cola accoudé au balcon. Dans la vieille ville de Xian, d'une lumière rouge, un jazz importé de l'occident se fait entendre. On a l'impression d'être à l'étranger, d'être loin d'être unique.

Il y a ces dessinateurs de mode, spécialistes de la soie, qui ont gaspillé leur talent devant une chaîne d'assemblage pendant des années ; un expert en droit international, auquel on a interdit d'exercer son métier ; un marxiste-léniniste, qui a déclaré - il, même ceux de Moscou, déclarent qu'il n'a rien de commun avec la révolution d'une société

M. Walker a occupé le poste d'analyste des affaires internationales chez Southam News et il a dirigé le bureau chinois de l'agence de 1973 à 1976. Il revient d'un séjour de quatre semaines en Chine.

Dans la cité portuaire affairée
un pays communiste.

Mais à la limite de leur zone se dressent les hautes grilles couronnées de barbelés, baignées la nuit par la lumière des projecteurs, qui interdisent l'accès de ce pseudo-paradis capitaliste au reste de la Chine. La liberté économique se résume à la répression politique : un cocktail délicat à manipuler dans

Les 350 000 habitants d'Argentan ont fait leur shopping à la mode à la station balnéaire de la côte d'Azur. Ils ont même gagné plus d'argent qu'ils n'en ont dépensé.

Il aura fallu cinq ans d'activité économique pour construire Shenzhen. Pour quelqu'un qui a vécu pendant trois ans et demi l'atmosphère de la Révolution culturelle, dans une Chine économiquement stagnante et politiquement déchainée, le

Finir, le temps où le voyageur devait traîner ses bagages sur l'outre-mer, la Chine à Hong Kong, jusqu'au sinistre bâtiment qui occupait les rues chinoises.

Les maisons de terre cuite du quartier, mélange qui dormait là, entre les vivres, les rizières en terrasses et les vergers de Pichu, ont disparu.

Il n'y a plus la charmante vallée environnée d'une haute et véritable forêt de galle-ciel, quadrillée de larges avenues : un Hong Kong en miniature avec un monumental complexe ferroviaire douanier coiffé d'un de ces toits de style Ming autrefois caractéristiques.

créerait inévitablement un fort besoin de libéralisation économique et politique qui mettrait en péril leur pouvoir et leurs privilèges. De même, prétendre que la politique future de l'Union soviétique sera strictement "défensive", c'est manquer de clairvoyance et de lucidité. Si l'URSS s'est engagée dans le Yémen du Sud, l'Angola et l'Éthiopie, ce n'est pas par besoin défensif mais parce qu'aux yeux des dirigeants du Kreninil, le pays doit s'imposer comme l'une des deux superpuissances de ce monde et posséder tous les droits et privilèges (des pays clients et des bases militaires, par exemple) dont jouissent, selon eux, les États-Unis. Dans sa volonté d'étendre le pouvoir de l'Union soviétique, le Poliburo suit une politique d'opportunisme prudent mais actif. Pour cette raison, l'Occident ne réussira à contenir l'expansionnisme soviétique qu'en stabilisant l'équilibre du pouvoir et en montrant clairement qu'il est fermement résolu à résister à tout empiètement sur ses intérêts vitaux. Mais nous devons aussi veiller à ne pas exagérer l'ampleur de la menace soviétique, à ne pas juger déformant la réalité et à ne pas prêter aux dirigeants soviétiques des idées de grandeur et des intentions diaboliques. L'Union soviétique est un géant s'exaltant peut-être par des préoccupations plus terre-à-terre. De plus, on analyse trop souvent la politique soviétique isolément, sans l'inscrire dans une perspective historique. Tout au long de l'histoire, les pays les plus forts se sont étendus au détriment des plus faibles. Au cours de la consoldation (jus à l'effondrement) des empires européens en Afrique et en Asie. Au début de notre siècle, le États-Unis affirmèrent activement leur présence en Amérique latine, bien avant que l'avènement du communisme soviétique n'apporte une nouvelle justification à cette politique. Au cours des trois dernières décennies seulement, les Américains ont envoyé des troupes en République dominicaine et à la Grenade, ils ont employé des forces "mandataires" au Guatemala et à Cuba, et ils ont essayé de destablisser le Chili et le Nicaragua. Sans vouloir justifier l'impérialisme armées directes dans des situations où leurs intérêts seraient mieux servis par d'autres solutions (par exemple, l'emploi de moyens d'intervention économique, la volonté affirmée d'un désengagement mutuel, l'attente d'une conjoncture politique plus favorable qui pourrait naître de l'éveil de certains nationalismes face à l'oppression soviétique).



l'ère 1960

Pour mieux comprendre les erreurs que nous commettons parfois dans nos analyses et la façon dont l'URSS perçoit le monde, imaginons un instant quelles auraient été les réactions si, au lieu du président américain, un dirigeant soviétique avait annoncé un programme massif destiné à créer un "bouclier spatial", si, au mépris de tout ce qui s'était dit auparavant sur les questions stratégiques, il avait déclaré que défense et attaque sont des choses tout à fait distinctes, et s'il s'était efforcé de rassurer ceux pour qui la promesse de partager avec d'autres pays toute grande découverte technologique (comme les progrès réalisés dans les domaines des gros ordinateurs, des logiciels ou des lasers à haute énergie) risquer de rompre l'équilibre nucléaire. De telles prises de position, qu'on jugerait indéfendables évitement, ne manqueraient pas de soulever du mépris et d'amener l'opinion à s'interroger sur les "intentions cachées" des Soviétiques. En revanche, lorsque c'est le président américain qui s'exprime ainsi, on prend généralement ce qu'il dit pour parole d'évangile. Même les critiques de la Guerre des étoiles ont surtout mis l'accent sur les aspects techniques du projet (par exemple, son coût farouchement élevé, les risques inhérents de déséquilibre pas ici de mettre en doute les

soviétique ni le mettre sur un même pied que les interventions américaines, nous devons toutefois examiner la façon dont les États-Unis minent la façon dont les États-Unis ont effectivement exercé leur pouvoir (comparativement à l'opinion internationale que beaucoup d'Américains ont au sujet de la politique de leur pays ?) et, à partir de là, essayer de comprendre ce que l'enjeu du tiers-monde représente pour l'Union soviétique. Moscou et Washington ont une conception très différente des changements légitimes nécessaires aux pays du tiers-monde ; l'une et l'autre superpuissance tient à conserver son entière liberté d'action. C'est pourquoi la rivalité qui les oppose ne s'apaisera pas. L'objectif à long terme consiste à trouver des moyens de canaliser cette rivalité de façon que les pays du tiers-monde aient le plus de chances possible d'accéder à l'autodétermination et que les tensions ne dégénèrent pas périodiquement en une dangereuse confrontation. Les pays occidentaux n'ont aucun avantage à faire preuve de faiblesse, car cela inciterait l'URSS à multiplier ses manœuvres, ni à se laisser gagner par la panique, ni à exagérer la gravité des menaces qui pèsent sur leur sécurité, ce qui pourrait déboucher sur des interventions

l'Union soviétique, le Poliburo suit une politique d'opportunisme prudent mais actif. Pour cette raison, l'Occident ne réussira à contenir l'expansionnisme soviétique qu'en stabilisant l'équilibre du pouvoir et en montrant clairement qu'il est fermement résolu à résister à tout empiètement sur ses intérêts vitaux. Mais nous devons aussi veiller à ne pas exagérer l'ampleur de la menace soviétique, à ne pas juger déformant la réalité et à ne pas prêter aux dirigeants soviétiques des idées de grandeur et des intentions diaboliques. L'Union soviétique est un géant s'exaltant peut-être par des préoccupations plus terre-à-terre. De plus, on analyse trop souvent la politique soviétique isolément, sans l'inscrire dans une perspective historique. Tout au long de l'histoire, les pays les plus forts se sont étendus au détriment des plus faibles. Au cours de la consoldation (jus à l'effondrement) des empires européens en Afrique et en Asie. Au début de notre siècle, le États-Unis affirmèrent activement leur présence en Amérique latine, bien avant que l'avènement du communisme soviétique n'apporte une nouvelle justification à cette politique. Au cours des trois dernières décennies seulement, les Américains ont envoyé des troupes en République dominicaine et à la Grenade, ils ont employé des forces "mandataires" au Guatemala et à Cuba, et ils ont essayé de destablisser le Chili et le Nicaragua. Sans vouloir justifier l'impérialisme

RELATIONS EST-OUEST:

Les conditions d'un réchauffement durable. Par Paul Marantz

J'ai parfois la désagréable impression... que la démocratie est comme un de ces monstres préhistoriques dont le corps est aussi long que cette pièce et la tête aussi grosse qu'une épinglette...

Renardz-le se prélasser dans la boue de notre vieille Terre, indifférent à ce qui l'entoure; il en faudrait beaucoup pour le faire bouger. Tant que vous ne lui avez pas écrasé la queue, il ne se rend pas compte que vous en avez après lui. Mais qu'il comprenne ce qui se passe, et le voilà qui se jette aveuglément sur son adversaire avec une telle détermination que non seulement il le détruit mais encore qu'il sème aussi la désolation tout autour de lui. On peut alors se demander s'il n'aurait pas été plus sage pour lui de s'intéresser un peu plus tôt à ce qui se passait dans son milieu pour éviter de se trouver dans une telle situation, plutôt que de passer sans transition d'une habitude bonne à une autre d'un comportement aussi mondial. Ainsi, du sommet de 1955 celui de 1959, "l'esprit de Camp David", mais chaque fois, de profonds désaccords sur des questions fondamentales (comme "le problème allemand" et les rapports entre les pays de l'Est et l'Union soviétique) ont provoqué un vif retour à la guerre froide sous ses pires aspects.

Le sommet d'après-guerre qui a obtenu le plus de succès est celui de 1972, au cours duquel le Président Nixon et le Secrétaire général Leonid Brezhnev signèrent le Traité sur les missiles antimissiles balistiques et le premier accord SALT. On devrait pourtant se rappeler que ces premiers accords n'ont pas été conclus du jour au lendemain. Ils représentaient l'aboutissement de plus de deux années de négociations patientes et laborieuses (et il fallut encore sept ans avant que le second traité SALT fût prêt à être signé). De plus, l'assouplissement des relations soviéto-américaines attribuable au

résident dans l'image changeante et stéréotypée que l'Occident se fait de l'Union soviétique. Nous faisons preuve, à tort, d'un optimisme injustifié lorsque les relations sont au beau fixe, et d'un pessimisme lugubre dans les périodes de grave tension. La réflexion désabusée de George Kennan sur la façon dont les démocraties abordent la politique étrangère, réflexion qu'on a pu lire au commencement de cet article, est aussi variée de nos jours qu'à l'époque où elle a été exprimée, au plus profond de la guerre froide, au début des années 1950.

Nous devons admettre que le régime soviétique reste un système politique extrêmement autoritaire et que l'Occident ne peut faire grand-chose pour modifier une telle situation. Une des grandes leçons des années 1970 est que ni les faibles économiques (expansion des échanges, prêts) ni les pressions économiques (embargos et sanctions) ne peuvent inciter l'Union soviétique à apporter des changements fondamentaux à sa politique. Certes, le Président Reagan a eu une bonne idée, à la veille du sommet, quand il préconisait de réduire la méfiance mutuelle par la multiplication des contacts personnels et des échanges culturels entre les deux peuples. C'est un rêve très louable, mais il faut être lucide et voir que les dirigeants soviétiques sont déterminés à empêcher toute ouverture de ce genre vers l'Ouest. S'ils s'opposent à pas par ignorance ou à cause d'une crainte irraisonnée que nous pourrions sans doute les aider à surmonter, mais parce qu'ils savent parfaitement qu'un tel processus

de réchauffement durable, alternant entre de courtes phases de dégel et des périodes de refroidissement brutal. Comment se fait-il qu'il soit si difficile de stabiliser les relations Est-Ouest? La première raison est qu'il existe entre l'Est et l'Ouest un certain nombre de conflits d'intérêts particulièrement difficiles à résoudre. Et tant qu'ils ne seront pas réglés, on ne pourra espérer une amélioration durable des relations entre les deux blocs. Les quatre principaux sujets de discorde sont la course aux armements, les luttes d'influence dans le tiers-monde, l'emprise de l'URSS sur l'Europe de l'Est et les inquiétudes des Occidentaux à propos des droits de la personne en Union soviétique.

Le monde occidental doit trouver des moyens d'exprimer sa réprobation à l'égard des actes qu'il juge la représentation répréhensibles (comme la répression dont les dissidents soviétiques font l'objet, l'application de la loi martiale en Pologne ou le recours à la force en Afghanistan) sans pour autant mettre en péril les négociations sur la limitation des armements qui sont nécessaires pour limiter les risques de conflit nucléaire. Quand les Soviétiques commettent des actes que nous désapprouvons, nous devons éviter de prêter le flanc à leurs attaques (en suspendant par exemple les échanges culturels avec l'URSS ou en refusant de lui vendre des produits qu'elle peut se procurer facilement ailleurs). Le deuxième facteur qui a contribué à cette alternance d'espoirs irréalistes et de désespoirs profonds a propos des relations Est-Ouest

membres des forces de sécurité accusés d'avoir abusé de leurs pouvoirs auprès de citoyens salvadoriens. La peur manifestée depuis toujours par l'armée à l'égard du réformisme de la Démocratie chrétienne s'avère avoir été exagérée, et les cadres supérieurs de l'armée guatémaltique n'ont pas manqué d'en prendre bonne note.

Dès 1982, Vinicio Cerezo, issu de l'aile progressiste du Parti chrétien-démocrate, s'est montré délibérément modéré dans ses propos. Autrefois provocant dans ses critiques à l'égard du pouvoir militaire (il a lui-même été la cible d'au moins quatre tentatives d'assassinat), il a commencé à adoucir ses positions à la suite du coup d'État du général Ríos Montt. Il s'est ainsi abstenu de condamner la complicité de ce dernier avec les auteurs de violations systématiques des droits de la personne dans les campagnes. Depuis s'est installée peu à peu un *modus vivendi* entre l'armée et la Démocratie chrétienne.

Toute tentative qui viserait à usurper le pouvoir de l'armée pourrait provoquer un nouveau coup d'État militaire. Et il est peu probable que l'armée renonce volontairement à diriger les affaires du pays. Dans l'étude qu'ils ont effectuée avant les élections sur les institutions de l'armée qui assurent la sécurité du pays et le développement rural (*Security and Development in the Guatemala Highlands*), deux anthropologues américains, notamment Chris Krueger et Kjell Engle, ont conclu ce qui suit :

Les militaires sont bien placés pour conserver la maîtrise de ces institutions et de ces programmes. Ou bien ils se retirent, et ils ne manquent pas alors d'imputer l'échec à leur successeur qui devra faire face à une société fortement polarisée et troublée et à une économie en situation de crise ; ou bien ils continuent de diriger des organismes et des opérations parallèles et à gérer les ressources, auquel cas les civils auront beaucoup de mal à se rendre maîtres des activités de développement.

L'élection de Vinicio Cerezo a sans aucun doute valu au Guatemala de retrouver la faveur de l'opinion mondiale, mais quelles sont les perspectives d'avenir du pays et de son président ? Cerezo pourra-t-il continuer à la démocratisation du pays autant qu'il l'a promis ?

Cette élection présidentielle permet de lever la condition à laquelle le Congrès américain avait assujéti l'attribution de son aide, qui s'élève à 10 millions de dollars dans le domaine militaire et à 80 millions dans le secteur économique. Le nouveau gouvernement civil espère réussir à obtenir l'aide de pays étrangers et à se gagner plus facilement la

sympathie des banques étrangères et afin de renégocier sa dette extérieure et d'attirer des investisseurs.

En transmettant le pouvoir "théorique" aux civils, les militaires poursuivent deux objectifs : d'une part, le pays obtiendra des fonds pour mettre en œuvre les deux volets de son programme intégré de lutte contre l'insurrection, à savoir le développement du pays et le maintien de la sécurité nationale ; d'autre part, l'arrivée d'un civil à la présidence, si le peuple en reconnaît la légitimité, aidera à stabiliser la situation politico-militaire.

Cependant, sans réformes fondamentales, il est impensable qu'on puisse mettre fin à l'instabilité sociale, économique et politique dont les racines sont très profondes. L'oligarchie en place a prévu qu'elle s'opposerait à toute réforme économique. Le président Cerezo doit donc faire de l'austérité économique l'axe principal de son administration. Pendant la période des élections, assassins et disparitions ont continué d'avoir lieu. D'après la Commission guatémaltique des droits de la personne, 626 civils ont été tués au cours du premier semestre de 1985. Immédiatement avant l'installation au pouvoir de Cerezo en janvier 1986, l'armée a émis un décret par lequel elle s'absolvait de tous les crimes commis depuis 1982. Une semaine après l'arrivée de Cerezo en poste, les autorités ont découvert six corps torturés dans la banlieue de Guatemala, ce qui laisse penser que le nouveau président n'a pas les pouvoirs voulus pour diriger la police secrète et les forces paramilitaires. Au Guatemala, l'élection ne rime pas avec démocratisation, et la fonction de président ne garantit pas à son titulaire la maîtrise du gouverne-



Tom Hunt

ment. Quant à l'aide étrangère, notamment l'aide militaire ou paramilitaire, elle ne peut engendrer aucune reprise ou expansion économique.

Le Guatemala a longtemps été considéré comme un pays à scène internationale. Ainsi, le Canada a suspendu son aide en 1981 par suite de violations flagrantes et systématiques des droits de la personne. En décembre 1985, le Canada a appuyé une résolution des Nations-Unies selon laquelle ces dernières déplorent profondément le fait que l'on continue de violer sans vergogne les droits de la personne... cette situation étant que en grande partie due au fait que les militaires et les forces de sécurité ne parviennent pas à remplir leur tâche tout en respectant les droits fondamentaux de tous les Guatémaltiques.

Pour que puisse être renouvelée une aide bilatérale quelconque, les conditions ci-dessous doivent avoir été préalablement remplies :

- arrêt définitif des violations systématiques des droits de la personne et démantèlement des structures de répression ;
- enquête sur le sort des disparus et poursuite des responsables en justice ;
- établissement des droits et libertés civils, y compris la liberté d'association pleine et entière ;
- mise en œuvre de réformes tant structurelles, que politiques, agraires, que politiques.

Le président Cerezo est un homme politique chevronné. Il parviendra certainement à se maintenir au pouvoir pendant plusieurs mois, et il est même possible qu'il remplisse entièrement son mandat de cinq ans. Mais réussira-t-il à modifier les structures en place et à mettre fin aux abus de pouvoir au Guatemala ? En subordonnant toute aide économique à la mise en œuvre de réformes structurelles et au respect des droits de la personne, la communauté internationale aiderait les Guatémaltiques à redévelopper politiquement maîtres de leur pays aux dépens des militaires quasiment tous-dissués. Une reprise prématurée de l'aide internationale ne ferait que priver les civils, déjà en position de faiblesse, de tout moyen d'intervention auprès des généraux, et retarder ainsi d'autant plus le processus de réconciliation nationale et l'armore d'un développement socio-économique équilibrable au Guatemala.

L'Union soviétique a commencé à déployer des missiles de croisière à long rayon d'action, dans une version modernisée du bombardier Bear. Il se peut aussi qu'elle mette en service de tels missiles à bord de sous-marins capables d'opérer dans les glaces arctiques. Faut-il, pour cette raison, renforcer la défense active ?

Carte montrant la disposition des éléments du système d'alerte du Nord et les secteurs couverts par les radars trans-horizon à rétrodiffusion (OTH-B).

Stephen Finley

La carte illustre la disposition des éléments du système d'alerte du Nord et les secteurs couverts par les radars trans-horizon à rétrodiffusion (OTH-B). Elle montre l'Amérique du Nord, l'Europe, l'Asie et l'Australie, avec des zones de couverture radar indiquées par des arcs concentriques. Des légendes indiquent les zones de couverture des radars OTH-B et les zones de couverture des radars conventionnels.

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GUERRE DES ÉTOILES:

Canada, NORAD et défense continentale. Par David Cox

Rien n'est plus comme avant, tant en ce qui concerne la défense du continent nord-américain que la coopération de longue date entre le Canada et les États-Unis au sein du NORAD. En gros, tous les témoins qui ont été entendus par le Comité permanent sont tombés d'accord sur ce point.

Mais lorsqu'il s'est agi de définir les changements en cours et la position que le Canada devrait adopter, le Comité, chargé de conseiller le gouvernement sur le renouvellement de l'accord NORAD en mai, s'est trouvé en présence d'avis très partagés. Les uns pensent que le Canada perdra de son influence et 'manquera le coche' s'il ne réussit pas à se tailler une place de choix au sein du système de défense du continent; les autres craignent que le renouvellement de l'accord entraîne le Canada dans la Guerre des étoiles.

Quelques points de vue, ces questions vont au-delà du simple renouvellement de l'accord NORAD, mais comme l'échecance de ce dernier coïncide avec la tenue de débats sur la défense stratégique aux États-Unis et dans d'autres pays, les Canadiens semblent penser que le NORAD est devenu étroitement associé à l'initiative de défense stratégique (IDS). Il ne serait donc pas inutile de faire un peu la lumière sur le débat et de se poser pour cela les questions suivantes:

Qu'est-ce que le NORAD et qu'a-t-il permis d'accomplir dans le passé? Qu'y a-t-il de nouveau pour que l'avenir du NORAD soulève autant de controverses? Quel rôle serait-il appelé à jouer si les Américains déploient leur système de défense stratégique? Quels choix s'offrent au Canada?

Lorsque fut signé en 1958 l'Accord sur la défense du continent nord-américain (NORAD), la principale menace stratégique qui pesait sur l'Amérique du nord était le bombardier soviétique qui prenait des sément, pour pouvoir prendre des

Des changements importants s'opéraient déjà au moment où se déroulaient les négociations sur l'accord NORAD. La menace la plus pressante qui se présentait à l'époque était celle du missile balistique intercontinental (ICBM), arme beaucoup plus redoutable que le bombardier pilote et contre laquelle le réseau DEW ne pouvait pas grand-

chose. Pour se prémunir contre les attaques de missiles, les Américains mirent au point le Système de pré-détection des missiles balistiques (BMEWS) et installèrent des radars d'alerte en Grande-Bretagne et au Groënland. Peu après, les États-Unis repèrent les bases et les lancements des systèmes d'alerte capables de repérer les missiles à l'aide de capteurs et d'appareils photographiques à infrarouge.

Tandis que l'on mettait au point ces systèmes, les renseignements recueillis par le NORAD, dont le siège se trouve à Colorado Springs, Le Canada, officiellement associé à part entière de ce commandement bilatéral, n'avait aucun rôle à jouer dans les nouveaux systèmes de défense spatiale ni dans les BMEWS. Entrentemps, comme la menace stratégique que que représentait son activité, le besoin de posséder une importante force d'interception était devenu moins pressant. En 1963 et jusqu'à 1980 (certains diront même jusqu'à nos jours), la défense aérienne active a été ramenée à un seuil minimum dicté par la prudence, c'est-à-dire à celui qu'il fallait pour sauvegarder la souveraineté et protéger le continent contre les intrusions isolées.

Le NORAD actuel

À l'aube des années 1980, les Américains avaient constitué un réseau diversifié et puissant de détecteurs spatiaux capables de détecter le lancement de missiles, les États-Unis ont installé sur leurs côtes de gros radars dits radars à longue portée (radars OTB-B) qui pourraient détecter et suivre des avions jusqu'à des distances de 1 500 milles.


Avec la mise en place de tous ces dispositifs de détection au sein du NORAD, le rôle du Canada dans ce domaine a, relativement parlant, perdu beaucoup d'importance. Les deux caméras installées au Canada pour la surveillance de l'espace lointain ne sont plus nécessaires, et notre pays n'apporte aucune contribution financière aux systèmes décrits plus haut. D'un autre côté, on a toujours besoin d'un système d'alerte aérienne dans le Grand Nord canadien, car les radars OTB-B ne sont d'aucune utilité dans les conditions atmosphériques propres à cette région. La solution (du moins intermédiaire) est le Système d'alerte du Nord (SAN). Il suffit d'un coup d'oeil sur la carte pour comprendre la raison d'être du SAN: fermer complètement la brèche dans le "rideau" de radars d'alerte protégeant l'ensemble du territoire continental des États-Unis. C'est donc un progrès par rapport au réseau DEW, qui devenait difficile à gérer et dont on connaissait les "trous" par lesquels les avions ennemis pouvaient en théorie s'infiltrer jusqu'au coeur du continent, sans être détectés. Pourtant, le SAN est probablement le moins utile des nouveaux systèmes présents ici. Malgré les dépenses engagées pour sa réalisation, dont la fin est prévue pour 1992 (soit 1,3 milliard de dollars dont les États-Unis et le Canada à 40 p. 100), le SAN n'aura que des capacités limitées contre les missiles de croisière lancés à partir d'avions ou de bâtiments navals. En cas de crise réelle, il faudra déployer depuis les États-Unis le système aéroporté pour pouvoir surveiller l'intérieur du Nord canadien. Si les recherches technologiques actuelles aboutissent, on peut penser qu'au moment où le SAN deviendra entièrement opérationnel, soit au début des années 1990, les Américains seront sur le point de mettre en place leur double système spatial qui comprendra des radars et des détecteurs à infrarouge dont le rôle consistera à capter

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Voici le premier numéro d'une revue que publiera tous les trois mois l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales. L'Institut est une société d'État et il fonctionne grâce à une subvention annuelle du Parlement. L'organisme ayant pour mandat d'accroître la connaissance et la compréhension des questions qui touchent la paix et la sécurité internationales, nous avons décidé de publier de l'information et des analyses sur ces thèmes, sous diverses formes : des exposés généraux destinés au grand public ; des cahiers plus longs et plus spécialisés ; des nouvelles brèves ; et enfin, la présente revue trimestrielle.

La revue contiendra des articles spéciaux sur des sujets correspondant à nos domaines de recherche et des chroniques régulières qui permettront au lecteur de suivre l'évolution des dossiers au Canada et à l'étranger et le tiendront au courant de nos propres activités. Il existe bien sûr beaucoup d'autres sources d'infor-

 *Paix et sécurité* paraîtra tous les trois mois ; ce bulletin vise à informer la population canadienne sur les activités de l'Institut et à favoriser l'expression de toutes les opinions ayant cours au pays sur les questions susmentionnées. Les opinions formulées dans chaque article sont exclusivement celles de l'auteur. N'hésitez pas à nous faire part de vos observations et idées.

Les textes de ce bulletin peuvent être reproduits, pourvu que la source en soit mentionnée.

La publication de questions de paix et de sécurité, particulièrement aux États-Unis, est plus que jamais d'actualité. L'Institut finance la publication de magazines et de rapports de conférences réalisés par divers autres organismes canadiens. Nous aurons pu décider d'en rester là. Mais, tout comme nous croyons que la création d'un nouvel institut – le nôtre – permettra au Canada de contribuer d'une façon plus démocratique et plus avisée à la réalisation de la paix et de la sécurité dans le monde, de même nous espérons que cette revue deviendra le témoin dynamique et fidèle du débat engagé au sujet de la paix et de la sécurité, dans une perspective canadienne.

Geoffrey Pearson,
Directeur général

Bureau de rédaction
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Rédactrice

Diane DeMille

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PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

GUERRE DES ÉTOILES Canada, NORAD et défense continentale



us le présent numéro:

David Cox, spécialiste de la défense, prévoit un rôle diffé-
rent pour le Canada au sein du
NORAD si les États-Unis
s'engagent dans l'IDS.

Tim Draymin, spécialiste des
affaires centraméricaines,
exprime des doutes quant à la
force de la "nouvelle démo-
cratie" au Guatemala.

Paul Marantz, spécialiste de
la politique étrangère sovie-
tique, nous exhorte à ne pas
trop attendre des conférences
au sommet.

PEACE & SECURITY

CAI
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THE CRISIS OF APARTHEID

The Canadian response



Dan O'Meara, a native of South Africa, urges Canada to respond decisively to the deepening crisis under Botha's regime.

John Honderich, a Canadian journalist, warns that some SDI components might be based in Canada.

Geoffrey Pearson, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, compares current assumptions about Canada's role in the world.

In this issue:

■ This is the second issue of the Institute's quarterly. Reader response has been encouraging. We hope to fill the niche between the brief synopses of events provided by the daily newspapers and the more detailed analyses found in academic journals. Each article will attempt to place current peace and security issues within a broader political or historical context.

Of prime importance in this quarterly is a Canadian perspective on world events. What is going on? How does it affect Canada? What should Canadians do?

Of course many of the topics covered are controversial and the policy recommendations are a source of vigorous debate within this country. *Peace & Security* is intended as a forum for the full range of Canadian opinion on issues affecting international peace and security. Each author will approach a subject from a particular viewpoint and we hope that readers will express their opinion too, in the form of Letters to the Editor.

The bibliography and AV resources will provide suggestions for further reading keyed to the subjects covered in the lead articles. In addition, it will feature new books, articles and films especially those written, published or produced in Canada.

Dan O'Meara's article on apartheid went to press just as the world heard about South Africa's raids on the neighbouring front-line states of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, all members of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group was in South Africa at the time, trying to set up talks between government officials and black nationalist leaders. Canada and the other forty-eight members of the Commonwealth condemned the raids saying that they had done "incalculable harm to hopes for peaceful change in South Africa."

Dianne DeMille
Editor

**CANADIAN
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SECURITY**

307 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K2P 0P7
(613) 990-1593

■ *Peace and Security* is published quarterly to let Canadians know what the Institute is doing and to provide a forum for the full range of Canadian viewpoints on these issues. Opinions expressed in each article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute and its Board of Directors. Your letters are welcome.

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
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 **Dan O'Meara** is a researcher/journalist with CIDMAA, a research and information centre on southern Africa based in Montreal; **John Honderich** is Business Editor at the *Toronto Star*; **Geoffrey Pearson** is Executive Director at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security; **James Travers** is a Canadian journalist based in Cyprus; **Jane Boulden** is a Research Assistant at the Institute; **Gregory Wirick** is a freelance writer in Ottawa.

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CRISIS OF APARTHEID:

The Canadian response. By Dan O'Meara



In late 1985 Canadian External Affairs Minister, Joe Clark, announced that

“the challenge that now faces the government of Canada is to take practical steps to bring a peaceful end to apartheid” in South Africa.

■ The Mulroney government has taken stronger action against South Africa than any of its predecessors. Mr. Clark implemented limited sanctions in September last year, warning twice “that Canada is prepared to invoke total sanctions” unless there “is tangible movement away from apartheid,” and even envisaged a situation in which “Canada will be left with no resort but to end our relations absolutely.” Both warnings were repeated in the Prime Minister’s October statement to the United Nations General Assembly.

Canada played a key role in the establishment of the Commonwealth “Eminent Persons Group,” set up to encourage democratization in South Africa. Further policy developments are on hold until this Group submits its report. Since the report can only be negative, Canada will be under pressure to put its money where its mouth is.

Tougher action can indeed be expected. If Canadian policy is to have a real impact, however, it needs to be based on a *strategy* with three clear components:

■ an understanding of the political dynamics inside South Africa;

■ a sense of what kinds of intervention will most weaken the apartheid regime while strengthening its victims both inside

South Africa and in the subcontinent; and,

■ an awareness of how a Canadian policy package might fit into a wider international strategy against apartheid.

Political Dynamics

Any programme of reform by the South African government would have to appease five very different political audiences: the black population, the ultra-right, the security forces, organized business, and the international community. None of these is monolithic; each contains widely divergent political viewpoints, but each is a major actor in the current crisis.

Most importantly, the government would need to win sufficient active support from within the black population to end the urban revolt. Such is the anger – and scent of looming power – in the black community, however, that even conservative black leaders could safely settle for nothing less than ‘one person/one vote,’ requiring the total and rapid dismantling of apartheid.

At the opposite side of the political spectrum are the ultra-right groups, estimated to enjoy the support of one-third of the white population. These groups have been arming themselves to resist what they term “the betrayal of the white man.” The strongest among them have

formed local vigilante/militia groups to patrol white areas.

Any reforms would also have to convince the security forces that their power would remain intact. This is a complex issue. There are deep political divisions in the army, an issue raised publicly by the generals as long ago as 1981. The commanders of the police and army are already the most important force in the key decision-making institutions, and their power under the current regime is widening. There is, on the other hand, strong support for the ultra-right in the middle and lower ranks of the police force and in the professional core of the South African military. The various sectors within the security forces can be expected to cling to a very hard line.

South African business and foreign investors, concerned about the profound radicalization of black politics, are desperate for a solution – any solution – which will restore stability. Long the major beneficiary of cheap labour, and ensconced in a cosy alliance with P.W. Botha between 1979 and 1984, business leaders are growing more and more insistent on the need for change. However, organized business remains strongly opposed to the idea of ‘one person/one vote’ in a unitary state. The federalist proposals they favour are seen, in the eyes of black political groups, as an attempt to secure white domination through constitutional tinkering. Moreover, business has made much noise and done much lobbying, but has used precious little of its real economic power against the government.

The final and most diffuse of these audiences is the international community. It ranges from NGOs, churches and trade unions, to western governments. The peculiar structure of the South African economy renders it very sensitive to international pressure. The country does not have the capacity to produce the technology, the capital equipment, and the intermediate goods without which there is no industry in South Africa. These are all imported and are paid for – as in any third world country – by mineral and agricultural exports, as well as by foreign investment in, and loans to, South Africa. Escalating economic sanctions severely limit the regime’s capacity to finance the vast edifice of apartheid. In March 1986, the former Chairman of the giant Anglo-American Corporation declared that disinvestment measures, initiated by non-government sources, were already hurting the South African economy. Looming international sanctions present a profound threat to the regime.

President Botha’s government is unable to appease all five of these audiences, particularly and most importantly the first two. Indeed it is doubtful if any white government could begin to dismantle apartheid without provoking armed revolt from the ultra-right and, possibly, a sergeants’ *coup d’état* from within the security forces. Because it has exhausted its political options, the regime is beginning to unravel to a degree not appreciated in Western countries.

South Africa today is living through one of those rare mo-

ments in history when the old order finally begins to collapse, but a new order is not yet able to impose itself. The regime has lost – morally, ideologically, politically, but not yet militarily; and the organized black opposition has largely won – morally, ideologically, politically, but not yet militarily.

As President Botha and his generals have regularly warned, they have not yet begun to use all the force at their command. Events of the past year have demonstrated that, as they lose their grip on political power, they will unleash simple violence, not only on their own population, but on the peoples and governments of neighbouring countries.

Thus, the essential terrain on which power will now be contested is *military*. The main black opposition group, the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) has begun to escalate its armed attacks – the number tripled during 1985 – and has warned that it will take the armed struggle into white areas. While the ANC has in the past rejected the use of terrorism, it has declared that it can no longer guarantee that there will be no civilian casualties.

Apartheid has clearly entered its terminal crisis and the final convulsive death throes can be expected to be prolonged and extraordinarily violent. Two pressing questions loom for anyone concerned with the future of the country:

- How long will the collapse of apartheid take?
- How much damage will be done to the people and economies of Southern Africa in the process?

A key variable is international pressure. It will not, by itself, bring down apartheid, but a coherent programme of international action founded on a strategic perspective can hasten the final collapse of the regime and significantly reduce the damage done in the process.

Canada's Role

Canada is uniquely placed in the international community to play a significant role, far out of proportion to its level of involvement in the economies of Southern Africa, and to its ranking among the nations of the world. Because the US "constructive engagement" policies have failed dismally, there is a vacuum of leadership in the West. Canada could take on a leadership role.

The main opponents to new international action against apartheid remain the US, Britain, and West Germany – with the position of the new French government still unclear.

Canada, as a member of both the Commonwealth and the Francophone community, can play a crucial brokerage role to develop concerted international action against apartheid. The Canadian government will very soon have to choose between siding with Britain on this issue or working with the Third World members of the Commonwealth (who already have the support of the two other former "white dominions," Australia and New Zealand). Direct pressure on Mrs. Thatcher by Canada will probably not work but, through the Commonwealth, a North/South consensus for action can be built which will make it far more embarrassing for the Thatcher government to maintain its intransigent position.

Canada could also create a parallel consensus in Europe by working with the Nordic countries and the European Economic Community (EEC) – beginning with the smaller countries, and then moving up to France and West Germany. At February's Francophone summit Canada was prominent in the tough position adopted against apartheid.

What Kinds of Action?

It is crucial to recognize that even if the US, Britain and West Germany do not support further international action, a great many highly effective steps can be taken by Canada. Sanctions are not an 'all-or-nothing' package, nor are they the only available options. Any new policies should be based on a hierarchy of options, moving from the easiest to the most difficult.


The easiest and least costly measures are political. The first step would be to downgrade diplomatic links with South Africa, acknowledging that the legitimacy of the regime has been destroyed. In addition, recognition of the ANC, or regular high-level public contacts with the ANC leadership, would be an important acknowledgement of the political reality inside South Africa. To reinforce these contacts, CIDA could resume the provision of matching funds for ANC welfare projects in

Southern Africa, ended by the Clark government in 1979.

Such steps would begin to move policy away from symbolic gestures and towards effective action at the political level. At the economic level, the actions suggested at the Nassau Commonwealth Conference in October 1985 would be effective first steps. They should be combined with increased assistance to South Africa's neighbours, already reeling under the effects of the regimes' economic destabilization. CIDA has already begun a feasibility study in this area.

The peculiar vulnerability of the South African economy, in combination with the escalating costs of sustaining apartheid, mean that both disinvestment and economic sanctions can be effective. Pressure for disinvestment has so far come almost exclusively from non-governmental groups, and South African businesses have acknowledged the impact of these measures. Economic sanctions, on the other hand, are the realm of governments. There is a pressing need to combine private disinvestment and official economic sanctions into an effective package. It might be useful for the Canadian government to convene an international forum for the detailed discussion of peaceful action against apartheid. The last detailed study of sanctions was completed in 1980 and is now badly dated.

The Canadian policy package must combine punitive actions against apartheid with measures to protect its victims from inevitable retaliation. The desperate situation inside South Africa makes effective, coordinated action literally a matter of life and death to thousands of people in South and Southern Africa. Canada is in a position to play a leading role. The Mulroney government has got the rhetoric right and has begun to take real action. It is time to take action much further. □



Amto Kunz

SDI IN CANADA?

Possibilities for deployment. By John Honderich

■ Could Canada find itself bound up in Star Wars? The very thought has sent shivers down the spines of many Canadians.

■ The recent renewal of the NORAD agreement, without the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) disclaimer, has led many strategic experts to suggest that Canada may become an unwitting partner in the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Canada, located in the middle of the nuclear no-man's land, would be a prime choice for deployment of part of the defence system. In the words of John Pike, Associate Director of Space Policy for the Federation of American Scientists: "there is no magic in this conclusion, only the facts of geography."

In a paper submitted to the October 1985 conference on SDI, sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Pike argued that "there are several ABM components that might be deployed in Canada, should Canada elect to participate in the deployment program. There are also some ABM components whose technical characteristics are such that their basing in Canada could enhance their contribution to the defense of the United States."

The technological chasms that must be bridged before SDI could become a reality appear almost insurmountable. Already various theories and defence concepts have been discarded as the research has evolved. Furthermore, Canada has so far insisted that it has no commitment to participate in any deployment of SDI. Defence Minister Erik Nielsen has scoffed re-

peatedly at any suggestion this policy may change. Nonetheless, it is a worthwhile exercise to understand what elements of current SDI planning might be deployed here and why.

Simply put, current thinking envisages a multi-layered defence umbrella which would guarantee the surveillance, tracking and eventual destruction of Soviet missiles or their warheads in all phases of their flight. (See diagram.)

Layered Defence

Planners have broken down the flight path of strategic missiles and their warheads into four phases: 1) the *boost phase*, lasting several minutes, as the missiles are first launched by booster rockets; 2) the *post-boost phase*, lasting several more minutes after the boosters have fallen away, during which the 'bus', carrying multiple warheads, travels outside the atmosphere; 3) the *mid-course phase*, which can take up to 25 minutes, as the warheads, housed in "re-entry vehicles," are released from the bus and soar through outer space towards their targets; and 4) the *terminal phase*, lasting one to two minutes, as the warheads re-enter the atmosphere and home in on their targets.

A fully

integrated SDI system would be comprised of both sensors and interceptors. The sensors – based on land, aboard aircraft, and in space – would track Soviet missiles and their multiple warheads. These sensors would have to work faultlessly, sifting through hundreds of thousands of decoys and bits of metallic chaff to pick out the "real" targets.

Once these targets were identified, it would be up to yet-to-be developed lasers, particle-beam weapons, and interceptor missiles to destroy Soviet missiles in the boost phase, or their warheads in the mid-course and terminal phases. Some of these sensors and interceptor weapons would be space-based, but some would have to be stationed on land. That is where Canada would fit in.

Lying directly beneath the flight path of incoming Soviet warheads, Canada's far North might provide one of the best spots to deploy some of the land-based systems for tracking and interception. What follows is a rundown of some components that could be installed in Canada.


Tracking Systems

Airborne Optical System (AOS)

SDI planners have proposed

modifying Boeing 767 jetliners to carry high-resolution infrared telescopes. These would track Soviet warheads in late mid-course and terminal phases, detecting the heat of the re-entry vehicles against the coldness of space.

Under current plans, anywhere from twenty to forty of the 767s would operate out of twelve patrol bases. There is even talk of development of remote-controlled, pilotless 767s which would fly several days at a time. The jets would fly at altitudes of between fifteen and twenty-five kilometres and cover an area with a radius of approximately 750 kilometres. This system has been under study for several years and the first test flight is set for 1988. To give maximum warning, it is thought these jets should be stationed as far north as possible and Canada's North is a prime location. However, even if they are stationed just south of the US/Canadian border these 767s would undoubtedly need to fly over Canadian territory to carry out their missions effectively.



Terminal Imaging Radar (TIR)

In order to confuse defence sensors, the Soviet Union would probably deploy an armada of decoys. The balloons, metallic chaff, and other light decoys which accompany the warheads through space in the mid-course phase would burn up upon re-entry into the atmosphere. However, additional weighted decoys could be deployed which mimic the characteristics of the warheads in the terminal phase. Scientists have developed a ground-based radar system which will take data from the 767s' airborne sensors, and refine the information even more. TIR would be able to distinguish terminal phase decoys from the falling warheads.

Mid-course Interception

ERIS (Exo-atmospheric Re-entry vehicle Interception System)

As part of the multi-layered defence umbrella, scientists have resurrected the idea of the ABM interceptor missile. Propelled by a two-stage rocket – each stage would burn just 15 seconds – ERIS is capable of phenomenal acceleration. The small “kill vehicle” weighing only 10 kilos, would be guided by an infrared sensing system as well as a homing laser. It must, in the current military jargon, “hit-to-kill” its target. As the term “exo-atmospheric” suggests, ERIS will engage its targets while they are outside the

atmosphere, in the late mid-course phase. If the missile were based in Northern Canada, ERIS might be able to hit targets much earlier in the mid-course phase, thereby extending the range and effectiveness of these interceptors.

Braduskill (Exo-atmospheric Non-Nuclear Kill Technology.)

Braduskill is another system designed to hit warheads in the mid-course phase. However, unlike the ERIS, Braduskill will not hit targets head-on. Instead it would fly alongside the warheads, providing extra time to discriminate decoys from real targets. Once identified, the warheads would be destroyed by numerous small, self-propelled “kill vehicles,” guided by infrared sensors or other homing devices.

“If I was the manager of this contract, I would be extremely disappointed if the contractors didn't look at Canada as the most likely base for these weapons,” Pike says. “The missiles would have to be based as close to the Soviet Union as possible and that limits your base sites considerably. A land-based weapon placed somewhere on Baffin Island or Ellesmere Island would be just ideal.”

ABM Laser Systems

More exotic than ERIS or Braduskill are the proposals for Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) laser weapons. Of the several types of laser weapons proposed, two could benefit from basing in Alaska or northern Canada.

The first is the Excalibur x-ray laser. This weapon was designed to use a pulse of x-rays to destroy missiles in the boost phase. These x-rays are generated by the detonation of a small nuclear device which destroys the Excalibur system a split second later.

Upon warning of an attack, Excalibur would be launched into space by a high velocity interceptor missile; this is referred to as the “pop-up” mode. To attack Soviet missiles before they leave the atmosphere, the Excalibur system would have to be situated very far north. Under current thinking, Excalibur could be launched from a submerged submarine but communications would obviously be simplified if this system were based in northern Canada.

The second type of laser weapon that could benefit from northern basing are the ground-based lasers. These would be very powerful (about 10 megawatts) excimer or free-electron lasers. The energy from these systems would be beamed to a ten-metre wide mirror in a high, geostationary orbit which would then relay the laser beams to smaller “mission mirrors” in lower orbits. These mission mirrors would, in turn, aim the laser beam at individual targets.

Basing the ground-based laser as far north as possible would reduce the number and size of space-based relay and mission mirrors.

Terminal Interception

HEDI (High-altitude Endo-atmospheric Defence Interceptor)

As a last line of defence for US (and Canadian) cities, current SDI thinking envisages a ground-based missile called HEDI. It would intercept in-

coming targets anywhere from fifteen to fifty kilometres above the ground. HEDI would receive its targeting information from the two tracking systems AOS and TIR described above and would probably be guided by infrared sensors. Once it got close to its target, the “kill vehicle” would explode showering the incoming warhead with shrapnel.

The USSR might deploy manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles in order to evade interception. In that case, another plan calls for HEDI to use an enhanced radiation warhead to ensure destruction of the incoming warhead.


Since many of the target cities would be very close to the Canada/US border, one can easily see how Canada might well station these interceptors for greater effectiveness.

Political Choices

The recent integration of NORAD into the Space Command in Colorado has alarmed many Canadians. When External Affairs Minister Joe Clark was recently asked about the possible links between NORAD and SDI, he admitted there might be some “inadvertent consequences” for Canada. But he hastened to add “we can get out of them.”

Certainly any Canadian participation in SDI would inherently involve an alliance among unequals. Canada couldn't and wouldn't expect to play any major role in decision-making. A review of the SDI elements described above reveals that Canada would be home to only a few cogs of a much larger continental war machine. Given the almost instantaneous decision-making required, SDI weaponry would of necessity be under unilateral American control. The implications for Canadian sovereignty are obvious.

Most importantly, by participating in SDI, Canada would become part of a major escalation in the arms race. □



Late mid-course interception (Braduskill)

4. Terminal interception (HEDI)

Stephen Priestley

THE NUCLEAR WORLD:

How should Canada respond? By Geoffrey Pearson

■ There are two different sets of assumptions about Canada's strategic situation. The first might be labelled "conventional," the second "naive," although neither is meant in a derogatory sense.

■ The conventional assumptions go something like this:

The most direct threat to Canada's security stems from the USSR and the international tensions created by Soviet foreign policy.

Deterrence, embodied in the strategic forces of the US and in the allied forces of Western Europe, is the best means of warding off this threat.

It is in Canada's interest to co-operate with the US in the defence of North America and with her allies in the defence of Western Europe, although in both cases Canada's military contributions to defence and deterrence are open to change.

Deterrence demands maintenance of a rough balance of forces between East and West and a willingness on the part of NATO, if it cannot match the conventional strength of Warsaw Pact Forces, to use nuclear weapons first.

Canada's interests include: the control of her territory and protection of her sovereignty; active involvement in seeking better East/West relations, especially through arms control and disarmament; and a readiness to assist her allies or the United Nations to help keep the peace in the Third World.

The second or "naive" set of assumptions takes shape along the following lines:

The main threat to Canada's

security is the danger of nuclear war between the superpowers.

This danger is intensified by policies, both Soviet and American, which emphasize the threat to use nuclear weapons to deter attacks from the other side anywhere in the world.

The effort to control and reduce nuclear weapons is a top priority. This may be accomplished by a ban on testing, production and/or deployment of nuclear weapons, by deep cuts in nuclear arsenals, or by general and complete disarmament.

Canada should work to change NATO's first-use policy, refuse to test nuclear-capable delivery systems, leave NORAD if its functions go beyond early warning and control of air space, and (some would add) declare itself a nuclear-free zone.

In the international arena, Canada should give greater priority to mediation and negotiation both in East/West relations and in regional conflicts; increase the aid budget at the expense, if necessary, of the defence budget; and, in general, seek allies among "like-minded" nations wherever they are located – the sponsors of the Five-Continent Peace Initiative, for example.

By and large, Canadian governments have accepted the "conventional" assumptions described above, although not without occasional misgivings over particular policies of our allies, especially the US. We

have been skeptical about the contention that there is a Soviet hand in most of the world's trouble spots. Canada has been much more willing than the US to accept such countries as Cuba and Nicaragua (or, in 1968, China) as legitimate partners rather than enemies. But in dealings with the Soviet Union, Canadian governments, and most Canadians, have accepted the vision of the USSR as the "adversary," if not the "enemy," and have supported the strategic posture which is the logical consequence of that view.

So far at least, the "naive" assumptions described above have failed to dislodge the basic conviction that, unchecked, the USSR would necessarily expand its power and influence in the world. A commonly heard claim is that the peace in Europe has been preserved for almost forty years because the armed forces of the Western Allies have deterred "Soviet expansionism."

It is impossible to test this claim, but it need not be accepted as revealed truth. My own view is that the conventional assumptions about Soviet objectives in Europe are now outdated, if indeed they were correct in 1949. In any event, the effort to preserve the balance of power in Europe has led to the taking of steps on both sides which threaten rather than enhance peace and security, e.g. the build-up of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

What is to be done to control and reduce the scale of nuclear confrontation both in Europe and around the world? The naive assumptions here run into the

obstacle of political realism espoused by the great majority of those in government, the media and the "establishment." This is the view that, if the US rejects most of these assumptions, Canada cannot promote them without damaging the bilateral relationship. This is all the more true if the major NATO allies also reject these assumptions, which at present they do. I say "at present," for it would not be surprising if the new Soviet proposals for arms control and disarmament have some effect on European opinion in the months ahead. For example, a Soviet move towards more realistic measures for verification, including on-site inspection to monitor weapons reductions and troop withdrawals, could create a favourable response in Western Europe.

Perhaps the key word in this debate is "stability." Is nuclear deterrence stable? If it has kept us from nuclear war for forty years, will it continue to do so? The conventional answer is "yes," but Canadians should not accept this answer without reservations. Disarmament is no guarantee of stability, but neither is the "balance of power." New weapons, new doctrines, new fears can upset the fragile confidence on which stability rests. That is the problem with the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI): whether or not the technology is viable, SDI may block efforts in Geneva to reach negotiated agreements on nuclear weapons. Without such agreements, tensions are bound to rise, and the security of Canada

will be affected, whether or not we participate in SDI.

We would be foolish to expect stability to prevail in some areas of the Third World, in Eastern Europe and in parts of the West. Conflict and crisis are endemic in these areas. What we need are better methods to manage such crises, including a revival of the functions of the Security Council of the UN, the permanent members of which are the nuclear weapons states. Countries which can afford to provide military assistance to the UN Security Council must be ready to do so. Canada is one of these countries.

My own assumptions about Canada's strategic situation would be something of a mix of the two lists I have given.

While I have said that our traditional concept of "enemy" is out of date, it must be noted that Marxist/Leninist ideology describes a similar enemy – "imperialism." But there is evidence that in the Soviet Union today the principle purpose of policy is to reach some kind of *modus vivendi* with the West, based on arms control and exchange agreements. Public opinion in both East and West seems to be moving towards a common vision of the "enemy" as nuclear war itself.

How do we prevent that war? I doubt that the conventional view of deterrence is an adequate basis for long-term security, but for the time being there may be no practical alternative. We shall have to hope that measures to reduce troop levels and conventional weapons in Europe, to-

gether with agreements to scale down nuclear arsenals at all levels, will produce an international environment in which co-operation will eventually be substituted for deterrence. Conditions in the Third World, where Soviet planners assume there will be a continuing evolution of social forces in favour of "socialism," will make it difficult to put co-operation into practice. Perhaps there will be little choice. Global problems in the year 2000, with six billion people severely taxing the carrying capacity of the planet, may compel co-operation.

Canada is not in a position to defend itself alone; the defence of North America is indeed a single problem. The US will take account of our views in proportion to our willingness to contribute

to defence, but we should link our defence co-operation with the US to Canadian perspectives on strategic arms reductions.

To "refuse the cruise" contributes little to East/West relations. But we would not be testing the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) if such weapons systems had been banned. The cruise missile issue was formerly on the table at Geneva, and could be put there again.

The Atlantic Alliance offers, in addition to the means for defence co-operation, a vehicle for the expression of Canadian priorities, an insight that the Canadians who negotiated the North Atlantic Treaty had very much in mind. Let's make the best use of it. □



LETTER FROM NICOSIA *By James Travers*



Along the green line that has separated both Cyprus and Cypriots for more than a decade, paint is peeling on the

United Nations' bright blue barriers and rust gnaws at the hoops of barbed wire.

■ On an unseasonably warm spring day, bouzouki music eddies quietly around a Greek Cypriot position while Turkish troopers swat flies and swap tales on the other side of no-man's land. A light breeze stirs the flags of the two armies and the six-nation UN peace-keeping force. Opponents lazily eye each other across a strip of land that measures four metres at its narrowest point.

In Sector Four, a seven-kilometre urban wasteland patrolled by Canadians since late 1974, guns and the wearying routine ensure the status quo.

"This is not a game," says Canadian Commander and UN Deputy Chief of Staff Dean Wellsman. "It's real. The bullets are real and the potential for trouble is always there."

But rarely does the grit that still rubs raw in the Cyprus wound lead to anything more serious than the hurling of rocks and insults across the buffer zone that gave the world the term 'green line.' A little more than two years ago a Greek soldier infuriated a Turk and was shot dead. The Canadians managed to defuse that crisis and today there is little sense that anyone wants to disturb the island's awkward but acceptable equilibrium.

So successful has the peace-keeping force been that 500,000 Greek and 150,000 Turkish

Cypriots have settled comfortably into their enclaves. Critics now question whether the 2,400-man force has not become just another institutionalized part of a problem that, since 1964, has brought 26,000 Canadians and every regular duty regiment here at least once.



The argument has its points. The force's presence has given Greek and Turkish Cypriots the luxury of intransigence while costing the United Nations and the contributing countries to date more than \$1.8 billion, a total that now rises by \$125 million annually.

Lack of progress and the cost to an institution facing a financial crisis have plagued UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. He has seen his hopes of shaping peace-keeping into peace-making frustrated by leaders who are neither bold enough nor brave enough to push conservative constituencies into the compromises that are needed to reunite Cyprus.

De Cuellar's position is unenviable. He cannot bully either President Spyros Kyprianou or Rauf Denktas, leader of the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and he can't risk pulling the force out.

"If the peace-keeping force wasn't here it would break out into open warfare, like Beirut," UN spokesman Major Rod MacArthur said recently.

Another less conventional argument in favour of peace-keepers was inadvertently put forward by President Ronald Reagan when he ordered US forces into action against Libya.

But rarely does the grit... lead to anything more serious than the hurling of rocks and insults across the buffer zone that gave the world the term 'green line.'

The naval clashes in the Gulf of Sidra followed by the air-strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi sent waves of apprehension rolling across this island. Cyprus, with its open borders and mix of East and West, suddenly seemed more vulnerable to violence from without than that from within.

In what was said to be an attempt to prevent potential retaliation against Britons, Canadian troops were deployed around the British High Commission, located in the buffer zone. Here in the capital, US and other Western diplomats lay low and events that would have brought expatriates together were cancelled.

So far the threats of retaliation have proven empty. They did, however, demonstrate how much Cypriot concerns have changed since 1974, the year Turkish troops took control of the northern third of the island in the wake of a short-lived coup which had been backed by Greece. No Greek Cypriot ever forgets the events of 1974 and no Turkish Cypriot forgives what happened before that, but the fear that their island might again become a battlefield for warring foreign factions has pushed the internal conflict from the forefront of Cypriot concerns.


That is another luxury the United Nations has made affordable. The UN's highly visible and open-ended presence here has made the island's no-war, no-peace situation not only tolerable but almost normal.

Middle Eastern events are not such a comfortable fit. Living in the turbulent eastern Mediterranean, Cypriots must constantly take the measure of the tides of violence that rise and fall around them. And the high-water marks of those fluctuations somehow seem much more threatening than an incident on the green line or a new political gambit by one side or the other.

In the struggle between Arab and Jew, moderate and radical, there is no green line of fading barrels, barbed wire or flags and the sounds that it makes are not as pleasing to the ear as bouzouki music.

James Travers is Southam News' Middle East correspondent based in Nicosia, Cyprus.

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST *By Jane Boulden*



Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

In his address to the Fortieth Session of the United Nations, Canadian Secretary of State Joe Clark stated that "... for Canada, the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continues to be a fundamental and abiding objective. Our aim is to stop all nuclear testing." In Geneva the United States and Soviet Union have not begun negotiations on a CTB, although the extension and eventual termination of the Soviet unilateral testing moratorium and General-Secretary Gorbachev's March 30 offer of a quick CTB Summit in Europe has meant that the issue has remained an important part of superpower relations and public debate.

On 26 February 1985 the US House of Representatives voted 268-148 in favour of a resolution that urged President Reagan to submit the Threshold Test Ban (TTB) Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty to the Senate for ratification. The resolution also called upon the President to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on a verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty.

Responding to the resolution, Reagan wrote to Senate Republican leader Robert Dole, suggesting that the two treaties needed improved verification methods before they could be submitted for ratification. "The actions called for do not serve the interests of the United States. . . . They would undercut the initiatives I

have proposed to make progress on nuclear test limitations issues and they would set back prospects on a broad range of arms control efforts."

Early in March, the leaders of Sweden, Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Greece, sponsors of the five-continent peace initiative, sent letters to Reagan and Gorbachev offering to help verify a CTB through on-site inspection and seismic monitoring. They asked that both sides refrain from nuclear testing until the next US-USSR Summit. In response Gorbachev stated his willingness to achieve effective verification methods, including on-site inspection, and extended the Soviet unilateral testing moratorium beyond its March 31 deadline. "We cannot extend [the moratorium] unilaterally forever. Having refrained from all nuclear explosions, both test and peaceful, for over seven months now, we have already paid a price both militarily and economically. . . . The Soviet Union shall not conduct nuclear explosions after March 31 either until the United States carries out its first nuclear explosion."

As the Soviet moratorium was brought to an end with a US nuclear test on 3 April 1986, the CIA revealed that it was revising its methods of evaluating Soviet nuclear tests. In the Fall of 1985, a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) panel concluded that previous Government methods of estimating the yield of Soviet tests had been based on faulty assumptions.

Early Warning

30 June - July 3	UN World Disarmament Conference, New York
mid-July	End of 39th Round of MBFR
19 August - 19 September	12th Session CDE, Stockholm
4 November	CSCE Review Conference, Vienna

The main Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk is more geologically stable than the test site at Nevada. This means Soviet explosions generate a larger sound wave through the earth than American tests of the same size. It is unclear how much this revision will affect previous White House claims of Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. A report on this issue has been requested by Reagan in National Security Decision Directive 202.

Geneva Negotiations (Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations)

In a letter to Gorbachev on 25 February 1986 Reagan outlined the American response to the INF elements of the January Gorbachev proposal. After consulting with the European allies, Reagan suggested three options for a three-year plan to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. In the first option both sides would reduce their INF launchers to 140, with a proportionate reduction in Asian-based SS-20s in the first year. In the second year both would reduce their remaining launchers by half and in the third year they would reduce to zero. The second option would eliminate all INF in Europe immediately, with Asian SS-20s limited to Central Asia (out of range of Japan). The US would be permitted to maintain an equal number of INF launchers in the US until all were eliminated by the third year. The final option calls for reductions

over three years of all INF on a global basis. The proposal rejected the Soviet condition that the French and British not build up their intermediate-range nuclear forces.


MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna)

On 20 February the Eastern delegation tabled a new draft treaty, taking into account some of the provisions of the Western proposal of December 1985. The draft treaty suggested reductions of 11,500 Soviet troops and 6,500 American troops (the Western offer proposed reductions of 11,500 and 5,000 respectively). to be followed by a 'no-increase' commitment for three years. Three or four permanent verification posts would be set up on each side and on-site inspection on "justified request" would be permitted. The Western response stated that the draft treaty "failed to move towards the Western position on any substantive issue . . . [it] did not resolve the question of size of initial US and Soviet reduction figures, but rather attempts to perpetuate it in another form." (20 March 1986)

SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)

The SALT II Treaty, which places limits on the strategic nuclear arms of the United States and the Soviet Union, was signed in 1979. Although the Treaty has never been ratified in the US, both sides have continued to comply with its terms. On 27 May President Reagan announced that "in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on . . . the SALT structure."

REPORT FROM THE HILL *By Gregory Wirick*



Attack on Libya

■ On 15 April 1986, the House of Commons held an emergency debate over the US attack on Libya. The opposition was generally critical of the government's support for the US attack, although Liberal Leader John Turner upheld the "US objective in its strike against the core of terrorism." This appeared to put him at odds with every other Liberal who spoke in the debate, namely Brian Tobin, Warren Allmand, Charles Caccia and David Berger.

Several Conservative members also spoke. The Minister of State for External Relations, Monique Vézina, was at pains to reassure Arab nations of Canada's friendship. "The isolated acts of a single government will not be allowed to cloud our perception of the grandeur of their civilization, nor to diminish our desire for substantial and cordial relations." A couple of other Conservative MPs – Doug Lewis, the Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Privy Council, and Tom Hockin, the Co-chairman of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations – cited the statements made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark during his visit to the Middle East. Clark had emphasized the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland within the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

All five of the New Democratic Party members who spoke, including NDP Leader Ed Broadbent, who had proposed the debate, condemned the US raid.

Saad Mujber, Libya's Chief of Protocol whose three-week visit to Canada coincided with the parliamentary debate, said that he was leaving with "A very positive impression." Mr. Mujber was reported as saying that the "noncommittal" official reaction and contradictory statements in Ottawa had led him to believe that Canada had no alternative but to back the attack.

Journalists and other pundits speculated that the issue of free trade talks between the US and Canada was uppermost in the minds of government leaders at the time. These political considerations, they suggested, made officials reluctant to criticize the US raid openly.

New Parliamentary Committees

■ The parliamentary reform package which came into effect in March saw the creation of a newly-organized Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) consisting of eleven members (seven from the government, two from the Liberals and two from the New Democratic Party). The chairman of SCEAIT is Dr. William Winegard, PC, who chaired the previous Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) from 1984 to 1986.

His experiences with international development organizations have convinced him to take, as the first major reference for SCEAIT, a review of the

entire Canadian official development assistance programme. The review began at the beginning of April 1986 and will be completed by June 1987. The other members of SCEAIT are: Lloyd Axworthy, Liberal Trade Critic; Pauline Jewett, NDP External Affairs Critic; Donald Johnston, Liberal External Affairs Critic; Steven Langdon, NDP Trade Critic; Robert Corbett, PC; Benno Friesen, PC; Nic Leblanc, PC; William Lesick, PC; Donald Ravis, PC; and John Reimer, PC.

The chairman of the new National Defence Committee is Patrick Crofton, PC. He was an officer in the Royal Canadian Navy from 1953 to 1971, retiring with the rank of Lieutenant-Commander.

The other members of the committee are: Derek Blackburn, NDP Defence Critic; Leonard Hopkins, Liberal Defence Critic; Stan Darling, PC; Robert Hicks, PC; Fernand Jourdenais, PC; and Allan McKinnon, PC, Minister of National Defence from 1979 to 1980.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, under its chairman, George van Roggen of British Columbia, is pursuing an extensive study of the problems of international debt. Since the Senate is not obliged to set a deadline for its references, it is unclear when this study will be completed. The future of the Senate Special Committee on National Defence is also not clear, although it is known that its chairman would like to continue to investigate specific aspects of Canadian defence requirements.

Most Members of Parliament could not be happier with the new changes in their status. As columnist Jeffrey Simpson wrote in the *Globe and Mail* (16 April 1986), "The new Commons rules give committees an expanded role. The chairman of these committees, previously considered rather insignificant characters around Ottawa, are suddenly somebodies." The new reality, Simpson continued, is that "giving MPs more independence means stronger committees, making Parliament a better expression of public opinion and running the risk of producing more headaches for the Government." By the next reporting, we may have a better idea of how significant the headaches are likely to be.

Joint Committee

■ The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations – which is reviewing the government's Green Paper, *Competitiveness and Security* – completed its hearings on 25 April 1986. By then the committee had visited centres in every province and both of the territories in an attempt to gain a comprehensive sampling of public opinion. In each centre, panels were organized on topics of specific interest to the region and a wide range of individuals and groups made presentations.

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE

■ In March, **John Toogood** joined the staff of the Institute as Secretary-Treasurer. A former naval captain, Mr. Toogood retired from the Canadian Armed Forces in mid-1985, where he had served as Director of Arms Control Policy in National Defence Headquarters and a member of Canadian delegations to a number of arms control negotiations including both the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). His Background Paper on these negotiations is available from the Institute.

■ **John Burton** of the Centre for International Development at the University of Maryland was the opening speaker at a workshop on conflict resolution organized by the Institute in early May. Other participants included **Brian Mandell** from the Department of National Defence, **Ronald Fisher** from the University of Saskatchewan, **James Laue** from the University of Missouri, **Janice Stein** from University of Toronto, **David deWitt**, from York University, **Harald von Riekhoff** and **John Sigler** from Carleton University, **Hanna Newcombe** from the Peace Research Institute in Dundas, **David Cox** and other members of the Institute staff. The workshop gathered together researchers to give advice to the Institute on the development of its research programme in the area of conflict resolution.

■ **Bruce Blair** of the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, visited the Institute on 26 May to speak at a press briefing and at a seminar for interested individuals. Mr. Blair later went on to Vancouver to attend the week-long conference on Accidental

Nuclear War funded by the Institute and organized by Professor **Michael Wallace** of UBC.

■ In late April, **Geoffrey Pearson** attended a UN conference in Sicily entitled, 'Strategic Stability and Mutual Security in

the Year 2000.' From Sicily he went on to Shannon, Ireland to attend a conference on peace-building sponsored by the Irish Peace Institute. Later in May, Mr. Pearson spoke to the Americas Society in New York on East/West relations. In June he visited the

USSR as the guest of the Institute of the USA and Canada and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. From the Soviet Union Mr. Pearson went to Oxford, UK, where he participated in a Ditchley Foundation conference on East/West Relations.

PUBLIC PROGRAMMES GRANTS Fourth Quarter 1985-86

Canadian Bar Association , Ottawa. Canadian Conference on Nuclear Weapons and the Law, 2-4 November 1986.	\$20,000
Canadian Association of Adult Education , Toronto. Workshop and special issue of 'Learning' Magazine.	9,800
Coalition québécoise pour le désarmement et la paix , Montréal. Kiosque: Salon international de la jeunesse, 13-19 mai 1986.	3,000
Co-op Radio , Vancouver. Women Talking Peace, Broadcast series.	5,000
McGill Faculty of Education/GEMS Conference Services , Montreal. Conference: 'Illusions and Realities in the Nuclear Age,' 21-23 April 1986.	6,000
Global Education Workshops , Stanstead, Quebec. Series of weekend workshops on Global Education, January - June 1986.	1,500
Kawartha Ploughshares , Lakefield, Ontario. Film Festival: 'Everyday Life in the Soviet Union,' 21-23 March 1986.	800
Les Productions Paix-Licule , Montréal. Video: La marche pour la paix en Amérique centrale.	5,000
Manitoba Peace Associates , Winnipeg. Conference 'In Search of Peace - Disarming the World,' 7-8 March 1986.	7,000
National Film Board of Canada , Montreal. Multi-media kit for schools.	8,000

Now Rooz , Toronto. Spring Festival on Peace and Multi-culturalism, 22 March 1986.	5,000
Peace Resource Centre , Ottawa. Ottawa Peace Calendar/Ottawa Peace News.	7,500
Pembina Institute , Alberta. Directory of Peace Educators in Canada.	8,000
St. John's Ploughshares , Newfoundland. Newsletter.	3,000
St-Paul University , Ottawa. Conference: 'Quest for Peace in Our Day,' 16-18 May 1986.	5,500
Université de Québec à Montréal . Semaine culturelle, 10-14 mars 1986.	7,000
Theatre of Change , Toronto. Play: 'Mother Courage and her Children,' Summer 1986.	7,000
Toronto Disarmament Network , Toronto. Education-Outreach Programme.	8,000
Groupe de recherche sur la paix , Université Laval, Québec. Bibliographie spécialisée sur paix, guerre et désarmement.	6,000
Janice Williamson , Toronto. Book: Canadian Women and Peace.	3,300
Total	\$126,400

RESEARCH GRANTS Fourth Quarter 1985-86

Mandell, Brian , Ottawa. Improving Performance in International Crisis Management.	\$10,000
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Centre québécois de relations internationales , Université Laval. La position canadienne en matière de désarmement.	
UNITAR , New York. The UN and Maintenance of International Peace and Security Conference	
Borgese, Elisabeth Mann , Hallé World Space Organization	
Research Programme in Strategic Studies , York University. Sovereignty, Security, and the Arctic.	
Parker, Ross , McMaster University. Canadian Children's Concern: Their Future.	5,000
von Riekhoff, Harald , Carleton University. Conference: Cohesion and the Warsaw Pact.	9,000
IUS-Canada , Calgary. Conference: Air Defence.	6,700
Soderlund, Walter , University of Windsor. North American Press Coverage of the 1984 Critical Election in the Caribbean Basin.	1,500
Centre for International Research and Training , Carleton University. Bibliography on Conflict Resolution.	3,000
Centre for Communication, Culture and Society , Carleton University. Media/Peace/Disarmament.	9,451
Mosco, Vincent , Queen's University. Economic Study on the Strategic Computing System of the USA	1,500
Norman Paterson School , Carleton University. International Negotiation Training Exercise.	2,000
Total	\$124,500

UPCOMING EVENTS

Date	Event	Sponsor(s)	City
6-12 July	International Institute for Peace Education	Faculty of Education, U. of Alberta	Edmonton
22-29 July	International Women's Seminar	Woman's International League for Peace and Freedom (Geneva)	Utrecht, Netherlands
3-8 August	International Perspectives on Peace and Education	Centre for Global Peace and Education, Western Washington U.	Bellingham, Washington
5-7 September	Conference: 'Toward a Common Security'	The Group of 78	Stoney Lake, Ontario
8-9 November	The True North Strong and Free? Nuclear Arms and Canadian Policy	Council of Canadians, Physicians for Social Responsibility	Edmonton

BIBLIOGRAPHY/AV RESOURCES

South Africa

■ O'Brien, Conor Cruise. "What Can Become of South Africa?" *The Atlantic*, March 1986, pp. 41-68.

A thoughtful, impressionistic essay on South African history and its relevance to the present critical situation.

■ Smiley, Xan. "A Black South Africa?" *The Economist*, February 1, 1986, pp. 33-34.

This frank and realistic assessment of the South African situation ends with the view that "the quicker the white tribe submits, the better its chance of a bearable (and non-Communist) future in a black-ruled South Africa."

Africa (general)

■ Lamb, David. *The Africans*. New York: Vintage Books, 1983.

Lamb, as a journalist for the *Los Angeles Times*, has reported on all the nations of post-colonial Africa. Here, he summarizes his experience of those nations, their people and their leaders, with all the liveliness of a journalist, but with enough historical detail to give the book substance.

■ Meredith, Martin. *The First Dance of Freedom: Black Africa in the Postwar Era*. London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1985.

A lively, readable and informative account of the anti-colonial movements led by men such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, and Patrice Lumumba.

SDI and Canada

■ *Canada's Territorial Defence*. Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985. (Eng. & Fr.)

The committee considers the problem of modernizing the North Warning System in light of new technologies and new thrusts in US strategic doctrine. This report summarizes the debate and excerpts many of the testimonies before the committee.

■ Lamb, John M. and Ronald G. Purver. "Is Canada Defensive about NORAD?" *Arms Control Today*, March 1986, pp. 10-12.

Lamb and Purver, from the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (CCACD) in Ottawa, review the sticky problems of belonging to NORAD while declining to participate in Star Wars.

■ Rosenblum, S. *Misguided Missiles: Canada, the Cruise and Star Wars*. Toronto: Lorimer & Company, 1985.

A clearly written, accessible account of the implications for Canada of the push for strategic defence ("Star Wars") and the Soviet and US deployment of long-range cruise missiles. The author argues that Canada should oppose both developments.

The Nuclear World

■ Allison, G.T., Carnesale, A. and Nye, J.S. Jr., (eds.) *Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1985.

Explores five ways a nuclear war might start and gives forty specific recommendations for reducing those risks.

■ Arkin, William M. and Richard W. Fieldhouse. *Nuclear Battlefields*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985.

The authors have dug deep to provide a comprehensive, detailed picture of nuclear planning and deployment, in what has

become one of the indispensable reference texts for the nuclear age.

■ Cohen, Stephen. *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Stephen Cohen, a well-known American Sovietologist, challenges some of our stereotypes of the Soviet Union and her people.

■ Paul, Derek (ed.) *Defending Europe: Options for Security*. London: Taylor and Francis, 1985.

The proceedings of the conference on "European Security Requirements and the MBFR Talks," sponsored by Science for Peace, Toronto. The analyses and opinions cover the spectrum from "conventional" to "radical."

AUDIO/VISUAL RESOURCE

■ *Defence of Canada*

By Gwynne Dyer
Reviewed by John Walker

Co-produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Company and the National Film Board of Canada in 3 one-hour episodes.

Defence of Canada is chiefly concerned with considering alternatives to what Dyer called the "alliance game."

The interviews with retired diplomats, politicians and military men recalled some interesting background about how we got into NATO, idealistically hoping that it would be a temporary thing and that the alliance would contain both of those burgeoning nuclear powers, the US and the USSR. They also provided useful reminders of the haphazard and ill-informed way in which Canada got involved in NORAD.

Watching Dyer in his casual designer jackets and listening to his world-weary voice dissecting clichés about Canada's defence roles will probably make old sweats and military officials fume, but if it makes ordinary Canadians think harder about the serious defence questions facing this country, the series will have achieved its aim.

A book based on the series will be published later this year by CBC and Lester & Orpen Dennys.

INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS

■ *Background Papers*

1. Canadian Response to the Strategic Defence Initiative – Gregory Wirick
2. A Nuclear Freeze? – David Cox
3. Nuclear Winter – Leonard Bertin
4. Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty – William Epstein
5. Conventional Arms Control Negotiations in Europe – John Toogood
6. The Origins of the Canadian Institute for International Peace & Security – Gilles Grondin

■ *Points of View*

1. East/West Relations: Values, Interests, Perceptions – Geoffrey Pearson

■ *Conference Reports*

1. Negotiations for Peace in Central America – Liisa North
2. Challenges to Deterrence: Doctrines, Technologies and Public Concerns – Dianne DeMille

■ *Occasional Papers*

1. Superpower Rivalry and Soviet Policy in the Caribbean Basin – S. Neil MacFarlane

Bibliographie/Documents audiovisuels

Par le biais d'entrevues avec

d'anciens diplomates, politiques et militaires, M. Dyer rappelle des détails intéressants sur la façon dont nous avons adhéré à l'OTAN en espérant un peu naïvement que l'alliance serait temporaire et qu'elle comprendrait les deux puissances nucléaires naissantes alors, à savoir les États-Unis et l'URSS. Les entrevues soulignent comment le Canada est devenu membre du NORAD, à l'aveuglette et sans être bien informé.

Dyer, dans ses blasons à la mode, dissèque au sujet des rôles du Canada en matière de défense, s'attirera sans doute les foudres des vieux de la vieille et des autorités militaires, mais s'il réussit à inciter le citoyen canadien moyen à réfléchir davantage aux sérénités questions de défense qui se posent à notre pays, il aura atteint son objectif.

La Société Radio-Canada et la maison Lester & Orpen Dennys publieront plus tard cette année un livre sur la mini-série.

PUBLICATIONS DE L'INSTITUT

■ Exposés

1. L'Initiative de défense stratégique : Qu'en pense le Canada – Gregory Wrick

2. Un gel nucléaire ? – David Cox

3. L'hiver nucléaire – Leonard Bertin

4. La non-prolifération des armes nucléaires – William Epstein

5. Les négociations sur la limitation des armes classiques en Europe – John Toogood

6. Les origines de l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationale – Gilles Grondin

■ Opinions

1. Les relations Est-Ouest : valeurs, intérêts et perceptions – Geoffrey Pearson

■ Rapports

1. Les négociations pour la paix en Amérique centrale – Liisa North

■ La défense du Canada, par Gwynne Dyer

(Coproduction de la Société Radio-Canada et de l'Office national du film; 3 épisodes d'une heure chacun.) Analyse rédigée par John Walker. L'émission télévisée en trois épisodes, intitulée *La défense du Canada* et préparée par Gwynne Dyer, porte principalement sur les choix qui s'offrent à notre pays en dehors de ce qu'il appelle le "jeu des alliances".

Le domaine nucléaire

■ Allison, G.T., Carnesale, A. et Nye, J.S. fils, (éd.), *Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An agenda for avoiding Nuclear War*. New York : W.W. Norton and Company, 1985.

L'ouvrage examine cinq contextes dans lesquels une guerre nucléaire pourrait éclater et il présente quarante recommandations précises pour réduire l'ampleur d'un tel risque.

■ Arkin, William M. et Fieldhouse, Richard W. *Nuclear Battlefield*. Cambridge (Massachusetts) : Ballinger, 1985.

Les auteurs ont fait des recherches poussées pour décrire en détail la planification nucléaire et le déploiement des forces nucléaires dans le monde. Ce livre constitue un ouvrage de référence indispensable sur l'ère nucléaire.

■ Cohen, Stephen. *Reinventing the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1985.

M. Stephen Cohen est un soviétologue américain bien connu. Dans ce petit traité, il tente de dissiper certains de nos préjugés au sujet de l'Union soviétique et de sa population.

■ Paul, Derek (éd.), *Defending Europe: Options for Security*. Londres : Taylor and Francis, 1985.

Compte rendu de la conférence organisée par *Science for Peace*, à Toronto, et intitulée *Les besoins de l'Europe en matière de sécurité et les pourparlers MBFR*. On y trouve des analyses et des opinions qui couvrent toute la gamme des degrés, depuis "classique" jusqu'à "radical".

DOCUMENT AUDIOVISUEL

■ *La défense du Canada*, par Gwynne Dyer

LIDS et le Canada

La défense aérienne du territoire canadien. Rapport du Comité spécial du Sénat sur la Défense nationale. Ottawa, Approuvée par le Comité Services Canada, 1985 (anglais et français)

Le Comité se penche sur les difficultés que présente la création du Système d'alerte du Nord, compte tenu des nouvelles technologies et des nouvelles orientations de la doctrine stratégique américaine. Le rapport résume le débat et contient des extraits de nombreux témoignages déposés devant le Comité.

Dossier *Star Wars*. *L'Analyse*, n° 13, printemps 1986, pp. 28-39.

Cinq contributions au dossier de l'Initiative de défense stratégique. Michel Fortmann traite des aspects techniques; Charles-Philippe David parle des États-Unis en quête d'une ligne Maginot; Jocelyn Coulon décrit les réactions de l'Europe devant l'IDS; Jacques Lévesque analyse la position de l'URSS face à l'IDS, et enfin, Albert Legault réfléchit à l'attitude du Canada devant le défi technologique.

Lamb, John M. et Ronald G. Purver. *"Is Canada Defensive about NORAD?" Arms Control Today*, mars 1986, pp. 10-12.

MM. Lamb et Purver, qui appartiennent tous deux au Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement (CCCAD), situé à Ottawa, se penchent sur la question épineuse à laquelle le Canada doit trouver réponse, lui qui appartient au NORAD mais qui refuse de participer à la Guerre des étoiles.

Rosenblum, S. *Misguided Missiles: Canada, the Cruise and Star Wars*. Toronto : Lorimer & Company, 1985.

Exposé clair et à la portée du grand public sur les conséquences, la défense stratégique (ou "Guerre des étoiles") et du déploiement des missiles de croisière à grand rayon d'action par les Soviétiques et les Américains. L'auteur croit que le Canada devrait s'opposer à ces deux projets.

Exposé public et à la portée du grand public sur les conséquences, la défense stratégique (ou "Guerre des étoiles") et du déploiement des missiles de croisière à grand rayon d'action par les Soviétiques et les Américains. L'auteur croit que le Canada devrait s'opposer à ces deux projets.

Afrique du Sud

■ O'Brien, Conor Cruise. "What Can Become of South Africa?" *The Atlantic*, mars 1986, pp. 41-48.

Exposé impressionniste et sérieux sur l'histoire de l'Afrique du Sud et sur sa pertinence par rapport à l'époque troublée actuelle où les jeunes noirs brûlent des personnes dans la rue au nom de la justice. Les Afrikaners, à l'instar des Algériens blancs, sont résolus à lutter jusqu'à la fin, et cette attitude risque de constituer un obstacle de taille à l'élimination de l'apartheid. L'auteur conclut en présentant un scénario surprenant : une intervention américano-soviétique sous les couleurs de l'ONU, pour provoquer la capitulation des Afrikaners devant le pouvoir de la majorité noire.

■ Smiley, Xan. "A Black South Africa?" *The Economist*, 1^{er} février 1984, pp. 33 et 34.

Cette évaluation réaliste et honnête de la conjoncture sud-africaine conclut que plus les Blancs se soumettront vite, meilleures seront leurs chances de connaître un avenir acceptable (et non communiste) dans une Afrique du Sud dirigée par des Noirs.

Afrique (en général)

■ Lamb, David. *The Africans*. New York : Vintage Books, 1983.

En sa qualité de journaliste du *Los Angeles Times*, M. Lamb a fait des reportages sur tous les pays d'Afrique ayant accédé à l'indépendance après l'époque coloniale. Il résume ici ce qu'il connaît de ces pays, de leurs peuples et de leurs chefs; le récit empreint de la vivacité caractéristique des écrits journalistiques contient néanmoins suffisamment de détails historiques pour avoir droit de cité.

Microfilm. Martin. *The First Dance of Freedom: Black Africa in the Postwar Era*. Londres : Sphere Books Ltd., 1985.

Récit pittoresque, informatif et agréable à lire sur les mouvements anticolonialistes dirigés par des hommes tels que Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta et Patrice Lumumba.

Nouvelles de l'Institut

sciences et de l'Institut des affaires canado-américaines de Moscou. M. Pearson est ensuite parti pour Oxford (R.-U.) où il a pris part à une conférence de la Ditchley Foundation sur les relations Est-Ouest.

PROGRAMMES PUBLICS -	Subventions du quatrième trimestre (1985-1986)	Association du Barreau canadien, Ottawa, Conférence canadienne sur les armes nucléaires et le Droit, du 2 au 4 novembre 1986.	Association canadienne pour l'éducation des adultes, Toronto, Learning, Atelier et numéro spécial du magazine	9 800 \$	Conférence intitulée A la recherche de la paix, à notre époque, du 16 au 18 mai 1986.	Université de Québec à Montréal, Semaine culturelle, du 10 au 14 mars 1986.	Theatre of Change, Toronto, Pièce intitulée Mother Courage and her Children, été 1986.	7 000 \$	Toronto Disarmament Network, Toronto, Programme d'éducation et de sensibilisation.	8 000 \$	Groupe de recherche sur la paix, la Bibliographie spécialisée sur la paix, la guerre et le désarmement, Janice Williamson, Toronto, Livre intitulé Canadian Women and Peace.	3 300 \$	Total	126 400 \$	Mandell, Brian, Ottawa, Mieux gérer les crises internationales.	10 000 \$
														</		

tant qu'il invite de l'Académie des

En juin, il s'est rendu en URSS en

il y a parlé des relations Est-Ouest.

Wamarcas Society, à New York, et

ard en mai, M. Pearson s'est adressé

sée par l'Irish Peace Institute. Plus

assister à une conférence de l'ONU intitulée "La stabilité stratégique et la sécurité mondiale en l'an 2000". De là, il est allé à Shannon (Irlande) où il a participé à une conférence sur la recherche de la paix, organi-

En mars, M. John Toogood est devenu secrétaire-trésorier de l'Institut. M. Toogood a été captaine (Marine) dans les Forces canadiennes qu'il a quittées vers le milieu le 1985. Il était alors Directeur des politiques de contrôle des armes à l'Institut.

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
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En direct de la colline parlementaire

Par Gregory Wirick



L'attaque contre la Libye

Le 15 avril 1986, la Chambre des communes a tenu un débat d'urgence

sur l'attaque américaine contre la Libye. En général, l'opposition a

critiqué la décision du gouvernement d'avoir appuyé les E.-U. dans

leur démarche, bien que le chef libé-

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positive". M. Mijber aurait soutenu que les déclarations contradictoires à Ottawa et le fait que le gouvernement avait réagi officiellement de façon à ne pas se compromettre lui faisaient croire que le Canada n'avait d'autre choix que d'appuyer l'attaque américaine.

Les journalistes et d'autres experts ont estimé que la question des pour-

parlers canado-américains sur le libre-échange préoccupait les diri-

geants gouvernementaux au plus haut point à ce moment-là, et que

cela expliquait pourquoi ces der-

niers s'étaient abstenus de critiquer ouvertement le raid américain.

Par suite de la réforme parlementaire amorcée en mars dernier, un

nouveau comité a été formé : il s'agit du Comité permanent des affaires

étrangères et du commerce extérieur (CPAEC), composé de onze mem-

bres (sept conservateurs, deux libé-

raux et deux néo-démocrates). Le président du CPAEC est M. William

Winograd (PC), qui avait présidé l'ancien Comité permanent des af-

aires étrangères et de la défense nationale (CPABDN) de 1984 à 1986.

Ayant oeuvré en collaboration avec des organismes qui s'occupent

de développement international, M. Winograd en est venu à la con-

clusion que le CPAEC devait, en tout premier lieu, entreprendre la

révision de tout le programme cana-

dien d'aide au développement. Cette

révision a débuté en avril 1986 et elle

se terminera en juin 1987. Les autres

membres du CPAEC sont M. Lloyd

Axworthy, critique libéral en ma-

tière de Commerce, Mme Pauline

Jewett, critique du NPD pour les

Affaires extérieures, M. Donald

Johnston, critique libéral pour les

Affaires extérieures, M. Steven

Langdon, critique du NPD en ma-

tière de Commerce, M. Robert

Corbett (PC), M. Benno Friesen

(PC), M. Nic LeBlanc (PC), M.

William Lesick (PC), M. Donald

Kavis (PC) et M. John Reimer (PC).

Le président du nouveau Comité

de la défense nationale est M. Patrick

Crofton (PC). Il a été officier dans

la Marine royale du Canada de 1953

à 1971 et, au moment de prendre sa

retraite, il était lieutenant-commander.

Les autres membres du Comité

sont MM. Derek Blackburn, criti-

que du NPD en matière de Défense,

Leonard Hopkins, critique libéral

pour la Défense, Stan Darling

(PC), Robert Hicks (PC), Fernand

Joudenis (PC) et Allan McKinnon

(PC) qui a été ministre de la Défense

nationale de 1979 à 1980.

Le Comité sénatorial permanent

des affaires étrangères, présidé par

M. George van Roggen, de la

Colombie-Britannique, effectue

actuellement une étude exhaustive

des problèmes associés à la dette

internationale. Puisque les comités

du Sénat ne sont pas tenus de fixer

une échéance pour la remise de

leurs rapports, on ne sait pas exacte-

ment quand l'étude sera terminée.

L'avenir du Comité spécial du Sénat

sur la défense nationale est égale-

ment incertain, mais on sait que son

président souhaite pouvoir continuer

à examiner des aspects particuliers

Unies et l'Afrique australe.

Les audiences du Comité mixte

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des besoins du Canada en matière

de défense.

La plupart des députés sont com-

missaires du changement dans

leur rôle. Dans sa chronique de

Globe and Mail du 16 avril 1986,

Jeffrey Simpson écrivait ce qui suit :

"Les nouveaux règlements des

Communes élargissent le rôle des

comités. Les présidents de ces comi-

tés, considérés auparavant comme

quantités négligeables, deviennent

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plus grande indépendance accordée

aux députés renforcera les comités

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engendrera sans doute encore plus

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
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Condensé sur la limitation des armements

Par Jane Boulden



Traité sur l'interdiction complète des essais

■ Dans le discours qu'il a prononcé à la Quarantième session de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, le

ministre canadien des Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, a déclaré qu'aux yeux du Canada, "la mise au point d'un Traité sur l'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires reste un objectif fondamental. Nous

avons pour but la cessation de tous les essais nucléaires." A Genève, l'Union soviétique et l'Union soviétique

sur un tel traité, mais comme Moscou a projeté, avant d'y mettre fin, le moratoire unilatéral visant les essais et que le Secrétaire général du

Parti, M. Gorbatchev, a proposé le 30 mars de tenir sans tarder en Europe un sommet sur la question, on peut en déduire que celle-ci

démontre un élément important du débat public et des relations entre les superpuissances.

Le 26 février 1985, la Chambre des représentants aux E.-U. a voté à 268 voix contre 148 en faveur d'une résolution qui exhorte le Président Reagan à soumettre au Sénat le

Traité sur la limitation des essais nucléaires (TTBT) et le Traité sur les explosions nucléaires buts pacifiques (PNE) pour leur faire ratifier. La résolution invitait par

ailleurs le Président à entreprendre des pourparlers avec l'Union soviétique au sujet d'un traité vérifiable sur l'interdiction complète des essais.

Le Président a répondu en écrit-avant à M. Robert Doole, Chef de la majorité républicaine au Sénat. Dans sa lettre, il donna à entendre

qu'il fallait intégrer de meilleures méthodes de vérification aux deux puits être envisagée. "Les actions

proposées ne servent pas les intérêts des Etats-Unis... Elles nuiraient aux démarches que j'ai proposées pour faire progresser le débat sur la limitation des essais nucléaires et elles entraveraient toute une gamme

d'efforts visant à limiter les armements."

Au début de mars, les dirigeants de la Suède, de l'Argentine, de l'Inde, du Mexique, de la Tanzanie et de la Grèce, auteurs de la proposition dite

M.M. Gorbatchev et Reagan pour "des cinq continents", ont écrit à MM. Gorbatchev et Reagan pour leur offrir de les aider à vérifier

l'application d'un traité sur l'interdiction complète des essais, par des inspections sur place et l'emploi de

inspections sur place et l'emploi de sismographes, et pour les priver de travers les couches terrestres que les

essais américains de même ampleur. On ne sait pas encore comment cette

révision influera sur les estimations antérieures de la Maison Blanche concernant les violations du Traité

sur la limitation des essais nucléaires. M. Reagan a demandé un rapport sur cette question dans sa

Directive décisionnelle n°202 sur la sécurité nationale.

■ Dans une lettre qu'il adressait à M. Gorbatchev le 25 février 1986, M. Reagan a esquisé la réponse

américaine à la proposition formulée par le dirigeant soviétique en

janvier au sujet des armes INF. Après avoir consulté ses alliés européens, M. Reagan a présenté trois

différents plans triennaux tous destinés à débarrasser l'Europe des armes à portée intermédiaire. En

vertu du premier plan, les deux blocs réduiraient à 140 le nombre de leurs lanceurs INF au cours de la première

année, et les Soviétiques abaisseraient en proportion le nombre de missiles SS-20 basés en Asie. La

deuxième année, les deux alliances lanceraient des SS-20 qu'en Asie centrale (hors de portée du Japon).

Les E.-U. conserveraient un nombre équivalent de lanceurs INF sur leur

Calendrier

30 juin - 3 juillet

Conférence mondiale de l'ONU sur le

désarmement, à New York

19 août - 19 septembre

12^e session de la CDE, à Stockholm

4 novembre

Conférence d'examen de la CSCF, à Vienne

par les gouvernements précédents pour estimer la puissance des essais

soviétiques étaient fondées sur de fausses hypothèses. Le principal

palatinak est situé dans une région plus stable que le Nevada, géologiquement parlant. Cela signifie que

les explosions soviétiques engendrent une onde sonore plus forte à

travers les couches terrestres que les essais américains de même ampleur.

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Les E.-U. conserveraient un nombre équivalent de lanceurs INF sur leur

territoire jusqu'à l'élimination complète de ces engins avant la fin de la troisième année. Le dernier plan prévoit l'élimination graduelle de toutes les armes INF en Europe et en Asie.

La proposition américaine rejetait la condition soviétique à savoir qu'il soit interdit aux Français et aux Britanniques d'accroître leurs forces.

MBFR (Pourparlers sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces, à Vienne)

Le 20 février, la délégation des pays de l'Est a déposé un nouveau projet de traité qui prend en compte certains éléments de la proposition occidentale de décembre 1985. Le

II 500 soldats soviétiques et de 6 500 soldats américains (la proposition occidentale citait des réductions de

II 500 et de 5 000 soldats, respectivement), les deux blocs s'engagent par la suite à ne pas augmenter leurs effectifs pendant trois ans. Trois des

quatre postes permanents de vérification seraient installés de chaque côté et, à condition qu'une demande

en ce sens soit justifiée, des inspections sur place seraient permises.

Les Occidentaux ont déclaré que le projet de traité ne traduisait aucun rapprochement sur les questions de

fonds... et qu'il ne résolvait pas le problème initial, à savoir s'entendre sur l'importance numérique des

troupes actuellement stationnées dans la région; bien au contraire, il cherchait à le perpétuer sous

une autre forme. (20 mars 1986)

SALT II (Pourparlers sur la limitation des armements stratégiques)

Le Traité SALT II, qui impose des restrictions aux arsenaux nucléaires stratégiques des Etats-Unis et de l'Union soviétique, a été signé en 1979. Bien que le Traité n'ait

jamais été ratifié par les Etats-Unis, les deux parties en ont toujours respecté les termes. Toutefois, le 27

mai dernier, le président Reagan a annoncé qu'à l'avenir, "la nature

et l'ampleur de la menace posée par les forces stratégiques soviétiques,

et non les dispositions du traité SALT II, détermineraient les décisions que les Etats-Unis prendront

relativement à la structure de leurs forces stratégiques".

Paix et Sécurité 9

Lettre de Nicosie

de voir la mission de maintien de la paix déboucher sur des pourparlers de paix sont constamment gênés par des dirigeants qui n'ont ni l'audace

ni le courage voulus pour amener leurs collectivités conservatrices respectives à accepter les compromis qui ouvraient la voie à la ré-

La position de M. Pérez de Cuellar ne fait pas très envie. En effet, il ne peut contraindre le président Syrtos à quitter le pouvoir. Le leader de la République turque de Chypre du Nord, M. Rauf Denkash, a enjambé des discussions, pas plus qu'il ne peut risquer de retirer la force de maintien de la paix.

Mais rarement les incidents qui ravivent les plaies de Chypre entraînent-ils plus que des échanges de cailloux et d'insultes des deux côtés de la zone tampon, dont la création a

donné naissance à l'expression "ligne de démarcation".

A ce sujet, le major Rod MacArthur, porte-parole de la force

“Si la force n'était pas là, ce serait la guerre ouverte, comme à Beyrouth.” De son côté, le président Reagan a bien involontairement apporté de

l'eau au moulin des partisans de la force en attaquant la Libye. Les escarmouches navales dans le golfe de Syrie, suivies des raids aériens

Cette île aux frontières ouvertes -
contre Tripoli et Benghazi, ont sus-
cité beaucoup d'inquiétude à Chypre.

Afin, officiellement, d'empêcher l'irruption que par ses conflits intérieurs, menacée par la violence de l'extérieur, l'Occident - a souffert pendant plus

nique situé au coeur de la zone tampon fasse l'objet de représailles, on a déployé des troupes canadiennes à proximité. Ici, dans la capitale, les

Le long de la ligne de démarcation (aussi appelée ligne Attila) qui divise l'île de Chypre et ses habitants depuis plus de dix ans, la peinture lève sur les barrières bleu clair de l'ONU, et la rouille rouge les rouleaux de barbelés.

plus personne ne semble vouloir mettre en péril l'équilibre précaire mais satisfaisant qui règne dans l'île. La mission de la force de maintien de la paix a été couronnée d'un tel succès que les 500 000 Grecs et les 150 000 Turcs de Chypre sont maintenant confortablement installés

Mais rare!

donné naissance à l'express

dans leurs enclaves. On se demande aujourd'hui si la force de l'ONU, composée de 2 400 hommes, ne fait pas injustement partie intégrante d'un

pas justement partie intégrante d'un problème qui a nécessité l'intervention de 26 000 Canadiens; depuis 1964, chaque régiment des Forces

régulières a envoyé la-bas certaines de ses unités au moins une fois. C'est un argument qui se défend. La présence de la force de l'ONU.

permet aux Chypriotes grecs et turcs de s'offrir le luxe de l'intransigeance et elle a jusqu'ici coûté aux Nations-

Unes et aux pays fournissant des contingents plus de 1,8 milliard de dollars, montant qui augmente maintenant de 125 millions par

La stagnation de la crise et l'im-
position d'un tel fardeau à une insti-
tution aux prises avec une crise

général des Nations-Unies, M. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Ses espoirs

Par une journée de printemps
très agréablement chaude, les
Français phylophages vaguent
dans les occupations, bercées par le
son d'une musique de bouzouki,
alors que de l'autre côté du no man's
land, les soldats turcs s'échangent
des histoires en chassant les mou-

drapaux de ces deux armées et des
six contingents nationaux qui com-
posent la force de maintien de la

pat de de l'ONU. Les adversaires de la guerre civile ont été surpris par le succès de la bande de terre. Dans le secteur quatre, une zone de sept kilomètres de long, en son point le plus étroit.

des médailles depuis la fin de

"Ce n'est pas un jeu, affirme Dan Wellisman. Commandant du contin-

major des forces de l'ONU. C'est bien réel. Les balles sont bien réelles, et la crise risque toujours

Mais rarement les incidents qui

cailloux et d'insultes des deux côtés de la zone tampon, dont la création a donné naissance à l'expression

ligne de démarcation : Il y a un peu plus de deux ans, toutefois, un soldat grec, qui avait exaspéré son voisin turc, a été abattu par ce der-

niér. Les Canadiens sont parvenus à désamorcer la crise, et aujourd'hui



de réparations ont été annulées. Jusqu'à maintenant, les menaces de représailles se sont répétées sans fondement. Toutefois, elles ont servi à montrer à quel point les préoccupations des Chypriotes ont changé depuis 1974, année où l'armée turque a envahi le tiers septentrional de l'île, par suite d'un coup d'État sans lendemain qu'avait appuyé la Grèce. Aucun Chypriote grec n'a oublié les événements de 1974, et aucun Chypriote turc n'a pardonné aux Grecs d'avoir agi comme ils l'ont fait avant l'invasion, mais la peur que leur illégitimité de nouveaux champions de la paix serve de prétexte à de nouvelles tentatives étrangères a atténué l'importance du conflit domestique dans l'esprit des Chypriotes. Voilà d'ailleurs un autre des "bienfaits" attribuables à la force de l'ONU. Celle-ci, très visible et titulaire d'un mandat sans échéance précise, a rendu le statu quo (pas tout à fait la guerre, pas tout à fait la paix) tolérable, et quasi normal. En revanche, on ne peut pas compter avant sur la stabilité au Moyen-Orient. Leur île étant située en Méditerranée orientale, zone troublée s'il en est, les Chypriotes doivent constamment suivre le flux et le reflux des combats qui font rage autour d'eux. Quand elle atteint sa marée haute, cette violence semblerait d'ailleurs présenter de bien plus grands dangers qu'un incident le long de la ligne Attila ou qu'une non-elle ruse politique de l'adversaire. Car la lutte entre Juifs et Arabes, entre modernes et radicaux, n'est pas engendrée par une ligne Attila ou encore par le contour flou des barrières, des barbelées ou des trépaneaux, et les sons qu'elle engendre ne sont pas aussi agréables à l'oreille que celui de la musique de bouzouki.

James Travers est le correspondant de l'agence Southam News au Moyen-Orient. Il habite à Nicosie (Chypre).

ment, et elles influenceront sur la sécurité du Canada, qu'il soit ou non partie à l'IDS.

Nous aurions tort de croire que certaines régions du monde – le tiers-monde, l'Europe de l'Est, diverses parties de l'Ouest – parviendront à la stabilité, car la guerre et les crises y sévissent à l'état endémique. Nous devons mettre en oeuvre des méthodes pour gérer ces crises et rendre au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU les fonctions qui lui furent dévolues à l'origine, surtout que ses membres permanents sont les puissances dotées d'armes nucléaires. Les pays qui peuvent se permettre de fournir une aide militaire au Conseil de sécurité doivent se mettre à sa disposition. Or, le Canada est l'un d'eux.

Ma propre liste d'hypothèses au sujet de la situation stratégique du Canada emprunterait des éléments aux deux listes que j'ai dressées au début.

J'ai dit que notre perception traditionnelle de l'"ennemi" était dépassée, mais il convient de rappeler ici que l'idéologie marxiste-léniniste définit elle aussi un ennemi compatible, à savoir l'"impérialisme". Mais des faits montrent que, dans l'Union soviétique d'aujourd'hui, la démarque politique a principalement pour objet de convenir avec l'Ouest d'un certain *modus vivendi* fondé sur des échanges et des accords de limitation des armements. De part et d'autre, l'opinion publique semble converger vers une définition commune de l'"ennemi" : la guerre nucléaire même.

Comment prévenir cette guerre? Je doute que la perception classique de la dissuasion constitue un fondement valable pour la sécurité à long terme, mais j'ai bien peur qu'il n'existe aucune autre option pratique pour le moment. Il faut espérer que les mesures envisagées pour retirer les troupes et les armes classiques d'Europe et les accords devant

entraîner une réduction des divers arsenaux nucléaires créeront un contexte international où la coopération remplacera un jour la dissuasion. Les conditions existant dans le tiers-monde, où les stratégies soviétiques comptent bien qu'il se produira une évolution sociale permanente en faveur du "socialisme", feront qu'il sera difficile de mettre cette coopération en pratique. Peut-être que personne n'aura vraiment le choix : en l'an 2000, quand la planète devra subvenir aux besoins de six milliards d'habitants, obligera sans doute les uns à coopérer avec les autres et inversement.

Le Canada n'est pas en mesure de se défendre seul; la défense des deux pays d'Amérique du Nord constitue un seul et même problème. Les E.-U. tiendront compte de nos opinions dans la mesure où nous accepterons de contribuer à l'effort de défense, mais nous devrions faire valoir

devant eux des liens de dépendance des armements stratégiques. En nous opposant aux essais des missiles de croisière au Canada, nous favoriserons peu l'amélioration des relations Est-Ouest. Mais nous ne serions pas en train de mettre à l'essai des missiles de croisière lancés depuis un avion (ALCM) si ces systèmes avaient été bannis dans le passé. Cette question a déjà été inscrite à l'ordre du jour des entretiens de Genève, et elle pourrait y figurer de nouveau.

Outre qu'elle offre des moyens de coopération en matière de défense, l'Alliance Atlantique permet au Canada d'exprimer ses priorités, et tant aux yeux des Canadiens qui ont négocié le Traité de l'Atlantique-Nord. Essayons d'en tirer le meilleur parti possible. □



L'UNIVERS NUCLÉAIRE:

Comment le Canada doit-il réagir. Par Geoffrey Pearson

Il existe deux gammes d'hypothèses différentes au

sujet de la situation stratégique du Canada, et l'on

pourrait employer les termes "classiques" et "naïves"

pour les désigner respectivement, sans toutefois leur

prêter un sens désobligeant.

Les hypothèses "classiques" sont

les suivantes:

La menace la plus directe qui pèse

sur le Canada provient de l'URSS et

des tensions internationales qu'en-

trepreneur la politique étrangère

soviétique.

La dissuasion, que les forces

militaires des E.-U. et les forces

armées de l'Europe occidentale con-

stituent, représente le meilleur

moyen de parer cette menace.

Le Canada a tout intérêt à co-

opérer avec les E.-U. pour défendre

l'Amérique du Nord, et avec ses

alliés pour protéger l'Europe occi-

dentale, même si, dans les deux cas,

la contribution militaire du Canada

est limitée de la défense et de la dis-

suasion ne peut changer.

La dissuasion suppose le maintien

d'un équilibre approximatif entre

les forces de l'Est et de l'Ouest et

la contribution de la part de l'OTAN

pour la première aux armes

nucléaires. Si l'Alliance ne peut

maintenir les forces classiques compa-

rables à celles du Pacte de Varsovie,

le rôle du Canada doit être reconsi-

déré. Sur la scène internationale, le

Canada doit mettre davantage l'accent

sur la médiation et les négociations

dans le cadre des relations Est-Ouest,

mais aussi dans celui des conflits

régionaux; accroître le budget ré-

servé à l'aide internationale, aux

dépens de celui de la défense, s'il le

faut; et, règle générale, chercher des

alliés parmi les nations "poursuivant

des objectifs s'apparentant aux

siens", où que ces pays soient dans

le monde (les auteurs de l'initiative

de paix dite "des cinq continents",

par exemple).

Le Canada doit s'efforcer de faire

modifier la politique autorisant le re-

cours à l'arme atomique par l'OTAN

en premier, refuser que des vecteurs

soient mis à l'essai au-dessus de son

territoire, se retirer du NORAD si

son rôle va au-delà de l'alerte avancée

et de la surveillance de l'espace

aérien, et (aux dires de certains)

se déclarer zone exempte d'armes

nucléaires.

Sur la scène internationale, le

Canada doit mettre davantage l'accent

sur la médiation et les négociations

dans le cadre des relations Est-Ouest,

mais aussi dans celui des conflits

régionaux; accroître le budget ré-

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des objectifs s'apparentant aux

siens", où que ces pays soient dans

le monde (les auteurs de l'initiative

de paix dite "des cinq continents",

par exemple).

Que faut-il faire pour limiter et

réduire l'envergure de l'affrontement

nucléaire en Europe et partout ail-

Europe.

à portée intermédiaire (INF) en

l'accumulation des forces nucléaires

favoriser. À titre d'exemple, citons

prises qui nuisent aujourd'hui à la

paix et à la sécurité, au lieu de les

à cause de cela, des mesures ont été

l'équilibre des forces en Europe. Et

trop prône la nécessité de maintenir

l'équilibre des forces. De nouveau,

l'équilibre des forces. De nouveau,

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LIDS AU CANADA:

Des éléments bases chez nous ? Par John Honderich

Le Canada risque-t-il d'être entraîné dans la Guerre des étoiles ? Cette simple pensée donne froid dans le dos à de nombreux Canadiens.

Le renouvellement récent de l'accord NORAD, sans qu'on y ait désavoué l'Initiative de défense stratégique du Canada pour la paix et la sécurité internationales, a conduit de nombreux stratèges à croire que le Canada pourrait bien devenir partie involontaire à la Guerre des étoiles.

Comme il est situé entre les deux superpuissances nucléaires, le Canada serait l'endroit idéal pour déployer des éléments du système de défense. Pour reprendre les mots de John Pike, Directeur chargé de la politique spatiale à la Fédération des sciences américaines, "Cette conclusion n'a rien d'extraordinaire: elle décrit simplement des réalités géographiques".

Dans un mémoire qu'il a présenté en octobre 1985 dans le cadre d'une conférence sur l'IDS organisée par l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationale (ICPSI), Pike a soutenu ce qui suit: "Plusieurs éléments du système anti-missiles balistiques (ABM) pourraient être déployés au Canada, si ce n'est-à-dire acceptant un tel rôle. Il y a par ailleurs certains éléments de ce système dont les caractéristiques techniques sont telles qu'ils contribueraient encore plus à la défense des États-Unis s'ils étaient basés au Canada".


Il convient de noter que les abîmes technologiques à franchir avant que l'IDS devienne réalité paraissent presque insurmontables. Les recherches effectuées ont déjà entraîné le rejet de divers concepts de défenses et théories. En outre, le Canada continue toujours d'affirmer qu'il ne s'est aucunement engagé à participer au déploiement de quelque qu'élément de l'IDS que ce soit. A maintes reprises, le ministre de la Défense, M. Erik Nielsen, a tourné en dérision toute allégation

suggérant que cette ligne de conduite pourrait changer. Malgré tout, il est utile de savoir quels éléments du système IDS actuellement envisagés pourraient être déployés chez nous et pourquoi.

Pour commencer, il convient d'expliquer sommairement comment les nouvelles défenses stratégiques fonctionneraient. La doctrine existante prévoit un "parapluie" de défense multicouche qui assurerait la surveillance, la poursuite et, le cas échéant, la destruction des missiles soviétiques ou de leurs ogives aux diverses étapes de leur vol.


Une défense multicouche

Les stratégies ont été divisées en quatre stades la trajectoire que suivraient les missiles stratégiques et leurs ogives: 1) la phase de propulsion, 2) l'étape de la postcombustion dure elle aussi plusieurs minutes, après que les fusées se sont détachées du missile; le "bus" qui transporte les ogives multiples voyage alors en dehors de l'atmosphère; 3) la phase balistique, qui peut durer jusqu'à 25 minutes; les ogives logées dans des véhicules de rentrée quittent le bus, filent dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique et foncent vers leurs cibles, qui durent une ou deux minutes; les ogives rentrent dans l'atmosphère et fondent sur leurs cibles.



Un système partiellement intégré de défense contre les missiles balistiques comprendrait des capteurs et des intercepteurs. Les capteurs, basés au sol ou dans l'espace, ou encore transportés à bord d'avions, repéreraient les missiles soviétiques et leurs ogives multiples et en suivraient la trajectoire. Ils devraient fonctionner à la perfection pour détecter les "véritables" objectifs parmi les centaines de milliers de lettres et de plaquettes de brouillage. Une fois que les objectifs auraient été repérés, il appartiendrait aux lasers, aux armes à faisceaux de particules et aux missiles intercepteurs (autant de systèmes n'ayant pas encore été mis au point) de détruire les missiles soviétiques, pendant la phase de propulsion, ou leurs ogives pendant les phases balistique et terminale. Certains de ces capteurs et armes d'interception seraient placés dans l'espace, mais d'autres devraient être installés au sol. Et c'est ici que le Canada aurait un rôle à jouer.

Comme il s'étend directement sous la trajectoire de vol que suivraient les ogives soviétiques, le Grand Nord canadien pourrait bien être un des meilleurs endroits où déployer certains des appareils terrestres de détection sommairement ci-après quelques-uns des éléments qui pourraient être installés



Les systèmes de poursuite

Le système optique aéroporté (SOA) des stratégies de l'IDS ont proposé de modifier des avions de ligne Boeing 767 pour leur faire porter des télescopes à infrarouges à haute résolution. Ces appareils repèrent-ils les ogives soviétiques à la fin de la phase balistique et pendant la phase terminale, en détectant la chaleur des véhicules de rentrée dans l'espace froid environnant. Selon les plans actuels, de vingt à quarante Boeing 767 évolueraient ainsi depuis douze bases. On parle même de mettre au point des Boeing 767 robots qui seraient téléguidés et qui pourraient voler plusieurs jours d'affilée. Ils circuleraient à des altitudes de quinze à vingt-cinq kilomètres et couvriraient chacun un secteur d'environ 750 kilomètres carrés. On étudie ce système depuis plusieurs années déjà, et le premier vol d'essai doit avoir lieu en 1988. Pour que l'infrastructure dispose d'un délai d'alerte maximum, on pense qu'il faudrait baser ces avions canadiens pour mener à bien leurs missions.




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Voici le deuxième numéro de la revue trimestrielle de l'Institut. Les réactions que le premier numéro a provoquées chez les lecteurs ont été encourageantes. Nous espérons combler le vide existant entre les brefs synopses présentés par les quotidiens et les analyses plus détaillées paraissant dans les revues spécialisées. Chaque article vise à placer les questions d'actualité concernant la paix et la sécurité dans un contexte politique ou historique plus large. La caractéristique dominante de notre revue, c'est qu'elle s'efforce de présenter le point de vue canadien sur les événements mondiaux. Quels sont ces événements ? Comment influencent-ils le Canada ? Quel rôle les Canadiens doivent-ils jouer ? Bon nombre des thèmes abordés portent, bien sûr, à controverse, et les recommandations formulées suscitent un débat animé partout au pays. *Paix et Sécurité* veut présenter toute la gamme des opinions canadiennes sur les questions intéressant la paix et la sécurité internationales. Chaque auteur traite son sujet selon une perspective particulière, et nous espérons que les lecteurs exprimeront eux aussi leurs opinions, en écrivant à la rédactrice en chef.

Paix et sécurité paraît tous les trois mois; ce bulletin vise à informer la population canadienne sur les activités de l'Institut et à favoriser l'expression de toutes les opinions ayant cours au pays sur les questions susmentionnées. Les opinions formulées dans chaque article sont exclusivement celles de l'auteur. N'hésitez pas à nous faire part de vos observations et idées. Les textes de ce bulletin peuvent être reproduits, pourvu que la source en soit mentionnée.

Autorisation à venir pour acheter minime par courrier de deuxième classe. Port payé à Toronto.

La bibliographie et la liste de documents audiovisuels contiennent des ouvrages qui permettront au lecteur d'approfondir la matière traitée dans les articles. En outre, cette section de la revue présente de nouveaux livres, articles et films, notamment ceux qui sont écrits, publiés ou produits au Canada.

L'article de Dan O'Meara sur l'apartheid est allé sous presse juste au moment où le monde était informé des raids lancés par l'Afrique du Sud contre trois pays voisins, à savoir le Botswana, la Zambie et le Zimbabwe, tous membres du Commonwealth. Le Groupe des personnalités du Commonwealth était en Afrique du Sud à ce moment-là et il tentait d'organiser des pourparlers entre les représentants du gouvernement et les dirigeants nationalistes noirs. Le Canada et les quarante-huit autres membres du Commonwealth ont condamné les raids en déclarant qu'avec eux, l'espoir d'opérer des changements pacifiques en Afrique du Sud s'était à toutes fins pratiques évanoui.

Dianne DeMille
Rédactrice en chef

Bureau de rédaction
Geoffrey Pearson, Nancy Gordon, David Cox

Rédactrice
Dianne DeMille

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PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ



réaction du Canada

LA CRISE DE L'APARTHEID

ans le présent numéro:

Dan O'Meara, natif de l'Afrique du Sud, exhorte le Canada à réagir avec fermeté face à la crise qui s'aggrave sous le gouverne-

ment Botha.
Le journaliste canadien John Honderich émet un avertissement : certaines composantes de l'IDS pourraient bien être basées

au Canada.
Geoffrey Pearson, ancien ambassadeur du Canada en Union soviétique, compare entre elles diverses hypothèses au sujet du rôle de notre pays dans le monde.

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PEACE & SECURITY

INDIA AND THE BOMB

An arms race with
Pakistan?

In this issue:

Sheldon Gordon reports on the debate within India over the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Patrick Keatley cites evidence that Reagan's Caribbean policy may boomerang.

John Walker reviews Canadian press coverage of NATO's 1979 two-track decision.

■ The eternal dance of the Hindu god Shiva, who holds in his hands the drum of creation and the fire of destruction, is a fitting symbol for the power condensed in the heart of the atom.

Sheldon Gordon's article on a potential nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan is particularly timely in view of recent developments.

In the summer of 1985, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi alleged that Pakistan was on the verge of developing nuclear weapons and announced in August of that year that India was capable of producing plutonium domestically. Pakistan pointed to this move as a 'major step' in India's own push for nuclear weapons.

In the summer of this year both superpowers issued warnings to Pakistan about that country's nuclear programme. The Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad delivered a message saying that the USSR would not tolerate the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan. In July, the US warned that it would cut off military and economic assistance to Pakistan if that country were to build nuclear weapons.

Both India and Pakistan have strong incentives to remain just below the nuclear threshold. It seems likely, however, that each is keeping the option open by attempting to acquire all the capabilities and components required for the production of atomic bombs; neither wants to be caught off-guard.

This is my last issue as editor of *Peace & Security*. Taking over from me will be **Michael Bryans** who brings an impressive range of skills to the job. He has just completed a year at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government studying international affairs and public administration. Prior to that he spent twelve years working at the NFB where most recently he took part in the creation and development of the Gwynne Dyer WAR series. He produced two of the episodes and served as contributing editor of the book based on the series.

Dianne DeMille
Editor

**CANADIAN
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INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND
SECURITY**

307 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K2P 0P7
(613) 990-1593

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■ **Sheldon Gordon** is on the editorial board of the *Globe and Mail*; **Patrick Keatley**, a Canadian, was for two decades diplomatic correspondent with the *Guardian* newspaper; **John Walker**, formerly with Southam News, is a member of the CIIPS editorial board; **Jane Boulden** is a research assistant at the Institute; **Gregory Wirick** is a writer based in Ottawa.

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
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INDIA & THE BOMB:

An arms race with Pakistan? By Sheldon Gordon



Since Indian scientists used plutonium from a Canadian-built reactor to set off a nuclear device in 1974, the

Indian subcontinent has been the scene of an undeclared nuclear arms race that could lead to overt deployment of nuclear weapons or even a preemptive attack on neighbouring nuclear facilities.

■ Despite Canadian qualms at the time, the Indian explosion of a so-called peaceful nuclear device in the Rajasthan desert did not raise the curtain on further nuclear tests, nor did it lead to the overt production or deployment of nuclear warheads by the Indian government. But, in the following decade, that prospect remained very real.

The late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi persisted in her refusal to make India a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty for the ostensible reason that the pact was discriminatory: it aimed to deny nuclear weapons only to those states which had not yet developed them.

India continued to expand its nuclear power production programme with the commissioning of new reactors. By some estimates, its nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants create sufficient plutonium for the production of 50 to 100 bombs a year. The 5,000 pounds of separable plutonium which India was estimated to have accumulated by 1984 would be adequate to build a nuclear armoury with the same number of weapons as that of Great Britain.

Moreover, the Indian armed forces have the means to deliver

nuclear weapons: nuclear-capable Canberra and Jaguar bombers are complemented by intermediate-range ballistic missiles, an achievement of India's space programme. But while these technical advances left no doubt as to India's nuclear capabilities, its intentions remained uncertain.

While it was New Delhi which initiated the nuclear rivalry on the subcontinent, the pace has been quickened by efforts in Islamabad to catch up. Pakistan, in recent years, covertly acquired and assembled the pieces for a uranium enrichment facility – a key element in a nuclear weapons programme – and its top atomic scientist boasted last year that the country had the capacity to produce a nuclear bomb if necessary.

The stealthy nuclearization of Pakistan would have alarmed India under any circumstances, but this development was particularly disturbing because it has cut across repeated – and unsuccessful – attempts in recent years to resolve other points of friction in their bilateral relations.

The scars inflicted by partition of the subcontinent, three Indo-Pakistani wars and the break-up of Pakistan itself have been all too resistant to conciliatory

diplomatic moves in recent years. Rival proposals for a no-war pact and a treaty of friendship have made no real headway. Periodic outbursts of rhetoric – and of artillery – over the disputed possession of Kashmir continue to foster mistrust between the two countries. In addition, India resents Pakistan's apparent readiness to provide sanctuary, arms and training for Sikh separatists who make repeated cross-border forays into India's turbulent Punjab state.

The tensions that result have been sufficient to cancel out the momentary bonhomie of Indo-Pakistani summits and the bilateral and regional steps to increase trade, transportation and other links. Suspicions are now so built-in that the mutual enmity feeds on itself. In that context, nuclearization becomes both a symptom and an additional spur to the tensions on the subcontinent.

Reports in the last two years that Pakistan was ready, if not necessarily set, to conduct a nuclear test have provoked controversy within India over how the 'superpower of South Asia' should respond to such an event. Because of the secrecy which surrounds matters of national security and the complexity which surrounds matters of nuclear science, the debate is limited to a relatively small number of politicians, military men, academics and journalists.

On one side of the debate is the country's military-industrial-scientific complex. Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyam, Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, is perhaps the most outspoken proponent of this pro-

nuclear school. A part-time adviser to the Ministry of Defence, Mr. Subrahmanyam claims to be an ardent opponent of nuclear arms who is forced by realism to favour India's possible acquisition of them.

"The pre-occupation with nuclear weapons is a cult, a totally irrational set of beliefs," he insists, "but once people are mad, you have to treat them according to their madness." He therefore favours a two-track approach for India: it should seek international disarmament, while at the same time developing its own nuclear arms so as to "establish its credibility" with the five declared nuclear weapons powers – the "nuclear dacoits." ["Dacoit" is derived from a Hindi word meaning 'gangster' or 'villain'.]

Subrahmanyam concedes that India has a lead over Pakistan in this regional nuclear arms race, but he insists that Pakistan is "more of a threat to India than the Warsaw Pact is to Canada." At first blush, this appears unlikely. An Indian arsenal that could menace Pakistan's major cities and nuclear installations would take no more than ten nuclear bombs, whereas for Pakistan to retaliate against India's major cities and military centres would require as many as a hundred bombs.

But if Islamabad's strategy were simply to knock out those Indian military concentrations which threatened its borders and to deter India from launching a counter-attack, it would need only a few bombs and the ability to convince India that it had an unspecified number in readiness

for a second strike. If India had assembled no bombs and had lost its nuclear installations to a Pakistani first strike, such a strategy could succeed.

To pre-empt such a possibility, the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reportedly pondered a conventional attack to destroy Pakistan's nuclear facilities before it could develop the Bomb. She did not carry out such a strike, however, and her son and successor, Rajiv, last December reached an agreement with Pakistani President Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq that neither side would attack the other's nuclear installations.

"It would be criminally stupid to bomb their nuclear facilities,"

says Subrahmanyam. "They would then bomb ours, and we have a lot more to lose: theirs is a uranium nuclear facility, whereas ours is plutonium" (and therefore much more lethal).

On the other hand, the hawks have persuaded Mr. Gandhi to spurn Pakistan's proposal for mutual inspection of each side's nuclear installations – on either a bilateral or a multilateral basis – to ensure that fissile material is not secretly diverted from civilian to military purposes. Mr. Gandhi contends that such surveillance can easily be circumvented, but a more important reason for the rebuff seems to be his

Government's determination not to tie its hands.

Whereas Subrahmanyam and other hawks want Prime Minister Gandhi to keep his nuclear options open, Professor Dhirendra Sharma of Jawaharlal Nehru University's Centre for Studies in Science Policy wants a clear-cut disavowal of nuclear weaponry. His Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (COSNUP), which includes two retired Supreme Court judges, a few MPs, some retired military officers and several prominent writers and academics, has called for a nuclear-free South Asia.

These anti-nuclear activists were alarmed by Mr. Gandhi's statements in Paris in the summer of 1985; he had hinted that India might covertly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons in response to Pakistani moves. Professor Sharma insists that such a clandestine policy would be contrary to a 1962 statute, passed by Parliament, which says that the Indian nuclear programme is solely for peaceful purposes.

COSNUP was reassured by, and takes some of the credit for, a subsequent statement by Mr. Gandhi in Tokyo which appeared to contradict his utterances in Paris. But Sharma's group remains fearful that "military-industrial interests" will prevail and turn India into a nuclear weapons state.

Professor Sharma downplays the Pakistani threat as a motive for Indian nuclearization. "We are not threatened by any country," he maintains. "Pakistan can survive only on the goodwill of India or with the guarantee of a superpower. Both of those conditions were absent in the 1971 war. I put the onus on us. We are responsible for driving the people of Pakistan to look for such a suicidal alternative. We began the nuclear programme. We have a certain responsibility for the welfare of South Asia."


Professor Sharma believes that

India's nuclear power programme was developed as a "showpiece to present to the poor." He insists that its electrical output has been so limited and so expensive that only military intentions can explain India's massive allocation of scarce resources to nuclear power. Moreover, he believes that nuclear arms are much more likely to be built for international status than for security. "Our goal is to be a superpower by 1995. The day we have nuclear rockets, the United States will respect us."

Whatever its future moves on nuclear arms, India is likely to shroud them in considerable secrecy. The Indian defence and atomic energy budgets have never been debated in Parliament. There has been some discussion of the Indian nuclear option in the press, and there is considerable elite support for India's leadership in the Five-Continent disarmament initiative aimed at the superpowers. But, COSNUP aside, no widespread public scepticism has developed over India's own contribution to nuclear proliferation.

Subrahmanyam explains the remoteness of Indian public opinion from the nuclear issue in these terms: "Debate is a reflection of the amount of knowledge in the country. If the stock of that knowledge is not adequate, there will not be much debate." But Sharma retorts that the government has created a climate hostile to the expression of anti-nuclear dissent: "We have not reached the stage of development where it is possible to oppose war preparations without being considered unpatriotic." □

Sheldon Gordon writes on foreign affairs for the Globe and Mail editorial board. He spent two months in India earlier this year on a fellowship from the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.



Ken Smith

■ In 1974, after India had tested its nuclear device, Canada suspended its "nuclear co-operation" with that country. Indian officials argued that the uranium fuel, which had been used to produce the device's plutonium, was not imported from Canada and that therefore India had not breached the original agreement between the two countries. In 1976, after trying unsuccessfully to work out an agreement which would fall in line with its non-proliferation policy, Canada ended all nuclear-related exports to India.

Pakistan was also unwilling to agree to the provisions laid down in the 1974 version of Canada's non-proliferation policy. In 1976, Canada terminated its nuclear co-operation with Pakistan. – Ed.

AFTER GRENADA:

US Policy in the Caribbean. By Patrick Keatley

■ History teaches that leaders of governments have been notoriously fallible in judging where their own vital national interests lie and, therefore, where to apply geopolitical pressures.

■ A circuit tour of the English-speaking democracies in the Caribbean, extending over several months, has left me with a strong impression that the strategy of the Reagan administration is culpable of this elementary fault.

It can be summed up in the phrase used by the Prime Minister of one of the smaller island territories. "President Reagan," he said to me, "is engaged in boomerang diplomacy. When the United States missions carry out the orders sent to them from Washington, time and again these initiatives turn out to be counter-productive. What went out as a diplomatic weapon, intended to block the advance of Marxism in the Caribbean Basin, actually comes back and hits us instead. If the aim is to shore up the stability of small, democratic territories and to prevent a slide to the left, as happened in Grenada, they are going the wrong way about it."

I have deliberately suppressed the identity of that island leader because, understandably, these prime ministers of the Commonwealth Caribbean have been reluctant until now to "go public" in their diplomatic tug-of-war with Washington. All of them – with the interesting exception of James Mitchell, the Canadian-educated Prime Minister of St. Vincent – submitted themselves to the supporting roles assigned to them

at the Roman triumph staged at Queen's Park in Grenada in February of this year. They courtuously grouped themselves around Mr. Reagan for the predictable photograph. The Trinidadian leader, George Chambers, decided at the last minute to absent himself.

When my lecture tour brought me to Trinidad some weeks later, Mr. Chambers' no-show was explained to me by a distinguished West Indian editor who remarked drily: "George was unwilling to play Caractacus with an election coming."

The same motivation, it is thought, led the Vincentian leader, Mr. Mitchell, to find a suitable pretext for staying away from the Grenadian rally altogether. Politicians develop a kind of radar for these things, and the signal I picked up in my circuit of a dozen Caribbean capitals is that the Ronald Reagan 'Seal of Approval' is no longer an electoral asset. The Queen's Park rally is, in retrospect, proving an embarrassment for those who did turn out, because of the way the President chose to associate them publicly with his personal crusade against the Left in Central America.

Some 40,000 Grenadians swayed to calypso music in roasting sunshine at the dusty cricket field, awaiting the arrival of the man they cheered as "Uncle Reagan" and "our liberator." When he arrived, in the company of Messrs.

Shultz and Weinberger, the cheers were gratifyingly deafening. I do not doubt that Grenadians are still profoundly grateful for being delivered, by the US Army's Airborne Division, from the grip of an authoritarian, one-party state in October 1983. When the *deus ex machina* appeared in person, borne before them in a bullet-proof limousine, they cheered his every word.

But, for the West Indian leaders who shared the platform with the President, there were words which, like the souvenir photo, are already having a boomerang effect. Even the staunchly pro-Republican *Time* magazine was prepared to sound a cautionary note:

"The audience Reagan was really addressing was back home. His extravagant, minutely-orchestrated five-hour drop-in on Grenada became the centrepiece of a campaign to sell what has become known as the Reagan Doctrine: US support for 'freedom fighters' battling Soviet-backed governments around the world. Reagan's speech at Queen's Park went beyond praise of new-found freedom in Grenada to rail against the absence of it in Nicaragua."

The Washington correspondent of the *London Guardian* summed up thus:

"Despite an overweening display of loyalty to President Reagan led by the Grenadian prime minister, Herbert Blaize, leaders of the English-speaking Caribbean islands left the summit here all but empty-handed.

"They were required to listen to an impassioned plea by Mr. Reagan for aid to the contras in their fight against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua; a cause which clearly failed to ignite passion. The \$100 million which he is requesting from Congress for the

contras next year is more than all the economic assistance pumped into the Caribbean islands for the last two years."

The *Time* magazine report was equally critical on this score, referring to "the President's stand-tall rhetoric" and his rosy prediction of how "in the not-too-distant future I see US businessmen flocking to the Caribbean...it's encouraging to witness what can happen in an environment where free enterprise is allowed to flourish."

The magazine went on:

"The praise was premature. Despite the \$74 million in US aid over the past two years, the before-and-after picture of Grenada is pretty much the same. The problems that beset the island under Marxist rule persist: minimal foreign investment, primitive communications and electricity systems; unemployment is 30% and twice that among youth. Grenada was meant to be one of the beneficiaries of Reagan's 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative... but last year Caribbean exports to the US dropped by 23%."

The *Washington Post* chose the week of Reagan's expedition to Grenada to assess the impact of the Basin plan, which it described as floundering. It noted that imports from the Caribbean had slipped while those arriving in the United States from other regions of the world had increased by 46 percent (Commerce Department official figures).

On my own visit to Grenada, an island I know well, I was disappointed to find no sign of the US investors and traders that Mr. Reagan had promised. The rescue job that has transformed two older hotels on the spectacular

Grand Anse beach – smashed up in the fighting during the airborne operation in 1983 – has also produced a handsome new hotel, aptly named the Ramada Renaissance. It is well up to international standards but is not, despite the name, American-financed. This act of faith was organized by an investment group in Trinidad. Likewise, the new direct airline service to New York, proudly named Grenada Airlines, has no American dollars behind it. The initiative was taken by a French-Lebanese consortium which intends to build another tourist hotel and link it with the Ramada in a package tour for Americans and Canadians.

In Belize, at the far western end of the Caribbean, I found a familiar schizophrenia about the value of a powerful American presence. The energetic young educationist who came to power at the head of a conservative regime in the recent election, Manuel Esquivel, is as firm a believer in “the magic of the marketplace” as is Mr. Reagan, but he does not want to be suffocated by an American bear-hug. He and his Foreign Minister, Dean Barrow, find it irritating that Washington has posted no less than 55 diplomats to their little capital, Belmopan.

As for the military embrace, the ambassador – a Reaganite hawk – keeps pressing for Belize to double the flow of young men into US Army training courses, although there are some 400 already in the pipeline.

By way of a counterbalance, Mr. Esquivel recently ordered the posting of six army officer cadets to Canadian training establishments, even though this cost the Belize exchequer hard currency. Another counterweight to the US embrace is a vigorous training programme for the new Belizean Defence Force, conducted by members of the 1500-strong British contingent.

(The British troops have been stationed there since colonial times because of Guatemalan territorial claims and threats of invasion.) What lurks in the back of Belizean minds is the thought that, should Washington under Reagan and Weinberger consider Guatemalan support vital in the battle against Marxism, Belize might be expendable.

In Jamaica I found the conservative administration of Edward Seaga privately bitter about US lack of support. The Prime Minister had publicly championed Thatcherite and Reaganite economics when coming to power five years ago and was rewarded with concessionary measures and aid worth \$ 680 million which has been tapering off ever since. Funds from the Caribbean Basin Initiative have failed to appear and the protectionist measures introduced by Washington last spring are hitting sugar, textiles and other vital Jamaican exports. During my visit there, Mr. Seaga gave a media briefing in sharply angry terms, then went off to Parliament and said most of it publicly.

It is against this background of disillusion, which I detected in all twelve Caribbean territories, that Mr. Reagan’s plan for military security must be assessed. His instinctive urge to enlist the support of these small island leaders for his anti-Marxist crusade is now seen by most West Indian prime ministers (although not Mr. Blaize in Grenada) as a potentially mortal hazard on the political minefield.

The first notable casualty was the moderately conservative leader, Bernard St. John of Barbados. He had inherited the mantle of the late Tom Adams and was, with him, intimately involved in the 1983 “sky-punch”, carried out by the American paratroops in Grenada. The Barbadian voters, in their first opportunity to register their view at the polls, swept away these mild conservatives in a landslide that cost Mr. St. John his own seat.

The wily (and conservative) Prime Minister of Trinidad, George Chambers, began his distancing tactics by avoiding the Grenada rally in February. This summer, when Washington called for troops from the islands to take part in “Operation Ocean Venture”, along with 300 men from the 82nd Airborne Division, Trinidad firmly declined.

So, surprisingly, did the free enterpriser and hotelier, James Mitchell, in St. Vincent. He is no longer a Reagan acolyte. His traumatic shock came when he was briefly away from home base and a spectacular offer was made to the acting prime minister by the disgraced ex-president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos: \$ 60 million for guaranteed safe sanctuary on one of the “out-islands” in the Grenadines. The offer was rebuffed.

I listened to Mr. Mitchell give a fascinating account of the plot, as he described it, over his own national network. The continuing entente between Mr. Reagan

and Mr. Marcos rang alarm bells in the West Indies. Political leaders, even those in small islands, do not relish being cast as puppets.

Small wonder that I found the former Jamaican prime minister, the socialist Michael Manley, in buoyant mood when I was staying in Kingston. The polls show his People’s National Party (PNP) running at 62 percent, as compared with 35 percent for the conservative Mr. Seaga. The latter, under some obligation because of the dribbles of aid he has received under the Basin plan, had decided that he must send a token contingent of Jamaican troops to the “Ocean Venture” sea-air exercise off Grenada. It may have been a politically fatal decision. The Carl Stone poll, which has a notable record for accuracy, showed support for Mr. Seaga going immediately into a steep decline.

Although the next election is not due for two years, Mr. Manley can scent victory. His major policy speech, coming on the heels of these events, dealt with the core issue of security:

“The biggest threat to our sovereignty comes from the neo-colonialist political leaders of the Caribbean on the radical right who seem to have given up the thought that Caribbean independence is viable.

“This situation is even more dangerous because it coincides with a US administration that is unapologetically and aggressively hegemonic. It intends to assert US power in this region on the basis of fostering those political processes it favours.”

This is the ultimate irony: the Reagan strategy has boomeranged because the six million people of the anglophone Caribbean value their sovereignty, have local loyalties, and are prepared to plunge leftward if that seems to be the only way to preserve their national identity. □



CANADA'S PRESS:

How one key issue was covered. By John R. Walker

■ Truth may be the first casualty of war, but adequate information is often a casualty of peacetime, especially coverage of issues such as arms control and disarmament.

■ For more than a century there have been professional war correspondents, but how many correspondents have there been, especially in Canada, who devote themselves to issues of peace and security?

This brief survey looks at one event which has had long-term effects on Canada's peace and security, and tries to assess how the press in Canada handled its job of informing Canadians about the consequences.

The event in question is NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, unless they could be bargained away in arms control negotiations between the US and the USSR during the following three years.

This so-called "two-track" policy was one of the most important and far-reaching decisions of the North Atlantic alliance in years.

Introduced into the NATO armoury was the long-range cruise missile, whose size and mobility created new verification problems for arms controllers. Also introduced was a new version of the Pershing missile, Mark II, which for the first time put Soviet military targets near Moscow under fire from US missiles in Europe.

The NATO decision exacerbated the discord within the alliance. The Netherlands, Belgium and

Denmark had to contend with their publics' reaction to nuclear escalation in Europe, and the Dutch and Belgians had to delay acceptance of the missiles on their soil until the domestic situation calmed down.

The decision to deploy new missiles while pursuing negotiations did not really help the Soviet-American arms control talks, especially those dealing with the so-called Euromissiles. The result of the protracted INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) negotiations was a Soviet walk-out in 1983.

Finally this NATO decision, which may not have seemed immediately relevant in Canada, was used as the rationale for getting involved in US strategic weapons testing. On 10 February 1983, Canada signed an umbrella agreement with the United States for the testing, over Canadian territory, of the air-launched version of the cruise missile, a weapon which is deployed on US long-range B-52 bombers.

The results of the NATO two-track decision are still with us. How well were the Canadian people informed by their press of the decision and its implications?

The short answer: not very well. A longer answer is that, as a result of both the public and the official reaction to the decision, the Canadian press began to handle some issues of peace and security in Canada more effectively.

It was often said, long after the fact, that the need for cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe sprang from a major lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, given by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on 28 October 1977. He was alarmed about the new Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe and the possibility of Europe being "decoupled" from the United States in the event of war.

This reporter looked in vain for any coverage of that speech in the major Canadian newspapers of that date. Nor was there any editorial comment later in 1977 on the implications of the Schmidt speech for NATO policy.

During 1978 the major nuclear debate was over the possible deployment of the neutron bomb and the public pressure on President Carter to reject it. There was no discussion in Canadian papers of the reason for the Soviet deployment of the new SS-20s. Did Soviet leaders have any idea what the reaction of Western Europe would be, or was this a routine decision taken under the weight of bureaucratic inertia?

It was not until 1979 that NATO appeared serious about new missile deployments, and these were portrayed as simply a "modernization" of NATO nuclear forces to meet the Soviet deployment of SS-20s.

NATO's 30th anniversary in April of 1979 produced a series in the *Montreal Star* in which General Alexander Haig, NATO Commander, called for "prompt modernization" of theatre nuclear

forces to meet the Soviet deployment of SS-20s.

After the June 1 NATO meeting at The Hague, several newspapers had short agency reports, noting that Cyrus Vance, US Secretary of State, said that a consensus had been reached "on moving ahead on decisions to modernize" their nuclear arsenal, and that there had been a call for new arms control negotiations.

Although it must be granted that Canada had been going through an election in the spring of 1979 and easing the Joe Clark government into place during the summer, it might be expected that during the fall, when the decisive NATO discussions were being held, there would be more press coverage of this upcoming event.

"Canada's national newspaper," the *Globe and Mail*, between September 1 and December 13, after the NATO annual meeting had made the decision official, had only one relevant news item. That was a one-paragraph story from Washington on October 5, at the bottom of a column of World News items on page 20. It said that "a high level Western group approved a US plan for deploying 572 nuclear missiles in Europe." The decision "taken last week in Brussels" would clear the way for public endorsement at the annual NATO meeting in December.

This was the month when the North Atlantic Assembly of NATO parliamentarians was meeting in Ottawa. There was a brief mention in the *Globe*, in a Canadian Press story on that session, of the controversy this plan was causing in Europe. Two


other *Globe* items in November drew brief attention to Soviet criticisms of the decision. And on December 7 from Brussels there was a half-page feature on NATO's urgent need for new missiles to meet the Soviet build-up, by former publisher Richard Malone. There was not one editorial or op-ed piece all fall. But it might be added that the *Globe's* business page, back on April 3, had the first major item about Litton Systems of Toronto negotiating a contract to build cruise missile guidance systems.

The *Toronto Star* did little better. It printed the October 5 item, four days later. On October 20 there was a half-page backgrounder by freelancer Tad Szulc on European concerns about Carter's foreign policy gaffes and about a continuing arms race if the cruise and Pershing II deployment was pursued. On November 14 there was a four-paragraph piece from a NATO nuclear planning group meeting in The Hague that said NATO would face "one of the toughest decisions in its history" introducing 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles into Europe to counter the Soviet SS-20s.

Nicholas Hills, reporting from London for Southams, had a lengthy piece on Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's arms reduction offer in late October that was contingent on NATO not deploying its new missiles. His story contained the only reference to the danger of cruise missile deployment. He quoted US arms control expert, Herbert Scoville, as saying the new deployment involved "a new era of weaponry that was nearly impossible to control," while the forward basing of Pershing II missiles was "a provocative step" since they could very rapidly hit military targets near Moscow.

A thorough combing of the clippings file for 26 major papers across Canada during the fall of

1979 turned up a fairly sparse coverage in both the English and French papers, and most of it repeated the standard NATO line about "simple modernization." Two feature articles raised other points. The *Ottawa Journal* (October 22) ran an *Economist* item, arguing that deployment



of these missiles was a "reasonable course" to get the Russians to the arms control table. The *Toronto Star* (November 29) ran a Gwynne Dyer piece arguing that Brezhnev's concern about the Pershing II might lead to a major "peace offensive" by the Russians in Europe.

When the final decision was approved on December 12, very few editorial comments raised questions about it. Jean Pellerin on the editorial page of *La Presse* (December 19) focussed on the Dutch decision to postpone its acceptance of the missiles. The *Ottawa Citizen* (December 17) said it does "not augur well for lessening cold war tensions" but that there might be no alternative. The *Winnipeg Tribune* (December 15) said "East and West Europe have become a vast chess-board with the Mad Hatter and the Queen of Hearts playing a nightmarish game of nuclear legerdemain."

One reason that there was so little comment in Canada, according to a Canadian Press story (October 27) from Ottawa, was that Canada was taking a "hands-off" attitude to this key NATO debate. McKinnon told the press that he would not make up his mind before going to the December meeting. There was

no parliamentary interest and only one question was asked in the House during that entire session, and that was the week before the final Brussels meeting. And, of course, the Clark government was defeated while that NATO meeting was still going on; External Affairs Min-

ister Flora MacDonald never even made her speech because she was trying to catch a plane home for the fatal House vote. The NATO decision was lost in election fever.

All this seems to suggest that in the late seventies, Canadian newspapers largely took their lead in this issue from government and parliament; if Ottawa ignored or played down the issues, the press did too. Much more informed and even critical coverage was to be found in European and some American papers in 1979.

In 1980, the Canadian press was initially focusing internationally on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and domestically on a new Trudeau government. The American press was into an election year at home. The focus abroad was on the continuing Iranian hostage crisis, and later by the crisis of Solidarity in Poland.

In the fall of 1981, the European peace movements began to make Canadian news pages, with various articles explaining the background for Europe's concern over the nuclear build-up there. This time the *Globe* had an excellent and lengthy series of articles by editorial writer, Stan

McDowell, on the nuclear arms race and where it might be leading.

What really seemed to bring it home to Canadians was the revelation, on 10 March 1982 in a Southam News story from Washington by Don Sellar that Canada was preparing to accept the testing of cruise missiles in this country.

It came out as the Commons External Affairs Committee was concluding its study of arms control and disarmament issues for an upcoming special UN session on disarmament. The Ministers of External Affairs and Defence had to be recalled to the hearings, MPs suddenly became more interested in arms control and NATO issues, peace groups became more active, and the Canadian press began to take a continuing interest in these issues. The *Toronto Star* devoted its entire front page on April 10 to the nuclear arms race and the growing peace movement.

The public debate grew as the time for signing an umbrella agreement on American military testing arrived early in 1983. This public concern and the resulting press coverage helped to encourage Prime Minister Trudeau to develop his own peace initiative in 1984, after the arms control negotiations had collapsed and the first cruise and Pershing II missiles were deployed in Europe.

Compared to the fitful and sketchy coverage of arms control and security matters in the Canadian newspapers of 1979, the press now appears to be trying a lot harder to cover these difficult subjects more thoroughly. It is beginning to raise some of the issues, rather than just taking NATO and government hand-outs, and in the process it is encouraging the informed public debate these subjects badly need. □

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE

■ September brought changes to the Institute staff. Joining the Research section as Fellows for 1986/87 are **Harald von Riekhoff** of Carleton University and **Michael Tucker** of Mount Allison University. **Fen Hampson**, formerly a Research Fellow at the Harvard Centre for Science and International Affairs, has become a part-time Research Associate. Two new Research Assistants have arrived: **James Moore** of MIT and **Francine Lecours** of Laval, replacing **Mary Goldie** and **Steven Baranyi**.

■ **Brad Feasey**, a recent graduate of Carleton, worked in the Public Programmes section as an assistant during the summer. New personnel in this section include **Michael Bryans**, who has been at the Institute since July as an editor, and **Jocelyn Coulon** of *Le Devoir*, who has replaced John Walker as a journalist Fellow. In addition, **Grazyna Beaudoin** joined the staff of Grants Administration as secretary to the Secretary/Treasurer.

■ On 25 June, the Institute organized the first of a series of evening seminars on issues within its mandate. The subject of the first seminar was South Africa. Leading the discussion was **Doug Anglin** of Carleton, **David Gallagher** of Oxfam, and **Dan O'Meara** of CIDMAA, a research and information centre on Southern Africa. Approximately 20 people took part, all of whom had some knowledge of, or interest in, this area. These seminars will bring together government officials, representatives of NGO's, and other interested individuals.

UPCOMING EVENTS

Date	Event	Sponsor(s)	City
2-4 October	Consultative Group on Disarmament	Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche	Ottawa
4-5 October	Colloquium: 'La paix est possible'	Carrefour de solidarité internationale	Sherbrooke, Quebec
15-19 October	Workshop on peace education (Social Studies Teachers' Convention)	Educators for Peace	St. John's, Newfoundland
16 October – 15 November	International Youth for Peace and Justice Tour	IYPJ	Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, Nova Scotia
23-25 October	Authors' Workshop on Comprehensive Test Ban	CIIPS and SIPRI	Montebello
24 October	Journée nationale de la paix	Ministry of Education	Quebec City
5-6 November	Roundtable on El Salvador	CAPA	Ottawa
7-8 November	The True North Strong and Free?	Council of Canadians	Edmonton

■ Planning sessions for two research projects took place at the Institute in July. On the 7th of the month, those researchers engaged in the study of the security problems of small states in the Commonwealth Caribbean discussed co-operation with institutes in the Caribbean and the International Peace Academy based in New York. A report will be published during 1987. On the 14th, another group discussed a possible research project on Canada's involvement with NATO, including a review of the options facing the Alliance and Canada.

■ On 29 July, **David Cox**, the Institute's Director of Research, attended a workshop at Conrad Grebel College in Waterloo. The purpose of the workshop was to demonstrate the use of a database on Canadian Military Production and Exports. The database was developed by **Ernie Regehr** of Conrad Grebel, in part with

funds provided by the Institute. In late June, Dr. Cox attended a meeting in New York to plan a research workshop, to be held in Finland in the spring of 1987, entitled 'War Prevention Diplomacy in a Multi-nuclear World.' The host of the workshop will be the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki. The Fund for Peace in the United States has coordinated the initial work of the international planning committee.

Another member of the planning committee is **Raimo Vaerynen**, Professor of International Relations at the University of Helsinki and a former Director of the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) in Finland. Mr. Vaerynen spoke on the UN and Conflict Resolution at a seminar organized by the Institute in the spring in Ottawa.

■ In June, the Institute sponsored a seminar entitled 'Options for Co-operation in Information

Services' in Ottawa. The twenty invited librarians and resource persons, all of whom came from institutes which specialize in the area of peace and security, discussed methods of co-operation and resource-sharing.

The Institute library is providing a small collection of books to a selected number of regional public libraries.

■ **Geoffrey Pearson**, Executive Director of the Institute, attended a conference sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyoto, Japan in early September. Participants discussed a number of subjects under the general theme 'East Asia, the West and International Security – Prospects for Peace.'

■ The Secretary-Treasurer of the Institute, **John Toogood**, moderated a panel discussion sponsored by the Ottawa Peace Resource Centre at St. Paul's

University in late June. The subject was nuclear weapons negotiations between the superpowers. Panelists were **John Lamb** of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Major-General **Leonard Johnson** (Ret'd), of Generals for Disarmament, **Viacheslav Bogdanov**, Second Secretary at the Embassy of the USSR, and **Robert Montgomery**, First Secretary at the US Embassy.

■ In August, **Beth Richards** of the Public Programmes section attended and spoke at a workshop on peace education hosted by the British Columbia Teachers' Federation (BCTF) in Vancouver. The workshop was part of the convention of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTF). Bringing

together delegates from over fifty countries, the convention was jointly sponsored by the BCTF, the WCOTF, and the Canadian Teachers' Federation.

In September, Ms. Richards spoke at a conference at Wayne State University in Detroit. That conference, entitled 'Arms Control and Alternative Security', was sponsored by the Great Lakes Womens' Network.

■ The Institute has recently published a *Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution*. The *Guide* contains some forty entries on issues ranging from the ABM Treaty to uranium exports. Copies may be obtained by writing to the Institute.

NEW AWARDS PROGRAMME

This fall the Institute is introducing a new Awards Programme. Funds will be made available for both scholars and non-academics to enter or re-enter the field of international peace and security studies. This Awards Programme is intended to:

■ Promote Canadian expertise in the field of peace and security, specifically in the areas of disarmament, defence, arms control and conflict resolution; and,

■ Provide opportunities for Canadians to study abroad in the centres of expertise of their choice (subject to the approval of the Institute).

Applicants must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents and hold a first University degree or, in the case of non-academics, have equivalent experience or demonstrated ability.

The Institute has set aside \$120,000 to award two fellowships, valued at a maximum of

\$25,000 each; and five scholarships, valued at up to \$14,000 each. Decisions on the precise amount of each award and the number of awards in each category will be made by an independent selection committee.

The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) will act as agent on behalf of the Institute. The deadline for applications for the academic year beginning September 1987 is 1 February 1987, but note that the award will be made conditional to acceptance by the chosen institution.

For further information and application forms, please write to:

Scholarship
Administration Services
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada
151 Slater Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 5N1

PUBLIC PROGRAMMES GRANTS - First Quarter 1986-87

British Columbia Teachers' Federation , Vancouver. Seminar on Education for Peace, 9-12 August 1986.	\$ 2,700
Canadian Council for the Tent of Meeting , Ottawa. Tent of Meeting, 15 May to 30 June 1986.	2,500
Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies , Toronto. Proceedings of two annual seminars, Fall 1986 to Spring 1987.	4,000
Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec , Montréal. Eduquer à la paix, c'est contribuer à bâtir la paix, 24 octobre 1986.	40,000
Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique Australe (CIDMAA) , Montréal. Séminaire d'information et de sensibilisation sur l'apartheid, avec Mgr. Tutu, 26 mai - 2 juin 1986.	5,000
Council for Canadian Unity , Ottawa. Encounters with Canada, September 1986 to May 1987.	9,000
Diocèse de Gatineau-Hull , Hull. Un F-18 pour la paix, août 1986 - janvier 1987.	15,000
Educators for Peace , St. John's. Workshop on Peace Education, 15-19 October 1986.	2,000
Fate of the Earth Conference , Ottawa. Publication of the proceedings, August 1987.	10,000
Group of 78 , Ottawa. Conference: Toward a Common Security, 5-7 September 1986.	10,000
Idea Centre , Winnipeg. Peace and development forums, 1 April 1986 to 28 February 1987.	9,200
International Youth for Peace and Justice Tour , Montreal. 16 October to 15 November 1986.	5,000
IVème conférence internationale de droit constitutionnel , Ste-Foy. Paix, relations internationales et respect des droits humains, 10-13 juin 1986.	10,000
La coopérative de théâtre des Bois-Francis , Victoriaville. Il y a de la paix sur la planche, septembre - novembre 1986.	5,000
Les productions Vent d'est , Montréal. Mémoire d'une guerre oubliée.	9,900
Marquis Project Inc. , Brandon. Book: Families Living with Global Awareness, Spring 1987.	4,000
Niagara Peace Movement , Welland. Peace Promotion 1986, 9-14 September 1986.	3,400
Peace Education Coalition , Burnaby. Youth Forums Project, Fall 1986 to Spring 1987.	5,000
PEACEFUND Canada , Ottawa. Development of international fund for peace-related projects.	5,000
Peace Magazine , Toronto. Distribution of <i>Peace Magazine</i> .	9,000
Peace Parties Network , Ottawa. Strategies for Peace, 1 September 1986 to 28 February 1987.	2,900
Peace Research Institute , Dundas. Book: How we Work for Peace, October 1985 to September 1986.	6,400
Rotary Club of Victoria Harbourside , Victoria. Soviet Friendship Exchange, August or September, 1986.	2,000
Science for Peace , Toronto. Public Lectures in Peace Studies, 1 January to 31 December 1986.	5,000
Service d'information sur le désarmement , Montréal. Calendrier de la paix, août 1986 - juillet 1987.	5,200
Students Against Global Extermination , Montreal. The Youth Nuclear Disarmament Tour, 1 October 1986 to 31 May 1987.	5,000
Télé Université , Montréal. Pour comprendre le processus de paix, automne 1986.	7,500
Toronto Volgograd , Toronto. Exchange on Delegations, October 1986.	6,000
World Federalists of Canada , Ottawa. Canadian Mundialization Campaign, one year.	5,000
Youth Corps , Toronto. Book: Stories of the Heart: Weaving Peace Together, 11 May 1986 - ongoing.	2,500
TOTAL	\$213,800

RESEARCH GRANTS - First Quarter 1986-87

Honderich, John , Toronto. Arctic Research Project.	\$ 10,000
Matthews, Robert and Pratt, Cranford , University of Toronto. Workshop: Human Rights and Sources of Conflicts.	3,000
Miljan, Toivo , Sir Wilfrid Laurier University. Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.	6,637
Paul, Derek , Science for Peace. Survey of Canadian Scientists and their Expertise.	2,500
Regehr, Ernie , Conrad Grebel College. Defence Industry Database.	5,000
TOTAL	\$ 27,137

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST *By Jane Boulden*



Chemical Weapons

■ At the NATO meeting of the Defence Planning Committee during the week of 22 May 1986, the American decision to resume production of chemical weapons was accepted as part of the NATO force goals. Congress had approved the weapons subject to acceptance by NATO. The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway stated they would not accept the weapons on their territory even during a crisis. Germany agreed to accept them in a crisis provided they were not the only Alliance member to do so. Although Alliance members agreed that the United States should begin production of new binary weapon shells, the Communiqué issued after the meeting confirmed NATO resolve to continue to seek a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States continue to state that they want a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. Negotiations on such a ban are continuing at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) in Geneva

■ Soviet negotiator Viktor Karpov outlined a new Soviet proposal on strategic nuclear arms at the 11 June plenary meeting in Geneva. Calling the proposal an interim option the Soviets suggested a limit of 8,000 on strategic nuclear "charges" and a ceiling of 1,600 on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) deployed on sub-

marines were included under the nuclear charges ceiling. US forward-based systems in Europe would be excluded from the ceilings but the Soviets proposed that these weapons be frozen at their present level.

On 29 May 1986 the Soviet Union tabled a new proposal on space arms in which the Soviets stated that they would agree to deep reductions in strategic offensive arms if the US would agree not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for 10-20 years.

In a letter to Gorbachev sent on 25 July, President Reagan outlined the American response to Soviet proposals. The letter is reported to suggest that the US was willing to delay deployment of SDI for 5-7 years during which time both sides would continue research on new technologies. At the end of the 5-7 year period either both sides would deploy defences or the United States would deploy on its own.

SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty)

■ On 27 May 1986, President Reagan stated that the United States would dismantle two Poseidon submarines. Although this decision kept the US within the limits of the SALT II Treaty, President Reagan also announced that the United States would make future decisions on strategic nuclear force deployments based on the nature of the

Soviet threat and not on the limits outlined in the SALT II Treaty.

The Soviet Union responded by stating that, once the US exceeded the SALT II limits, the Soviet Union would consider itself free of these limits as well as those of the 1972 Interim Agreement (SALT I) and would make appropriate increases in its strategic forces in order to maintain a situation of parity. The USSR requested a special session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to discuss the SALT II Treaty. The session accomplished little of substance. The United States stated that, after the October session of the SCC, the United States would no longer be willing to discuss the SALT I and SALT II Treaties at the SCC and would discuss only the ABM Treaty.

MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna)

■ The Soviet Union tabled a new proposal on 11 June 1986. The proposal calls for reductions of 25% in ground troops and tactical air forces in Europe over a period of ten years, with initial reductions of 150,000 troops in the first two years. In a new twist, the proposal also includes nuclear missiles with ranges under 600 miles. The proposal, also known as the second Budapest appeal, attempts to apply the reduction schedule to *all* troops and conventional weapons deployed by NATO and the Warsaw

Pact in Europe. Previously the talks had concentrated on troops and weapons stationed in specific states of each alliance.

Comprehensive Test Ban

■ In mid-May the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing was extended by General Secretary Gorbachev until 6 August 1986, and on 18 August Mr. Gorbachev extended the moratorium again until 1 January 1987. Bilateral talks between the US and Soviet Union on testing issues began in Geneva on 25 July and ended on 31 July. The Soviet Union expressed its willingness to negotiate a complete ban on nuclear testing and the United States emphasized the need to improve verification methods for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Both sides agreed to meet again in September. As the result of an agreement reached between the privately-funded American Natural Resource Defence Council and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, scientists have been permitted to set up seismic stations near Semipalatinsk in the Soviet Union.

Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

■ Delegates wanted to reach some form of agreement before the 19 September CSCE preparatory meeting in Vienna. Adjustments in positions have been made by both sides. The Soviet Union has accepted on-site and aerial inspections of troop formations from East Germany to the Urals and the United States has agreed to notify the Soviet Union if it sends a large number of troops to Europe. Negotiations continue over a non-aggression accord and over the number of on-site inspections allowed yearly

Early Warning

November	CSCE Review Conference
Undetermined	US/USSR Summit
December	Deployment of 131st B-52 Bomber equipped with cruise missiles, taking the US over the SALT II limits unless other systems are dismantled Deployment of first 10 MX missiles in Wyoming
January 1987	End of unilateral Soviet testing moratorium

REPORT FROM THE HILL *By Gregory Wirick*



■ At the end of August the Deputy Prime Minister, Don Mazankowski, caught the opposition parties off guard by announcing that Parliament would prorogue until October 1st. Parliament had been expected to reconvene in the second week of September.

Prorogation upset the plans of many parliamentary committees since it automatically ended their work and even the composition of the committees themselves until Parliament reassembles in October and has a chance to reconstitute them. There is also the possibility that the government will choose new membership for certain committees when it selects a new group of parliamentary secretaries, expected early in October. In any case, prorogation means that the bulk of committee work is stalled until mid- or even late October.

But the extra time will give the government a breathing space in which to try and devise a fool-proof strategy to maintain control of the political agenda, which in the past has appeared beyond them. Central to this plan is a Speech from the Throne that will sketch in broad outline what the government intends to do in the remaining two years of its term.

It will be intriguing to watch for foreign or defence policy initiatives in the Throne Speech that may be based on the report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations (also known as the Hockin-

Simard committee after its two co-chairmen) which was tabled in Parliament on 26 June.

The 196-page report, consisting of 11 chapters on different aspects of Canadian foreign policy and 130 recommendations, represented the culmination of an 11-month investigation by the 20-person committee made up of 12 Conservatives, 5 Liberals and 3 New Democrats.

It was the first comprehensive foreign policy review since the Trudeau government's 1970 effort, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*. Furthermore, it was the first such review ever conducted by a parliamentary committee, reflecting the Conservative government's desire to open up some of the traditionally elite functions of government policy-making to greater public scrutiny (hence the coast-to-coast hearings).

Among the more newsworthy recommendations were the following:

- a more independent security policy for Canada, with greater reliance on Canadian sources of information and analysis;
- an intensification of Canadian efforts, both multilaterally and bilaterally, to win acceptance for the comprehensive set of arms control measures already enunciated by the government, namely:
 1. A mutually agreed and verifiable radical reduction of nuclear forces and associated measures to enhance strategic stability. The latter should include, in particular, reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, interpreted strictly as prohibiting all but basic research on defensive systems.
 2. The maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime.
 3. The negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons.
 4. The achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty that will be mutually verifiable.

5. The prevention of an arms race in outer space.

6. Agreement on confidence-building measures sufficient to permit the reduction of conventional military forces in Europe and elsewhere;

■ an immediate study of long-term defence requirements to discover how much additional expenditure would be necessary to complete the task of re-equipping the armed forces over the next ten years;

■ the development of a coherent arctic policy, an essential element of which must be a northern dimension for Canadian foreign policy;

■ the possibility of equipping the Canadian navy with diesel-electric submarines to provide more adequate surveillance of the Northwest Passage;

■ to seek, in cooperation with other arctic or nordic nations, the demilitarization of the arctic through pressure on both superpowers;

■ far greater emphasis on human rights concerns – "the international promotion of human rights is a fundamental and integral part of Canadian foreign policy";

■ endorsement of a previous committee's recommendation that Canadian development assistance be reduced, terminated or not commenced in cases where gross and systematic violations of human rights make it impossible to promote the central objective of helping the poor;

■ the government should consider making significantly greater use of reserve forces for UN peacekeeping service;

■ Canada should move immediately to impose full economic sanctions against South Africa and seek their widest possible adoption by other countries;

■ Canada should explore the possibility of a new financial arrangement for the United Nations whereby no single nation would contribute more than an amount set so as to ensure that the organization is not unduly dependent on any one member.

The committee was forthright about security policy stating that "a priority for the government . . . should be to elaborate a Canadian perspective on strategic, arms control and disarmament issues." They suggested a four part approach consisting of: 1) recruiting and developing the kind of analytical expertise in which a more active Canadian role must be based; 2) the government must formulate its own judgements on these issues; 3) with this background the government could be more effective in pressing its views with other governments and in international forums; 4) the government should engage the public in a continuing dialogue on security policy.

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark welcomed the committee's report, calling it "a very valuable perspective", and promised an official cabinet response when Parliament resumed in the fall. Press commentary was favourable with laudatory editorials appearing in the *Toronto Star*, the *Winnipeg Free Press* and the *Ottawa Citizen*. The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, which had been critical of the earlier report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *NORAD 1986*, also welcomed the Joint Committee's suggestions, particularly those pointing to a greater emphasis on a Canadian perspective in security policy.

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NATO'S 'Two-Track' Decision

■ Buteux, Paul. "NATO and Long-range Theatre Nuclear Weapons: Background and Rationale" in *The Crisis in Western Security*, Lawrence S. Hagen, editor, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1982.

In this short, scholarly essay Buteux examines NATO's strategic and military rationale for deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles, and generally finds it sound.

■ Freedman, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1981.

In a chapter titled 'The European Dimension', Freedman gives a concise, readable account of the political struggles and strategic acrobatics which led both to independent French and British nuclear forces as well as to the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe.

■ Hampson, Fen Osler. "Escalation in Europe", in *Hawks, Doves and Owls*, Allison, Carnesale and Nye, editors, W.W. Norton, 1985 (distributed in Canada by Penguin Books).

Just how and why all those nuclear weapons in Europe might get used during an armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is the subject of this essay.

■ Schwartz, David N. *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1983.

This book is a thorough exploration of the controversy (of which the two-track decision is only the latest episode) which has plagued the Western alliance's defence

strategy since its inception: the role of nuclear weapons and the American nuclear umbrella in the defence of Western Europe.

■ Zwicker, Barry. *War, Peace and the Media*, Sources, Toronto, 1985.

This 50 page monograph examines media coverage and popular perceptions in Canada of war and peace issues. The author concludes that Canadian mainstream media are witting and unwitting partners in the "arms chase".

The Caribbean

■ Anderson, Thomas D. *Geopolitics of the Caribbean: Ministates in a Wider World*, Praeger/Hoover Institution, New York, 1984.

Anderson presents a comprehensive and scholarly overview of the many Caribbean states from the perspective of US political and strategic interests.

■ Canadian Institute for International Affairs, "The Caribbean", *International Journal*, Vol. 40, Spring 1985.

Of particular interest in this issue, devoted entirely to economic and security problems of the Caribbean states, is "Militarization of the Caribbean: Concerns for National and Regional Security", by David A. Simmons.

■ *Central America and the Caribbean*, Arno Press/New York Times Company, New York, 1980.

A fascinating recounting, through more than a hundred years of stories from the pages of the *NY Times*, of United States involvement in and attitude towards the nations of the Caribbean.

■ Commonwealth Secretariat, *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society*, Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group, Marlborough House, London, 1985.

This dense (in the way committee authored reports usually are) but extremely valuable book surveys the economic, political and security problems to which small states are particularly prone.

■ Fenton, Thomas P. and Mary J. Heffron, *Latin America and the Caribbean: A Directory of Resources*, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1986.

A comprehensive list of books, films and other resources on the region compiled from a left-of-centre political perspective.

■ MacFarlane, S.N. *Superpower Rivalry and Soviet Policy in the Caribbean*, CIIPS Occasional Paper #1, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa, 1985.

This paper examines Soviet policy in the Caribbean region in general and its effects on the economic and political stability of Central American states in particular.

■ Segal, Aaron. "Caribbean Realities", in *Current History*, Vol. 84, no. 500, March 1985.

A concise, readable survey of contemporary Caribbean problems and promises. With numerous references to longer, more detailed works.

India, Pakistan and the Bomb

■ Kapur, Ashok. "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980's", *International Journal*, Vol. 36, no. 3, Summer 1981.

Kapur considers the non-proliferation treaty "a bad move, and a lost opportunity" because it lacks credibility in the eyes of non-nuclear states.

■ Nye, Joseph. "The Logic of Inequality", *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1985.

Nye (in contrast to Kapur) argues that the NPT works; that "most states are likely to accept some ordered inequality in weaponry" because the alternative appears even more dangerous.

■ Rais, Rasul B. "Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Prospects for Proliferation", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, no. 4, April 1985.

This is a detailed, often technical account of the state of Pakistan's nuclear capability.

■ Spector, Leonard S. *The New Nuclear Nations*, Vintage Books, New York, 1985.

Details of current events and intrigues give this report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace a fast-paced, readable style. With a glossary at the back, it is accessible to the general reader, and with extensive end-notes and appendices, is sufficiently well-documented to be useful to the researcher.

GENERAL

■ *The Dismantler*, a quarterly publication of Operation Dismantle, Inc., Box 3887, Station C, Ottawa, K1Y 4M5. \$20/year individual membership; \$5 for library only.

This publication provides commentary on disarmament issues, arms control developments, and serves as newsletter among Dismantle's twenty branches.

Bibliographie

La «double décision» de l'OTAN

■ Butoux, Paul, "NATO and Long-range Theatre Nuclear Weapons: Backgrounnd and Rational", dans *The Crisis in Western Security*, sous la direction de Lawrence S. Hagen, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1982. Dans ce court essai de haut niveau, M. Butoux se penche sur les motifs stratégiques et militaires ayant présidé au déploiement des missiles de croisière et Pershing 2, et il en conclut qu'ils sont en général solides.

■ Freedman, Lawrence, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., Londres, 1981. Dans un chapitre intitulé "The European Dimension", l'auteur explique son européenne, l'auteur explique en un langage concis et facile à lire les luttes politiques et les pironnettes idéologiques ayant abouti à la création des arsenaux nucléaires indépendants de la France et la Grande-Bretagne, ainsi qu'au déploiement d'armes nucléaires américaines en Europe.

■ Hampson, Fen Osler, "Escalation in Europe", dans *Hawks, Doves and Owls*, sous la direction du groupe Allison, Carnesale and Nye, W.W. Norton, 1985 (distribué au Canada par la maison Penguin Books). Cet ouvrage précise comment et pourquoi toutes les armes nucléaires présentes en Europe pourraient être employées pendant un conflit armé entre l'OTAN et le Pacte de Varsovie.

■ Schwartz, David N., *NATO's Nuclear Dilemma*, The Brookings Institution, Washington (D.C.), 1983. L'ouvrage analyse de près la controverse (la décision ambivalente n'en est que le dernier volet) qui entrave l'évolution de la stratégie de défense de l'Alliance occidentale depuis son élaboration: le rôle des armes nucléaires et du parapluie nucléaire américain dans la défense de l'Europe occidentale.

■ Zwicker, Barry, *War, Peace and the Media*, Sources, Toronto, 1985. Dans cette monographie de 50 pages, l'auteur examine comment les médias traitent de la guerre et de

La paix et comment la population

canadienne perçoit ces questions. Il conclut que les principaux médias canadiens contribuent tantôt sciemment, tantôt sans le savoir, à la course aux armements.

■ Anderson, Thomas D., *Geopolitics of the Caribbean: Ministries in a Wider World*, Praeger/Hoover Institution, New York, 1984. L'auteur analyse dans le détail et avec erudition la situation des nombreux Etats des Caraïbes, dans le contexte des intérêts politiques et stratégiques des Etats-Unis.

■ Fenion, Thomas P. et Mary J. Heffron, *Latin America and the Caribbean: A Directory of Resources*, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1986. Liste détaillée de livres, de films et d'autres documents sur la région, dressée d'un point de vue du centre gauche.

■ Institut canadien des affaires internationales, "The Caribbean", *International Journal*, vol. 40, printemps 1985. Dans ce numéro consacré entièrement aux difficultés économiques et aux problèmes de sécurité des pays des Caraïbes, un article de David A. Simmons présente un intérêt particulier, il s'intitule *Concerns for National and Regional Security*.

■ MacFarlane, S. N., *La rivalité entre les superpuissances et la politique soviétique dans le bassin des Caraïbes*, Les cahiers de l'ICPSI, numéro 1, Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales, Ottawa, 1985. Le document analyse la politique soviétique dans la région des Caraïbes en général et son incidence sur la

Stabilité économique et politique des

Etats centraméricains, en particulier, Secréariat du Commonwealth, *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society*, Rapport d'un groupe consultatif du Commonwealth, Marlborough House, Londres, 1985. Cet ouvrage dense (comme le sont, en général, les rapports rédigés par des comités) mais extrêmement précieux passe en revue les difficultés économiques et politiques et les problèmes de sécurité auxquels les petits Etats se heurtent plus particulièrement.

■ Segal, Aaron, "Caribbean Realities", dans *Current History*, vol. 84, numéro 500, mars 1985. Analyse concise et facile à lire des problèmes contemporains des Caraïbes et des perspectives d'avenir de la région. Nombreux renvois à des ouvrages plus longs et plus détaillés.

■ Kapur, Ashok, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980's", *International Journal*, vol. 36, numéro 3, été 1981. L'auteur estime que le traité sur la non-prolifération est nuisible, en ce sens qu'il manque de crédibilité aux yeux des Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires.

■ Nye, Joseph, "The Logic of Inequality", *Foreign Policy*, été 1985. Contrairement à M. Kapur, M. Nye soutient que le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires est ordonné des arsenaux, car l'autre option semble comporter encore plus de dangers.

■ Rais, Rasul B., "Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Prospects for Proliferation", *Asian Survey*, volume 25, numéro 4, avril 1985. Empruntant souvent un langage technique, l'auteur présente ici en détail les moyens nucléaires dont dispose le Pakistan.

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OUVRAGES GÉNÉRAUX

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■ Gallois, Pierre, *La guerre de cent secondes*: les Etats-Unis, l'Europe, et la guerre des étoiles, éditions Fayard, 1985, 197 pages. Le général Gallois, parlant de l'Initiative de défense stratégique, soutient qu'il est illusoire de vouloir arrêter la «règle d'inventer». Il invite du même souffle les Européens à se réveiller et à élaborer une Initiative de défense tactique pour l'Europe.

■ Kerblay, Basile, et Lavigne, Marie, *Les Soviétiques des années 80*, éd. Armand Colin, Paris 1985, 215 pages. Un livre qui invite à situer les problèmes du monde soviétique contemporain dans le contexte global des interdépendances entre le pouvoir, l'économie et la société.

DOCUMENT AUDIOVISUEL

■ Télé-Université, «Pour comprendre le processus de paix», Treize entrées d'une demi-heure de pertonnalités canadiennes provenant d'horizons différents mais dont les témoignages et les réflexions permettent de mieux cerner ce qu'est ou devrait être – la paix. Disponible à Télé-Université, 4835 Christophe-Colomb, Montréal H2J 4C2 (514) 522-3540.

En direct de la colline parlementaire

Par Gregory Wirick



en ce qui concerne l'élaboration de certaines politiques, dont la politique étrangère, fonction qui était autrefois réservée à une élite gouvernementale (c'est ce qui explique les audiences tenues d'un océan à l'autre).

Parmi les recommandations les plus dignes de mention, citons les suivantes:

- Le Canada doit se donner une politique de sécurité plus autonome et compter davantage sur ses propres ressources;
- Le Canada doit intensifier ses efforts, dans les tribunes multilatérales et bilatérales, pour faire accepter l'ensemble complet de mesures favorables à la limitation des armements que le gouvernement a déjà approuvées et qui sont les suivants (citation):

■ A la fin d'août, le vice-premier ministre, M. Don Mazankowski, a pris les partis d'opposition par surprise quand il a annoncé la prorogation du parlement jusqu'au 1^{er} octobre. La session était censée reprendre pendant la deuxième semaine de septembre. Ce report donnera au gouvernement un répit dont il profitera pour mettre au point une stratégie "infaillible" devant lui permettre de reprendre en main l'orientation des débats à la Chambre, manœuvre sur laquelle il a semblé incapable d'accomplir jusqu'ici. La stratégie repose sur un discours du trône par lequel le gouvernement ouvrira la nouvelle session et esquissera ce qu'il entend faire au cours des deux dernières années de son mandat.

Il sera intéressant de voir quelles initiatives le discours du trône présentera relativement à la politique étrangère et à la politique de défense, du rapport déposé au printemps 1986 par le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada (également appelé "Comité Hockins-Sinard", du nom de ses coprésidents).

Il chapitres sur divers aspects de la politique étrangère du Canada et 130 recommandations, représente le fruit d'une enquête de 12 mois menée par le Comité formé de 12 Conservateurs, 5 Libéraux et 3 Néo-démocrates. C'était là le premier examen complet de la politique étrangère de notre pays, depuis la publication du rapport intitulé *La politique étrangère du Canada*, paru sous le gouvernement Trudeau en 1970. C'était aussi le premier examen du genre qu'un comité parlementaire ait jamais effectué, ce qui montre la volonté du gouvernement conservateur de solliciter davantage l'opinion du public.

■ Mener immédiatement une étude sur les besoins à long terme de la Défense, pour établir quelles dépenses supplémentaires seraient nécessaires pour finir de régénérer les forces armées au cours des dix prochaines années.

■ Elaborer une politique cohérente et notament un volet essentiel de la politique étrangère du Canada.

En ce qui concerne la sécurité, le Comité a carterment déclaré qu'une "des priorités du gouvernement... doit consister à adopter un point de vue qui lui soit propre sur les questions de stratégie, de contrôle des armements et de désarmement".

■ "Le Canada devrait étudier la possibilité d'établir... un nouveau barème de contributions à l'ONU, selon lequel aucun Etat ne fournirait plus qu'un montant déterminé, afin que l'Organisation ne dépende pas trop d'un seul membre".

■ "Le Canada doit sans tarder imposer des sanctions économiques s'efforcer de les faire adopter par le grand nombre possible de pays. Le Canada devrait étudier la possibilité d'établir... un nouveau barème de contributions à l'ONU, selon lequel aucun Etat ne fournirait plus qu'un montant déterminé, afin que l'Organisation ne dépende pas trop d'un seul membre".

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
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Condensé sur la limitation des armements

Par Jane Boulden



Les armes chimiques

■ A la réunion du Comité des Plans

de défense de l'OTAN, qui s'est tenue

dans la semaine du 22 mai 1986,

l'Alliance a accepté de prendre en

compte la décision américaine de

recommencer à fabriquer des armes

chimiques dans sa planification re-

lative aux besoins en effectifs. Le

Congrès a donné son aval à condition

que l'OTAN accorde aussi sa sanc-

tion. Les Pays-Bas, le Danemark et

la Norvège ont cependant fait savoir

qu'ils interdiraient le déploiement

d'une telle arme sur leur territoire,

même en période de crise. L'Alle-

magne s'est dite prête à accepter des

armes chimiques chez elle ne soit pas le

seul membre de l'Alliance à la faire.

Bien que celle-ci ait consenti à ce que

les deux armes binaires, le com-

muniqué diffusé après la réunion a

confirmé l'intention de l'Alliance de

continuer à faire des efforts pour

éviter une interdiction des armes

chimiques à l'échelle de la planète.

L'URSS et les Etats-Unis affirment

aujourd'hui vouloir que les armes chimi-

ques soient proscries dans le monde

entier. Les négociations à cet égard

se poursuivent à Genève, à la Confé-

rence du désarmement.

SALT II

■ Le 27 mai 1986, le président

Reagan a annoncé que les Etats-Unis

déclaraient deux sous-marins

poséidon. Avec cette décision, les

Americains resteront en deçà des

limites imposées par le Traité SALT

II, mais le président Reagan a précisé

que son pays déciderait désormais des

(SALT II) : elle a ajouté qu'elle aug-

mentera en conséquence ses forces

stratégiques pour conserver la parité

avec les Etats-Unis. Par ailleurs,

l'URSS a demandé à la fin de juin que

la Commission consultative perma-

nente (créée aux termes du Traité de

1972 sur les missiles anti-missiles

balistiques) tiennent une séance spé-

ciale pour discuter du Traité SALT II.

Le 16 juillet 1986, les Etats-Unis ont

accepté d'assister à la séance qui a eu

lieu pendant la semaine du 29 juillet

à Genève.

Les pourparlers n'ont pas abouti à

grand-chose. L'Union soviétique a

mis les Etats-Unis en garde contre les

raisons américaines de la décision

de l'abandonner le Traité SALT II, et

de l'exhorter à convenir de me-

surances qui garantiraient l'effacement du

système des traités. Les représentants

américains ont déclaré que la déci-

sion du président Reagan sur SALT II

était finale et qu'après la séance

d'octobre de la CCF, les Etats-Unis

n'accepteraient plus de discuter des

traités SALT I et II devant la Com-

mission et qu'ils s'en tendraient au

Traité sur les missiles anti-missiles

balistiques (ABM).

Pourparlers sur les armes

nucéaires et spatiales

■ Le négociateur soviétique Viktor

Karpov a esquisé une nouvelle pro-

position soviétique sur les armes

nucéaires stratégiques, à une séance

plénière tenue à Genève le 11 juin.

Désignant leur offre comme étant une

option intermédiaire, les Soviétiques

ont proposé de limiter à 8 000 le

nombre des "charges" nucléaires

stratégiques, et à 1 600, celui des ve-

teurs. Détail intéressant, la nouvelle

proposition incluait dans les nou-

lancés depuis un sous-marin. Elle

exclut les systèmes américains

déployés en Europe, mais elle deman-

de qu'un nombre n'augmenterait pas

par rapport à ce qu'il était alors.

Le 29 mai 1986, l'Union soviétique

a déposé une nouvelle proposition

sur les armes spatiales : elle y disait

prête à réduire considérablement son

arsenal offensif stratégique à condi-

tion que les Etats-Unis s'engagent à

continuer de respecter le Traité sur

les missiles anti-missiles balistiques

(ABM) pendant encore 10 à 20 ans.

Dans une lettre adressée à M.

Gorbachev et datée du 25 juillet, le

président Reagan a fait connaître la

réaction américaine aux proposi-

tions soviétiques. Dans la lettre, les

Etats-Unis se seraient dits disposés à

reporter de 5 à 7 ans le déploiement

des systèmes de l'IDS, période où les

deux blocs continueraient à faire des

recherches sur de nouvelles techno-

logies. Une fois ces années écoulées,

ou bien les deux adversaires déploie-

raient des dispositifs de défense, ou

bien les Etats-Unis traitent de l'avant

seuls.

Les pourparlers MBFR

■ L'Union soviétique a déposé une

nouvelle proposition le 11 juin 1986.

Elle y préconisait de réduire de

500 000 hommes (25 p. 100), sur

une période de dix ans, les troupes

terrestres et les forces aériennes

tactiques présentes en Europe, et

d'en retirer 150 000 au cours des

deux premières années. Adoptant

une nouvelle perspective, la propo-

sition a aussi porté sur les missiles

nucéaires ayant une portée supérieure

à 600 milles. Dans la proposition,

"Deuxième plaidoyer sous l'appellation

"L'URSS cherche à appliquer le calen-

dre de réduction à toutes les

troupes et à toutes les armes classi-

ques déployées par l'OTAN et le

Pacte de Varsovie en Europe. Aupa-

avant, les pourparlers n'avaient visé

dans des pays bien précis de chaque

alliance.

■ A la mi-mai, le Secrétaire général

du Parti communiste de l'URSS,

M. Gorbachev, a prolongé jusqu'au 6

août 1986 le moratoire unilatéral sur

les essais nucléaires, et le 18 août,

il a de nouveau reporté l'«échec»,

ceci fois jusqu'au 1^{er} janvier 1987.

Des entretiens bilatéraux sur les

essais ont commencé entre les Etats-

Unis et l'Union soviétique à Genève

le 25 juillet, l'Union soviétique s'est dite

disposée à négocier une interdiction

complète des essais nucléaires, et les

Etats-Unis ont insisté sur la nécessité

d'améliorer les méthodes de vérifi-

cation dans le cadre du Traité sur la

limitation des essais nucléaires et du

Traité sur les explosions nucléaires à

buts pacifiques. Les deux camps ont

convenu de se réunir de nouveau en

septembre. Par suite d'un accord

intervenu entre l'American Natural

Resource Defence Council, financé

par des fonds privés, et l'Académie

des sciences de l'Union soviétique,

des scientifiques ont été autorisés à

installer des stations sismographi-

ques près de Simipalinsk en URSS.

■ On poursuit toujours les démar-

ches pour arriver à un accord

quelconque avant la réunion prépara-

toire de la CSCO devant se tenir à

Vienna le 19 septembre. Les deux

camp ont apporté des modifications

à leur position.

L'Union soviétique a accepté d'as-

suivre les formations basées entre

l'Allemagne de l'Est et la chaîne de

l'Oural à des contrôles sur place et

à des inspections aériennes, et les

Etats-Unis ont convenu d'informer

l'URSS avant d'envoyer de forts con-

tingents de troupes en Europe. Des

négociations se poursuivent quant à

un accord de non-agression et au

nombre d'inspections permises sur

place chaque année.

■ La Conférence du désarmement

en Europe (CDE)

■ Sommet américano-soviétique

■ Conférence de révision de la CSCO

■ Date

■ Déclenchement du désarmement

■ Déclenchement du désarmement

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Nouvelles de l'Institut

■ Au cours du mois de septembre, la composition du personnel de l'Institut a changé sensiblement.

Harald von Riekhoff, de l'Université Carleton, et Michael Tucker, de l'Université Mount Allison, ont rejoint la Direction de la recherche en tant que membres associés pour l'année 1987-1988. Fen Hampson, ancien chercheur boursier au Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs, est devenu chercheur adjoind à temps partiel. Deux nouveaux auxiliaires de recherche sont arrivés: en effet, James Moore, du MIT et Francine Lecours, de l'Université Laval, ont remplacé Mary Goldie et Steven Baranyi.

■ Brad Feasey vient d'obtenir son diplôme de l'Université Carleton et il a travaillé pendant l'été à la Direction des programmes publics, en tant qu'administrateur. Les nouveaux membres de cette direction comprennent Marcel Hébert, qui était rédacteur à l'Institut depuis le mois de juillet. Jocelyn Coulon du journal Le Devoir, qui est venu remplacer John Baker en tant que journaliste et chroniqueur, a rejoint l'Institut. En outre, Graziya Beaudoin fait désormais partie du personnel de l'Administration des relations.

Le 25 juin, l'Institut a présenté le rapport de toute une série de colloques du soir consacrés à des sujets relevant de son mandat. Ce premier colloque a porté sur l'Afrique du Sud et les débats ont été menés par Doug Anglin (Carleton), David O'Meara du CIDMAA, centre de recherche et d'information sur l'Afrique australe. Vingt personnes environ étaient présentes sur cette occasion et s'y intéressaient. Ces colloques permettront à des membres du gouvernement, à des représentants d'organismes non gouvernementaux et à d'autres personnes intéressées de dialoguer sur les divers thèmes.

■ En juillet, des séances de planification ont eu lieu à l'Institut au sujet de deux projets de recherche.

Activités à venir

Date	Activité	Organisateur(s)	Endroit
2 au 4 octobre	Groupe consultatif sur le désarmement	Ambassadeur au désarmement, Douglas Roche	Ottawa
4 au 5 octobre	Colloque - "La paix est possible"	Carrefour de solidarité internationale	Sherbrooke, (Québec)
15 au 19 octobre	Atelier sur l'éducation à la paix (Congrès des professeurs de sciences humaines)	Educators for Peace	Saint-Jean (Terre-Neuve)
16 octobre - 15 novembre	La jeunesse internationale pour la paix et la justice (Tournée)	JIPJ	Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Québec, Nouvelle-Ecosse
23 au 25 octobre	Atelier d'auteurs sur l'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires	ICPSI et SIPRI	Montebello
24 octobre	Journée nationale de la paix	Ministère de l'éducation	Québec
5 et 6 novembre	Table ronde sur le Salvador	CAPA	Ottawa
7 et 8 novembre	The True North Strong and Free ?	Council of Canadians	Edmonton

Le 7 de ce mois, les chercheurs étudiant les problèmes de sécurité qui se posent aux petits Etats des Caraïbes membres du Commonwealth ont discuté de la coopération avec différents instituts des Caraïbes. Le 25 juin, l'Institut a présenté le rapport de toute une série de colloques du soir consacrés à des sujets relevant de son mandat. Ce premier colloque a porté sur l'Afrique du Sud et les débats ont été menés par Doug Anglin (Carleton), David O'Meara du CIDMAA, centre de recherche et d'information sur l'Afrique australe. Vingt personnes environ étaient présentes sur cette occasion et s'y intéressaient. Ces colloques permettront à des membres du gouvernement, à des représentants d'organismes non gouvernementaux et à d'autres personnes intéressées de dialoguer sur les divers thèmes.

Avons-nous les bons renseignements à votre sujet?

Si nous avons des renseignements tous, nous nous orientez beaucoup en remplissant la présente formule.

Mon principal domaine d'intérêt est:

Titre	Francis (✓) Anglois (✓) Numéro	Quantité
Paix et sécurité		
Exposés		
Opinions		
Autres?		

Pour obtenir gratuitement d'autres exemplaires:

Nom	Organisation ou affiliation	Adresse	Ville	Code Postal	Province (Etat)	N° de tél au bureau	N° de tél à domicile
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mun de 25 000 \$ chacune et cinq
bourses d'étude d'une valeur maxi-
male de 14 000 \$ chacune. Le mon-
nombre des bourses dans chaque
catégorie seront fixés par un comité
de sélection indépendant.

NOUVEAU PROGRAMME DE SUBVENTIONS

diat des organismes de la profession enseignante (WCOTP). Le congrès a rassemblé des délégués de plus de cinquante pays et était parrainé conjointement par la BCTF, la WCOTP et la Fédération canadienne des enseignants et enseignantes. En septembre, M^{me} Richards a également pris la parole au cours d'une conférence donnée à l'Université Wayne State de Détroit; cette conférence intitulée *Arms Control and Alternative Security* était présidée par le *Great Lakes Women's Network*.

■ L'Institut vient de publier une *Introduction aux politiques canadiennes sur la limitation des armements, le désarmement, la défense et la solution des conflits*. Cette introduction renferme un sommaire qui aborde environ quarante sujets allant du Traité ABM aux exportations de uranium. Pour obtenir des copies, prière d'écrire à l'Institut.

ressources pour la paix, à Ottawa, et présentée à l'Université Saint-Paul, à la fin du mois de juin. Les discussions ont concerné les négociations menées par les superpuissances sur les armes nucléaires, les participants étaient **M. John Lamb**, du Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement, le major-général **Leonard Johnson** (R.C.), du mouvement *Vieirans for Multilateral Disarmament*, **M. Vachelslav Bogdanov**, deuxième secrétaire de l'ambassade d'URSS, et **M. Robert Montgomerie**, premier secrétaire de l'ambassade des États-Unis.

■ En août, **M^{me} Beth Richards**, de la Direction des programmes publics, a assisté à un atelier sur l'éducation à la paix et elle y a pris la parole. C'est la Fédération des enseignants de la Colombie-Britannique (BCTEF) qui a accueilli les participants à Vancouver. Cet atelier avait lieu dans le cadre du congrès de la Confédération mon-

Nouvelles de l'Institut

Activités à venir

Date	Activité	Organisateur(s)	Endroit
2 au 4 octobre	Groupe consultatif sur le désarmement	Ambassadeur au désarmement, Douglas Roche	Ottawa
4 au 5 octobre	Colloque - "La paix est possible"	Carrefour de solidarité internationale	Sherbrooke, (Québec)
15 au 19 octobre	Atelier sur l'éducation à la paix (Congrès des professeurs de sciences humaines)	Educators for Peace	Saint-Jean (Terre-Neuve)
16 octobre - 15 novembre	La Jeunesse internationale pour la paix et la justice (Tournée)	JIPJ	Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Québec, Nouvelle-Ecosse
23 au 25 octobre	Atelier d'auteurs sur l'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires	ICPSI et SIPRI	Montebello
24 octobre	Journée nationale de la paix	Ministère de l'éducation	Québec
5 et 6 novembre	Table ronde sur le Salvador	CAPA	Ottawa
7 et 8 novembre	The True North Strong and Free ?	Council of Canadians	Edmonton

■ Au cours du mois de septembre, la composition du personnel de l'Institut a changé sensiblement. Harald von Riekhoff, de l'Université Carleton, et Michael Tucker, de l'Université Mount Allison, ont rejoint la Direction de la recherche en tant que membres associés pour l'année 1986-1987. Fen Hampson, ancien chercheur boursier au Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs, est devenu chercheur adjoind à temps partiel. Deux nouveaux auxiliaires de recherche sont arrivés; en effet, James Moore, du MIT et Francine Lecours, de l'Université Laval, ont remplacé Mary Goldie et Steven Baranyi.

■ Brad Peasey vient d'obtenir son diplôme de l'Université Carleton et il a travaillé pendant l'été à la Direction des programmes publics, en tant qu'auxiliaire. Les nouveaux membres de cette direction comprennent Michael Bryan, qui était rédacteur à l'Institut depuis le mois de juillet, et Jocelyn Coulon du journal *Le Devoir*, qui est venu remplacer John Walker en tant que journaliste et Beaudoin fait désormais partie du personnel de l'Administration des subventions.

■ Le 25 juin, l'Institut a présenté le premier de toute une série de colloques du soir consacrés à des sujets relevant de son mandat. Ce premier colloque a porté sur l'Afrique du Sud, et les débats ont été menés par Doug Anglin (Carleton), David O'Meara du CIDMAA, centre de recherche et d'information sur l'Afrique australe. Vingt personnes environ étaient présentes et toutes avaient des connaissances sur cette région ou s'y intéressaient. Ces colloques permettront à des membres du gouvernement, à des représentants d'organismes non gouvernementaux et à d'autres personnes intéressées de dialoguer sur les divers thèmes.

■ En juillet, des séances de planification ont eu lieu à l'Institut au sujet de deux projets de recherche.

Le 7 de ce mois, les chercheurs étudiant les problèmes de sécurité qui se posent aux petits États des Caraïbes membres du Commonwealth ont discuté de la coopération internationale des Caraïbes avec l'*International Peace Academy* dont le siège est à New York. Un rapport et un livre seront publiés à ce sujet dans le courant de 1987. Le 14 juillet, un autre groupe a examiné la possibilité de mener un projet de recherche sur le rôle du Canada dans l'OTAN et d'examiner les choix qui s'offrent à l'Alliance et au Canada.

■ Le 29 juillet, David Cox, Directeur de la recherche à l'Institut, a participé à un atelier au Collège Conrad Grebel de Waterloo. Il s'agit d'une base de données sur la production et l'exportation d'équipements militaires canadiens. La base de données avait été conçue par Ernie Regehr du Collège Conrad Grebel, qui avait bénéficié en cela d'une aide financière de l'Institut. À la fin du

mois de juin, M. Cox a assisté à New York à une réunion dont l'objet était de préparer un atelier de recherche qui doit avoir lieu en Finlande au printemps de 1987 et s'intituler "Prévention de la guerre dans un monde multilatérale". Ce sera l'Institut finlandais des affaires internationales, installé à Helsinki, qui accueillera les participants. Aux Etats-Unis, le Fonds pour la paix s'est chargé de coordonner les travaux préliminaires du comité international de planification.

■ M. Raimo Vaerinen fait aussi partie du comité de planification internationale de relations internationales à l'Université d'Helsinki et ancien directeur de l'Institut de recherches sur la paix à Tampere en Finlande (TAPRI). Au cours d'un colloque organisé au printemps à Ottawa par l'ICPSI, M. Vaerinen a fait un exposé sur les Nations-Unies et parlé des méthodes de règlement des conflits.

■ En juin, l'Institut a parrainé à Ottawa un colloque sur les moyens de favoriser la coopération dans

■ Le secrétaire-trésorier de l'Institut M. John Toogood, a joué le rôle de modérateur au cours d'une réunion-

■ M. Geoffrey Pearson, Directeur général de l'Institut, a assisté à une conférence organisée par l'*International Institute for Strategic Studies* et s'étant tenue à Kyoto (Japon) au début de septembre. Les participants ont étudié un certain nombre de questions regroupées sous le thème de l'Occident et la sécurité internationale: perspectives de paix.

■ M. Geoffrey Pearson, Directeur général de l'Institut, a assisté à une conférence organisée par l'*International Institute for Strategic Studies* et s'étant tenue à Kyoto (Japon) au début de septembre. Les participants ont étudié un certain nombre de questions regroupées sous le thème de l'Occident et la sécurité internationale: perspectives de paix.

LA PRESSE CANADIENNE :

L'étude d'une question clef. Par John R. Walker

Si la vérité est la première victime de la guerre, c'est l'information, souvent, qui est atteinte en temps de paix, ou tout du moins l'information en profondeur, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de questions comme la limitation des armements et le désarmement.

Les correspondants de guerre professionnels existaient depuis plus d'un siècle. Mais durant ce temps, combien de correspondants se sont consacrés aux questions de paix et de sécurité, au Canada notamment? Dans ce bref exposé, je me propose en un premier temps d'analyser un événement particulier dont les effets à long terme sur la paix et la sécurité du Canada se sont avérés considérables, puis d'évaluer dans quelle mesure la presse canadienne a rempli son devoir, c'est-à-dire de donner aux citoyens canadiens une idée de ce qui se passe dans le monde, et de leur faire part de la situation qui se présente. Les Soviétiques ont commencé à traiter et médier en 1983, les Soviétiques ont commencé à rompre les discussions. Enfin, cette décision de l'OTAN, qui ne semblait pas, à première vue, concerner le Canada directement, a été invoquée pour justifier la participation de notre pays au programme d'essai des armes stratégiques américaines. Le 10 février 1983, le Canada a conclu avec les États-Unis un accord global autorisant la mise à l'essai, au-dessus du territoire canadien, de la variante aéroportée du missile de croisière, engin transporté par les bombardiers américains B-52 à long rayon d'action.

C'est ainsi que deux nouveaux éléments sont venus s'ajouter à l'arsenal de l'OTAN: le missile de croisière à longue portée, dont la faible taille et la mobilité créaient de nouveaux problèmes de vérification pour les négociateurs, et une nouvelle variante du missile Pershing, le Mark II, dont la mise en batterie signifiait que pour la première fois, des cibles militaires soviétiques près de Moscou étaient menacées par des missiles américains basés en Europe.

La décision de l'OTAN a exacerbé la tension entre les pays de l'Alliance.

Aux Pays-Bas, en Belgique et au Danemark, l'opinion a fortement réagi contre l'escalade nucléaire en Europe; les gouvernements belge et néerlandais ont dû retarder le déploiement des missiles sur leurs territoires, en attendant le retour au calme. La décision de déployer de nouveaux missiles tout en poursuivant les négociations soviéto-américaines sur la limitation des armements, a fait fuir celles concernant les "euro-missiles". Les négociations sur les INF (forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire) ont commencé à traîner et en 1983, les Soviétiques ont carrément rompu les discussions.

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et de sécurité au Canada.

On a souvent dit, longtemps après le coup, que la nécessité d'implanter des missiles de croisière et des engins par suite d'une longue allocation prononcée le 28 octobre 1977 à l'International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) à Londres par le chancelier ouest-allemand Helmut Schmidt. Il était alarmé par la présence de nouveaux missiles soviétiques SS-20 sur le sol européen et par la possibilité que l'Europe et les États-Unis soient "désunis" en cas de guerre.

C'est en vain que j'ai cherché un compte rendu de ce discours dans les grands journaux canadiens tirés à cette époque. Et plus tard dans l'année, aucun éditorial n'a paru sur les conséquences du discours de M. Schmidt pour la politique de l'OTAN. En 1978, le grand débat nucléaire portait sur le déploiement éventuel de la bombe à neutrons et sur la pression que l'opinion exerçait sur le président Carter pour l'inciter à renoncer au projet. Les journaux canadiens n'ont fait aucune mention de raisons qui aient pu motiver le déploiement des nouveaux SS-20 soviétiques. Le Krenalin avait-il seule-ment prévu la réaction de l'Europe de l'Ouest? S'agissait-il plutôt d'une décision comme une autre, attribuée à l'incertitude bureaucratique? Ce n'est qu'en 1979 que l'OTAN a affiché la volonté de se doter de nouveaux missiles, mais on ne parlait alors que de "modernisation" des forces nucléaires de l'OTAN comme parade au déploiement des SS-20 soviétiques.

Le *Montreal Star* ponctue le tri-èème anniversaire de l'OTAN en avril 1979 par une série d'articles dans lesquels le général Alexander Haig, commandant en chef de l'OTAN, prône la "modernisation rapide" des forces nucléaires de l'OTAN pour contre le déploiement des SS-20 soviétiques.

Au lendemain de la conférence de l'OTAN tenue le 1^{er} juin à La Haye, plusieurs journaux ont fait paraître des brefs communiqués de presse précisant que M. Cyrus Vance, Secré-

En visitant la Grenade, une île que je connais bien, j'ai été déçu de ne pas

Pour contrebalancer l'influence américaine dans son pays, M. Esquivel a récemment décidé d'envoyer six élèves-officiers de l'Armée de terre dans des centres militaires canadiens de formation, même si cette initiative représente pour l'Etat

La première victime de cette situation a été le dirigeant conservateur modéré de la Barbade, M. Bernard St. John, qui avait succédé à Tom Adams, après le décès de celui-ci et avait, comme lui, été étroitement lié au "coup de poing aérien" asséné

les ondes de la radio nationale, un compte rendu passionnant de l'affaire, prononcé par M. Mitchell. Les relations de complicité entre M. Reagan et M. Marcos ont alerté les dirigeants des Caraïbes. En effet, même ceux qui gouvernent de petites

nouveau grâce des investisseurs américains et commandants américains promits par M. Reagan. Grâce à une vaste opération de sauvetage, deux hôtels situés sur la rive belle plage de Grand Anse, qui avaient été détruits pendant les combats de l'opération atterpochée de 1983 ont pu être relevés et transformés, et par la même occasion, on a constaté un magnifiquement hôtel qui satisfait pleinement aux normes de qualité internationale.

En Jamaïque, j'ai rencontré M. Edward Seaga, chef du gouvernement conservateur, qui m'a avoué être très déçu du manque d'appui des États-Unis. Au moment de son arrivée au pouvoir il y a cinq ans, le premier ministre s'était fait le champion des politiques économiques de Mme Thatcher et de M. Reagan et il avait été récompensé par diverses concessions et une aide de 680 millions.

En 1953, par ses partisans, amène-
cains à la Grenade. A la première
occasion qu'ils ont eu d'exprimer
leur opinion sur cette initiative, les
électeurs de la Barbade ont renversé
les conservateurs modérés dans un
raz-de-marée qui a même coûté à M.
St. John son propre siège.

Le premier ministre conservateur
de la Trinidad, M. George Chambers,
a très astucieusement commencé à se

Pendant ma visite à Kingston, en Jamaïque, j'ai compris les raisons qui motivèrent l'homme radicaux socialiste Michael Manley, ancien premier ministre. Les sondages d'opinion venaient en effet d'accorder 62 p. 100 des voix à son Parti national populaire (PNP), contre 35 p. 100 au conservateur Seaga. Se

nales et qui porte bien son nom de Ramada Renaissance. Mais contrairement à ce qu'on pourrait penser, il n'a pas été financé par les Américains : c'est un groupe d'investisseurs de Trinidad qui a entrepris de faire ainsi ce qu'il convient d'appeler un « acte de foi ». La nouvelle compagnie aérienne, qui porte fièrement le nom de Grenada Airlines et assure la liaison directe avec New York n'a pas,

lions de dollars, montant qui a diminué constamment depuis. Les fonds Reagan pour le bassin de l'Initiative n'ont jamais été versés, et les mesures protectionnistes adoptées par Washington au printemps dernier ont eu des conséquences dramatiques pour les principales exportations jamaïcaines, notamment le sucre et les produits textiles. Pendant mon

tant pas au rassemblement organisé en février dernier à la Grenade. Par la suite, lorsqu'au cours de l'été dernier, Washington a invité les troupes américaines à se joindre aux 300 hommes de la 82^e Division aéroportée pour participer à l'exercice naval *"Ocean Venture"*, le gouvernement de Trinitad a carrément décliné l'offre américaine.

À la surprise générale, le dirigeant

Américains des tribes d'aide reçues dans le cadre du plan des Caraïbes, M. Seaga avait accepté d'envoyer un semblant de contingent jamaïcain participer à l'exercice aéronaval *Ocean Venture*, organisée au large de la Grenade. Cette décision politique risquée de lui avoir été fatale. Un son-risque de Carl Stone, qui donne en général des résultats très précis, a fait ressortir que la cote de popularité de

libanais qui envisage de construire un autre hôtel touristique et de l'associer au Ramadan pour accueillir des Américains et des Canadiens dans le cadre de voyages organisés.

Au Belize également, à la bordure occidentale des Caraïbes, j'ai retrouvé ce sentiment de schizophrénie

sejour dans ce pays, M. Seaga a donné une conférence de presse au cours de laquelle il a exposé avec force ses griefs envers Washington, pour se rendre ensuite au Parlement répéter en public l'essentiel de son discours.

Le sentiment de déception qui prévaut dans les douze territoires des Caraïbes que j'ai eu l'occasion de visiter est donc un élément important

hôtelier James Michell, l'entrepreneur et de Saint-Vincent, l'ancien président de la République des Philippines, M. Ferdinand Marcos, en a profité pour faire au premier ministre suppléant une offre

M. Scages avait chuté en fliche peu après qu'il eut pris cette décision. Même si la prochaine élection n'aura lieu que dans deux ans, M. Manley est quasiment certain de remporter la victoire. Il a mis le thème de la sécurité au centre de son principal discours politique prononcé au lendemain de ces événements :

« Dans les Antilles, ce sont les dirigeants politiques néo-colonialistes

comme son ministre des Affaires étrangères M. Dean Rusk ou par l'emprise américaine. Tout pour autant dispose à se laisser étouffer par la "libre-entreprise", mais il n'est pas quant aux "effets magiques de la démocratie" que Reagan remette les convictions de M. Reagan à la tête d'un régime conservateur, partageant avec le jeune pédagogue dynastique récemment élu à la tête d'un

proposé par M. Reagan. La plupart des premiers ministres de la région (à l'exception de M. Blaise, à la Grenade) considèrent désormais que les efforts acharnés déployés par M. Reagan pour s'assurer leur concours seraient représenter un péril fatal sur le champ de mines qu'est le monde politique.

spécialement à l'initiative d'un chef de poste au dirigeant de Saint-Vincent la somme de 60 millions de dollars pour pouvoir se réfugier en toute sécurité dans l'une des îles recueillies des Grenadines. L'offre a finalement été repoussée.

Lors de mon séjour à Saint-Vincent, j'ai eu l'occasion d'entendre, sur

de la droite radicale avec un représentant de la plus grave menace pour notre souveraineté: ils semblent en effet ne plus croire à l'indépendance des pays de la région.

"Cette situation est d'autant plus dangereuse qu'elle coïncide avec l'arrivée au pouvoir d'une administration américaine qui ne se gêne pas pour pratiquer une politique agressive d'hégémonie. L'objectif de M. Reagan est d'associer la puissance des Etats-Unis dans cette région en sou-

En ce qui a trait à l'emprise millitaire, le faucon réagissant nommé ambassadeur à Belmopan exerce sur le gouvernement du Belize une pression incessante pour que celui-ci fasse passer de 400 à 800 le nombre de jeunes hommes inscrits aux cours



Et voilà le comble de l'ironie, la stratégie de M. Reagan aura eu finalement un effet "boomérang", car les six millions d'habitants des Caraïbes anglophones, seraient prêts, s'il le fallait, à élire un gouvernement de gauche pour protéger leur souveraineté et faire valoir leurs convictions nationales. □

LES LENDEMAINS DE LA GRENADE :

La politique américaine dans les Caraïbes. Par Patrick Keatley

■ L'histoire nous enseigne que, faute d'avoir su situer leurs intérêts nationaux, les chefs de gouvernement n'ont, par conséquent, pas toujours été en mesure de déterminer où ils devaient exercer des pressions

g opolitiques.

■ Après quelques mois passés à

anglophones des États-Unés, j'en suis venu à la conviction intime que le gouvernement Reagan est l'un de ceux à avoir commis cette erreur élémentaire. Il suffit, pour se persuader, d'écouter la stratégie qu'il a mise en oeuvre dans les pays de cette

Quelques semaines plus tard, lors de mon passage à Trinidad dans le cadre de ma tournée, l'absence de M. Chambers à cette manifestation m'a été expliquée de façon assez ironique par un éminent rédacteur de la région qui m'a déclaré: "George ne tenait pas à faire figure de Crataecus"

à la veille d'une élection.

Il semble que les mêmes raisons aient conduit le dirigeant de Saint-Vincent, M. Mitchell, à se trouver un bon prétexte pour ne pas assister du tout au sommet de la Grande-Certaines hommes politiques acquie-ent un sixième sens qui les met en garde contre les dangers que présente la participation à de telles manifestations de capitales antillaises et ce que fois

« Il en l'impression que la "dénadition" de Ronald Reagan n'était pas, pour ces dirigeants, l'aboutissement d'un jeu. En fait, il apparaît aujourd'hui que le sommet de Grenade a plutôt mis à leur répertoire, comme tenu de la façon dont le président américain les a personnellement associés à sa croisade antimarxiste en Amérique centrale. En février dernier, quelque 40 000 Grenadins se sont rassemblés sur un terrain de cricket poussiéreux malgré un soleil de plomb, pour accueillir au son d'un calypso, "On Ocle Reagan", "le Libérateur". L'appar-

glissent à gauche, comme ce qui s'est produit à la Grenade, ils n'ont pas du tout choisi la bonne méthode. J'ai préféré faire le nom du dirigeant qui m'a fait cette déclaration, car jusqu'à présent, les premiers ministres des pays des Caraïbes membres du Commonwealth ne tenaient pas, et nous le comprenons, à faire de leur guerre diplomatique avec Washington une "affaire publique". Tous, à l'exception notable de M. James Mitchell, premier ministre de Saint-Vincent ayant fait ses études

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tion de MM. Reagan, Shultz et Weinberger a été saluée par un tumulte d'acclamations, *a priori* très flatteur pour ces trois personnalités. Je ne doute pas que les Grenadins saient encore infiniment reconnaissants aux Américains de leur avoir envoyé, en octobre 1983, une division aéroporée de l'Armée pour les arracher des griffes d'un gouvernement autoritaire à parti unique. Ils ont applaudi chacune des paroles de

l'occurrence dans une limousine à l'appareil en char et en os, véhiculé en l'épreuve des balles.

Mais comme ce fut le cas pour la photo souvent, certaines paroles prononcées ce jour-là ont déjà, pour les dirigeants antillais qui entouraient le président Reagan à la Grande, des effets "boomérang". Même le magazine *Time*, d'allégeance on ne peut plus républicaine, n'a pas hésité à mettre ses lecteurs en garde :

«En fait, le discours prononcé par le président Reagan à la Grenade était destiné aux Américains. Les cinq heures qu'il a passées à la Grenade dans le cadre d'une visite tout à fait extravagante, mais néanmoins partiellement orchestrée, sont finalement devenues la cîc de votre d'une campagne de publicité à l'appui de ce que l'on appelle désormais la Doctrine Reagan, celle qui consiste, pour les États-Unis, à appuyer tous les "résistants" luttant dans le monde entier contre les gouvernements s'adressant à la foule de Queens Park. Le président Reagan ne s'est retourné à la Grenade; il a profité de l'occasion pour décrier l'oppression qui régnait au Nicaragua».

Quant au correspondant du *London Guardian* à Washington, il a donné de l'événement le compte rendu suivant:

contre le gouvernement sandiniste du Nicaragua. Mais cette cause ne semble pas avoir suscité chez eux une quelconque réaction, et pour cause, puisque les 100 millions de dollars que le président américain réclame au Congrès pour financer l'aide aux *contras* l'année prochaine représentent un montant supérieur à l'aide économique totale accordée par les États-Unis aux Antilles au cours des deux dernières années."

Cette dernière critique trouve aussi un écho dans le reportage du *Time* qui va jusqu'à parler de la "rhétorique trompeuse du président" et de ses prédictions optimistes quant à l'avenir de la région des Caraïbes, "qui va très bientôt attirer une foule d'entrepreneurs américains... Il est très encourageant de constater ce à quoi peut donner lieu un environnement où l'on favorise le développement de la libre-entreprise." Toujours dans le même article, on peut lire:

« Reagan s'est montré optimiste trop vite. En effet, les 74 millions de dollars versés par les Américains au cours des deux dernières années n'ont guère modifié la situation économique de la Grande, par rapport à ce qu'elle était avant 1983. Les problèmes que nous connaissons là sous la tutelle marxiste sont restés les mêmes: la faiblesse des investissements étrangers, le manque d'efficacité des infrastructures de communications et des réseaux électriques; 30 p. 100 pour l'ensemble de la population active et 60 p. 100 parmi les jeunes. A l'origine, la Grande devait être l'un des principaux bénéficiaires de l'Initiative pour le bassin des Caraïbes, présentée par M.

Reagan en 1983... Or l'année dernière, les exportations américaines de destination des Etats-Unis ont chuté de 23 p. 100.

Le *Washington Post* a choisi la semaine du voyage de M. Reagan à la Grenade pour publier un reportage sur cette initiative, et il en a qualifié les résultats de "mitigés". L'étude présentait notamment que les importations en provenance des Antilles avaient diminué, alors qu'on avait, au

sonnent que la production énergétique s'est avérée si faible et si coûteuse que seules des visées militaires peuvent expliquer que l'Inde ait affecté une part démesurée de ses ressources peu abondantes à ce programme. Le professeur Sharma croit en outre que les armes nucléaires serviront beaucoup plus à accroître le prestige international de son pays qu'à favoriser sa sécurité. "Notre but est d'accéder au rang des superpuissances dès 1995. Le jour où nous aurons des fusées nucléaires, les Etats-Unis seront obligés de nous respecter".

Quelles que soient les décisions

(Quelles que soient les décisions futures de l'Inde en matière d'armes nucléaires, elles seront probablement enveloppées du secret le plus complet. Les budgets de la défense et de l'énergie atomique n'ont jamais été débattus au Parlement indien. L'option nucléaire a fait l'objet de certaines discussions dans la presse indienne, et l'élite du pays a approuvé et considéré au gouvernement qui joue un rôle de premier plan dans l'initiative de désarmement des cinq superpuissances. Mais le COSNUP mis à part, le qu'il semble se poser peu de questions sur le rôle de l'Inde dans la prolifération nucléaire.

M. Subrahmanyam explique en ces termes le détachement qu'affiche l'option indienne face à la question nucléaire: "Tout débat est fonction des connaissances qui l'animent. Si l'opinion du pays n'est pas suffisamment informée, le débat sera forcément limité." Mais le professeur Sharma riposte que le gouvernement a créé un climat défavorable à l'expression de tout sentiment anti-nucléaire: "Nous n'avons pas encore atteint ce stade de développement où il est possible de s'opposer à un militarisme sans qu'on accuse de manque de patriotisme." □

M. Sheldon Gordon est un spécialiste pour le conseil de rédaction du Globe and Mail. Il a passé deux mois en Inde au début de la présente année grâce à une bourse que lui avait décernée l'Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

Tandis que M. Subrahmanyam et d'autres faucons veulent que le premier ministre Gandhi ne se prive d'aucune option, le professeur Dharendra Sharma du *Centre for Studies in Science Policy*, à l'Université du Jawaharal Nehru, réclame une réputation inconditionnelle de l'arme nucléaire. Le *Committee for a Sans Nucleur Policy* (COSNUP) qu'il dirige et qui regroupe deux juges retraités de la Cour suprême, une poignée de députés, quelques officiers à la retraite et plusieurs écrivains et universitaires très en vue, a demandé que l'Asie du Sud soit déclarée région désarmée. Ces militants anti-nucléaires ont pris pour lorsque M. Gandhi, de pas

sage à Paris pendant l'été de 1985, a fait certaines déclarations laissant sous-entendre que l'Inde pourrait s'assembler et déployer sous cape des armes nucléaires comme parade aux mesures prises par le Pakistan. Le professeur Sharma soutient qu'une telle politique clandestine serait contraire à une loi votée par le Parlement en 1962 et stipulant que le programme nucléaire de l'Inde ne doit servir qu'à des fins pacifiques. Le COSMIP a été rassuré par une déclaration ultérieure de M. Gandhi à Tokyo, déclaration qui semblait démentir les propos qu'il avait tenus à Paris. Mais le Comité, qui affirme avoir contribué à ce revirement, craint toujours que les "intéêts militaires-industriels" n'emportent sur la "voix de la raison" et transforme un jour l'Inde en un Etat doté d'armes nucléaires. Le professeur Sharma refuse

l'argument voulant que la menace exercée par le Pakistan justifie la nucléarisation de l'Inde. "Nous ne sommes menacés par aucun pays", soutient-il. "Le Pakistan ne peut survivre que grâce à la bonne volonté de l'Inde ou à la caution d'une super-puissance. Ces deux conditions n'existaient pas à l'époque de la guerre de 1971. C'est notre pays qui est en faute. C'est nous qui avons accueilli le peuple pakistanais à cette solution suicidaire. C'est nous qui avons lancé le programme nucléaire. Or, le bien-être de l'Asie du Sud nous incombe dans une certaine mesure." Le professeur Sharma est persuadé que le programme indien de production d'énergie nucléaire a surtout été lancé pour "épater les pauvres". Il

meubles classiques pour détruire les installations nucléaires du Pakistan avant que celui-ci ait eu le temps de mettre au point sa propre bombe. Mais l'attaque n'a jamais eu lieu, et Rafiq Gandhi, fils et successeur d'Indira, a conclu avec le président pakistanais Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq en décembre dernier, un accord aux termes duquel chacune des parties s'est engagée à ne pas attaquer les installations nucléaires de l'autre. "Bombarder leurs installations nucléaires serait d'une stupidité criminelle", dit M. Subrahmanyam. Ils riposteraient en bombardant les nôtres, et nous avons beaucoup plus à perdre puisque leurs installations

■ En 1974, après que l'Inde eut fait exploser un engin nucléaire, le Canada a suspendu son "accord de coopération" en matière nucléaire avec ce pays. Les représentants indiens ont alors fait valoir que l'uranium qui avait servi à fabriquer le plutonium employé dans la bombe n'avait pas été importé du Canada et que, par conséquent, l'Inde n'avait pas violé l'accord original conclu avec le Canada. En 1976, après avoir tenté en vain d'établir un accord qui aurait respecté sa politique de non-prolifération, le Canada a mis fin à toutes ses exportations de matières nucléaires à destination de l'Inde. Le Pakistan n'était pas disposé, lui non plus, à se plier aux dispositions "moncées dans la politique canadienne de 1974 relative à la non-prolifération. En 1976, notre pays a donc mis fin à sa coopération avec le Pakistan en matière nucléaire. - N.D.L.R.

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☞ La danse éternelle du dieu hindou

Siva, qui tient dans ses mains le tamour de la création et le feu de la destruction, symbolise parfaitement toute la puissance que l'atome représente.

L'artite de **Sheldon Gordon**

sur les risques de course aux armements nucléaires entre le Pakistan et l'Inde tombe particulièrement à point, compte tenu des faits récents.

Pendant l'été 1985, le premier ministre de l'Inde, M. Rajiv Gandhi,

a affirmé que le Pakistan était sur le point de construire des armes nucléaires et il a annoncé en août de cette même année que l'Inde était en mesure de produire du plutonium chez elle. Aux yeux du Pakistan, l'Inde faisait alors un pas important pour accroître son arsenal nucléaire.

Au cours de l'été 1986, les deux superpuissances sont intervenues auprès du Pakistan en condamnant son programme nucléaire. L'ambassadeur soviétique à Islamabad a remis un message aux autorités pakistanaises dans lequel l'URSS

disait qu'elle ne tolérerait pas l'acquisition d'armes nucléaires par le Pakistan. En juillet, les États-Unis ont menacé de priver le Pakistan de toute aide militaire et économique s'il se dotait d'armes nucléaires.

☞ *Paix et sécurité* paraît tous les trois mois; ce bulletin vise à informer la population canadienne sur les activités de l'Institut et à favoriser l'expression de toutes les opinions ayant cours au pays sur les questions susmentionnées. Les opinions formulées dans chaque article sont exclusivement celles de l'auteur. N'hésitez pas à nous faire part de vos observations et idées. Les textes de ce bulletin peuvent être reproduits, pourvu que la source en soit mentionnée.

Autorisation à venir pour acheter minimelement par courrier de la deuxième classe Port payé à Ottawa.

L'Inde et le Pakistan ont tout inté-

rêt à demeurer juste sous le seuil nucléaire. Il semble, cependant, que chaque pays désire conserver cette option, car de part et d'autre on s'efforce de se procurer tous les moyens et les éléments nécessaires pour produire des bombes atomiques; aucun des deux adversaires ne veut se faire surprendre par l'autre.

C'est le dernier numéro de *Paix et Sécurité* dont je dirige la production en tant que rédactrice en chef. **M. Michael Bryans**, qui possède une gamme impressionnante de compétences, me succède dans le poste. Il vient de passer une année à *John F. Kennedy School of Government* de Harvard où il a étudié les affaires internationales et l'administration publique. Il a par ailleurs travaillé pendant douze ans à l'ONF et c'est au sein de cet organisme qu'il a récemment pris part à la création et à la réalisation de la série *WAR* de Gwynne Dyer. Il a produit deux des épisodes et a été réviseur associé du livre inspiré par la série.

Dianne DeMille
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PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ



Dans le présent numéro:

Sheldon Gordon présente le débat qui existe en Inde sur l'acquisition possible d'armes nucléaires par ce pays.

Patrick Keatley cite des signes attestant que la politique menée par M. Reagan dans les Caraïbes risque de faire boomcrang.

John Walker examine la couverture que les médias canadiens ont accordée à la décision ambivalente prise par l'OTAN en 1979.

Une course aux armements avec le Pakistan?

L'INDE ET LA BOMBE

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
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PEACE & SECURITY

NEW ZEALAND'S NUCLEAR ALLERGY

Cop-out or Common Sense?



In this issue:

Jocelyn Coulon examines the roots and implications of New Zealand's policies on nuclear weapons.

David Leyton-Brown wades into the murky business of economic sanctions.

Michael Bryans looks at one organization's version of 'peace education'.

Fen Osler Hampson evaluates the legacy of the Iceland superpower summit.

Institute Publications 1985-86

Occasional Papers

1. Superpower Rivalry and Soviet Policy in the Caribbean Basin, by Neil MacFarlane, Winter 1986, 70 pages.

Annual Review

A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1985-86, 285 pages.

Background Papers

1. Canadian Responses to the Strategic Defence Initiative, by Gregory Wirick, October 1985.

2. A Nuclear Freeze?, by David Cox, January 1986.

3. Nuclear Winter, by Leonard Bertin, March 1986.

4. Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by William Epstein, March 1986.

5. Conventional Arms Control Negotiations in Europe, by John Toogood, April 1986.

6. The Origins of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, by Gilles Grondin, August 1986.

7. Satellite Surveillance and Canadian Capabilities, by Ron Buckingham, October 1986.

8. Peace in Central America?, by Steven Baranyi, October 1986.

9. A Second Look at No First Use, by Fen Osler Hampson, November 1986.

10. The Debate About Peace Education, by Elizabeth Richards, December 1986.

Points of View

1. East/West Relations: Values, Interests, Perceptions, by Geoffrey Pearson, March 1986.

2. Nuclear Weapons and the Averting of War, by Robert Malcolmson, October 1986.

Conference Reports

1. Negotiations for Peace in Central America, by Liisa North. (out of print)

2. Challenges to Deterrence: Doctrines, Technologies and Public Concerns, Proceedings of Conference, Ottawa, 17-19 October 1985, by Dianne DeMille.

3. The Risk of Accidental Nuclear War, Proceedings of Conference, Vancouver 26-30 May, by Andrea Demchuk.

A noted French nuclear weapons expert recently remarked that he could not understand what the New Zealanders were so upset about. London is not very much further away from the Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk than Wellington is from the French site at Mururoa Atoll. He reasoned that since the British were not angry at the Russians, the Kiwis had no cause to be mad at the French. "The New Zealanders act like the Pacific was their ocean!"

The cover story for this issue is **Jocelyn Coulon's** look at the roots of New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy and the possible implications for the future of the Western alliance system. The New Zealand saga raises a number of issues: coat-holding within the Western alliance, state-sponsored terrorism (the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior), the power of an aroused and offended populace and a general, if not particularly vocal, impatience on the part of the many states that have no nuclear weapons with those few that do. This impatience is, for all the

obvious reasons, a great deal easier to express inside the Western Alliance than it is within the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union has never accepted deviation from its strategic and military policy by countries it feels are central to its security. Soviet reaction to past deviations has ranged from the brutal (the invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968) to the merely paranoid (aborting in 1985 a state visit to West Germany by the President of the German Democratic Republic).

But as Coulon explains, New Zealand is of marginal importance to American strategy. The real test of American resolve, and the hitherto more or less unified Western policy on nuclear weapons, will come if and when a central Alliance player such as Britain or the Federal Republic of Germany elects a government with ideas similar to those of New Zealand's Prime Minister Lange.

Among other articles in this issue is **David Leyton-Brown's** examination of an old and often misunderstood tool of international diplomacy - economic sanctions. Leyton-Brown, of York University's Centre for

International and Strategic Studies, is the editor of a new volume, *The Utility of Economic Sanctions*, published in 1986 by Croom Helm, London.

The big news from the international politics front is what happened (and what did not happen) at October's Iceland superpower summit. **Fen Hampson** presents his assessment of the outcome, and its influence on future strategic arms control negotiations.

With this fourth issue of *Peace&Security* we are growing in size and including a book review section. However, unlike the rest of the magazine, the reviews will not be translations from the original. The English and French sections will be written and edited separately. We are fortunate to have the services of **Jocelyn Coulon**, correspondent for *Le Devoir* and currently a CIIPS Fellow, as French review page editor.

Michael Bryans
Editor

CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

307 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K2P 0P7
(613) 990-1593

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Nancy Gordon
David Cox
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John Walker
Dianne DeMille
Jocelyn Coulon

Editor:

Michael Bryans

French Review

Page Editor:

Jocelyn Coulon

Design and Production:

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Jocelyn Coulon is a correspondent for *Le Devoir*, Public Programmes Fellow at the Institute and French review page editor of *Peace&Security*; **David Leyton-Brown** is Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of the Centre for International and Strategic Studies at York University; **Michael Bryans** is editor of *Peace&Security*; **Fen Hampson** is a research associate at the Institute and teaches international affairs at Carleton University; **Jane Boulden** is a research assistant at the Institute; **Gregory Wirick** is a writer based in Ottawa; **Patrick Nagle** is Southam News correspondent based in Harare, Zimbabwe.

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NEW ZEALAND'S NUCLEAR ALLERGY:

Cop-out or common sense? By Jocelyn Coulon



For over two years New Zealand, a country which is not often front page news, has been in the limelight because

of a dispute with the United States over its recent anti-nuclear policy.

The Labour government of David Lange, in keeping the promise made during the summer election of 1984, decided to introduce legislation in the New Zealand Parliament forbidding ships carrying nuclear weapons or powered by nuclear energy to enter New Zealand's ports, or airplanes equipped with nuclear weapons to land at its airports.

Wellington's determination to persist with this policy has allowed the US to have New Zealand suspended from ANZUS, the defence pact to which Australia, New Zealand and the United States have adhered for the last thirty-five years. Throughout the summer of 1986 relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate, but early in the fall there was an improvement. Lange announced that his anti-nuclear legislation would not be passed by the end of October, as originally foreseen, but would be delayed until the following year. This period of detente may allow both sides to reconcile their differences and to reach some agreement on a matter which is inevitably of great interest to those of the United States' allies which have accepted nuclear weapons on their territory.

The Source of the Problem

New Zealand's distaste for nuclear weapons is nothing new.

During the Labour administrations of Normand Kirk and Wallace Rowling (1972-75), Wellington closed New Zealand ports to ships carrying nuclear weapons. However, this legislation was entirely theoretical as the government never actually checked any ships.

New Zealand also played an active role at the United Nations where it put forward a plan to make the Pacific area a de-nuclearized zone. All the major powers, with the exception of China, rejected this proposal each time it was put forward. With the defeat of Labour in 1975, the idea was buried for a decade. The plan was resurrected by Australia in 1983 and at Rarotonga, on 6 August 1985, the thirteen members of the South Pacific forum, including New Zealand, adopted a treaty which declared the major part of the southern Pacific a de-nuclearized zone. It is worth noting that New Zealand has always been opposed to the nuclear tests which France conducts on its territories in the Pacific, and it has never missed an opportunity to raise this issue at international meetings.

From 1975 to 1984 the Conservative government of Robert Muldoon reversed the previous administration's policy in the interest of strengthening New

Zealand's alliance with the US. In 1983, however, the advent in Australia of a Labour government – which was openly anti-nuclear – gave impetus to New Zealand's peace movement. During the summer election campaign of 1984 New Zealand's Labour Party took a step to the left in promising to make the country a de-nuclearized zone. Two other parties, including a conservative one, followed in its footsteps and the party in power, the National Party, was divided on the issue with some of its members threatening to vote with Labour on matters relating to defence. On 14 July 1984, David Lange won a clear majority of the seats in Parliament and the three parties opposed to nuclear weapons took sixty-three per cent of the vote.

The new Prime Minister did not waste any time in showing that he was in earnest about this policy. In February 1985 he stopped the visit of an American ship to New Zealand's ports because Washington refused to say whether it was carrying nuclear weapons. The Americans maintained that this was in accordance with their policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on any particular ship. The Lange administration's determination increased when, in July, France attacked a ship that belonged to the Greenpeace ecology movement. The Rainbow Warrior, which was sunk in Auckland harbour with the loss of one life, had been on its way to observe French nuclear tests. Two months later President Francois Mitterand visited the test site at Mururoa and confirmed that testing would continue.

In December the Labour government – whose position was strengthened by these incidents and the subsequent wave of popular support – introduced anti-nuclear legislation in Parliament.

The ANZUS Treaty

The United States quickly reacted to New Zealand's action. The Americans announced that they would not participate further in any military exercises organized by New Zealand, that they would reduce exchanges of information to zero, and that they would phase out programmes for training New Zealand officers in US military colleges. On 11 August 1986, after a final meeting between Lange and US Secretary of State Schultz, the United States and Australia decided to suspend New Zealand from the ANZUS Defence Pact on the grounds that Wellington had reneged on an essential element of the agreement. The two allies believed that allowing nuclear armed ships and aircraft free passage was essential for the ANZUS Pact to be effective. For the Americans, defence of the South Pacific was one and indivisible, and states which were part of this security system, and received the protection which it offered, must accept the means of defence which were used by it – including nuclear weapons.

New Zealand's Labour government found this action incomprehensible since nowhere in the text of the Treaty was it specified that the signatories must accept a nuclear role in the defence of the Pacific. The Treaty, signed in San

Francisco in 1951 by Australia, New Zealand and the United States, did not explicitly require any one signatory to automatically come to the defence of another. It was not a formal military alliance and contained no provision for an integrated force under a central command. It referred only to consultations between the member States in the event of danger. In the opinion of most experts, the United States would come to New Zealand's defence if the latter were attacked, not because of its obligations under the Treaty, but because its own interests were at stake. In an effort to appease Washington, New Zealand reaffirmed its support for ANZUS, strengthened its commitment to defend the Pacific by conventional means and announced an increase in its military budget.

Is Dissent Contagious?

The importance of New Zealand's position can only be appreciated in the context of the United States' global interests. The US relies on a vast network of bases and military installations in the Pacific region of which the most important are situated in Australia, Japan and the Philippines. Three important communications centres in Australia – Pine Gap, Nurrungar and North West Cape – are vital for the efficient functioning of part of the US nuclear force. They are used to send messages to nuclear submarines and relay the alert in the event of a nuclear missile attack by the Soviet Union. Japan and the Philippines play host to more than 60,000 US military personnel as well as hundreds of ships and planes which patrol the Pacific, particularly the northern region where the Soviet presence has increased considerably in the last ten years. Japan shuts its eyes to the presence of nuclear arms on its territory even though their presence is forbidden by its Constitution and is the object of

increasingly violent protests on the part of peace groups.

The Australian Labour Party has long supported the position currently adopted by New Zealand, but until now the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Hawke, has managed to keep the anti-nuclear movement in check. He is under considerable pressure, however, from both the population at large and from his own party. The Dibb Report on defence – tabled in June – while hardly isolationist, recommended an Australian defence policy which concentrates on national rather than alliance needs. This will certainly revive Australia's debate over its military alliances.

New Zealand's opposition to nuclear weapons, nicknamed the 'Kiwi Disease', could also have an effect on Western Europe, where in recent years the peace movement seems to have been losing ground after a period of great activity from 1979 to 1983. Certain governments, notably those of Greece and Norway, and the majority of the Social Democratic parties which are in opposition, have either adopted radical anti-nuclear policies, or are on the verge of doing so. The British Labour Party, for example, has decided that it would dismantle Britain's nuclear force and forbid the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory. In Denmark, the Social Democrats have adopted an isolationist defence policy contrary to NATO's 'forward strategy', while in the Federal Republic of Germany the Social Democrat Party is moving ever closer to neutralism. In Greece the Papandreu government announced last September that it was determined to get rid of the nuclear weapons now stationed on its territory. At the same time, in Norway, the Labour Government prevented US F-111 bombers, capable

of penetrating into the heart of the Soviet Union, from taking part in NATO exercises on Norwegian territory, lest they be considered a provocation to the Soviets.

As yet, the nuclear allergy has not reached Canada. The country was rid of US nuclear arms in the summer of 1984, and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has reaffirmed the previous government's policy of refusing to let nuclear weapons be deployed on Canadian territory. Nevertheless, our ports and airports remain open to US ships and aircraft, and it is far from clear whether, in the event of a major crisis, Canada would be able to avoid accepting nuclear weapons.

The American Reaction


The severity of the US reaction has been out of all proportion to New Zealand's political or strategic importance. It was a carefully calculated response to prevent the allergy from spreading. In taking progressively stronger retaliatory measures as Lange upped the ante, Washington hoped to send a message to its allies, and above all to those opposition parties which, as in the case of Britain and West Germany, might well soon be in power. It seems, however, that this policy failed to produce the desired result.

New Zealand is now seen as a small country being victimized by a superpower and this perception has increased support for the anti-nuclear movement in Europe. Some observers think that Washington would have been well advised to have delayed sanctions until the summer of 1987, when the Parliamentary elections due to be held in New Zealand might produce a Conservative government. However,

as things now stand, the polls show that three-quarters of the population supports the policy of David Lange and that a Labour government will be re-elected.

If the two sides do not agree to settle their differences amicably in a few months time, one may witness the end of an alliance which forms part of Western collective security. The United States, however, has no interest in bringing matters to a head or in humiliating New Zealand. It is worth remembering that France left the NATO military structure in 1966 and drove US forces from its territory without damaging Western security. New Zealand's action is understandable as an example of the frustration felt by middle-sized powers with the lack of progress in East-West relations and the resumption of the arms race. It is not surprising that a country like New Zealand should be unwilling to accept a passive role in the grand strategic games between the superpowers. Being unable to directly influence the course of relations, these countries believe – whether rightly or not – that they can advance the cause of peace by taking concrete actions of their own. New Zealand's nuclear allergy may well spread if the superpowers are not more sensitive to this growing impatience. □

*translation by
Mary Taylor*



ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:

What they do and how they work. By David Leyton-Brown

Should economic sanctions be imposed on South Africa? Should Canada join the United States in imposing economic sanctions on Nicaragua?

Should Canada enforce sanctions against Libya because of its support for terrorism, (or against the United States because of its retaliatory raid on Libya)?

Many people feel strongly about these and similar questions, but the public debate is often emotional and ill-defined. We need a clearer understanding of just what economic sanctions are, what sanctions can be intended to accomplish, and what effects sanctions have, in order to suggest how economic sanctions can be better designed and implemented.

Nature of Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions are deliberate government actions to inflict economic deprivation on a target state or society, through the limitation of trade or financial relations. The most common economic sanctions involve controls upon exports to the target country, ranging from restrictions on specified items, usually strategic goods, to a complete embargo. The intended results of export controls are to deny the target access to critical materials and technology, and thus impair its economic growth and development, and to inflict economic costs through the purchase of higher priced substitute imports or the diversion of resources to the local production of substitutes.

A second category of economic sanctions involves restrictions upon imports from the target. Import controls are intended to

deny the target access to export markets, and thus to force it to accept lower prices from other buyers, if it is able to export at all. The ensuing lack of foreign exchange then restricts its ability to purchase foreign products, and requires the diversion of domestic resources.

The third type of economic sanctions involves restrictions upon official or commercial finance. The termination of foreign aid and officially-subsidized loans or an interruption in private financing can impose a higher cost of borrowing from alternate lenders, if these can be found. The ultimate form of financial sanctions is a freeze of the target's assets in the sanctioning country or countries, which stops financial flows, and denies the target the use of its assets for productive purposes or as security for borrowings. This occurred during the Iranian hostage crisis when the US government froze over \$4 billion of Iranian assets in the United States.

Purposes of Economic Sanctions

There are five qualitatively distinct purposes for which economic sanctions can be designed and implemented. Each of these is best served by sanctions of different severity and duration, each has a different likelihood of success, and each should be evaluated by different criteria.

The first purpose is to impose a penalty on one who violates the desired or established order. The use of sanctions to punish an

offender is analogous to a jail sentence for a criminal, for retribution rather than in the hope of rehabilitation. Such sanctions should not be open-ended, any more than life imprisonment should be inflicted on every convicted criminal. Appropriate and effective punitive sanctions should be severe enough to be painful, but not so severe as to inflict crippling or fatal damage, and should be of relatively short and fixed duration. The time-limited Canadian sanctions on the Soviet Union after the shooting down of the KAL airliner are a good case in point. Used for punitive purposes, economic sanctions can set limits on acceptable behaviour. Punitive sanctions cannot be expected to produce a renunciation by the target of previous values or a reversal of past actions (any more than a civil rights law can immediately make a bigot less prejudiced), but they may be judged successful if the norms of acceptable behaviour have been clearly reaffirmed, and the violator has been effectively punished.

A second purpose is to deter future unacceptable action, through the explicit or implicit threat of retaliation. The punishment of those who have acted unacceptably in the past can also be intended to deter them and others from behaving similarly in the future. As with any deterrent threat, credibility rests on the proportionality of the costs to be imposed and the certainty that the threat will be implemented. Economic sanctions may be considered to have served deterrent purposes successfully, despite all the ambiguity about the effectiveness of deterrence, if the

future undesired behaviour is avoided, even if other objectives, such as a change in current behaviour, are not met. Many believe that the likelihood of Soviet military intervention in Poland was reduced by the vigour of sanctions against the Soviet Union over Afghanistan.

The purpose which is the most widely attractive yet the most difficult to attain is to compel a change in the behaviour of the target by inflicting economic pain. Desired alterations in the status quo can range from minor policy changes, such as the resumption of negotiations or the release of hostages, through major policy changes, such as the withdrawal of troops or cessation of hostilities, to the destabilization of a government or even the transformation of the entire social, economic and political basis of a regime. The principle of compellence is to apply pressure to the target, and to maintain that pressure until the target complies by changing its behaviour. Thus once begun, compellent sanctions must be kept in place until the objective is reached, or their termination is tantamount to an admission of failure. However, once sanctions have been explicitly and publicly tied to this compellent purpose, it becomes politically more difficult for the target to comply, for it will be seen by its own citizens and by others to have yielded to foreign pressure. Even in the apparently successful Rhodesian sanctions case, many white Rhodesians resisted what they saw as external interference in their affairs. Today we are seeing increasing Nicaraguan and South

African intransigence in the face of foreign economic sanctions.

A longer term purpose is to restrict the economic and military capabilities of the target, and thus to make it more costly and time-consuming for the target to pursue its foreign and domestic policies. The best known example is the restricted export of strategically important goods to the Soviet Union from the United States and its allies. Restricting access to modern technology can force the target to pay more to obtain the products from alternate suppliers, or to divert resources to domestic production. The long term nature of this purpose suggests that there is no reason to lift such sanctions unless the purpose itself has changed, or been overtaken by other objectives.

The final purpose is to send a signal of resolve to the target and to one's own domestic population. To the target, sanctions can communicate outrage, firmness and solidarity. Where rhetoric is insufficient, but governments must act, sanctions are a less costly and less escalatory alternative to the use of military force.

The signal to one's own population is perhaps even more important. It may be necessary for a government to act in a conflict situation, but in domestic political terms it is even more critical for it to be seen to be acting. So intended, economic sanctions may satisfy demands for firm action, and defuse pressures for more extreme measures.

Effects of Economic Sanctions

Governments too often appear to apply economic sanctions without clear purpose, as an instrument more symbolic than real.

Confusion about the purposes sanctions are intended to serve

can breed public dissatisfaction with their results, if the public never clearly understood what the results were intended to be. Similarly, if sanctions are oversold to the public as a cure-all, sure to produce the total (and immediate) capitulation of the target, exaggerated public expectations of the results are almost sure to lead to public disillusionment with their ineffectiveness in the immediate case, and disinclination to rely on sanctions in possible future cases when they may be more appropriate. The mishandled presentation of the Olympic boycott created this kind of disillusionment when Soviet troops were not withdrawn from Afghanistan as a result.

A country will be less susceptible to the pressure of economic sanctions if it is economically strong and self-sufficient, and thus able to absorb the effects on its domestic economy with little discomfort. If a target can respond flexibly, sanctions can even have the counter-productive long term effect of stimulating the development of the target's economic infrastructure, making it more self-sufficient and less susceptible to economic leverage in the future. External assistance may also offset the impact of economic sanctions, which may then serve only to drive the target more firmly into the orbit of another powerful state.

Even if the objectives are clear and the target susceptible to pressure, those imposing the sanctions may not be able to bring about the desired effects. Sanctions can be frustrated by alternate suppliers or purchasers. In an economically interdependent world, many sources of supply

and channels of access, such as foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations, are beyond total government control, making some desired effects unattainable.

Even when sanctions have exactly the desired impact on the target, there can be unintended costs for the initiator as well, in terms of lost sales and profits, and possibly diminished competitiveness in the longer term. Some costs however may not be entirely unintended, or at least not unanticipated. The seriousness of a political signal can be strengthened by the demonstration that the sender feels so strongly that it is willing to bear some cost in order to express that feeling. Nevertheless a perception of excessive or unequal costs borne by particular domestic groups (like athletes in the Olympic boycott or farmers in the grain embargo of the Soviet Union) or by allies (such as Western European countries in the dispute with the United States over the Siberian natural gas pipeline sanctions) can erode solidarity and resolve. Resentment about the inequitable distribution of burdens can lead to political opposition at home and damaging disagreements abroad.

The termination of sanctions sends a signal as much as their imposition. For example, if punitive sanctions are clearly intended to be imposed for a fixed time period, they can be automatically lifted without incident, just as a criminal is released from jail at the end of his sentence. But if the declared purpose of sanctions is to impose a policy change, and the policy remains unchanged, then to lift the sanctions, even after an extended period, may signal approval or at least acceptance of the previously unacceptable policy. At the very least it will signal retreat by the sanc-

tioner from an ineffectual posture. Sanctions can be harder to end than to begin. The necessary planning should not be so rigid as to remove control by policymakers, but must anticipate the conditions under which the sanctions will be lifted.

Prescription for Better Sanctions

The following precepts can help to minimize negative effects and maximize the prospects for success when designing and implementing economic sanctions.

Be clear which purposes the sanctions are intended to achieve when designing the kind, severity and duration of sanctions, and when presenting them to one's public.


Be sure that the target is susceptible to the desired impact, so that the intended signal is received.

Be sure that the objective is realistically attainable through measures under the control of the initiating country or countries.

Consult adequately with allies, to ensure that they understand, accept and share the objective and will not engage in offsetting action, and to ensure that unnecessary or unacceptable costs will not be imposed on them.

Be sensitive to domestic support, to ensure that unnecessary or unacceptable costs will not be imposed on particular domestic groups, and to ensure that the declared purpose and anticipated effects of the sanctions are not exaggerated to the domestic audience.

Plan ahead for the eventual termination of the sanctions to avoid disagreement over the suitability of that action and disillusionment with the result. □



PEACE EDUCATION:

Telling Jack and Jill the Facts of Life. By Michael Bryans

**“Two children fighting over a playground ball,
and two nations fighting over an oil field both
reflect similar dynamics...**

Because of this, if we understand conflict in our own lives, we can better understand it between other people, groups and nations.”

This quote represents the central precept of a body of educational material – teaching guides and classroom exercises – intended for use in North American schools at all levels. ‘Peace education’, a label applied to this and other similar materials, has not escaped critical attention. The enthusiasm with which peace educators pursue their aims, the inherently political content of the subject, and the audience at which the material is aimed – children and young adults – almost guarantee controversy. School boards all across North America strike committees of teachers and parents to study these new curricula guides and decide whether to use them. Unfortunately, most of the attention is on the smoke and flames of ideological dispute and not on the substance of what is to be taught.

The exact origins of peace education are difficult to pin down because its goals are many and its proponents diverse. Nevertheless, the centre of gravity of peace education seems to lie with a group of American teachers, *Educators for Social Responsibility* (ESR) of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Their first work, a curriculum outline designed for schools, kindergarten through twelfth grade, and titled *Dialogue: A Teaching Guide to Nuclear*

Issues, was published four years ago. Since then, ESR has published a teaching guide on “peace-making skills” designed to give young people a “clear sense of what peace might be,” and another on how to participate in the democratic process.

There are a number of sources of peace education guides, including a few Canadian ones, but the most comprehensive and thoughtful material is ESR’s. Many peace educators borrow a lot of their ideas, if not actual writings, from ESR publications. ESR activists play a significant role in the movement which aims to have peace education included in school curricula all across the continent. ESR is the avant-garde of peace education, and it is principally their work that this article will discuss.

Vocal political opposition, mainly from conservative parents and educators, has struck home with advocates of peace education. The Executive Director of the American ESR, Tony Wagner, prefers to drop the name peace education completely because it “suggests partisan education. It suggests appeasement education, [it] suggests pacifist education.” Such cosmetic adjustments will not satisfy conservatives, either here or in the United States, and the ideological name calling will probably continue. Meanwhile the essential question goes mostly unasked. What can one teach about international conflict by looking at the dynamics of two

children fighting over a playground ball?

A brief tour of two ESR guides shows how central to their work is the idea of equivalence between the personal and international realms. It also shows that in stretching the reality of international affairs to fit their own pedagogical theories, ESR authors leave out a lot that is essential to real understanding of issues of war and peace.

The notion that states relate to other states as you relate to your sister or your school teacher is a core assumption around which the peace education movement (at least ESR’s part of it) is built. It is not a completely bizarre notion and it is a very appealing one especially for teaching school-age kids about the nasty world they live in. It reduces conflict to a human scale, relates it to a child’s personal experience and provides some assurance that an individual’s conduct can be influential in world affairs.

This view of the world is also comforting for teachers and parents. Peace education holds the promise of changing the world for the better; helping “students see choices and alternatives for the future and feel confident they can be peacemakers,” is how one of the ESR teaching guides puts it. In an atmosphere of fear and despair about the future where the ability of individuals to influence events appears non-existent, this is no small consolation. We may not be able to stop the bomb builders today, but our kids might if we educate them right. The logic is compelling, especially in the absence of other obvious solutions to the dilemma in which we find ourselves.

So much for the motivations of peace educators and the functional reasons for their arguments; what about the substance of their work? It may be comforting, but is it true? ESR stresses the open, pluralistic character of its materials, and the “critical” thinking they are supposed to engender in young people. Says ESR’s Tony Wagner:

Our goal is to bring the urgent issues of our time into the classroom in a manner that is professional, that is educationally appropriate, that is age appropriate and in away that encourages students to be more actively involved and engaged as citizens in a democracy.

But that is not what is going on in ESR’s teaching guides. For all their pluralistic, progressive gloss the ESR manuals have a vision that is at once naive, paternalistic and quite parochial – sadly typical of mainstream America’s perspective of the world beyond its borders.


The underlying tone of the guides is soft, warm, and reassuring, especially in sections for younger children. The recurrent theme is that if people are nicer and more reasonable; if they “play fair” and understand why other people are angry or unhappy, peace can be achieved. Plenty of effort is put into activities the guide says are designed to “encourage cooperative behaviour.” There are exercises which contrast cooperation games (the path to peace) with competition games (the road to conflict). Children from kindergarten to grade six are urged to “contact the peacemaker” within themselves, to “remember times

of peace” and to make drawings of what they think peace is like. In thinking about the problems of war and peace the children are to “think globally and act locally.” Students are to have the opportunity to see the “whole world collage” and to experience “their connection with people and cultures from all over the world.”

Enhancing in young people the ability to empathize and understand cultures other than their own improves the climate for civilized discussion between groups and is clearly a good idea, but international conflict is not only a matter of closing cultural gaps. Wars are not conducted by peoples and cultures; the major players in international politics are states and the governments that run them. However, one looks in vain through two thick ESR teaching guides for serious treatment of the princes, kings, presidents, priests, cabinets, political bureaux, national security councils, embassies and general staffs that carry out the complex business of international politics. Children are likely to conclude from all of this that when it comes to war and peace there is ‘us’ (the Americans), the ‘Russians’ (who are not the enemy but really nice people if you try to understand them) and the ‘world’ (everybody else, also warm and friendly if you are willing to “experience their cultures”). It is multi-cultural pablum for the nuclear age.

The absence of states and governments in ESR’s model of the world is quite strained at times. A chapter for grades kindergarten through six looks at examples of “peacemakers.” It asks students to find them among members of their families, their communities, their schools, and “international peace groups” like UNICEF or Greenpeace. They read about “famous peace-makers” such as Martin Luther

King, Albert Schweitzer and Eleanor Roosevelt. These are impressive individuals and groups, but it is misleading to give the impression that they do very much of the peacemaking. Most countries are at peace most of the time because most conflict



is settled without resort to war. Someone is doing that peace-making: the diplomats, negotiators, and politicians who work daily and anonymously within governments. Clearly they need help; they are in serious danger of blowing the world up. But education about war and peace that does not spend much of the time on the nature of states and governments is like teaching the game of football without reference to players and teams.

The material for older students (grades seven through twelve) is a little more substantive. The *Nuclear Issues* guide deals with the effects of nuclear weapons, and encourages students to examine critically the kind of information the West gets about the Soviet Union. In *Concepts of Peace* there are exercises on conflict resolution and negotiation, the role of propaganda and ideology, and the dilemma of violence versus non-violence in peacemaking. However, as the following excerpt shows, the personal-behaviour-equals-international-behaviour model still dominates:

We believe that we can achieve a more democratic foreign policy by teaching the next generation of voters that negotiating arms control is like negotiating a contract between a company and a union, like working out a divorce

settlement, like convincing the school to sell better lunches, like getting the car for Saturday night.

This view of the way the world works is at best only partly true, and to be truly critical and pluralistic ESR materials should seriously discuss the many ways in which it is not. There are very specific and powerful group dynamics which swamp the importance of individual behaviour on the battlefield or in the Cabinet room. Individuals do not perpetrate wars; states do. Street violence is not equivalent to organized, state-sanctioned killing during wartime. Understanding why Jill gave Jack a swat in the eye during recess is only marginally helpful in understanding why nations go to war.

In a curriculum about war and peace it will not do to ignore the pervasive influence of organization and institutions on human activities. An ESR exercise on the use of words to “inflare arguments and induce hatred” is especially illuminating on this issue. One reading explicitly connects the My Lai massacre of Vietnamese civilians to Lt. Calley’s grade school education where he was taught that Communists were not human. The implicit lesson: if you teach people to hate other people they will become soldiers and kill civilians. While it is obviously true that hating people is a bad idea, it is not true that soldiers kill because they are angry or full of hate. They kill because of the process of socialization they are put through by a highly structured institution designed to deliver young men into situations where they believe they have little choice but to kill. Through sins of commission (Calley was hardly a normal soldier doing his regular job) and omission (the guides do not deal with soldiers or armed forces anywhere else in a comprehensive way), ESR would have its student readers believe that the military institution is merely the sum total of the

hatreds, bad manners and flawed negotiating strategies of its member soldiers. If one wants children to grow up knowing more about how to make peace, this is an odd way to start.

A vital task of education is to simplify and order what appears random and chaotic – to provide those receiving the education with a framework for understanding. To better understand war and peace, the single most useful of these simplifying insights is that relations between nations is *never* simple. On this basis alone, ESR’s adherence to the paradigm of equivalence between the different arenas of human experience – individual, family, tribe, community, people, nation – is dubious. And as we have seen, it leads to some strange conclusions.

Peace educators, including ESR, resort to the aphorism that ‘peace is not just the absence of war’ as justification for much of what they do. But this is mere semantic acrobatics. The real test of something that calls itself ‘peace’ education is how well it deals with war and international conflict. If the dynamics of interpersonal relations were a useful guide to managing a planet populated by nation states we would be doing much better than we are. There is clearly some other set of forces at work here that we do not as yet fully comprehend. The playground and the living-room are not faithful guides to inter-state behaviour.

Considered in the broadest sense peace does encompass more than the absence of war, but as historian Michael Howard wrote, war’s absence is “not a bad place to start.” If one wants to teach kids how to stop war they must be informed about how wars start and how states and their interests interact. Peace education, as formulated by ESR, fails to deliver that crucial knowledge. □



ARMS CONTROL AFTER REYKJAVIK:

Promise and risk. By Fen Osler Hampson

The arms control talks will resume in Geneva this January and the superpowers will get back to the difficult business of trying to turn the new vision of Reykjavik into negotiable proposals.

Both the superpowers committed themselves, in principle, to reducing their strategic* nuclear arsenals by half and, over the longer term, to the possible elimination of certain strategic weapons. The vision was dramatic and caught most observers by surprise. For the first time, the superpowers appeared committed to turning back rather than bringing a temporary halt to the arms race.

Arms control is like Zeno's paradox. Zeno, a Greek philosopher, observed that a man would never reach his destination if each step he took forward was half the distance of the step which preceded it. With each step, progress in arms control has seemed more distant and elusive. Was Reykjavik a half or a full step forward? Are the principles developed at Reykjavik, on which current negotiations are based, good ones? What are the prospects for an agreement in the new round of talks at Geneva?

First, it is useful to recall what was agreed and what the sticking points were at Reykjavik.

Theatre nuclear forces. Both sides agreed to eliminate virtually all medium-range missiles in Europe although each side would be able to retain one hundred warheads outside the European

zone. French and British weapons were not included and the Soviets indicated their willingness to freeze missiles with ranges under one thousand kilometres.

Testing. Gorbachev apparently accepted an American proposal to gradually scale down nuclear testing as long as it was understood that tests would eventually come to a halt.

Strategic weapons. The negotiating record is somewhat murky. It seems that general agreement in principle was reached to reduce strategic weapons (ICBMs, bombers, SLBMs) by fifty per cent in five years. The Soviets also offered to seek the complete elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons in ten years. The subsequent American interpretation was an offer to eliminate all ballistic nuclear delivery vehicles in this period (thereby leaving untouched bombers and cruise missiles).

Gorbachev made the entire package conditional on American acceptance to limit testing and development of space-based technologies for ballistic missile defence to the laboratory. President Reagan refused on the grounds that research, testing and development of space-based systems is permissible under the ABM Treaty.

Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits testing of ABM systems or components "which are sea-based, air-based, space based, or mobile land-based." American

negotiators have argued that this restriction only applies to ABM systems and components that existed when the Treaty was negotiated; it does not apply to the new systems (lasers, particle beam weapons, etc.) envisaged in Star Wars. However, this interpretation is not shared by the Soviets who believe that the ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits testing of components of potential space-based anti-ballistic missile systems. Unless the Soviets drop their insistence on linkage, which is unlikely, the United States and the Soviet Union will have to resolve their fundamental differences over SDI if any sort of agreement on offensive systems is to be achieved.

There may be room for compromise. Some argue that the ABM Treaty only prohibits testing and development of ABM "components" or "systems." Because "components" are not defined, this ambiguity leaves room for negotiation, and an agreement could be worked out that would allow for a vigorous research program and the testing of some sub-components of systems. But it would prevent a crash program to develop defences, thus maintaining strategic stability while the relevant capabilities of these new technologies, most of which are still only in the very preliminary stages of research, are being assessed.

The proposals for offensive reductions have elicited enthusiasm in some quarters and skepticism in others. There is little doubt that they are ambitious. However, there are a number of important outstanding issues that will have to be addressed during the negotiations.

Fifty percent cuts – There is sufficient redundancy in the arsenals of both sides now that adding to or reducing the number of weapons will not make much of a difference in the ability of either superpower to inflict massive and unacceptable damage on the other. The world would still be MAD (a world of mutual assured destruction). However, the way those reductions are made could be important.

ICBMs and bombers are more vulnerable than missiles in submarines and reductions across the three legs of the strategic triad would be less desirable from the point of view of crisis stability than reductions of more vulnerable systems. Furthermore, unless some effort is also made to eliminate MIRVed systems (i.e. systems carrying multiple independently targeted warheads) and to move to single-warhead systems (like Midgetman), deep cuts might actually exacerbate strategic instabilities by *worsening* cost-exchange ratios (i.e. increasing the number of weapons an attacker could destroy with a single warhead thereby raising the value of the target and the incentive to destroy it).

Verification and compliance concerns would also increase in a world of deep cuts. With fewer weapons, each side would worry more about the other cheating. And the value and importance of weapons in the possession of countries like China, France, or Britain would correspondingly increase.

Elimination of ballistic nuclear delivery vehicles – The American proposal to eliminate ballistic nuclear delivery vehicles

*Strategic weapons are those which have ranges greater than 5,500 kilometres.

(ICMBs and SLBMs) over the long term is even more controversial. Some believe that the idea is a good one because these weapons give little warning and cannot be recalled once they are fired. Eliminating them would help to reduce the probability of war in a 'hair-trigger' crisis situation.

Others argue that idea is flawed and that eliminating ICMBs and SLBMs would be a throwback to the 1950s when the US relied on strategic bombers for deterrence.

But the comparison is not perfect. The development of long-range cruise and air-to-surface missiles enables bombers to attack targets without penetrating Soviet air space – capabilities which they hitherto lacked. The development of stealth technologies to hide these systems from radar will also reduce their vulnerability to Soviet air defences. The United States would also retain the option, under its proposal, to place greater numbers of cruise missiles on submarines (which are relatively invulnerable to attack) and on surface ships.

It is important to note that a world without ballistic or strategic nuclear weapons would not be a world without nuclear weapons. The number of weapons would not necessarily be reduced if the superpowers decided to offset reductions in strategic ballistic nuclear forces with increases in bombers, cruise missiles, and other systems. In some circumstances the numbers might even go up. Although the elimination of ballistic missiles might enhance crisis stability, the costs of nuclear confrontation would still remain high because of the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the two superpowers and other countries.

The Soviet proposal to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons would not necessarily make the world a safer place either. If the superpowers felt they had less to

fear from the dangers of escalation because of the removal of strategic nuclear weapons, the probability of war might actually go up in regions where the superpowers have conflicting interests and the risks of direct confrontation are high. The balance (or imbalance) of conventional forces at the regional level would have a more decisive effect on the probability of war than it does now.

Conflicting interpretations of these utopian end points may prove a major stumbling block. The Americans are less than enthusiastic about the Soviet proposal to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviets worry about US superiority in cruise missile and stealth technologies which would not be limited under the American proposal to get rid of ballistic missiles only.

Allied concerns about Reykjavik reflect the dilemmas of reassurance: the twin fears of abandonment and entrapment. They have expressed fears that the withdrawal of the recently deployed Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles from Europe would weaken deterrence because of NATO's deficiencies in conventional forces.

Such action, however, would be consistent with the logic (if not timing) of NATO's decision to deploy them in the first place – the so-called 'dual-track' decision of 1979. It must be remembered that the reason for deploying these systems was to meet the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20 missiles, not a build-up of conventional forces. If these systems were removed by the Soviets, as they have provisionally agreed, the rationale for keeping Pershing II and GLCMs in Europe would be gone.

Such reductions, however, could create pressures to reduce inventories of tactical and theatre nuclear weapons which would have important implications for

the conventional balance and for Canada's role in NATO. A new, sustained build-up by NATO of its conventional capabilities would bring pressure on the allies, including Canada, to increase their contribution to NATO's defence.

There are three schools about the Reykjavik summit and its consequences for an agreement at Geneva. The first sees Reykjavik as a clever Soviet ploy intended to embarrass the Reagan Administration and put SDI in the worst possible light. This school is pessimistic about the possibilities for an arms control agreement.

A second school sees Reykjavik as more of a bungled effort than a serious negotiation – of little or no consequence for negotiated agreements on arms control.



A third believes that the summit did represent a major breakthrough. According to this view, Gorbachev is interested in arms control. His offer was sincere, although SDI is the obvious sticking point. But, say the optimists, there is room for compromise on both sides.

My own view is somewhat different. Both sides were sincere, but tried to accomplish far too much in too little time. There are important outstanding issues, not only concerning SDI but also the implications of deep cuts in strategic forces, which will have to be resolved before the principles put forward at Reykjavik can be turned into negotiable proposals.

There are, however, significant down-side risks if an agreement

– even a partial agreement on intermediate range nuclear forces – is not reached in the months ahead. The first is that the negotiations will lose momentum and eventually stall in a quagmire of conflicting bureaucratic and political interests in the final years of the Reagan presidency. The second is that the Soviets will defer serious negotiations until they can deal with a new Administration.

In the absence of an agreement, there is also the real danger that Reagan's legacy will make future arms control more difficult by undermining the domestic consensus necessary to sustain it. Future proposals will be held up to the Reagan standard of dramatic reductions and a future world without nuclear weapons. If they fall short of this vision, they will enjoy little domestic support.

Reagan's vision may also weaken the Alliance if the negotiations fail. Those who seek to do away with both nuclear weapons and NATO have found a new source of strength and legitimacy at Reykjavik, while the credibility of those who have worked to strengthen the Alliance may have been eroded.

In the meantime, the world may be left with an arms control regime that lies in shreds. The SALT II Treaty has an uncertain future at best and the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty may be undermined if both sides exploit its ambiguities in the race to test and perfect defensive technologies.

Reykjavik's ambitious agenda is a volatile mixture of promise and risk. The proposals did not break the immediate deadlock at Geneva as its architects had hoped. The next round of talks will be decisive. If the outcome is not promising, one will be forced to the reluctant conclusion that Reagan's legacy will have been to make the world a more, not less, dangerous place. □

REPORT FROM THE HILL *by Gregory Wirick*



The Speech from the Throne which opened the second session of the Thirty-third Parliament on October 1st contained no surprises in foreign or defence policy. The surprise would have been if it had. Under the general rubric of 'Constructive Internationalism', reference was made in passing to the work of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations which tabled its report, *Independence and Internationalism*, in Parliament on 26 June.

The government's official response to that report is expected on 4 December but the hiatus did not denote either inattention or inactivity on the part of the government. On the contrary, the Department of External Affairs was engaged in an exhaustive effort to provide a comprehensive response, covering all or most of the Joint Committee's one hundred and thirty recommendations.

Although the presentation of the response is expected to be low-key, without much public fanfare, this should not obscure the singularity of the process itself. Twenty-five years ago, the distinguished scholar, James Eayrs, described the dominance of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in foreign affairs and dismissed Parliament's capacity to exercise influence as virtually non-existent. Since then there have been several instances to the contrary, but the Joint Committee exercise – initiated by External Affairs Minister Joe Clark himself – may prove to be the greatest exception to the Eayrs' model yet.

Defence White Paper

The long-awaited White Paper on Defence has now been promised by Defence Minister Perrin Beatty for March 1987. It seems unlikely, especially in the run-up before the next election, that the government will undertake any major restructuring of Canada's defences. This could make the White Paper dull reading indeed: the government's determination to reduce the deficit leaves virtually no funds for additional defence expenditures at a time when most knowledgeable people are shaking their heads about the gap between commitments and resources.

As it is, the rate at which the government is buying equipment will not keep pace even with current needs. The biggest crunch is expected to come in the early 1990s and will particularly affect the navy, leaving it with fifteen frigates, for example, as compared with the present twenty.

Reykjavik

On 21 October Joe Clark addressed the House of Commons in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit between the American and Soviet leaders that had taken place the previous weekend. The Minister described the key issue dividing the two governments as "whether research on strategic defensive weapons is limited to the laboratory under the existing ABM Treaty."

Both Liberal External Affairs critic Donald Johnston and NDP Leader Ed Broadbent accused the government of a sudden case of timidity. Broadbent insisted that US President Reagan had every intention of pursuing the development and testing of space-based systems and that this was the crucial sticking point at Reykjavik. Both men called on

the government to reiterate its stated position in favour of a restrictive interpretation of the treaty which would have the effect of prohibiting the testing, development and deployment of space-based weapons. They accused the government of showing an unfortunate lack of independent judgement in the wake of the admittedly confused events in Iceland.

Canada and Nicaragua

Whatever interpretation could be placed on the Canadian response to Reykjavik, no lack of independence could be read into Canada's vote on 3 November in the UN General Assembly to endorse the World Court decision condemning US activities in and against Nicaragua. The resolution passed overwhelmingly, but no less than forty-seven countries abstained including France, West Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.

Arms Sales to Iran?

Another point of contention in the House was over the disclosure that Pratt and Whitney Canada, a Montreal-based subsidiary of the US defence contractor United Technologies Corporation, sold helicopter spare parts to Iran in late 1985.

Ottawa approved the shipments on the assurance that the helicopters were not intended for military use in Iran since government policy rules out military exports to countries at war and to human-rights violators. Yet the helicopters for which the parts were intended are very similar to Iran's military Cobra helicopters and Iran desperately needs spare parts for its war machine. Moreover, it appeared that Washington also approved the shipments at the very time when, it has since been revealed, the Reagan ad-

ministration had opened its own back channel for arms to Tehran.

Although Liberal and NDP members sought to imply that there was some understanding between the American and Canadian governments on the matter, Mr. Clark emphatically denied the charge. Jacques Guilbault (Lib. Saint-Jacques) pointed out, however, that Pratt and Whitney Canada was sending supplies to Iraq as well, the other belligerent in the Persian Gulf war. The government did acknowledge that there was a problem concerning the dual use of equipment. It indicated that it would seek to resolve that problem, according to Clark, "in a way which protects all Canadian interests."

Editor's Note:

As this issue was going to press the Federal Government tabled in Parliament its response to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's International Relations.

In the forward to its response External Affairs writes that it "concurs in the great majority of the individual recommendations [of the Special Committee]." It also accepts "with enthusiasm the theme of active internationalism that underlies the report." In a general statement on foreign policy the government reaffirms Canada's commitment to the Western Alliance as the best way of "maximizing Canada's security and influence." It also stresses the need for Canada to continue working towards reducing East-West tensions through a "vigorous disarmament and arms control policy, strengthening the multi-lateral instruments that help to settle regional conflicts peacefully, and participating in peace-keeping operations."

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST *By Jane Boulden*



The Reykjavik Summit

The "pre-summit" meeting between US President Reagan and Soviet Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland exceeded all expectations in the scope and nature of the subjects covered.

There was agreement between Reagan and Gorbachev to eliminate all intermediate-range forces from Europe allowing each side to retain elsewhere one hundred warheads each, the Soviets in Asia, the Americans in the US. Missiles with ranges under one thousand kilometres would be frozen at their present levels and negotiations for their reduction would begin.

As in the case of the Geneva negotiations, the issues of strategic arms reductions and maintenance of the ABM Treaty were linked. Gorbachev proposed that there be a ten-year guarantee period for the ABM Treaty during which time neither side would exercise their right to withdraw. During that period strategic nuclear arms would be eliminated in two five-year phases.

There was general agreement that in the first five years both

sides would reduce to 6,000 strategic warheads and 1,600 strategic launchers each. There is disagreement over what the second five-year phase would entail. Gorbachev stated that agreement had been reached to eliminate all *strategic* nuclear arms by the end of the ten-year period. Reagan has disagreed, saying that he proposed the elimination of all *ballistic* missiles, leaving cruise missiles and nuclear bombs unaffected. Secretary of State George Shultz suggested a further modification in the US position in a speech on 17 November in Chicago. Shultz stated that the US may want to retain a "small" force of ballistic missiles as a further way of guarding against possible Soviet cheating.

Statements by both Reagan and Gorbachev immediately after the meeting indicated that the talks had broken down over the issue of strategic defence. Gorbachev's proposal for a ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty included a provision that both sides strictly adhere to its limits and that "the testing of all space elements of an antimissile defense in space [be] forbidden, except research and testing carried out in laboratories." The US insisted that they be able to continue testing and development which they consider permissible under the Treaty.

At the close of the Sixth Session of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva on 12 November, US Chief Negotiator Max Kampelman stated that the two sides were in agreement on three issues: medium-range weapons, a fifty per-cent reduction of strategic arms in five years, and a ten-year guarantee for the ABM Treaty. The conditions surrounding the ABM guarantee still divide the two sides and the Soviets still insist that all issues are linked and can only be agreed upon as a single package.

The Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

The CDE reached agreement on a Final Document on 21 September 1986. The agreement involves all NATO and Warsaw Pact nations and all other European nations except Albania and concerns military manoeuvres and exercises in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The agreement comes into force 1 January 1987.

Participating states are required to give forty-two days advance notice of *ground-based* military activities involving 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks (independent exercises in the air or at sea are not included). Such notification will include detailed information about the purpose and extent of the exercise. If a ground-based exercise involves more than 17,000 troops, observers from other participating states must be invited.

Should any state suspect that another party is not complying with the provisions of the agreement, it has the right to demand an inspection.

Soviet acceptance of provisions in the agreement for foreign observers on its territory is considered important since they have traditionally avoided such measures.

On 15 November every year, each participating state will give a calendar of its planned military exercises in Europe to every other participating state. Exercises involving more than 75,000 troops must be announced in the calendar at least two years in advance. Exercises with more than 40,000 troops require a one year notice.

Biological Weapons Review Conference

Sixty nations participated in the Second Biological Weapons Review Conference in Geneva. The Conference began on 8 September 1986 and finished with unanimous agreement on a Final Document on 26 September 1986. The Final Document included new provisions allowing states to call a consultative meeting about activities in other states that may raise compliance concerns. The exchange of data on research facilities, biological materials and outbreaks of diseases that deviate from normal patterns was also encouraged.

SALT II

On 26 November 1986 the US Department of Defense announced that the US would be exceeding the SALT II limits on 28 November by deploying their 131st cruise missile carrying B-52 bomber.

NATO

NATO's Nuclear Planning Group met in Gleneagles, Scotland during the week of 21 October. The agenda included a briefing on new estimates of Soviet forces and an update and appraisal of NATO's nuclear stockpile. Discussion also centred on proposed new political guidelines for the wartime use of NATO nuclear forces.

Early Warning

15 January 1987	Resumption of Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, Geneva.
Mid-January	Pentagon report on the military effects of eliminating all nuclear weapons.
31 March - 15 April 1987	Technical meeting on Biological Weapons, Geneva.
3 February - 24 April 1987	Spring Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva.
Spring 1987	NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting, Norway.

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



New members of the Board of the Institute were appointed in November. They are:

Lise Bissonnette, a columnist for the *Globe and Mail* and *Le Soleil*. Ms. Bissonnette, who holds a Ph.D. in Education, was the editor of *Le Devoir* from 1981 to 1985.

David Braide, President of the Niagara Institute. Educated at the Universities of British Columbia and Toronto, Mr. Braide was Vice-Chairman of Canadian Industries Limited before joining the Niagara Institute in 1986.

Anne Gertler, from Montreal. Educated at Vassar College and Columbia University, Ms. Gertler has been active in a number of organizations including the Voice of Women, the Group of 78, and Project Ploughshares. For some years she has been a representative of Project Ploughshares to the United Nations.

Kal Holsti, Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Professor Holsti's major fields of interest include international relations theory, Canadian-American relations, underdevelopment and international politics, and strategic theory.

Richard Mercier, Secretary-Treasurer of the Canadian Labour Congress. Mr. Mercier was formerly the President of the Quebec Council of the United Food and

Commercial Workers and an Officer of the Quebec Federation of Labour. Mr. Mercier represents the CLC at the International Labour Organization in Geneva, Switzerland.

Brian Urquhart, now with the Ford Foundation in the United States. Sir Brian recently retired from the UN where he was Under-secretary general for Special Political Affairs. A British citizen, he served the UN from 1946 until his retirement in 1985.

Jean-Guy Vaillancourt, Professor of Sociology at the University of Montreal. Mr. Vaillancourt received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley in 1975. He has written extensively on issues of disarmament and peace as well as on sociological subjects.

Ron Purver joined the Institute staff in November as a Research Associate. Most recently with the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Mr. Purver has also been associated with the University of British Columbia, Queen's and Dalhousie. His special interests and expertise include sea-bed arms control and Arctic security and arms control.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and CIIPS are co-operating in a project entitled 'A Comprehensive Test Ban: Problems and Prospects'. As part of the project, the two Institutes convened a symposium in Montebello, October 23 to 25. Among the twenty-five invited participants were nuclear weapons designers and specialists in seismology and

verification procedures from two major US laboratories, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore; leading international seismologists who specialize in identification of nuclear weapons tests, environmental effects and treaty verification; scientists from other nuclear possessing states; policy analysts from the host Institutes and from the US and Europe. While the symposium did not include representatives from governments, a number of Canadian officials attended as observers.

Papers at the symposium examined both the technical and political aspects of a possible nuclear test ban. These, along with a summary and conclusions by **David Cox** of CIIPS and **Jozef Goldblatt** of SIPRI, will be published by Oxford University Press in the summer of 1987.

Following the Montebello symposium a number of participants visited the Institute. **Jeremy Leggatt** of Imperial

The Institute's Awards Programme

The Institute has set aside \$120,000 to award two fellowships, valued at a maximum of \$25,000 each, and five scholarships, valued at up to \$14,000, to scholars and non-academics who wish to study in the field of international peace and security.

Applicants must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents. They should hold a first University degree, or, in the case of non-academics, have demonstrated experience, interest and ability.

Decisions on the amount of each award and the number

of awards will be made by an independent selection committee. The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada is the Institute's agent for this programme.

The deadline for applications is 1 February 1987.

For further information and application forms, please contact:

Scholarship Administration
Services, Association of
Universities and
Colleges of Canada.
151 Slater Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5N1

Grant Applications

Grant requests of \$10,000 or less will be considered at each of the quarterly reviews; however, requests over \$10,000 will

be considered by the Board of Directors of the Institute twice a year. Deadlines for these requests are August and February.

For 1987 the deadlines are:

2 February 1987	for a March decision
1 May 1987	for a June decision
14 August 1987	for an October decision
6 November 1987	for a December decision

College, London was in residence for several days. **Jozef Goldblatt, Carl Jacobsen and Connie Wall** of SIPRI spoke to the Institute staff about the projects, programmes and organization of SIPRI. **Vitalii Goldanskii** of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and **A.A. Vasilyev** of the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow spoke to CIIPS staff about their own work.

'Superpower Relations: Now What?' was the title of a day-long briefing for working journalists sponsored by the Institute at the end of November. Institute staff and Fellows, including **Geoffrey Pearson, David Cox, Fen Hampson, Harald von Riekhoff**, along with **Michael Krepon** of *The Carnegie Endowment* and **Franklyn Griffiths** of the University of Toronto, led the discussion and answered questions.

Tom Delworth, Canadian Ambassador to the recently concluded Stockholm talks on disarmament and confidence-building measures in Europe, addressed a public briefing organized by the Institute in October. Mr. Delworth spoke of the agreements reached, of their political and military significance, and of the possibilities for future discussions and agreements.

'The Changing International System: American and Canadian Perspectives' was the title of a seminar led by **Richard Gardner**, professor of International Law at Columbia University and advisor to Mario Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York. The seminar, organized by the Institute in late October, was attended by twenty people from the universities, the House of Commons, the non-governmental sector and the Institute.

In November, **Kari Mottola** of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and **Pertti Joenniemi** of the Tampere Peace Research Institute addressed a meeting organized by CIIPS on Security and Strategic Developments in the Arctic.

Elementary and high school teachers discussed peace and security education at various meetings during the autumn. **Dianne DeMille**, of the public programmes staff at the Institute, spoke at conferences in Regina, St. John's, Toronto and Winnipeg. She also attended a seminar organized by Ross Parker of the medical school at McMaster University to discuss the results of a survey on 'Canadian Children's Concerns About Their Future'.

The National Council of Women organized a series of meetings on issues of peace and security during October. **Elizabeth Richards** spoke to the Ottawa chapter. **Geoffrey Pearson** addressed the group in London, Ontario. The next day he spoke to a meeting organized by the Project Ploughshares group in Elora and Fergus. He also addressed the general meeting of the Eastern Ontario branch of the Ontario Association of Professional Social Workers in Ontario. At the end of Disarmament Week, Mr. Pearson took part in the annual Encounter Conference at the School of Journalism, University of Western Ontario.

Geoffrey Pearson and Lois Wilson spoke at 'The True North Strong and Free? A Public Inquiry into Canadian Defence Policy and Nuclear Arms' in Edmonton on 8 and 9 November.

PUBLIC PROGRAMME GRANTS - Second Quarter 1986-87

Briarpatch Magazine , Regina	
Five articles on "Peace and Security in Global Context"	\$ 7,000
Centre St-Pierre , Montréal	
Programme d'activités "Paix et qualité de vie" à l'intention des groupes populaires et de femmes du Centre-Sud et de l'Est de Montréal	5,100
Council of Canadians , Edmonton	
Conference: "The True North Strong and Free?", November 8-9, 1986	20,000
Defence Research and Education Centre Limited , Halifax	
Brief on "Towards a World Without War: Next Steps in Canadian Defence Policy"	6,800
GEMS - McGill University , Montreal	
Publication of selected papers from the International Conference on Peace and Security	3,500
International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa , Ottawa	
Briefing paper "Militarization of Southern Africa"	5,100
Mouvement Option Paix Québec , Hull	
Publication de la revue <i>Option Paix</i>	7,500
National Council of Women of Canada , Ottawa	
Series of discussions across Canada on "Educating for Peace" (October 17-31, 1986)	7,000
Regehr, Ernie; Epps, Ken , Waterloo	
Conrad Grebel College, Canadian Military Industry, Database	5,000
Scenz de la Calzada, Marta , Rouyn-Noranda	
Représentation de la pièce <i>Le goûter des généraux</i> dans le cadre du programme "La paix s'il vous plaît"	5,000
Thoughts on Peace and Security , Montreal	
Magazine	3,000
University of Calgary , Calgary	
Peace and Conflict Resolution Group "Defence of Canada" Workshop Program (October 1 - November 15, 1986)	1,100
University of Victoria , Victoria	
Humanities and Social Science Programs	14,900
Community education series "Canada's National Security: Prospects for the Future"	
York University , Toronto	
Calumet College Peace Conference 1986	6,000
"Pathways to Peace", November 14-15, 1986	
TOTAL	\$ 97,000


PUBLIC PROGRAMMES JOINT PROJECTS - Second Quarter 1986-87

Council for Canadian Unity , Ottawa	\$ 40,000
Peace and Security Programme for high school students at the Terry Fox Canadian Youth Centre	
Fédération professionnelle des journalistes du Québec , Montréal	
Bourse, 1986-1987	10,000
Royal Commonwealth Society , Ottawa	
"Commonwealth Young Leaders Conference"	10,000
TOTAL	\$ 60,000

RESEARCH GRANTS - Second Quarter 1986-87

Robert Bothwell, Jack Granatstein , University of Toronto, Toronto	\$ 25,000
Trudeau and Foreign Policy	
Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament , Ottawa	
Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Bibliography	9,960
Centre for Russian and East European Studies , University of Toronto, Toronto, Canadian - Soviet Relations	80,500
Walter Dorn , Toronto	
Peace-Keeping Satellites	4,500
Michel Fortmann , L'Université de Montréal, Montréal	
La pertée militaire du concept de neutralité	25,000
David G. Baglund, Boris Castel , Queen's University, Kingston	
Canadian Nuclear Products and Vertical Proliferation	12,000
Institute for International Relations , University of British Columbia, Vancouver, International Security of Arms Control in the Pacific Basin	40,000
Nicolas Matte, Anne-Marie Stojak, Andrew Young , McGill University, Montreal	
Extant and Prospective Settlement of Disputes	15,500
Larry Pratt, Thomas Keating , University of Edmonton, Edmonton	
We Stand on Guard for Whom? Strategy and Canadian Security Interests	7,000
Ernie Regehr, Ken Epps , Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo	
Canadian Military Industry, Database	10,000
Research Programme in Strategic Studies , York University, Toronto	
Workshop and simulation "Canada and International Peacekeeping", February 1987	13,158
Professor Janice Stein , University of Toronto, Toronto	
International Negotiations	25,000
TOTAL	\$267,618

REVIEWS



Nuclear Ethics

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

New York: The Free Press,
1986, 162 pgs. \$24.25

By Harald von Riekhoff

It is unusual to find fundamental questions of nuclear ethics addressed by a distinguished political scientist and former senior foreign policy adviser to the US government. The result is an immensely reasonable and persuasive argument in defence of nuclear deterrence. The argument is a sophisticated one, and it is made in a clear and elegant form that should appeal to strategic analysts and concerned laymen alike. It is interesting to see someone with Professor Nye's strategic expertise draw on the work of moral philosophers and recent pronouncements of the American Catholic bishops and thereby give a new perspective to well-rehearsed strategic arguments on nuclear deterrence. Overall, the author is equally critical of the single-track mentality of utilitarian strategists and moral absolutists. Nye confirms his position as a self-confessed owl in the on-going debate between hawks and doves by his predilection for well-balanced and multi-dimensional arguments which are better suited to do justice to such a complex and sensitive subject.

Nye's central thesis of the morality of nuclear deterrence is derived from the classical doctrine of the just war. Like the latter, his is not an enthusiastic endorsement but rather a conditional and reluctant acceptance

of a fundamental moral dilemma. He does not provide a simplistic utilitarian ends-means justification. Instead, he proposes a complex calculus involving the consideration of motives, means and consequences to guide decisions on the ethics of nuclear deterrence. According to the author, reliance on nuclear deterrence may be regarded as morally justified if the following conditions can be satisfied at least to some degree: the restriction of nuclear deterrence to self-defence; a clear distinction being drawn between nuclear and conventional forces; targeting doctrines seeking to minimize potential harm to innocent people; and finally, utmost care being taken to reduce the risk of nuclear war and diminish reliance on nuclear weapons.

Nye is enough of a realist to recognize the enormous practical difficulties involved in fulfilling these conditions. He is aware that human fallibility and institutional weaknesses pose an ever-present risk of nuclear war as long as nuclear weapons exist. At the same time, he correctly observes that the laws of mathematical probability have no equivalent theoretical status in the realm of international relations, and that the probability of nuclear war thus cannot be predicted with any reasonable degree of accuracy despite frequent assertions to the contrary. While noting that future technological innovations or a breakthrough in the political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union might foster a diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, no concrete scenarios are put forward to make such a fundamental transformation appear more plausible. Having rejected the strict Kantian tradition which denies legitimacy to the pursuit of desirable ends by unjust means, it is not without

some irony that Professor Nye ends his excellent book by raising the prospects of an international order which relinquishes reliance on nuclear deterrence and which in many ways resembles Kant's noble vision of perpetual peace among enlightened nations.

von Riekhoff is Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, and a CIIPS Research Fellow.

The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline

Seweryn Bialer

New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1986, 391 pgs. US \$22.95

By Geoffrey Pearson

Seweryn Bialer's latest book is a layman's guide to the USSR and its foreign policies, shorn of scholarly apparatus except for a useful bibliographical essay. This approach has advantages and disadvantages. The former are considerable, including greater readability and presumably a wider audience. But in what must have been an impressive sprint to the finish-line of publication – before the Gorbachev era had attracted too many 'definitive' interpretations – something has been lost as well, in particular a mastery of the material from that very era, still unfolding as he wrote. Bialer takes us up to the Twenty-Seventh Congress in February 1986, but the meaning and consequences of that meeting are left for the reader to deduce from other sources. Evidence of haste is the repetition in Part II, on Soviet foreign policy, of ideas and themes which are enunciated at length in Part I, on Soviet internal affairs. Much of the latter material is also a repetition of conclusions reached in Bialer's 1980 volume titled *Stalin's Successors*.

Nevertheless, this book is probably the best general account

available of the roots of Soviet policy, at home and abroad. Bialer is a shrewd and knowledgeable observer whose research is based on a very wide spectrum of source material, including frequent visits to the USSR. His main thesis is that we must learn to live with a Soviet Union which is not going to change in its essential features either soon or in any fundamental way. Basic reform of the economic system is impossible, he argues, without change in the political system, which would in turn be too risky for any Soviet leadership to undertake. But the economic resources of the country are strong enough to make possible a kind of muddling through the next decade or so without the need for fundamental change, although the claim to superpower status will become increasingly hollow in all respects except the military. Whether this pressure on the economic choices available to Soviet leaders will lead to a more or less aggressive foreign policy, Bialer finds hard to predict. His advice to American policy makers is to manage the inevitable competition over influence and power in ways that take account of Soviet realities and abjure the myths of economic collapse or political transformation.

Bialer writes from the perspective of the tough-minded European intellectual who has nevertheless adopted the American tendency to see the world in East/West terms. His policy prescriptions boil down to the traditional nostrum of 'containment'. But I wonder whether he has taken sufficient account of the potential for change in East/West relations. The safest prediction of Sovietologists is that these relations are more or less fixed, and their favorite targets are Western 'liberals' who think they

will improve. Bialer is right to be cautious, but if he had waited another year before publishing his book he might have looked again at the evidence for his expectation of more of the same in Gorbachev's Soviet Union.

Reagan, God and The Bomb
F.H. Knelman

Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985, 343 pgs. \$22.95

The central thesis of this book is that an alliance of nuclear strategists, who believe in limited nuclear war, and born-again-Christians, who believe in the imminence of the final 'holocaust', now occupies key policy positions in Washington. This fact, according to the author, "heralds a significant historical discontinuity in the dynamics of the nuclear age" and makes nuclear war far more likely.

Knelman's writing is cluttered and, at times, histrionic. A more serious flaw is that Knelman ascribes uniquely pernicious motives to individuals and organizations now in office. As a result, the history of nuclear weapons strategy is badly represented. For example, he attributes the origins of nuclear war-fighting strategies to Herman Kahn and the opposing "deterrence by assured retaliatory destruction" (MAD) strategy to Bernard Brodie. The real story about the evolution of nuclear war strategies – excellently recounted from different perspectives in Fred Kaplan's *The Wizards of Armageddon* and Lawrence Freedman's *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* – is a great deal less amenable to this simplistic bad guy/good guy treatment.

This is not a minor point. Knowing what to do about this mess we are in requires a clear understanding of how we got here. Knelman's attacks on Reagan and his fellow travellers might be emotionally satisfying, but they obscure a much grimmer reality. For over forty years the best or-

ganizational skills, the brightest minds (Brodie, Sakharov, Kahn et al), and most clever technologies our civilization can offer have been devoted to planning and practicing for an event that nobody wants. And nobody has figured out how to stop. It would be so much easier if Knelman were right. – *Michael Bryans*

Arms Control and the Arms Race: Readings from Scientific American
Bruce Russett and Fred Chernoff

New York: W. H. Freeman and Co. 1985, 229 pgs. US \$14.00

In 1979, Bruce Russett and Bruce G. Blair edited a useful collection of readings entitled *Progress in Arms Control?* A lot has happened since 1979 and this new volume presents the key technical issues underlying the policy debates of the 1980s.

The collection is clearly designed with the college or university course in mind, with excerpts from the major arms control agreements, including the non-proliferation, ABM and SALT II treaties. There are three sections: a historical review, current negotiations, and European security issues. Each is preceded by an editors' introduction that gives the broader context for the selections which follow.

The introduction to Section II contains a number of factual errors. For example, the authors refer to SSX-22 and SSX-23 as Soviet ICBMs in the experimental stage of development. The SS-22 and SS-23 are, in fact, short-range ballistic missiles which have been deployed since 1979. Errors of this sort undermine the reader's confidence in the material.

Beyond simple factual errors, there is a problem with the interpretation of technical information. For example, the authors claim that "total lethality is as good a single measure of the overall balance as is available..." Yet lethality is a product of other estimates – numbers, yields,

accuracies – and thus the uncertainties are multiplied in the calculation. Most analysts and negotiators use primary data such as launcher and warhead numbers to compare the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers.

These drawbacks aside, the articles written by experts in weapons technology and nuclear strategy – John Steinbruner, Hans Bethe, Kosta Tsipis, and others – will help readers understand some of the complexities of the current arms control debate.

– *Dianne DeMille*

Target Nation: Canada and the Western Intelligence Community
James Littleton

Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys/CBC Enterprises, 1986, 228 pgs. \$22.95

Intelligence organizations "seek to alter in the long term the thinking in the target nation," and to manipulate public opinion in a state whose loyalty and dependability is considered crucial to the security of their own state. In a fascinating, disturbing and highly readable book, James Littleton shows how Canada has been a target nation of US intelligence organizations, how cold war ideology continues to pervade the murky world of espionage operatives in both countries, and how the assumptions and activities of the FBI, CIA, RCMP and Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) challenge the underlying philosophy of liberal-democratic states.

Littleton discusses the work of the McDonald Commission, the attempts at reform of the security service, and the creation of the CSIS. Despite these efforts, one is left with a sense of unease: security organizations and their political masters march to different drummers. In Canada, although we insist on a Canadian conductor, we know that the score is American.

– *Nancy Gordon*

The Verification Challenge: Problems and Promise of Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Verification

Richard A. Scribner, Theodore J. Ralston, and William D. Metz

Boston: Birkhauser 1986, 249 pgs. \$30.00 (approx.)

The Verification Challenge offers a concise and thorough background to the history, technology, politics and future of arms control verification. Both Soviet and American views on the issue are outlined and discussed along with differing views within the United States. Numerous photographs and illustrations help demonstrate the current capabilities and limitations of verification methods as well as possible future developments. The authors also provide an outline of the current debate on treaty compliance and the charges made by both sides. The book contains four appendices including a glossary and selected bibliography. *The Verification Challenge* is a useful examination of a complex issue suitable for beginner and expert readers alike.

– *Jane Boulden*

BRIEFLY NOTED

Conflict Resolution and Negotiation Studies in International Relations: A Bibliography

compiled by Steven Douville, Michael Pearson and Bradley Feasey

Ottawa: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1986, 32 pages, \$6.00

Defence and Arms Control: Science and Society – A Directory to Information Sources, vol. 1.

Terry Duguid et al (editors)
Ottawa: Canadian Student Pugwash Publications, 1986, 266 pages, \$9.95

Both of the publications noted above were produced with the financial assistance of CIIPS.

LETTER FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA *By Patrick Nagle*




The opening words of the Commonwealth report on South Africa read as follows: "We were unprepared for what we found."

That statement was not written by an uninformed or unaware body without a head. These were the "eminent persons," a group of very good heads in one body who were better briefed and better informed than are many offshore commentators and surveyors of today's South African scene. Yet, despite their advance work, the eminent persons were unprepared for what they found. As a foreign correspondent working in Africa I have felt personally chastised by that statement since first reading the report. The Commonwealth persons produced an eminently fair and comprehensive summary of the South African situation in May, 1986. But there was nothing in it that had not been covered in exhaustive detail during the previous year by South African and foreign press operating within the country, working under constraint of the various press laws the government applies from time to time.

So why were the eminent persons unprepared for what they found? Without having interviewed the authors directly, I can only guess what prompted that damning reflection on contemporary journalism from South Africa. A contributing aspect would have to be what author Hanna Arendt called – in a different context – "the banality of evil." What is happening in South Africa is banal in the purest dictionary sense of being com-

monplace. And it is evil in the judgement of virtually every political leader in the world. In that context I suspect the Commonwealth investigators were unprepared for the relentless, everyday evidence of the basic elements of racial segregation in South Africa.



For a foreign correspondent the rules are quite clear. Say the wrong thing or write the wrong line and your work permit is lifted, putting you on the next plane out of town.

However, I fear another factor may have been more influential: that the South African government's campaign to discredit the press was successful in making the Commonwealth persons discount what they read before they saw it with their own eyes. Blaming an outside influence – the foreign press – for a country's self-inflicted problems is not restricted to Pretoria on the South African continent. Virtually every country on my beat exercises restrictions through press ownership, visa control or straight censorship. For a foreign correspondent the rules are quite clear. Say the wrong thing or write the wrong line and your work permit is lifted, putting you on the next plane out of town.

I do not propose to re-open the debate about the new information order and the merits of control-

ling information by host countries. It is a widely held axiom in Africa that these countries need to regulate the media in the early stages of nation-building to ensure that their fragile political stability is not disturbed. The promise (as yet unfulfilled in most of Africa) is that once stability is achieved press freedom will be opened up.

A recent African political survey showed thirty-nine of the fifty-one countries on the continent were either single party governments or outright dictatorships of a military or civil order.

Three are hereditary kingdoms with no exercise of civil power as we know it. One of the remaining nine is South Africa, definitely not a democracy by our standards, but definitely a more open society than many of its neighbours and critics. Yet after more than three hundred years of western settlement in South Africa they still find it necessary to regulate the press. So I am not optimistic that our style of press freedom will come soon to any other part of the African continent.

Our standards are certainly part of the problem. They are not necessarily higher, as some ideologues would have it, but they are of a different order. The standards of my country and my newspapers are the standards I bring to the reporting of African affairs. It could not be otherwise.

A host country's demand to report events by their standards is untenable where, for example, a military dictator sees nothing wrong in shooting a couple of dozen of his opponents. He thinks he is maintaining order; I think he is killing people. The government of South Africa says it had to declare a state of national emergency because of an apprehended insurrection in the country. I cannot prove this to my readers because I am forbidden by law to quote the potential leaders of such an insurrection.

In terms of peace and security (or the lack of it) as well as economically, South Africa dominates the African sub-continent just as the United States dominates the Americas or Russia dominates Eastern Europe. Pretoria will continue to dominate the region for the foreseeable future. Personally, I could wish it otherwise but there is nothing on the current record to gainsay the prediction. The Southams have operated an African bureau for more than ten years. Over that period a substantial library of contemporary books on Africa has been accumulated, all of which is now shelved at my house in Harare. Fully one-quarter of those books are about South Africa, bearing titles such as: *The Crisis in South Africa*; *Can South Africa Survive?* and the very recent *South Africa After Apartheid*. Despite their titles, none of those books is definitive. The ideal title: *Peace in South Africa*, is a long way from being reported and written.

Patrick Nagle is Southam News' Southern Africa correspondent based in Harare, Zimbabwe.

Lettre d'Afrique australe

Par Patrick Nagle



En tête du rapport du Commonwealth sur l'Afrique du Sud, on pouvait lire ces quelques mots : « Rien ne nous avait pré-

parés à ce que nous allions découvrir. »

Cette déclaration n'émane pas d'une personne inconsciente ou mal informée, au contraire. Elle traduit l'opinion du « groupe des sages », équipe composée de personnalités qui étaient mieux préparées et mieux renseignées que beaucoup d'observateurs et de spécialistes étrangers de la question sud-africaine. Pourtant, en dépit de leur position privilégiée, les sages considéraient que rien ne les avait préparés à ce qu'ils allaient découvrir. À titre de correspondant en Afrique, depuis que j'ai lu le rapport pour la première fois, je perçois cette affirmation comme un reproche personnel. Le groupe des sages a dressé en mai 1986 un portrait très juste et très détaillé de la situation qui existe en Afrique du Sud. Pour-



Les correspondants étrangers savent très bien à quoi s'en tenir : un mot de trop, et on leur retire leur permis de travail...

man et sur les mérites du contrôle de l'information par le pays hôte. En Afrique, on tient généralement pour acquis que l'État doit réglementer la presse pendant les premières phases de l'édification nationale, pour préserver sa fragile stabilité politique. Un récent examen de la carte politique africaine a révélé que trente-neuf des cinquante et un pays du continent sont dominés par un parti unique ou un régime carrément dictatorial, qu'il soit civil ou militaire. Dans trois autres pays, on trouve des monarchies héréditaires qui n'auto-risent l'exercice d'aucun pouvoir civil au sens où nous l'entendons. ment que Pretoria a lancé contre le balance : la campagne de dénigrement n'aît pesé davantage dans la Je crains toutefois qu'un autre élément des enquêtes du Commonwealth aux manifestations implacables et soupçonne que rien n'avait préparé tous les chefs politiques concernés. Dans un tel contexte, je sentent le mal dans l'esprit de presque communs ». Par ailleurs, ils repro-

presse. Le gouvernement sud-africain avait-il réussi à discréditer les journalistes aux yeux des enquêteurs du Commonwealth, jusqu'à ce que ces derniers aient constaté de visu la triste réalité ? L'Afrique du Sud n'est certes pas le seul pays de la région où les autorités imputent à un agent extérieur – la presse étrangère – des problèmes qui sont d'origine strictement interne. Dans presque tous les pays que desserte mon bureau, on a restreint la liberté d'expression des journalistes par la nationalisation de la presse ou le contrôle des visas, sinon par une censure pure et simple. Les correspondants étrangers savent très bien à quoi s'en tenir : un mot de trop, et on leur retire leur permis de travail, ce qui revient à une expulsion en bonne et due forme.

Je n'ai pas l'intention de rouvrir le débat sur le nouvel ordre de l'infor-

Parmi les neuf derniers États, on compte l'Afrique du Sud, pays qui ne répond pas à nos critères de démocratie mais qui est certainement plus libéral que beaucoup de ses voisins et critiques. Or, plus de trois cents ans après l'arrivée des premiers colons européens là-bas, ses dirigeants trouvent encore des raisons pour grand espoir que les médias jouissent bientôt d'une liberté d'expression comparable à la nôtre, dans les autres régions du continent. Le problème est certainement lié à nos critères de démocratie dont j'ai parlé plus haut. Ils ne sont pas nécessaires, contrairement à ce que Africains, pour le dire en bref, saientement plus nobles que ceux des Africains, certains idéologues, mais ils sont différents. Quand j'écris au sujet de l'Afrique, je suis les critères qui sont en vigueur dans mon pays et dans mon journal. Il ne pourrait en être autrement. Je ne peux plus appartenir aux critères du pays hôte.

quand, par exemple, son dictateur militaire considère qu'il n'y a rien de mal à fusiller une vingtaine d'opposants, il croit qu'il maintient l'ordre. Je crois que c'est un assassin. Le gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud soutient qu'il devait déclarer l'état d'urgence parce que le pays vivait sous la menace d'une insurrection. Je ne peux pas prouver à mes lecteurs que c'est bien le cas parce que la loi m'interdit de citer les meneurs éventuels de cette insurrection. Sur le plan de la paix et de la sécurité (ou plutôt de l'absence de paix et de sécurité) comme sur celui de l'économie, l'Afrique du Sud domine la région tout comme les États-Unis dominent les Amériques, et la Russie, l'Europe de l'Est. Pretoria continuera à dominer l'Afrique australe dans un avenir prévisible. Personnellement, je préférerais peut-être qu'il en soit autrement, mais rien n'indique pour l'instant que je pourrais être exaucé. La chaine Southam possède un bureau en Afrique depuis plus de dix ans. Au cours de cette période, ses représentants ont amassé un nombre impressionnant d'ouvrages contenant des informations sur l'Afrique du Sud. Harare. Le quart des ces livres, au moins, traitent de l'Afrique du Sud. On y lit des titres comme *The Crisis in South Africa*, *Can South Africa Survive?* et le tout récent *South Africa After Apartheid*. Malgré ces titres, aucun des ouvrages n'est concluant. On est encore loin du jour où paraitra le livre idéal, celui qui serait intitulé *Paix en Afrique du Sud*.

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période qui vont de l'Afghanistan à la Pologne en passant par l'affaire du gazoduc euroasiatique, le commerce et les enjeux technologiques.

Ces relations, en dents de scie, ont privilégié le commerce au détriment des droits de la personne et ont révélé notre myopie face aux drames des peuples afghans et polonais. La course aux armements se poursuit malgré les sanctions prises contre l'Union soviétique, comme cette arme alimentaire si inefficace et facilement contournable, celle-ci demeure toujours sourde à nos impératifs. Les auteurs sont toutefois optimistes sur la poursuite du grand dialogue entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

— Jocelyn Coulton

Ve République et défense

de l'Afrique,
John Chipman
Éditions Bosquet, Paris 1986,
151 pgs.

John Chipman, dans cette étude réalisée pour le International Institute of Strategic Studies, de Londres, invite le lecteur à examiner les possibilités et les difficultés du dernier acte de décolonisation que doit encore poser la France en Afrique: la réduction progressive de son rôle dans la sécurité de l'Afrique francophone.

Dans la première partie du livre, l'auteur analyse les fondements de l'action de la France en Afrique, passant en revue les différents accords militaires signés entre la France et ses anciennes colonies. John Chipman décrit rapidement comment la politique que de la gauche, arrivée au pouvoir en 1981, s'inscrit en continuité plutôt qu'en rupture avec celle de ses prédécesseurs de droite.

La France a renoncé de nouvelles ententes avec la plupart de ses anciennes colonies à partir de 1972, selon le cas, des accords de défense, des accords d'assistance militaire technique, ou les deux. Un accord de défense n'oblige pas Paris à accéder toute demande d'aide, comme il n'est pas non plus un préalable nécessaire à une intervention française. «La liberté d'action est l'une des règles d'or de la politique africaine de la France...»

Si en plus la formation des cadres militaires africains en France accente la dépendance des anciennes colonies, comment parvenir à cette réduction du rôle de la France dans la sécurité africaine?

L'Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA), organisme trop divisé malgré son nom, n'est pas une solution. Les pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest ont mis sur pied un Accord de non-agressivité et d'assistance en matière de défense (ANAD). Cet accord permet surtout l'échange d'information, quoiqu'il ait joué un rôle non négligeable dans le règlement du conflit ayant opposé, à la fin 1985 début 1986, le Mali et le Burkina Faso. Un tel mécanisme n'est pas enviable en Afrique centrale, plusieurs pays africains craignant une influence prépondérante du Nigéria.

L'auteur croit que le système de sécurité liant la France et ses anciennes colonies africaines restera en place à tout le moins jusqu'à la fin du siècle, car chacun y trouve son compte. John Chipman soutient que les intérêts de la France en Afrique ne sont pas économiques. Peut-être, mais à la lecture du livre, le lecteur se demande ce qui pousserait la France à vouloir se départir de ce dernier aspect formel du trisme célèbre «fardeau de l'homme blanc».

— Olivier Nicoloff

La France et la sécurité internationale
David S. Yost
Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1985, 345 pgs, \$38,15

Spécialiste des questions sur la sécurité européenne, David Yost nous offre un livre fort intéressant sur le rôle de la France en matière de dissuasion et de sécurité en Europe. Il examine comment ce singulier pays a quitté la structure militaire de l'OTAN tout en restant membre de l'Alliance et pourquoil de Gaulle a développé une force nucléaire indépendante. La première partie du livre est consacrée aux doctrines militaires, aux défis stratégiques des forces nucléaires et enfin au développement des capacités tactiques nucléaires et classiques.

Dans la seconde partie, M. Yost analyse les conséquences de la politique française à la fois pour l'Alliance et pour la France. Tout en reconnaissant quelques problèmes, il trouve de nombreux avantages aux positions françaises sur le désarmement et le contrôle des armements. Écrit dans une langue claire, qui évite le jargon militaire, l'ouvrage de M. Yost est un complément indispensable à l'information sur les relations militaires Est-Ouest.

— Jocelyn Coulton

Géostratégie de l'Atlantique Sud
Hervé Couneau-Bégarie
Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1985, 214 pgs, \$38,15

Les études sur la stratégie et la diplomatie navales se sont multipliées depuis quelques années mais, phénomène singulier, la région de l'Atlantique Sud a très peu retenu l'attention. La raison de cette omission relève de l'absence d'une rivalité navale américano-soviétique dans cette zone, perçue comme une région excentrée et secondaire.

L'importance de la zone de l'Atlantique Sud s'est accrue avec les années: elle est redevenue une artère vitale de communications; les pays qui la bordent représentent une aire d'expansion économique et culturelle pour le monde atlantique; elle pourrait enfin être éventuellement élevée au rang de zone de patrouille pour les sous-marins stratégiques.

Hervé Couneau-Bégarie amène des réflexions sur les possibilités d'une défense occidentale dans cette région en tenant compte du problème de la coopération avec les pays riverains. L'auteur conclut en la montée en puissance des marines sud-américaines et à la passivité de l'Afrique dans le cadre géo-stratégique de l'Atlantique Sud. — Franchine Lecours

Pacifique... vous avez dit Pacifique
Jean-Claude Courdy
Éditions de la Sorbonne, Paris 1985, 245 pgs, \$17,35

Écartant le déterminisme quasi-impérialiste des données géographiques économiques, Jean-Claude Courdy souligne l'importance de considérer à la fois les données naturelles et politico-culturelles d'un Etat pour rendre compte des rapports qui le lient à un autre Etat. Cela l'amène à remettre en question l'idée d'une zone Asie-Pacifique globale, (enclins à retenir l'harmonie), qui met en exergue ce qu'elle recèle dans son ensemble de richesses, d'énergies et de spécificités. Même les peuples de la région sont sceptiques à l'égard de ce concept qui relève plus d'une représentation européenne.

L'idée d'une vision pacifique-centrique du monde n'est guère plus acceptable. Jean-Claude Courdy rejette les modèles de dichotomie Est-Ouest, Nord-Sud, Orient-Occident, pour définir cette région. Il affirme: «Si une réalité Asie-Pacifique peut être perçue, c'est au travers des synergies qui se sont créées entre les spécificités nationales de la zone, ou des allergies qui la dissuadent à des tensions et à des conflits.»

L'auteur examine successivement la politique du Japon, de la Chine et celles des grandes puissances dans la région. Concluant à l'inevitabilité d'un monde bi-polaire dominé par l'interventionnisme américain et soviétique, il suggère une forme d'unité pour les pays asiatiques inspirée de la philosophie chinoise du Yang et du Yin.

— Franchine Lecours

TARGET NATION: Canada and the Western Intelligence Community
James Littleton
Toronto, Lester and Open Demmings/CBC Éditions, 1986, 228 pages, 22,95 \$

Les services de renseignement jouent dans l'une de ces nations cibles, le Canada. À partir d'une description du monde trouble — encore profondément imprégné par l'idéologie de la guerre froide — où vivent les agents et les patrons des services secrets des deux pays, il explique en quoi les hypothèses et les activités du Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS) remtent en question les assises philosophiques des démocrates libéraux.

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
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Livres



Un destin ambigu

T.D. Alliman
Farnham, 1986.
621 pages, \$45.00.

Par Edmond O'Leary

Le titre original, « Unmanifest Destiny », plus évocateur pour le public nord-américain, ne trahit pas le caractère politique de l'ouvrage. Ce dernier étudie les « illusions » et les « ravages » de la politique américaine (surtout présidentielle) de Monroe (l'auteur établit tout de suite une parallèle entre des politiques qui ont finalement comme dénominateur commun de renier l'idéal non-ambitionniste et neutraliste qu'il attribue à Monroe. Ce dernier, selon lui, n'ayant à cette époque que les moyens réservés à des puissances de « 1^{er} ordre ». Ce qui n'empêche pas les Etats-Unis de se lancer, avec Monk, à la conquête de la Californie, du Mexique, riches territoires attachés à une faible adhésion, le Mexique. L'auteur compare ces interventions et ce qui en découle automatiquement (force de contrainte), avec celles pratiquées de nos jours au Guatemala, au Nicaragua, à la Grenade et au Salvador.

Il s'étend davantage sur ce pays, et, partant d'un fait divers étudié dans toutes ses ramifications (l'assassinat de quatre religieuses américaines), il remonte le plus élevé, tel comme dans de nombreux pays d'Amérique latine, il montre comment les gouvernements américains se sont faits les complices de régimes d'extrême droite, antithèses de la liberté au nom de laquelle ils ont prétendu intervenir. Il passe ainsi en revue une longue série d'interventions (généralment, Et ce, contrairement à l'idéal de liberté invoqué et en opposition avec l'intérêt à long terme des Etats-Unis eux-mêmes.

Edmond O'Leary est Professeur titulaire Département de science politique Université de Montréal.

La guerre froide recommencée Gérard Bergeron Les Editions du Boreal Express 1986, 340 pages, \$25.95

Par Jocelyn Coulon

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L'Imperial College de Londres, y a passé quelques jours. Jozef Goldblatt, Carl Jacobsen et Connie Wall du SIPRI se sont entretenus avec le personnel de l'Institut au sujet des projets, des programmes et de l'organisation de leur institut.

Quant à eux, Vitalii Goldanskii, de l'Académie des sciences de l'URSS, et A. A. Vasiliev, de l'Institut des études américaines et canadiennes de Moscou, ont parlé du travail accompli par leurs organismes respectifs.

À la fin de novembre, l'Institut a présenté une séance d'une journée intitulée *Superpower Relations: Now What?* à l'intention des journalistes exerçant activement leur profession. Des membres associés et des membres du personnel de l'Institut, notamment Geoffrey Pearson, David Cox, Ren Hampson et Harald von Rikchhoff, ainsi que Michael Krepon du Carnegie Endowment et Franklyn Griffiths de l'Université de Toronto ont mené la discussion et répondu aux questions.

En octobre, le Conseil national de la femme a organisé une série de réunions sur les thèmes de la paix et de la sécurité. Elizabeth Richards s'est adressée au chapitre d'Ottawa, tandis que Geoffrey Pearson a fait de même à London (Ontario). Le lendemain, il a pris la parole pendant une assemblée organisée par le groupe *Project Ploughshares* à Elora et Fergus. Il s'est également adressé à la division de l'Est de l'Ontario de l'Association des travailleurs sociaux professionnels de l'Ontario. À la fin de la Semaine du désarmement, M. Pearson a participé à l'*Encounter Conference*, activité annuelle de l'École de journalisme de l'Université Western Ontario.

Geoffrey Pearson et Lois Wilson ont pris la parole dans le cadre de la conférence intitulée *The True North Strong and Free? A Public Inquiry into Canadian Defence Policy and Nuclear Arms*, à Edmonton les 8 et 9 novembre.

À la fin d'octobre, Richard Gardner, professeur de droit international à l'Université Columbia et conseiller de Mario Cuomo, gouverneur de l'Etat de New York, a dirigé un colloque organisé par l'Institut et intitulé *The Changing International System: American and Canadian Perspectives*. Vingt personnes représentant les universités, la Chambre des communes, le secteur non gouvernemental et l'Institut y ont assisté.

En novembre, Kari Mottola, de l'Institut finnois des affaires internationales, et Pertti Joennemi, de l'Imperial College de Londres, y a passé quelques jours. Jozef Goldblatt, Carl Jacobsen et Connie Wall du SIPRI se sont entretenus avec le personnel de l'Institut au sujet des projets, des programmes et de l'organisation de leur institut.

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SUBVENTIONS AUX PROGRAMMES PUBLICS - Deuxième Trimestre 1986-87

Brinpatch Magazine, Regina

Cinq articles on «Peace and Security in Global Context»

Centre St-Pierre, Montréal

Programme d'activités «Paix et qualité de vie» à l'Est de Montréal

Council of Canadians, Edmonton

Conférence: «The True North Strong and Free?», November 8-9, 1986

Defence Research and Education Centre Limited, Halifax

Brief on «Towards a World Without War: Next Steps in Canadian Defence Policy»

GEMS - McGill University, Montréal

Publication of selected papers from the International Conference on Peace and Security

Briefing paper «Militaryization of Southern Africa»

Mouvement Option Paix Québec, Hull

Publication de la revue *Option Paix*

National Council of Women of Canada, Ottawa

Séries of discussions across Canada on «Educating for Peace» (October 17-31, 1986)

Regehr, Ernie; Epps, Ken, Waterloo

Scen de la Cazada, Marta, Rouyn-Noranda

Représentation de la pièce *Le goûtier des généraux* dans le cadre du programme «La paix s'il vous plaît»

Thoughts on Peace and Security, Montréal

Magazine

University of Calgary, Calgary

Peace and Conflict Resolution Group «Defence of Canada»

Workshop Program (October 15, 1986)

University of Victoria, Victoria

Humanities and Social Science Programs

Community education series «Canada's National Security: Prospects for the Future»

York University, Toronto

Calumet College Peace Conference 1986

«Pathways to Peace», November 14-15, 1986

TOTAL

97 000 \$

ENTREPRISES CONJOINTES DES PROGRAMMES PUBLICS - Deuxième Trimestre 1986-87

Council for Canadian Unity, Ottawa

Peace and Security Program for high school students at the Terry Fox Canadian Youth Centre

Fédération professionnelle des journalistes du Québec, Montréal

Bourse, 1987

Royal Commonwealth Society, Ottawa

«Commonwealth Young Leaders Conference»

TOTAL

60 000 \$

SUBVENTIONS À LA RECHERCHE - Deuxième Trimestre 1986-87

Robert Bothwell, Jack Granatschein, University of Toronto, Toronto

Trudeau and Foreign Policy

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmement, Ottawa

Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Bibliography

Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canadian - Soviet Relations

Walter Born, Toronto

Peace-Keeping Satellite

Michel Fortmann, L'Université de Montréal, Montréal

La perle militaire du concept de neutralité

David G. Baglund, Boris Castel, Queen's University, Kingston

Institute for International Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, International Security of Arms Control in the Pacific Basin

Nicolas Matte, Anne-Marie Stojak, Andrew Young, McGill University, Montréal

Existant and Prospective Settlement of Disputes

Larry Pratt, Thomas Keating, University of Edmonton, Edmonton

We Stand on Guard for Whom? Strategy and Canadian Security Interests

Ernie Regehr, Ken Epps, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo

Canadian Military Industry, Database

Research Programme in Strategic Studies, York University, Toronto

Workshop and simulation «Canada and International Peacekeeping», February 1987

Professor Janice Stein, University of Toronto, Toronto


TOTAL

267 618 \$

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Paix et Sécurité

Nouvelles de l'Institut



De nouveaux membres se sont joints au conseil de l'Institut en novembre. Ce sont :

Lise Bissonnette, rédactrice pour le *Globe and Mail* et *Le Soleil*. Elle a été rédactrice en chef du journal *Le Devoir* de 1981 à 1985.

David Braide, président du Niagara Institute. Il a fait ses études à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique et à l'Université de Toronto; il a occupé des postes de direction au sein de la Canadian Industries Limited avant de se joindre au Niagara Institute en 1986.

Anne Gertler, de Montréal. M^{me} Gertler a fait ses études au Collège d'Université Columbia; elle a travaillé activement dans divers organismes dont la Voix des femmes, le Groupe des 78 et Projet Ploughshare. Elle a représenté ce dernier organisme aux Nations-Unies pendant quelques années.

Robert Holsti, professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique. Les principes de la théorie de la stratégie internationale, les relations canado-américaines, le sous-développement et la politique internationale, et enfin la théorie de la stratégie.

Richard Mercier, secrétaire-trésorier du Congrès du travail du Canada. M. Mercier a autrefois été président du Conseil québécois des Travailleurs unis de l'alimentation et

du commerce et il a été administrateur de la Fédération des travailleurs du Québec. M. Mercier représente le CTC au Bureau international du travail à Genève (Suisse).

Brian Urquhart, oeuvre maintenant au sein de la Fondation Ford, aux États-Unis. Sir Brian vient de quitter les Nations-Unies, où il était Secrétaire général adjoint aux affaires politiques spéciales, pour prendre sa retraite. Il est citoyen britannique et il a travaillé à l'ONU de 1946 jusqu'au moment de sa retraite en 1985.

Jean-Guy Vaillancourt, professeur de sociologie à l'Université de Montréal. M. Vaillancourt a obtenu son doctorat de l'Université de la Californie (Berkeley) en 1975. Il a beaucoup écrit sur le désarmement et la paix ainsi que sur des thèmes sociologiques.

Ron Furver s'est joint à l'Institut en novembre en qualité d'auxiliaire de recherche. Il a fait partie du personnel du Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement et il a auparavant travaillé à trois universités, à savoir celle de la Colombie-Britannique, Queen's et Dalhousie. Il s'intéresse tout particulièrement à la limitation des armements dans les fonds marins ainsi qu'à la limitation des armements et à la sécurité dans l'Arctique.

L'Institut international de recherches pour la paix de Stockholm (SIPRI) et l'ICPSI collaborent à la réalisation d'un projet intitulé *L'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires : problèmes et perspectives*. Dans le cadre de ce projet, les deux instituts ont tenu un symposium à Montebello du 23 au 25 octobre. Parmi les vingt-cinq participants invités figuraient des concepteurs d'armes nucléaires, des sismologues et des spécialistes des méthodes de vérification venus de deux grands laboratoires américains (Los Alamos et Lawrence Livermore), des sismo-

logues de réputation internationale se spécialisant dans le repérage des essais d'armes nucléaires, l'analyse des effets de ces essais sur l'environnement et la vérification des traités, des scientifiques d'autres États munis d'armes nucléaires, ainsi que des politiciens des instituts hôtes, des États-Unis et d'Europe. Aucun représentant des gouvernements n'était présent, mais un certain nombre de dignitaires canadiens ont assisté au symposium en qualité d'observateurs.

Programme de bourses de l'Institut

L'Institut a constitué un fonds de 120 000 \$ devant servir à attribuer deux bourses de recherche d'un montant maximal de 25 000 \$ chacune et cinq autres bourses d'étude ne devant pas dépasser 14 000 \$ chacune à des savants et à des non-universitaires qui souhaitent excécuter des travaux concernant la paix et la sécurité internationales. Les candidats doivent être citoyen(ne)s canadien(ne)s ou posséder le statut d'immigrant reçu. Ils doivent détenir un diplôme universitaire de premier cycle ou, dans le cas des non-universitaires, montrer qu'ils possèdent l'expérience, les aptitudes et l'intérêt voulus. Un comité de sélection indépendant décidera du montant de chaque bourse.

Les demandes d'aide financière seront examinées par le conseil d'administration de l'Institut deux fois par année. Ces dernières doivent parvenir au plus tard, le 1^{er} mai 1987. Les dates limites fixées pour 1987 sont les suivantes :

2 février 1987	décision prise en mars
1 ^{er} mai 1987	décision prise en juin
14 août 1987	décision prise en octobre
6 novembre 1987	décision prise en décembre

Les exposés présentés au symposium ont porté sur les aspects techniques et politiques d'une interdiction éventuelle des essais nucléaires. À l'été de 1987, les Presses de l'Université d'Oxford publieront ces exposés ainsi qu'un compte rendu et les conclusions de **David Cox** (ICPSI) et de **Josef Goldblatt** (SIPRI).

Après le symposium de Montebello, certains participants ont visité l'Institut. **Jeremy Leggatt**, de l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationale, a été reçu par le directeur, M. Vaillancourt, et par le vice-directeur, M. Gertler. Ils ont été reçus par le directeur, M. Vaillancourt, et par le vice-directeur, M. Gertler. Ils ont été reçus par le directeur, M. Vaillancourt, et par le vice-directeur, M. Gertler.

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Condensé sur la limitation des armements

Par Jane Boulden



De façon générale, les deux Grands ont convenu de ramener leur arsenal stratégique à 6 000 ogives et 1 600 lanceurs chacun, pendant la première phase de cinq ans. Par contre, il s'est en désaccord sur les modalités de réduction à la seconde étape. M. Gorbachev a déclaré qu'on s'était

entendu pour supprimer tous les armements nucléaires *stratégiques* avant la fin de la période de dix ans. Mais M. Reagan a démenti cette affirmation en disant qu'il avait proposé d'éliminer tous les missiles *ballistiques* en laissant intacts les missiles de croisière et les bombes nucléaires. Le Secrétaire d'Etat M. George Shultz a d'ailleurs laissé entendre une nouvelle clarification de la position américaine dans un discours prononcé le 17 novembre à Chicago. M. Shultz a déclaré que les Etats-Unis voudront peut-être continuer un «petit» nombre de missiles balistiques comme garantie contre toute tentative de duplicité par les Soviétiques.

Les déclarations faites par M. Reagan et Gorbachev au lendemain de leur rencontre montrent que les discussions ont abouti sur la question de la défense stratégique. La proposition de M. Gorbachev visant la non-dérogation au régime du traité ABM pendant une décennie était assortie d'une condition : les deux camps devaient adhérer strictement aux limitations imposées par le Traité, et la mise à l'essai de toutes les composantes spatiales d'un système de défense anti-missiles serait interdite, sauf en laboratoire. Pour leur part, les Etats-Unis exigent de pouvoir continuer les travaux de

«comme dans les négociations qui se poursuivaient à Genève, la réduction des armes stratégiques et le maintien du traité ABM ont été jugés indissociables. M. Gorbachev a proposé que les obligations imposées par le Traité soient respectées pendant une période de dix ans, sans que l'un ou l'autre camp exerce son droit de retrait. Les armements nucléaires stratégiques seraient supprimés en cette décennie.

Le sommet de Reykjavik

Calendrier	15 janvier 1987	Mi-janvier	31 mars au 15 avril 1987	3 février au 24 avril 1987	Printemps 1987
	Reprise des pourparlers sur les armes nucléaires et spatiales, à Genève.	Rapport du Pentagone sur les repercussions militaires qu'entraînerait la suppression de toutes les armes nucléaires.	Conférence technique sur les armes biologiques, à Genève.	Séance de printemps de la Conférence de désarmement à Genève.	Réunion du Groupe de planification nucléaire de l'OTAN en Norvège.

recherche et de développement, activités qu'ils jugent admissibles en vertu du Traité.

Le 12 novembre, au terme de la sixième session des pourparlers sur les armes nucléaires et spatiales à Genève, le négociateur en chef des Etats-Unis, M. Max Kampelman, a déclaré que les deux camps s'entendaient sur trois questions : les armes de portée moyenne, une réduction de 50 p. 100 des armements stratégiques en cinq ans, et la reconduction garantie du Traité ABM pour dix ans.

Toutefois, les Etats-Unis et l'URSS restent divisés sur la nature des conditions associées à cette reconduction, et les Soviétiques affirment que toutes les questions abordées à la conférence sont indissociables et doivent faire l'objet d'un accord unique.

La Conférence du désarmement en Europe (CDE)

Les pays membres de la CDE ont conclu un accord sur un document final le 21 septembre 1986. L'accord de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie et par tous les autres Etats européens sauf l'Allemagne; il porte sur les manœuvres et les exercices militaires qui se déroulent en Europe, de l'Océan Atlantique à la chaîne de l'1^{er} janvier 1987.

Les Etats contractants sont tenus d'exécuter des manœuvres militaires fournissant un préavis de 42 jours avant d'exécuter des manœuvres militaires de combat ou plus (les exercices de 13 000 fantassins ou 300 chars terrestres auxquelles doivent participer des observateurs (au maximum deux autres Etats contractants à convoquer des observateurs par pays).

Lorsqu'un Etat soupçonne qu'un autre pays contractant contrevient aux dispositions de l'accord, cet Etat a le droit d'exiger une inspection. Les dispositions de l'accord relatives à la présence d'observateurs étrangers sur leur territoire est jugé important,

puisque l'URSS s'est toujours opposée à ce genre de mesures.

Le 15 novembre de chaque année, chaque Etat contractant devra fournir à tous les autres Etats contractants un calendrier des exercices militaires qu'il entend conduire en Europe. Les exercices faisant intervenir plus de 75 000 fantassins doivent être annoncés dans le calendrier au moins deux années à l'avance. Les manœuvres supposant la participation de plus de 40 000 fantassins doivent faire l'objet d'un préavis d'un an.

Soixante pays ont participé à la seconde Conférence d'examen des armes biologiques


Conférence des parties chargées de l'examen de la Convention sur les armes biologiques

Le 26 novembre 1986, le Département américain de la Défense a annoncé que les Etats-Unis allaient dépasser les limites imposées par le traité SALT II en déployant, le 28 novembre, le 13^e bombardier B-52 porteur de missiles de croisière.

Le groupe de planification nucléaire de l'OTAN s'est réuni à Glencoe (Ecosse) pendant la semaine du 21 octobre. À l'ordre du jour figurait un exposé sur les nouveaux chiffres estimatifs concernant les forces soviétiques ainsi qu'une mise à jour et une évaluation à propos des débats ont par ailleurs porté sur les nouveaux principes directeurs politiques proposés au sujet de l'emploi des forces nucléaires de l'Alliance en temps de guerre.

En direct de la colline parlementaire

Par Gregory Wirick



Livres blancs sur la défense

Le ministre de la Défense M. Perrin Beatty vient de promettre pour mars 1987 son Livre blanc sur la défense tant attendu. Il est fort peu probable, surtout dans la période préparatoire menant aux prochaines élections, que le gouvernement pro-

...cède à une refonte importante de l'appareil de défense canadien. Le cas échéant, le Livre blanc risque

de dire plutôt ennuyeux : la volonté que manifeste le gouvernement de réduire le déficit n'autorise aucune augmentation ni véritable des crédits réservés à la défense, alors même que les observateurs avisés se préoccupent de l'écart grandissant entre les engagements pris et les moyens

consentis.
De fait, le rythme auquel le gou-

matériel ne permet même pas de répondre aux besoins actuels. On prévoit que la situation deviendra critique vers le début des années 1990 et que la marine ne touchera plus durement, car il ne lui restera, par exemple, que quinze frégates au lieu des vingt qu'elle possède

Le 21 octobre, M. Joe Clark s'est

prononce devant la Chambre des communes sur la Conférence au sommet qui, la fin de semaine précédente, avait réuni les dirigeants américains et soviétiques à Reykjavik.

Pour M. Clark, la principale pierre d'achoppement à la conférence était la question de savoir si, aux termes de l'actuel traité ABM, la recherche sur les armes de défense stratégique

Le critique libéral pour les Affaires extérieures, M. Donald Johnston, et le chef du NPD, M. Ed Broadbent, ont tous deux accusé le gouverne-

...militaire, M. Broadbent a soutenu que le président Reagan était décidé à poursuivre la mise au point et l'essai de systèmes spatiaux et que cette attitude des Américains était le véritable accueil à Reykjavik. Les deux hom-

énoncé par Hayrs.

maine. Depuis, on compte plusieurs exemples tendant à infirmer cette thèse, mais le Comité mixte, mandaté par nul autre que le ministre des Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, pourrait s'avérer la plus importante exception par rapport au principe

« Nous y attend, présente sa réponse
pétite, il ne faut pas perdre de vue le
caractère exceptionnel de l'exercice.
Vous venez-vingt ans, l'éminent
membre du cabinet sur la politique étrangère du
pays, et il a qualité d'insignifiante la
capacité du parlement d'exercer une

la majorité, sinon la totalité des cent trente et une recommandations formulées par le Comité mixte. Même si le gouvernement, comme

Le gouvernement doit faire connaître sa réaction officielle à ce rapport le 4 décembre, c'est-à-dire cinq mois après la parution du document. Toutefois, cet intervalle ne traduit ni l'indifférence ni l'inactivité de la part du gouvernement. Au contraire, le ministre des Affaires extérieures a mis ce temps à profit pour élaborer une réponse exhaustive concernant

l'ouverture de la douzième session le 1^{er} octobre, était dénué de surprises en matière de politique étrangère et de défense. Sous la rubrique générale « internationalisme constructif », mention a été faite des travaux du Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada, qui a présenté son rapport intitulé *Indépendance et internationalisme* le 26

Le discours du trône qui a marqué

mes ont exhorté le gouvernement à

d'une interprétation stricte du traité, ce qui reviendrait à proscrire la mise au point, la mise à l'essai et le déploiement d'armes dans l'espace. Ils ont accusé le gouvernement d'avoir manqué de discernement devant les tractations certes confuses

du sommet.

Quelles que soient les variations dans l'interprétation de la réaction canadienne face au sommet de Reykjavik, on ne saurait reprocher au Canada un manque d'indépendance après qu'il eût voté, le 3 novembre, à l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies, en faveur du jugement

de la Cour internationale de justice
condamnant les agissements des

Les ventes d'armes à l'Iran

en Chambre concernait la nouvelle que Pratt et Whitney Canada, filiale montréalaise de la United Technologies Corporation qui reçoit des

contrats de la Detense americaine, avait vendu à l'Iran des pieces de rechange pour helicopteres vers la fin de 1985. Pour reprendre les propos d'un editorial paru dans le *Globe*

and Mail, cette révélation remettait en cause l'efficacité de la politique canadienne en matière de réglementation des ventes d'armes.

pièces à la condition que les hélicoptères en cause ne fussent pas employés à des fins militaires en Iran; la politique du gouvernement interdit en effet les exportations mili-

laire vers les pays en guerre et vers ceux qui violent les droits de la personne. Or, les hélicoptères devant recevoir ces pièces sont très semblables aux appareils militaires *Cobra* déployés par l'Iran dont les forces armées manquent désespérément de

prouvé ces ventes au moment même

nous venons de l'apprendre, ouvrait sa propre filière clandestine pour approvisionner Téhéran en armes. Certains députés libéraux et néo-démocrates ont tenté de suggérer qu'une entente était intervenue entre les gouvernements canadien et

américain a propos de la question, mais M. Clark a formellement écarté cette hypothèse. Toutefois, le député

libéral Jacques Guibault (Saint-Jacques) a fait remarquer que Pratt et Whitney Canada vendait également du matériel à l'Iraq, c'est-à-dire à l'autre belligérant dans la guerre du Golfe. Le gouvernement a reconnu que le double emploi du matériel constitue bel et bien un problème.

qu'il s'efforcera de résoudre, selon M. Clark, d'une façon qui soit con-

Note de la rédaction

Au moment où nous allons mettre sous presse, le gouvernement fédéral a fait connaître sa réponse au Rapport du Comité mixte spécial du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes sur les relations extérieures

forme aux intérêts du Canada.

Dans l'avant-propos du document, le Ministre écrit qu'il « approuve la vaste majorité des recommandations

[du Comité special]». Il accepte aussi «avec enthousiasme et empressement le thème de l'internationalisme qui sous-tend l'ensemble du rapport». Dans une déclaration

général sur la politique étrangère, le gouvernement réaffirme que l'adhésion du Canada à l'Alliance occidentale constitue la meilleure façon d'assurer son influence et

à accroître sa sécurité ». Le Ministère insiste sur la nécessité pour le Canada de continuer à travailler pour atténuer les tensions Est-Ouest « par l'entremise d'une politique vigou-

refuse en matière de désarmement et de contrôle des armements, par le renforcement des instruments multilatéraux qui contribuent au règlement pacifique des conflits régionaux et par la participation aux opérations de maintien de la paix».

Toutefois, si l'on ne parvient pas à un accord quelconque durant les mois à venir – ne serait-ce qu'un accord partiel sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire – les perspectives d'un déblocage à moyen terme sont moins réjouissantes. En effet, à défaut d'un accord, les négociations risquent de péricliter, voire de s'effriter complètement dans des querelles politiques et bureaucratiques pendant les dernières années du mandat Reagan. Ensuite, les Soviétiques se refusent éventuellement à toute négociation sérieuse en attendant de pouvoir traiter avec une nouvelle administration. À moins d'un accord prochain, un autre danger réside dans le fait que l'héritage laissé par l'administration Reagan rendra beaucoup plus difficiles les négociations futures sur la limitation des armements en embrouillant les critères de jugement du peuple américain, dont le consensus est essentiel à un accord. À l'aventure, les propositions risquent d'être évaluées en fonction du plan de Reagan, qui n'envisage rien de moins que des réductions radicales et un monde débarrassé de l'arme nucléaire. Si ces propositions ne sont pas à la hauteur de cette vision, elles ne trouveront qu'un faible appui populaire. La vision de Reagan pourrait également affaiblir l'Alliance si les négociations n'aboutissent pas. Ceux qui veulent se débarrasser de l'arme nucléaire et supprimer l'OTAN ont pu puiser à Reykjavik une nouvelle force et une nouvelle légitimité, tandis que la crédibilité de ceux qui veulent renouer l'Alliance a peut-être été sapée.

Entre-temps, il est possible que le régime mondial de la limitation des armements ait été gravement affaibli. L'avenir du traité SALT II est incertain dans le meilleur des cas, et le Traité sur les missiles anti-missiles balistiques de s'effriter si les deux camps n'exploitent les ambiguïtés dans leur acharnement à perfectionner les systèmes défensifs.

Le programme ambitieux dressé à Reykjavik est un mélange délicat de risques et d'espérances. Contrairement à ce qu'avaient espéré les architectes du sommet, les propositions n'ont pas débouché sur un déblocage immédiat à Genève. La prochaine ronde de pourparlers sera donc décisive, et à défaut d'une issue favorable, force en sera de constater que l'héritage de Reagan aura intensifié plutôt qu'atténué le danger pesant sur l'humanité. □

Perspectives d'accord

Les opinions concernant le sommet de Reykjavik et ses répercussions sur les perspectives d'un accord à Genève se divisent en trois courants de pensée. Pour les uns, Reykjavik n'était qu'une ruse ingénieuse des Soviétiques destinée à gêner l'administration Reagan et à placer l'IDS sous un jour défavorable. Les partisans de cette optique sont pessimistes quant à la possibilité d'en venir à un accord sur la limitation des armements.

Un deuxième groupe juge que le sommet de Reykjavik ne constituait pas une tentative sérieuse de négociation, mais plutôt un manège bâclé qui n'influera pas vraiment sur les chances de conclure un accord sur la limitation des armements.

Enfin, il y a ceux pour qui le sommet constitue un véritable bond en avant. Les partisans de cette thèse croient que M. Gorbachev s'interdit véritablement à la limitation des armements et que son offre était sincère. Certes, l'IDS constitue une pierre d'achoppement, mais d'après les optimistes, un compromis reste toujours possible.

Mon propre point de vue est quelque peu différent. Je crois que des deux camps étaient sincères, mais qu'ils ont voulu trop faire en trop peu de temps. Des questions très importantes demeurent en suspens, qui concernent non seulement l'IDS mais également les conséquences d'une réduction importante des forces stratégiques; il faudra résoudre ces questions avant de pouvoir transformer en propositions négociables les principes esquissés à Reykjavik.

Enl. Lefebvre



Gail Gelmer

pourraient même augmenter dans les régions où les superpuissances cherchent à protéger des intérêts divergents et où les risques d'affrontement direct sont déjà grands. L'équilibre (ou le déséquilibre) des forces classiques au niveau régional aurait une influence plus décisive sur les probabilités de guerre qu'à l'heure actuelle.

Les États-Unis et l'URSS inter-présentent différemment les objectifs comme toute utopies de leurs démarches respectives, et cette réalité pourrait constituer un obstacle considérable à tout progrès. Les Américains sont loin d'être emballés par la proposition soviétique visant l'élimination de toutes les armes stratégiques nucléaires. Pour leur part, les Soviétiques s'inquiètent de la supériorité des États-Unis dans le domaine des missiles de croisière et des appareils «furtifs», d'autant plus que ces domaines ne seraient pas touchés en vertu de la proposition américaine qui porte uniquement sur la suppression des missiles balistiques.

Les forces nucléaires de théâtre

La réaction des pays alliés au sommet de Reykjavik traduit l'ambivalence de leur sentiment face à la «pense américaine en Europe : d'une part, la peur d'être abandonné, et d'autre part, la peur d'être entraîné, malgré soi dans une guerre. Ils ont exprimé la crainte que le retrait des missiles Pershing II et des missiles de croisière basés sur terre (GLCM), récemment déployés en Europe, minerait la doctrine de la dissuasion en raison des lacunes de l'OTAN au chapitre des forces classiques. Un tel retrait serait toutefois conforme au raisonnement (sinon à l'OTAN) à qu'il a justement poussé l'OTAN à déployer ces missiles par suite de la décision de deux volets de 1979. Il faut se rappeler que ces systèmes ont été mis en batterie pour contre le déploiement des missiles SS-20 par l'Union soviétique, et non un accroissement de ses forces classiques. Les Soviétiques relaient leurs missiles – ce qu'ils ont provisoirement convenu de faire – il n'y aurait plus aucun motif de conserver les Pershing II et les GLCM en Europe. En revanche, un tel retrait appellerait logiquement une réduction des inventaires d'armes tactiques et d'armes nucléaires de théâtre, éventuellement qui aurait des répercussions considérables sur l'équilibre des forces classiques et sur le rôle du

une vive controverse. Pour certains, les armes supposent des délais d'alerte très courts et elles ne peuvent être rappelées une fois qu'elles ont été lancées; leur suppression aiderait à réduire les risques de guerre soudaine en cas de crise grave.

D'autres affirment au contraire que la proposition est mauvaise et qu'en éliminant les ICBM et les SLBM, les Etats-Unis se retrouveraient dans la même situation que dans les années 1950, époque où la dissuasion dépendait de la flotte de bombardiers stratégiques.

L'analogie laisse pourtant à désirer. Grâce à la mise au point de missiles de croisière et de missiles air-sol à longue portée, les bombardiers sont en mesure d'attaquer des cibles sans pénétrer dans l'espace aérien soviétique, ce qui n'était pas le cas il y a 30 ans. L'avènement de nouveaux appareils «furtifs» impossibles à détecter par radar contribuera également à réduire la vulnérabilité de la flotte américaine face aux défenses anti-aériennes soviétiques. En vertu de leur position, les Etats-Unis se réservent aussi la possibilité de déployer un nombre accru de missiles de croisière à bord de sous-marins (qui sont relativement invulnérables) et sur les bâtiments de surface.

Il est important de signaler que l'élimination des arsenaux balistiques et stratégiques ne signifierait pas pour autant que le monde serait débarrassé de l'arme nucléaire. Si les superpuissances décidaient de continuer à développer leurs forces nucléaires et balistiques en accroissant le nombre de leurs bombardiers, missiles de croisière et autres systèmes, l'arsenal mondial ne serait pas forcément diminué. Dans certaines conditions, le nombre total d'armes pourrait même augmenter. Même si l'absence de missiles balistiques serait susceptible d'accroître la stabilité mondiale en cas de crise, un affrontement nucléaire serait encore lourd de conséquences parce que les superpuissances et d'autres pays possèderaient toujours l'arme atomique.

Et il n'est pas dit que la proposition soviétique visant l'élimination de toutes les armes stratégiques nucléaires mettrait le monde à l'abri du danger. En effet, si les superpuissances estimaient qu'une escalade serait moins dangereuse qu'un absence de ces armes, les risques de guerre

PERSPECTIVES ET RISQUES :

La limitation des armements après Reykjavik. Par Fen Osler Hampson

Les pourparlers sur la limitation des armements reprendront à Genève en janvier 1987, et les superpuissances devront encore une fois s'atteler à la tâche pour essayer de transformer en propositions négociables la nouvelle vision des choses esquissée à Reykjavik.

Les deux superpuissances se sont engagées, du moins en principe, à réduire de moitié leurs arsenaux nucléaires stratégiques*, voire à supprimer à long terme des catégories entières d'armes stratégiques. Cette démarche était inattendue, et la plupart des observateurs ont été pris au dépourvu. Pour la première fois, les superpuissances semblaient décidées à renverser la vapeur, au lieu de se contenter de freiner provisoirement la course aux armements.

La limitation des armements fait penser au paradoxe de Zénon d'Elée, car si son but si chaque pas qu'il fait pour avancer mesurait la moitié du pas précédent. De même, les réalisations concrètes dans le domaine de la limitation des armements semblent se faire plus loin qu'on essaye de s'en rapprocher. Est-ce que Reykjavik a constitué un véritable pas en avant, ou seulement un demi-pas ? Les principes qui ont été élabores à Reykjavik et qui servent de bases aux négociations actuelles sont-ils valables ? Quelles sont les chances pour que la nouvelle ronde de pourparlers à Genève aboutisse à un accord ?

**Une arme est qualifiée de stratégique lorsque sa portée est supérieure à 500 kilomètres.*

Reykjavik.

Les forces nucléaires de théâtre, pour éliminer presque tous les missiles à moyenne portée en Europe, bien que chacun puisse conserver un

Les défenses stratégiques M. Gorbachev a précisé que ses propositions étaient valables à la seule condition que les Américains acceptent de limiter aux laboratoires tous les travaux d'essai et de mise au point des équipements spatiaux destinés à la défense contre les missiles balistiques. Le président Reagan a refusé cette restriction en objectant que les travaux de recherche, d'essai et de mise au point des systèmes basés dans l'espace sont admissibles en vertu du traité ABM.

Paix et Sécurité 8

L'essai de systèmes ou de composantes anti-missiles balistiques santes en mer, dans l'air, dans l'espace ou sur des plates-formes terrestres mobiles). Les négociateurs américains ont soutenu que cette restriction s'appliquait uniquement aux systèmes et composantes ABM qui existaient au moment où le Traité a été ratifié et qu'elle ne porte pas sur les nouveaux systèmes (lasers, armes à faisceaux de particules, etc.) en visages dans l'Initiative de défense stratégique. Toutefois, les Soviétiques ne partagent pas cette opinion. Selon eux, le traité ABM interdit explicitement l'essai de composantes susceptibles de servir à la mise en place d'un système spatial anti-missiles balistiques. À moins que l'URSS cesse d'insister sur cette condition, l'éventualité peu probable, les deux superpuissances devront réduire leurs écarts entre leurs positions respectives sur l'ID, si elles espèrent conclure un accord quelconque sur les systèmes offensifs. Un compromis reste possible. On soutient dans certains milieux que le traité ABM interdit uniquement l'essai et la mise au point des «composantes» et des «systèmes» anti-missiles balistiques. Le terme «composantes» n'étant pas défini, les deux parties pourraient exploiter cette ambiguïté du traité pour négocier un accord qui permettrait la mise en oeuvre d'un programme de recherche vigoureux et la mise à l'essai de certaines sous-composantes. Parallèlement, cet accord négocierait tout programme accéléré visant à l'élaboration de défenses stratégiques. La stabilité stratégique serait donc maintenue pendant qu'on évaluerait le potentiel des nouvelles technologies, dont la plupart en sont aux tous premiers stades de mise au point.

Réductions des armes offensives

Les propositions visant la réduction du nombre d'armes offensives ont été accueillies avec enthousiasme dans certains milieux et avec scepticisme ailleurs. Il fait peu de doute que ces propositions sont ambitieuses.

Long terme des vecteur nucléaires

Les incertitudes liées à la vérification et à l'observation des traités seraient amplifiées dans l'hypothèse de coupures radicales. Ne disposant plus que d'un arsenal diminué, l'un et l'autre camp craindraient d'autant plus de se faire duper. En outre, la valeur et l'importance des armes nucléaires que possèdent des pays comme la Chine, la France et la Grande-Bretagne augmenteraient en conséquence.

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impartiale. Si l'objectif des enseignants de l'ESR est de montrer aux enfants comment instaurer la paix, ils s'y prennent plutôt mal.

L'une des missions essentielles de l'éducation est de simplifier et d'ordonner des notions *a priori*

vision du monde n'est que partielle-ment vraie, et les manuels de l'ESR devraient le démontrer, puisqu'ils se

veulent véritablement critiques et pluralistes. Il régit sur un champ de bataille où dans un cabinet politique

mes de la guerre et de la paix, il faut savoir d'emblée (car cela simplifie les choses) que les relations entre les

connotation sur elle seule pour mettre en doute la validité du précepte adopté par le groupe ESR qui établit

un parallèle entre les différents aspects de la vie humaine : l'individu, la famille, la tribu, la collectivité, le

peuple, la nation. C'est d'ailleurs un postulat qui, comme nous l'avons

déjà vu, peut aboutir à d'étranges conclusions.

Les partisans de l'éducation en faveur de la paix, notamment ceux de l'ESR, justifient une grande partie

de leurs actions par l'aphorisme suivant : « La paix n'est pas simplement l'absence de guerre ». Mais il

s'agit là que d'un simple exercice sémantique. Le principal critère d'évaluation d'un mouvement qui se

dit « en faveur de la paix » est la façon dont il traite de la guerre et des conflits internationaux. Si le fonctionnement des relations humaines pouvait

véritablement servir à étudier la manière dont il convient de gouverner une planète remplie d'États-

nations, la situation mondiale serait bien meilleure qu'elle ne l'est actuellement. De toute évidence, il existe

des forces à l'œuvre dont nous ne saisissons pas encore toutes les facettes. Ce n'est pas dans un salon

ou dans une cour de récréation qu'on trouvera une explication aux relations

inter-étatiques.

Au sens le plus large, la notion de paix dépasse certainement la simple

absence de guerre, mais comme l'a écrit l'historien Michael Howard,

l'absence de guerre, « c'est déjà un bon point de départ ». Si l'on veut

montrer aux enfants comment arriver à un point de départ, c'est déjà un

intéressant exercice. Or, les manuels d'éducation à la paix de l'ESR ne nous donnent pas cette précieuse information. □

entre une entreprise et un syndicat, de régler un divorce, de convaincre une école d'améliorer la qualité de ses repas ou d'avoir la voiture pour le samedi soir, nous pourrions élabo- rer une politique extérieure plus démocratique.

Dans le meilleur des cas, cette vision du monde n'est que partielle-ment vraie, et les manuels de l'ESR

devraient le démontrer, puisqu'ils se veulent véritablement critiques et

pluralistes. Il régit sur un champ de bataille où dans un cabinet politique

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invités à rechercher dans leur famille, dans leur collectivité, à l'école ou dans des « mouvements internationaux pour la paix », comme le FISE ou

Greepac. On leur parle de quel-ques « artisans de paix » devenus célè- bres, notamment Martin Luther

King, Albert Schweitzer et Eleanor Roosevelt. Toutes ces associations et

personnalités sont certainement im-pressionnantes, mais il est illusoire

de faire croire aux enfants que nous

avons la paix à ces « héros ». En fait, si la majorité des pays vit en paix une

grande partie du temps, c'est surtout parce que les conflits sont réglés

sans qu'il ait recours à la guerre.

Cette paix, nous la devons au travail quotidien et anonyme des diplomates, des négociateurs et des politiciens au

sein des gouvernements. Certes, ils auraient besoin d'aide, car ils ris-quent sérieusement de faire exploser

le monde. Mais donner un cours sur la guerre et la paix sans parler essen-

tiellement de la nature des États et des gouvernements, c'est comme

enseigner le football sans parler des joueurs ni des équipes.

Les ouvrages destinés aux élèves des classes supérieures (de la 7^e à la 12^e année) sont un peu plus consis-

tants. Dans le manuel *Nuclear Issues*, les enfants apprennent les effets des

armes nucléaires et sont invités à porter un jugement critique sur

l'information qui nous vient de l'Union soviétique. Dans *Concepts of Peace*, on trouve des exercices

axés sur le règlement des conflits et la négociation, le rôle de la pro-

pagande et de l'idéologie, et la con-tribution internationale à la question de la paix.

Cependant, ici encore, le modèle fondé sur le parallélisme entre le

comportement de l'individu et les relations internationales reste pré-

dominant, comme on peut le constater d'après le passage suivant :
« Nous sommes convaincus qu'en montrant à la prochaine génération d'élèves que toutes les négociations

proceedent de la même démarche, qu'il s'agisse d'obtenir une réduction des armements, d'aboutir à un accord

partout exagéré. Dans un chapitre par l'ESR pour décrire le monde est

nécessaire dans le modèle mis au point par l'ESR pour décrire le monde est

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L'ÉDUCATION À LA PAIX:

Enseigner aux enfants «les choses de la vie». Par Michael Bryans

«Deux enfants qui se disputent un ballon dans une

cour de récréation ou deux nations qui s'affrontent

pour la possession d'un gisement de pétrole : deux

réalités qui procèdent de la même origine.

Ainsi, la compréhension de ce qui suscite le conflit dans la vie quotidienne nous permet de mieux saisir la nature des antagonismes entre les gens, les groupes et les nations.»

Ce passage résume le postulat de la pacification» et dont l'objectif est de «mieux faire comprendre la

base à ce matériel d'enseignement et de l'éducation, qui a servi de

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Guide to Nuclear Issues, destinée aux élèves de la maternelle à la 12^e année. Depuis, l'ESR a fait paraître un manuel d'enseignement qui est consacré à l'apprentissage de «l'art de la pacification» et dont l'objectif est de «mieux faire comprendre la

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une cour de récréation peut-elle servir à expliquer les mécanismes d'un conflit international ?

Un rapide survol des deux manuels du groupe ESR permet de constater que le concept d'une identité entre la vie personnelle et la vie internationale

en est le fondement. On s'aperçoit également qu'en voulant adapter la

réalité des affaires internationales à leurs propres théories pédagogiques,

de nombreux facteurs essentiels pour la guerre et de la paix.

L'hypothèse d'une similitude entre la nature des relations internationales et celle des relations interpersonnelles constitue la pierre angulaire du mouvement de l'éducation en faveur de la paix, du moins en ce qui concerne le groupe ESR. La notion n'est pas complètement farfelue et elle est particulièrement utile lorsque il s'agit de décrire aux enfants d'âge scolaire la jaideur du monde dans lequel ils vivent. Elle permet de ramener la notion de conflit à une échelle plus humaine, en établissant un parallèle avec une expérience personnelle

Le présent article est consacré essentiellement à la discussion des ouvrages de ce groupe, en quelque sorte un pionnier de l'éducation à la paix.

Les tenants de l'éducation à la paix ne sont pas restés insensibles à la violente opposition politique qu'ils ont suscitée, notamment chez les parents et les enseignants conser-

général du groupe américain ESR, vateurs, Tony Wagner, Directeur

proposé de renoncer à l'expression «éducation en faveur de la paix», car

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sur les événements du monde. Certes, nous ne pouvons rien faire aujourd'hui pour arrêter les fabricants de bombes, mais demain, nos enfants le pourront, si nous les y préparons. Le tout est d'une logique écrasante, notamment lorsqu'il n'y a aucune autre issue évidente au dilemme dans lequel nous sommes

Après avoir examiné les motivations des détracteurs de ce mouvement

et les raisons pratiques de leurs arguments, penchons-nous maintenant sur la substance de leur travail. Leurs

théorèmes sont peut-être rassurantes, mais sont-elles crédibles ? Le groupe

ESR met de l'avant le caractère ouvert et pluraliste de ses ouvrages, conquis, dit-il, pour favoriser chez leurs lecteurs le développement d'un esprit

«critique». Le Directeur général de l'ESR, Tony Wagner, a déclaré :

Notre objectif est de permettre aux enseignants et aux élèves de débattre en classes des principes pédagogiques, adaptés à

l'actualité, selon des méthodes professionnelles, conformes à certains

l'âge des enfants et susceptibles de les inciter à jouer un rôle plus actif et

engagé en tant que citoyens vivant dans une démocratie.

Mais le contenu des ouvrages de l'ESR ne répond en aucun cas à ces différents critères. Sous un vernis fait de pluralisme et de progressisme,

les manuels cachent une vision du monde qui est à la fois naïve,

paternaliste et relativement chauviniste, malheureusement caractéristique de la conception que se font

actuellement les États-Unis du monde extérieur.

D'une façon générale, les auteurs

des ouvrages ont employé un ton

plutôt légitimant, chaleureux et rassurant, notamment dans les chapitres

destinés aux jeunes enfants. Leur

légitimité : pour faire régner la paix,

il suffit d'être plus gentil, plus raison-

nable, de jouer franc-jeu et d'essayer de comprendre les raisons du

mécontentement ou du malheur des

autres. Les auteurs ont consacré énormément d'efforts à la mise sur

pied d'activités destinées à «encou-

LES SANCTIONS ÉCONOMIQUES :

Quelle en est l'utilité ? Par David Leyton-Brown

Faut-il imposer des sanctions économiques à

l'Afrique du Sud ? Le Canada devrait-il se joindre

aux États-Unis, qui ont décidé de prendre ce genre

de mesures contre le Nicaragua ?

Serait-il bon que le Canada use de

forces répressives contre la Lybie

parce qu'elle soutient le terrorisme

(ou contre les États-Unis, après le

raid de représailles qu'ils ont mené

en territoire lybien) ?

Beaucoup ont des opinions très

arrêtées au sujet de ces questions et

d'autres du même genre, mais le

débat public est souvent passionné et

mal défini. Pour proposer des moyens

d'améliorer la façon dont les sanc-

tions économiques sont conçues et

mises en oeuvre, il faut d'abord

clarifier le rôle qu'elles sont censé remplir et

les effets qu'elles entraînent.

Nature des sanctions économiques

La nature des sanctions écono-

miques les mesures qu'un gouverne-

ment prend pour imposer des

sanctions économiques est

très complexe. Elle peut varier

de la simple interdiction d'importer

certains produits à l'embargo

complet sur un pays, en passant

par l'interdiction de l'exportation

de certains produits, à l'interdiction

de l'investissement étranger

et à l'interdiction de l'exportation

de certains produits.

Sur un autre plan, les sanctions

économiques consistent à limiter les

importations en provenance du pays

visé. Il s'agit dans ce cas de lui in-

terdire l'accès à certains marchés

et de le contraindre à

accepter les conditions d'acheteurs

plus exigeants, à supposer qu'il en

trouve. Le pays touché manque des

lors de devises, et il lui est alors plus

difficile de s'approvisionner à l'étré-

ner, ce qui l'oblige à puiser davan-

tage dans ses propres ressources.

Il existe une troisième forme de

sanctions économiques qui ont pour

objet de réduire le soutien finan-

cière accordé au pays par les voies officiel-

les ou dans le cadre des échanges

commerciaux. Toute interruption de

l'aide étrangère, qu'il s'agisse de prêts

officiels ou d'accords de finance-

ment privés, peut contraindre le pays

en question à emprunter, moyennant

un coût plus élevé, auprès d'autres

prêteurs. Si tant est qu'il puisse en

trouver. Enfin, dernière forme de

sanctions financières, le « gel » des

avoirs que possède le contrevenant

dans l'Etat ou les Etats instigateurs

des sanctions; pareille mesure en-

traîne l'arrêt des mouvements de

capitaux et empêche le pays d'utiliser

Washington à décidé de bloquer les

avoirs iraniens aux États-Unis, avoirs

dont la valeur s'élevait à plus de

4 milliards de dollars.

But des sanctions économiques

L'adoption et la mise en oeuvre de

sanctions économiques peuvent viser

à cinq objectifs d'intérêt variable. À

chacun de ces derniers correspon-

dent des mesures dont la gravité, la

durée et les chances de succès dif-

ferent selon le cas et qui doivent être

évaluées d'après des critères distincts.

d'un point de vue économique à un

criminel, et elles sont prises davan-

tage dans l'espoir de ramener le cou-

table dans le droit chemin. L'appli-

cation de telles sanctions ne peut être

illimitée, de la même façon que tous

les criminels ne peuvent être con-

damnés à la réclusion à vie. Pour être

justes et efficaces, les sanctions

doivent être suffisamment

sévères pour laisser leur marque,

sans provoquer pour autant de déte-

rioration ou de dommages fatals, et il

importe qu'elles s'exercent pendant

une durée relativement brève et bien

définie. À titre d'exemple, on se

souviendra des pressions que le

Canada a exercées sur l'Union sovié-

tique, pendant une courte période,

après la destruction de l'Avion de la

KAL. Employées des fins punitives,

les sanctions économiques peuvent

servir à préciser les limites de ce

qu'est un comportement acceptable,

Il ne faut pas attendre à ce que de

telles mesures conduisent le pays

visé à renoncer ses valeurs ou à

changer totalement de conduite (de

même, l'adoption d'une loi sur les

droits civils ne peut inciter immédia-

tement une personne bornée à aban-

donner certains de ses préjugés).

Mais on estimera probablement que

ces sanctions ont donné les résultats

escomptés si elles ont permis de

punir efficacement le contrevenant et

de réaffirmer clairement ce qu'on

entend par comportement acceptable.

Le deuxième objectif des sanctions

économiques consiste à dissuader le

pays visé de récidiver dans l'avenir.

Comme pour toute menace, la cré-

dibilité des sanctions envisagées

dépend de leur envergure et de la

probabilité selon laquelle elles seront

mises à exécution. Même si l'effi-

cacité de la dissuasion est souvent

mise en doute, on pourra considérer

que les sanctions économiques ont

produit les résultats escomptés si les

actes que l'on craignait n'ont pas été

commis, quand bien même d'autres

objectifs – par exemple, modifier le

comportement habituel du contreve-

nant – n'ont pas été atteints. Beaucoup

croient que, si l'Union soviétique

n'est pas intervenue militairement en

Pologne, c'est en partie grâce aux

sanctions énergiques prises contre

elle après l'invasion de l'Afghanistan

par ses troupes.

L'objectif qui présente générale-

ment le plus d'intérêt, bien qu'il soit

le plus difficile à atteindre, consiste à

exercer des pressions économiques

pour obliger le pays visé à modifier

son comportement. L'évolution

souhaitée varie selon le cas. On peut

exiger du pays qu'il modifie légère-

ment ses politiques et lui demander,

par exemple, de repenser des négé-

ciations ou de libérer des otages, ou

bien on réclamera des changements

plus importants, comme le retrait de

troupes ou la cessation des hostilités.

Dans d'autres cas, on visera à dés-

tablir un gouvernement ou même

changer la transformation totale

des bases sociales, économiques et

politiques d'un régime. Le but de ce

genre de contraintes est de faire pres-

sion sur le pays visé et de maintenir

cette pression jusqu'à ce qu'il accepte

de modifier son comportement. Une

fois le changement amorcé, il faut

continuer d'appliquer les sanctions

jusqu'à ce que l'objectif soit atteint,

sinon leur interruption risque d'être

perçue comme un échec. Par contre,

une fois qu'on a explicitement et

publiquement lié les sanctions à

l'objectif visé, il devient politique à

ment difficile pour le pays en cause

d'obtenir, car aux yeux de ses

propres citoyens et d'autres pays, son

acceptation équivaudrait à une capit-

ulation face à des pressions étrangères.

Ainsi, même en Rhodésie où les

mesures prises ont semblé réussir,

beaucoup de Rhodésiens blancs se

sont opposés à ce qu'ils considéraient

comme étant une ingérence de puis-

sances extérieures dans leurs affaires.

Aujourd'hui, nous constatons que le

Nicaragua et l'Afrique du Sud font



Bory Blin

Le geste de la Nouvelle-Zélande s'explique par le sentiment de frustration qu'éprouvent les puissances moyennes devant la lenteur des négociations stratégiques Est-Ouest et la reprise de la course aux armes nucléaires. Il n'est donc pas surprenant de voir des pays comme la Nouvelle-Zélande refuser d'être un acteur passif du grand jeu stratégique entre les superpuissances. Ne pouvant influencer le cours des négociations certains pays pensent, à tort ou à raison, qu'en posant des gestes particuliers et concrets, ils contribueront au renforcement de la paix. L'allergie nucléaire néo-zélandaise pourrait bien se propager si les grandes puissances ne se montrent pas plus compréhensives. □

comme en Grande-Bretagne et en Allemagne de l'Ouest, de prendre le pouvoir. Cependant, il semble que cette stratégie ait dérapé. La Nouvelle-Zélande apparaît maintenant comme un petit allié victime d'une grande puissance et le mouvement antinucléaire au sein de plusieurs formations politiques européennes s'en trouve même renforcé.

Certains observateurs pensent que Washington aurait dû attendre l'été 1987 avant de prendre des sanctions envers la Nouvelle-Zélande. En effet, des élections législatives sont prévues dans ce pays et un gouvernement conservateur pourrait être élu. Toutefois, les sondages indiquent que plus des trois quarts de la population appuient la politique de M. Lange et que le gouvernement travailliste sera réelu.

Si les deux parties ne s'entendent pas pour régler leurs différends à l'amiable, on pourrait assister d'ici quelques mois à la fin d'une des alliances du système occidental de sécurité collective. Pourtant, les Américains n'ont aucun intérêt à précipiter les choses et à humilier les Néo-Zélandais. La France a quitté la structure militaire de l'OTAN en 1966 et expulsé les Américains de son territoire sans que la sécurité européenne ne soit pour autant remise en question.

Latitudes américaine

La réaction extrêmement dure des Américains a été soigneusement calculée pour éviter que l'allergie ne se propage. Elle n'aurait rien à voir avec l'importance stratégique et géopolitique supposée de ce pays. En adoptant des mesures de représailles au fur et à mesure que le gouvernement de M. Lange faisait monter les enchères, Washington espérait envoyer un signal aux gouvernements alliés et principalement aux formations d'opposition susceptibles,

une politique de défense isolationniste qui rompt avec celle de l'OTAN (défense de l'avant) tandis qu'en Grèce, le gouvernement de M. Andreas Papandréou, a réaffirmé en plus en plus vers le neutralisme. En Grèce, le gouvernement de M. Papandréou, a réaffirmé en plus en plus vers le neutralisme. En Grèce, le gouvernement de M. Papandréou, a réaffirmé en plus en plus vers le neutralisme.

La politique de défense efficace d'une partie de la force nucléaire américaine par l'envoi de messages aux sous-marins nucléaires et le déclenchement de l'alerte en cas de lancement des missiles soviétiques. Le Japon et les Philippines accueillent 60.000 militaires américains, des centaines d'avions et de navires qui patrouillent dans toute la région du Pacifique, principalement le nord où la présence soviétique s'est considérablement accrue depuis 10 ans. Le Japon ferme les yeux sur le passage d'armes nucléaires sur son territoire malgré un interdit inscrit dans sa Constitution et les protestations de plus en plus violentes des groupes antimilitaristes.

longtemps préconisés les thèses aujourd'hui adoptées par les Néo-Zélandais, mais jusqu'à maintenant le premier ministre, M. Robert Hawke, réussit à contenir le mouvement antinucléaire. La pression est cependant forte au sein de la population et même dans le Parti travailliste. Le dépôt, en juin 1986, du rapport Dibb sur la défense qui recommandait une politique d'avantage centrée sur les besoins de la nation, va certainement relancer le débat sur les alliances militaires du pays.

La politique antinucléaire néo-zélandaise, surnommée «Kiwidisease», pourrait aussi avoir ses effets en Europe de l'Ouest où le mouvement pacifiste, après une période fort agitée entre 1979 et 1983, semble perdre du terrain depuis peu. Certains gouvernements, notamment en Grèce et en Norvège, et la plupart des partis sociaux-démocrates dans l'opposition ont déjà adopté des positions antinucléaires radicales ou sont sur le point de le faire. Ainsi, le Parti travailliste anglais a décidé de démanteler la force nucléaire britannique et de prohiber l'entrée d'armes atomiques dans le pays. Au Danemark, le Parti social-démocrate a adopté

UNE DISSIDENCE CONTAGIEUSE?

La politique antimucleaire de la Nouvelle-Zelande. Par Jocelyn Coulon

deux ans, au coeur d'une controverse avec les États-Unis au sujet de sa nouvelle politique



and the

Le gouvernement travailliste de M. David Lange, respectant une promesse électorale faite durant l'été 1984, a décidé d'interdire, par voie législative, l'entrée dans les ports et aéroports néo-zélandais de navires transportant des armes nucléaires ou des déchets radioactifs. Cette mesure, proposée par l'Énergie nucléaire et le Département du Commerce, a été adoptée par le Parlement néo-zélandais le 14 juillet 1984. M. David Lange remporta la majorité absolue au Parlement et les trois partis anti-nucléaires 63 % des suffrages.

Le premier ministre ne tarda pas à démontrer le sérieux de sa nouvelle politique. En février 1985, il interdisait à un navire américain de visiter les ports du pays, Washington ayant refusé de déclarer si le bâtiment transportait ou non des armes nucléaires. Les Américains invoquèrent leur politique de ne jamais confirmer ou démentir si un navire

dispose ou non d'un armement nucléaire. La détermination du gouvernement Lange lui renforcée le 10 juillet 1985, lorsque la France cogit le navire du mouvement écologiste Greenpeace dans le port d'Auckland provoquant la mort d'une personne. Le Rainbow Warrior devait surveiller les essais nucléaires français. Deux mois plus tard, le président François Mitterrand se rendit à Mururoa et confirma la poursuite des essais dans le Pacifique. Fort de ces nombreux incidents et de l'appui massif de la population, le gouvernement travailliste déposa au Parlement en décembre sa législation antinucléaire.

Le traité de PANZUS

Le traité de PANZUS

Le traité de l'ANZUS

La réaction américaine à la politique de la Nouvelle-Zélande a été très prompte. Les Américains ont signifié la fin de leur participation à toute manœuvre militaire organisée par la Nouvelle-Zélande, la diminution jusqu'à l'arrêt complet des échanges de renseignements et la fin progressive de la formation des officiers.

Le traité de l'ANZUS

Une dissidence contagieuse?

Une dissidence contagieuse?

Une dissidence contagieuse?

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
de la dissuasion remise

PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

UNE DISSIDENCE CONTAGIEUSE?

*La politique antinucléaire
de la Nouvelle-Zélande*

Dans le présent numéro:



nucléaires.

zelandaise sur les armes

de la politique néo-

l'origine et les incidences

Jocelyn Coulon décrit

la lumière sur les sanc-

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
un point de vue sur

l'éducation à la paix.

Reykjavik.

Fen Osler Hampson fait

le bilan du Sommet de



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PEACE & SECURITY

A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

*Putting the nuclear genie back
in the bottle?*

By David Cox

Also in this issue:

Richard Handler

An inside look at
CBC *Morningside's*
war and peace
column.

Nancy Gordon

Why the UN has
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Jocelyn Coulon

The politics of
neutralism in
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Institute Publications 1986-87

Occasional Papers

1. **Superpower Rivalry and Soviet Policy in the Caribbean Basin**, by Neil MacFarlane, June 1986, 70 pages.

2. **Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective**, by David Cox, December 1986, 50 pages.

Annual Review

A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1985-86, 285 pages.

Background Papers

4. **Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty**, by William Epstein, March 1986.

5. **Conventional Arms Control Negotiations in Europe**, by John Toogood, April 1986.

6. **The Origins of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security**, by Gilles Grondin, August 1986.

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12. **Who's Ahead: Examining the Nuclear Balance**, by Jane Boulden, March 1987.

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2. **Nuclear Weapons and the Averting of War**, by Robert Malcolmson, October 1986.

3. **Canadian Press Coverage of Arms Control and Disarmament Issues**, by John R. Walker, March 1987.

Conference Reports

2. **Challenges to Deterrence: Doctrines, Technologies and Public Concerns**, Proceedings of Conference, Ottawa, 17-19 October 1985, by Dianne DeMille.

3. **The Risk of Accidental Nuclear War**, Proceedings of Conference, Vancouver 26-30 May 1986, by Andrea Demchuk.

■ Our cover story this issue looks at the prospects for a nuclear test ban treaty. The story is a topical one because of the recent ending of Moscow's unilateral test moratorium and the continuing refusal of the Reagan Administration to negotiate a halt to the US testing programme. Written by **David Cox**, the article places the test ban controversy in the context of the larger arms control problem and underlines the difficulties in achieving an effective agreement. Not only are there the obvious political difficulties – like one superpower refusing point blank to negotiate – but there are challenging technical problems as well.

Among the current generation of nuclear weapons designers, there is talk of creating re-usable underground facilities to permit tests under 300 tons in yield. This raises some delicate questions: are tests at such levels detectable, can devices used in these tests really be called 'weapons,' and finally, are tests this small useful to people designing newer and more elegant bombs? Arms controllers would see it as a pyrrhic victory, indeed, if the weapons designers had figured a clever way to build and test new weapons while not violating a treaty that was intended to halt all such activity in the first place.

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Cox's article draws on a study of various aspects of a comprehensive test ban undertaken jointly by CIIPS and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The study commissioned papers from scientists at the major US nuclear weapons laboratories; seismologists from European, American and Canadian institutions; Soviet experts on test verification; participants in previous test ban treaty negotiations; and political analysts dealing with the long and frustrating history of attempts to reach a test ban agreement.

The results of the comprehensive test ban workshop and study – edited by study co-directors **Jozef Goldblat** of SIPRI and **David Cox** – will be published by Oxford University Press in late summer 1987.

■ The other articles this quarter range across the spectrum of peace and security concerns: **Richard Handler** provides insight into how one of the most popular English-language radio shows in Canada deals with the relatively gloomy business of war and peace in the 1980's; **Nancy Gordon** delves into the financial woes of the United Nations and comes up cautiously optimistic; **Jocelyn Coulon** offers opinion on why neutralist and non-alignment sentiment is resurgent in Canada; and **Joel Sokolsky** shows that recent changes in how the US Navy says it is going to do

its job have profound implications for our own navy and for how we ought to think about our Arctic waters.

■ The Spring '87 issue has two new sections. 'Defence Notes' is assembled by members of the Institute research and public programmes staff, and highlights significant developments in the defence policies of Canada and other countries, major weapons procurement decisions, NATO plans and policies, and evolution of military strategy. The items in this section will be presented in relatively non-specialized language with the expectation that the column will be useful for all readers concerned with military affairs. Also, we are for the first time publishing letters to *Peace&Security* in reaction to articles we have run. Your comments are, of course, welcome. A warning about length – lack of space will force us to edit letters (even good ones) that are longer than five hundred words. ■ Finally, the magazine is fortunate to have acquired the services of **Hélène Samson** as Associate Editor. Ms. Samson was most recently editor and programme officer at the United Nations Association of Canada.

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David Cox is Director of Research at the Institute and member of the faculty at Queen's University; **Richard Handler** is a radio producer for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation; **Nancy Gordon** is Director of Public Programmes at the Institute; **Jocelyn Coulon** is a correspondent for *Le Devoir* and French Review Page Editor for *Peace&Security*; **Joel Sokolsky** is Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College, Kingston; **Jane Boulden** is a research assistant at the Institute; **Gregory Wirick** is a writer based in Ottawa; **Sarah Taylor** is a doctoral candidate at Cambridge University.

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THE GLITTERING PRIZE:

What next for a comprehensive test ban? By David Cox

"The reader must be aware that I regard the failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban as a world tragedy of the first magnitude."

So wrote Glenn Seaborg, Nobel Prize Laureate, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in the United States, and a principal negotiator for President Kennedy during the negotiations which ended in 1963 with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

Seaborg has joined an impressive group of former office holders – amongst whom one would include Averrel Harriman, Robert MacNamara, perhaps even Harold Brown – who, like repentant sinners bearing public witness, have wished that they had used their time in office to greater advantage in seeking to control the arms race.

Seaborg's book vividly recalls for us the great effort made to negotiate a comprehensive test ban in the early 1960s. In those days both the superpowers tested above ground, creating radioactive fallout and widespread public anxiety. Negotiations for a test ban started in 1958 but limped along for several years, stuck mainly on disagreement about the need for on-site inspection and other verification measures. Then in a remarkable sequence of events, Kennedy and Khrushchev stared into the abyss of the Cuban missile crisis, and emerged committed to cooperate in measures to halt what many believed had become a reckless drive towards nuclear profligacy.

Despite their efforts, the superpowers, joined by the United Kingdom in the negotiations, failed to achieve a comprehensive ban, and settled instead for one which prohibited testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water, but which continued to permit underground testing. In so doing, they

removed a worldwide health hazard and allayed much public concern about nuclear weapons. Underground testing is inconvenient and expensive, but it has not constituted much of a barrier to the superpowers who have managed to conduct about nine hundred tests since the Treaty came into force. In the intervening decades, the modernization of strategic nuclear weapons has continued apace, affected not at all, apparently, by the restriction imposed by the Partial Test Ban Treaty. This rather sombre conclusion may seem at odds with the further efforts of the superpowers which culminated in the Threshold Test Ban of 1974, and in an accompanying threshold on peaceful nuclear explosions signed in 1976. In these agreements, the signatories agreed to a limit of 150 kilotons – about ten times the size of the Hiroshima bomb – in their underground test programmes. As to why they chose 150 kilotons, there are no clear answers, but it is evident that the 150 kiloton threshold, like the Partial Test Ban of 1963 did not achieve much in the way of restricting strategic modernization or new weapons development.

Under the Carter Administration, the three powers resumed negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, apparently still determined in their quest for a complete ban. The indications are that in 1977 and 1980 most of the technical difficulties – still mainly about verification and the need for on-site inspection – were overcome. Whether there was a real will to sign a comprehensive test ban is something which we may now doubt, but in any event the nearly complete negotiations were

swallowed up by the Senate battle over the ratification of SALT II, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing continues to be the declared objective of many governments, including Canada.

For many, a permanent and comprehensive ban on testing is still the glittering prize sought by arms controllers and disarmers who see it as the single most important step in blocking the further development of the superpower nuclear rivalry, and indeed in preventing nuclear proliferation. The idea of a road block – of a barrier which in a single stroke would cut off the most dangerous developments in the arms race, and give time for negotiations to take hold – has fascinated and preoccupied reformers over many decades. But is there any such single stroke that can achieve this effect? In particular, is it now the case that a comprehensive ban would have the dramatic effect that Seaborg and others believed possible in the 1960s? To answer these questions, it is worth looking at the nature of modern nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

There are many tried and proven designs for nuclear weapons. Over the years they have become smaller in size and weight, of lower yield, and ever more precisely adapted to the requirements of the missile engineer who has only so much space and weight for the payload of the re-entry vehicle or the cruise missile. Over time, this has become a symbiotic relationship. The reduction in the yield of nuclear weapons required by the new missile designers is more than offset by the increasing accuracy of the missiles. In one sense, this is an advantage; there may be some dubious consolation in the thought that, should the weapons ever be used, the lower yields (in the order

of 200 to 500 kilotons), may create slightly less destruction than the monstrous devices produced in earlier days. On the other hand, the extraordinary accuracy of modern missiles is destabilizing, and may induce one side or the other in a time of crisis to launch a first attack.

What does this have to do with a test ban? If the nuclear weapon designer was unable to test at all, this would not prevent the development of new weapon systems. It would simply mean that the missile designer was required to begin with an existing nuclear device design and to build his missile accordingly, perhaps not achieving an optimum design, but certainly able to continue some modernization. The situation may be likened to the aircraft designer, who must begin with a series of givens about the shape and size of the passengers; an aircraft design which required passengers to change their size and weight might be wonderfully efficient, but it would not be useful. In other words, if the size, yield and shape of the nuclear device cannot be changed, the missile designer is constrained but not thwarted.

Is it worth causing that restraint? For many people, the answer is yes. First, certain kinds of refinements and modifications would be prevented, precisely because the missile or aircraft designer could not accommodate the payload to an existing nuclear weapon design. For example, it is just possible that the family of stealth (invisible to radar) weapons will require new, more compact, more elegant warheads. If one wishes to stop stealth development, preventing further warhead design would be an advantage. If such an obstacle is imposed there would be a political and psychological bene-


fit to preventing modernization, since it would allow more breathing space for arms control negotiations and break the cycle whereby the new weapons designs seem to overtake the tortoise-like pace of attempts to control them.

More encouragingly, for this purpose we may not necessarily need a comprehensive test ban, but only a very low yield test ban. This is why, in the United States, Congressional supporters of a test ban are seeking to promote a resolution which will ban all testing of nuclear weapons over one kiloton. The point of a one-kiloton threshold is precisely to preclude the testing of new strategic nuclear devices. Although the issues surrounding this argument are complex and technical, the sum of it is that for the new nuclear device to be fully guaranteed it must be tested at least once at full yield. Therefore, although even a one-kiloton limit would allow some meaningful tests of a new design, it is unlikely that the United States or the Soviet Union would place such a new warhead in the inventory if it had not been tested at least once at its designed yield. Since a one kiloton weapon, or a three or a five kiloton weapon, would have little strategic or even tactical value, the one kiloton threshold would inhibit strategic modernization to the degree that the modernization required a new design.

Why set the limit at one kiloton and not zero? The issue essentially revolves around the problem of verification. A zero threshold or comprehensive ban, it is argued by some specialists, would open the door to numerous charges and countercharges of violations. Even the smallest nuclear test would constitute a violation. Even if it has no technological or military significance, the fact that a violation had occurred would itself be a cause of enormous suspicion and acrimony. Do the same problems surround a one-kiloton threshold? Here the debate is now joined, with many serious people on both sides.

At the one-kiloton level, it is claimed, every year there are approximately thirty thousand seismic "events" which have to be not only detected, but identified so

that there can be no doubt that an explosion is not confused with an earthquake. Some specialists in verification argue that the limit is too low, and that a higher limit – say between five and ten kilotons – would be less controversial and,



Henry Chan

therefore, a greater contribution to the creation of trust between the superpowers.

Other seismologists, such as Lynn Sykes from Columbia University, and, indeed, many non-American specialists working with the Group of Scientific Experts in Geneva, believe that an international network of stations and communications would permit high confidence even at the one-kiloton level. The debate is a difficult one, but it is characterized by a growing sense that a low threshold is feasible, and would have a limited but significant impact on strategic weapons modernization.

This view is not shared by the Reagan Administration. In recent years the Administration has produced a number of reasons to explain why it is necessary to continue nuclear testing. Verification is one of them; there have been many US challenges to Soviet compliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. But by its own admission, verification is not the central issue for the Reagan Administration. A number of arguments have been advanced, including the need to improve the safety and security of the nuclear weapons now developed. Additionally, much has been made of the need to assure the

reliability of weapons in the stockpile, and incidents have been cited of weapons deployed on submarines and missiles which either failed to explode when tested or produced yields dramatically lower than those predicted by the designers and engineers. These issues are important, but they are not insurmountable obstacles to a very low yield threshold. A very small number of tests each year would suffice to accommodate these requirements.

Behind all these arguments, however, there is another one which is at the heart of the current Western dilemma in arms control and international security. Unlike the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration has asserted that a comprehensive test ban is undesirable as long as we depend on nuclear weapons for deterrence, for national security, and for international stability. There is, of course, a world of difference between difficulty of implementation, verification, and other such issues, and the statement that the goal itself should not be pursued and is contrary to the interests of the Western states. When first made in the early years of the Reagan Administration this statement received little attention, since it appeared to be more polemical than substantive. But since the Gorbachev speech of 15 January 1986, which offered a plan to de-nuclearize the world by the end of the century, and since the Reykjavik summit, when President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev shared a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, the opposition to a comprehensive test ban within the Reagan Administration has assumed a new significance.

In the aftermath of Reykjavik, West European Governments, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defence Weinberger, and other prominent representatives of the Reagan Administration have sought to correct the view that the United States and its allies were anxious to move to a de-nuclearized world. Put simply, they claim that without nuclear weapons the Allies would be at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and, as a consequence, that we would live in an unsafe world. Like the discussions at Reykjavik, the quest for a

comprehensive test ban has led us to a profound dilemma. Do we want to live with or without nuclear weapons? If we want to live with them, because we depend on them for our security, then how many do we need? If we want to live without them, what should we do about conventional defence? How can we negotiate reductions in conventional defence with the Soviet Union and its allies? Is there any level of conventional defence that would be an adequate guarantee against war?

For the moment, the Soviet Union has captured the high ground in this debate. The moratorium was sustained for over eighteen months and the Soviets can hardly be faulted for abandoning it in the light of continued American testing. In their public statements the Soviets seem more than willing to engage in a massive mutual nuclear disarmament. Of course, this may only be an appearance. Many who are suspicious of the Soviets, see it merely as propaganda, or regard the exercise of de-nuclearization as so inherently futile that it costs nothing to advocate it. But even if we assumed the worst about Soviet motivations, the dilemma for Western publics remains. If we want to live with nuclear weapons, there is little point in continuing to protest their existence, or the need to test them. If we want to live without them, an extraordinary long, complex, frustrating and perhaps frightening path looms ahead. The comprehensive test ban may not be the glittering prize that Glenn Seaborg so cherished, but the quest for it has revealed the essential dilemma caused by our knowledge of nuclear weapons and their unimaginable fury. □

Further Reading

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WAR AND PEACE ON THE RADIO:

Treating the most important story in the world. By Richard Handler

When we started we may have been the only mainstream radio programme in the country – and perhaps the only media outlet – to give nuclear war and peace issues a weekly slot.

For two years I have produced the *Morningside* War and Peace column, the segment of the programme we devote to nuclear, defence, peace and security issues. The column airs on Thursdays, usually in the third hour. *Morningside* is talk radio with a personal touch (what in CBC parlance is called “companion radio”). We are on the air fifteen hours a week; Peter Gzowski is the host. About a million people listen in during the week – with each quarter-hour segment gathering up to a quarter of our total audience, depending on the time (about 180,000 for the War and Peace slot). Listeners have a place on the show; they feel at home here. They write thousands of letters to Gzowski – short and very long, filled with commentary, suggestions, confessions, recipes, and poems. Gzowski attends to these letters with an editorial passion. He believes his letters (more than he believes his producers, to our everlasting despair!). And so it was that Gzowski began to notice that some of his listeners were getting nervous about the prospects of a nuclear war.

A producer puts people on the air, comes up with ideas, interviews potential guests, researches the story, and writes a “green” – an introduction, a set of questions, and a background essay or notes. I had, in the past, produced items on nuclear issues – on arms talks, on nuclear tensions and super-power fears, on deterrence, on nuclear winter, and on what it is like to live, as a parent and child, in a nuclear world. But in spite of how much I had done, I had always

been perplexed about how much to do on the issue of nuclear war. And though we were not subject to the tyranny of the headline (we never rely on news pegs for our items) I still felt many of the same rules applied that apply elsewhere – somebody has to come up with something ‘new’ about nuclear war before I would put him on air.

But the rules of news – of novelty – do not apply to our listeners. They are not current affairs producers. They had witnessed the breakdown of detente and the increased tensions of the 1980’s. They were nervous and some of them were scared. So the letters started arriving, including one from a listener who suggested we devote a part of our programme to the nuclear threat. And Gzowski, at one of our story meetings, put forward this listener’s suggestion and proposed we create a War and Peace column. I jumped at the idea, arguing that it was the least we could do for the most important story in the world.

But of course what is ‘important’ can be deadly radio, especially when the subject is the end of the world. How much doom and gloom could our listeners take? Is this what they wanted to hear? I had to figure out what we would talk about every week – without paralyzing our listeners and ourselves. So here are the *Morningside* rules, about all stories, from the most important to the incidental (these rules are broken more than we wish, but these are our rules nevertheless) that are supposed to prevent paralysis.

Rule number one says that a *Morningside* guest has to think on

air. That means no shtick artists, no traveling thought salesmen, no guests who are pushing a line they have pushed a thousand times before. We don’t want people who turn on a tape machine when they open their mouths (though I must confess, a few of these have appeared on the show). And our guests have to talk with Peter, and not at him – which brings up the problem of the ‘expert.’

Other programmes thrive on experts – all that arcane and disinterested talk from men (generally) who inhabit the capitals of the world. But for our purposes experts can be boring. They are often like neutron bombs – they kill people but leave the furniture standing! I knew if I populated the column with experts, the War and Peace segment would not survive. So I went back to the root of the problem – the fact that our listeners – homemakers, professionals, business people – were worried about nuclear war. And I decided that along with the occasional expert, I would invite people to come on *Morningside* who had begun to think about nuclear war and the whole concept of security – and this is crucial – even if it was not their business to do so. These people would have an unusual ‘take’ on our dilemma. A schoolteacher like Susan Hargraves might look at attitudes in children to nuclear war, and a psychologist and logician like Anatol Rapoport would use game theory as his nuclear ‘prism.’ Guests would have to work at it. No casual thoughts were allowed. There is nothing like catastrophe to bring out banality. They would have to expand the listener’s awareness of the dilemmas involved.

Censoring the banal may be undemocratic, but it is essential to our understanding of the programme and the column. Each week I get press releases from nuclear en-

thusiasts who jog, walk, run, meditate, chant, or ring bells for peace. But I cannot put these people on air. Most of them are well meaning, but they fail the test of the second question. The test simply asks: after a guest tells you why he is doing what he’s doing, have you exhausted his knowledge and the range of his response? (I am not judging these people, dedicated and fine as they are. I am talking format – sixteen minutes! – and intellectual breadth. People who fail the test of the second question may get to heaven before I do, but they will not be invited on air.) What we need are people with an argument, because *Morningside* is one of the last places where you can go to hear the spoken essay, disguised as an interview. I say essay, because the best guests speak from a personal position which advances the line of their argument (which is what the best essay writers do). The essay is always about discovery – the structures of inquiry, and its personal intent. These are the features that make not only the best essays (or mystery stories) but the best radio interviews. And what is more compelling than to seek out intelligent people who – in spite of ‘official positions,’ the fog of jargon, and the inhuman double-speak – come upon what they believe to be the truth of an impending catastrophe or its opposite, the prospects for hope.

What about balance? You may think the War and Peace column is simply a conduit for smart peace activist-thinkers – members of the professional guilds for social responsibility that are flourishing in Canada. But we do try to strike some sort of balance. True, I have never put anybody on who was for nuclear war; though I have heard guests say they would prefer it to the capitulation of the West. One of

the ways balance comes in is when we deal with superpower conflict. Many of our guests have been critical of both sides. I have heard few apologies for the Soviet Union, but I also go out of my way to feature items on the independent peace movement in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as interviews on Soviet life, its military-industrial complex, and its own colonial war in Afghanistan.

A range of conservative opinion does appear on *Morningside*, which we try to feature in two ways. First I try to select those who feel passionately and know a lot about the problems of our adversaries. This is, to some extent, an American phenomenon. Neo-conservatism is, after all, renegade liberalism and a form of self-discovery. We have featured long interviews with Norman Podhoretz, editor of *Commentary* magazine, and the cold warrior and national security consultant, Michael Ledeen, among others. But most of our guests are Canadian. So, while they are less abundant and not as well organized, our cold warriors do make it to air. We have also featured Canadians from Eastern Europe and their allies – those who despise the Soviet Union and desperately want us to despise it too. Secondly, war and peace adversaries do appear on our debates, a regular feature of the column. Debates on Star Wars, NATO and neutrality, nuclear weapons free zones, and peace studies add some heat to *Morningside's* obsession with light.

(We once ran what I consider the War and Peace equivalent of the abortion debate: two Eastern European mothers now living in Canada, one afraid of nuclear war, the other traumatized by Stalinism. I wanted to see if these women could speak to each other; find some common ground. But all they did was invalidate each other's arguments – talk past each other – like those who argue for or against abortion. It was an instructive insight in itself.)

Not all the items are about peace or the fear of war. Like most people immersed in the subject, I am interested in the military: how they do their job and how they think.

Soldiers and former soldiers have appeared on the column – including an especially good piece with three cadets from the Royal Military College at Kingston, who gave our listeners an insight into why they are choosing a military career. One of our best items was a week-long series with the American military analyst Richard Gabriel,



Mike Connolly

an ex-career officer and a Vietnam veteran. Though a critic of his country's military failings, Gabriel has few quarrels with its foreign policy goals. He saves his anger for his country's military – its bloated command structure and its incompetence. His insights into how armies are motivated to fight, and how they fail, was one of the highlights of the War and Peace column last year. Still there are no doubt more "pro-peace" people who appear on *Morningside* than those who don't agree with them. And for this I offer two reasons, one having to do with the satisfactions of novelty and the other with the nature of conservative thinking in this country.

The column began with the listeners' concerns – with the fact that the global arms race was getting out of hand. Those who are rethinking war and peace in new and interesting ways are those who don't like what they have found. Because journalism lives and thrives under the rule of novelty, there is a built-in bias toward critical thinking – even while the intention of the column and the programme is neutral or 'non-aligned.'

Secondly, what does it mean to be a conservative in Canada on the issue of nuclear arms? It may mean

watching out for the Russians, and supporting America – but a whole host of conservatives are breaking down the categories of their thinking, even if they are anti-Soviet and pro-NATO. Many of the peace people who appear on the show are not radicals. They do not call for revolution. They are people with

a real stake in this society. (I have heard it said that Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War just want a world safe enough to preserve their privilege – and so be it, if that's what motivates some of them.) But lots of 'conservative' people in this country – our listeners included – feel they are conservative when it comes to conserving the planet. Retired military officers and business executives are now worried about American and Soviet plans to fight and win a nuclear war. Are they liberals? Misguided conservatives? It's impossible to label them. Even the most pro-American Canadians are disturbed by the cavalier attitudes displayed by the US on the issue of Arctic sovereignty and the militarization of Canadian air space. 'Peace' is becoming mainstream. There is a flowering of activity on a local level. It is estimated that ninety-five percent of the peace groups in the country are five years old or less. The Liberal Party passed a resolution at its last convention calling for a nuclear weapons-free zone in Canada. Even if this is never implemented, its passage is significant.

I have a favourite question I like to ask the experts during a pre-

interview: why are there 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world? Do these weapons make any military sense? The experts rarely have a good answer. They suggest that lots of weapons are needed to do lots of jobs (you wouldn't want big bombs to do little jobs and little bombs to do big jobs, would you?). But mostly their answers come down to fear. You need these weapons, irrational as they are, because if the other side can neutralize a lot or some of them, then you need more weapons to overcome the threat. So in the end it comes down to this: nuclear weapons are the world's biggest Rorschach ink-blot test. They are the perfect projection screen for the fears and illusions of nations, corporations, armies, and the employees of the world's industrial-military complex. What an incredible admission – all these weapons exist as a psychological play! – a figment of our imagination dispensing money, power, prestige, and dominance.

But people are worried – about the numbers, about the chance of an accident, a mistake. No wonder people are beginning to rethink what it means to exist in a world where 50,000 nuclear weapons are 'normal,' a world where even a small reduction in the numbers of these weapons panics those whose business is "national security." Who wouldn't be nervous under these circumstances? What does 'balance' in journalism mean here? I find it hard to believe that balance means just another rehash of the same old cold war arguments. That is why the people I talk to want to examine how they fit into this collective suicide arrangement. And that means re-examining Canada's relationship to the superpowers and the nuclear arms race.

It just may be that the new nationalism of the 1980's – after the demise of the nationalizations of the seventies and the glimmer of free trade – will be in the area of what it means to be nationally secure. And that may mean a rethinking of the legitimacy of a global system that insists that being normal is living with the threat of nuclear war. □

MONEY PROBLEMS AT THE UN:

Getting its financial house in order. By Nancy Gordon

Successive Canadian governments have usually thought and acted as if a strong UN was in Canada's national interest.

Geographically tied to the world's most powerful state, Canadian governments have tended to look on the UN as a sometimes blessed, if mild, antidote to the influence of the US. Thus it was with some surprise that observers read the speech of the Minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark, to the UN this past September; Mr. Clark demonstrated a bit of "tough love" on the UN. Having said that Canada was a strong supporter of a strong UN, he then went on to chastise both the organization for its inefficiencies, and member states for their unwillingness to use it.

Later in the autumn Prime Minister Mulroney visited the UN and said that it was "unseemly for the UN to have to go around with a tin cup, and we're not going to allow it." It may well be that a tough speech from a friend, like Mr. Clark, was an effective way to bring political support behind the need for reform, for indeed the "tin cup" is out at UN headquarters in New York.

Each autumn the UN Secretary-General issues a report on the state of the organization. This year the booklet was not available from the usual sources in Canada – the UN had run out of postage on its bulk distribution metre and, as a cost-cutting measure, was not replacing it until sometime in 1987.

A small matter undoubtedly – the text of the report could be found and copied from other sources. But the incident is illustrative of the very tight financial squeeze the UN found itself in last year, when the US announced it would cut its assessed contribution by anywhere from \$70 million to

\$110 million. The UN was in real danger of running out of money.

The regular budget of the UN is financed by assessments from each member state, generally based on ability to pay. Because of discrepancies in wealth, as measured by GNP, rich nations pay virtually all the budget. In 1986 the US was assessed 25 percent of the total, Japan 10.8, the USSR 10.2, West Germany 8.2, France 6.3, Britain 4.86, Canada 3.06. Only sixteen states paid more than one percent of the budget; 78 states were assessed at the minimum of .01 percent. The 1986 regular budget of the UN was originally set at slightly over US \$800 million. Of this the US should have paid \$210 million, the USSR \$75.9 million, Britain \$34 million, Canada \$21.4 million.

Any discussion of UN finances needs to be prefaced by looking carefully at the amounts of money involved in the context of national government expenditures. "Chicken-feed" is how one official puts it. Canada's contribution of C\$24 million to the regular budget compares to \$30 million for the cost of one CF-18 jet fighter, (and we are buying 138 of them) or \$490 million to keep Via Rail going for one year.

In the General Assembly and its committees each state has one vote, regardless of size, population, or assessment. In the late 1950's and early 1960's some states began the practice of "withholding" a portion of their contributions to demonstrate unhappiness with certain UN programmes. The USSR led this development by withholding in protest against the Middle East and Congo peacekeeping operations. France also withheld money for the Congo operation.

The practice has become more widespread, until in 1986 at least eighteen states withheld some portion of their contribution.

In the US, opposition both to the UN itself and more particularly to the budget process and administrative practices has been growing for some time. Fueled by the Heritage Foundation, these criticisms were given tacit or overt support by members of the Administration. Congress reflected this sense of dissatisfaction when it passed the Kassebaum amendment which stipulated that the US must reduce its contribution to the UN unless, for matters related to the budget, a system of weighted voting was introduced. The Gramm-Rudman Bill which gives the President the authority to cut spending to reduce the deficit was also relevant.

The UN budget process has been a cause of concern to many states, particularly major donors. States which pay very little push for programmes which are of marginal interest, at best, to the major donors. And recently the major donors have, in fact, voted against the budget. According to the Charter, assessments are a binding obligation which states must pay. But we have an evolving international system, one which has not yet come to rely on international law to provide the sanctions necessary to enforce it. *Realpolitik* still lives in international relations, and if member states decide they will not pay a portion of their assessment there are few, if any, effective sanctions available to the UN to enforce its will. The UN has chosen, wisely, not to deny voting privileges to those who break its financial rules. Thus instead of having an exclusive, smaller, and poorer organization, the UN is still a universal organization capable, in theory, of concerted action.

In December 1985 the General Assembly appointed a Group of

Experts, known as the Group of 18, to make recommendations on medium and long-term arrangements which would avert a financial crisis and put the UN administrative, management and personnel systems and policies on a more solid footing. A Special Session in April 1986 considered short-term measures which would allow the organization to continue to pay its bills.

In fact, the UN ended 1986 with a surplus of \$10 million, despite an American contribution of less than half its assessment. The Secretary-General undertook a number of cost-cutting measures during the year which reduced the budget to about \$700 million. He ordered a hiring freeze, reductions in travel and overtime, postponement of construction projects and cuts in meetings and conferences. During 1986 staff was reduced by nine percent through attrition.

The crisis also spawned a number of meetings and reports by those who had an interest and expertise in the subject. Sadruddin Aga Khan, a former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Maurice Strong, a Canadian with a variety of experiences at the UN issued a series of recommendations. Active in their group was George Davidson, a Canadian, and a former Under Secretary-General at the UN. The Stanley Foundation also weighed in with a report. These reports, together with the recommendations of the Group of 18 which were released in August, and considered by the General Assembly during the autumn, focussed on reforms which would avoid such crises in the future. The premise was that if the UN could put its administrative house in order, major donors would be less inclined to withhold part or all of their assessments or refuse to pay. During the course of the reviews a number of chronic problems with

UN management and practices were discussed more openly than had previously been the case.

The most vociferous complaints about the UN administrative structure revolve around the Secretariat, its size, its classifications, its travel habits, its qualifications. Any large bureaucracy, whether it be the government of Canada or the Coca Cola company, suffers from inefficiencies. In the UN system normal bureaucratic problems are exacerbated by the need for what is called "equitable geographic distribution" of the Secretariat posts. Thus member states often put pressure on the Secretary-General to appoint one of their nationals to a particular job. And it is not unheard of for member states to lobby for the appointment of someone they wish to rid from their own governments. Thus effectiveness, skills and ability to do the job are sometimes less important than they should be when recruitment decisions are taken. The UN is also guilty of a certain amount of over-classification at its highest levels: the structure has become top-heavy with highly paid staff.

The Group of 18, together with the other reports on this subject, all reiterated the need for the Secretary-General to take command of this situation, to recruit on the basis of qualifications and experience, to reduce the number of posts at the Under Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General levels. While most observers expected that this may be easy to propose and hard to accomplish, Pérez de Cuéllar has already begun the task.

In the US the UN has been looked upon as a rather lax employer in terms of hours of work and annual vacation. The Aga Khan/Strong report recommended restoration of the eight-hour work day, and a reduction in vacation time from six weeks to four.

Duplication of effort is another area where there was almost unanimous agreement that something needed to be done. In many cases the UN duplicated the work of a specialized agency, or the reason for a programme's existence had long since been overtaken by other

agencies or events, or a programme was established because member states could not agree on any political solution to a problem. UN Technical Assistance Programmes were criticized for duplicating work done by the UN Development Programme; aspects of the work of the regional economic commissions, which are financed through the



... It is, of course, a kind of jet age corruption by no means confined to non-free-enterprise. The cost per annum of such proliferation would probably not buy a jet-fighter, but too much fat, too much duplication of activity, and too little co-ordination cannot be ignored, even by those who would argue the virtues of looseness.

– John Holmes

regular budget, duplicate the work of UNIDO; the Population Division within the Secretariat does much the same sort of work as UNFPA; the World Food Council should be integrated with, instead of fighting with, FAO. The Aga Khan/Strong report pointed to the overlapping and duplication of programmes and activities related to *apartheid* and Namibia.

The reports criticized the tendency of the UN to tackle all problems, social, political, economic. According to George Davidson, "Some things should be left to national governments." In his view, it is essential that the UN set priorities and restrict its activities to those areas.

The 71 recommendations from the Group of 18 included:

- a 15 percent reduction in the 12,000 member Secretariat and a 25 percent reduction in the Under Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General posts within three years;
- simplification of the structure of the Secretariat;
- a significant decrease in the number of meetings and conferences;
- a reduction in the amount of paper produced, and in the activities of the Department of Public Information;
- the abolition of a number of inefficient services.

Perhaps the most controversial part of their deliberations and of the eventual decisions of the General Assembly was the question of the budget process: it is here that the proposals for weighted voting had surfaced. Some member states thought that voting on budget matters should be weighted in favour of those who contributed

Committees, commissions, subcommittees, conferences which meet too often by the blissful waters of Lac Lemán or the Blue Danube or just two kilometres from Broadway threaten to choke healthy growth.

the most – this was the intent of the Kassebaum amendment. In the end the UN did not accept this procedure, but agreed that there should be consensus on budget matters by member states. This means that in future a situation should not develop where the major donors vote against the budget.

Reducing the maximum amount that any one state should contribute was discussed, but not agreed. Various proposals had been put forward – that the maximum be 20 percent or 15 percent or even 10 percent. The corollary of such propositions, of course, would be that others would have to pay a greater percentage, and such increases would fall on middle powers like Canada, the UK, France, Germany. Not being as dependent on one contributor, especially a fickle one, would be advantageous to the UN. But the principle of equity would be further destroyed, and the thought has been expressed that if the US contributed less, it might be even less interested in what goes on at the UN.

Most member states had hoped that the reforms of 1986, together with the resolution on the subject would cause the US to pay its arrears and/or return to a contribution level of at least 20 percent. Such does not appear to be the case

however: US State Department appropriations for the current year do not reflect a return to previous levels of funding.

Some argue that the US was not interested in reforming the UN, but instead wished to cripple it. It may well be that some in the US administration are so opposed to multilateralism that they would gladly see the UN disappear. But recent statements by administration spokesmen indicate that they are pulling back a little; that they are afraid that the anti-UN sentiments they set in motion need now to be dampened. Supporters of the UN will welcome that reversal – a UN without the US would indeed be a crippled organization. Lessons from the League loom large.

The recommendations of the Group of 18 were accepted, with some qualifications, by the Assembly. According to some observers the solutions were not far-reaching enough – the Assembly should have directed the Secretary-General where to make cuts in personnel and programmes. Such direction would have given him the political clout needed to attain the objectives.

The overall effect of the financial crisis should be salutary. Coming to grips with administrative, management and personnel problems is not something organizations do easily or completely. However, a start has been made at the UN – a start which should result in a stronger organization, and thus one more likely to hold the support of its member states. In the interdependent world of the 1980s, an effective UN is essential for the development and maintenance of the myriad of multilateral dealings which govern international relations. □

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ANOTHER PATH FOR CANADA?

The politics of neutralism. By Jocelyn Coulon

Canada's defence policy has been the object of considerable controversy for several years.

Our close ties with the United States, the role we play in the defence of the European allies and our involvement in the West's nuclear infrastructure are a source of discontent for many Canadians.

Controversy over our defence policy is not new but it has reached unprecedented heights since 1983 when the former Liberal government authorized the testing of US cruise missiles over Canadian territory. More and more groups, associations and individuals are now questioning the basic tenets of our military policy and are proposing solutions which range from a utopian kind of pacifism to the most questionable brand of neutralism. Despite the variety of these suggestions, new developments in strategic thinking and a much livelier public debate, it is clear that the options available to Canada are limited. It cannot avoid the dictates of its geographical position, its political culture or the enormous economic and cultural pull of the United States.

This article examines the proposition that Canada should adopt a position of neutrality and that it should place greater emphasis on national independence. These ideas have been put forward by such public figures as Major-General Leonard Johnson, the writer and historian Gwynne Dyer – he expressed his views in the television series *Defence of Canada*, which he produced with Tina Viljoen – and, in a somewhat modified fashion, by one of our most outstanding and best known diplomats, George Ignatieff. Though these individuals differ on the ways in which they think defence policy can be changed,

they are at one in their determination to alter the status quo and to distance Canada from the growing ascendancy of the United States. The most interesting characteristic of this group is that they are all members, in some sense, of the Canadian 'establishment,' whether military, political or intellectual. This is the first time in post-war Canadian history that people of this stature have distanced themselves so radically from official government policy.

The Defence of Canada

For a long time Canada's defence policy was an offshoot of its relationship with Britain; it adopted a British strategic perspective and often British enemies as well. There was even a time, before the Second World War, when Canada's defence plans included provisions for attacking the United States – a hangover from the antagonisms of the preceding century. However, memories of the War of 1812, and of American expansionist tendencies were forgotten with the outbreak of war in 1939.

Canada-US military co-operation began in August 1938, when President Roosevelt declared at Kingston, Ontario that the United States would not stand idly by if Canadian territory were threatened by a foreign power. A few days later, Prime Minister Mackenzie King promised that Canada would do everything it could to prevent enemy forces from making use of its territory to attack the US. Two years later the Ogdensburg Declaration gave official sanction to the Canada-US alliance by setting up the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

The post-war situation and fear

of the Soviet threat led in 1949 to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in which Canada was to play an active role. During the fifties, Canada-US co-operation was further strengthened by the signing of two agreements; one formalized the joint production of military equipment, and the other organized the air defence of North America (NORAD). As a result of the latter agreement, strong pressure was placed on Canada to acquire nuclear weapons; something the Diefenbaker government refused to do right up to its fall from power in 1963. Nuclear weapons were stored on Canadian soil by the subsequent government, but were completely withdrawn from Canada by the summer of 1984.

The international scene has seen some difficult moments during the first years of the current decade and Canada has not been immune from the effects. The crisis over the US deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe shook the Atlantic alliance and provoked widespread popular misgivings about nuclear weapons. Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed paralyzed. Meanwhile in 1983, in the midst of these developments, the Canadian government signed an agreement allowing US cruise missiles to be tested over Canadian territory thus arousing the ire of peace groups and creating a deeply divided public opinion. A few months earlier, President Reagan had introduced his plan for the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) which called into question the basic assumptions of nuclear deterrence. Finally, throughout 1985, public hearings on the renewal of the NORAD Agreement indicated the possibility of continental air defence becoming linked with SDI – further increasing our military dependence on the

United States. Despite the repeated warnings of various experts, the Mulroney government signed the agreement and thus found itself without any guarantee that the country would not be drawn willy nilly into the Star Wars strategy.

Public Reaction

This combination of international tension and internal confusion over Canadian defence policy has produced reactions among certain sections of the public. After a wave of public meetings and demonstrations, of which the most violent manifestation was the bomb attack against Litton Industries of Toronto in 1982, the movement dedicated to changing our defence policy remodeled itself. A varied collection of ecologists, pacifists and nationalists, the peace movement moderated its actions in order to be more effective and more broadly acceptable. It has thus succeeded in attracting many intellectuals. Furthermore, the movement's ideas have had an impact on the established political parties and received the support of various public personalities. Some members of the NDP have reaffirmed their intention to withdraw Canada from both NATO and NORAD, should their party attain power. And elements within the Liberal Party have moved to the left of the political spectrum, as far as our military relationship with the US is concerned. They openly express their opposition to the testing of cruise missiles.

Individuals like Johnson, Dyer and Ignatieff have not hesitated to adopt strong positions on one or another aspect of our defence policy. Johnson and Dyer support a policy of neutrality whereas Ignatieff is more concerned with maintaining our national independence to the greatest extent possible without destroying our relationship with

European allies and the United States.

Those who opt for neutrality are not utopian visionaries prepared to see Canada unilaterally disarmed and withdrawn from international affairs. Quite the contrary – they are very much aware of Canada's responsibilities as a member of the Western community of nations but look to countries such as Sweden or Finland as models for action. Both Sweden and Finland, while remaining aloof from East-West rivalry, spend more than Canada on defence in order to preserve their independence.

Johnson and Dyer believe that neutrality is both financially possible and politically acceptable. As a first step, they recommend that Canada withdraw from NATO and NORAD. The armed forces which we maintain in Europe are of only token military value compared to the American presence; nonetheless, according to various calculations the cost of keeping them there, together with other commitments to the allies, accounts for between thirty and fifty percent of the defence budget. This money could be redirected towards the defence of Canadian territory – a particularly appropriate step after we had left NORAD.

In the view of Johnson and Dyer, the NORAD agreement is less concerned with protecting Canada than with safeguarding the US nuclear infrastructure, specifically the cruise missile-carrying bombers. Participation in NORAD and the links which that organization is forging with Star Wars will slowly embroil us in a US nuclear strategy over which we have no control. It will force us to trade the present policy of mutual deterrence for strategies aimed at fighting controlled and protracted nuclear wars. We must, therefore, abandon the agreement and then set up our own surveillance system to detect and intercept intruders, not only in order to protect our territory, but also to reassure the US that no threat from the North will catch it by surprise. All this could be carried out in stages, its advocates claim, leaving it to Canada to make the necessary adaptations and to decide on the pace of change.

The neutralists take care to

emphasize that any new defence policy must also account for US security interests. It is this, they believe, which makes their proposals politically acceptable. It would be essential to give a guarantee to the US that Canadian territory would not be used against it. Nothing would prevent us from collaborating closely in time of crisis and from uniting in defence of Western values in the event of war. What proponents of neutralism want to exclude is participation in restrictive military alliances where our influence is negligible.

In fact, the champions of this option believe that such alliances have no part to play in a modern security system. For neutralists, the existing alliances are pernicious, concerned only with the interests of the two superpowers and likely to produce a nuclear conflict into which both sets of allies will be drawn against their will. Since it is these military alliances which give the superpowers their overarching power, the allies should reject this situation in order to overthrow the system. By leaving NATO, neutralists claim, Canada would give an example to other countries like Denmark or the Netherlands. This in turn would influence the East, where Romania or some other country might well initiate the break-up of the Warsaw Pact.

Obviously, neutralism does not mean that we would be spared were war to break out. The importance of such a policy lies in the reduction of tension and the lowering of risk before war starts. And it is not an immoral position as some would characterize it. Supporters of neutralism cite the example of Sweden where the debate on neutrality began a hundred years ago and where the first proponents of the idea were reviled as traitors.

George Ignatieff adopts a more moderate position. He is not a neutralist, but thinks it is high time for Canada to take a hard look at its defence policy. NATO remains

for him a basic element of our foreign policy, but he believes that unless we are capable of exercising political control inside NORAD, we have no other choice but to end that agreement. He is worried, as are many others, that in the event of a crisis, such as that which arose from the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, Canada would be deprived of influence concerning the defence of North America. He advocates a nationalist defence policy which would put Canada's interests ahead of those of either the US or its allies.

Another Path?

Pursuing a different kind of defence policy will not be without difficulty. The neutralists and even the nationalists are well aware that the US would retaliate for any attempts to alter the status quo to its disadvantage. Modifying our special relationship with the United States, and withdrawing from NATO and NORAD in order to fall back on a more isolationist position may provoke strong reactions and perhaps economic sanctions from allies. The question then is: are Canadians willing to pay the price?

For the moment, all the indications are that the answer is 'no.' And those who propose change are well aware of this. They rely on the passage of time and increased awareness by the public of the new strategic realities to achieve the desired effect. But do we really want such an upheaval and is it practical to think it might actually occur?

Since the Second World War there has been no move in Canada, by the public or by those in government, to radically transform our defence policy. The current neutralist resurgence represents the first time that a well-organized movement, with support from some members of the establishment, has managed to escape the trap of political marginality to mount a significant attack on the received ideas of current policy.

When Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau decided in 1969 to conduct a review of foreign policy, including defence, the concepts of neutrality and non-alignment were examined by the experts, politicians and senior public servants who had been brought together for this exercise. They studied these two options, estimated what they would cost and, as it turns out, both were subsequently dropped by the Prime Minister. It is worth noting, moreover, that neither inside the government nor outside were there groups or individuals prepared to argue in favour of these neutralist-type options. Certain ministers advocated a complete withdrawal of Canadian troops from Europe and some even supported the 'French solution,' whereby Canada would withdraw from NATO's military structure while still remaining a member of the alliance. But at no time did neutralism receive support from members of the Cabinet or the military.

Today, faced with the changes in strategy which have taken place over the last ten years, and with the strength of public feeling about defence, Canada is at a crossroads. For many, the status quo is no longer acceptable and yet the room for manoeuvre is very limited. Bounded on either side by the United States and the Soviet Union, and strongly influenced by American culture, customs and politics, Canada is unable to break all ties with its powerful neighbour to the south or with its European allies. And even if it wanted to do so, this might not necessarily be in its best interest. The path for Canada is yet to be discovered. □

translation by Mary Taylor

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THE US NAVY AND CANADIAN SECURITY:

Trends in American Maritime Strategy. By Joel Sokolsky

In recent months, changes in US maritime strategy caught Canadian public attention, largely through reports about possible transit by United States Navy submarines through the Canadian Arctic.

The main worry seems to be national sovereignty. However, the under-ice activity of the US Navy is only one of several trends in US maritime strategy which could have a profound impact not only upon Canadian sovereignty, but also on the way Canada allocates resources to maritime defence and the position it takes on arms control questions.

The new maritime strategy

The maritime strategy currently being elaborated by the US Navy in the press and before US Congressional Committees is a significant variation on the Navy's roles since 1945. As part of its contribution to deterrence, the Navy maintains a fleet of ballistic missile submarines whose sea-launched ballistic missiles constitute America's secure second-strike capability. The security of this capability is based upon the invulnerability of the submarine to a first strike. The existence of these submarines on both sides is therefore said to make Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) a certain consequence of nuclear war and thus an important contributor to strategic stability.

In addition to its submarine force, the US Navy also maintains nuclear strike capabilities on its aircraft carriers. More recently it has added nuclear-capable, sea-launched cruise missiles, which could be used to strike the USSR. Both the Soviet and American navies also deploy a wide range of tactical nuclear weapons designed to be fired from ships, submarines, and aircraft. The wide dispersal of these weapons throughout the

navies of the superpowers makes it virtually impossible to distinguish between nuclear and conventional maritime forces. While the US Navy is prepared for nuclear war at the strategic and tactical level, the bulk of its forces are designed to undertake the more traditional naval tasks associated with securing use of the sea for the projection and sustaining of conventional force ashore. It is argued that in the event of a conventional war, especially in Europe, control of the sea lines of communication could well determine whether the US and its allies will be able to sustain conventional resistance or be compelled to resort to nuclear weapons.

The major threats to the sea lanes are the submarines and land-based naval aircraft of the Soviet Navy. Any war in Europe is expected to be accompanied by a vigorous anti-submarine warfare campaign in the North Atlantic and European coastal waters, and close protection of convoys against both submarines and naval aircraft. From the Soviet perspective, this effort will appear as an offensive operation since NATO will have to secure access to allies on its flanks such as Norway and Turkey. Such forward pressure by NATO will bring the allied navies close to the USSR where the Soviet Navy is expected to collect and defend its submarine fleet.

The US Navy also has the job of defending the American homeland. In conjunction with Canada, it maintains a continual surveillance of the seaward approaches to North America utilizing ships, aircraft, and bottom-based sensing devices. Although the more modern Soviet

ballistic missile submarines do not have to enter the Western Atlantic to hit targets in the US, older subs (still in service) do and they frequent the American eastern (and western) seaboard along with Soviet attack submarines. In general though, North American waters have not been of prime importance to the US Navy. This strategy could change, however, both in the way the US Navy intends to meet the Soviet threat and where it intends to wage the war at sea.

The current strategy envisions a much more aggressive anti-submarine and anti-air campaign which would take US naval forces right into Soviet waters to contain attack submarines and to strike at bases in the USSR itself, particularly facilities located around the Kola Peninsula opposite Norway. The strikes at land bases could entail widespread use of submarine-launched cruise missiles in a nuclear or conventional mode. To move into the Soviet 'backyard' the US Navy is expected to transit under the ice. The Navy has improved the ability of its existing attack submarines to operate in this environment and is planning to construct a new submarine, named SEAWOLF, with a better under-ice capability.

Taking the anti-submarine effort under the ice into Soviet waters, the US Navy will be pressing against the bastions of the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet. This 'strategic' anti-submarine warfare would be deliberate, since part of the new maritime strategy proposes increasing the vulnerability of the Soviet missile submarine fleet. In the event of a major conventional war, threatening these submarines is viewed as a further means of deterring escalation to the nuclear level. But forward operations would also put the US Navy in a better position to

destroy them either before or after the nuclear threshold is crossed, at sea or elsewhere.

The forward posture envisioned under the US Navy's proposed strategy also differs from past approaches in that it calls for a deliberate "horizontal escalation" of the war at sea in the case of a Soviet attack upon Europe. There the Soviets would be seeking a quick and decisive victory and would, according to the Navy, prefer to be able to concentrate their forces on achieving that victory. One of the central premises of the maritime strategy is to "deny them such an option by ensuring that they will have to face the prospect of a prolonged global conflict." This would be accomplished by engaging Soviet naval forces around the world.

The maritime strategy currently being elaborated by the Navy is not without its critics in the US. Objections have been raised on grounds of both military value and arms control. The critics argue that the US Navy's plans would not contribute to the strategic defence of Europe in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict because it would draw maritime forces away from their primary function of supporting the land and air forces by securing the seas. Protection of the sea lanes, they assert, does not require going into the Soviet Union's backyard. Moreover, even if the US Navy was successful in destroying a large portion of the Soviet Navy around the world, the USSR would still be able to win the land war in central Europe. It is also pointed out that the closer the American forces get to the USSR's coastal waters and territory, the more favourable the maritime situation is for the Soviets because there they could call upon their large force of land-based maritime aircraft. Finally, if the US Navy is successful at the conventional level, the Soviets will escalate to nuclear war

at sea rather than lose control of their home waters.

From an arms control standpoint the maritime strategy is viewed as destabilizing because of its emphasis upon strategic anti-submarine warfare. It undermines mutual deterrence by threatening the Soviets' secure second-strike capabilities. The emphasis on cruise-missile submarines, able to threaten the USSR, is also viewed as dangerous – adding a new dimension to the nuclear arms race and encouraging the Soviets to mount a similar threat in North American waters. In general, the maritime strategy is criticized because it would increase strategic competition in the Arctic, without measurably improving US or allied security.

Implications for Canada


To a certain point, the US maritime strategy would not alter Canadian naval forces' existing roles. Within NATO, Canada joins with the US and other allies in maintaining day-to-day surveillance of the North Atlantic and has responsibility for a particular portion of the ocean. In the event of a war in Europe, Canada would also supply anti-submarine escort forces for convoys and might contribute ships to allied naval task forces, for example those which might come to the aid of Norway.

Canada's cooperation with the US in the seaward defence of North America is similar in principle to air defence cooperation in that the objective is to provide surveillance and warning of possible Soviet attacks, be they from attack submarines or subs with short-range missiles. Canada contributes not only in order to support collective security, but also because it reduces the need for US forces to assume a greater share of the burden for continental defence, thereby undermining Canadian sovereignty.

The maritime forces which Canada devotes to NATO and North America also contribute to the protection of Canadian sovereignty against non-military threats such as illegal fishing. However, over the past fifteen years, Canada's maritime forces (ships, planes, and submarines) have declined in

numbers and capability to the point where fulfillment of any of their roles is doubtful. Trends in the American maritime strategy could exacerbate this condition.

There is a whole new set of problems created, however, if the US Navy increases operations in the Arctic. Should sea-launched cruise missile deployment go un-



restricted, the United States would want to ensure that movements of Soviet submarines in the Canadian Arctic could be detected. Canada would have to respond to such concerns. But it would also have to face increased use by the US of the Canadian Arctic as a transit route for the US Navy's attack submarines into the Soviet Arctic, where the USSR is expected to hide its ballistic missile submarine fleet. The Canadian Arctic archipelago is not the only route into Soviet bastions, but it is believed that US submarines have passed through it in the past. Without any significant under-ice capability of its own, Canada would neither be in a position to respond to US concerns about Soviet use of our Arctic waters nor know about US use. In both cases, the question of sovereignty arises.

These trends also raise arms control issues. As with critics in the US, Ottawa may feel uncomfortable with deliberate American efforts to place the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet in a vulnerable position, thereby possibly undermining strategic stability. Given the implications of unrestricted sea-launched cruise missile development, Canada may disagree with what appears to be the current US position that limits on these weapons should not be immediately sought. And Canada, as a NATO ally, may view the forward offensive and horizontal escalation plans of the US Navy as a weakening of deterrence in Europe.

Some have argued that the proper Canadian response to these trends

should be to object to them and seek arms control solutions which would also ease the strain on Canadian maritime resources and help protect Canadian sovereignty. Canada could, for example, join other nations in calling for an Arctic nuclear-free zone which would forbid transit by submarines. Ottawa might press the US to agree to limits on sea-based cruise missiles. And it could raise the whole issue of US maritime policies with NATO councils.

Arms control solutions would, however, be extremely difficult to attain. The Soviets currently make much greater use of their Arctic areas than the West and would be unlikely to accept restrictions. And it is precisely because of the importance which the USSR attaches to the Arctic that the US Navy is anxious to increase its capabilities there. More importantly, any arms control agreements applied in the area would not necessarily help Canada's dilemma very much. Restrictions on under-ice transit would require verification which in turn would require greatly enhanced under-ice capabilities for Canadian Forces. Limits on long-range, sea-launched cruise missiles would not do away with the need to maintain surveillance of the approaches to North America, including the Arctic, although it would reduce the threat. And even if the US were to agree to abandon ideas of very far forward anti-submarine warfare and horizontal escalation, the coming years will see increasing demands on Canada to support NATO at sea.

It should also be recognized that while recent trends in US maritime strategy do pose certain challenges for Canada, those trends do not challenge the necessity for collective security at sea through NATO and in the bilateral context. Canadian response to trends in the US maritime strategy ought to combine an appreciation of the need to maintain allied naval cooperation along with efforts to meet particular Canadian arms control and sovereignty concerns.

What should Canada do?

Given the considerations outlined above, the following set of responses are appropriate:

Calling upon NATO to examine the implications of recent trends in US maritime strategy which could affect deterrence in Europe.

Raising with the US and other allies concerns about the Arctic, unrestricted cruise missile development and the issue of strategic anti-submarine warfare against Soviet ballistic missile-carrying submarines.

Serious consideration should be given to a NORAD-type of cooperative effort with the US in this region. This would meet US security concerns while at the same time enhancing recognition of Canadian sovereignty. It must be appreciated that in the absence of such an arrangement, the US might undertake Arctic defence on its own.

Canada must also build up its maritime forces, if necessary at the expense of its land and air forces. Such forces would include additional anti-submarine warfare surface ships, maritime patrol aircraft and nuclear-powered attack submarines for under-ice operations. Efforts should also continue in the development of a fixed under-ice surveillance system. While ideally such a system would complement other forces, should financial constraints mean the postponement of new submarines, consideration should be given to early deployment of the fixed system alone.

Whatever their implications for other allies, current trends in US maritime strategy should, at the very least, compel Canada to devote more attention to its interests at sea and the resources necessary to secure those interests. □


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ARMS CONTROL DIGEST *By Jane Boulden*



Geneva Negotiations

On 28 February 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union was willing to separate negotiations on intermediate range forces (INF) from those on other issues such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, and to make a deal for the complete elimination of intermediate range forces from Europe. As agreed in Reykjavik, the US and the Soviet Union would each maintain one hundred intermediate range missiles on their own territory. The Soviets would maintain their missiles in Soviet Asia and the US in the continental United States.

The US responded by submitting a draft treaty on 5 March. Some differences still need to be ironed out. The US wants the right to deploy its intermediate range missiles in Alaska – keeping them within range of the Soviet Union. Another issue of special concern is how to deal with shorter range nuclear forces. The elimination of US intermediate range missiles from Europe means only a small number of short range missiles remain on the NATO side. The Soviet Union has a larger number deployed in Eastern Europe. Before signing an agreement for the elimination of intermediate range missiles, the US wants to ensure that this resulting “imbalance” will be dealt with. The Soviets have expressed a willingness to negotiate this issue in parallel with the INF negotiations.

In the area of strategic weapons (intercontinental range forces) there is general agreement between the two sides on reductions of fifty percent in strategic nuclear arsenals

within a five-year period. The US appears to have backed away from its Reykjavik proposal to abolish intercontinental ballistic missiles within ten years. This is reflected in a NATO communique from the December foreign ministers meeting in Brussels that supported the goal of fifty percent reductions in five years but did not mention the elimination of ballistic missiles in ten years.

Conventional Reductions in Europe

In December 1986 NATO foreign ministers proposed a new negotiating structure for the discussion of conventional arms reductions in Europe. The proposal called for negotiations that would include all of Europe, “from the Atlantic to the Urals.” This proposal reflects the increased attention given to the issue of conventional arms reduction since discussions in Reykjavik about the possible elimination of nuclear arms. The NATO proposal responds to one from the Warsaw Pact made in June 1986 which also advocated expanding the area and nature of conventional force negotiations. If the proposal is accepted by the Soviet Union, the new forum would replace the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations which have met in Vienna without success for the past fourteen years.

Chemical Weapons

In a major shift from previous positions, the Soviet Union agreed to disclose the location of its chemical weapon stockpiles and storage areas, and allow them to be inspected by international monitors within thirty days of an agreement on chemical arms coming into effect. Disagreement between the US and the USSR remains on the question of challenge inspections of facilities suspected to be in violation of an agreement. The Soviet Union continues to be unwilling to make such inspections mandatory.

Negotiations on a chemical weapons ban are continuing in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. France has included the production of chemical weapons as part of its new five-year defence plan and has told the Conference on Disarmament that it would not accept any form of moratorium on the development of chemical weapons.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

On 10 February 1987 China became the second nuclear weapon state to sign the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing the South Pacific as a nuclear-free zone. The Treaty was created by the thirteen nation South Pacific Forum on 6 August 1985 and prohibits the manufacture, use, disposal, storage and testing of nuclear weapons in the region.

The three protocols to be signed by nuclear weapon states have been open for signature since 1 December 1986. The Soviet Union signed the treaty almost immediately. The US has not signed, stating that it does not want to set a precedent in creating nuclear-free zones that may endanger its own security interests. Australia has been particularly upset by the US refusal since, in an effort to make the treaty acceptable to the US, it lobbied hard to ensure the treaty would not specifically prohibit transit of nuclear weapons-carrying ships in the area. The US has also announced that a US-New Zealand logistics pact will not be renewed when it expires in June because of US disapproval of New Zealand's anti-nuclear policies.

The ABM Treaty

The future of the ABM Treaty remains as one of the most important issues to be dealt with in bilateral arms control negotiations between the USSR and the United States. The “broad” interpretation was first announced by the US in October 1985. Under this interpretation only deployment of ABM systems based on new physical

principles is banned. The USSR advocates continued adherence to the Treaty as it now stands, and has tied agreement on this issue to reductions in strategic nuclear arms.

US Secretary of Defense Weinberger is one of the strongest supporters, within the Reagan Administration, of a decision for early deployment of a limited form of SDI and a decision to move to a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Mr. Weinberger has stated that deployment of a partial defence consisting of interceptors based in space and on the ground could occur by 1993. However, this would only be possible if the broad interpretation of the Treaty is adopted so that tests of interceptors in space can be carried out.

In a 16 February 1987 speech, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the US had put the broad interpretation on the table at the Geneva negotiations. NATO allies have consistently advocated maintaining the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty and consultations between the allies and the US on this question have begun. In response to the recent debate in the US about the Treaty, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark sent a letter to US Secretary of State George Shultz reiterating Canada's support for the restrictive view of the treaty and expressing concern over possible changes in the US position. The Canadian government has also stated that it believes SDI research to be “prudent” and permissible under the restrictions set out in the ABM Treaty.

Comprehensive Test Ban

The eighteen-month Soviet unilateral testing moratorium came to an end on 26 February 1987 with the first Soviet nuclear weapon test since 6 August 1985. The United States continues to refuse to negotiate a comprehensive test ban and as of 1 March had conducted twenty-six tests since the beginning of the Soviet moratorium.

Editor's Note:

With this issue, Arms Control Digest expands to two pages. This will permit more detailed coverage of the many arms control arenas – official and unofficial – where the complex business of negotiation, deal-making, and treaty drafting takes place. As always, the column will bring a Canadian perspective to bear on these issues.

The following is a review of publicly available sources of information used daily by professional arms control negotiators, policy makers and interested observers alike. The examination of arms control proposals, their merits and their faults, requires knowledge about the nature of the military and strategic balance. Who has what weapons, how many and what are their capabilities? – these are unavoidable questions for anyone concerned about arms control and disarmament. This review of sources by Jane Boulden is excerpted from a larger study just published by CIIPS: Background Paper #12, *Who's Ahead: Examining the Nuclear Balance*.

Public Sources on the Military Balance

There is no single source of public information that will provide an accurate and full picture of the military balance. The Canadian government, like most other NATO members, must rely on the American government for accurate information on strategic nuclear forces. However, the American figures are themselves subject to debate, especially in the United States, where they are an important part of the larger public

debate on defence spending, arms control and weapons procurement.

It is, therefore, important to examine more than one source for the nuclear balance and to understand the assumptions and the methodologies of each source. By analyzing and comparing various sources, it is possible to understand the areas of uncertainty and controversy in the debate about the capabilities and characteristics of strategic weapons systems, as well as to gain a better understanding of the balance itself.

The Military Balance is published annually by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and contains a detailed, worldwide listing of both conventional and nuclear forces. The data is based on a wide range of unlisted sources and is up-to-date as of 1 July of each year. The Institute notes that the data published is based on information available at the time; thus, changes from year to year do not necessarily reflect changes in national forces, but may be due to changes in the sources of information.

The SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbook, *World Armaments and Disarmament*, is the other widely used annual source on the subject. Each edition of the Yearbook includes a chapter on the nuclear balance which gives an overview of new developments accompanied by charts of the strategic and tactical forces of all nuclear weapon states. Members of the US-based Natural Resources Defense Council, who also publish the Nuclear Weapons Databook series, now prepare this chapter for

SIPRI. As with the IISS, changes in the data from year to year may be the result of factors other than changes in force levels.

Soviet Military Power is an annual review of Soviet forces published by the US Department of Defense. There is heavy emphasis on the quantity and size of Soviet forces and little discussion of quality and performance. The publication also contains information on American force deployments but this information is much more general in nature. While *Soviet Military Power* tends to serve a public relations role it is an important barometer of official American thinking on Soviet forces, and on upcoming Soviet weapons systems.

The military posture statement published by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff every fiscal year is the best summary of the American government's view of its own forces and defence spending. The *Annual Report to Congress* by the US Secretary of Defense also provides a view of American forces and provides an estimate of Soviet forces similar in nature to *Soviet Military Power*.

Whence the Threat to Peace is published by the Soviet Union primarily as a response to *Soviet Military Power*. *Whence the Threat to Peace* emphasizes the quality of American strategic forces and, like *Soviet Military Power*, makes no direct comparison between Soviet and American forces. The Soviet publication contains very little information on Soviet forces.

A comprehensive examination of the characteristics and capabilities of US nuclear weapons systems is provided by the Natural Resources Defense Council, an independent research organization. *US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities*, the first volume in their series of Nuclear Weapons Databooks, is a detailed compendium of information compiled from an extensive list of sources, including more than 200 requests under the Freedom of Information Act. The

volume is an indispensable reference manual although it does not undertake counts of deployed missiles such as those found in other sources.

The US-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985 by Congressional Research Service analyst John M. Collins offers an extensive record of the US-Soviet balance in nuclear, chemical and conventional arms. Fact sheets or press releases from the Arms Control Association and the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C., also provide assessments of the strategic balance and are useful updates on the latest developments.


The Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Brookline, Massachusetts has published the first edition in their World Weapons Databook series, *Soviet Missiles*. The first volume provides a comparison of estimates of missile numbers and characteristics from a number of different sources, providing a useful overview of the range of opinion on Soviet missile characteristics. IDDS also publishes the *Arms Control Reporter*, an annual summary of key arms control negotiations; it is supplemented with monthly updates.

In addition to these publications, information is available from other sources which are not necessarily solely concerned with nuclear forces. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, *Air Force Magazine* and *Jane's Defence Weekly* can all be valuable sources. Designed primarily for a military and trade readership, these journals have excellent "inside" sources and often contain detailed information on both Soviet and American strategic forces. While these periodicals are very useful, care must be taken in using the information; there is a fine distinction between access to inside sources and the release of information designed to lead the public debate in a desired direction. □

Early Warning

26 May-5 June 1987	Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for UNSSOD III
June 1987	North Atlantic Council meeting, Reykjavik Iceland
August 1987	UN Disarmament and Development Conference, New York
Fall 1987	ABM Treaty Review Conference, Geneva

DEFENCE NOTES



Military Spending

Department of National Defence estimates tabled in Parliament indicate that the government plans to spend \$10.34 billion over the next year on defence. This is an increase from \$9.91 billion for the fiscal year ending March 31. The size of the armed forces will increase by 1,135 to a total of 85,627 uniformed personnel. Expenditure on capital items – much of it for CF-18 fighter aircraft, new patrol frigates, and the low-level air defence system – accounts for over twenty-six per cent of the total.

New Submarines for Canada

Canada maintains a small fleet of three diesel-electric submarines, all acquired in the 1960s and now based in Halifax. Since they will be worn out by the early 1990s, in 1984 the government began the process of considering their replacement, under the Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project. Last July, Cabinet formally approved the Project Definition phase, calling on Canadian contractors to develop options for between four and twelve new subs. Building of the first vessel would begin in 1990, with the minimum four joining the fleet by 1999.

Lending added interest to the subject has been the fact that, for some time, government officials have considered the possibility of replacing the diesel-electric subs with nuclear-powered ones. Indeed, late last year it was reported that DND had formed a study group to examine the feasibility of acquiring up to twelve nuclear-powered subs.

Nuclear-powered subs are controversial for a number of reasons. Supporters argue that they are the only variety capable of cruising for extended periods under the Arctic ice in defence of Canadian sovereignty. And the nuclear subs are also said to have three times the capability of their conventional counterparts in the ice-free waters of the Atlantic and Pacific. Critics charge that they are far too expensive – the cheapest costing roughly twice as much per unit as the diesel-electric variety, plus added support costs. Others worry that Canadian nuclear-powered subs might become involved in the US Navy's Maritime Strategy of threatening Soviet ballistic missile subs in their own waters. Peace and environmental groups balk at using nuclear power, even only for propulsion (the weapons would remain conventional).

Nevertheless, testimony before Parliamentary committees by senior government officials suggests strong support within the Department of National Defence for the nuclear option. The Canadian submarine acquisition programme thus promises to be one of the more contentious and significant procurement decisions of recent times.

Air Defence in Europe

The Canadian Forces are modernizing their air defence capability with the acquisition of a low-level air defence system. The system will consist of a mobile missile, twin trailer-mounted 35mm anti-aircraft guns, and the "Skyguard" fire control system. The missile is designed to engage aircraft using passive optic and infrared sensors for target tracking, thereby reducing electronic emissions so that detection and evasive manoeuvring by the target is limited. The missile can also be used as an anti-tank weapon. The 35mm guns are radar-controlled and can track twenty targets simultaneously. With a greater capability

than the missile to operate in adverse weather, the guns will serve as a foul-weather back-up.

The new system will replace the aging air defence weapons currently deployed at the Canadian airfields at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen in West Germany. Canadian ground forces stationed in Germany, as well as Canada-based forces dedicated for use in Norway, will also use the missile component of the system for anti-aircraft and anti-tank defence.

Five demonstration firings of the missile were conducted in Saudi Arabia. Three missiles hit their intended targets while the remaining two, fired in desert sandstorms, missed. The performance of the test missiles under extreme weather conditions raised questions regarding the "all-weather" capability of the system. DND officials responded by insisting that an "all-weather" capability excludes operations in such extreme weather as blizzards, sleet, and hurricanes (extremes in which aircraft are also unable to operate). Although the performance of the system diminishes as the weather deteriorates, they maintain that the performance of hostile aircraft falls at an even faster rate.

The prime contractor, Oerlikon Aerospace, maintains that the new air defence system has the potential for world-wide sales amounting to several billion dollars by the year 2000, including the lucrative American market. However, the United States will probably delay a decision on awarding a US\$3.5 billion air defence contract until US firms have developed a competitive system.

NATO Fighter Training in Labrador

Konya, Turkey and Goose Bay, Labrador are the two competing sites for the proposed \$500 million NATO Tactical Fighter and Weapons Training Centre. The Centre will train pilots from NATO countries in air combat, ground support, low-level flying, and aerial

refueling, and will employ a multinational staff of 1,700 in addition to 2,000 air and ground crew personnel on temporary assignment.

An interim NATO report tabled in September 1986 recommended the selection of Konya, citing significant cost discrepancies between the two sites. However, Canadian officials argued that the assumptions upon which the assessment had been made were faulty and that a full costing study of both locations was necessary before a final decision could be made.

The Canadian delegation at the December 1986 NATO Defence Planning Committee meeting convinced the allies to delay a decision until the next NATO meeting in May 1987, by which time the fuller study should be complete.

The Goose Bay option has encountered significant opposition in Canada. Native groups in Labrador and Quebec charge that low-level flight training in the region currently practiced by Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, and West Germany disrupts traditional hunting and fishing. A federal environmental assessment panel, created in 1986 to study the issue, has tabled three interim recommendations: to limit the number of training flights to the 1986 level until late 1988; to restrict minimum altitudes depending on the area and season; and to create a toll-free telephone service to advise residents on flight schedules and expected training areas.

Advanced Cruise Missile

The Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM or Stealth cruise) is one of the "blackest" programmes in the Pentagon budget, meaning its cost and progress have been kept secret. In his *Annual Report to Congress* this January, Secretary of Defense Weinberger announced that the US would begin deploying the ACM by the early 1990s at an air force base in Michigan.

Stealth technology is a combination of three related technologies: special materials that absorb radar transmissions instead of reflecting them, special electronics, and new airframe shaping to reduce the visibility of the missile on a radar screen. The current generation of cruise missiles is also difficult to detect but this new generation combines decreased visibility with increased range, speed and accuracy, creating a missile substantially different from its predecessor. It is the current generation of air-launched cruise missiles, already deployed by the US, that is being tested in Canada.

The Weinberger announcement that the advanced cruise will be deployed in the US by the early 1990s raises questions about its possible testing in Canada. An Access to Information request by Project Ploughshares revealed the existence of a briefing note to the Minister of National Defence entitled "Project Proposal for Captive Carry Tests of the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile." In response to questions in the House of Commons in early February by NDP member Pauline Jewett, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty would neither confirm nor deny the existence of the memo, saying only that "there is no current request" to test the ACM in Canada.

US Air Defence Initiative

The US Air Force plans to spend US\$500 million between 1987 and 1991 on a new programme to establish an air defence network that will provide a defensive shield against Soviet cruise missiles and bombers.

In the recent past, little interest has been given to extensive air defence efforts since vulnerability to ballistic missile attack made efforts to develop air defences seem of limited use. The advent of SDI has generated renewed interest in continental air defence since a ballistic missile defence on its own will not be able to defend against bombers and cruise missiles. One US Air Force official

stated that the new programme known as the Air Defense Initiative (ADI) "hopes to close the 'windows' on a continent 'roofed' by SDI."

The purpose of the ADI programme is to develop a three-layered defensive shield with surveillance, intercept and battle management capabilities. The object is to engage the cruise missile-carrying bomber as far away as possible before it releases its weapons. Since Canadian territory could play an important role in any effort to construct a comprehensive air defence shield, the ADI-SDI link will raise important questions about Canadian involvement and how it ties in to Canada's role in NORAD.

A New Soviet Missile?

A *Washington Times* report of 7 January 1987 quotes US government intelligence sources in asserting the existence of a new

Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile. This ICBM, says the article, is intended as a follow-on to the SS-18 ICBM and is called the SS-X-26. The new missile was first tested successfully in December 1986, is expected to eventually replace all existing SS-18s, and is said to be more accurate and capable of carrying more warheads than the SS-18 – currently the largest ICBM in the world.

Peacekeeper Mobile Once Again?

In late December 1986 the Pentagon announced that it was requesting funds from Congress to deploy fifty MX intercontinental ballistic missiles on railroad cars. The MX missile (officially labelled 'Peacekeeper') has been the object of debate and controversy for many years, both because of disagreements over how to deploy it in a way that reduces its vulnerability to Soviet rocket

attack, and because of the missile's implications for strategic stability and arms control. Many Pentagon plans for basing the multiple-warhead missiles – such as putting them on large wheeled vehicles in the Nevada desert (the 'race track') or clustering them close together in silos ('dense pack') – have met with severe criticism in Congress, from state Governors and from many strategic and scientific experts. Congress eventually authorized the purchase of fifty MX missiles, the first ten of which have been deployed in the conventional manner in static hardened silos at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. Congress tied this authorization to the development of a smaller, mobile, single-warhead missile – the Midgetman – that is seen by some experts as less likely to be perceived by the Soviets as a "first strike" weapon. This most recent Pentagon railroad plan involves an additional fifty missiles and is an effort to make MX mobile once again.

The new plan – yet to be approved by Congress – calls for the MX to be mounted on converted rail cars, kept on military reservations during peacetime, and sent out onto the US rail system during times of crisis. In this way, the missiles would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Soviets to pinpoint and destroy with missiles of their own. General John T. Chain, head of the US Strategic Air Command, is quoted in the *New York Times* as saying: "In a couple of minutes, I can be outside of that ground zero [the military reservation] and in a couple of hours can be spread all over the United States. Give me twelve hours and I defy you to pick that out from anything else." General Chain also noted that the Soviet Union currently has two types of mobile missiles in its inventory or under development that can reach the US – the rail-mobile SS-24 and the truck-mounted SS-25. □

ALLIANCE NEWS

Chemical Weapons Strategy

As part of an overall allied chemical defence strategy, NATO has established, for the first time, general procedures and standards for the use of chemical weapons in times of conflict. According to a report in *Defense News* of 24 November 1986, the decision was made in the fall of 1986 and has not yet been publicly announced.

Although several NATO countries have a policy of non-production or refusal to store chemical weapons, the US has recently received conditional authority from Congress to begin producing chemical weapons again after a seventeen year moratorium. France has announced that it plans to renew production of chemical weapons in the fall of 1987 subject to approval by its National Assembly this spring.

There has been little controversy over the need to develop defensive measures against chemical weapons but there has been considerable debate within NATO and the US about the value of possessing the weapons themselves. Some military experts suggest that the value of chemical weapons is that they force the enemy to take protective measures that considerably degrade fighting ability.

New Supreme Allied Commander

US General Bernard Rogers, currently the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, will resign his post at the end of June. Rogers has held the post for seven years. General John Galvin, currently commander-in-chief of US Southern Command, headquartered in Panama, has been named as his successor.

NATO Parliamentarians

The North Atlantic Assembly, a group of NATO parliamentarians, will meet in Quebec City in May 1987. Topics on the agenda include arms control and Soviet changes under Gorbachev.

REPORT FROM THE HILL *By Gregory Wirick*



Joint Committee Response

On 4 December the government tabled its response in the House of Commons to the report of the Parliamentary Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations. It promptly sank without a trace into the oblivion to which reports that fail to pass the test of newsworthiness are consigned. The chief significance of the response lay in its tone rather than its specific content. It embraced the multi-lateral and humanitarian thrust of the Special Joint Committee.

Two broad areas which stood out as new emphases in Canadian foreign policy, both in the Joint Committee report and in the government's response, were human rights and the North. The government accepted the Committee's thesis that "the international promotion of human rights is a fundamental and integral part of Canadian foreign policy." In direct response to a recommendation from the Joint Committee, External Affairs has begun regular training in human rights prior to officers being posted abroad and for returnees working as desk officers for specific geographical areas or administering policy on export controls. The other instance of direct influence is found in the government's commitment to establish an International Institute of Human Rights and Democratic Development. Currently, two specially-appointed 'rapporteurs' are investigating the requirements of such an institute: John Courtney, Professor of Political Science at the University of Saskatchewan and president-elect of the Canadian Political Science Association and Gis  lle C          , Professor of Law at Universit   Laval and vice-

president of the Canadian Human Rights Foundation.

The government also outlined a comprehensive northern foreign policy with four principal themes: 1) affirmation of Canadian sovereignty; 2) modernization of Canada's northern defences; 3) preparation for commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and 4) promotion of enhanced circum-polar cooperation. By so doing, the government signalled its recognition of the fact that northern concerns are now a permanent fixture of the foreign policy agenda.

Defence Committee Hearings

The House of Commons Defence Committee has been relatively quiescent in recent months. It did hold two days of hearings in December at which Paul Dick and Perrin Beatty, the Associate Minister and the Minister of National Defence respectively, appeared along with senior military officers.

A range of topics was discussed, from the role of the reserves and the relative capabilities of nuclear-powered compared to diesel-electric submarines in the Arctic, to the place of women and homosexuals in the armed forces. Mr. Beatty also used the occasion to review new programmes for re-equipping the armed forces that were underway.

The Defence Committee also held an *in camera* session on 3 March, and an open session shortly after at which Mr. Beatty discussed 1987-88 spending estimates.

Arms Sales to Contras?

On 12 February the Secretary of State for External Affairs was questioned by two NDP MPs, following the disclosure in the *Montreal Gazette* that a Montreal firm, Trans World Arms, bought arms in Portugal and shipped them under forged Guatemalan documents to the contra rebels in Nicaragua. It was also revealed that an airline company, Propair, which at the time was partially

owned by the Quebec government, was involved in the clandestine arms operation. In reply, the Minister indicated that these actions were illegal and were under investigation by the RCMP. He promised to convey any information on the results of those investigations to the House.

Canada's Role in the Space Station

On 11 and 12 February US government officials met with representatives of the European Space Agency, Canada and Japan to explain recent decisions defining possible military uses of the American space station. In the House of Commons on 13 February, Joe Clark noted that he was not satisfied with the answers he had received from US authorities regarding military uses of the space station. Mr. Clark said that the government would insist on the interpretation given by the US administration when the project was announced: that use of the station for defence purposes would be minimal. He also held out the possibility that, if negotiations failed to ease Canadian concerns, Canada might choose to reconsider its involvement. Canada had agreed to contribute C\$600 million toward a repair facility.

ABM Treaty Concerns

On the same day in the Commons, in response to a question from Liberal External Affairs critic Donald Johnston, Mr. Clark also indicated that he had written to US Secretary of State George Shultz to emphasize the grave importance Canada placed on continued US adherence to a strict interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This came at a time of intense speculation that the US administration was on the verge of adopting a broader interpretation of the treaty.

Cruise Testing and Geneva

The 28 February announcement by the Soviet Union that it was

willing to negotiate a treaty on intermediate range ballistic missiles separate from other contentious arms control issues such as SDI and intercontinental missiles, prompted Opposition questions to Mr. Clark in the House of Commons. On 2 March NDP critic Pauline Jewett asked Mr. Clark whether the government would indicate that it would end cruise missile testing in Canada by the US "if the breakthrough on INF in Geneva is realized?" Mr. Clark chided Ms. Jewett for asking hypothetical questions and said the news from Geneva was cause for celebration and that the government would determine policy "on the basis of what is actually decided in Geneva."

In a related matter, a *Canadian Press* report of 3 March quoted Liberal Party leader John Turner as saying that the position taken by the Liberal Party's external affairs critic Don Johnston and former caucus chairman Doug Frith against further cruise missile testing, was not Party policy. At the Liberal Party convention held in November a resolution (not binding on the leader) was passed calling for an end to testing; Mr. Johnston and Mr. Frith have both made statements in support of this resolution.

In a 9 March Commons vote on a NDP motion calling for an end to cruise testing in Canada, four Liberal MPs voted with the NDP while the rest of the Liberals present sided with the government to defeat the motion.

Looking Ahead

The chief item on the 'peace and security' agenda in the coming months will be the release of the Defence White Paper. Expected in June is the report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism which has thus far held mainly *in camera* sessions. □

(See 'Defence Notes' and 'Arms Control Digest' in this issue for further details on military re-equipment programmes, Geneva arms talks, and ABM Treaty interpretation.)

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



International politics too complex for children

We had some difficulty in accepting the all-or-nothing approach which Mr. Bryans makes in his article ('Peace Education,' *Peace&Security* Winter 86/87). The article condemns one popular educational approach to the teaching of peace but offers nothing positive in its wake. While it would be nice to preach/teach what we adults consider essential, the reality is that the complexities of international politics cannot be cognitively or emotionally understood by young children.

A basic premise of educational theory is that people learn only what they are ready to learn, are capable of understanding, and that which builds on their previous experience. To teach children from Kindergarten through the third grade about the complex issues of international politics would be educationally pointless. Most children of this age in North America are just beginning to become familiar with the concept of neighborhood.

How do we teach about the complexities of war and peace to which Mr. Bryans refers, and whose interpretation of wars, causes and treaties we present. There are very few "neutral" facts. Our opinions and attitudes are deeply ingrained by years of socialization and where we stand on the personal and world power continuum. With so much power interlocked between the military, transnational corporations and governments throughout the world, how can school boards, which by and large, represent the status quo, begin to contemplate teaching information which challenges society's mainstream ideas.

Educators for Social Responsibility (ESR) chose one approach. They made a clear decision to make their materials acceptable in the schools. Had they strategized differently they would not be able to boast a membership of 10,000 teachers across the US and Canada. ESR chose to follow a politically neutral path, one which still threatens many educators. Their approach includes taking into account the developmental readiness of students at different ages, looking at many sides of complex issues, and studying the effects of bias and propaganda in the media. Peace as a process and as a subject are equally valued. Once comfortable with this approach teachers themselves may become more innovative in their curriculum designs. ESR considers its educational materials as guides and is constantly engaged in updating its material.

Starting with peace in our lives, our homes and in the neighborhood is not so far-fetched. Recent Canadian research indicates that although children tend to become frightened by discussions of nuclear death, they are also eager to talk about the issue. They want to bring the issues out of their dreams and fantasies into the classroom. They need help in talking about what most of us fear to face ourselves. Children who deal with the issues upfront seem to feel more assured that there is something they can do to avert the ultimate holocaust.

In his next article I hope Mr. Bryans will offer us some suggestions about how to deal with the methods and politics of teaching peace, *encompassing all the complexities*. I hope he will include the teaching approach for young children, teenagers and the greater silent adult majority. The questions this article raises are many. We need to open the dialogue about how to best work with these complex issues. But please let us keep the options open, find forums for raising discussion and talking with each other. Instead of condemning

others with whom we disagree, perhaps we could expand our own biases toward conceptualizing alternative solutions. Achieving peace will not be easy, nor is it simplistic in its ultimate form. What we must affirm is the value in each others ideas and develop these further as a community of interested persons.

*Dr. Lanie Melamed
Coordinator of Peace Education
Network, (Quebec)*

Helpful critique

Congratulations on your critique of 'Peace Education' in the latest issue (*Peace&Security* Winter 86/87). I hope you will offer a critique of peace research and peace action as soon as feasible. These critiques should be very helpful to the peace movement in general.

*William Eckhardt
Lentz Peace Research Laboratory,
Dunedin, Florida*

Reviewed the wrong book

Michael Bryans' article 'Peace Education' (Winter 86/87) makes one good point – that teaching international peace issues as simply an extension of human relations omits important factors such as the role of states, governments, armies and negotiators in a democratic society. But why does he think peace educators (other than those in junior grades) omit these subjects?

Here are some table of contents entries from *Decision Making in a Nuclear Age*, a curriculum guide used by teachers in the Ottawa/Carleton area, and published by Educators for Social Responsibility, Cambridge, Mass.: The Yalta Conference, Parts I and II; Espionage, the Government and the Cold War; NATO Defense Strategy; The First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; Negotiating SALT II; Economics and Budget Priorities.

There are many more entries that address such subjects and they are treated maturely in the text. Of course Canadian peace educators prefer to use Canadian material – and do, as more and more becomes available. Can we hope that the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security will fund the research and production of such material? In the meantime Michael Bryans has seriously under-valued the work of ESR and misled his readers.

*Penny Sanger
Educating for Peace, Ottawa*

The meaning of 'strategic'

A footnote to Fen Osler Hampson's article ('Arms Control After Reykjavik', *Peace&Security*, Winter 86/87) defines strategic weapons as those with ranges greater than 5,500 km. This is just one of the possible meanings of the devalued and now rather reprehensible word 'strategic'. In his book *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* professor Lawrence Freedman traces the changing definitions of 'strategy' from Clausewitz's time to the present. Originally strictly military, it expanded to include diplomacy and international relations also, as in Liddell Hart's "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill ends of policy." The use of 'strategic' has changed together with the shift of warfare from the battlefield to attacks on industrial/civilian targets. In WW II we saw such attacks undergo a transition from "truly strategic" to those carried out for purposes of terror and/or retribution – culminating of course with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Today it is probably simplest to define strategic weapons as those designed to threaten or accomplish the mass murder of civilian populations.

*D.B. Stewart, MD
Killarney, Manitoba.* □

REVIEWS



The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made

Walter Isaacson and
Evan Thomas

New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986,
853 pgs. \$35.95

This is an account of the public lives and opinions of six American officials who, in the words of the authors, "made the US assume the responsibility of a world power and defined its global mission." They were Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman, John McCloy, Robert Lovett, George Kennan, and Charles Bohlen. They were also friends and appear to have been chosen for study as a group because they represented the "American Establishment" of the times. The zenith of their influence and power was reached during the Presidency of Harry Truman, and three-quarters of this long book is taken up with the years before 1952. There is much of interest, for example, about the early careers of Kennan and Bohlen in the Foreign Service.

The dominating theme of this book is USA/Soviet relations. Three of the protagonists served as Ambassadors to the USSR, and all were closely involved with the policies of "containment" that led, after 1945, to the Marshall Plan, NATO and the stationing of American troops around the globe. They differed only in degree about their assessment of Soviet ambitions, which they regarded as a threat to Western security that had to be met by "the vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points," as Kennan was to put the matter in his 1947 *Foreign Affairs* article. Kennan and Harriman were later to temper

their views of the Soviet threat and indeed to be perceived as naive by Acheson, whose thinking developed in the opposite direction. But as the authors remind us, Acheson too was regarded as untrustworthy by those who clamoured for a new orthodoxy after the Republican victory of 1952. By then, the "threat" had become an all embracing "Communist conspiracy," including China as well as Russia, values as well as interests. Those who are said to have shared "an unabashed belief in America's sacred destiny to take the lead in protecting freedom around the globe" became themselves the objects of suspicion and innuendo.

Indeed, one of the insights this account has to offer is that in American politics since the war it has been easier to masquerade as a hawk than as a dove, whatever the Party in power. Of this group, only Kennan consistently backed away from his early espousal of military power as the appropriate way to deal with "communism," although both Acheson and Harriman turned against the use of such power in Vietnam after first strongly supporting military intervention there. The failure of Truman, Acheson and Lovett to prevent General MacArthur from pursuing reckless policies in Korea in 1950 are echoed by the failure of the "Wise Men" to persuade President Johnson to negotiate seriously the end of the war in Vietnam. Paul Nitze, who is also treated as a "wise man," was the author of a seminal memorandum in 1950 that, by greatly overrating Soviet military strength, persuaded Truman and Acheson to embark on an American military build-up which continued for two decades. The window of opportunity which opened after Stalin's death in 1953, when Bohlen was in Moscow, was hardly noticed by Foster Dulles, who himself believed that Acheson had failed to understand the nature of the Communist "conspiracy."

There is something, therefore, to be learned from these recollections

of earlier attempts to deal with the "evil empire." The authors have consulted those involved and read all the memoirs and letters (except those of the allied statesmen and friends who dealt with the "wise men" and who are conspicuously absent from this history, as though Washington had fought these battles alone; there are two references to Canada in the whole book, apparently too inconsequential even to be noted in the index). But it is not clear to this reviewer that a history of the early years of the cold war written around the lives of six officials is the best way to understand the lessons of the past, especially if it is forced into the mould of the search for "a sacred destiny." Perhaps there were more mundane motives at work, including those of achieving power and influence in a world where the collapse of the old order left little choice to those who found themselves in a position to build the new. On the other hand, it is salutary to be reminded that there was a time when prominent bankers and lawyers regarded public service as a high calling, and the public good as an end in itself.

— Geoffrey Pearson

How NATO Weakens the West

Melvyn Krauss

New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986,
271 pgs. \$29.95

NATO-bashing is again fashionable in right-wing circles in the United States. Mr. Krauss's book is part of this fad. He presents many of the time-worn criticisms of NATO and his litany of complaints has a familiar ring. Krauss argues that the allies are not making a sufficient contribution to the Alliance and that the US is carrying a disproportionate share of the burden. The resources that the United States pumps into NATO are a drain on the US economy. If the US were to withdraw from the Alliance, Krauss believes, this would free up resources "to finance

a full-blown strategic defense system" and also help "to reduce the budget deficit." (Would a "full-blown" SDI program be that cheap?) He further argues that reductions in defence spending would decrease interest rates which, in turn, would increase the demand for both skilled and unskilled labor and encourage an increase in the general level of economic activity.

Krauss claims that the US defence commitment to Western Europe has had a pernicious "defense feedback" effect. Because the allies have had a "free ride" they have been able to "trade with, and subsidize the Soviets." This, in turn, has freed up resources in the Soviet economy for their own military effort. However, says Krauss, "The increase in the US defense budget by comparison with what it otherwise would have been — made necessary by the enrichment of the Soviet Union by its allies — can be called the 'defense-feedback' costs of the detente policies of America's allies."

Krauss believes that a US withdrawal from NATO would make Western Europe do more for its own defence and that it would learn to stand on its own feet. He cites France as a case in point. He believes that French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command under De Gaulle in the 1960s led to a strengthening of France's force posture which is reflected in the strength of France's deterrent today (but he fails to point out that France's effort is increasingly nuclear rather than conventional).

I would take issue with many of Krauss's arguments on both empirical and logical grounds. He fails to consider the impact a US withdrawal from Western Europe would have on the smaller European allies like Belgium, the Netherlands, and the northern and southern flank partners. He underestimates the effect a US withdrawal would have on West Germany's desire to acquire an independent nuclear capa-

bility and how this would be viewed by the Soviets who have a longstanding allergy to a nuclear Germany. But to focus on these issues would be to miss the larger point.

There is little doubt that Krauss's book is symptomatic of increasing disenchantment with the current structure of NATO and a desire for change and reform which is to be found on both sides of the Atlantic. There is an obvious need for creative thinking about ways of sharing the burdens of defence in ways that are compatible with the national interests and capabilities of NATO's members. Krauss's concerns are legitimate although his cure is worse than the disease. But there is also a danger in complacency and a blind adherence to the status quo. NATO must not suffer the same fate as the Cheshire cat whose fading smile stayed in the window long after the cat herself had gone. – *Fen Osler Hampson*

Empty Promise: The Growing Case Against Star Wars The Union of Concerned Scientists

Boston: Beacon Press, 1986, 238 pgs. US \$19.95

As the title would suggest this book sets out to make the case that the Strategic Defense Initiative is at best a mistake, and at worst, sheer folly. Over the course of ten chapters written by various authors, *Empty Promise* focuses its attention on what it describes as the "weak links" in the SDI program.

The portrait of SDI drawn here is that of a programme of unprecedented complexity combined with great uncertainty as to what the billions of US defence dollars will buy. As the foreword to the book cautions, Chapters 3 to 6, which examine such questions as SDI computer software and the command and control requirements for a successful defence, are particularly difficult reading for the non-expert.

On the question of political issues, *Empty Promise* is effective in illustrating fundamental contradictions and tensions which abound in the SDI. Especially thoughtful, is the chapter on the Reagan Administration's blueprint for the transition from an offence-

dominated world to a defence-dominated world. Such a change will require careful diplomatic negotiation and cooperation. Yet, SDI is based on the assumption of a continuing, highly adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union, for which only advanced US technology can provide adequate security. One is left with the question: can security be bought by expanding the scope of superpower competition and potential conflict? – *Bradley Feasey*

London Under Attack: The Report of the Greater London Area War Risk Study Robin Clarke

Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 397 pgs. \$11.95 paper/\$45.50 cloth

New British Civil Defence Regulations enacted in 1983 gave British local authorities much greater responsibility for civil defence. As a result the Greater London Council (GLC) found itself required, by law, to provide extensive civil defence procedures and plans. Having been denied information from the Home Office on the types of attacks that might be expected, the GLC established the Greater London Area War Risk Study (GLAWARS). The study was carried out by a group of experts drawn from disaster relief organizations, as well as the military and scientific communities.

Six scenarios were examined ranging from "continued non-belligerence" through conventional war to different nuclear attack scenarios. GLAWARS concluded, among other things, that in the event of a deliberate nuclear attack on London, civil defence would be of no use and therefore London should expend its energy on trying to cope with a war scare or conventional attack scenario. The book contains a very useful set of detailed appendices and tables and also discusses the pros and cons of civil defence more generally.

The study lives up to and exceeds its own assessment as "the most detailed analysis ever made of the consequences of attack on a major city," and is a valuable reference work for anyone interested in the difficulties inherent in civil defence in the nuclear age. – *Jane Boulden*

The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy Tom Gervasi

New York: Harper and Row, 1986, 545 pgs. \$36.50

Gervasi aims to explode the myth of Soviet advantage in strategic, theatre nuclear, and conventional forces. In his view, this myth is perpetuated by government officials and an uncritical press to serve the interests of the military-industrial complex. An "objective" analysis of the balance reveals the extent of the deception. For example, despite Reagan Administration claims of Soviet strategic superiority, the United States holds a substantial lead in the total number of strategic nuclear warheads – 12,449 to 7,865 in 1985 (Gervasi hastens to add that such superiority is meaningless in an age of mutual assured destruction). Similar discrepancies between Administration claims and Gervasi's view of the actual state of the balance are highlighted in 216 pages of detailed, extensively-footnoted tables.

Although there is a need to question the blanket assertions made regarding the supposed imbalance in military force, Gervasi's arguments are too polemical to be convincing. In his black-and-white view of the world, all those who differ with his assessment of the balance are creatures of the military-industrial complex, knowingly deceiving the public to satisfy the insatiable appetite of the defence establishment. The only redeeming feature of the book is the tabular appendices. While they do not necessarily present the final "truth" regarding the balance, they provide a useful comparison for other, more alarmist assessments.

– *James Moore*

Peace Is My Profession Raymond Shulstad

Washington: National Defense University Press, 1986, 209 pgs. US \$6.50

In the course of a thirty-five year navy career one of the certainties of my life was that peace was a policy of my government and that my profession required me to

deliver combat efficiency and readiness whenever my government wanted. It follows that, given the title, I approached Shulstad's book with a jaundiced eye. The sub-title pretty well describes the content: "A soldier's view of the moral dimension of United States nuclear policy." As a serving officer, the author has little choice other than to support approved policy but to his credit there are nuances in his conclusions. These boil down to a practical approach for the foreseeable future; one that is morally preferable to other alternatives.

His route to this conclusion centres on an examination of the US Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter of 1983. He summarily dismisses all-out nuclear war as patently immoral and then his argument settles on the morality of nuclear deterrence with its inherent acceptance of the possibility of deliberate, but limited, nuclear war. Shulstad's research is impressive but his treatment of the philosophical and moral arguments is overly brief. Instead, American ethnocentric perspectives and practical aspects such as deterrence policy dominate.

The topic is difficult and the author has achieved the not inconsiderable feat of presenting an easy to read discussion of it. His case is less a theological examination than an argument in support of the current Washington hard-line policy. The expert will gain little from the book but for the general reader it is as good a starting place as any to have a look at both sides of the moral arguments posed by nuclear weapons. – *John Toogood*

BRIEFLY NOTED

Roots of Peace: The Movement Against Militarism in Canada

Edited by Eric Shragge, Ronald Babin, and Jean-Guy Vaillancourt
Toronto, DEC Books, 1986, 208 pgs. \$12.95 paper/\$29.95 cloth

This volume includes articles by Andrea Levy, Major-General (ret.) Leonard Johnson, Phyllis Aronoff and others. □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* 'Livres' section.

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



'Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean Basin: Perspectives to the Year 2000' is the title of a research project sponsored by the Institute in cooperation with the International Peace Academy, New York, and the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Jamaica. Following up on the report of the Commonwealth Secretariat to the 1985 Heads of Government meeting on 'Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society,' this project will identify and analyse current trends and issues in Caribbean security and development, with particular reference to the small independent Commonwealth Caribbean states; analyse the implications of these trends for the future security, stability and development of the region; and consider what might be done, both by states inside and outside the region, to deal with future threats to security in the area.

A number of papers have been commissioned: these were discussed at a seminar in Kingston, Jamaica in late March, attended by **Geoffrey Pearson** and **Fauzya Moore** from the Institute. A further meeting will take place in June at Dalhousie University to consider the final report which will be written by **Geoffrey Pearson** and **Lloyd Searwar**, a former diplomat with the Caribbean Community Secretariat.

'Defending Canada: Policy Choices for the 1990s' was the subject for discussion at a day-long seminar for members of the media sponsored by the Institute in late February. Briefing the twenty-five

working journalists were Institute staff members **Geoffrey Pearson**, **Fen Hampson** and **David Cox** along with retired **General John Collins**, **Dan Middlemiss** of Dalhousie University, **Ernie Regehr** of Project Ploughshares, and **Jane Sharp** now at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and most recently at Harvard University.

Among the issues discussed were: the future of Canada's political and military relationship with its alliance partners in NATO and NORAD; strategy and procurement options facing government policy makers writing the upcoming White Paper on defence; long-range political trends within the North Atlantic alliance; the role of emerging technologies – specifically space-based systems – in the protection of Canadian sovereignty and surveillance of the North; the need for a further definition of the military threat facing Canada in the creation of a long-term defence strategy; attitudes of the Canadian public towards defence policy questions and the relevance and accuracy of public opinion polls in reflecting those attitudes.

Joseph Nye, Professor of Government and Director of the Centre for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University visited Ottawa at the invitation of the Institute in January. Professor Nye is a co-author of *Hawks, Doves and Owls* and his most recent book is *Nuclear Ethics* (reviewed in *Peace & Security*, Winter 1986/87). He met with officials at the Department of External Affairs, spoke at a luncheon meeting and gave a lecture at Carleton University. Professor Nye spoke on the avoidance of nuclear war, emphasizing the necessity for and the techniques of managing the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. He also discussed the ethics of nuclear deterrence.

Grant Applications

Grant requests of \$10,000 or less will be considered at each of the quarterly reviews; however, requests over \$10,000 will

be considered by the Board of Directors of the Institute twice a year. Deadlines for these requests are August and February.

For 1987 the deadlines are:

1 May 1987	for a June decision
14 August 1987	for an October decision
6 November 1987	for a December decision

A seminar on Peace Education took place at the Institute in January. Participants included teachers, trustees, Ministry and Board officials, education professors, teachers federation and union members. **Henry Wiseman** of the University of Guelph discussed the various meanings of 'Peace' at the opening dinner. The following day **Rob MacIntosh** of the Pembina Institute and **Dianne DeMille** of the Public Programmes staff at the Institute led a discussion of theoretical and practical problems in peace education. **Nancy Gordon**, Director of Public Programmes, chaired a session on the role of the Institute in this field. The Institute provides educational materials on issues of peace and security, contributes to professional development days, and generally provides information to teachers who are interested in discussing and teaching international relations and issues in their classrooms. In addition the Institute provides grants to individuals and organizations to carry out educational projects within the school system and for teachers.

'Militarization in the Third World' was the topic of a conference held at Queen's University, with the support of the Institute, in January. Approximately seventy participants, including **Geoffrey**

Pearson and **David Cox**, discussed this growing phenomenon and its implications, particularly for Southern Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America. The conference brought together academics and representatives of non-governmental organizations, people who had studied the process of conflict in the developing world, specialists in arms transfers and experts in the technology of weapons systems.

Recent additions to the staff of the Institute include: **Hélène Samson**, French editor and joint projects officer. Ms. Samson graduated from Université Laval with a degree in biology, and from the University of Ottawa's Institute for International Development and Cooperation. She worked in the Ivory Coast for the Canadian International Development Agency, and was most recently with the United Nations Association of Canada as an editor and programme officer.

Salim Mansur, Research Associate. Mr. Mansur was educated at the University of Toronto from which he received a Ph.D. in 1986. His major areas of study are comparative politics and international relations theory with special focus on the Middle East and South Asia. At the Institute Mr. Mansur is working on questions related to the regulation of the arms trade.

William George, Executive Assistant. Mr. George was educated at the Université de Montréal and

at Carleton University from which he earned a Masters in Political Science. During 1984 he was a Research Associate with the Arms Control Association in the United States.

David Cox attended the Moscow meetings 'Forum for a Nuclear-Free World and the Survival of Mankind' which brought together political experts, business people, scientists, doctors, writers, performers, religious leaders, and retired military officers, to talk about peace and disarmament.

In late March the Institute and the Canadian Association for Adult Education organized a seminar on issues of peace and security as part of a longer term partnership arrangement between the two organizations. Leaders from the adult education community in Canada took part in discussions of Canadian security led by **David Cox**, **Simon Rosenblum** of Project Ploughshares and **George Lindsey** of the Department of National Defence; of international relations theory, led by **John Sigler** of Carleton University and on media and public opinion led by communications consultant **Peter O'Malley**, and journalist **Arch MacKenzie**. On the final day of the session participants addressed strategies to engage the Canadian public in discussions of peace and security issues.

At the end of February **Geoffrey Pearson** spoke at a conference organized by the Canadian Council on International Cooperation in Montreal entitled 'Taking Sides in Southern Africa.' The conference focused on two main themes, sanctions and the regional policy of Canada towards Southern Africa. Participants from Africa and Canada assessed the impact of the measures so far adopted by Canada, the present state of Canadian economic relations with South Africa, the current aid programme, and the ways in which Canada should respond to the emergency needs of the Southern African countries.

On their visit to Ottawa **Alison Carpenter**, **Maxime Faille**, **Seth Klein** and **Desiree McGraw**, members of SAGE (Students Against Global Extermination) visited the Institute. Funds from the Institute provided money to get the tour started, and the four students shared some of their experiences with Institute staff. Lack of political awareness amongst high school students was one of the major findings of the group; they urged their audiences to learn about the nuclear arms race, form clubs in their schools and get in touch with their Members of Parliament. The tour has generated a great deal of media attention and a documentary film of the tour is now in production. While in Ottawa the SAGE group visited Parliament Hill and met with a number of MPs and representatives of various non governmental organizations. Together with **Geoffrey Pearson**, they appeared on a regional CBC television show geared to teenagers.

In early March **John Toogood** took part in a conference at the University of Manitoba on 'Canada and the Western European Alliance.' Mr. Toogood gave a paper on arms control in Europe, specifically on the Conference on Disarmament.

Viktor Karpov, former chief negotiator for the Soviet Union on nuclear arms visited CIIPS on 5 March. Mr. Karpov headed the Soviet delegation in Geneva for eight years. Members of the Institute staff along with **John Lamb** and **John Barrett** of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament received a briefing from Mr. Karpov on current Soviet arms control proposals and progress in Geneva.

Mark Kramer, a Fellow at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University visited CIIPS in March to discuss Soviet attitudes towards US charges of non-compliance with the ABM Treaty. Mr. Kramer had been in Canada to speak to students at the National

Defence College in Kingston, and to participate in a seminar on 'The Gorbachev Era' sponsored by the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.

Gerald Wright has resigned from the Board of Directors of the Institute to take up a position as policy advisor to the Minister of State for Finance, the Honourable Tom Hockin. □

PUBLIC PROGRAMMES GRANTS – Third Quarter 1986-87

Les Ami-e-s de La Terre de Québec , Québec Ateliers: Paix et justice sociale	\$ 1,900
Annapolis Valley International Community Centre , Wolfville Annapolis Valley Peace Education Centre	9,800
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee , Ottawa Publication of "Canada's International Relations in the Circumpolar Region" in <i>Northern Perspectives</i>	5,400
Canadian Peace Educators' Network , Drayton Valley, Alberta Production of the first issue of Peace Education Network News – Canada	3,600
Centre de solidarité internationale , Alma La paix et la sécurité internationales : sessions en région	2,900
Centre pour le désarmement nucléaire et la santé communautaire , Montréal Série d'émissions sur "La dépression latente chez les jeunes devant la peur du nucléaire"	9,900
The Children's International Centre , Hamilton Videotaping of the Conference on Global Education (Jan. 5-7, 1987)	5,450
Conference of Defence Associations , Ottawa Seminar "Total Defence and Peace Through Security" (Jan. 15, 1987)	7,600
Great Peace Journey , Toronto Dissemination of information on the Great Peace Journey	2,000
Jarvis, Michael et al , Ottawa Study of the Need for a Publication Produced and Edited in Canada on Soviet Affairs and on Canadian-Soviet Relations	4,700
Polyvalente Manikoutai de Sept-Iles , Sept-Iles Les prophètes de la Paix	350
Office national du film du Canada , Ville St-Laurent Film "L'Odyssée"	10,000
Project Ploughshares , Ottawa PEACEFUND Canada	5,000
United Nations Association in Canada , Ottawa Canadian National Model United Nations – 1987	9,200
University of Manitoba , Winnipeg Third Annual Political Studies Student Conference "Canada and the West European Alliance" (March 4-7, 1987)	5,000
University of Waterloo , Waterloo Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism Conference on Canada, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance (May 21-23, 1987)	9,500
World Without War Research and Education Network , Tweed Community Awareness Project	5,500
World Federalists of Canada , Ottawa Canadian Mundialization Campaign	5,000
TOTAL	\$102,200

RESEARCH GRANTS – Third Quarter 1986-87

Black, J.L. , Carleton University, Ottawa ISEES Bibliography Series, Issue No. 5 "Moscow's Problems of History: A Select Critical Bibliography of the Soviet Journal Voprosy Istorii, 1956-1985"	\$ 1,284
Buteux, Paul , University of Manitoba, Winnipeg	23,000
Byers, Rod , York University, Toronto Canada, NATO and European Security (collaborative project)	23,000
Peace Research Institute – Dundas , Toronto The United Nations Voting Series	5,500
Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute , Calgary Planning activities the conference "India and Canada – Partners for the Future", March 7-11, 1988	5,000
Tracy, Nicholas , University of New Brunswick, Fredericton Naval Forces and Canadian Defence Strategy in the Arctic	10,000
TOTAL	\$ 67,784

LETTER FROM SOUTH KOREA

By Sarah Taylor



On the fifteenth of every month, air raid sirens sound throughout the streets of Seoul.

Traffic grinds to a halt, pedestrians hurry for the shelter of nearby buildings or subway entrances, and for twenty minutes nothing moves in the city but military vehicles. If the air-raid drills are infrequent enough to take sometime to get used to, the sonic boom from US fighter jets rattles windows and pops eardrums so regularly that after a few weeks you barely notice it. Drive south from Seoul on the highway to the nearby town of Suwon, and you will find one section of the road unusually wide, with no crash barriers and only temporary, movable median dividers; the road doubles as an airstrip. Enter a high-rise apartment building in central Seoul, and you will see polite notices forbidding you to take photographs or use binoculars from the windows of the upper floors.

This is the Republic of Korea: not a country in a state of war, but one in a state of truce. This truce, relatively unmarked by violence thanks to the carefully monitored Demilitarized Zone along the thirty-eighth parallel which separates North from South, is nonetheless one of the most tense and hostile anywhere. There was a slight warming of the atmosphere following recent Red Cross-sponsored North-South talks on aid and family reunification. However, this trend has been reversed by a number of factors, including disagreements over arrangements for the 1988 Olympics, and Southern suspicion of the motives behind an alleged Northern broadcast last November, falsely announcing the death of Kim Il-Song.

For the average South Korean, this tension translates into what seems to an outside observer a highly militarized life. In addition to the visibility of a standing army of roughly 600,000 in a country of forty million, every young man

does two or three years compulsory military service. Though South Korea's "economic miracle" has brought a giant leap in the average standard of living, a sizable chunk of its revenues, which might otherwise be invested in economic projects or social welfare, is siphoned off to pay for the armed forces. About six percent of the GNP, amounting in 1987 to a whopping thirty-one percent of the government's budget, is spent on defence. This does not include the cost of the massive US Army presence within the Republic of Korea-US combined Forces Command.



...the frequent invocation of the threat of North Korean attack by the government to justify its domestic policies has led to a certain skepticism...

The Americans keep fairly much to themselves, living on military bases which reproduce as closely as possible Middle American suburbia. Except on a professional level they have little direct impact on the lives of most Koreans not in the immediate vicinity of these bases. Nevertheless, a superficial American influence, if only in the form of hamburger chains, is visible in urban lifestyles. Some older Koreans who fought in the War worked closely with US troops at the time. Many Korean academics undertake graduate studies abroad, and of these over half go to the US. American influence is thus strong in intellectual circles. And above all, US military support is considered crucial by the South Korean government, so policy changes in Washington inevitably create repercussions in Seoul.

Despite all this, the possibility of another war seems distant from the minds of most South Koreans – government and military leaders excepted. Reports on North Korea,

as gleaned from the foreign press, are rare and uninformative. The military presence is pretty much taken for granted. And Koreans are too caught up in the all-consuming business of economic growth, and now also in the preparations for the '88 Olympics, to spare much thought for the possibility of war. While memories of the War remain clear, South Koreans seem to feel that times have changed. Moreover, the frequent invocation of the threat of North Korean attack by the government to justify its domestic policies has led to a certain skepticism, at least among those who follow politics, about the likelihood of such an attack.

What Koreans experience now is not external threat so much as

domestic violence, mainly in the form of student demonstrations. Even these, for most people, are something seen only on television, since demonstrations are always strictly confined to university campuses (many of which have been deliberately isolated in suburban locations). Reports in the Western press often make it appear as if these disturbances only occur in particularly troubled periods. While they do flare-up over specific issues, they are endemic and tend to be highly ritualized, formal affairs which are, with the exception of some sit-ins, noisy but relatively harmless. One Friday afternoon demonstration at Seoul National University ended in a giant conga-line in the campus centre. It felt more like a party than a riot. And at certain times of the year one works to a continuous background of drumbeats and rhythmic chanting.

The cycle of student demonstrations is linked as much to academic schedules as to external events.

During holidays and exam periods they virtually disappear, while during the school term the favourite time is afternoon towards the end of the week. Campus security goes through corresponding cycles, as the tear gas slowly clears and the lines of security police at the gates stopping traffic and checking student ID cards gradually dwindle. Once the students head towards the campus gates, (threatening to carry the demonstration into the streets) the atmosphere changes. Riot police, far outnumbering the students, block the exits. Tear gas and molotov cocktails are exchanged. Students are arrested, though usually all but a few politically active 'ringleaders' are soon released.

Government prosecutors usually claim that these leaders are Pyongyang-aligned Communists, whose aims are revolution and reunification of the peninsula on North Korean terms. However, the vast majority of student demonstrators (including, rumour has it, the children of some high-level members of the government) are motivated by peer pressure and a vague desire for Western-style democracy rather than doctrinaire political beliefs. On leaving university they become law-abiding citizens and generally leave politics alone.

While plain clothes security men (instantly recognizable, as they are all young, male, are dressed exactly alike and stand around with no obvious purpose) guard university entrances and public places against who knows ... Student rioters? Political plotters? North Korean suicide squads? – everyone else gets on with grabbing a share of the economic action. □

Sarah Taylor is a graduate of the University of Toronto and recently spent two months in South Korea doing research for her doctorate in oriental archeology from Cambridge University.

Par Sarah Taylor

ment amenée à effectuer un séjour de deux mois en Corée du Sud.

Sarah Taylor est diplômée de l'Université de Toronto et fait actuellement un doctorat en archéologie orientale à l'Université de Cambridge. Ses recherches l'ont récemment amenée à effectuer un séjour de deux mois en Corée du Sud.

Le Sud invoque souvent la guerre pour justifier ses politiques internes

Malgre tout, la majorité des Coréens du Sud, exception faite des instances politiques et militaires, semblent très peu songer à la possibilité d'une nouvelle guerre. Les renseignements sur la Corée du Nord, rares dans la presse étrangère, sont étonnants et peu instructifs. Les militaires surtout, les Coréens sont trop absorbés par leur poursuite effrénée de la croissance économique et aussi, maintenant, par les préparatifs des Jeux Olympiques, pour penser à la guerre. Même si le Conflit a laissé un souvenir marquant, les Coréens du Sud semblent croire que les temps ont changé. Par ailleurs, le gouvernement du Sud invoque tellement souvent la menace nord-coréenne pour justifier ses politiques internes


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Pour le Coréen du Sud moyen, cette tension se traduit par un cadre de vie à forte dominante militaire : c'est du moins l'impression qu'en retire un observateur étranger. Outre que l'armée permanente compte quelque 600 000 hommes pour une population de quarante millions d'habitants, tous les hommes sont tenus de faire un service militaire de deux ou trois ans. Même si le «miracle économique» du Sud a débouché sur une hausse prodigieuse du niveau de vie, le maintien des Forces armées bloque une part importante des revenus nationaux, part qui ne peut donc pas être investie dans des projets économiques ou des programmes sociaux. En effet, la défense retient environ 6 p. 100 du produit national brut, ce qui ne représentait pas moins de 31 p. 100

Le gouvernement

menace nord-coin

politiques intern



Le 15 de chaque
siècles d'alerth
rues de Séoul.



Collège de la Défense nationale, à Kingston, et pour participer à un colloque sur « l'ère Gorbatchev », paraient par la *Norman Paterson School of International Affairs*, à l'Université Carleton.

Gerald Wright a démissionné de son poste au conseil d'administration de l'Institut pour devenir conseiller l'honorable Tom Hockin, ministre d'Etat chargé des Finances. □

SUBVENTIONS AUX PROGRAMMES PUBLICS -	
Troisième trimestre 1986-87	
1 900 \$	Les Amis-de La Terre de Québec, Québec
9 800	Ateliers: Paix et justice sociale
5 400	Amnapolis Valley International Community Centre, Wolfville
9 800	Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa
3 600	Publication of "Canada's International Relations in the Circumpolar Region" in <i>Northern Perspectives</i>
2 900	Production of the first issue of Peace Education Network News - Canada
9 900	Centre de solidarité internationale, Alma
2 900	La paix et la sécurité internationales : sessions en région
9 900	Montreal
5 450	Série d'émissions sur "La dépression latente chez les jeunes devant la peur du nucléaire"
7 000	The Children's International Centre, Hamilton
7 000	Videoaping of the Conference on Global Education (Jan. 5-7, 1987)
2 000	Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa
4 700	Seminar "Total Defence and Peace Through Security" (Jan. 15, 1987)
2 000	Dissemination of information on the Great Peace Journey
4 700	Great Peace Journey, Toronto
2 000	Study of the Need for a Publication Produced and Edited in Canada
4 700	Jarvis, Michael et al., Ottawa
350	on Soviet Affairs and on Canadian-Soviet Relations
10 000	Polyvalente Mankouat de Sept-Îles, Sept-Îles
10 000	Les prophéties de la Paix
5 000	Office national du film du Canada, Ville St-Laurent
5 000	Film "L'Odyssee"
9 200	Project Ploughshares, Ottawa
9 200	PEACEFUNB Canada
9 200	United Nations Association in Canada, Ottawa
5 000	Canadian National Model United Nations - 1987
5 000	University of Manitoba, Winnipeg
5 000	Third Annual Political Studies Conference "Canada and the West European Alliance" (March 4-7, 1987)
9 500	University of Waterloo, Waterloo
5 500	Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism Conference on Canada, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance (May 21-23, 1987)
5 500	World Without War Research and Education Network, Tweed
5 000	Community Awareness Project
5 000	World Federalists of Canada, Ottawa
102 200 \$	TOTAL
SUBVENTIONS À LA RECHERCHE -	
Troisième trimestre 1986-87	
1 284 \$	Black, J.L., Carleton University, Ottawa
23 000	ISEBS Bibliography Series, Issue No. 5 "Moscow's Problems of History: A Select Critical Bibliography of the Soviet Journal Voprosy
23 000	Buteux, Paul, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg
23 000	Canada, NATO and European Security (collaborative project)
5 500	Peace Research Institute - Dundas, Toronto
5 000	The United Nations Voting Series
5 000	Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, Calgary
10 000	Planning activities the conference "India and Canada - Partners for the Future", March 7-11, 1988
67 784 \$	TOTAL

William George, attaché de direction, a étudié à l'Université de Montréal et à l'Université Carleton qui lui a décerné une maîtrise en sciences politiques. En 1984, il a été auxiliaire de recherche auprès de l'Arms Control Association aux États-Unis.

David Cox a assisté aux séances du Forum de Moscou pour la dénucléarisation du monde et la survie de l'humanité. Des psychologues, des gens d'affaires, des scientifiques, des médecins, des écrivains, des représentants du monde du spectacle, des chefs religieux et des officiers militaires à la retraite ont participé à ce grand rassemblement qui a principalement porté sur la paix et le désarmement.

À la fin de mars, l'Association canadienne pour l'éducation des adultes et l'Institut ont organisé un colloque sur la paix et la sécurité dans le cadre d'une entente à long terme conclue entre eux. Des spécialistes de l'éducation permanente au Canada ont participé à diverses discussions sur des thèmes définis : la sécurité du Canada, avec David Cox, Simon Rosenblum (Projet Ploughshares) et George Lindsey (Ministère de la Défense nationale); la théorie des relations internationales, avec John Sigler (Université Carleton); les médias et l'opinion publique, avec Peter O'Malley, expert-conseil en communications, et le journa- liste Arch Mackenzie. Au cours de la dernière journée, les participants se sont interrogés sur les stratégies à adopter pour intéresser le public canadien aux discussions sur la paix et la sécurité.

À la fin de février, Geoffrey Pearson a pris la parole lors d'une conférence organisée à Montréal par le Conseil canadien pour la coopération internationale et ayant pour titre «Prendre parti en Afrique australe». La conférence a porté sur deux grands thèmes, à savoir les sanctions et la politique du Canada à l'égard de l'Afrique australe. Les participants, qui représentaient l'Afrique et le Canada, ont évalué l'incidence des mesures prises jusqu'ici par ce dernier. L'état actuel des relations économiques du Canada avec l'Afrique nominale du Sud et le programme d'aide actuel; ils se sont aussi penchés sur les façons dont notre pays doit répondre aux besoins pressants des pays de l'Afrique australe.

Au début de mars, John Toogood a participé à une conférence sur le Canada et l'Alliance de l'Europe occidentale, à l'Université du Manitoba. M. Toogood a présenté un exposé sur la limitation des armements en Europe, exposé qui portait plus particulièrement sur la Conférence du désarmement.

Viktor Karpov, ancien négociateur en chef de l'Union soviétique dans le cadre des pourparlers sur les armes nucléaires, a visité l'ICPSI le 5 mars. M. Karpov a dirigé la délégation soviétique à Genève pendant huit ans. Des membres de l'Institut ainsi que MM. John Lamb et John Barrett, du Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement, se sont entretenus avec M. Karpov sur les propositions actuelles de l'URSS concernant la limitation des armements et sur les progrès qui s'accomplissent à Genève.

Mark Kramer, chargé de recherche au *Russian Research Center* de l'Université de Harvard, est venu à l'ICPSI en mars pour discuter de l'attitude de l'URSS face aux accusations des États-Unis qui lui reprochent de ne pas respecter le Traité sur les missiles anti-missiles balistiques. M. Kramer était au Canada pour s'adresser à des étudiants du

Si la lecture du livre de Charles

Zorgbibe nous laisse perplexe quant

à l'éventualité d'assister aux derniers

jours de l'Afrique du Sud, il le four-

nit un enseignement précieux sur les

problèmes qui se vivent dans ce pays.

Le livre débute avec un récit his-

torique qui dépeint les Africains

«enracinés depuis plus de trois siècles

à l'extrémité du continent africain»

et les rivalités sans fin qui n'ont cessé

d'opposer le peuple Boer aux Britan-

niques. L'arrivée des Hollandais, la

création de deux républiques indé-

pendantes Boers, la proclamation de

l'Union sud-africaine et, un demi-

siècle plus tard, de la République in-

dépendante d'Afrique du Sud; autant

d'événements qui défilent sous les

yeux du lecteur, étonné de l'absence

notoire de «l'autre», des «autres»,

ceux et celles d'une autre race, popu-

lations noires autochtones qui ont

très tôt été mises au ban de l'histoire

sud-africaine.

Avec une approche qui rappelle sa

formation de juriste, Zorgbibe nous

présente ensuite un tour d'horizon de

la question sud-africaine qui, avec

ses facettes multiples et sa grande

complexité, suscite une série d'inter-

rogations. Dans les thèmes abordés

on retrouve notamment la nouvelle

constitution de 1983 accordant cer-

tains droits aux Xhosa et aux Indiens,

le système d'apartheid en soi, les

homeland; ces foyers nationaux

créés artificiellement par Pretoria,

la nature du régime politique et les

groupes d'opposition, enfin les rela-

tions qu'entretiennent Pretoria avec les

Etats d'Afrique australe de même

qu'avec la communauté internationale.

L'originalité de cet ouvrage vient

de ce que ces informations nous sont

livrées au moyen d'une cinquiaine

d'entretiens avec des membres du

gouvernement, parlementaires pro-

gressistes ou tenants de l'apartheid,

des grands banquiers, des universi-

taires et des leaders des commu-

nautes de couleur. Cette enquête sur

le terrain s'est effectuée aux quatre

coins du pays.

Au fil de ces entrevues, le lecteur

comprend mieux comment les con-

cepts de société et système politique

multiraciaux, de principe démocra-

tique, de fédération d'Etats territo-

riaux et de droits civiques et humains

prennent une signification différente

dependamment de l'interlocuteur.

Comment rester insensible au dé-

tachement de certains Blancs face à

la situation politique du pays et aux

allégations déhonnêtes de certains

autres pour qui «l'Homme d'Afrique

est une partie intégrante (...) mys-

rique du cosmos, il a le même statut

que les animaux ou les arbres. (...)

Pour le Noir, le pouvoir c'est l'auto-

rité, insérée dans une sorte de pan-

théisme mystique». On aurait aimé

que le problème central de la division

entre les non Blancs soit approfondi;

on trouve en effet trop peu d'entre-

vues avec des membres des commu-

nautes noire, métis et indienne.

L'auteur termine son livre avec trois

courtes chapitres qui dégagent les

composantes «d'un programme pour

l'évolution pacifique de la République

sud-africaine»: abolition de l'apar-

theid, décolonisation des Etats noirs.

A regretter, l'absence de bibliolo-

graphie et de notes de références.

— *Francine Lecours*

Qu'y a-t-il de l'Afrique du Sud?

Gérard Chaland

Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1986

184 pages, 23,95 \$

Ce livre d'un spécialiste de re-

chercheur du public de non-spécialistes

«éclairer un sujet d'actualité sur une réalité

désireux de s'informer sur une réalité

complexe». Une bibliographie bien

faite, un utile atlas en annexe, de

même que des observations intéres-

santes n'arrivent pas à compenser

l'approche superficielle et les in-

formations insuffisantes utilisées

par l'auteur.

Plusieurs questions sont succes-

sivement abordées: les différentes

communautés d'Afrique du Sud avec

un bref survol de l'évolution de la

condition des Noirs, la montée des

groupes d'opposition anti-apartheid,

l'économie, le pouvoir et les forces

armées sud-africaines ainsi que la

stratégie. Aucun de ces thèmes n'est

approfondi, ce qui encourage la con-

fusion chez le lecteur non-familier

avec le sujet. Toutefois, Chaland

propose dans les deux derniers

chapitres une analyse assez fine du

présent et des perspectives futures.

Est particulièrement intelligent, son

traitement de la perception de la com-

munaute internationale à l'endroit de

Pretoria, de l'application des sanc-

tions économiques et des enjeux pour

les Sud-africains. Son appréciation

globale est, somme toute, pessimiste.

«Qu'y a-t-il de l'Afrique du Sud ?», au

mieux, une lecture complémentaire

pour le lecteur averti mais n'est cer-

tainement pas une bonne entrée en

matière pour le novice.

— *Francine Lecours*

Armées et arsenaux en Europe

Laurence Martin

Éditions Autrement, 1986, 150 pages,

30,95 \$

L'Europe, qui connaît la paix

depuis maintenant plus de quarante

ans, est le continent le plus sûr

de la planète. Sa population vie

quodidennement ce fait qui est venu

encore rappeler le déploiement des

armées américaines. Le livre de

Laurence Martin s'emploie à cons-

tater puis à expliquer pourquoi. Les

Européens, de l'Est et de l'Ouest, ont

appelé sur leur sol depuis la fin de la

Seconde Guerre mondiale le plus

formidable système d'armes au

monde.

L'enjeu stratégique européen est

d'une importance capitale. Le vieux

continent, où les deux grands

organisations militaires, l'OTAN et

le Pacte de Varsovie, s'affrontent, est

le centre stratégique du monde et le

lieu privilégié de la confrontation

américano-soviétique.

Laurence Martin décrit comment

les deux organisations sont nées et

de quelles manières leur chaîne de

commandement et de décision fonc-

tionne. Toutes les données sur les

forces militaires en présence sont

alignées mais l'auteur ne tombe pas

dans le piège des comparaisons

strictement quantitatives. L'aspect

qualitatif est bien analysé. Les dif-

férentes doctrines militaires sont

exposées ainsi que les options de

«batailles» qui s'offrent aux deux

protagonistes. Grâce à une présen-

tation toute en couleur, on voit les

armées face à face, les distances à

parcourir, le rayon d'action des

armes, les manœuvres et les con-

cepts planifiés, etc. Des chapitres

sont consacrés au contrôle des arme-

ments, aux nouvelles technologies et

aux fondements économiques de la

stratégie.

L'intérêt du livre de Martin réside

dans son accessibilité à un large

public. Malgré la complexité du

problème, l'auteur pose une série de

questions qui, à défaut d'apporter

les réponses, incite à la

réflexion.

— *Jocelyn Coulon*

— *Jocelyn Coulon*

EN BRIEF

«Roots of Peace: The Movement

Against Militarism in Canada»

Sous la direction d'Eric Shrage,

de Ronald Babin et de Jean-Guy

Vaillancourt

Toronto, DEC Books, 208 pages, 12,95 \$

non relié, 29,95 \$ reliure de toile.

Le livre comprend des articles

de Andree Levy, du major-général

(rel.), Leonard Johnson, de Phyllis


Aronoff et d'autres auteurs. □

Voir l'analyse sommaire d'ouvrages

publiés en anglais dans la rubrique

Review de Peace&Security.

Livres



Le retour de l'Islam

Bernard Lewis
Guilluminat, Paris 1985.
426 pages, 59 \$

Illustré islamologue, Bernard Lewis fait indéniablement partie de la catégorie de savants réputés, à la culture encyclopédique. Son dernier livre, publié chez Gallimard, et intitulé «Le retour de l'Islam», témoigne de nouveau de la profondeur d'analyse de ce chercheur juif d'origine anglaise, maintenant professeur à l'Université Princeton.

Une remarque s'impose d'emblée: ce livre rassemble plusieurs textes et souvent repris dans son ouvrage «Islam in History» publié en 1973. Le lecteur peut, sans trop risquer de perdre le propos, passer d'un chapitre à un autre sans suivre fidèlement l'ordre prescrit par les éditeurs.

L'originalité du livre tient en son caractère hétéroclite: textes savants et études sur des sujets récents et parfois traitant de sujets musulmans. Dans ce livre, Lewis se fait scientifique dans le même esprit que les historiens se colportent allégrement, mais toujours avec le même esprit d'analyse.

Dans un article publié en 1976, il a été un des premiers de la communauté universitaire à se pencher sur l'islamisme dans les pays musulmans, un phénomène qui fait maintenant l'objet d'une littérature abondante. Dans ce texte, M. Lewis reproche l'ethnocentrisme des analyses traitant de ce sujet et insiste sur les différences culturelles qui séparent les cultures occidentales et musulmanes à l'égard de la religion.

Entre le politique et le religieux, l'Islam dans le domaine de la politique internationale et des affaires étrangères, l'Islam n'est pas seulement une religion, mais la source de l'identité collective des musulmans.

Le seul territoire sans organe politique, ou «la privation a créé un nouveau sentiment d'identité fondé sur le par-

La troisième section du livre est consacrée au problème de la Palestine. Autrefois simple province d'une entité plus grande, la Palestine actuelle est progressivement devenue le seul territoire sans organe politique.

Le livre de Mme d'Encausse, cependant, constitue un ouvrage à l'heure de la lecture tout en respectant la richesse et les nuances d'un sujet fort complexe.

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âge de l'expérience, du désespoir et des aspirations.»

Selon B. Lewis, la solution au conflit arabo-israélien.

Il n'est guère utile de présenter, à nouveau, Mme d'Encausse qui est à l'heure de la lecture tout en respectant la richesse et les nuances d'un sujet fort complexe.

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résumer en quelques mots: l'URSS, depuis Lénine, a constamment poursuivi un grand rêve d'expansion, et là

exception à la règle, malgré la décadence des relations Est-Ouest, de

«À la vision continuée, à la progression continuée qui fut celle de ses prédécesseurs, souverains ou communistes. Brejnev a substitué une

conception mondiale de la puissance». Partant de ce postulat,

ce grand dessein, l'Afrique, tout d'abord, où l'URSS s'est implantée

en Angola, au Mozambique, en Somalie, en Éthiopie, en Libye et

au Yémen; l'Asie, ensuite, où il est question du Viêt-Nam, du Cambodge

et du Laos ainsi que de l'Afghanistan. Chacun de ces cas historiques est

traité en profondeur pour nous démontrer que, malgré les revers et les

révulsions, l'Union soviétique, en profitant des circonstances et en

s'adaptant à elles, a su se bâtir un réseau de points d'appui qui constitue

l'armature d'un empire mondial. En somme, pour Mme d'Encausse,

la chose ne fait pas de doute, l'ambition géopolitique de l'URSS s'inspire

«d'une vision générale cohérente et à très long terme», et les moyens dont

disposent les Soviétiques, leurs stratégies, sont impressionnants: les armes, les traités d'amitié, les

réseaux de clientèles contribuent tous à appuyer leur partie d'échecs

planétaire. Pour tous ceux qui sont déjà con-

vaincus que l'URSS est l'empire du mal, *Ni paix ni guerre* ne fera donc

que renforcer leurs préjugés. Or, ceci

est dommage car la qualité des analyses politiques de Mme d'Encausse

mérite d'être appréciée par un public plus tolérant et plus large.

Il convient donc, en ouvrant ce

livre, de se rappeler que «l'empire soviétique», s'il existe, fait pendant à

«l'empire américain», et qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de percevoir les plus

noirs desseins derrière le comportement normal d'une superpuissance.

Michel Formann est professeur au Département de science politique de l'Université de Montréal

confrontées depuis de nombreuses années parce qu'on ne s'entend pas sur la façon de le déployer pour réduire sa vulnérabilité en cas d'attaque par des missiles soviétiques et que par des incidents sur la stabilité stratégique et la limitation des armements. Le Congrès, des gouvernements d'Etat, ainsi que beaucoup de stratégies et de scénarios militaires, le Pentagone concernant le mode de déploiement des missiles porteurs d'ogives multiples (les ins-tallier sur des véhicules sur roues, dans le désert du Nevada – la « piste de courses » –, ou les rassembler les uns près des autres dans des silos – le « regroupement dense »). Le Congrès a finalement autorisé l'achat de cinquante missiles MX, dont les dix premiers ont été déployés de la manière conventionnelle, c'est-à-dire dans des silos statiques renforcés à la base aérienne de Warren, dans le Wyoming. Le Congrès a cependant assujéti son autorisation à la mise au point d'un missile mobile, plus petit et porteur d'une seule ogive; il s'agit du Midgeman que les Soviétiques, d'après certains experts, seront moins enclins à considérer comme une arme de « première frappe ». Le plan le plus récent du Pentagone concernant le recours aux chemins de fer vise cinquante autres missiles et a pour objet de rendre sa mobilité au MX. Le nouveau plan, que le Congrès n'a pas encore approuvé, prévoit que les MX seront installés sur des wagons de chemin de fer transférés qu'on gardera dans les dépôts militaires en temps de paix et qu'on pourra lancer sur le réseau ferro-viaires américains en temps de crises. Il sera des lors difficile, pour ne pas dire impossible, pour les Soviétiques de repérer les engins avec précision et les détruire avec leurs propres missiles. Le général John T. Chain, chef du *Strategic Air Command* (Ets-Unis), aurait fait la déclaration suivante au *New York Times* : « En quelques minutes, mes engins se seront éloignés du point zéro (les dépôts militaires) et en quelques heures ils auront été dispersés dans tout le pays. Dans un délai de douze heures, ils seront complètement intégrés au reste du paysage ! » Le général Chain a par ailleurs fait observer que l'Union soviétique possède actuellement deux types de missiles mobiles ayant atteint le stade opérationnel ou celui de la mise au point; les deux peuvent atteindre les Ets-Unis : il s'agit du SS-24 monté sur rails et du SS-25 installé sur camion. □

participation du Canada et sur la façon dont elle s'intégrerait au rôle qu'il joue au sein du NORAD.

Un nouveau missile soviétique ?

Un article paru dans le *Washington Times* du 7 janvier 1987 cite les services de renseignement du gouvernement américain pour affirmer que l'URSS dispose d'un nouveau missile balistique intercontinental. Selon cet article, le SS-X-26 (c'est ainsi que le nouvel ICBM s'appelle) est censé être le successeur du SS-18. Il a subi avec succès un premier essai en décembre 1986 et il doit éventuellement remplacer tous les SS-18 existants. Le SS-18 (le plus gros ICBM du monde, à l'heure actuelle) est capable d'emporter plus d'ogives que ce dernier.

Le Peacekeeper mobile de nouveau ?

À la fin de décembre 1986, le Pentagone a annoncé qu'il allait demander des fonds au Congrès pour déployer cinquante missiles balistiques intercontinentaux MX sur des wagons de chemin de fer. L'engin (officiellement appelé « Peacekeeper ») suscite des débats et des questions fondamentales sur la gestion des combats. Il a pour but de surveiller, d'interception et de mise en place d'un bouclier défensif à trois niveaux et d'un moyen de destruction de missiles de croisière et avant qu'ils aient largué leurs engins. Comme le territoire canadien pourrait jouer un rôle important si jamais on construit un réseau complet de défense aérienne, le lien entre l'IDA et l'IDS suscitera des questions fondamentales sur la

vastes moyens de défense aérienne, car la vulnérabilité du territoire en cas d'attaque par missiles balistiques réduisant considérablement l'utilité de tels moyens. Depuis le lancement de l'IDS, cependant, les stratégies d'IDS, accordées de nouveau de l'attention à la défense aérienne du continent, étant donné qu'un système anti-missiles balistiques ne pourrait pas lui seul protéger le pays contre les bombardiers et les missiles de croisière. Un porte-parole de l'Aviation américaine a déclaré qu'avec le nouveau programme connu sous le nom d'Initiative de défense aérienne (IDA), on espère fermer les « fenêtres » d'un continuum par ailleurs protégé par le « parapluie » de l'IDS.

Le programme IDA prévoit la mise en place d'un bouclier défensif à trois niveaux et d'un moyen de destruction de missiles de croisière et avant qu'ils aient largué leurs engins. Comme le territoire canadien pourrait jouer un rôle important si jamais on construit un réseau complet de défense aérienne, le lien entre l'IDA et l'IDS suscitera des questions fondamentales sur la

Stratégie concernant les armes chimiques

Dans le cadre d'une stratégie globale de défense contre les armes chimiques, l'OTAN a défini pour la première fois une procédure et des normes générales relativement à l'emploi d'armes chimiques en cas de conflit. Selon un rapport paru dans *Defense News* le 24 novembre 1986, la décision a été prise l'automne dernier, mais elle n'a pas encore été annoncée publiquement.

Bien que plusieurs pays de l'OTAN suivent une politique interdisant la production ou l'entreposage d'armes chimiques chez eux, les Ets-Unis ont récemment reçu une sanction conditionnelle du Congrès les autorisant à commencer de nouveau à produire des armes chimiques après un moratoire de dix-sept ans. La France a annoncé qu'elle compte reprendre la fabrication de telles armes à l'automne de 1987, à condition d'en obtenir la permission de son Assemblée nationale au printemps.

La nécessité d'acquiescer des armes chimiques a suscité peu de controverses, mais maints débats ont eu lieu au sein de l'OTAN et aux Ets-Unis quant à l'utilité de posséder de telles armes. D'après certains experts militaires, la valeur des armes chimiques réside dans le fait qu'elles forcent l'ennemi à prendre des mesures de défense qui entravent considérablement les combats dans leurs opérations.

Nouveau Commandant suprême des forces alliées en Europe

Le général américain Bernard Rogers, actuellement Commandant suprême des forces alliées en Europe démissionnera de son poste à la fin de juin. Il occupe ces fonctions depuis sept ans. Le général John Galvin, commandant en chef du *US Southern Command*, dont le quartier général est à Panama, lui succédera.

Les Parlementaires de l'OTAN

L'Assemblée de l'Atlantique-Nord, qui est un groupe de parlementaires de l'OTAN, se réunira à Québec en mai 1987. Parmi les sujets inscrits à l'ordre du jour figurent la limitation des armements et les changements survenus en l'Union soviétique depuis l'arrivée de M. Gorbatchev au pouvoir.

dans le budget et les dossiers du Pentagone. Dans le rapport annuel qu'il présentait au Congrès en janvier, le Secrétaire à la Défense, M. Weinberger, a annoncé que les Ets-Unis commencent à déployer l'ACM au début des années 1990, à une base aérienne du Michigan.

La technologie des engins dits « furtifs » résulte en fait des technologies propres à trois domaines connexes : la technologie des matériaux, les dispositifs électroniques, les radars au lieu de les réfléchir; les nouveaux dispositifs électroniques, et la nouvelle forme des cellules qui réduisent la visibilité des missiles sur les écrans de radar. La génération actuelle de missiles de croisière est elle aussi difficile à détecter, mais outre qu'ils sont moins visibles, les engins de la nouvelle génération bénéficient d'une portée, d'une vitesse et d'une précision accrues, ce qui en fait des missiles sensiblement différents des précédents. C'est l'actuelle génération de missiles de croisière lancés du haut des airs (ils sont déjà déployés aux Ets-Unis) qui est mise à l'essai au Canada.

Le fait que M. Weinberger ait annoncé le déploiement du missile perfectionné par les Ets-Unis au début des années 1990 évoque la possibilité qu'il soit mis à l'essai au Canada. Ayant déposé une demande en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information, les dirigeants de Project Ploughshares ont appris l'existence d'une note adressée au ministre de la Défense nationale et intitulée *« Project Proposal for Captive Carry Cruise Missile »* (Essais proposés de Test of the ACM-129 en mode captif).

Répondant aux questions que la députée néo-démocrate Pauline Jewett lui posait en Chambre, le ministre de la Défense, M. Perrin Beatty, n'a ni confirmé ni nié l'existence de la note; il s'est contenté de dire que personnellement, il ne se souvient pas d'avoir vu la note. Le fait qu'il soit mis à l'essai au Canada, au début des années 1990, est un événement qui suscite de vives préoccupations. Les dirigeants de Project Ploughshares ont appris l'existence d'une note adressée au ministre de la Défense nationale et intitulée *« Project Proposal for Captive Carry Cruise Missile »* (Essais proposés de Test of the ACM-129 en mode captif).

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Condensé sur la limitation des armements

pour réduire ses arsenaux nucléaires stratégiques. Le Secrétaire américain à la Défense, M. Weinberger, compte parmi ceux qui, dans le gouvernement Reagan, favorisent le plus ouvertement le déploiement habituel d'éléments d'un réseau de défense stratégique (DS) et l'adoption d'une interprétation élargie du fameux traité. Selon M. Weinberger, le déploiement d'un système partiel de défense qui comprendrait des intercepteurs basés dans l'espace et au sol pourrait se produire dès 1993. Cependant, cela ne serait possible que si l'adite interprétation était acceptée; sinon, les essais des intercepteurs dans l'espace seraient interdits. Dans un discours prononcé le 16 février 1987, le secrétaire général Gorbatchev a annoncé que les États-Unis avaient présenté l'interprétation élargie du Traité à la table des négociations, à Genève. Les autres membres de l'OTAN ont toujours insisté sur la nécessité de conserver l'interprétation stricte du Traité, et ils ont amorcé des consultations avec les Américains de cet égard. Pour faire écho au débat récent qui a eu lieu aux États-Unis au sujet du Traité, le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, M. Joe Clark, a écrit au Secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. George Shultz, pour lui signaler de nouveau que le Canada favorise l'interprétation rigoureuse de l'entente et lui exprimer notre inquiétude au sujet de la modification possible de la position américaine. Le gouvernement canadien a par ailleurs déclaré qu'à ses yeux, la recherche liée à l'ITDS est «venue de ce qu'elle est autorisée en vertu des clauses restrictives du Traité sur les missiles anti-missiles balistiques.

Interdiction complète des essais nucléaires

Le moratoire de dix-huit mois que l'URSS s'était imposé dans le domaine des essais nucléaires a pris fin le 26 février 1987 quand elle a exécuté son premier essai depuis le 6 août 1985. Les États-Unis refusent toujours de négocier une interdiction complète des essais; entre le début du moratoire soviétique et le 19 mars, ils ont effectué vingt-six essais.

Le 10 février 1987, la Chine est devenue le dixième pays doté de l'arme nucléaire à signer le Traité de Rarotonga faisant du Pacifique-Sud une zone dénucléarisée. Le Traité a été créé par les treize pays qui participaient au Forum du Pacifique-Sud le 6 août 1985 ; il interdit la fabrication, l'emploi, la destruction, l'entreposage et la mise à l'essai des armes nucléaires dans la région. Les trois protocoles devant être signés par les pays munis d'armes nucléaires sont prêts à l'être depuis le 1^{er} décembre 1986. L'Union soviétique a paraphé le document presque immédiatement. Les Etats-Unis s'en sont abstenus, alléguant qu'ils ne voulaient pas créer un précédent en sanctionnant la création de zones dénucléarisées risquant de mettre en jeu leur propre sécurité en péril. Le refus américain a indigné l'Australie, car pour rendre le traité acceptable aux yeux de Washington, elle avait exercé de fortes pressions pour garantir que le traité n'interdirait pas expressément le passage dans la région de navires portant des armes nucléaires. Les Etats-Unis ont par ailleurs annoncé un pacte de logistique liant à la Nouvelle-Zélande, quand celui-ci expirera en juin, car ils ne désapprouvent les politiques anti-nucléaires de Wellington.

Le Traité ABM


L'avenir du Traité sur les missiles anti-missiles balistiques demeure l'une des questions les plus importantes que l'URSS et les Etats-Unis doivent régler dans le cadre de leurs négociations bilatérales sur la limitation des armements. Les Etats-Unis ont annoncé pour la première fois en octobre 1985 leur intention de donner une interprétation « plus large » au Traité, interprétation qui interdit uniquement le déploiement de systèmes ABM faisant appel à de nouvelles techniques. L'URSS préconise l'adhésion au Traité dans sa forme

En décembre 1986, les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'OTAN ont proposé un nouveau plan de négociation pour discuter de la réduction des armes conventionnelles en Europe. Le plan porterait sur toute l'Europe, depuis l'Atlantique jusqu'à la chaîne de l'Oural. La position attestée de l'attention accrue que l'on accorde à la réduction des forces conventionnelles depuis les entretiens de Reykjavik sur l'élimination possible des armes nucléaires. Elle fait écho à un plan déposé par le Pacte de Varsovie en juin 1986, lequel préconisait lui aussi d'élargir l'envergure et la portée des négociations sur les forces conventionnelles. Si l'Union soviétique accepte le nouveau cadre soumis par l'OTAN, celui-ci remplacera les négociations sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces qui se déroulent sans succès à Vienne depuis quatorze ans.

Armes chimiques

Changeant radicalement ses positions antérieures, l'URSS a accepté de révéler l'emplacement de ses dépôts d'armes chimiques et d'autoriser l'inspection par des agents internationaux de contrôle dans les trente jours qui suivraient l'entrée en vigueur d'un accord sur les armes chimiques. Les deux superpuissances sont toujours en désaccord au sujet des inspections qui seraient réclamées par l'une d'elles qui soutiendrait alors que l'autre a violé l'accord. L'Union soviétique refuse de rendre les inspections obligatoires en parlés cas.

Les négociations sur l'interdiction des armes chimiques se poursuivent à la Conférence du désarmement, à Genève. La France a intégré la production d'armes chimiques à son




plus est, même si la Marine américaine réussissait à détruire une grande partie de la Marine soviétique un peu partout dans le monde, l'URSS pourrait malgré tout remporter la victoire en Europe centrale. Les détracteurs de la stratégie soulignent aussi que plus les forces américaines se rapprocheraient des eaux côtières et du territoire soviétique, plus la « posture » maritime de l'URSS s'améliorerait, car la Marine russe pourrait alors faire appel à son immense flotte d'aéronefs basés au sol. Enfin, si la Marine américaine l'emportait dans les combats classiques, les Soviétiques reconstruirait certainement l'arme nucléaire plutôt tôt que de baisser pavillon dans leurs eaux territoriales.

Du point de vue de la limitation des armements, la nouvelle stratégie maritime est un facteur de déséquilibre, car elle met l'accent sur la guerre contre les sous-marins stratégiques. Elle mine la doctrine de la dissuasion mutuelle en menaçant des éléments protégés des forces soviétiques de représailles. Les critiques dénoncent aussi l'importance accordée aux sous-marins munis de missiles de croisière capables d'atteindre l'URSS; à leurs yeux, ces derniers sont dangereux, car ils ajoutent une nouvelle dimension à la course aux armements nucléaires, et leur existence inciterait les Soviétiques à constituer une menace semblable dans les eaux nord-américaines. En général, on retrouve la stratégie maritime proposée parce qu'elle intensifierait la concurrence stratégique dans l'Arctique sans pour autant accroître sensiblement la sécurité des États-Unis ou celle de leurs alliés.

Les répercussions pour le Canada

Dans un certain sens, la nouvelle stratégie navale américaine ne modifierait pas les rôles actuels des forces navales canadiennes. Au sein de l'OTAN, le Canada épaulé les États-Unis et d'autres pays alliés pour assurer la surveillance quotidienne de l'Atlantique-Nord, et il est notamment chargé d'un secteur donné de l'océan. Advénant une guerre en Europe, notre pays fournirait aux convais des forces d'escorte anti-sous-marines, et il détacherait sans doute des navires auprès de groupe-ments navals opérationnels alliés, porterait au secours de la Norvège. La coopération que le Canada fournit aux États-Unis pour assurer la défense des approches maritimes de l'Amérique du Nord s'apparente à une coopération qui le Canada pourrait en tirer de nombreux avantages. Dans un certain sens, la nouvelle stratégie navale américaine ne modifierait pas les rôles actuels des forces navales canadiennes. Au sein de l'OTAN, le Canada épaulé les États-Unis et d'autres pays alliés pour assurer la surveillance quotidienne de l'Atlantique-Nord, et il est notamment chargé d'un secteur donné de l'océan. Advénant une guerre en Europe, notre pays fournirait aux convais des forces d'escorte anti-sous-marines, et il détacherait sans doute des navires auprès de groupe-ments navals opérationnels alliés, porterait au secours de la Norvège. La coopération que le Canada fournit aux États-Unis pour assurer la défense des approches maritimes de l'Amérique du Nord s'apparente à une coopération qui le Canada pourrait en tirer de nombreux avantages.

En principe à celle qui leur offre en matière de défense aérienne : en effet, l'objectif consiste à exercer une surveillance et à donner l'alerte sur des éléments soviétiques donnant l'assaut, qu'il s'agisse de sous-marins de missiles à courte portée. Le Canada accorde son appui aux Américains non seulement pour renforcer la défense collective, mais aussi parce que, de cette façon, la défense continentale incombe moins aux forces américaines : la souveraineté canadienne est des lors moins affectée auprès de l'OTAN et à la surveillance des côtes nord-américaines protégent aussi la souveraineté nationale contre les agresseurs non militaires – les pêcheurs étrangers dépassant leurs quotas, par exemple. Au cours des quinze dernières années, cependant, la taille et les moyens des forces navales du Canada (navires, aéronefs et sous-marins) ont diminué au point qu'on peut se demander si elles sont à même de remplir l'importante leçon de leur rôle. Vu l'orientation que la stratégie navale américaine semble prendre, les choses risquent encore d'empirer. Toute une gamme de nouveaux problèmes surgiront, cependant, si la Marine américaine intensifie ses opérations dans l'Arctique. Advénant que les deux blocs se mettent sans restrictions à déployer des missiles de croisière en mer, les États-Unis voudront s'assurer qu'il sera possible de détecter les mouvements des sous-marins soviétiques dans l'Arctique canadien. Notre pays devra alors réagir devant de telles préoccupations, et il devra aussi envisager la possibilité que les sous-marins d'attaque américains passent davantage par l'Arctique canadien pour se rendre dans l'Arctique soviétique, là où l'on pense que l'URSS dissimule ses flottes de sous-marins porteurs de missiles balistiques. L'archipel arctique canadien n'offre pas la seule route à destination des bastions russes, mais on croit que des sous-marins américains ont emprunté ce chemin dans le passé. S'il ne dispose d'aucun moyen valable pour pénétrer sous les glaces, le Canada ne pourra dissiper les craintes des États-Unis quant à l'emploi de l'Arctique par les Soviétiques, non plus qu'il



Bob Hamby

sera en mesure de savoir si des sous-marins américains y circulent. Dans les deux cas, la question de la souveraineté refait surface.

Toute cette conjoncture amène encore une fois le Canada à réfléchir à la limitation des armements. À l'instar des critiques américains, Ottawa pourrait bien franchir les sources face aux efforts déployés par Washington d'obtenir une position vulnérable pour les sous-marins soviétiques porteurs de missiles balistiques, car cela risquerait de déséquilibrer la scène stratégique. Comme on ne semble pas vouloir limiter la mise au point des missiles de croisière navals, le Canada pourrait aussi dénoncer ce qui semble être la position actuelle des États-Unis, à savoir qu'il n'y a pas lieu dans l'immédiat de chercher à limiter le nombre ni les capacités de ces armes. Enfin, en sa qualité de membre de l'OTAN, le Canada pourrait considérer que les plans d'offensive avancée et d'escalade horizontale envisagés par la Marine américaine compromettent la dissuasion en Europe.

À l'heure actuelle, les Soviétiques se servent beaucoup plus que l'Occident de leurs régions arctiques. C'est précisément à cause de l'importance que la Marine américaine portait que l'URSS accorde à ces régions. L'URSS accorde à ces régions une coopération avec les États-Unis dans l'Arctique, dans le cadre d'un accord qui s'apparenterait à celui du NORAD. De cette façon, le Canada calmerait les craintes américaines en matière de sécurité tout en affirmant d'avantage sa souveraineté dans cette région. Il faut bien comprendre que, faute d'un tel accord, les États-Unis pourraient bien décider de se charger eux-mêmes de défendre l'Arctique.

Le Canada doit par ailleurs accroître ses forces navales, aux dépens de ses forces terrestres et aériennes, s'il le faut. Il faudrait ainsi qu'il se procure d'autres navires de lutte anti-sous-marine, d'autres avions de sous-marins, d'autres capacités de patrouille maritime et des sous-marins d'attaque à propulsion nucléaire capables de naviguer sous la glace. Il doit aussi poursuivre la mise au point d'un réseau fixe de surveillance sous la glace. Idéalement, pariti réseau devrait compléter d'autres forces, mais si les restrictions financières forcent le gouvernement à reporter l'achat de nouveaux sous-marins, celui-ci devra envisager de déployer d'abord le réseau fixe.

Quelles que soient les conséquences de l'évolution récente de la stratégie maritime américaine pour les intérêts maritimes et le sonner à se procurer les ressources nécessaires pour les protéger. □

Les options du Canada

Étant donné les éléments énoncés ci-dessus, les mesures suivantes paraissent appropriées :

Exhorter l'OTAN à examiner l'évolution récente de la stratégie maritime américaine (sont-ils vraiment à l'escalade horizontale et aux déploiements avancés) et d'influer sur la dissuasion en Europe.

Exprimer aux États-Unis et à d'autres alliés ses craintes relatives à l'Arctique, à la mise au point d'armes de missiles de croisière et à tout ce qui concerne la guerre stratégique contre les sous-marins soviétiques porteurs de missiles balistiques.

Il importe d'envisager sérieusement une coopération avec les États-Unis dans l'Arctique, dans le cadre d'un accord qui s'apparenterait à celui du NORAD. De cette façon, le Canada calmerait les craintes américaines en matière de sécurité tout en affirmant d'avantage sa souveraineté dans cette région. Il faut bien comprendre que, faute d'un tel accord, les États-Unis pourraient bien décider de se charger eux-mêmes de défendre l'Arctique.

CHANGEMENT DE CAP :

La Marine américaine et la sécurité du Canada. Par Joel Sokolsky

Au cours des derniers mois, l'évolution de la stratégie maritime des Etats-Unis a retenu l'attention du Canada, notamment par suite des rumeurs selon lesquelles des sous-marins américains transiteraient peut-être par l'Arctique canadien.

On semble principalement se

soucier de la souveraineté nationale;

après la presse et les propos

tenus devant les comités du Congrès

américain, la stratégie navale que les

Etats-Unis sont en train d'élaborer

diffère sensiblement de celle qu'ils

avaient depuis 1945. Pour contribuer

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de certaines invulnérabilités

de l'abri d'une première frappe ennemie.

L'existence même de ces sous-

marins dans les deux camps garantit

l'immunité totale de part et d'autre

— la destruction mutuelle assurée

(MAD) — advenant un affrontement

nucléaire; c'est pourquoi on dit que

la stabilité contribue d'une façon

fondamentale à préserver la stabilité

stratégique.

Outre sa flotte de sous-marins, la

Marine américaine possède des

porte-avions ayant une capacité

nucléaire. Récemment, elle a équipé

ses navires de missiles de croisière

Flanco, notamment la Norvège et la

Turquie. En exerçant de telles pres-

sions vers l'avant, les marines de

l'OTAN se rapprocheraient de

l'URSS, là où l'on prévoit que la

Marine soviétique se regroupera

pour défendre ses sous-marins.

Il incombe aussi à la Marine

américaine de protéger le territoire

occidental pour pouvoir atteindre

des objectifs aux Etats-Unis, con-

trairement à des sous-marins plus

anciens toujours en service qui

navagent le long des côtes Est des

Etats-Unis, aux côtés de sous-marins

d'attaque. En général, cependant, les

eaux nord-américaines n'ont pas

revêtu beaucoup d'importance aux

yeux de la marine de nos voisins du

Sud. Mais voilà qui pourrait changer,

tout comme d'autres aspects de la

stratégie maritime des Etats-Unis.

Comment la Marine américaine

a-t-elle l'intention de protéger les

voies maritimes contre les Sovie-

tiques, et où compte-t-elle livrer

bataille en mer ? Voilà les deux ques-

tions qui déterminent actuellement

l'évolution de la stratégie navale des

Etats-Unis. Celle-ci prévoit une

campagne anti-sous-marin et anti-

aérienne très énergique qui amè-

nerait les forces navales américaines

dans les eaux soviétiques où elles

Le serait surtout les sous-marins et

les avions de la Marine soviétique

basés à terre qui menaceraient les

l'Atlantique-Nord et dans les eaux

protecs de l'Europe; en outre, les

convais feraient l'objet d'une protec-

tion serrée contre les sous-marins et

l'atmosphère ennemis. Aux yeux des

Soviétiques, tous ces déploiements

prendraient l'allure d'une opération

offensive, car l'OTAN devrait s'as-

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ces conditions et elle envisage de

qui s'appellera SEAWOLF et qui sera

encore mieux équipé pour évoluer

sous les glaces.

En faisant ainsi pénétrer ses sous-

Marine américaine menacera les

national. De concert avec le Canada,

elle surveille en permanence les

approches maritimes de l'Amérique

du Nord avec des navires, des aéro-

nets et des détecteurs ancrés au fond

de la mer. Les sous-marins sovié-

tiques plus modernes porteurs de

missiles balistiques ne sont pas

obligés de pénétrer dans l'Atlantique

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Marine américaine menacera les

basions mêmes de la flotte sovié-

tique de sous-marins porteurs de

missiles balistiques. Ce serait là une

démarche délibérée, car la nouvelle

stratégie maritime vise notamment à

accroître la vulnérabilité de cette

dernière flotte. Si un conflit clas-

sique d'envoie éclatant, il n'est pas

nécessaire qu'en menaçant ainsi les

sous-marins du Pacte, les Etats-Unis

retarderaient le recours à l'arme

nucléaire. Mais en menant de la

sorte des opérations avancées, la

Marine américaine serait aussi

mieux placée pour détruire les sub-

mersibles ennemis avant ou après

en mer ou ailleurs.

Le déploiement avancé envisagé

dans la stratégie proposée par la

Marine américaine présente une

autre variante par rapport aux doc-

trines du passé : il suppose une

«escalade horizontale» intentionnelle

de la guerre en mer au cas où les

Soviétiques ataqueraient l'Europe.

Dans un tel scénario, l'URSS cher-

cherait à remporter une victoire

rapide et décisive et, selon la Marine

américaine, elle préférerait pouvoir

regrouper ses forces pour atteindre

cet objectif. Or, l'un des buts fonda-

mentaux de la stratégie navale améri-

caine consiste à priver l'URSS de

cette option en l'obligeant à envier

sager la possibilité d'un conflit

mondial prolongé. Et pour ce faire,

les Etats-Unis s'en prendraient aux

forces navales soviétiques à l'échelle

du globe.

La stratégie navale que la Marine

est en train d'élaborer ne fait pas

l'unanimité aux Etats-Unis; les cri-

tiques ont formulé des objections

concernant tant sa valeur militaire

proprie que la limitation des arme-

ments. Ils soutiennent que les plans

de la Marine américaine ne favorise-

raient pas la défense stratégique de

l'Europe en cas de conflit entre

l'OTAN et le Pacte de Varsovie, car

les forces navales abandonneraient

alors leur rôle premier, à savoir ap-

puyer les forces terrestres et aérien-


nes en conservant la maîtrise de la

mer. Pour protéger les voies mari-

times, affirment les mêmes critiques,

il n'est pas nécessaire de se rendre

dans l'arrière-cour de l'URSS. Qui



notre monde moderne. Elles seraient permises, uniquement constituées pour protéger les intérêts particuliers des deux superpuissances et la source d'un éventuel conflit nucléaire, où les alliés des deux camps seraient entrainés contre leur gré. Comme se sont les alliances militaires qui donnent aux deux Grands leur pouvoir hégémonique, les alliés devraient rompre avec cette situation pour briser ce système. En quitte l'Alliance atlantique, souvenant-ils, le Canada démocrate l'exemple à d'autres pays comme le Danemark ou les Pays-Bas et cela produirait un effet d'équilibre et ne mettrait à l'Est ni la Roumanie et d'autres pays seraient éclairer le Pacte de Varsovie.

Evidemment, la neutralité ne signifie pas que nous serions éparpillés le jour où la guerre serait déclenchée. Elle est importante avant le conflit, pour atténuer les tensions et les risques d'escalade. Cette idée n'est pas immorale, comme certains le prétendent, mais tout à fait légitime. Et ses partisans de citer l'exemple de la Suède, où le débat sur la neutralité a débuté il y a 100 ans et où ses promoteurs étaient qualifiés de traitres.

George Ignatieff est plus modéré. Il ne croit pas en la neutralité, mais estime qu'il est grand temps pour le Canada de revoir en profondeur sa politique de défense. L'Alliance atlantique demeure pour lui une assise de la politique étrangère du pays, mais si le pouvoir politique national ne peut pas contrôler les activités du NORAD, il n'y a pas d'autre choix que de quitter l'organisation. Il s'agit, comme beaucoup d'autres, que lors d'une crise, comme celle de 1962 avec la présence de missiles soviétiques à Cuba, le Canada soit privé de droit de regard sur la défense de l'Amérique du nord. Il se fait l'avocat d'une politique de défense nationaliste où les intérêts du pays

Une autre voie?

L'adoption de nouveaux choix en matière de politique de défense ne se fera pas sans problèmes. Les neutra-listes et mêmes les nationalistes répi-blicains savent bien que les Américains répi-bli-cains ont à toutes les tentatives visant à modifier le statu quo à leur désavan-tage. La remise en question des rela-tions privilégiées avec les États-Unis, la sortie de l'OTAN et du NORAD et le repli sur des positions plus isola-tionnistes pourraient nous attirer de violentes réactions et même des san-c-tions économiques de la part de nos Alliés. Les Canadiens sont-ils prêts à payer le prix la neutralité?

Tout indique que non, du moins pour le moment et ceux qui préconisent le changement en sont parfaitement conscients. Ils comptent sur le temps et sur l'éveil de la population aux nouvelles réalités stratégiques. Cepen-dant, est-il si certain que nous vou-lons ce bouleversement et celui-ci est-il possible?

Il n'y a pas eu jusqu'ici, dans l'histoire canadienne d'après-guerre, d'action publique ou même de pro-position venant des cercles dirigeants pour transformer radicalement nos options en matière de défenses. C'est la première fois qu'un mouvement structurel, recevant le soutien de membres de l'establishment, par-vient à sortir de la marginalité pour tenter d'agir sur les idées reçues. Lorsque l'ancien premier ministre, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, décida, en 1969, de revoir l'ensemble de notre politique étrangère, y compris celle de la défense, les concepts de neutra-lité et de non-alignement furent examinés par des experts, politiques et hauts fonctionnaires réunis pour l'exercice. Il en ressortit que ces deux options, après avoir été étudiées et leurs coûts évalués, étaient inac-ceptables pour M. Trudeau qui les écarta. On constata, de plus, qu'il n'existait ni à l'intérieur du gouver-

nement ni à l'extérieur, d'individu ou de groupe pour plaider en leur faveur. Certains ministres étaient partisans d'un retrait total de nos troupes en Europe ou même d'une solution à la française, où le Canada se serait dégagé de la structure militaire de l'OTAN tout en restant membre de l'Alliance. Mais en aucun cas, les thèses de la neutralité et du non-alignement ne reçurent un appui ou même un avis encourageant de la part du cabinet ou des militaires. Aujourd'hui, devant les changements stratégiques intervenus depuis une dizaine d'années et l'ampleur de la contestation populaire au sujet de nos politiques de défense, le Canada est à la croisée des chemins. Pour plusieurs, le statu quo ne semble plus admissible et pourtant la marge de manœuvre du pays est extrêmement mince. Coincé entre les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique, fortement marqué par la culture, les moeurs et les politiques américaines, le Canada n'a pas les moyens de rompre toutes les amarres avec son puissant voisin du sud et ses alliés européens. En outre, il a la volonté que cela ne serait pas nécessairement bon pour ses intérêts. La voie reste à trouver. □

☐

UNE AUTRE VOIE POUR LE CANADA ?

La politique de défense. Par Jocelyn Coulon

La politique de défense du Canada est l'objet de profondes critiques depuis plusieurs années. Nos liens trop étroits avec les États-Unis, notre participation à la défense des alliés européens et notre engagement dans l'infrastructure nucléaire occidentale sont des sources de mécontentement chez beaucoup de Canadiens.

La contestation de notre politique de défense n'est pas récente, mais elle n'a jamais eu autant d'ampleur que depuis 1983, quand l'ancien gouvernement libéral a autorisé calmement des politiques nationales,

La défense du Canada

Longtemps tournée vers la Grande-Bretagne, la politique de défense du Canada fut toujours dépendante des orientations militaires britanniques, adaptant ses options stratégiques et souvent ses ennemis. Il fut même une époque, avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, où les plans de défense du Canada comportaient des attaques contre le territoire américain. Vexé par les rancunes du siècle dernier. Toute-

En 1812, les armées de la guerre de 1812 et les prétentions annexionnistes américaines furent oubliées lorsque débuta le conflit de 1939-45. La coopération canado-américaine

à commencer à Kingston, le 18 août 1938, quand le président Franklin D. Roosevelt déclara que les États-Unis ne resteraient pas indifférents dans le cas où le territoire canadien serait

menacé par une quelconque puis-
sance. Quelques jours après, le pre-
mier ministre, Mackenzie King,

«d'attaquer les États-Unis en se ser-

La fin de la guerre et la peur de la menace soviétique contribuèrent à la

du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord à l'Organisation

accords de co-production sur le matériel

l'Amérique du nord (NORAD). De
militaire et sur la défense achemine
John Diefenbaker refusa, jusqu'à sa
chue en 1963, de déployer de telles
armes. Après avoir été entreposées,
elles furent complètement retirées
à l'été 1984.

Durant les six premières années de la présente décennie, la scène internationale a particulièrement connu des moments houleux et le Canada en a subi les contre-coups. La crise

des euromissiles à cibranie l'Alliance et entraîné ainsi le malaise général de la population envers les armes nucléaires. Les négociations américano-soviétiques ont été

pratiquement paralysées. Malgré
deux sommets récents entre les diri-
geants des deux superpuissances
nous sommes encore loin d'une en-
tente globale sur le contrôle des

armements. Parallèlement à ces événements, en 1983, le gouvernement canadien signait un accord permettant l'essai, en sol canadien, du missile de croisière américain en pro-

voquant la colère des pacifistes et la division au sein de l'opinion publique. Quelques mois plus tôt, le président Ronald Reagan présentait son plan d'initiative de défense stratégique.

(IDS), qui remet en question les fondements de la dissuasion nucléaire. Enfin, tout au long de 1985, les audiences publiques sur le renouvel-

montré les liens futurs possibles entre la défense aérienne et le projet IDS, accentuant notre dépendance militaire envers les États-Unis.

Malgré les avertissements répétés de nombreux experts, le gouvernement Mulroney a signé l'entente et se trouve donc sans la garantie que le pays ne serait pas entraîné dans

la «guerre des étoiles» sans son consentement.

nationale et de confusion intérieure, concernant la politique de défense, qu'une partie de la population commence à réagir. Après une vague de

La réaction publique

donc le symptôme le plus violent fut l'attentat à la bombe contre la firme L'itton de Toronto en 1982, le mouvement visant à changer nos politiques militaires (associations assez hétéro-clie d'écologistes, de pacifistes et de nationalistes) s'est transformé pour mieux structurer ses actions et prendre des décisions réalisées.

acceptables. La modération ainsi affichée attire beaucoup d'intellectuels, mais plus encore, les idées véhiculées pénètrent les partis politiques et réussissent à obtenir

L'appui de personnalités prestigieuses, Les sociaux-démocrates du Nouveau parti démocratique réaffirment leurs intentions de retirer le Canada de l'OTAN et de l'accord NORAD,

alors que certains éléments du Parti libéral radicalisent ses positions sur nos relations militaires avec les Etats-Unis, rejetant maintenant les essais du missile de croisière.

Du côté des individus, des person-
nalités comme Johnson, Dyer et
Ignatieff viennent donner leur appui
à certaines manifestations et n'hési-
tent pas à prendre fermement pos-

tion sur un aspect ou l'autre de notre politique de défense. Les deux premiers soutiennent la neutralité alors que le troisième se prononce plutôt pour l'adhésion plus stricte de

L'indépendance nationale sans rupture totale avec les Etats-Unis ou les Alliés. Les tenants de la neutralité ne sont pas des utopistes qui voudraient voir

le Canada complètement assumer et se retirer des affaires internationales. Au contraire. Très conscients des responsabilités du Canada comme membre du système occidental, ils

suédois ou finlandais, qui tout en
restant loin de la rivalité Est-Ouest,
dépendent plus que le Canada pour
sauvegarder leur indépendance.

Johnson et Dyer pensent que la neutralité est possible financièrement et acceptable politiquement. Tout d'abord, ils préconisent le retrait du Canada de l'OTAN et de l'accord

NORAD. Les forces que nous maintenons en Europe sont symboliques par rapport à la présence américaine.

Les plaintes les plus virulentes formulées au sujet de la structure administrative de l'ONU concernent le Secrétariat, sa taille, ses catégories d'emplois, ses habitudes en matière de déplacements et ses compétences. Toute grande organisation bureaucratique, que ce soit le gouvernement du Canada ou Coca-Cola, souffre de certains défauts. A l'ONU, la nécessité de respecter ce qu'on appelle la «répartition géographique équilibrée» du personnel au sein du Secrétariat vient compliquer les problèmes bureaucratiques normaux. C'est ainsi que des Etats membres du genre Israël ou Israël ont des représentants au sein du Conseil de Sécurité, mais pas de représentants au sein du Conseil de Sécurité. Et il est arrivé que des Etats membres cherchent à faire nommer à l'ONU une personne qu'ils voulaient évincer de leur propre gouvernement. Ainsi, l'efficacité, les compétences et les aptitudes n'ont parfois pas autant d'importance qu'elles le devraient au moment du recrutement. Par ailleurs, il existe un certain surclassement aux niveaux supérieurs de l'ONU, où les fonctionnaires grassement payés sont légion. Les conclusions du Groupe des 18, tout comme les autres rapports rédigés sur la question, insistent toutes sur la nécessité pour le Secrétaire général de prendre la situation en compte, de recruter le personnel en fonction des compétences et de l'expérience, et de réduire le nombre des secrétaires généraux adjoints et des sous-secrétaires généraux. La plupart des observateurs pensaient que ce serait là une tâche facile à proposer mais difficile à accomplir, mais M. Pérez de Cuellar s'est déjà mis à l'œuvre.

Aux Etats-Unis, on considère que l'ONU est un employeur trop peu exigeant pour ce qui est des heures de travail et des congés annuels. Dans leur rapport, MM. Aga Khan et Strong ont recommandé de revenir à la journée de travail de huit heures et de ne plus accorder au personnel que quatre semaines de congé annuel au lieu de six.

La plupart des observateurs s'accrochent à réduire le doublement des efforts. Il est arrivé souvent que l'ONU excède de son côté un travail déjà entrepris par une institution spécialisée, ou qu'un programme continue d'exister longtemps après que d'autres organismes en eurent assumé le mandat ou que les circonstances en eurent éliminé la raison d'être, ou encore qu'un programme soit créé parce que les Etats mem-

bres ne parvenaient pas à s'entendre sur une solution politique à un problème donné. Les programmes d'assistance technique de l'ONU ont fait l'objet de critiques parce qu'ils font double emploi avec le Programme des Nations-Unies pour le développement, à certains égards, les commissions économiques régionales, qui sont financées à même le budget ordinaire, exécutent les mêmes tâches qu'on s'attendait à ce que les commissions économiques régionales, qui sont financées à même le budget ordinaire, exécutent les mêmes tâches. C'est le processus budgétaire et les décisions que l'Assemblée générale a prises à cet égard qui ont souvent conduit à ce qu'on a proposé d'instaurer le vote pondéré. Certains Etats membres estiment que, sur les questions budgétaires, le scrutin devrait être pondéré en faveur de ceux dont la contribution était la plus élevée.

«Les comités, commissions, sous-comités et autres groupes semblables qui se réunissent trop souvent sur les bords enchanteurs du lac de Genève ou du Danube bien, ou encore à deux kilomètres à peine de Broadway, risquent d'enrayer le processus de croissance... Bien sûr, c'est là une sorte de corruption de notre être qui est loin d'être confinée au secteur public. Le coût annuel d'une telle prolifération n'équivaut sans doute pas au prix d'un chasseur à réaction, mais même les partisans du relâchement ne pourraient fermer les yeux sur le superflu inutile, le doublement excessif des activités» — John Holmes

— c'était l'objet de l'amendement Kassebaum. L'ONU n'a finalement pas accepté cette formule, mais les pays ont convenu qu'il devrait y avoir un consensus parmi les Etats membres au sujet des questions budgétaires. Cela signifie que la situation où des principaux donateurs votent contre le budget ne devrait plus se reproduire dans l'avenir.

Les membres de l'Assemblée ont discuté de la proposition voulant qu'on limite à un niveau inférieur le montant maximal de la contribution d'un Etat donné, mais ils n'ont pu s'entendre là-dessus. On avait avancé divers pourcentages à cet égard : 20, 15 ou même 10 p. 100. Une telle proposition suppose évidemment que d'autres pays, notamment des puissances moyennes comme le Canada, le Royaume-Uni, la France et l'Allemagne, devraient payer davantage. La plupart des Etats membres avaient espéré que, par suite des réformes de 1986 et de la résolution adoptée à ce sujet, les Etats-Unis paieraient leurs arriérés ou verseraient une contribution au moins égale à 20 p. 100 du budget. Mais tel ne semble pas être le cas : les crédits affectés à l'ONU dans le budget du Département d'Etat pour l'année en cours ne laissent pas présager un retour aux niveaux de financement antérieurs.

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Pour en savoir plus

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- John Holmes, «The United Nations in Perspective», *Behind the Headlines*, octobre 1986.
- Rapport du groupe d'experts intergouvernementaux de haut niveau chargé d'examiner l'efficacité du fonctionnement administratif et financier de l'ONU, 15 août 1986, 39 pages.
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LA CRISE FINANCIÈRE DE L'ONU :

Mettre de l'ordre dans ses affaires. Par Nancy Gordon

Depuis 1945, le Canada a en général pensé et agi comme s'il était dans son intérêt que l'ONU soit forte.

Comme, du point de vue géogra-
phique, le Canada est lié à l'Étai-
plus peuplé du monde, nos diri-
gants ont eu tendance à considérer
(M.), comme un antidote, parfois
bienvenu bien qu'ambigu, contre l'in-
fluence américaine. C'est pourquoi
les observateurs ont été quelque peu
surpris en lisant le discours que
M. Joe Clark, ministre des Affaires
extérieures, a prononcé à l'ONU en
septembre, car il s'y est montré «un
pion dur» à l'endroit de cette dernière.
Après avoir déclaré que le Canada

quant l'inefficacité de l'organisation des Etats membres qui refusent de s'en servir. Plus tard Mulhoney, qui était de passage à l'ONU, a déclaré : « Il ne convenait pas que l'ONU ait à demander l'aumône, et nous n'allions pas per-

« Il se pourrait bien que les propos accueillis d'un ami tel que M. Clark ont finalement convaincu les pays de la nécessité d'opérer des réformes. Chaque année à l'automne, le Secrétaire général de l'ONU diffuse un rapport sur l'état de l'Organisation. Cette année, il était impossible d'obtenir le document après des

L'ONU avait épuisé ses ressources : les machines à affranchir avaient été rachetées en nombre et, par mesure d'économie, elle avait décidé de ne pas réapprovisionner ces machines à affranchir avant une date indéterminée en 1987.

Bat Bani, sans aucun doute : on pouvait trouver ailleurs le texte du rapport et le faire photocopier. Mais

L'incident donne une bonne idée des difficultés financières auxquelles l'ONU s'est heurtée à la fin, quand les États-Unis ont annoncé qu'ils réduiraient de 70 à 110 millions de dollars leur contribution mise en recouvrement. L'ONU risquait fort de se trouver à court d'argent. Le budget ordinaire de l'ONU provient des contributions mises en

recouvrement auprès des États membres, celles-ci étant normalement fonction de la solvabilité desdits États. À cause des écarts entre les fortunes des pays, qui sont mesurées d'après le produit national brut (PNB), les pays riches paient la vaste

majorité du budget. En 1980, les contributions des États-Unis, du Japon, de l'URSS, de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et du Canada ont été fixées respectivement à 25, 10,8, 10,2, 8,2, 6,3, 4,86 et 3,06 p. 100. Seulement seize États ont payé plus de p. 100 du budget, tandis que soixante-dix-huit États ont versé le minimum, soit

0,01 p. 100. En 1986, le budget ordinaire de l'ONU plus de 800 millions de dollars US. De ce montant, les États-Unis auraient dû verser 210 millions, l'URSS, 75,9 millions, la Grande-Bretagne, 34 millions, et le Canada, 12,4 millions.

Avant d'amorcer une discussion quelconque sur les finances de

l'ONU, il importe d'examiner soigneusement les sommes d'argent dont il s'agit, dans le contexte des dépenses gouvernementales nationales. «Des possibilités». C'est l'expression que la contributrice du Canada : 24 millions en devises de notre pays. Cela se compare à 30 millions pour payer un chasseur CF-18 (et nous en

achetons 138), ou encore à 490 millions pour financer Via Rail pendant un an.

partie ont commencé à reculer, une primauté méconcomente à l'égard de divers programmes de l'ONU. L'URSS a amorcé cette pratique quant elle a refusé de verser sa quote-part pour payer les opérations de l'ONU au Congo et au Moyen-Orient. La France a fait de même à l'égard des

opérations s'est répandue par la suite, pratique qui est répandue au moins dix-huit États ont retenu une partie de leur contribution. Aux États-Unis, l'opposition à l'ONU même, et plus particulièrement à son processus budgétaire et à ses méthodes administratives, s'accroît depuis quelque temps déjà. La *Heritage Foundation* avait déclenché l'attaque, et des

membres du gouvernement avaient appuyé, tantôt tacitement, tantôt ouvertement, les critiques dirigées contre l'ONU. Le Congrès a exprimé ce mécontentement quand il a sanctionné l'amendement Kassebaum qui stipulait que les États-Unis réduiraient leur contribution à l'ONU à moins que, pour les questions budgétaires, elle adoptait un système de

violation pondérée. On a également évoqué, à ce moment-là, la loi Gramsc-Rudman qui accorde au président le pouvoir de réduire les dépenses pour atténuer le déficit. Le processus budgétaire de l'UNO, inquitée de nombreux États, et plus particulièrement ceux qui y contribuent beaucoup. Les pays qui versent peu à l'UNO, mettent l'accent

sur des programmes intéressants peu, pour ne pas dire pas du tout, les États riches. Tout récemment, d'ailleurs, sont tenus de payer leur contribution. Cependant, le système international évolue, mais il ne recourt pas encore au droit international afin de punir ceux qui violent ce principe.

Etats membres décident qu'ils ne
relations internationales, et si des
relations politiques existe encore dans les

de très inégalitaires. Ainsi, au lieu d'être un organisme plus petit, plus pauvre et à adhésion exclusive, elle demeure une entité universelle, capable en théorie de mener une action concertée.

mandats sur des mesures à moyen et à long terme qui lui permettraient d'éviter une crise financière et de renforcer ses mécanismes et ses politiques en matière d'administration, de gestion et de personnel. En avril 1986, à l'occasion d'une session extraordinaire, elle s'est penchée sur des mesures à court terme susceptibles de lui garantir les moyens de payer ses comptes.

En fait, l'ONU a terminé l'année 1986 avec un excédent de 10 millions de dollars, en dépit du fait que les Etats-Unis ont versé seulement la moitié de leur contribution de mise en recouvrement. Le Secrétaire

général a pris diverses mesures d'économie au cours de l'année, ce qui a réduit le budget à environ 700 millions de dollars. Il a ordonné de cesser toute embauche, de réduire les déplacements et les heures supplémentaires, de reporter des projets de construction et d'annuler des réunions et des conférences. En 1986, les effectifs de l'ONOU ont

diminué de 9 p. 100 par élimination naturelle. La crise a par ailleurs incité ceux que la chose intéressait et qui considéraient bien le sujet à tenir des réunions et à rédiger des rapports. Sadrudin Aga Khan, ancien Haut Commissaire de l'ONU pour les réfugiés, et Maurice Strong, divers rôles

à l'INOU, ont formulé une série de recommandations, le Canadien George Davidson, ancien Secrétaire général adjoint de l'INOU, a joué un rôle actif au sein de leur groupe. La Fondation Stanley a elle aussi présenté une analyse. Ces rapports, tout comme les recommandations du Groupe des 18 qui ont été diffusées en août puis érudites par l'Assemblée

général à la communauté internationale, nous nous efforçons d'apporter une contribution à leur contribution.

L'art de traiter le plus important sujet du monde. Par Richard Handler

Au début, c'était sans doute la seule émission radio-
diffusée au pays – et peut-être aussi la seule manifes-
tation de l'intérêt des médias pour la question – à
consacrer chaque semaine du temps aux questions
concernant la guerre nucléaire et la paix.

concernant la guerre nucléaire et la paix.

sur la dissuasion, sur l'hiver
paralyse et le statisme.
En premier lieu, toute personne
nucléaire et sur ce qu'un parent ou

ite la seule émission radio-
re aussi la seule manifes-
pour la question – à
u temps aux questions
ire et la paix.

« L'homme du péril nucléaire. Mais en fait, il n'a rien pu ressentir et vivait de la guerre nucléaire. Nous n'avons jamais été assujettis à la tyrannie des titres à la une (nous évitons de compter sur les nouvelles spectaculaires pour donner de l'attrait à nos entrées), mais j'ai toujours pensé qu'une bonne partie des règles applicables ailleurs s'appliquent aussi à mon travail — mon interlocuteur « potentiel » doit me présenter quelque chose de « neuf » sur la guerre nucléaire avant que j'accepte de lui passer l'antenne. Mais nos auditeurs ne sont pas à la

«... et à l'émission *MorningSide* de
fourniste, ni de rêveur, ni d'original
qui réurgit des idées mille fois
remâchées auparavant! Nous ne vou-
lions pas de ces gens qui parlent
comme s'ils étaient des magnétopho-
nes (même si je dois admettre qu'il
nous est arrivé d'en avoir quelques-
uns à *MorningSide*). Et puis, nos
invités doivent dialoguer avec Peter,
ils ne doivent pas se contenter de lui
parler. Ce qui nous amène au pro-
blème des «experts».

D'autres émissions font futur grâce aux experts – tout ce mystère et toute cette indifférence de la part d'hommes (en général) qui habitent les capitales du monde! Mais dans notre contexte, les experts risquent d'être ennuyeux. Ils s'apparentent souvent à une bombe à neutrons : ils

« Je ne suis pas un homme d'affaires », dit-il, « mais j'ai décidé d'inviter des experts à l'occasion, mais aussi des personnes qui avaient commencé à réfléchir à la guerre nucléaire et au concept de sécurité dans son ensemble même si ce n'était pas la leur métier – et c'est là un aspect essentiel. Ces personnes auraient un perception inhabituelle de notre dilemme. L'enseignant comme Susan Harveys observait les attitudes des enfants face à la guerre nucléaire, tandis qu'un psychologue et un logicien comme Anatoli Rapoport ferait de la théorie des jeux son « prisme » pour décomposer le débat nucléaire en ses divers aspects. Les

Depuis deux ans, je réalise la chronique hebdomadaire qui porte sur la guerre nucléaire, la défense, la paix et la sécurité. Elle est diffusée le jeudi, habituellement à la troisième heure de l'émission. *Morning-side* – c'est ainsi que cette dernière s'intitule en anglais – s'accompagne de Radio-Canada on appelle la «radio sommaire, et Peter Gzowski est l'animateur. Environ un million d'auditeurs nous écoutent pendant la semaine, tous les quarts d'heure, au minimum un quart du nombre total d'auditeurs synchroisant notre programme, tout dépendant de l'heure (à peu près 180 000 pour la chronique «Guerre et paix»). Les auditeurs ont leur mot à dire: ils se sentent chez eux avec nous. Ils écrivent des milliers de lettres à Peter Gzowski – certaines breves, d'autres longues – et elles sont remplies d'observations, d'idées, de confessions, de recettes et de poèmes. Peter s'occupe de son courrier avec la passion d'un éditeur. Il croit ses correspondants réalisateurs. Il croit ses correspondants (plus) qu'il ne croit ses réalisateurs, à cet aspect du de l'histoire. Et c'est ainsi qu'il a commencé à sentir que le spectre de la guerre nucléaire inquiétait de plus en plus certains de ses auditeurs.

Un réalisateur met des gens en ondes, il trouve des idées, interviewe des personnes qu'il songe à inviter à une émission, mène des recherches et rédige un mot d'introduction, une sorte de questions et des notes préparatoires. Dans le passé, j'ai réalisé des émissions sur la question nucléaire, sur les pourparlers concernant les armements, sur les tensions causées par l'arme atomique, sur les craintes des superpuissances.

tant» risque d'être assommant à la radio, surtout s'il faut parler de la fin du monde. Pendant combien de temps pouvait-on évoquer le jour du jugement dernier avant d'irriter nos auditeurs ? Étais-ce bien là ce qu'ils voulaient voir traiter ? Je devais penser à ce que nous analyserions chaque semaine – sans paralyser nos

recherche de nouvelles fraîcheurs ou de nouveauté. Ce ne sont pas des réalisateurs d'émissions sur l'actualité. Ils ont assisté à l'échec de la décente et à l'intensification des tensions dans les années 1980. Ils étaient nerveux, et certains étaient même effrayés. Et ils ont commencé à écrire; un auditeur nous a proposé de consacrer une partie de notre émission à la menace nucléaire. Pendant une de nos réunions de préparation, Peter Gzowski a alors présenté la proposition de cet auditeur et demandé la création d'une chronique sur la guerre et la paix. L'idée m'a beaucoup plu, et je lui ai donné suite, car il s'agissait en fait d'un des thèmes les plus importants de notre époque. Évidemment, ce qui est impor-

Aucun cliché ne serait permis (il n'y a rien de mieux qu'une catastrophe pour faire surgir la banalité). Les invités devraient aider les auditeurs à se sensibiliser davantage au dilemme en question.

Censurer la banalité est peut-être contraire à la démocratie, mais c'est un acte essentiel à la compréhension de l'émission et de la chronique.

Chaque semaine, je reçois des communications de presse de la part d'apôtres de la dénucléarisation qui font du jogging, marchent, courent, méditent, scandent des slogans ou sonnent des cloches pour la paix. Mais je ne peux pas les inviter sur les ondes. La plupart d'entre eux sont tout au plus de bons citoyens, mais ils ne sont pas au second ordre : une fois que l'invité a expliqué les motifs de ses actions, a-t-on atteint les limites de son savoir ? (Je ne juge pas ici toujours ces personnes dévouées à leur cause : je songe simplement au temps qu'il dispose – seize minutes précisément – et au contenu intellectuel de l'émission. Ceux et celles qui viennent à répondre par la négative à cette deuxième question iront peut-être au ciel avant moi, mais ils ne seront pas invités à prendre l'antenne à mon émission.) Ce qu'il nous faut, ce sont des interlocuteurs ayant quelque chose à dire, car *MorningSide* est l'une des dernières émissions offrant encore des essais ou des discussions sous forme d'entrevues. Je dis bien des «essais», car les meilleurs invités de *MorningSide* expriment un point de vue personnel qui clarifie leur argument (ce que font, d'ailleurs, les meilleurs essayistes, car un essai vise toujours à faire découvrir quelque chose – les structures de l'investigation et l'intention personnelle l'ayant inspirée). Ce sont seulement les meilleurs essais (ou les meilleurs romans à suspens), mais aussi les meilleures conférences radiophoniques. Et qu'il y ait toujours un lien entre la recherche de certains auteurs et la recherche de certains intellectuels, ce n'est pas un défaut, mais un avantage.

Les personnes qui, en dépit des dispositions officielles, des jargons techniques et des ambiguïtés pédagogiques de l'esprit humain, décou-

termes dans des essais nous a en-
voudions-nous vivre avec ou sans les
armes nucléaires ? Si c'est avec,
parce que notre sécurité en dépend,
combien devons-nous en garder ? Et
si c'est sans, comment assurer notre
défense par des moyens classiques ?
Comment s'y prendre pour négocier
une réduction des forces convention-
nelles avec l'Union soviétique et ses
alliés ? Existe-t-il un seuil de défense
classique susceptible d'offrir une
garantie suffisante contre la guerre ?
Pour l'instant, l'avantage dans ce
débat appartient à l'Union soviétique.
Le moraliste sur les essais nucléaires,
a été maintenu pendant plus de dix-
huit mois, et l'on peut difficilement
blâmer les Soviétiques de l'avoir
abandonné, vu la reprise des essais
aux Etats-Unis. Dans leurs déclara-
tions publiques, les Soviétiques sem-
blent plus que disposés à s'engager
dans la voie d'un désarmement
nucléaire mutuel et radical. Bien
certain, il peut ne s'agir là que d'une
apparence. Nombreux sont ceux qui,
méditants à l'égard des Russes, y
voient un simple exercice de propa-
gande ou affirmant qu'il ne coûte
rien de prouver la dénucléarisation
puisque celle-ci est, de toute façon,
irréalisable. Toutefois, même si nous
supposons que les Soviétiques soient
mouvés par le plus pur cynisme, le
dilemme qui confronte les peuples
occidentaux demeure. Si nous vou-
lions garder l'arme nucléaire, rien ne
sert vraiment de continuer à protes-
ter contre son existence, ou contre la
nécessité des essais. Par contre, si
nous voulons nous en débarrasser,
devrons, pour parvenir à l'objectif,
cheminer sur une voie longue et rem-
plie d'embûches, de frustations et
de problèmes de toutes sortes, une
voie qui risque de nous effrayer.
L'interdiction totale des essais
nucléaires n'est sans doute pas le
« Graal » qui tenait tant à cœur à Glen
Seaborg, mais les efforts déployés en
ce sens ont permis à tout le moins de
mettre en évidence la terrible ambi-
guïté inhérente à notre connaissance
des armes nucléaires et de leur
effroyable pouvoir destructeur. □


Des spécialistes de la vérification soutiennent que le seuil d'une kilotonne est trop bas et qu'une limite plus élevée — de cinq à dix kilotonnes, par exemple — lèverait l'ambiguïté et favoriserait par le fait même l'instauration d'un climat de confiance entre les superpuissances.

D'autres sismologues, comme Lynn Sykes de l'Université Columbia et, d'ailleurs, de nombreux spécialistes non américains travaillant au sein du Groupe d'experts scientifiques à Genève, affirment qu'un réseau international de stations de mesure et de communications garantirait le respect des ententes, même avec un seuil d'une kilotonne. Le débat à ce sujet n'est pas facile, mais il semble que l'on commence à pencher en faveur d'un seuil très bas comme option praticable dont les répercussions sur la modernisation des armes stratégiques serait limitée mais importante.

Le gouvernement Reagan n'est toutefois pas de cet avis. Ces dernières années, il a avancé de multiples raisons pour justifier la poursuite des essais nucléaires. La vérification en est une : maintes fois, les États-Unis ont accusé l'URSS de se soustraire aux dispositions du Traité sur la limitation partielle des essais nucléaires. Mais de l'aveu de Washington, la vérification n'est pas la principale question en cause. D'autres arguments ont été avancés, dont l'obligation d'accroître la sécurité des armes nucléaires en voie de mise au point. En outre, le gouvernement américain a beaucoup insisté sur la nécessité de garantir la fiabilité des armes déjà en stock. À cet égard, on a cité des cas où des armes nucléaires déployées sur missile ne sur sous-marin n'ont pas explosé lors des essais, ou ont fourni un rendement nettement inférieur.

Mais en filigrane de tous ces arguments s'en dessine un autre qui est au cœur même de l'actuel dilemme en Occident concernant la maîtrise des armements et la sécurité internationale : le gouvernement Reagan, contrairement au régime Carter, a déclaré qu'une interdiction totale des essais nucléaires ne sera pas souhaitable tant que la dissuasion, la sécurité nationale et la stabilité internationale dépendront des armes nucléaires. Il y a toute la différence du monde entre, d'une part, reconnaître les difficultés rattachées à la mise en oeuvre d'une telle interdiction et, d'autre part, affirmer que une telle interdiction serait contraire aux intérêts des pays occidentaux. Le gouvernement Reagan a fait cette affirmation dans les premières années de son mandat. Or ne s'y est pas attardé, croyant alors à une position essentiellement polémique. Mais depuis le discours prononcé le 15 janvier 1986 par M. Gorbatchev, qui évoquait un plan pour dénucléariser le globe avant la fin du siècle, et depuis le sommet de Reykjavik, où le président américain et son homologue soviétique ont partagé la vision d'un monde affranchi de l'arme nucléaire, l'opposition dans l'administration Reagan à une interdiction totale des essais nucléaires assume une tout autre dimension.

Après Reykjavik, les gouvernements d'Europe occidentale, le Comité conjoint des chefs d'état-major aux États-Unis (JCS), le Secrétaire à la Défense Weinberger et d'autres dignitaires du gouvernement Reagan se sont efforcés d'imprimer l'impression que les États-Unis et leurs alliés étaient impatients d'en arriver à la dénucléarisation du monde. En bref, ces milieux affirment que la liquidation des armes nucléaires placerait les Alliés dans une position de faiblesse vis-à-vis de l'Union soviétique et que la sécurité du globe serait compromise et non accrue. Comme les pourparlers de Reykjavik, la recherche d'une inter-



Henry Chan

n'avons pas forcément besoin d'inter-
dire tous les essais nucléaires : il
pourrait suffire de limiter à un seuil
très bas la puissance explosive des
engins testés. C'est pourquoi, au
Congrès des Etats-Unis, les partisans
de l'interdiction cherchent à pro-
mouvoir une résolution qui prohi-
berait l'essai de charges nucléaires
ayant une puissance explosive supé-
rieure à une kilotonne. En fixant un
tel seuil, on empêcherait justement
les essais de nouveaux engins stra-
tégiques nucléaires. Les réalités qui
sous-tendent ce choix sont assez
complexes, mais elles se résument
grosso modo comme suit : le rende-
ment d'un nouveau dispositif
nucléaire ne peut être garanti que si
celui-ci fait l'objet d'au moins un
essai à sa puissance explosive nomi-
nale. Certes, l'imposition d'un seuil,
même aussi bas qu'une kilotonne,
n'empêcherait pas certaines catégo-
ries d'essais, mais il est peu probable
que les superpuissances docent leurs
arsenaux d'un nouvel engin nucléaire
qu'elles n'auraient pas fait exploser
au moins une fois à sa puissance
nominale. Etant donné qu'une arme
de une kilotonne, voire de trois ou
cinq kilotonnes, ne présenterait
aucune utilité sur le plan stratégique
ni même tactique, la limite d'une
kilotonne entraverait la modernisa-
tion des systèmes stratégiques, dans
la mesure où l'on entend par moder-
nisation la mise en oeuvre de nou-
veaux types d'armes.

Pourquoi fixer la limite à une kilo-
tonne plutôt qu'à zéro ? La réponse
est liée au problème de la vérification.
Pour certains spécialistes, une inter-
diction totale des essais nucléaires
(seuil zéro) se solderait par une
flambée d'accusations et de contre-
accusations, chacun dénonçant son
adversaire d'avoir violé le traité.
Même si l'essai était le plus significatif,
même s'il restait sans conséquences,
sur les plans militaires et techniques,
tôt fait tôt saisi, une infraction qui aurait
constitué l'essai d'une kilotonne
serait-elle assortie des mêmes pro-
blèmes ? Le débat a ce propos est
sans cesse ouvert, et il ne manque pas de parti-
sans sérieux pour défendre les deux
aspects de la question.

D'après certains sismologues, il se
produit chaque année quelque 30 000
séismes produisant une onde de choc
comparable à celle engendrée par
l'explosion d'une bombe d'une kilo-
tonne ; il faudrait donc non seulement
les détecter, mais également les ex-
pliquer afin d'éviter tout risque
de confusion entre une explosion



Howey Chan

EN QUÊTE DU GRAAL :

L'interdiction totale des essais nucléaires. Par David Cox

« Je tiens à préciser au lecteur que l'absence d'un traité sur l'interdiction totale des essais nucléaires constitue à mes yeux un échec tragique pour l'humanité. »

Ces paroles sont de Gienn Seaborg, l'ancien directeur de la Commission aux États-Unis et principal négociateur pour le président Kennedy dans le cadre des pourparlers qui ont abouti en 1963 à la signature du Traité sur l'interdiction partielle des essais nucléaires.

Seaborg s'est joint à un groupe éminent d'anciens hauts fonctionnaires, dont Averral Harriman, Robert MacNamara en même Harold Brown – qui, à l'exemple de pénitents battant leur coulepe, disent regretter années à Washington pour aider à juguler la course aux armements. Dans son ouvrage, Seaborg évoque de manière très vivante l'effort fourni au début des années 1960 pour en arriver à une interdiction totale des essais nucléaires. À cette époque, les deux superpuissances effectuaient leurs essais dans l'atmosphère, et le problème posé par les retonibées radioactives suscitait une grande angoisse chez le public. Les négociations en vue d'une interdiction des essais nucléaires ont commencé en 1958, mais elles ont pitié pendant plusieurs années, en raison surtout de divergences concernant la nécessité des inspections sur les lieux et d'autres mesures de vérification. Soudaine-

ment est intervenue la crise de Cuba, coup de théâtre qui a poussé les États-Unis et l'URSS au bord du gouffre nucléaire. Le péril écarté, Kennedy et Khrouchtchev se sont engagés à trouver des mesures aptes à freiner une course aux armements nucléaires qui, aux yeux de beaucoup, était devenue on ne peut plus irréversible.

Malgré les efforts déployés durant les négociations, les superpuissances, aux côtés desquelles siégeait la Grande-Bretagne, n'ont pas réussi à

parvenus à résoudre la majorité des vau en 1980, les négociateurs sont portés à croire qu'en 1977 et de nou-

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■ Dans l'article principal du pré-

sent numéro, David Cox analyse

les chances pour que soit conclue un

traité sur l'interdiction des essais

nucléaires. Le sujet est d'actualité,

car Moscou vient de mettre fin à son

moratoire unilatéral sur les essais,

malgré que la Maison Blanche pour-

siste à nier que la limitation des

armements n'est pas le but de la

réduction des essais dans le con-

texté plus vaste de la limitation des

armements. Il décrit les difficultés

techniques de l'interdiction des

essais nucléaires.

Les concepteurs d'armes nucléai-

res envisagent de créer des installa-

tions souterraines réutilisables pour

exécuter des essais avec des bombes

de 300 tonnes. Il faudrait alors savoir

si de tels essais pourraient être détec-

tés, vu la faible puissance explosive

des engins. Si une explosion nucléaire

rendu détaillé sur l'atelier et l'étude

ayant concerné l'interdiction totale

des essais nucléaires.

■ Les autres articles du numéro

abordent l'ensemble des thèmes con-

cernant la paix et la sécurité:

Richard Handler nous renseigne

sur la façon dont l'une des émissions

les plus populaires à la radio anglo-

phone canadienne présente la question

relativement sombre de la guerre et

de la paix dans les années 1980;

Nancy Gordon examine de près les

malheurs financiers des Nations-Unies

et affiche, en terminant, un

optimisme prudent; Jocelyn Coulton

■ *Paix et Sécurité* paraît

tous les trois mois; ce bul-

letin vise à informer la

population canadienne sur

les activités de l'Institut et

à favoriser l'expression de

toutes les opinions ayant

cours au pays sur les ques-

tions susmentionnées. Les

opinions formulées dans

chaque article sont exclu-

N'hésitez pas à nous faire

part de vos observations

et idées.

Les textes de ce bulletin

peuvent être reproduits,

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PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

INTERDICTION COMPLÈTE DES ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES

Par David Cox
Objectif wopique?



Dans le présent numéro:

Richard Handler
La chronique "Guerre
et paix" à l'émission
MorningSide de CBC -
Point de vue du réalisateur.

Nancy Gordon
Pourquoi les coffres de
l'ONU sont-ils vides?

Jocelyn Coulon
Le neutralisme au Canada.

Joel Sokolsky
Nouveau cap pour la
Marine américaine.
Qu'en pense le Canada?

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PEACE & SECURITY

CAI
IPS
- P27

WEAPONS FOR THE THIRD WORLD

Finding alternatives to buying more

By Chris Smith



Mary Lou Finlay

As El Salvador struggles through years of civil war the society is polarized and the economy grows poorer.

Michael Tucker

In a little noticed event last fall, the nations of Europe agreed on ways to reduce the risk of war.

Timothy J. Colton

Gorbachev's regime is altering the way professional Soviet-watchers in the West look at Russia and its capacity for change.

Michael Howard

A pre-eminent military historian tackles peace movements and the meaning of peace.

Also in this issue:

Institute Publications 1986-87

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

1. **Superpower Rivalry and Soviet Policy in the Caribbean Basin**, by Neil MacFarlane, June 1986, 70 pages.

2. **Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective**, by David Cox, December 1986, 50 pages.

ANNUAL REVIEW

A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1985-86. 285 pages.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

6. **The Origins of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security**, by Gilles Grondin, August 1986.

7. **Satellite Surveillance and Canadian Capabilities**, by Ron Buckingham, October 1986.

8. **Peace in Central America?**, by Steven Baranyi, October 1986.

9. **A Second Look at No First Use**, by Fen Osler Hampson, November 1986.

10. **The Debate About Peace Education**, by Elizabeth Richards, December 1986.

11. **Nuclear Disarmament: The Gorbachev Initiative**, by John R. Walker, January 1987.

12. **Who's Ahead: Examining the Nuclear Balance**, by Jane Boulden, March 1987.

13. **Review of the Geneva Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions**, by David Cox, June 1987.

POINTS OF VIEW

1. **East/West Relations: Values, Interests, Perceptions**, by Geoffrey Pearson, March 1986.

2. **Nuclear Weapons and the Averting of War**, by Robert Malcolmson, October 1986.

3. **Canadian Press Coverage of Arms Control and Disarmament Issues**, by John R. Walker, March 1987.

4. **Maintaining Peace With Freedom: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control**, by Lorne Green, March 1987.

CONFERENCE REPORTS

2. **Challenges to Deterrence: Doctrines, Technologies and Public Concerns**, Proceedings of Conference, Ottawa, 17-19 October 1985, by Dianne DeMille.

3. **The Risk of Accidental Nuclear War**, Proceedings of Conference, Vancouver 26-30 May 1986, by Andrea Demchuk.

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

Three articles in this issue touch on the dilemmas presented by the purchase and manufacture of military equipment by countries that are hard put to provide the basics of life for their people.

Mary Lou Finlay's essay on El Salvador resulted from a recent visit to prepare a documentary film series for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. She describes the grim state of El Salvador's economy after eight years of civil war and notes that the only growth industry around is the military.

In a wide-ranging interview originally recorded for the TV Ontario programme *Realities*, the British historian Sir Michael Howard takes a self-described 'heretical' position on the idea that Third World conflicts like that between Iran and Iraq are sustained by the international arms trade. "The Third World are grown-up people; they have real problems, they have real conflicts. And to regard them as simply the puppets of arms manufacturers is... insulting to them."

Our cover article this issue comes from an expert in the area of arms and development, Chris Smith, a researcher at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. Smith shows that while the volume of arms purchases has declined or is stagnant, there will be renewed demand for a new generation of weapons systems by the turn of the century. He maintains that this next round of arms purchases is beyond the ability of Third World economies to sustain, and alternative solutions must be found to poor countries' very real security problems.

Other articles include a reflective look by the director of University of Toronto's Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Timothy Colton, at the impact Mikhail Gorbachev has had on how the West views the USSR. And Michael Tucker, a CIIPS Research Fellow and professor of Political Science at Mount Allison University, examines how representatives of thirty-five countries managed last Fall in Stockholm to agree on measures that could reduce the chances of a European war by misadventure.

As this issue was going to press, the Government of Canada published its long-awaited 'White Paper' on defence policy. The main points of the document are outlined in the "Defence Notes" column on page 16. The Fall issue of *Peace&Security* will present more detailed analysis of both the policy itself and the reaction to it.

Michael Bryans

CANADIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY

307 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0P7
(613) 990-1593

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Associate Editor:

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French Review Page Editor:

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Chris Smith is a researcher at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex; **Mary Lou Finlay** is a reporter and producer for CBC Television's *The Journal*; **Michael Tucker** is Professor of Political Science at Mount Allison University and CIIPS Research Fellow; **Timothy Colton** is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto; **David Cox** is a member of the faculty at Queen's University and Director of Research at CIIPS.

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THROUGHOUT THE 1970s IT WAS customary to link the growing militarization of the Third World to steeply rising military expenditures and arms imports. The call for disarmament and development rested on the unchallenged assumption that if military expenditures and arms imports could be reduced, the process of militarization would be reversed. According to the logic of the disarmament lobby, the problem had an obvious and straightforward solution: Third World countries should forego future modernization, reduce military expenditure and channel the resources saved into development projects. In reality, the situation is much more complex.

Since the early 1980s both military expenditures and arms sales in the Third World appear to have

countries becomes evident. In Latin America there is a marked downward trend in South America but not Central America. In the Middle East the oil glut and declining export revenues have placed severe constraints on defence activities, except in Iran and Iraq. In Africa the picture is one of gradual decrease, although this aspect is to an extent counter-balanced by the situation in Southern Africa. In South Asia both India and Pakistan have shown no restraint in their continuing arms race, and military expenditure in Sri Lanka is rising steeply, albeit from a very low level. In South East Asia, levels of arms imports appear steady, but possibly on the point of declining.

ECONOMIC RECESSION IS THE MOST convenient and obvious explanation for the current lack of dynamism in the arms trade, but there are other factors to be considered. For example, it may be the case that Third World countries are buying a different type of defence equipment or purchasing in a different way, and that methods of monitoring arms transfers have not been adjusted to account for these changes. Also, it is becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate between requests for civilian and military technology – information technology is a case in point. Moreover, all governments are notoriously bad at releasing reliable, disaggregated statistics on defence expenditures and there is no shortage of opportunities for Third World governments to obscure the eventual use of their purchases or to pay for defence equipment out of civilian budgets. The unfolding drama in the United States concerning arms sales to Iran and the covert funding of the Contras is a shining example of an increasing need to obscure arms transfers in order to circumvent legal restrictions.

Clearly, the overall arms market is in a state of considerable flux. It appears, however, that structural changes are coinciding with genuine economic constraints. Third World countries are, by and large, avoiding the purchase of expensive major weapons systems such as

fighter aircraft. Instead, they are turning their attention to other, less quantifiable areas of the defence sector or simply reducing imports. And as the market for defence equipment continues to slide, it becomes much harder to manage a system of restraint as exporters grow concerned about declining orders. The more general problem for control is that the sale of arms is gradually being replaced by the sale of military technology, and it is, therefore, no longer appropriate to consider the arms trade solely in terms of the transfer of weapons systems. The simple transfer of tanks or guns or aircraft has given way to sales of manufacturing technology and industrial plant.

Economic constraints and new priorities do provide good reasons why the arms trade has changed so much in recent years. But it may also be helpful to consider the combination of circumstances which permitted Third World countries to increase their defence capabilities in the mid-1970s.

During this period the Middle East was the largest regional importer of major weapons – made possible by OPEC and the swift rise in oil prices. In addition, the oil crisis created conditions which led to the availability of credit for non-OPEC states. Thus, a situation arose where all Third World countries were able to increase their defence capabilities.

At the same time, demands for defence modernization programmes had built-up a head of steam. At independence most Third World countries were presented with regional and local security problems and little in the way of a defence capability to meet those threats. The security-defence dilemma was dealt with in different ways. Alliances were forged between military institutions in the Third World, and American policy makers who saw the military as a progressive, modern and anti-communist institution; strengthening these institutions through military aid and credits became a major policy plank. Countries close to the Soviet Union, such as Iraq and Pakistan, manipulated the Cold Warriors in Washington and secured major military aid pack-

WEAPONS FOR THE THIRD WORLD

Most poor countries cannot afford another round of weapons purchases, but their security problems are real and the solutions are not obvious.


BY CHRIS SMITH

been reduced. But few would argue that the Third World is any less militarized than it was in the 1970s – witness the appalling and costly conflicts in Southern Africa, Central America and South West Asia. Add to this the increasing level of ethnic conflict and continuing economic recession and one is faced with regions of the Third World which appear every bit as underdeveloped and militarized as they were in the 1970s.

The latest update from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on the arms trade indicates that the market for arms exports to the Third World is indeed stagnant; the five year moving averages indicate a slight decline since 1982. On closer inspection it appears, however, that if the five major importers, Iraq, India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, are excluded from the calculation, the full extent of the decline in other Third World

ages on the understanding that they would play a part in the containment process.

But, post-war supply constraints and later, the declining ability of major powers to offer large military aid packages coupled with limited purchasing power in the Third World, led to relatively modest procurement programmes in this period. By the 1970s much of this equipment was either obsolete or had been destroyed in wars. Moreover, obsolescence is a relative term – by the 1970s the major arms suppliers were prepared to sell more sophisticated equipment than before. Consequently, the amount of arms traded to the Third World rose significantly through the late-1970s, fueled by export revenues or credits and justified by military demands for an increased defence capability.



IF THE DEFENCE MODERNIZATION programmes which took off in the 1970s can be seen as the result of a merging of military demands and prevailing economic conditions, the situation in the 1980s can be explained in a similar way. The economic conditions for continued procurement no longer exists. But, nor do the demands for modernization programmes; requests for new frontline equipment carry less weight in the light of this past procurement. Thus, many Third World countries are now in a position where restraint is more feasible than before.

In addition, armed forces are in a much worse bargaining position. In many instances they are being forced to argue against the laws of diminishing returns and in some countries, such as in South America, their political power is much reduced. There is another factor: under pressure from the international development community, Third World governments are developing a cautious approach

to defence. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has already taken Peru to task on defence expenditures and the World Bank is starting to show a growing concern over the scale of defence allocations and how they are spent. Certainly neither the Bank or the IMF would contemplate a confrontation with governments over defence expenditure. But, a more subtle approach appears to be showing limited returns.

If the Third World is showing a tendency towards restraint, it is by no means certain that this situation will continue. It is, after all, a compromise, and the process has not been accompanied by conspicuous moves towards disarmament. Given that advanced military technology is prone to rapid obsolescence, pressure for re-equipment will rise towards the end of the century. While the gaps between modernization programmes can be extended by attempts to upgrade and refurbish existing systems, there are technical limitations and the process is expensive. Third World countries will not be able to sustain another process of modernization on the scale of previous programmes. If there is economic recovery in the Third World over the next two decades, it will not be sufficiently dynamic to absorb the costs of another round of modernization.

THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS must address their external and internal security problems; they cannot do otherwise. Yet, the options open to them, apart from conventional re-armament, are limited. Arms control agreements in the Third World are largely cosmetic. Although there have been efforts to normalize the regional security environment in South America, for example, these will take time to develop into a credible peace process. In some countries the security issue is particularly stark. In Nicaragua, Lebanon and Southern Africa and, arguably, in states such as Pakistan, survival is the key issue. Too often the genuine security problems faced by Third World countries are forgotten.

Third World leaders are keen and quick to point out that the current complexion of international politics affords no leeway and that defence and security must be a first charge on the national purse. Often heard is the argument that development is meaningless without first ensuring security and national viability, and the deliberate manipulation of national sentiments to this end is usually successful.

Disturbing though the security dilemmas are for Third World countries, hard choices have to be made over the next decade. If Third World countries are incapable of sustaining orthodox defence programmes in the future then alternatives must be sought. Otherwise, the strategy which seeks to guarantee security at all costs will be self-defeating and the armament-underdevelopment process will be pushed to its most logical and dangerous point. If present security dilemmas render unilateral disarmament a dangerous option a new security regime must be found. Border disputes, ethnic crises, irredentist claims, sub-imperial rivalries and regional conflicts must be confronted with a view to finding rapid solutions. At the same time, any alternative and more settled security environment must be complemented by a radical appraisal of orthodox defence policies. Here, current thinking around concepts of transarmament and nonoffensive defence should be applied to the specific regions of the Third World.

'TRANSARMAMENT' IS A TERM USED by Norwegian researcher Johan Galtung as an alternative to 'disarmament'. To 'disarm' implies leaving a society defenseless. To 'transarm', on the other hand, involves changing from one sort of defence to another. The essence of both transarmament and non-offensive defence is the search for alternatives. While there are no set formulae for these alternatives, they are fundamentally concerned with how to uncouple the making of defence policy from the current fetishism for advanced military technology. They look to a form of defence which minimizes the

threat to others, exploits available resources, reduces military expenditures and generally, breaks the links between armament and dependency, underdevelopment and conflict.

For too long Third World countries have been dependent upon an armament culture which is inappropriate for their security needs. Arms imports and, in many cases, indigenous production programmes have introduced into Third World countries weapons systems which are inefficient, expensive and broadly counter-productive.

The development of an alternative approach to defence would have another beneficial effect; it would enable the Third World to put pressure on countries in the North to accept conventional arms limitation. A system of transarmament and alternative security would reduce the demand for arms from the North. This would deprive defence industries in the North of the economic relief which stems from reducing unit-costs through export to the Third World, and in turn force governments of the industrialized nations into detailed reviews of defence policy which they have so far avoided.

It would be somewhat naive to think that transarmament will appeal to military decision-makers on the basis of logic alone. However, a unique situation is emerging which effectively places conventional arms limitation in direct line with the interests of Third World governments. This is surely the most compelling argument for taking this analysis and debate much further and at the same time moving beyond the shibboleth of disarmament and development. □

Further Reading

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NO SAVIOUR FOR EL SALVADOR?

*A human rights commission of the right and another of the left
are evidence of El Salvador's political polarization.*

BY MARY LOU FINLAY

THE ONLY SURPRISE THAT awaits a visitor to El Salvador is that there are no surprises. The capital and its surrounding countryside are as you would expect: the dusty, rolling hills, the poverty, the bad roads – and everywhere the familiar dark youth decked out in camouflage gear and a submachine gun, perennial symbol of a world beset by misery and conflict, the Third World.

The military is the only growth industry in El Salvador. It is estimated that people bearing arms now number about 50,000, not counting the guerrillas, of whom there are another six to nine thousand. There's the regular army and air force; there are special counter-insurgency forces; there are para-troop battalions; there are local militia and treasury police and security forces.

The day I arrived President Jose Napoleon Duarte was speaking to a gathering of Salvadoran businessmen, begging them to co-operate with him in his efforts to cope with the situation... the situation being a failing economy, widespread disaffection, and a guerrilla war that has dragged on for over seven years. A week later the business people gave Duarte their answer: they boycotted the bi-annual international trade fair in the capital.

Chamber of Commerce President Victor Steiner accuses Duarte of socializing the economy, of killing free enterprise with high taxes, import controls and corrupt practices: "They have no respect whatsoever for the participation of the private sector in the economy."

Steiner is bitter about President Duarte. In the agrarian reform that

began in 1980 – and is plagued with problems – his wife's family lost all their holdings. The government expropriated their land in return for some cash and some bonds, but the bonds, says Steiner, are worthless, and the purchase price was too low. It was based on the value of the land as declared in the owner's 1975 and 1976 tax declarations. The peasants are equally disgruntled about land reform because it doesn't go far enough.

LAND REFORM HAS BEEN THE clarion call of all the revolutionary movements in the region for decades. In El Salvador the big landowners have been particularly successful in resisting it. In 1932 their response to a *campesino* revolt was the *matanza* – an army massacre of ten to twenty thousand peasants. By 1975, El Salvador had the highest ratio of landless families to total population in Latin America.

In 1980 initial land reform measures were carried out like this: The government bought a number of large farms. On a given day, on the designated farms, all the workers who were then living on the property became co-operative owners, who would then manage and run the farms and assign some of their earnings to the banks that held the mortgages on the property.

The result has been rocky ploughing so far. The owners feel aggrieved at the seizure of the farms. The farmers who worked the land but did not live on the farm feel cheated by the arbitrary fashion in which the cooperatives were established. And the farms lost all the managerial skills that had resided in the previous owners.

A US Agency for International

Development (AID) report points out that most of the co-operatives are not keeping up with mortgage payments, and that the government is behind on its debt payments to the previous landowners. Many of the expropriated lands are still the object of litigation. And many of them still suffer from raids by guerrillas, making them at best unprofitable and at worst totally uninhabitable. But providing encouragement and counsel to the land reform movement is one arm of the complex American strategy in El Salvador, evidence that simple gun-boat diplomacy has been replaced, in part, with more sophisticated action.

Two US AID workers, farmers from Iowa and Arkansas, accompanied me on a visit to one of the co-ops just outside and to the south of San Salvador. This farm is planted mainly in sugar cane and rice, with some beans and a few other food crops. It's one of the "prosperous" ones; clearly a showcase.

In the broiling heat of noon, there were still a handful of men cutting sugar cane, their arms scratched and blackened from the twenty-foot stalks that were falling under their machetes. The cane had been burned before cutting, explained one of the Americans. They shouldn't burn it, he said, because it loses a lot of its value if it is burned first, but it makes the cutting easier. And anyway, the price for sugar is so low that the stuff is practically worthless. Duarte has to subsidize the price of sugar; if he didn't, all the sugar cane properties would be bankrupt.

No one commented on the irony of a US government actively conspiring in the running of a col-

lective venture, controlled by the Salvadoran government, as part of an overall fight to ward off communism.

The afternoon of the farm visit we were back in the capital to witness a noisy student demonstration outside the US embassy. The US embassy in San Salvador looks more like a maximum security prison than an embassy, a towering structure with steel-plated walls, surrounded by another wall of concrete, topped at the corners by gun-towers.

The embassy is located in the centre of the city just a couple of blocks from the University of El Salvador, where the demonstrators assembled before marching off in full war-paint and masks. There were only a couple of hundred of them, out of a total university enrolment of 30,000, so it wasn't much of a turn-out. What it lacked in size, however, it made up in noise and rudeness. Armed with loud-speakers and spray cans, they shouted obscenities and painted slogans on the concrete wall: YANQUI GO HOME, and AMERICA IS SHIT.

THE US PRESENCE IN EL SALVADOR is a mixed blessing to say the least. When he was mayor of San Salvador, Jose Napoleon Duarte had harsh words to say about American policies in Central America. Now his tone has softened, as befits the recipient of nearly \$2 million a day in US aid: "I had made speeches in the National Press Club of Washington saying that historically the United States is living a democracy but it's exporting dictatorship. This

is changing because we have to recognize that for the last years there's been a trend in which the United States is trying to support democracies in the world."

Critics of American policy in El Salvador cite the failure to end the war and the concomitant militarization of the country, along with the failing economy. President Duarte says that economic recovery cannot occur until the fighting stops. Others respond that the fighting will not stop until the people feel that they have achieved some social justice.

Jose Luis Galdez is a sociology professor at the University of El Salvador: "Nobody can tell exactly what is the right solution to the conflict. The Salvadoran people have to sit down and discuss it – the government, the FMLN, FDR,* the legal opposition, the unions – everybody that has something to say. Our country has to find a solution to its conflict, but a Salvadoran solution. First of all, we have to start by putting an end to the US meddling in our affairs. Then the Salvadorans can discuss the war problem and seek a solution for a true and just peace."


IN THE MEANTIME THE WAR SOAKS up resources and lives. The guerrillas, fewer in number than they were, are still active in wide regions of the country: Morazan, San Miguel, Usulután, La Libertad, Chalatenango... and Oaxaca.

Just thirty kilometres from San Salvador, Oaxaca has been the target of Operation Phoenix: an all-out aerial war against the guerrillas said to be tunnelled into the sides of the volcano. In the villages just outside the target zone, people point to the patches of smoke rising from the volcano and tell us, "That's where they bombed last night." Or, "That's where the army is burning things" – dwellings, huts, whatever they find that might be useful to the enemy. The villagers are quite used to it.

From the villages inside the zone pour some of the hundreds of thousands of refugees that the war has created. In a refugee camp on the outskirts of the capital a Cana-

dian nun oversees the care and feeding of seven hundred people at a time. Sister Andrea says that the US ambassador thinks she harbors subversives, and that the army has descended on them several times in an apparent attempt to intimidate them. But having lost her patience with the soldiers one time, and literally chased them out of the camp, she has tested the limits of the government's willingness to harass her.

At the Human Rights Commission offices in San Salvador (not



the government Human Rights Commission) small children chase each other around a small, dirty courtyard amid stacks of documents and affidavits, while volunteers prepare lunch for the people who have temporarily sought refuge there. There are nine portraits on one wall, pictures of the most recent slayings or "disappeared." Another wall charts the total deaths since 1981... 56,626 in all; 1,821 last year. The government admits there are still killings: casualties of the war they say. This Human Rights office says they are casualties of the army.

How many civilians have been killed by the guerrillas I ask. "We don't know of any," they reply. But this very day the newspapers carry reports of the execution of two village mayors by guerrilla forces. The existence of two human rights commissions – one of the left and one of the right – is evidence of the polarization of El Salvador.

SINCE THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT Duarte in 1984, and the victory of his Christian Democratic Party in the legislative elections of 1985, the United States believes El Salvador is on the road to salvation, if only there is no interference in the form of aid to the

guerrillas from neighbouring Nicaragua. The US government believes that with some guidance and a lot of money, El Salvador can beat back the revolutionary forces of the left and gradually satisfy the desire for change among the people. President Duarte himself, when he isn't addressing the Chamber of Commerce, fairly boasts of his own revolutionary ideals. His heart maybe in the right place, but the problems he faces are grave and his chances of success not overwhelming.

People are tired of the war to be sure, but having come this far and paid so dearly they are not likely to give up their demands for a new social order and a radical redistribution of resources. For this to happen, Duarte will need some luck in restoring the economy and seeing to it that the people feel they are benefitting from change. He is hampered by the emphasis on military strength that the US insists on; by the intransigence of the right and the business class; by the fact that guerrilla leaders seem unwilling to settle now for anything less than a radical left-wing restructuring of the government; by charges that his own party members are involved in corruption.

Most of all perhaps, he is hampered by a five hundred year history of colonial oppression and strife that has taught Salvadorans a lot about corruption and cheating and violence, and very little about peaceful change and democracy.

El Salvador, like the other nations of Central America, is deeply affected by what happens in Nicaragua. There too, the United States relies heavily on military action to topple the government of Daniel Ortega. But the recent scandals involving Iranian arms sales and money and arms to

the Contras have weakened the Administration's hand and may breathe new life into the peace proposals put forward by the Con-tadora group of nations (Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico and Panama), and more recently by the president of Costa Rica.

A DEFEAT FOR RONALD REAGAN and victory for the Sandinistas may mean that the Salvadoran guerrillas will redouble their efforts for a Nicaragua-style revolution in their own country. But it could also mean that guerrilla leaders who have given up hope that change can be had by peaceful means as long as the US is determined to call all the shots, would see an opening for talks with the government of El Salvador.

"No hay uno salvador para El Salvador," quotes President Duarte 'El Salvador – The Saviour – has no saviour.' He hopes to put the lie to that saying. It is a beautiful country with a sad history. It has a chance now to build a future out of the embers of its troubled past. The United States has a chance to bolster its own security against a hostile southern front by judiciously promoting a third alternative to the twin pillars of communist dictatorship and right-wing tyranny that have come in this century to represent the principle choices for the people of Central America. It will be a delicate task, one not well understood by all the forces that shape American government today, and hardly noticed by the majority of American people who themselves generally share only two concerns about the region: they don't want another Viet Nam, and they don't want another Cuba. Presumably they would welcome a third option for the Third World on their doorstep. □

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*The FMLN and FDR are the guerrillas' military and political organizations.

REDUCING THE LEVEL OF FEAR

In Stockholm last year, Canada, the United States, and all the countries of Europe except Albania agreed on measures designed to reduce the risk of war through surprise attack or miscalculation.

BY MICHAEL TUCKER

 ON 19 SEPTEMBER 1986, THE clocks were stopped at the *Kulturhuset* in Stockholm in order to allow the thirty-five national delegations therein a last clear chance to meet their deadline for agreement on a package of "confidence and security-building measures" (CSBMs) designed to reduce the risk of war in Europe through miscalculation or surprise attack. NATO, Warsaw Pact, and neutral and non-aligned countries, party to this Stockholm meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), were in fact able to reach agreement on a CSBM document that 22 September, some one hundred and seventy-eight plenary and countless working sessions after the conference formally began in January 1984. This was an important, if modest and little noticed, event in the contemporary history of arms control and East-West relations.

THE STOCKHOLM CDE GOT underway in a sombre atmosphere of heightening East-West tensions, and at a time when all other East-West arms control dialogues had been adjourned. The 1986 Stockholm accord, moreover, remains the first, and only, East-West security agreement which has been reached since the signing of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) in 1979. Just as important as the political symbolism of the CDE agreement are the complex military provisions which it contains for the annual forecasting, notification, observation, and inspection of large-scale troop manoeuvres in Europe.

These provisions are binding upon the thirty-five signatories to the Stockholm accord, requiring them to give prior notification of troop exercises above certain defined thresholds within specific periods of time. They also include, for the first time since 1945, an East-West agreement over the principle of mandatory on-site inspections of military facilities, to provide for the verification of compliance with the Treaty. The CDE agreement will thus provide a test for the efficacy of on-site inspection measures. Another important feature, from the standpoint of Western security, is that it will also provide a test for Soviet acceptance of this principle and the mellowing of the historic Russian penchant for secrecy in all matters military. It is to be noted that the agreement applies to a zone which extends from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains, encompassing the entire European sector of Soviet Russia.

The relevance of the Stockholm experience for Canada must be understood in the broad context of Canada's NATO membership and of its staunch commitment to what is termed the "CSCE process." Canada has been from the outset a party to the post-1972 dialogues of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and was a signatory, as well as important contributor, to the 1975 Helsinki CSCE Final Act. The Stockholm talks were an integral part of the CSCE process, having been mandated by the 1983 Madrid CSCE Review Conference to strengthen and extend the confidence-building measures which had been agreed upon at Helsinki. Yet Canada was invited

to participate in the talks which led to the Helsinki accord because of its membership in NATO. It was Alliance participation which provided this country with an entrée to the CSCE in the first instance, and at Helsinki, as at Stockholm later on, and at all the CSCE review conferences, Canada acted as a loyal team member of the NATO caucus. This was not always an easy diplomatic task, however, because of intra-alliance differences over the aims of the CSCE.

CANADA HAS ALWAYS SEEN THE CSCE debates – in political as well as military and arms control terms – as a measure of its interest as a North American power in European security and co-operation. At the time of the Helsinki Conference, Canada directed its energies toward the fulfillment of a humanistic conception of East-West détente, which included a recognition of human rights and a freer movement of peoples across national boundaries. These efforts were a clear challenge to the harsher aspects of Soviet authoritarianism, and at the same time they were also seen by Washington as a fetter upon its quest for superpower strategic arms control. While Canada was more sensitive to the logic of SALT than its West European allies, the CSCE was initially a useful medium through which Canada could distance itself, for both domestic and West European consumption, from an American conception of East-West détente which was largely confined to military-strategic stability.

At Stockholm, it was clear from the outset that the United States and the Soviet Union would be the

key players, and the conference would have foundered without their political will to reach agreement. In the absence of any likely East-West accord over conventional or intermediate nuclear force reductions in Europe, moreover, CSBMs represented the most promising and perhaps the only arms control regime for that war-prone theatre. And because of its political and symbolic importance for the future of East-West security relations Stockholm, it has been said, was "condemned to succeed." But down to the final hours of the conference its lesser participants could not take it for granted that the major powers had the political will to agree.

The Stockholm experience showed that multilateral arms control can work. Yet initial and recurring American reluctance to become fully engaged in the exercise made Canadian participation both necessary and opportune. At times a more constructive flexibility was required of Washington, for instance over the highly-intrusive on-site inspection measures it thought were necessary. And Ottawa recognized, perhaps more clearly than Washington, that the CDE was for the Soviet Union an expression of its long-standing interest in a pan-European security regime which might reduce the North American military presence in Europe. Thus, for Canada, this trend in Soviet thinking was a compelling reason for a stronger rather than a weaker Canadian-American commitment to the Stockholm negotiations.


For Canada, the CDE was very much a NATO arms control exercise in coalition diplomacy. This meant, of course, that Canada would not deviate from Western unity in support of Eastern proposals; it also meant that Canada should not expose or exacerbate intra-alliance differences, particularly between the United States and Western Europe.

These two pillars of Canadian security policy have differed over non-proliferation strategies, theatre and strategic arms limitation and reduction talks, and strategic defences. Where these issues have cut across the thorny matter of the American nuclear guarantee of the defence of European members of NATO, Canada has tended to avoid taking sides. This is because Canada, as John Holmes has observed, is the odd man out in the Alliance, being neither European nor American but both. Historically, Canada has taken the view that nuclear arms and arms control issues which relate directly to European security are for the NATO European powers most closely involved to weigh and decide upon. Yet Canada is also a North American nation indebted to the United States for guidance on strategic matters, and sensitive to the responsibility shouldered by the US as keeper of the Western deterrent.

Intra-alliance debates over European arms control issues have thus occasioned a deferential, if conscientious, silence on Canada's part, which has masked domestic tensions between continental and Atlantic orientations in Canadian arms control policy. Yet, the Stockholm Conference was of a different order, as regards military strategy and arms control, from negotiations concerning the reduction of theatre-nuclear and conventional forces. A successful CSBM regime for Europe could only augment Alliance security; its failure, or the failure of the Warsaw Pact to comply with its terms, would not put West European security fundamentally at risk. As a consequence, neither internal agonizing nor deferential silence were discernable

attributes of Canadian diplomacy at Stockholm.

On the assumption that both West and East shared fears about the possibility of war breaking out in Europe through surprise attack or miscalculation (an assumption which would remain constant in Canadian thinking about arms control in Europe down to the present day) Canada, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, urged its allies to take a serious look at the possibility of an East-West agreement on the reciprocal establish-



ment of ground observation posts. Yet, in the prevailing atmosphere of distrust over Eastern intentions, and fears that Alliance military planning and preparedness would be compromised, Canada did not pursue this initiative. It was an idea whose time had not then come, and was not to come until the 1970s when the Alliance undertook studies of confidence-building measures in the context of the CSCE and Vienna Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations.

THE CSBMs WHICH WERE FINALLY agreed upon in the 1975 Helsinki accord involved the prior notification of large-scale military manoeuvres in Europe. Notification was non-obligatory, however, and this accord aroused justifiable fears in the West that the Soviet Union was not living up to the spirit of the Helsinki provisions. As far as the West and Canada were concerned, this compliance gap had to be closed through the Stockholm agreement, and it was. The principle, which Canada helped to frame, that CSBMs should be politically binding and verifiable as well as militarily significant and applicable to all of Europe, was accepted by the Soviet Union.

Canada was an important but not a major actor at Stockholm. As in most areas of arms control, the accord which was agreed upon in the CDE will not impinge in any substantive way upon Canada's military activities in Europe; these activities are normally well below the minimum threshold of 13,000 troops required for notification and observation. The Stockholm provisions should, however, have an impact upon NATO as well as Warsaw Pact multinational military manoeuvres. As a consequence,

the CDE accord should represent a step toward the fulfillment of another aim which has been a constant in Canadian thinking about arms control and security in Europe.

CANADA HAS SEEN ARMS CONTROL not strictly as an alternative to NATO defences but as a means to help achieve a greater measure of co-ordination and forward planning in Alliance military preparations. Ottawa must continue to identify arms control in Europe not just as a political palliative for thorny Alliance hardware decisions, but as a counterweight to NATO's penchant for quick-fix hardware solutions to the myriad problems of the defence of Western Europe. It is to be hoped that both West and East will come to see a militarily-significant CSBM regime for Europe as an alternative to a costly and (in the case of the West) politically unpalatable conventional re-armament programme, with its reliance on potentially destabilizing emerging "deep-strike" technologies. In a Europe without arms control, the West may well see such re-armament as necessary in order to offset the significant nu-

merical edge which the Warsaw Pact holds in the conventional field.

CSBMs will not diminish Warsaw Pact conventional capabilities; that is not the aim of these arms control measures. They are not steps toward disarmament, and should not be seen as such. They are, rather, instruments of a more stable balance of power. If complied with and if extended through a renewed mandate for the CDE, the Stockholm provisions should begin to redress an asymmetry in the European balance of power. They should diminish the strategic edge which the Warsaw Pact holds in the field of war readiness through its capability for secrecy and deception.

Confidence-building measures in essence provide a means of communication between adversaries, with respect to their military establishments. They are designed to reduce the risk rather than the instruments of war, through the reciprocal exchange of military intelligence. As such, "confidence" is a matter of knowledge and predictability rather than trust, which has little place in the lexicon of international strategy. An apparent Eastern acceptance at Stockholm of this essentially Western conception of CSBMs must be seen as the single most important achievement of the CDE exercise. For this, NATO cohesion was as much responsible as the sudden and fortuitous interest of Gorbachev's Russia in *glasnost*. □

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TAKING GORBACHEV'S MEASURE

*The new Soviet regime has caught a generation of
Kremlin-watchers off-guard.*

BY TIMOTHY J. COLTON

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV IS challenging not only many inherited structures and policies in his own country but also the intellectual frameworks we on the outside use to interpret Soviet affairs.

For a generation, Western Sovietologists have been preoccupied with questions of power and influence. How great is the political clout of the General Secretary? How does it compare with that of his fellow Kremlin leaders? What say, if any, do bureaucratic agencies have, or think tanks, or local and ethnic constituencies? There is no universally accepted wisdom on these matters. But it is fair to say that foreign specialists, while paying rather greater attention to the political role of groups and interests other than the party oligarchy in Moscow, have continued to see the Soviet Union as highly centralized and authoritarian by comparison with the liberal democracies.

If such issues have lost none of their ultimate import, they are tending to be overshadowed in the late 1980s by dilemmas put forward by the rise of Gorbachev and his ringing announcement of the need for systemic reform. It is now less the distribution of power than the capacity of the Soviet system for innovation and adaptation that grabs our attention. Can Soviet political and economic institutions indeed be modernized and, as Gorbachev now propounds, "democratized"? What are the factors that stimulate and retard reform? How much reform can the system handle without losing its Marxist-Leninist essence?

The change to change in Moscow has caught most of us off guard. Not only is it forcing research scholars and government officials to pay close attention to current developments in a way deemed unnecessary during the long and seemingly changeless Brezhnev era. It is also prodding us to look afresh at assumptions about the connection between political power and system capacity. In the past, we tended to think that it was precisely the great concentration of power at the centre of the regime that made it so resistant to change. But what happens when those at the apex of the system are committed to changing it, rather than to conserving it as was the case during the Brezhnev hibernation? Gorbachev and his reformist administration are providing a fascinating real-life experiment that may help us eventually to come up with an answer.

I say "eventually," because today, in only the third year of the Gorbachev era, it is far too early to say with confidence what the outcome is to be. One factor complicating our assessments is that Gorbachev's own views about what needs to be changed have fluctuated. When he came to power in March 1985, his emphasis was mostly on technological modernization and the tightening of state "discipline" over deviance, in forms such as alcohol abuse, graft, and absenteeism and sloth on the job. By the time of the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in early 1986, Gorbachev's ambitions were increasing and he was speaking of "radical reform" of the mechanism of economic planning and management. And by the summer of 1986 his rhetoric about

perestroika, or national reconstruction, was soaring still higher. Gorbachev now insists that Soviet society must undergo revolutionary changes, not just piecemeal reforms, and equally important, that these transformations have to go beyond technology and economic structures to encompass politics, culture, and personal morality. He also emphasizes the dynamic nature of reform, saying it must be done "on the march," by trying out initiatives and learning from experience, rather than by imposing a preconceived blueprint.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV IS A MOVING target, not a static one. Moreover, there is much about his programme that remains vague, tentative, and even contradictory. More time will be needed before we and, for that matter, the Soviet people see what exactly he has in mind.

In the economic area, for instance, Gorbachev seems to advocate simultaneous decentralization and recentralization within the bureaucracy, goals that may in principle be reconcilable but have yet to be sorted out with any rigour in his statements. Gorbachev supports greater freedom for individual and co-operative enterprise, and new legislation coming into effect in 1987 embodies this idea, but entrepreneurs are still hedged in with restrictions which, on some points, are harsher than before. In the cultural and intellectual sphere, Gorbachev, especially since mid-1986, has promoted a remarkable thaw, not seen since the Khrushchev years, a development for which he and his fellow leaders deserve full credit. Yet he

clearly harbors at least residual doubts about unimpeded public discussion of the vexed Stalin issue, and he has failed so far to deliver on promises of legal changes that would institutionalize press and artistic freedom.

One of Gorbachev's most intriguing proposals, made at the January 1987 plenum of the party's Central Committee, is for multi-candidate elections, not only for government legislative bodies, as has been done for years in Eastern Europe, but within the ruling Communist Party itself. In putting the proposal forward, however, he claimed without explanation that it would not compromise the time-honored principle of "democratic centralism," whereby decisions of high-level party bodies are binding on officials of lower rank.

Adding further to the difficulty of analyzing recent Soviet developments is the unmistakable but elusive evidence of resistance to Gorbachev's ideas. Of the nine Politburo members (apart from Gorbachev himself) in place in March 1985, four have been retired, presumably for refusing to go along with the new General Secretary's approach. In every single speech since the party congress, Gorbachev has commented on the widespread nature of the resistance.

He stated in a February 1987 speech that reservations about the electoral and other political proposals he put forward in January were so great among the membership of the Central Committee that the plenum had to be postponed three times before he could achieve the needed consensus. In another address, in April 1987, Gorbachev declared that detractors were to be found "at the level of the Central

Committee and government, in the ministries, republics, and regions . . . in laboring collectives and in the youth league." Gorbachev allowed in the same speech that not all opposition was selfish and narrow-minded, which is how he tended to dismiss it in earlier pronouncements, conceding now that some of the reservations were motivated by a "concern for the stability of our society."

There is no scientific way to measure the extent or depth of the opposition to Gorbachev or to estimate the odds of whether, like Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, his reforms will be prematurely terminated by a conservative coup. We can surmise, nonetheless, that his ideas are least popular among older age groups, among those attached to orthodox Soviet ideology and behavioral norms, and among those who stand to lose materially from serious economic reform (and this includes many workers as well as administrators).

We can note that Gorbachev has shown himself to be a resourceful and tactically nimble politician, who so far has outwitted his opponents at every turn. We can reason also that roughly the next year is a period of maximum danger for him. His reforms, especially in the economy, are still in embryo and will not pay off for some time to come, whereas the special party conference, the first since 1941, that Gorbachev intends to convene in order to push political changes (and presumably to purge conservatives from the Soviet establishment) looms in 1988. If Gorbachev is to be stopped outright, the best and perhaps the only time for this to be done is in the months ahead.

FORTUNATELY, CERTAIN OF Gorbachev's own changes should help us follow the progress and predict the fate of his programme. The policy of *glasnost* (openness, publicity, candour) is being expanded almost by the week, with the main responsibility for its execution being borne by Aleksandr Yakovlev, the national party secretary for propaganda and cultural affairs and a former ambassador

to Canada. Many things remain beyond criticism; the communications media have a new bias (pro-Gorbachev), and some of the newly released information (for example, in statistical handbooks) is amateurishly prepared and inconsistent. Nevertheless, one can only wonder at how many institutions, policies, and habits can now be discussed with reasonable accuracy and honesty.

What is most encouraging for the Sovietologist is that Gorbachev and his team now accept the necessity of providing the Soviet public with a modicum of information pertinent to politics, and not merely on economic or technical questions. Only this way, in their view, can the Soviet Union's passive subjects become more active citizens who will participate, admittedly under controlled con-

ditions, in the making of some political decisions and whose higher morale and sense of responsibility will spill over into the economy. Thus Soviet officials, journalists, and social scientists have been starting in recent months to write and talk about how political decisions are and should be made, this with a degree of frankness unknown in the Soviet media since the 1920s.

Gorbachev himself has said that the party Central Committee, a supposedly all-powerful body, has for years been inert and uninterested in discussing policy issues. Biting critiques have been published of the local soviets, the municipal councils that have sweeping rights on paper but in reality are largely subservient to their executives. Local party secretaries have given interviews in which they refer gingerly to power relations within secretive party bureaus. Journalists and historians have been looking again at Stalin's style of rule and a decision has now apparently been made to revise the party history textbooks of the Brezhnev period and, in fact, to probe more deeply into the early years of Soviet political history than was possible even under Khrushchev.

WE ARE LOOKING HERE ONLY AT beginnings, but they are exciting beginnings in a society in which politics has almost always been equated with control from above. In the area of information policy, at least, Western analysts should in a significant way benefit from changes aimed at the Soviet population and ultimately at making the Soviet system less neurotic, more modern, and more competitive. If Gorbachev has his way, neither Soviet political life nor Western views of it will ever be quite the same again. □

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THE WORDS OF GORBACHEV

Editor's Note: *The following are excerpts from a marathon-length speech delivered by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Communist Party Central Committee in Moscow in January 1987. The question is: how are they to be read? As serious proposals or clever puffery? How, indeed, do we take the measure of Gorbachev and the USSR today?*

Economic Reforms

... the income of an enterprise, all forms of incentives for the members of labour collectives and the scale of satisfaction of social requirements will depend wholly on the final results of work, on the quantity and quality of output produced and services rendered.

Overcoming Resistance to Reforms

... Apparently it is difficult for some comrades to understand that democracy is not just a slogan but the essence of restructuring. They must change their views and habits, if they are not to be left outside the mainstream of life. This is our insistent advice to all doubters and laggards.

'Openness' and Democracy

The democratization of society poses in a new way the question of control over how Party, Soviet and economic agencies and their personnel work. As far as control 'from above' is concerned, here, as you know, appreciable changes have taken place recently. Various 'forbidden zones' for criticism and control are receding into the past.

MICHAEL HOWARD: AN INTERVIEW

*A pre-eminent military historian tackles peace movements
and the meaning of peace.*

This interview is excerpted from the TV Ontario programme *Realities* first broadcast in December 1986. Sir Michael Howard is Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University. His best known book is *The Causes of War* published by Harvard University Press in 1983. The interview was conducted by Richard Gwyn – European correspondent for the *Toronto Star*.

RICHARD GWYN: I'll start with a discussion about war and peace and the nature of those two activities... I guess with the most obvious of all questions: will war always be with us? Will our children, our children's children, be involved in wars, be worried by wars, be trying to prevent wars?

MICHAEL HOWARD: War will always be with us so long as there are people who are prepared to use violence to attain political objectives. They may not want to use violence as their first resort; they may feel they have to use it as their last resort if there's no other way of getting what they want. People who are not satisfied with the existing state of the world, who feel they're under-privileged, who feel their frontiers are wrong, who feel that their ideology is insufficiently powerful, are always likely to resort to violence if they can't get their way by negotiation, when negotiation simply means accepting the status quo. So there is always likely to be a tendency towards the use of violence. Whether it is going to be a formal war, whether it is going to be guerrilla conflicts, whether it is going to be terrorist manifestations, it's always likely to be there.

R.G.: And peace, is peace the absence of war?

MICHAEL HOWARD: Well, peace is two things. In the first place it is the absence of war. And that is no bad thing. When people nowadays say why cannot we have peace, they are usually living in a condition of profound peace. And those of us who experienced the Second World War are very grateful for the peace that we have got. But they're quite right when they say that this is not true peace. I mean true peace is where there is such agreement between people – so much empathy, so much mutual understanding, that there's no conflict. And we have not got that. It is very difficult to achieve it. But peace as non-war is, in the minds of most people, a necessary preliminary to moving on to peace, which I call reconciliation of conflict.

R.G.: The way you define true peace – it's almost like the Kingdom of God come to earth.

MICHAEL HOWARD: Yes. And I think that that is what most peace movements mean when they say – we want peace. We want a condition in which there is no longer going to be any conflict, when there is no longer going to be any threat, where the lion is going to lie down with the lamb, and the young child is going to play in the Cockatrice's den. This image of peace, of shalom, is what does inspire most of the great saints and great martyrs of the world today. And part of the problem, I think, about peace movements and the conflict between the establishment diplomats on the one hand and peace movements on the other, is that establishment diplomats –

when they mean peace – mean non-war. They mean making the best that we can of a very imperfect world. And peace movements say we want more than that. We want to move to a perfect world...

R.G.: You were going into the reasons why men have fought... you say it is not because their purposes were necessarily acquisitive nor aggressive, but rather because they would be acting rationally... I found that expression surprising, since surely war is an expression of man's aggressivity – the male chest thumping. It's a sort of macho exercise. It's territorial imperative. Is it not rooted in the animal side of our nature?

MICHAEL HOWARD: I don't think it is nowadays. I think that the macho activities as depicted by football hooligans have very little, if anything, to do with the calculations of war and peace which are carried on by statesmen. Let me give you an example. In 1939, the British declared war on the Germans – not the other way around. The British were profoundly peace-loving, who had had one war which virtually eviscerated us; we didn't want any more. We had to be dragged kicking and screaming into a conflict with Germany. But the decision was taken in 1939, with massive popular support, that if we do not go to war with the Germans now, we will never be in a position to do so; they will simply continue building up their strength – they will conquer Eastern Europe, they will then overrun Western Europe; we will be confronted with an adversary so strong that we will simply have to surrender. And it was this rational

calculation, against our instinctive desire not to go to war, which led us to go to war. And you can find that in most of the decisions to go to war. In 1914 it was also there – although in 1914 there was much more of the macho spirit around.

Now, one can see in the calculations about nuclear strategy on the side of the United States and, no doubt, on the side of the Russians as well, that always there is a 'what if'... What if they were to build up such an overwhelming strength of accurate missiles that they were then able to take out all of our land-based missiles? Well, alright, we still have sea-based missiles. But what if they were to then say, if you use your sea-based missiles we will attack your cities? And what if an American President was so weak that he then surrendered? Or what if, even if the American President was not so weak, the Soviet Union miscalculated that he might be so weak and they started it. Or... It's this kind of super-rational calculation which leads to arms races...

R.G.: Is there a particular problem with the arms race today... that while to keep a rough parity between East and West isn't that difficult... the two sides which have acquired these huge armaments industries then flog their weapons to the Third World, because that cheapens the per-unit cost to themselves and they make some foreign exchange?... I mean surely Iran and Iraq couldn't have been pounding each other for seven years, except that there are so many Western arms on the market.

MICHAEL HOWARD: ... I am rather a heretic on this. The conflicts in the Third World are real conflicts.

They are conflicts about turf. The situation is always the same when you get the collapse of empires – empires which have held areas in some kind of stability. Successor states and successor groups come up which dispute with one another as to where the legitimate rule is going to be.

I think it was inevitable with decolonization there would be conflicts, and that these conflicts ... were likely to spill into wars. Now, I don't see it as the West flogging arms to the Third World. I see it as the Third World coming to the West and saying sell us your arms. And I get very angry when I hear the Third World complaining at the United Nations that the West sells them arms which they want. Dammit, they don't have to buy them. They buy them because they see political purposes in having them ...

... So I think that this knee-jerk feeling that it is the arms manufacturers of the Western world in search of profits who are provoking and causing some of these conflicts in the Third World does not stand up to examination. The Third World are grown-up people; they have real problems, they have real conflicts. And to regard them as simply the puppets of arms manufacturers is, frankly, so insulting to them that I wonder they don't rise up in their majesty and object.

R.G.: You have an ambivalence, it seems to me, toward the peace movement. I mean, you write that often the questions they, the peace movement, pose about Western defence postures are entirely legitimate. And yet, you have ... a sense of exasperation.

... Is your root criticism of the peace movement that it refuses to

come to terms with the reality of power in the world – the nastiness of power, the perpetuation of power, no matter what else one can do?

MICHAEL HOWARD: I suppose you could put it like that. I think that there are a number of issues which they simply do not factor into their equation. And the principle issue, perhaps, is the extent to which our peace-loving culture in Western Europe and in the North Atlantic world is part of a state system which does need power to keep it going and to protect it? Now, what does one mean by power? Power is the effect, the capacity to control one's environment and to prevent other people controlling your environment; the capacity not so much to have your own security system as to prevent yourself being part of someone else's security system, is not a bad way of looking at it.

If one looks at the problem in Western Europe, the neutralists would say, well, we are part of the American security system so we are impotent. To which one has to say, yes, we are part of the American security system but this is a decision which was taken by our own statesmen as being the lesser of two evils. The alternative – well, there are two perceived alternatives. One is to become part of the Soviet security system, which is self-evidently rather undesirable. The other is the belief that we can somehow be non-aligned between these two great powers. But non-alignment does require its own kind of power to keep the other people out.

Why not be neutral is quite often asked. To which I reply rather boringly, it takes three people to make a neutral. It is not simply you who decide you're going to be a neutralist between A and B. Both A and B have got to agree that you're

going to remain neutral – as has been discovered by countries like Belgium throughout history. So the problem of power, I'm afraid, is the capacity to control your environment, to control your territory to prevent anybody else controlling it. Which does involve a strong element of military capability.

R.G.: ... The reasons why they [the peace movement] rail at those in authority, the establishment, the professionals – they march against them for two reasons. One, that these people – who are terribly impressive because they know all the jargon, and throw-weights and all this kind of thing, and have all these offices, and they look impressive – have in the past been singularly stupid, murderously stupid. 1914 – a grotesquely unnecessary war ... that almost destroyed Europe. And this was the Establishment's war, as it were. And so ... can you have any faith in the children or the successors to that establishment? The second one, of course, is accident. That with all those missiles, somebody somewhere is going to push the wrong button and that is the end of mankind.

And is the peace movement ultimately not right on this? One, that the bureaucracy, the establishment, is ultimately stupid. And second, that accident is inevitable?

MICHAEL HOWARD: Bureaucracies and statesmen are cut from the same cloth as other people. They have their own wives and their own children; they are part of their society. It is simply their job to specialize in these very, very nasty things. And if you don't like the answers they come up with, then it is your job to try to think of other answers. And this is my exasperation with the peace movement. On the whole, they don't.

The second point, accident.

Yes, but it's not just the peace movement that is concerned about this. Everybody is. And the problem of actual – well, it breaks down into two elements. The preventing of technical malfunctioning – how do you stop everything from going off? On the whole, the record is pretty good on this ...

... Misperception – bad judgments in a crisis. Well, this is what worries me. It is there. And the problem of what in the jargon is called crisis management does seem to me to be the really central one which has got to be addressed. Again, on the whole the record is not bad. When the two sides have approached the brink, they've been fairly cool; they've thought, they have drawn back. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 – the one time since 1945 when I have been really terrified – was managed 1973 was also very hairy occasionally. Again, very alarming, but it didn't actually get near the seriously dangerous point. It doesn't mean it might not happen, but there is nothing whatever that one can do to create a world in which this might not happen – except a world in which there are no nuclear weapons whatever, which is a world different from the one in which we are living.

It is a world in which there are no sovereign states. It's a world in which there is a world government, a world government which commands the consent and the legitimacy of all the different cultures in the world, be it Russian, be it American, be it British, be it Arab, be it Israeli. And that isn't the world that we've got to cope with. And to think of such a world is, quite frankly, a cop-out. It is a refusal actually to tackle the existing problems which we have to tackle head-on. □



LETTER FROM KIEV BY DAVID COX



Kiev is a city rich in history and monuments. Its inhabitants, though, might wish that its history had been otherwise....

In this century alone, it has been the site of fierce battles and civil wars. In 1917 revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces fought a see-saw struggle for the control of Kiev. In the Second World War it was captured by the Germans after a major campaign, and recaptured by the Soviets two years later in a battle of equal ferocity. The ravine at Babi Yar, where more than 100,000 citizens of Kiev were executed by the German invaders, is still an open sore, for the authorities have dedicated the monument not to the Jewish victims, who were undoubtedly the majority, but to the Kievites generally who resisted the invaders.

Kiev has once again been touched by catastrophe. It was dangerously close to the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, and for a week afterwards the fate of the city was uncertain. Now it is the command centre for the massive Soviet efforts to rehabilitate the contaminated area around Chernobyl, and to limit further environmental damage from the radioactive elements that were released by the fire at the reactor.

A 200-kilometre perimeter has been created around Chernobyl, within which access is restricted. The contamination within the zone is uneven, and so the efforts of rehabilitation are complicated.

Monitoring this operation are scientists at the Institute for Nuclear Research in Kiev and the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine. In what may be for some a cruel irony, they have before them an environmental laboratory for nuclear research on a scale not seen since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The damaged nuclear reactor is sealed, but sensing devices have

been installed which permit constant computer monitoring of the temperature, fissile activity and vibration within the concrete tomb. With the initial danger now over, the scientists at Kiev are engaged in detailed analysis of the consequences of the radioactive fallout. By their own admission, there have been many surprises.

Plant life has not reacted uniformly to the radioactivity. Some plants have absorbed great amounts, some very little. Don't eat blueberries after a dose of radioactivity, but do try the tomatoes – even in the most contaminated areas, they were virtually free of radioactive nucleides. At the heart of the scientific effort is an attempt to understand the pattern of dispersal of the

chemists have located in Kiev to analyze the problem. The Institute for Nuclear Research uses a super-computer to assimilate all the data and it has produced a model of the region which will include every known detail of the ecology.

The Institute of Nuclear Research is clearly proud of its work, but recognizes that difficulties lie ahead. For example, with the heavy winter snows, there was a large spring run-off. Emergency water supplies for Kiev are planned. The migration of the nucleides is still uncertain, the full process of rehabilitation still problematic.

With all these imponderables, the authorities remain committed to nuclear power. They have no realistic choice, they argue, for coal is just as environmentally dangerous as nuclear power, and there are no other economically viable alternatives for the Kiev region. While the Soviets have abandoned

table? Do we have the combination of scientists necessary for the recovery effort comparable to that now under way in Kiev?

Kiev's experience with the nuclear genie has other implications as well. The damage to life around Chernobyl was caused by the release of about four to five percent of the radioactive core of the reactor. This has been compared to the radioactivity that might result from the burst of a five-kiloton nuclear weapon (only about one-third the size of the one dropped on Hiroshima). But a real five-kiloton weapon would destroy the Institute for Nuclear Research, the Academy of Sciences, and the hospitals mobilized to deal with the victims of Chernobyl. What chance then for the survivors to discover that their best bet is to eat tomatoes?

Of course, the answer will be that Canadian reactors are completely safe. On this, however, the last word goes to the Soviets. Since they suffered the accident with their own "safe" reactor, they have increased all safety regulations many times over, and thoroughly reviewed the reliability of the reactor itself. But they admit frankly to one essential problem: the human factor. Nothing can be foolproof, they say, because the fools are too ingenious. □

David Cox is the Director of Research at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. He attended the Moscow International Forum last February, and while in the Soviet Union visited the Institute for Nuclear Research in Kiev.

In what may be for some a cruel irony, they have before them an environmental laboratory for nuclear research on a scale not seen since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

individual elements of the radioactivity – particularly those like strontium and caesium whose effects persist the longest. To understand this in a total context, the research at Kiev seeks to relate this information to the complete ecological environment of the immediately-affected area, and of the larger region of the Ukraine. The problems are: how does the level of the water table vary from one location to another? How do the soils vary, and which ones absorb or resist radioactive nucleides? What happens when the rivers and streams carry the radioactivity from one area to another? How do the plants respond in the new area of contamination?

Teams of geologists, biologists, climatologists, physicists, and

plans to build two new reactors at the Chernobyl site, and will build no new reactors of the graphite design, they are repairing the second damaged reactor which was shut down after the accident.

One can only hope that the lessons at Chernobyl have been learned by Canada and other nuclear energy users. Could the Government of Ontario evacuate 45,000 people in the two hours following a major reactor accident? Do we have thirty-kilometre emergency evacuation zones? Do we know in intimate detail the micro-ecology of the regions in which our reactors are located, or even the local variations in the water

REPORT FROM THE HILL



Space Station

An area of controversy between Canada and the United States, concerning the role of the space station, appears to have been resolved in Canada's favour.

The space station – which will consist of a beam structure and pressurized modules for research labs and astronaut living quarters – is planned for construction in the mid-1990s. The cost to the US is estimated to be about US\$12 billion in 1984 dollars. Europe, Japan and Canada are contributing almost one-third as much again with Europe and Japan building research modules and Canada the Mobile Servicing Centre which, at a cost of C\$800 million, will be used for the station's assembly, maintenance and repair facility.

The controversy centered on whether the station should be used for military purposes. The US Department of Defense made a vigorous effort to include explicit language in the international agreements reserving its right to use the station for "national security purposes." Early in April, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger wrote Secretary of State George Shultz warning that the United States "must be prepared to go forward alone if the price of [international] co-operation is too high."

It would seem that Weinberger's view did not prevail. With the Defense Department ranged against the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of State and all of the allies concerned, the National Security Council sided with NASA in favouring language describing the station's use as being "for peaceful purposes consistent with international law."

A leading American space expert, Ashton Carter of Harvard

University's Center for Science and International Affairs, speaking at a Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament seminar held in Ottawa, dismissed the space station's military usefulness and pointed out that the Pentagon had opposed the project from the outset specifically for that reason. Nevertheless, science writer Lydia Dotto warned in a *Globe and Mail* commentary on 1 May that the allies should not relax their guard. Although Canada plans to register the Servicing Centre under international law, which means that technically it will retain jurisdiction and control, it will be an integral part of the station, the management of which (and, therefore, the role both of the allies and of the Pentagon) remains undefined.

Soviet Overtures on Arms Control

Early in May, Alexander Bessmertnykh, a special envoy from the Soviet Union, visited Ottawa and met with Prime Minister Mulroney, Joe Clark and senior External Affairs officials. He brought an appeal from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev for Canada "to help guide the West" in reaching a deal to eliminate medium – and short-range nuclear missiles based in Europe. Practically the same day, Clark was quoted in the *Globe and Mail* describing the superpower proposals as "serious and significant" and expressing concern that Western European attitudes might be an obstacle to an arms control deal. "We can't allow a process which has involved this much movement by the superpowers to be frustrated at the beginning by some understandable but surmountable differences within the alliance", Mr. Clark said.

Southern African Situation

Early in April, Canadian Ambassador to the UN Stephen Lewis hinted that Canada might be asked to participate in a UN peace-keeping force in Mozambique

which has been beset by civil war abetted by the hostility of the neighbouring South African regime.

This news elicited a skeptical editorial in the *Ottawa Citizen* of 13 April. It warned that the likelihood of all parties agreeing to invite the UN in was remote. Since a clear mandate from all disputants remained the key to a successful multilateral operation, the editorial declared, "Canada should make it known in advance that it will not be a party to a sure prescription for disaster."

Later in the month, the Secretary of State for External Affairs rejected a call by the NDP that the government sever diplomatic relations with South Africa following a military raid by Pretoria on Zambia. Clark denounced the raid, which took the lives of four civilians, calling their deaths "acts of murder" by South African troops. But he indicated that the government sought to keep political lines open to South Africa while continuing to apply economic pressure.

The government's preferred option is to work in concert with other like-minded nations to bring about peaceful change in the subcontinent. A *Canadian Press* report of 15 April quotes Mr. Clark saying that Canada will propose a new international peace mission to South Africa at the seven-nation Economic Summit in Venice in June. It would apparently be modelled on the *Eminent Persons Group* sent on a similar mission by the Commonwealth in 1986.

Parliamentary Committees

The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs released a report on international financial institutions and the debt problem of developing countries on 13 May. In general terms, it questioned the continuing usefulness of dealing on a case-by-case basis with the debt problem. This strategy, pursued since 1982, needs to be supplemented by arrangements for an increased flow of funds to debtor countries through international agencies such as the World Bank

and creditor governments. It called on Canada to increase market access to indebted developing countries, to raise the proportion of Canada's official development assistance committed to the multilateral development banks from nineteen to twenty-five percent, and to play a leading role in consensus-building within the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in favour of *ad hoc* measures of debt relief and an enhanced role for World Bank lending.

Development assistance is the subject of another report tabled in Parliament on 28 May, this one from the House Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT). Titled *For Whose Benefit?*, the report focuses on Canada's record in this area and how it can be improved.

The Committee made many detailed recommendations but one of its more overarching proposals was that the government adopt a Development Assistance Charter to guide Canada's development assistance programme. The Charter would contain three main principles: that Canadian aid should help the poorest countries in the world; that the programme should work to help developing countries solve problems in harmony with the natural environment; that development priorities should prevail over other considerations when setting objectives. The Committee placed particular stress on linking Canadian aid policy and human rights. The report recommends that CIDA elaborate a human rights policy framework that would create a system to classify countries which are potential recipients of Canadian assistance according to their human rights performance. Countries which ranked the lowest on the Committee's recommended scale would be automatically ineligible to receive direct bilateral assistance. □

– GREGORY WIRICK

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



Export Limitations on Missiles

After four years of negotiations, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany, and the United States announced agreement on 7 April to limit the export of certain missiles and their associated technologies. This is the first agreement to concentrate on limiting the systems capable of *delivering* nuclear weapons, as opposed to attempting to limit material and technology used to develop nuclear *explosives* and warheads.

The seven nations have agreed not to export missiles or other unmanned vehicles capable of carrying a five hundred kilogram warhead and travelling more than three hundred kilometres. This approximately corresponds to the weight of an unsophisticated nuclear device and the minimum distance thought to be militarily significant. These missiles will not be exported, even if their stated use is peaceful, unless there is a binding government-to-government agreement stipulating that they will not be used to carry nuclear warheads. The supplying nation is responsible for enforcing the missiles' end-use.

Complete systems such as ballistic missiles, space-launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles and drones are thus banned for export. Sub-systems are also controlled. No installations for producing such missiles can be exported under any circumstances and an extensive list of technologies to be controlled is also part of the agree-

ment. Certain other technologies will be reviewed on a case by case basis.

Nuclear Testing

During March the USSR announced a shift from its previous testing policy. The Soviet Union proposed beginning simultaneous negotiations on verification measures that will lead to the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), along with negotiations on lower limits on the size and frequency of nuclear tests. The previous Soviet position had been that negotiations on a comprehensive test ban should take precedence.

Although the shift in the Soviet position brings it closer to the US position, the US has rejected the Soviet offer. The US position is that the Soviet Union must agree to further verification measures on the TTBT and PNET before additional limitations on testing can be negotiated. A complete ban on testing is still considered the ultimate goal, but US administration officials have stated that as long as there are nuclear weapons they will need to test.

On 13 January 1987 President Reagan sent the two existing treaties (PNET and TTBT) to the Senate for approval but attached provisions that required agreement with the Soviet Union on advanced verification measures. The treaties have been before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and have yet to go to the full Senate.

The Soviet Union has also offered (17 April) an exchange of nuclear tests. The offer would entail each side travelling to the other's test site, and detonating and measuring a nuclear test there. Insufficient knowledge of the geological nature of the Soviet test site has been a problem in verifying the yield of Soviet tests. An ex-

change of tests would be an important step forward in the calibration of the test sites. The offer is being explored by the two sides at talks in Geneva.

Chemical Weapons

Negotiations for a ban on chemical weapons are continuing at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Substantial progress has been made since President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev stated their desire for a chemical weapons agreement at their 1985 Summit. According to reports from the CD the agreement under consideration would establish an agency along the same lines as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that would oversee the dismantlement of the weapons and act as an enforcement mechanism.

If agreement is reached, the weapons and their manufacturing sites would be destroyed over a ten-year period. The Soviet Union announced during the last week in April that it had stopped production of chemical arms and was constructing a facility to destroy the weapons it had stockpiled. The United States extended an invitation to the Soviet delegation to visit its destruction and storage facilities in Utah.

France has stated that it will go ahead with plans to acquire new chemical weapons and that it will want to maintain them over the ten years the Soviets take to destroy their stocks. This has caused some concern within NATO, especially in West Germany where the weapons would likely first be used. West German officials have already asked the United States not to deploy its new chemical weapons on German territory.

United Nations inspectors visited Iraq in April to investigate Iraqi claims that Iran had been using chemical weapons. The UN team stated that there was evidence some Iraqi troops had been ex-

posed to chemical attack but found no conclusive evidence demonstrating that Iran had used the weapons. The inspection team also stated that Iraq has used chemical weapons against Iranian civilians. This is the first time an inspection team has visited Iraq. The team has previously gone to Iran twice to investigate allegations of Iraqi use of chemical weapons.

Conventional Arms Reductions in Europe

Representatives from the twenty-three NATO and Warsaw Pact nations have been meeting in Vienna in an effort to establish a mandate for negotiations that will act as a follow-on from the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (also known as the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe - CCSBMDE) process that concluded in September 1986.

Statements from Vienna indicate that France is in favour of holding the new talks within the larger framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). This would involve thirty-five European nations including the neutrals and non-aligned. A few of the neutral states insist that they should have a seat at the table and France prefers this format because it allows individual states to put forward their own positions. The US has proposed a bloc-to-bloc format (similar to the existing Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna which have gone on without success for fourteen years) involving only NATO and Warsaw Pact member states. In this framework, negotiating positions would be uniform within each bloc. Some form of a compromise where the neutral and non-aligned members of the CSCE would be kept up to date on the negotiations or could act as observers may be possible.

On 9 April, the Warsaw Pact called upon NATO nations to begin negotiations on freezing and reducing military spending. A similar offer was made by the Warsaw Pact in 1983.

On 8 May, Poland presented a four-part plan calling for conventional and nuclear disarmament in central Europe. The proposal calls for the reduction and withdrawal of nuclear and conventional weapons from Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark. (See the article by Michael Tucker on the Stockholm Treaty in this issue of Peace&Security.)

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST)

President Reagan provided Secretary of State Shultz with new negotiating instructions for his visit to Moscow on 13-16 April. President Reagan changed the time frame for strategic reductions of fifty percent from five years to seven years. A seven-year period (reduced from ten) was also proposed for a joint agreement of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. At that point (1994) both sides would be free to deploy defences.

A US draft treaty on these issues was presented on 8 May during the eighth round of the NST. The general structure for reductions of strategic nuclear weapons by fifty percent remains the same – both sides would reduce to 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles and 6,000 nuclear warheads or charges. In an apparent concession to the Soviet Union, the US raised the sub-ceiling on warheads that can be put on ICBMs from 3,300 to 3,600. This raises the level of the sub-ceiling to sixty percent of the total

warheads (6,000) previously proposed by the Soviet Union. The US also continues to call for a ban on mobile missiles.

Intermediate Range Forces (INF)

There has been considerable activity in this area since Gorbachev offered to negotiate limits on INF as a separate package (28 February 1987). Both sides have agreed, as they had previously at Reykjavik, to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles from Europe and maintain one hundred each outside of Europe on their national territory.

Two draft treaties have been presented. The US presented one on 4 March followed by a detailed verification annex on 12 March; the Soviets presented a draft in response on 27 April. The texts of the draft treaties have not been made public but statements by negotiators from both sides suggest that the two sides have moved closer to agreement. Some issues still remain to be worked out. The US wants the right to convert its Pershing II missiles into shorter range missiles and deploy them in Europe. The Soviets have refused to accept this saying that the missiles can easily be converted back to their longer ranges. The question of where exactly the one hundred remaining INF warheads will be deployed on either side also remains to be solved.

According to reports from Geneva the verification annex in the US draft calls for the broadcast of uncoded data from missile tests and the exchange of detailed information on the characteristics of missiles. In terms of monitoring the treaty, inspectors would go to the missile sites to verify the number of missiles deployed and then would be present to monitor the elimination of the missiles.

Permanent inspectors would be placed at the sites of the one hundred remaining missiles. In order to ease the verification requirements, the US has also proposed that INF missiles be completely eliminated. The Soviets have rejected this offer however, stating that they need to maintain the one hundred warheads in Soviet Asia to counter-balance the threat posed by US forces in South Korea and Japan.

The major sticking point in the negotiations has been the issue of short-range (500 to 1,000 kilometres) intermediate forces (SRINF). Both sides agreed at Reykjavik to include language dealing with SRINF in an INF treaty. The Soviets, however, vacillated and at one point seemed to retreat to their previous position of not negotiating on SRINF until after an INF treaty was signed. At the time of the US draft treaty, early in March, the Soviets stated their willingness to deal with the SRINF issue in parallel with negotiations on INF. Finally, during a visit to Prague, Czechoslovakia, General Secretary Gorbachev suggested the Soviets would be willing to completely eliminate SRINF in Europe and this offer was formally presented to Secretary of State Shultz, during his visit to Moscow on 14 April.

Gorbachev has consistently stated his willingness to remove Soviet SRINF from East Germany and Czechoslovakia as soon as an INF deal was signed, regardless of other progress on SRINF. However, the offer to completely eliminate these missiles from Europe has created political problems in Western Europe.

Gorbachev's surprise offer has generated renewed concern about Soviet conventional superiority in Europe. Although many have questioned whether Warsaw Pact superiority is as great as some claim it to be, Western European leaders have expressed concern that a Europe free of nuclear missiles will leave them vulnerable to the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. Coupled with that fear is the fear that elimination of the INF and SRINF missiles would

cripple NATO's strategy of flexible response and effectively "decouple" Europe from the nuclear guarantee of the United States.

The Soviet offer has caused particular problems for the West German coalition government. West German Defense Minister Manfred Wörner favours keeping SRINF and building up to the level of the Soviet Union. His cabinet colleague, Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, is in favour of accepting the Soviet offer.

A NATO meeting originally scheduled for 4 May was postponed because of West German inability to forge a consensus on the issue. Added pressure has come from an announcement by the British government on 15 May that it is prepared to accept the Soviet deal provided certain conditions are met. Britain has stated that SRINF must be part of an INF deal and a deal on SRINF must be applicable world-wide; it must also stipulate that British and French forces, along with the Pershing I missiles in West Germany, would not be affected by the treaty. The Pershing I missiles are deployed by the West German air force but the US controls the use of their warheads. The Soviets have, therefore, adopted the position that they be included in an INF-SRINF deal.

Since the original offer by the Soviets in February, the United States has insisted on the right to convert the Pershing II missiles into shorter range missiles. The US has made it clear to the West German government through conversations between President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl that if it does not accept the SRINF deal it must be prepared to accept the converted Pershing II missiles on its territory.

The US is waiting until it has heard from all NATO allies before forming its own final position and presenting it to the Soviets as negotiations progress. □

– JANE BOULDEN

Early Warning

June – August	Summer session of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva.
22 June – 2 July	Meeting of UN Ad Hoc committee on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, New York.

DEFENCE NOTES



Changes in Canadian Defence Policy Announced

The long-awaited Defence White Paper was tabled in the House of Commons on 5 June. Although the major provisions of the White Paper came as no surprise, having been discussed extensively by DND officials in the months prior to release, the policy statement confirmed major changes in Canada's defence posture.

CANADA PROPOSES TO PURCHASE ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines, which are intended to give the Canadian Forces the capability to operate in three oceans – the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic. At present, only nuclear submarines have the capability to operate under the ice for extended periods of time. The unit purchase price of the submarines is around C\$500 million, but the actual operating costs are uncertain, since they involve building various complex facilities to refuel the nuclear power plants and maintain the subs.

A SECOND BATCH OF SIX NEW frigates will be built as projected, but the third batch may need to be cancelled to make way for the nuclear submarines. This means that in the year 2000 Canada will have sixteen surface combat ships, and perhaps four or five of the new submarines, with the total rising to the projected dozen by about 2010.

CANADA'S MARITIME PATROL AND anti-submarine warfare capabilities will be further improved by the purchase of additional Aurora long-range patrol aircraft (currently there are eighteen), and new medium-range patrol aircraft to

replace the aging Trackers now in service. The White Paper also confirmed the previously announced decision to acquire new anti-submarine warfare helicopters for the frigates.

A CHANGE IN CANADA'S NATO policy was contained in the decision to drop the commitment to reinforce northern Norway in times of crisis. Canada had previously undertaken to send one light mechanized brigade to northern Norway, which would be transported by air and sea. The decision to abandon the commitment reflects the military view that the brigade either could not be transported in time to help deter a conflict, or that, if hostilities began, the brigade would be excessively vulnerable.

TO REASSURE NATO ALLIES THAT there will be no reduction in Canada's overall commitment to Europe, the brigade in question will be re-equipped to bring it up to full capability as a mechanized brigade, and be committed to reinforce the existing mechanized brigade in Germany. Not all brigade personnel will be kept in Germany, but a divisional headquarters will be established, and military equipment will be pre-positioned so that the remaining personnel can be flown across to join up with their equipment.

A LIMITED NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL CF-18s will be bought to compensate for attrition, and the Canadian Air Group in Germany will increase its strength.

A MAJOR FACE-LIFT FOR THE Reserves is planned. Naval reserves will have an active role in coastal defence and minesweeping. The increases in the number of army and air force reservists suggest that the part-time soldier may play a larger role in Canada's future defence policy.

WHILE THE WHITE PAPER DOES not deal fully with how these changes and purchases will be paid

for, it is agreed that if all the changes described are implemented, it will require large increases in the defence budget.

Canada's Strategy for the Pacific

Traditionally, Canada's naval defence effort has been concentrated on its east coast, in keeping with the priority accorded to defence of Europe and the North Atlantic sea-lanes. In recent years all three of its submarines, its four most modern destroyer escorts, two-thirds of its operational anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates, most of its Aurora long-range maritime patrol aircraft, and all thirty-two Sea King ASW helicopters have been based in the Maritimes rather than at Esquimalt, on Vancouver Island.

The situation is beginning to change, however, as the Pacific Ocean acquires increasing military-strategic importance and Canada begins to orient itself away from Europe. Part of the reason can be attributed to new deployments in the area by the US Navy – in particular, the stationing of new Trident ballistic missile submarines at Bangor, Washington, and plans for the "homeporting" of an aircraft carrier battle group in nearby Everett. This in turn has attracted the close attention of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, now the largest of the USSR's four fleets. Soviet attack submarines were recently reported to have entered the Strait of Juan de Fuca, between Vancouver Island and Washington State, in an effort to keep tabs on the Tridents.

The Canadian Government has already begun to respond by shifting more of its active-duty naval forces to the west coast. Last January, Defence Minister Beatty announced that HMCS Huron (a modern, helicopter-equipped destroyer) and four Sea Kings would be transferred from Halifax to Esquimalt this summer. The Huron's presence as a command

and control ship will for the first time permit the creation of an independent Canadian task force in the area. Further bolstering of Canada's Pacific fleet can be expected in the future. The new submarine programme, for example, has been specifically designed to allow the stationing of at least one vessel on the west coast.

Early Deployment of Strategic Defences?

Since US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announced that a limited form of SDI could be deployed by 1994, there has been considerable debate over the plausibility and advisability of such a plan. In February 1987 the George C. Marshall Institute published a study describing a possible early deployment strategy. The Institute outlines a three layer defensive system based primarily on kinetic kill vehicle technology. Unlike more exotic systems like lasers and particle beams, kinetic weapons rely for their killing power on the ability to hit the target with a solid object. The first layer would be spacebased and would intercept Soviet missiles in their boost phase. The other two layers would be based on the ground and would attack the missiles and their warheads in midcourse and terminal phases.

Critics of early deployment proposals based on these technologies have suggested that the system will be vulnerable to countermeasures such as space mines (designed to destroy satellites in earth orbit), fast-burn boosters (which would reduce the length of time the missile is vulnerable to attack) and decoys (used in hope of confusing or overwhelming the defensive system).

A similar idea for a simplified defence system known as "High Frontier" was put forward by the Heritage Foundation in 1982.

Documents released in early May

show that at the time, the idea was criticized by Department of Defense analysts, as "unrealistic." Also, the system would be unable to shoot down enough enemy missiles to be effective. The documents were released by General Abrahamson, head of the SDI Office, in response to a request from Senator Johnston. General Abrahamson suggested that the assessment was correct at the time but said that the rate of technological advance since then has been "phenomenal."

A report from the offices of Senators Proxmire and Johnston concludes that although no final decision has been made public, the SDI programme has already been reoriented towards technologies that could be deployed by the mid-1990s. The report states that there is a "black programme" within SDI "which is developing a blueprint for deploying strategic defenses in the near term."

On 24 April the American Physical Society released a study on the laser and particle beam technologies that would be required for the SDI programme. The study concluded that it would take at least ten years to determine whether or not it was even feasible to use these technologies in a SDI system. According to the study there are still formidable technological obstacles to overcome and some of the most crucial technologies would have to improve by factors of one hundred to one million.

Soviet Military Power

In March the US Department of Defense released its annual report, *Soviet Military Power*, describing the latest Soviet military developments. The report states that the Soviets are reconsidering their traditional strategy of "rapid offensive operations" in the European theatre. This change is attributed to the increased sophistication of NATO conventional weapons and new US and NATO doctrines of deep attack that would carry the war deep into Warsaw Pact territory. Furthermore, the sheer size of the arsenals and improved capabilities on both sides have apparently led the

Soviets to believe that a European conflict would be of much longer duration than they had previously thought.

The nature and extent of the Soviet ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme is also raised in this year's *Soviet Military Power*. It is an area in which there has been considerable dispute between the various intelligence agencies

concerned. The Pentagon states that the Soviet Union is in the process of developing a nation-wide BMD system; something that is prohibited by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The CIA puts the probability of this at ten percent or less. In an apparent compromise, *Soviet Military Power* states that, taken together, Soviet BMD activities "indicate a significant com-

mitment to enhancing the strategic defenses of the USSR and suggest that the Soviets may be preparing an ABM defense of their nation."

Whence the Threat to Peace

In February 1987 the Soviet Union released its equivalent to *Soviet Military Power*, entitled *Whence the Threat to Peace*. The last issue of the Soviet publication was published in 1984. This latest edition is of particular note because it contains Soviet estimates of the nuclear forces of the US and the Soviet Union. In the past the Soviet Union has been reluctant to release its own estimates of the two nuclear arsenals and has generally only done so as part of arms control negotiations such as SALT.

The estimates presented are those given to President Reagan by General Secretary Gorbachev at their meeting in Reykjavik in October. By Soviet estimates, the US has approximately 14,800 nuclear warheads on 2,208 strategic delivery vehicles and the Soviet Union has about 10,000 warheads on 2,480 delivery vehicles. *Whence the Threat to Peace* also places heavy emphasis on the need to maintain the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and reiterates the Soviet view that the US Strategic Defense Initiative will be destabilizing and lead to a new arms race.

The Last Titan 2

According to an *Associated Press* report of 7 May, the last operational Titan 2 intercontinental ballistic missile was deactivated by the US Air Force in early May. At one time fifty-four Titan missiles were deployed in concrete silos in Arkansas, Arizona and Kansas. The Titans were among the earliest missiles to be placed in the US arsenal. They were large, not very accurate, and prone to accident. They carried what by present standards is an enormous multi-megaton warhead. The AP report said the silos they leave behind will be left open for some months to allow Soviet surveillance satellites to confirm that they are empty. □

ALLIANCE NEWS

Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly

During the weekend of 23 May legislators from the NATO countries gathered in Quebec City to discuss economic, political and military issues. Among the subjects raised by the Parliamentarians at the conference were the future of Mikhail Gorbachev's reform initiatives in the USSR, and the role of strategic defenses in Western security.

As leader of the host country, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney spoke to the Assembly. The speech ranged across the spectrum of arms control and security issues, however, Mr. Mulroney made specific reference to the US Strategic Defense Initiative. Canada continues to support research into strategic defence, but Mulroney cautioned: "... extreme care must be taken to ensure that defences are not integrated with existing forces in such a way as to create fears of a first strike... and second, we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the arms control process and existing agreements."

Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation

A meeting in March between the British and French defence ministers laid the groundwork for closer coordination of the two countries' nuclear forces. André Giraud and George Younger announced on March 10 that their governments are seeking to formalize close, but largely *ad hoc* exchanges on questions relating to their nuclear forces.


According to a report in the *Economist* (14 March) the U.K.-France accord is an indication that they are considering the possibility of a combined European nuclear force in the event that the United States withdraws its nuclear forces. The new Anglo-French nuclear cooperation comes at a time when the presence of American nuclear missiles in Europe has been made uncertain by the progress in the superpower arms control negotiations.

Revival of the Western European Union

As the superpowers move closer to an arms control agreement Western European countries are moving to revitalize the Western European Union (WEU). The seven-member body (Britain, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) was formed in 1954 as a defensive pact and was part of the allied effort to bring West Germany into NATO. The WEU is the object of increasing interest because it is the only exclusively European body with a mandate to deal with matters of defence.

In December 1986, French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac proposed a Charter of Western European Security Principles in a speech to the WEU assembly in Paris. The main elements of Chirac's proposal are that nuclear deterrence remains the only way to ensure European security, and that Western Europe must retain its link to the American deterrent force.

REVIEWS



Hungary and Suez 1956: A View from New Delhi

Escott Reid

Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1987,
160 pgs. \$12.95 paper/\$24.95 cloth

This crisp little book is a compact and easily readable account of Escott Reid's time of testing, in the hot turmoil of two acute international crises, which in their longest days did seem to be tearing apart the flawed fabric of the post-war world. It recalls what we novitiates saw first some forty years ago in the old East Block: brilliant flashes of a strong but resilient intellect, a deeply sensitive analytical power, a tireless dedication to causes firmly espoused, an unshakable sense of duty. These sterling qualities still shine brightly in the book, even when its arguments, as always well-marshalled, are not fully persuasive.

The book is not one more attempt to put the record straight for, as Reid points out in the prologue, every view of those crises suffers from some distortion deriving from difference of viewpoint. Even if the entire cast of international actors, intimately involved in Hungary and Suez, could be assembled on some supernatural stage, it would take them beyond eternity to agree on what happened thirty years ago during the protracted time the crisis endured. Reid has sensibly centred his account on his own attempts, in New Delhi, to persuade Prime Minister Nehru to denounce the Soviet violent suppression of the Hungarian revolt with the same vehemence as he was denouncing the Anglo-French attacks on Egypt.

Reid shared the belief of most Western observers that India displayed a double standard in its reaction to the two crises, which both involved permanent members of the UN Security Council. India's lapse lay in the failure of Nehru to speak forthrightly against the USSR and in the perfunctory performance of the Indian delegation at the UN General Assembly, during its emergency special session on Hungary. Reid painstakingly explains why he saw it as his duty to try to correct these Indian aberrations, without receiving much help from his Department and Minister because, in Reid's view, they were so preoccupied with Suez. His secondary theme concerns a set of might-have-beens – what would have happened if he had been more solidly supported in his demarches in New Delhi.

Reid develops his main theme with the masterly debating and drafting skills, which long ago won him wide acclaim even from detractors. He supports his opinions and judgments with citations which on the whole are authoritative and illuminating. His solid work should have special appeal for historians, students of political science and scholars generally, but it has relevant lessons as well for foreign policy watchers and practitioners today, who continue to wrestle with similar issues of worldwide significance. This book's value and appeal are enhanced just because it is neither aridly academic nor pompously self-important. The people we meet in it, including the author, are warm-blooded, emotional and ever conscious of their doubts, faults and fears.

The book raises questions beyond the range of the might-have-beens mentioned, but many of them are left unanswered. On the main theme, Reid seems to be partly satisfied that by mid-November 1956 he had helped to bring Nehru closer to the positions Reid had been pressing. He does not explain

very convincingly, however, why Nehru preferred to vacillate and procrastinate, for it is hard to believe Nehru was really taken in by Bulganin's propaganda any more than he would have been swayed by more vigorous advocacy by the United States. Since their bitter experiences of Korea in 1950-53 – compounded by Dulles's obstinacy on Vietnam, his brinkmanship and defence pact proclivities in 1954 – the uncommitted Asian and African states had been putting distance between themselves and the United States which culminated in their formalizing of non-alignment at the Bandung summit of 1955. Reid does not make much of this growing evidence of Asian-African determination to keep clear of East-West clashes, yet it is a key factor bearing on both his main theme and his might-have-beens.

As for the distortions in this view from New Delhi, are they valid or merely inserted to underline Reid's recurring complaint that he was not kept sufficiently abreast of major developments in New York and Ottawa? For example, how could he, with his past experience in the Department of External Affairs and the UN, have failed to grasp that the Canadian Government's intense preoccupation with Suez was born of dire political necessity, in both national and international contexts. Or, that once Canada had embarked on a course of constructive endeavour at the UN, we had to move to the middle ground on some Assembly votes and to enter into complicated voting deals with the African-Asian members, above all with India? With such constraints, could Canada afford the risk of putting additional pressures on them concerning Hungary? They knew and we knew, in any event, that the UN had very limited scope for effective action on Hungary, especially with the Western powers in angry disarray.

These and other questions left hanging – for example, how did the reprimand he received come

about? – give the book an air of unresolved mystery. It is one more reason why once taken up this book will not be put down until it is read fully and in all probability more than once. – *Geoffrey Murray*

Mr. Murray spent ten years of his foreign service career on UN affairs, both in New York and Ottawa.

The Siege

Conor Cruise O'Brien

New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986,
798 pgs. US \$12.95 paper

Conor Cruise O'Brien was initiated into the Arab-Israeli conflict while seated between Israel and Iraq in the United Nations, as a representative of Ireland, nearly thirty years ago. As diplomat, editor and writer, O'Brien has immersed himself in the subject ever since, producing now a highly readable, expansive yet critical account of "the saga" of Israel and Zionism.

He calls it aptly, "The Siege." The Jews, like the Irish Catholics in the past, have been a stigmatized people. They have been persecuted and oppressed for centuries, a besieged people in Europe and now, beneath the Zionist emblem in a Jewish National Home, they are under siege in the Middle East.

With a subject that has produced more than enough books peddling either the pro-Israeli or the pro-Palestinian line, O'Brien has managed to write a fairly balanced assessment of a tragic situation. It neither flatters the Israelis nor indict them, and it does detail most of the wrongs done the hapless Palestinians. Just as important, he reminds us all that this terrible predicament of Israel "is not the creation of Israelis only, but is also the creation of all the rest of us – those who attacked and destroyed the Jews in Europe and those in Europe and America who just quietly closed the doors."

After a fairly exhaustive examination of the Zionist background,

of the history of the Israeli state to date, and of the various proposals for solving the Arab-Israeli problem, O'Brien comes to the rather depressing conclusion that none of the suggestions is realistically going to lead to a peaceful settlement. Enlarging on Moshe Dayan's aphorism that "Israel has no foreign policy, only a defence policy," O'Brien is most categorical about the impossibility of a "peace for territory" solution. The militarily unrealistic idea of Israel withdrawing to its pre-1967 boundaries is an "agreeable international pipedream." The possibility of a federation of the West Bank and Jordan is not going anywhere without East Jerusalem. As for the old Allon option of controlled settlements in the West Bank as a defensive line with military access to the Jordan river, that could never be accepted by Jordan and is no longer realistic domestically because settlements have become so widespread.

He takes a skeptical view of a comprehensive, superpower settlement. Israel, he argues, as a Zionist state and home for Jews everywhere now "cannot be other than it is," and the Muslim world is not free to be other than what it is. "It seems to follow that the siege will continue, in some form, into the indefinite future." As for the Palestinians, he argues, their best hope for the future is not in territory but in a "tacit condominium" between Israel and West Bankers, buttressed by some tacit accommodation with Syria over Lebanon. His assessment won't please activists on either side. But his lucidity and fairness are very welcome. — *John R. Walker*

Mr. Walker writes a weekly column on international affairs for Southam News.

Women in War: From World War II to El Salvador

Shelley Saywell

Toronto: Penguin Books 1986, 324 pgs. \$9.95 paper

Saywell is a Toronto-based television producer whose previous credits include *The Ten Thousand Day War*, a documentary series about the war in Vietnam. Her account of women's experiences in war is written in the

straight-forward and dramatic style of a documentary. Saywell spares the reader any tiresome soliloquies about the evils of war, instead she permits the women she interviewed to speak for themselves.

They range from aging Warsaw and Paris housewives who at the age of nineteen or twenty took part in resistance attacks against the Nazis, to present-day guerilla fighters in El Salvador. Whether they were fighting for the 'glory' of Britain or simply for survival, each woman felt at the time that she had no choice. "They say that women have babies, and so don't kill. I was very young and very determined . . . I never asked myself if the soldier or SS man I killed had a wife or children." (Marisa Musu, member of the Gappisti resistance in Rome)

Memories of intense friendship and loyalty forged in the battlefield are juxtaposed with stark accounts of rape and deprivation suffered by female POWs. Although women felt generally equal to men in battle, they felt that equal status in war did little to raise their status in civilian life. According to a British pilot in WWII, "You could say that the forgotten army was not the one in Burma, but the one in skirts."

Nearly every woman emerged from war bruised and embittered, but most said they would do it again in defence of their homeland. If their stories dispel the myth that women are less violent by nature than men, they reinforce the fact that war brings out the best and the worst in humanity generally. "War changed me. You cannot go through that and come back the same. I've been to a place where nothing is sacred except what you have inside. What keeps you going is that little inner part that you own and that is really all you do own . . ." (Lynn Bower, Vietnam veteran) — *Elizabeth Richards*

Women Against War

Compiled by Women's Division of Soka Gakkai Translated by Richard L. Gage

Tokyo: Kodansha International 1986, 247 pgs. US \$17.95

Forty testimonials were drawn from a collection of twelve volumes published in Japanese by women of the Soka Gakkai, a

Buddhist organization that advocates the abolition of nuclear weapons. Unlike the subjects of Saywell's book, these women did not fight. They were civilians caught first by the loss of loved ones to a war they barely understood, and finally by the poverty of post-war Japan and the indignities of defeat.

Japanese women were not permitted to enter University until after the war, and because of this, most of the women who recount their experiences are uneducated. The collective result is a simple, unembellished, and poignant story told straight from the heart. And unlike Saywell's subjects, these women have nothing positive to say about war. Victims of radiation sickness relate their slow awakening to the fact that, for them, WWII never ended. — *Elizabeth Richards*

NATO and the Defense of the West

Laurence Martin

New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1985, 159 pgs. US \$18.95 cloth

This book was published before the current flurry of arms control activity over Europe-based nuclear weapons; however, far from making its analysis out of date, the combination of text and illustration assembled in these few pages is more useful than ever. With the prospect of a Europe free of particular kinds of nuclear weapons the attention of many in the West has shifted to conventional forces. Can they do the job? Can Western Europe be defended without nuclear weapons?

Laurence Martin is a leading British defence analyst, but this book is not at the cutting edge of academic reflection. It is instead a basic walk through the elements that make up the military forces which confront each other in Europe. As such it should be extremely useful to the non-expert interested in understanding just what all those tanks and soldiers are doing in Europe, and how their owners think they might get used. Martin does not examine motives for starting WW III in Europe, he just looks at how the soldiers and their masters say they will fight war there if it comes.

Examples of chapter headings give a feel for the style: "Early Evolution of NATO Strategy" — "The Maritime Battle" — "Air Power in the Land Battle" — "Command Structure of NATO" — "...of the Warsaw Pact." The illustrations are clear and informative, and deal with everything from how a tank shell penetrates armour to the stages of authorization NATO military commanders would go through if they wanted to use nuclear weapons in battle. (The caption for this complex multi-coloured flowchart states wryly that NATO's nuclear release system is "possibly unworkable.")

The only obvious drawback to the book (especially for students and other newcomers to the field) is that the vision presented is entirely too sanitized. A modern conventional war fought in Europe would be an unimaginably ghastly business for the soldiers — not to mention hapless civilians. The air would be filled with flying metal and poison gas, the soldiers would be stuck inside tanks and bunkers, the battle would be fought around the clock in "continuous operations" consuming large amounts of equipment and a great many lives. Martin's readers would have been even better served if the precise cutaway tank diagrams and neat illustrations of armour penetrators had been accompanied by some description of what those penetrators are designed to do to the people stuck inside. — *Michael B.*

BRIEFLY NOTED

No Other Way: Canada and International Security Institutions

John W. Holmes et al

Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1986, 155 pgs \$10.95 paper

A collection of essays on the Canada's role in international institutions such as the UN Security Council and NATO, this volume is the product of a conference of some seventy academics and officials held in Toronto in June 1984.

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* 'Livres' section.

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



'The Allies and Arms Control' is the title of a study jointly sponsored by CIIPS and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, England. From 13 to 15 May, the two Institutes organized a workshop in London to discuss the papers which will be published towards the end of this year in a volume edited by **Fen Hampson** (CIIPS/Carleton University) and co-edited by **John Roper** (Chatham House) and **Harald von Riekhoff** (CIIPS Research Fellow).

Jane Sharp of SIPRI gave a paper on the allies view of the superpower's bilateral negotiations. **Jim Macintosh** of York University led the discussion on the allies perceptions of the multi-lateral and regional negotiations. **Julian Perry Robinson** of Sussex University spoke on chemical and biological weapons negotiations. Giving papers on national and regional perspectives were **Phil Williams** of the University of Southampton, **Jean Klein** of the French Institute of International Relations, **Gert Krell** of the Frankfurt Peace Institute, **Harald von Riekhoff** of CIIPS, **Arne Bruntland** of the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs.

The influence and impact of the allies on US politics and arms control was examined by **Hugh de Santis** of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, while **David Newsom** of Georgetown University looked at co-ordination and consultation among the allies. **Lawrence Freedman** of King's College, University of

London, gave a paper assessing the future of arms control and the alliance. Also in attendance were the Director of Research at CIIPS, **David Cox**, and **Doina Cioiu** of the Institute's Research section.

Other Canadian participants at the conference included **Admiral Robert Falls** (Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament), **Ernie Gilman** (Department of National Defence), **Paul Buteux** (University of Manitoba), **L. A. Delvoie** (Deputy High Commissioner for Canada, London), and **John Halstead** (former Canadian Ambassador to NATO).

While in the U.K. **Fen Hampson** attended the Ditchley Foundation conference held 15 to 17 May: 'A New Generation, Old Institutions and a Middle-aged Alliance: Is There Room for Innovation in the Trans-Atlantic Relationship?' The conference brought together journalists, academics and policy makers from countries of the Western Alliance.

Geoffrey Pearson, Executive Director at the Institute, spoke on 'Alignment or Non-alignment' at a conference organized by the Collège Militaire Royal de St-Jean and the Université de Montréal in April on Canada and Military Neutrality. Later that month he addressed a class at the National Defence College in Kingston. In May, Mr. Pearson spoke to the Forum for Young Canadians in Ottawa and to a workshop organized by the Quebec Bar Association on the role of lawyers in the nuclear age. He participated in a panel discussion on 'NATO, the Peace Movement and Public Opinion' at a conference in Toronto organized by the University of Waterloo and Wilfrid Laurier University and titled 'Canada, the USA and the Atlantic Alliance.'

Selig Harrison of the Carnegie Endowment for International

1988 Grants Procedures and Deadlines

■ Beginning in January 1988, the Institute will make decisions on and allocate grants twice a year instead of four times as is currently the case. Please note the following deadlines:

14 August 1987 for an October 1987 decision

6 November 1987 for a December 1987 decision

31 December 1987 for a March 1988 decision.

30 June for an October 1988 decision.

Peace spoke to a seminar organized by the Institute on recent developments in and about Afghanistan. Mr. Harrison covered south Asia for many years for the *Washington Post*, and spoke of the domestic situation within Afghanistan as well as of the role of the Soviet Union, the views of Pakistan and the United States. Mr. Harrison also addressed the issues surrounding the negotiations which are taking place under the auspices of the UN, and was moderately optimistic about the chances for a negotiated withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Hans Günter Brauch of the University of Stuttgart and **Alain Carton** from the Institute for East/West Security Studies led an Institute-sponsored seminar in April on the 'European Defence Initiative and Extended Air Defence: Technical, Political, Military and Arms Control Aspects.'

David MacDonald, Canadian Ambassador to Ethiopia led a discussion on the present situation in the Horn of Africa at a meeting in April co-sponsored by the CIIPS and *International Perspectives*. Mr. MacDonald talked about problems of famine and regional security in eastern African, concentrating his remarks on Ethiopia.

The study group on conflict resolution, a periodic seminar organized by CIIPS for the past year, held two sessions during the quarter. In April, Ambassador **John MacDonald** of the US Foreign Service Institute led a discussion on two-track diplomacy and the work of his Institute. In May, **Herbert C. Kelman**, Professor of Social Ethics at Harvard University was the guest speaker. Mr. Kelman talked about the conflict resolution roles Canada might consider which have practical relevance to policy makers, and about the possibility of teaching negotiation.

Leslie Wake, the Institute's librarian for the past two years, left in May to take up a position with the National Red Cross. **James Moore**, a research assistant for the past year, joined the staff of the Directorate of Strategic Analysis at the Department of National Defence. **Peter Gizewski**, a Ph.D. student at Columbia University, joined the staff in May as a research assistant. Summer students at the Institute this year are **Emily Atkins** of Queen's University in the Public Programmes section, **Jill Tansely**, a Master's student at Carleton

University in the grants administration section, and **Christina Homonylo** in the Library.

Salim Mansur, a research associate at the Institute, gave a paper to the Learned Societies meetings in Hamilton in June entitled 'Security or Insecurity: Regional Politics in South Asia'. This autumn Mr. Mansur will be joining the faculty of the Department of Political Science of the University of Western Ontario as Assistant Professor.

During the spring **Geoffrey Pearson** met with editorial boards of the *Toronto Star*, *Regina Leader-Post*, *Calgary Herald*, and *Vancouver Sun*.

Nancy Gordon attended the annual conference organized by the Department of National Defence for and about their Military and Strategic Studies programmes. She and **David Cox** gave brief presentations on the grants programme of the Institute.

A 'Roundtable on Negotiations for Peace in Central America', organized by the Canada-Caribbean-Central American Policy Alternatives Group, in co-operation with CIIPS and others, was held in Ottawa in May. Approximately forty experts from both official and non-governmental sectors in Central America, Canada, the US, Latin America and Europe, discussed the Contadora process, the reasons for its lack of success, and the possible ways that it might proceed.

Geoffrey Pearson and **Michael Tucker** participated in a seminar organized by the North/South Institute and co-sponsored by CIIPS on the role of middle powers in the international system. Mr. Tucker, a Research Fellow at the Institute, gave a paper entitled 'Middle Powers and Multilateral Arms Control: The Geneva Ex-

perience.' The seminar was part of a larger project on the same subject in which the North South Institute and CIIPS are co-operating.

David Cox gave a paper on Canadian defence policy at a meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Quebec City in May. The Assembly is the parliamentary arm of the alliance, and meets annually for an exchange of views. **John Toogood**, Secretary-Treasurer at the Institute attended as an observer.

In early May, the Information Services Consultative Group met in Toronto. Members of the group include librarians from the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, the Centre for International and Strategic Studies at York University, le Centre québécoise de relations internationales, and members of the CIIPS library staff. The group was established by CIIPS to explore possibilities for co-operation, specifically, to develop a database on issues of peace and security to which each library would contribute and have access. A thesaurus, which will provide access to the database in both English and French, was discussed at the meeting; work on the thesaurus has begun at the Institute. □

RECENT PUBLICATIONS FROM THE INSTITUTE

Background Papers:

13. A Review of the Geneva Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions, by David Cox

Points of View:

4. Maintaining Peace with Freedom: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control, by Lorne Green.

PUBLIC PROGRAMMES GRANTS - Fourth Quarter 1986-87

Les Ami-e-s de la Terre de Québec , Québec Colloque "Paix et justice social" (14-15 mai 1987)	\$ 5,000
Robert Cadotte , Montréal Livre sur la politique de défense et les travailleurs	6,400
Canadian Institute of International Affairs , National Capital Branch, Ottawa Study of the Northern Dimension of Canadian Foreign Policy	4,150
Canadian University Press , University of British Columbia, Vancouver To improve the coverage of international peace and security issues in 52 Canadian student newspapers	8,500
Committee on Atlantic Studies , Carleton University, Ottawa Conference "Arms Control and Atlantic Security" (October 2-4, 1987)	5,000
Conférence mondial des religions pour la paix/Canada , Montréal Publication des actes du colloque "Une deuxième chance pour la paix"	5,000
DLI Productions , Montreal Film about SAGE Nuclear Disarmament Tour	25,000
Forum on Nuclear Politics , Ottawa Public conference on Nuclear Politics (March 27, 1987)	200
Le Groupe des 78 , Ottawa Etude "Au-delà de la balance du pouvoir: politiques de défense pour le Canada"	7,500
Lawyers for Social Responsibility , University of Toronto, Toronto Conference on Law and Disarmament (March 20, 1987)	1,400
Manitoba Educators for Social Responsibility , Winnipeg A two-week workshop "International Institute for Peace Education" (August 1987)	9,500
Peace Resource Centre , Ottawa Ottawa Peace Calendar - 1987	5,000
Peel Senior History and Social Science Conference Committee , Mississauga Fourth Annual Conference "Peace: Myth or Reality" (April 8, 1987)	2,500
Project Ploughshares Calgary , Calgary Southern Alberta Peace Education Project - Phase II	7,500
St. John's Ploughshares , St. John's Newsletter - 1987	2,000
Vues d'Afrique , Montréal "Regard canadien sur l'Afrique et les pays créoles" (12 avril 1987)	1,000
York University , Atkinson College, Toronto Conference, Outside the Nuclear Club (June 10-13, 1987)	10,000
YWCA - Ontario Area Council, Toronto Workshop on Global Peace (April 4, 1987)	2,900
TOTAL	\$108,550


PUBLIC PROGRAMMES JOINT PROJECTS - Fourth Quarter 1986-87

Royal Commonwealth Society , Ottawa Commonwealth Conference for Young Leaders	\$ 40,000
Canadian Association for Adult Education Joint Seminar - Adult Education on Peace and Security Issues	20,000
TOTAL	\$ 60,000

RESEARCH GRANTS - Fourth Quarter 1986-87

Kornel Buzek , Dalhousie University, Halifax The Evolution of Seismic Verification Technology and Canada's Test Cessation Diplomacy	\$ 10,000
Patrick James , McGill University, Montreal Systemic Polarity and International Stability: The Role of Structure in the Generation of Conflict	3,500
David Robert Jones , Murray Edward Trott , Dalhousie University, Halifax The Soviet Defence Budget's Relationship to the USSR's National Accounts	24,250
Ruth Klassen , Peace Research Institute - Dundas The United Nations Voting Series (Volume III)	2,000
Douglas Alan Ross , University of British Columbia, Vancouver Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific	1,600
Paul R. Shaw , University of British Columbia, Vancouver Humanity's Propensity for Warfare: An Evolutionary Theory with Policy Implications	4,000
Michael Wallace , University of British Columbia, Vancouver Accidental Nuclear War	5,000
David Wurfel , Bruce Burton , University of Windsor, Windsor Prospects for Resolution of the Indochina Conflict	4,000
TOTAL	\$ 54,350

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



A response from Educators for Social Responsibility

I recently read Michael Bryans' article "Peace Education: Telling Jack and Jill the Facts of Life," (*Peace & Security*, Winter '87). As the coordinator of the ESR teaching guides, *Dialogue*, *Perspectives*, and the *Participation* series, I was interested in his comments. I feel, however, that Mr. Bryans fails to understand the intent and design of ESR's curriculum materials.

Mr. Bryans articulates a tension facing all of us in peace education. Clearly it is essential for our young people to grow up to an awareness of the complexities of the power dynamics of states and governments. Clearly these relationships are more intricate and far-reaching than any metaphor drawn from interpersonal relations can suggest. Nevertheless, we do need to create a bridge between the distant and confusing dynamics of nation-states and the daily lives of our students.

In our research on student attitudes, we found that, in contrast to their vivid and concrete concepts of war, students' concepts of peace were often vague and abstract. In addition, students often attributed stereotyped "images of the enemy" to countries with whom we have political differences. Even more disturbing, we found that students felt powerless, hopeless, and cynical about the possibility of creating change. Our educational efforts must provide the process and content to meet these challenges as well as providing information about vital international issues. Rather than defining peace as the absence of war or the preservation of international order, we viewed

it as the pursuit of justice on personal, social, national and international levels.

We feel it is as important for students to understand the nature of social and ecological interdependence, to develop conflict resolution and cooperation skills, and to participate in making the world a safer, more just, and peaceful place, as it is to understand intellectually the dynamics of international politics.

All of ESR's materials are written by classroom teachers. In the discussions they held during the creation of *Dialogue* and *Perspectives*, these teachers agreed that quality materials dealing with the content of international relations were readily available. But they noted, on the other hand, the relative scarcity of good teaching materials that look beyond the content at the importance of the *process* we use when we teach about vital contemporary issues.

In *Dialogue* the contributing teachers chose, at the elementary level, to look at developmentally-appropriate ways to listen and respond to young children's concerns about nuclear issues without adding to their fears; and, at the secondary level, to provide a variety of direct activities on developing and applying critical thinking skills to the content of the nuclear arms race and international issues.

In the *Participation* series ESR teachers provided activities to help students see the link between such content areas as math or science and the politics of public decision-making, as well as to experience their own ability to act to make a difference. They wanted the ESR teaching guides to be useful in many subjects and grades and to provide age-appropriate materials for elementary teachers who might find personal conflict resolution a much more teachable and appropriate concept than conflict on an international level.

Mr. Bryans simplifies ESR's materials by maintaining that we

equate the personal and the international. Although he is correct in recognizing our belief that we can learn some important lessons from our personal, community, and national conflicts, we do not "equate" these areas. We ask students to think about the similarities and the differences among four levels of conflict (personal, community, national and international). Although there are many activities that focus on personal conflict, there are also activities on international dynamics; in fact, the section on "Conflict Resolution" culminates in a simulated negotiation of the placement of cruise missiles in Europe.

Mr. Bryans also accuses ESR of overemphasizing personal perceptions and skills. We do indeed encourage reflection on our individual behaviour. Taking personal responsibility for the world we create means understanding the consequences of our actions on the people around us, on the environment, and on the larger society. Mr. Bryans seems to feel that this perspective ignores the factors of power, economics, and political socialization in international relations. We tried to explore the impact on international relations of ideology, ethnocentrism, propaganda, territoriality, aggression, and images of the enemy – especially in the "Obstacles to Peace" section of *Perspectives*. But we need to realize that this is a very political and sensitive area to deal with. We must conscientiously avoid propagandizing to students on these issues.

This is not to deny that more could be done to deal with the concerns Mr. Bryans has about ESR's treatment of a number of important issues. We do not consider our material complete: we are constantly rethinking and revising as our understanding grows.

I regret the labeling and simplifying of ESR's approach found in Mr. Bryans' article. He and I prob-

ably agree more than we disagree about what students need in order to make conscious and informed decisions about international issues.

*Shelley Berman, President
Educators for Social Responsibility
Cambridge, Mass.*

'Trident II' a lot more sombre for Canada

Mr. Sokolsky's article, "The US Navy and Canadian Security" (Spring '87), is interesting but it may miss the real drive behind the US Navy submarine program. This drive is to develop a most powerful first strike capability that, by itself, could devastate most of the USSR's strategic nuclear forces.

He states that: "... a fleet of ballistic missile submarines whose sea-launched ballistic missiles constitute America's secure second-strike capability." However, the upcoming (deployment starts 1988) Trident II system and its D-5 missile are not a second-strike weapon.

The Trident II submarine system, notwithstanding the US Navy's claims to the contrary, is designed to give the US the power to destroy, within less than fifteen minutes, most of the USSR's ICBM force and most other significant nuclear targets in the USSR. Moreover, the current Trident I submarine is designed to be easily converted to accommodate the powerful and highly accurate D-5 missile. The US Navy's plan is to convert these submarines to the D-5 during the next decade.

I suggest that when one realizes this development many of the arguments in the article regarding the new US Navy policy take on a considerably different meaning. And that meaning, the possible initiation of a first-strike, could have a considerably more sombre impact on Canada and its navy. *Dr. Matania Ginosar, Director
Target Nuclear Disarmament
Sacramento, CA*



Lettre des Educators for Social Responsibility

J'ai récemment lu l'article de M. Michael Bryans intitulé « Enseigner aux enfants les choses de la vie » paru dans *Peace and Security* (Hiver 1987). En la qualité de coordonnateur de l'Elaboration des guides pédagogiques des ESR intitulés *Dialogue, Perspectives et Participation*, je me suis intéressé à ses observations. Je crois cependant que M. Bryans n'a compris ni l'objet ni la teneur des ouvrages didactiques préparés par notre groupe.

M. Bryans décrit un dilemme auquel tous ceux et celles qui « enseigne » la paix font face. Il est de toute évidence essentiel pour les jeunes de se sensibiliser aux complexités des rapports de force dynamiques existant entre les Etats et les gouvernements. Et il est certain que ces rapports sont plus complexes et plus lourds de conséquences que les relations interpersonnelles, quelles que soient les comparaisons qu'on puisse établir entre les deux. Il nous faut néanmoins créer un lien entre la réalité lointaine et la vie quotidienne de nos élèves et étudiants.

A la faveur de nos recherches sur les attitudes des étudiants, nous avons constaté que, s'ils possèdent des idées claires et nettes sur la guerre, les étudiants ont une perception des disciplines comme les mathématiques et les sciences, d'une part, et des dimensions politiques du processus décisionnel public, d'autre part, les auteurs ont aussi visé à montrer concrètement comment ils peuvent effectivement influencer sur le cours des choses. Les ESR veulent que leurs guides pédagogiques soient utiles dans de nombreuses disciplines et à divers niveaux et qu'ils contiennent une matière adaptée aux enfants d'âges différents, matière qui pourra servir, au niveau primaire, aux enseignants et enseignants pour définir la paix comme étant l'absence de guerre ou la préservation de l'ordre international, nous l'envisageons comme étant la poursuite de la justice sur les plans personnel, social, national et international.

M. Bryans simplifie les ouvrages didactiques internationaux. Nos professeurs de changements sociaux, nationaux et internationaux, nous l'envisageons comme étant la poursuite de la justice sur les plans personnel, social, national et international.

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appellée *High Frontier*. Des documents divulgués au début de mai révélèrent qu'à l'époque, les analystes du Département de la Défense avaient critiqué l'idée en la qualifiant de « peu réaliste » et en ajoutant que le système serait incapable d'abattre assez de missiles ennemis pour être efficace. Le général Abrahamson, chef du Bureau de l'IDS, a diffusé ces documents pour accéder à une demande du sénateur Johnston. Le général a soutenu que l'évaluation faite en 1982 était exacte, mais que la technologie avait fait des progrès « phénoménaux » depuis.

Un rapport émanant des cabinets des sénateurs Proxmire et Johnston conclut que, même si aucune décision finale n'a été rendue publique, les programmes de l'IDS a déjà été réorientés vers des technologies qui pourraient être mises en oeuvre vers le milieu des années 1990. Le rapport précise qu'il existe au sein de l'IDS un « programme noir » dont l'objet est de préparer le déploiement de défenses stratégiques dans un avenir rapproché.

Le 24 avril, l'American Physical Society a publié une étude sur les technologies relatives au laser et aux faisceaux de particules qui exigeraient l'IDS. L'étude concluait que si l'IDS, l'étude de particules qui exigeraient au moins dix ans simple-ment pour savoir s'il serait possible d'employer ces technologies dans un système de défense stratégique. Selon les auteurs, il y a encore de formidables obstacles technologiques à franchir, et il faudrait améliorer certaines des technologies essentielles par des facteurs allant de 100 à un million.

La puissance militaire soviétique

En mars, le Département américain de la Défense a publié son rapport annuel intitulé *Soviet Military Power* qui décrit les tout derniers progrès militaires de l'URSS. Le rapport précise que cette dernière est en train de réévaluer sa stratégie classique axée sur des opérations offensives rapides dans le théâtre européen. On attribue cette évolution au perfectionnement toujours plus grand des armes classiques de l'OTAN et aux nouvelles doctrines des Etats-Unis et de l'Alliance qui la guèrent profondément dans le territoire du Pacte de Varsovie. En outre, la simple taille des arsenaux et les capacités accrues des camps ont, semble-t-il, amené les Soviétiques à conclure qu'un conflit en Europe durerait beaucoup plus longtemps qu'ils ne l'avaient escompté antérieurement.

Dans l'édition de cette année de *Soviet Military Power*, on s'interroge aussi sur la nature et l'ampleur du programme soviétique de défense contre les missiles balistiques (DMB). C'est une question qui divise les divers services de renseignement concernés. Le Pentagone soutient que l'Union soviétique est en train d'élaborer un système de DMB à l'échelle du pays, ce qui serait contraire au Traité sur les missiles anti-missiles balistiques. La CIA évalue à dix pour cent ou moins une telle probabilité. Recherchant de toute évidence le moyen terme, le rapport *Soviet Military Power* soutient que, considérées dans leur ensemble, les activités soviétiques au chapitre de la DMB montrent que l'URSS est résolue à améliorer ses défenses stratégiques et qu'elle est peut-être en train d'ériger un système national de DMB.

En février 1987, l'URSS a publié *Whence the Threat to Peace*, un livre intitulé *Soviet Military Power*. Le dernier numéro de cette publication soviétique avait paru en 1984. Cette récente édition présente un intérêt particulier, en ce sens qu'elle contient les estimations soviétiques sur les forces nucléaires des Etats-Unis et de l'URSS. Dans le passé, celle-ci a hésité à faire savoir à combien elle estimait les forces nucléaires des deux pays et elle s'était limitée à le faire dans le cadre des négociations sur la limitation des armements (celles des traités SALT, par exemple).

Les chiffres présentés sont ceux que le secrétaire général Gorbatchev avait soumis au président Reagan, lors de leur réunion de Reykjavik en octobre. Selon ces données, les Etats-Unis auraient environ 14 800 ogives nucléaires montées sur 2 208 vecteurs possédant 10 000 installées sur 2 480 vecteurs. Par ailleurs, *Whence the Threat to Peace* insiste beaucoup sur la nécessité de préserver le Traité sur les missiles anti-missiles balistiques et réitère le point de vue soviétique à savoir que l'Initiative de défense stratégique des Etats-Unis aura des effets déséquilibrés et mènera à une nouvelle course aux armements.

Le dernier Trian 2 Selon un article de *Associated Press* daté 7 mai l'Aviation militaire américaine a neutralisé au début de mai le dernier missile balistique intercontinental *Titan 2*. A une certaine époque, cinquante-quatre missiles *Titan* étaient déployés dans des silos au Kansas. Ces engins ont été parmi les premiers à être intégrés à l'arsenal américain. Ils étaient gros, peu précises et souvent la cause d'accidents. Ils transportaient ce qui était, d'après les normes actuelles, une énorme ogive mégatonnique. On laissera ouverts pendant quelque temps les silos qu'ils occupaient pour permettre une surveillance soviétique de survetel et bien vides. □

Coopération anglo-française en matière nucléaire

En mars, les ministres britannique et français de la Défense se sont réunis pour jeter les bases d'une coordination plus étroite en ce qui concerne l'utilisation des forces nucléaires de leurs deux pays. MM. André Girard et George Younger ont annoncé le 10 mars que leurs gouvernements cherchent à rendre officiels des échanges étroits mais principalement ponctuels sur les questions intéressant leurs forces nucléaires.

D'après un article paru dans *L'Economist* (14 mars), l'accord franco-britannique atteste que les deux pays envisagent de créer une force nucléaire européenne advenant que les Etats-Unis retirent leurs engins nucléaires du continent. Le nouvel accord de coopération nucléaire arrive à un moment où les progrès accomplis par les superpuissances dans le cadre des négociations sur la limitation des armements rendent incertaine la présence des missiles nucléaires américains en Europe dans l'avenir.

À mesure que les superpuissances se rapprochent d'un accord sur la limitation des forces nucléaires, les pays ouest-européens font des démarches pour redonner vie à l'Union de l'Europe occidentale (UEO). Cet organisme de sept membres (Grande-Bretagne, France, République fédérale d'Allemagne, Italie, Belgique, Pays-Bas et Luxembourg) a été créé en 1954; il s'était donné une vocation défensive et avait notamment pour objet de faire entrer l'Allemagne de l'Ouest dans l'OTAN. L'UEO présente de plus en plus d'intérêt, étant donné qu'elle est le seul groupe exclusivement européen à même de s'occuper des questions de défense.

En décembre 1986, le Premier ministre français, M. Jacques Chirac, a proposé une Charte des principes garantissant la sécurité de l'Europe occidentale, dans un discours qu'il prononçait devant l'UEO réunie à Paris. La proposition de M. Chirac reposait sur deux éléments principaux, à savoir que la dissuasion nucléaire demeure la seule façon d'assurer la sécurité de l'Europe, et que l'Europe occidentale doit conserver ses liens avec la force de dissuasion américaine.


Réunion de l'Assemblée de l'Atlantique-Nord

Pendant la fin de semaine du 23 mai, des hommes politiques des pays de l'OTAN se sont rassemblés à Québec pour discuter de questions économiques, politiques et militaires. Parmi les thèmes abordés à la conférence, l'OTAN se voit rassembler à Québec pour discuter de questions économiques, politiques et militaires. Parmi les thèmes abordés à la conférence, l'OTAN se voit rassembler à Québec pour discuter de questions économiques, politiques et militaires. Parmi les thèmes abordés à la conférence, l'OTAN se voit rassembler à Québec pour discuter de questions économiques, politiques et militaires.

NOUVELLES DE L'OTAN

En sa qualité de chef du pays hôte, le Premier ministre Brian Mulroney a joué des défenses stratégiques dans le contexte de la sécurité occidentale. L'initiative de défense stratégique des Etats-Unis, le Canada continue d'appuyer les recherches propres à la défense stratégique, mais M. Mulroney a fait une mise en garde : « ... il faut bien s'assurer que les défenses ne sont pas intégrées aux forces existantes de façon que l'adversaire n'en vienne pas à faire une première trappe... », en outre, nous ne pouvons permettre que les efforts dans le domaine de la défense stratégique nuisent au processus de la limitation des armements et aux accords existants ».

CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



Une nouvelle politique de défense
pour le Canada

Le Livre blanc sur la défense, qu'on attend depuis longtemps a été déposé à la Chambre des communes le 5 juin. Les principales dispositions du Livre blanc n'ont causé aucune surprise, car les porte-parole du ministère de la Défense nationale avaient abondamment discuté au cours des derniers mois, mais

l'annonce de politique a confirmé que l'orientation de la défense canadienne va subir d'importants changements.

LE CANADA ENVISAGE D'ACHETER DE
dix à douze sous-marins à propulsion
nucléaire pour doter ses forces
armées de la capacité d'évoluer dans
les océans : l'Atlantique, le Paci-
fique et l'Arctique. À l'heure actuelle,
seuls les sous-marins nucléaires
peuvent naviguer sous la glace pen-
dant de longues périodes de temps.
Chaque sous-marin coûterait environ
100 millions de dollars canadiens.

mais on ne sait pas exactement à quel point l'exploitation réelle est donnée qu'il faut construire diverses installations complémentaires pour réapprovisionner les groupes moteurs nucléaires et entretenir les sousmersibles.

UN DEUXIÈME GROUPE DE SIX régionales sera construit comme prévu, mais on renoncera peut-être au troisième groupe en faveur des zones moins riches. Cela signifie qu'en l'an 2000, le Canada possèdera seize navires de combat de surface, peut-être quatre ou cinq nouveaux sous-marins, tous les autres devant être achetés entre l'an 2000 et l'année 2010 à peu près.

DANS LES DOMAINES DE LA PATROUILLE maritime, le Canada renforcera ses moyens en achetant d'autres avions *Aurora* de patrouille à grande autonomie (il y en a actuellement dix-huit) et de nouveaux avions de patrouille à système autonome pour remplacer les vieux *Tracker* encore en service.

Le Livre blanc confirme par ailleurs la décision annoncée précédemment, à savoir que le pays se dotera de nouveaux hélicoptères de lutte anti-sous-marin pour ses frégates. Le CANADA A MODIFIÉ SA POLITIQUE à l'égard de l'OTAN, en ce sens qu'il a renoncé à son engagement de renforcer le flanc nord en Norvège, en période de crise. Il s'agit d'un

Le pays devait, en pareille situation, s'attendre à ce que la Norvège ne lui apporte aucune aide. La brigade était transportée à bas par mer et par air. La décision d'abandonner cet engagement traduisait le point de vue des militaires selon lesquels la brigade ne pourrait parvenir à pied d'œuvre assez rapidement pour aller à empêcher l'éclatement d'un conflit. Ils soutenaient par ailleurs qu'advancerait une guerre, la brigade

serait excessivement vulnérable. POUR ASSURER AUX ALLIÉS DE l'OTAN que le Canada on réduira considérablement son rôle mondial, mais l'ampleur globale de ses engagements envers l'Europe, il réduira la brigade mécanisée pour en faire une brigade mécanisée dotée de tous les moyens propres à ce genre de formation; elle aura pour rôle de renforcer la brigade mécanisée déjà déployée en Europe. Tous les efforts

...mais on créera un quartier général
de division, et le matériel militaire
sera entreposé outre-mer à des en-
droits déterminés d'avance, de façon
à ne pas en créer un en Allemagne,
comme on en a créé en Europe. Tous ces armements
seront donc répartis dans les zones
d'occupation, et les autres effectifs et le maté-

ciel en Europe.

LE CANADA ACHETERA QUELQUES CF-18 supplémentaires pour compenser les pertes, et le Groupe aérien du Canada augmentera ses effectifs.

ON ENVISAGE DE MODERNISER ET DE réorganiser le fond en combat les Réserves. La Réserve navale participera activement à la défense côtière.

« L'augmentation du nombre des réserves de la monnaie et de l'avatation laisse croire que les soldats à temps partiel auront désormais un rôle plus important dans le cadre de la politique de défense. »

La stratégie du Canada dans le Pacifique

ant la corée est, à cause de la proximité de l'Europe et des voies maritimes de l'Atlantique-Nord. Ces derniers années, les trois sous-marins du Canada, ses quatre destroyers les plus modernes, les deux tiers de ses frégates opérationnelles de lutte anti-sous-marin (ASM), la plupart de ses avions de patrouille à grande autonomie (*Avrocar*), et ses trente-deux hélicoptères *Sea King* de lutte

ASTI ont été basés dans les mari-
nisme plutôt qu'à Esquimalt, dans
Vancouver.

ment de signaler l'attribution de nouveaux sous-marins *Trident* porteurs de missiles balistiques à Bangor (Washington), et des plans en vertu desquels Everett, non loin de là, deviendrait le port d'attache d'une force d'attaque de porte-avions. Tout cela attire l'attention de la Flotte

La plus grande des quatre flottes de la souveraineté du Pacifique, aujourd'hui l'URSS. Des sous-marins d'attaque soviétiques auraient récemment pénétré dans le détroit de Fucua, centre l'Elle Vancouver et l'Etat de Washington, et ils cherchaient sans doute par là se tenir au courant sur les activités des Indiens.

réagi en détachant une plus grande partie de ses forces navales actives sur la côte Ouest. En janvier 1987, le ministre de la Défense, M. Beatty, a annoncé que le NCSM *Huron* (un des- troyeur moderne porte-hélicoptères) et quatre *Sea King* quitteraient Halifax pour aller s'installer à Esquimalt cet

Un déploiement anticipé de défenses stratégiques ?

Depuis que le Secrétaire américain à la Défense, M. Caspar Weinberger, a annoncé que certains éléments de l'IDS pourraient être déployés d'ici 1994, on a beaucoup contesté l'adoption de la plausibilité d'un tel projet. En février 1987, l'un tel


Marshall Institute a publié une étude qui décrivait une stratégie possible de déploiement anticipe. Il présentait sommairement un système de défense à trois «couches» faisant surtout appel à des véhicules de destruction par énergie cinétique. Contrairement à des dispositifs plus «exotiques» comme les lasers et les faisceaux de particules, les armes à énergie cinétique visent à traverser

posants de la première couche cible avec un objet solide. Les dispositifs de la première couche intercepteraient les missiles soviétiques pendant la phase de propulsion. Ceux de deux autres couches seraient basés au sol et attaquerait les engins ennemis et leurs ogives.

pendant les phases balistique et finale. Les critiques du plan de déploiement "diffé" axé sur ces technologies ont fait valoir que le système serait inviolable face à des contre-mesures telles que les mines spatiales (con-sens) et les engins de destruction (com-placés à l'orbite terrestre), les pro-jectiles à combustion rapide (qui) réduisant le temps où le missile est

La *Heritage Foundation* avait présenté en 1982 un plan semblable sur un système de défense simplifié.

CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



Limitier l'exportation des missiles

Après des négociations qui auront duré quatre ans, l'Allemagne, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie et le Japon ont annoncé le 7 août qu'ils avaient convenu de limiter l'exportation de certains missiles et de technologies s'y rapportant. C'est le premier accord visant à limiter le nombre de systèmes capables de transporter des armes nucléaires, par opposition aux matériels de fabrication des explosifs et des armes nucléaires.

Les sept pays ont convenu de ne pas exporter des missiles ou d'autres véhicules non pilotes capables d'emporter une ogive de cinq cents kilogrammes et de parcourir plus de trois cents kilomètres. Ces deux critères correspondent respectivement au poids d'un engin nucléaire non perfectionné et à la portée minimale sentant la moindre importance du rôle de vue militaire. Ces missiles seront pas exportés, même si l'acheteur déclare qu'il compte s'en servir à des fins pacifiques, à moins qu'il y ait entente officielle entre le pays vendeur et le pays acheteur stipulant que les missiles ne seront pas dupiqués d'ogives nucléaires. Il incombera au pays vendeur de s'assurer que cette disposition est rigoureuse-

ment respectée.

Il est donc interdit d'exporter des systèmes complets tels que des missiles balistiques, des lanceurs spatiaux, des fusées-sondes, des missiles sous-systèmes sont également assujettis à des contrôles. L'accord interdit en toutes circonstances d'exporter des installations qui permettraient de fabriquer de tels missiles, et il dresse en outre une longue liste de technologies visées par les mêmes restrictions. D'autres technologies pourront faire l'objet d'examen individuels. L'accord aide énormément à limiter

Les essais nucléaires

En mars, l'URSS a annoncé qu'elle avait modifié sa politique sur les essais nucléaires; elle a en effet proposé d'amorcer simultanément des négociations sur les mesures de vérification susceptibles d'aboutir à la ratification du Traité sur la limitation des essais nucléaires (TTBT) et du Traité sur les explosions nucléaires à buts pacifiques (PNET), ainsi que des négociations sur l'établissement de seuils plus bas quant à la puissance des engins nucléaires mis à l'essai et au nombre d'essais effectués. Apparaissant, l'URSS avait soutenu qu'il fallait tout d'abord entreprendre des négociations sur une interdiction totale des essais.

Bien que l'Union soviétique se soit ainsi rapprochée de la position américaine, Washington a rejeté l'offre de Moscou. Pour les États-Unis, l'URSS doit accepter d'interdire des mesures de vérification plus poussées au PNET et au TTBT avant qu'il soit possible de négocier l'établissement d'autres limites. On considère toujours que l'interdiction complète des essais est l'objectif ultime, mais des porte-parole de Washington ont déclaré que, tant et aussi longtemps qu'il y aura des armées nucléaires, les États-Unis jugeront nécessaire d'exécuter des essais. Le 13 janvier 1987, le président Reagan a envoyé le texte des deux

résolutions au Sénat pour qu'il l'approuve, mais il y a joint des dispositions exigeant un accord avec l'Union soviétique sur de meilleures mesures de vérification. Le Comité sénatorial des relations étrangères (E-U) a étudié les deux documents, mais l'ensemble du Sénat ne s'est pas encore penché sur la question.

Les armes chimiques

Les négociations sur une interdiction des armes chimiques se poursuivent à la Conférence du désarmement (CD), à Genève. Des progrès sensibles ont été accomplis depuis que le président Reagan et le secrétaire général Gorbatchev ont exprimé, au sommet de 1985, le désir d'en arriver à une entente sur les armes chimiques. D'après des rapports émanant de la CD, l'accord à l'étude prévoit la création d'un organisme semblable à l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA), qui surveillerait le démantèlement des arsenaux et serait chargée de faire respecter les dispositions de l'accord.

Si l'accord est conclu, les armes et les usines de fabrication seront détruites au cours d'une période de dix ans. Pendant la dernière semaine d'avril, l'Union soviétique a annoncé qu'elle avait cessé de produire des armes chimiques et qu'elle avait amorcé la construction d'un centre de destruction des engins constituant son arsenal actuel. Les États-Unis ont invité la délégation soviétique à venir chez eux visiter les installations de destruction et d'entreposage, dans l'Utah.

La France a déclaré qu'elle mettrait ses plans à exécution relativement à l'acquisition de nouvelles armes chimiques et qu'elle conserverait ces dernières pendant les dix ans que les Soviétiques prendront pour détruire leurs stocks. Ces propositions ont suscité de l'inquiétude au

L'Union soviétique a par ailleurs offert (le 17 avril) d'échanger des observateurs aux emplacements des essais nucléaires. Ainsi, chaque partie envierait des représentants chez l'autre au moment où l'on ferait exploser un engin nucléaire et où l'on mesurerait les effets et phénomènes se produisant alors. Comme les États-Unis possèdent des caractéristiques géologiques des polygones d'essais soviétiques, ils n'ont pu évaluer avec précision la puissance des engins que l'URSS faisait exploser. Pareil échange favoriserait énormément le calibrage des parties profitant des pourparlers de Genève pour examiner cette offre.

Des inspecteurs des Nations-Unies se sont rendus en Irak en avril, après que ce pays eut accusé l'Iran d'avoir employé des armes chimiques. Ils ont affirmé que des signes attestaient que des soldats irakiens avaient été exposés à des agents chimiques, mais ils n'ont trouvé aucun élément permettant de conclure que l'Iran avait effectivement employé de telles armes. Les inspecteurs ont également affirmé que l'Irak avait utilisé des armes chimiques contre des civils iraniens. C'était la première fois que des inspecteurs se rendaient dans ce pays. À deux reprises dans le passé, des enquêtes avaient été accusées l'Irak d'avoir recouru à des armes chimiques.

Réduction des armes classiques

Des représentants des vingt-trois pays de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie se sont réunis à la Conférence du désarmement en Europe (égale) pour discuter de la sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe) qui a pris fin en septembre 1986. La France s'est dite en faveur de tenir les nouveaux pourparlers dans le cadre plus large de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE). Participeraient alors aux débats trente-cinq pays européens, y compris les nations neutres et non alignées. Quelques pays neutres ont fait valoir leur désir d'être présents, et la France préfère cette formule, car elle permet à chaque Etat de présenter sa propre position. Les États-Unis ont proposé des négociations entre blocs (semblables aux Pourparlers de réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces, qui se déroulent sans succès

sein de l'OTAN, notamment de la part de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest où les armes seraient sans doute utilisées en premier. Bonn a déjà demandé aux États-Unis de ne pas déployer leurs nouvelles armes chimiques sur le territoire ouest-allemand. Des inspecteurs des Nations-Unies se sont rendus en Irak en avril, après que ce pays eut accusé l'Iran d'avoir employé des armes chimiques. Ils ont affirmé que des signes attestaient que des soldats irakiens avaient été exposés à des agents chimiques, mais ils n'ont trouvé aucun élément permettant de conclure que l'Iran avait effectivement employé de telles armes. Les inspecteurs ont également affirmé que l'Irak avait utilisé des armes chimiques contre des civils iraniens. C'était la première fois que des inspecteurs se rendaient dans ce pays. À deux reprises dans le passé, des enquêtes avaient été accusées l'Irak d'avoir recouru à des armes chimiques.

EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE



La station spatiale

Il semble que la question du rôle de la station spatiale, un sujet de discorde entre le Canada et les États-Unis, ait été réglée à l'avantage du Canada.

La station spatiale, qui sera construite d'une structure de poutres et

d'un ensemble de modules pressurisés

destinés à abriter des laboratoires de

recherche et les logements des astronautes, est censée être construite vers

le milieu des années 1990. Les États-

Unis ont estimé que cette opération

leur coûtera environ 12 milliards de

dollars (1984). La contribution de

'Europe, du Japon et du Canada

devrait représenter un montant équivalent à près du tiers de cette somme,

'Europe et le Japon assurant la construction de modules de recherches et

le Canada celle du Centre mobile

d'entretien; cette dernière installation

qui coûtera 800 millions de dollars

canadiens servira à l'assemblage,

de la station.

La controverse porte essentiellement sur la question de savoir dans

quelle mesure la station doit ou non

être utilisée à des fins militaires. Le

Département américain de la Défense

a fait tout ce qui était en son possible

pour insérer dans les accords internationaux des clauses visant explicitement à se réserver le droit d'utiliser

la station aux «fins de la sécurité

nationale». Au début du mois d'avril,

le Secrétaire à la Défense, M. Caspar

Weinberger, a écrit au secrétaire

d'État George Shultz, en lui indiquant

que les États-Unis devaient être prêts

à faire cavalier seul dans l'hypothèse

où le prix d'une coopération internationale se révélerait trop élevé.

Il semble cependant que M. Wein-

berger n'ait pas réussi à faire accepter

son interprétation. Si le Département

de la Défense a pris parti contre la

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA), le Département d'État et tous les alliés militaires

utilisée «à des fins pacifiques conformément aux préceptes du droit

À l'occasion d'un colloque organisé

à Ottawa par le Centre canadien pour

le contrôle des armements et le

désarmement, M. Ashton Carter,

éminent expert américain des questions spatiales et membre du Centre

for Science and International Affairs

(Université Harvard), a nié que la

station spatiale puisse présenter une utilité militaire et a souligné que c'est

précisément pour cette raison que le

Pentagone s'était d'emblée montré

hostile au projet. Dans un éditorial

paru le 1^{er} mai dernier dans le *Globe*

and Mail, Lydia Doto, spécialiste

des questions scientifiques, exhortait

les alliés à ne pas relâcher leur vigilance pour autant. Même si le Canada

en définitive ne parvient pas à obtenir

le Centre d'entretien conformément aux

régles du droit international pour se

réserver une compétence et une souveraineté de principe sur cette installation, le Centre fera néanmoins

partie intégrante de la station; or, les

modalités de gestion de cette construction, et par conséquent, le rôle

des alliés et du Pentagone, restent

encore à définir.

Les ouvertures soviétiques sur la limitation des armements

Au début du mois de mai,

M. Alexander Bessmertnykh, envoyé

spécial de l'Union soviétique, s'est

rendu à Ottawa pour s'y réunir avec le

premier ministre Mulroney. M. Joe

Clark et des hauts fonctionnaires des

Affaires étrangères. À cette occasion,

d'éliminer les missiles nucléaires à

Europe. Le jour même on presqu,

sur la limitation des armes-

ments. «Nous ne saurions permettre

qu'une initiative ayant demandé tant

d'efforts aux superpuissances soit

sapée par les désaccords compréhensibles certes, mais non insurmontables,

entre les membres de l'Alliance», a

déclaré M. Clark.

La situation en Afrique australe

Au début du mois d'avril, l'ambas-

sadeur du Canada auprès des Nations-

Unes, M. Stephen Lewis, a laissé

entendre que son pays pourrait être

prêt de participer à une force onu-

sienne de maintien de la paix au

Mozambique, pays miné par une

guerre civile qui entretient l'hostilité

de son voisin sud-africain. Cette in-

formation a fait l'objet d'un éditorial

pluôt sceptique paru le 13 avril dans

'*Ottawa Citizen*. Dans cet article,

l'auteur du éditorial recommandait

en définitive clairement le mandat,

l'auteur de l'éditorial recommandait

au Canada d'annoncer des mainte-

nant son intention de ne pas parti-

ciper à une contreprise d'ores et déjà

vouée à l'échec.

Plus tard dans le courant du mois

d'avril, M. Clark a rejeté la demande

présentée par le NPD qui invitait le

gouvernement à rompre les relations

diplomatiques avec l'Afrique du

Sud, à la suite du raid militaire de

Pretoria contre la Zambie. M. Clark

a déclaré le raid, qui a coûté la vie

à quatre civils, et accusé les troupes

sud-africaines d'avoir commis «des

actes meurtriers». Il a toutefois

précisé que l'Ottawa tenait à maintenir

la collaboration avec les pays alliés

partageant son point de vue, pays

avec lesquels il espère favoriser un

réglement pacifique de la situation

dans le sous-continent africain.

Les comités parlementaires

Le Comité sénatorial permanent

des Affaires étrangères a publié le 13

mai dernier un Rapport sur les insti-

tutions financières internationales et

le problème de l'endettement des

pays en développement. Dans ce

document, les auteurs mettent en

double la validité d'une approche

«ponctuelle» pour régler le problème.

Il convient désormais de compléter

cette stratégie, appliquée depuis

1982, par d'autres modalités visant à

accroître le flot des capitaux en

créanciers. Les auteurs du rapport

l'accès de ses marchés aux pays en

développement endettés, à porter de

dix-neuf à vingt-cinq pour cent la

part de l'aide publique au développe-

ment versée aux banques multilaté-

rales de développement et enfin, à

jouer un rôle prépondérant pour

favoriser un consensus au sein de la

Banque mondiale, du Fonds moné-

taire international et de l'Organisation

de coopération et de développement

économiques, en vue de mettre au

point des mesures spéciales propres

à réduire l'endettement de ces pays.

L'aide au développement fait

l'objet d'un autre rapport ayant été

déposé en Chambre le 28 mai; le

Comité permanent des affaires

étrangères et du commerce extérieur

CPAECB) en est l'auteur. Le docu-

ment est intitulé *Qui doit en profiter?*

et concerne les efforts du Canada

dans le domaine de l'aide au déve-

loppement et les moyens qu'il pour-

rait prendre pour faire mieux à cet

égard. Le Comité a formulé de nom-

mais l'une des propositions fonda-

mentales préconisant l'adoption par

notre pays d'une Charte de l'aide au

notre programme en la matière. La

Charte énoncerait trois grands prin-

cipes : le Canada doit viser à aider

les pays les plus pauvres du monde;

il doit chercher à aider les pays en

développement à résoudre leurs

problèmes tout en tenant compte de

l'environnement naturel; au moment

de définir les objectifs, le développe-

ment doit l'emporter sur les autres

considérations.

Le Comité s'est particulièrement

soucié d'établir un lien entre la poli-

tique canadienne d'aide à l'étranger

et les droits de la personne. Le

Rapport recommande que l'ACDI

ainsi établis seraient autonomes

ment éliminés de la liste des pays

LETTRE DE KIEV PAR DAVID COX

Kiev : une ville dont les nombreux monuments reflètent une longue et riche histoire. Pourtant, on peut conjecturer que ses habitants se seraient accommodés d'un héritage moins lourd....



Depuis le début du XX^e siècle, Kiev a été le théâtre de batailles sanglantes et de cruels affrontements civils. En 1917, les forces révolutionnaires s'en disputent la ville. Pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la ville tomba entre les mains des Allemands après une dure campagne, pour être reprise deux ans plus tard par les Soviétiques, au prix de combats d'une féroce intensité. Le ravin de Babi Yar, où plus de 100 000 citoyens de Kiev furent exécutés par les occupants allemands, suscite encore d'amères diatribes, car le monument officiel est dédié non pas aux victimes juives, qui constituaient certainement la majorité, mais plutôt à tous les Kievien qui résistèrent à l'envahisseur.

Mais une fois de plus, le malheur a frappé à Kiev : la ville se trouvait dangereusement près de l'accident nucléaire, au moment de l'accident nucléaire, et pendant près d'une semaine, l'atmosphère est demeurée incertaine. À Kiev, elle constitue le centre d'une vaste opération soviétique, ayant pour but de réhabiliter la région contaminée autour de Chernobyl et de contenir les dégâts environnementaux attribuables aux éléments radioactifs libérés par l'incendie du réacteur.

Dans un rayon de 200 kilomètres autour de Chernobyl, on a établi un périmètre sanitaire dont l'accès est réglementé. La contamination à l'intérieur de cette zone étant très inégale, la réhabilitation suppose des mesures très complexes.

La surveillance des opérations est assurée par les spécialistes de l'Institut des recherches nucléaires à Kiev et par ceux de l'Académie des sciences de l'Ukraine. Bien malgré eux, ces scientifiques disposent, pour leur enquête sur l'environnement et le nucléaire, d'un «laboratoire» plus vaste que tout autre ayant existé depuis Hiroshima et Nagasaki.

Le réacteur nucléaire endommagé est maintenant scellé, mais l'on est en place des sondes qui permettent aux ordinateurs de surveiller constamment la température, l'activité nucléaire et les vibrations à l'intérieur du «tombeau» de béton. Maintenant que le danger des premiers temps s'est estompé, les chercheurs de Kiev s'attachent à analyser les répercussions des retombées radioactives. De leur propre aveu, il y a eu de nombreuses surprises. Les plantes n'ont pas toutes réagi de la même façon aux radiations. Certaines ont absorbé des doses massives, d'autres moins. On sait maintenant qu'il ne faut pas manger de myrtilles après le passage d'un nuage radioactif, mais que les tomates – même dans les régions les plus touchées – sont presque exemptes de nucléides radioactifs. L'objectif premier des travaux scientifiques est de comprendre les mécanismes de dispersion des différents éléments radioactifs comme le strontium et le césium, par exemple, dont les effets durent le plus longtemps. Pour bien discerner l'incidence de la dispersion dans un contexte global, les scientifiques de Kiev cherchent à déduire les répercussions de ces mécanismes sur le milieu écologique de la région directement touchée, puis de la carte phréatique varie-t-il d'un endroit à l'autre ? Quelles différences existent-il entre les sols qui absorbent les nucléides radioactifs et ceux qui résistent ? Que se produit-il lorsque les rivières et les cours d'eau charrient la radioactivité d'une région à l'autre ? Comment les plantes réagissent-elles dans la nouvelle zone de contamination ?

Des équipes de géologues, de biologistes, de climatologues, de physiciens et de chimistes se sont réunies à Kiev pour analyser le problème. À l'aide d'un super-ordinateur capable de digérer toutes les données, l'Institut des recherches nucléaires a réalisé un modèle de la région qui incorporera toutes les caractéristiques connues du système écologique. De toute évidence, l'Institut des recherches nucléaires est fier des résultats obtenus jusqu'à présent. Mais les chercheurs reconnaissent que l'avenir s'annonce difficile. Par exemple, en raison des fortes chutes de neige en hiver, le dégel du printemps a engendré un ruissellement abondant en surface. L'approvisionnement en eau de Kiev doit donc faire l'objet d'une planification des ressources difficile à prévoir, et il faudra résoudre de nombreux problèmes pour pouvoir mener à bien la réhabilitation.

Malgré tous ces impondérables, les instances soviétiques continuent de miser sur l'énergie nucléaire. Ils affirment qu'ils n'ont d'ailleurs pas le choix – car le charbon est aussi dangereux pour l'environnement que l'énergie nucléaire – et qu'il n'existe aucune autre solution de rechange à l'énergie nucléaire. Ainsi, même si les Soviétiques ont abandonné leur projet de construction de deux nouveaux réacteurs à Chernobyl et qu'ils renonceraient désormais aux réacteurs fonctionnant au graphite, ils sont en train de reparer le second réacteur endommagé qui avait été mis en veilleuse après l'accident.

Il reste à espérer que la catastrophe de Chernobyl aura fait réfléchir le Canada et les autres usagers de l'énergie nucléaire. Le gouvernement

Bien malgré eux, ces scientifiques disposent, pour leur enquête sur l'environnement et le nucléaire, d'un «laboratoire» plus vaste que tout autre ayant existé depuis Hiroshima et Nagasaki.

Certes, on nous répondra que les réacteurs canadiens sont tout à fait sûrs. Mais le dernier mot, à ce propos, revient aux Soviétiques. Depuis l'accident du réacteur, qu'ils croyaient «nouveau et sûr», les Soviétiques ont considérablement resserré toutes les normes de sécurité et réexaminé de fond en comble les paramètres techniques des réacteurs. Ils avaient cependant en toute franchise qu'un problème essentiel demeure : le facteur humain. Rien n'est parfait, disent-ils, car la perfection n'est pas de ce monde. □

M. David Cox est Directeur de la recherche à l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales. Il a assisté au forum international de Moscou en février dernier et a profité de son séjour en Union soviétique pour se rendre à l'Institut des recherches nucléaires de Kiev.




MICHAEL HOWARD : Ma thèse à ce propos est plutôt hétéroïque. Les confédérés, car ils concernent des révolutions territoriales. C'est ce qui se produit toujours après l'échec d'empire, dont l'hégémonie avait assuré une certaine stabilité. On assiste alors à l'émergence d'États ou de groupes successeurs qui se disputent la légitimité des nouveaux pouvoirs.

D'après moi, il était inévitable que la décolonisation donne lieu à des conflits et que ces conflits dégénèrent en guerre ouverte. Or, ce que je vois, ce n'est pas l'Ouest qui fourgue plutôt le tiers-monde qui demande à l'Occident de lui vendre des armes. Et cela me met hors de moi lorsque j'entends les pays du tiers-monde se plaindre aux Nations-Unies parce que l'Ouest leur vend des armes. Après tout, personne ne les oblige à les acheter. S'ils sont prénus, c'est parce qu'ils estiment que ces armes favoriseront leurs visées politiques...

... Alors cette opinion reçue d'armes occidentales, avides de bénéfices, qui provoquent et entretiennent certains conflits dans le tiers-monde, à mon avis n'est pas valable. Les gens du tiers-monde ne sont pas des enfants; leurs problèmes sont de vrais problèmes, et leurs conflits, de vrais conflits. Prendre ces gens-là pour de simples fantômes des fabricants d'armes équivaut à les insulter carrément, et je m'étonne d'ailleurs qu'ils ne surgissent pas émergeantement contre cette interprétation.

R.G. : Il me semble que vos sentiments envers les groupes pacifistes sont ambivalents. D'une part, vous écrivez que les questions soulevées par ces groupes à propos des doctrines de défense occidentales sont souvent tout à fait légitimes. Mais d'autre part, on sent chez vous une certaine... irritation... Ce que



vous reprochez surtout aux groupes pacifistes, est-ce leur refus de composer avec les impératifs de la souveraineté, c'est-à-dire la puissance avec toutes ses laideurs, la puissance qui, malgré tout, doit se perpétuer ? MICHAEL HOWARD : Oui, si vous voulez. Je crois qu'il y a plusieurs facteurs que ces groupes n'ont tout simplement pas pris en compte. Du nombre, le plus important est peut-être que notre mode de vie pacifique en Europe occidentale et en Amérique du Nord s'inscrit dans un système étiologique dont la puissance est un instrument nécessaire pour maintenir et protéger ce mode de vie. Qu'entendons-nous par puissance ? Eh bien, la puissance, c'est la capacité d'être maître chez soi et d'empêcher les autres peuples de contrôler vos destinées; c'est moins la capacité d'avoir son propre système de sécurité, que celle d'empêcher tout autre État de vous entrainer de force dans le sien. Je crois que ce n'est pas une mauvaise façon de voir les choses. À propos de l'Europe de l'Ouest, les neutralistes vous diront : « Eh bien, nous sommes impuissants parce que nous faisons partie du dispositif de sécurité américain. » Ce à quoi il faut répondre : « D'accord, nous faisons partie du dispositif de sécurité américain, mais c'est là une conséquence d'une décision prise par nos propres dirigeants qui voyaient en cette solution le moindre de deux maux. » Quant aux solutions de rechange, on en voit généralement une ou deux. La première consiste à faire partie du dispositif de sécurité soviétique, ce qui de toute évidence n'est pas très souhaitable. L'autre tient à l'idée que nous pourrions, d'une manière ou d'une autre, adopter une position non alignée par rapport aux deux superpuissances. Mais même les pays non alignés ont besoin de leur propre mesure de puissance pour dissuader les autres de les attaquer. Pourquoi ne pas choisir la neutralité ? C'est une question assez tré-



quemment posée. Ma réponse, MICHAEL HOWARD : Les hommes même étioffent que vous et moi. Ils ont des femmes et des enfants. Ils font partie de la société. Simplement, ils ont choisi comme bœuf de se spécialiser dans ces questions très controversées. Et si vous n'aimez pas les solutions qu'ils trouvent, alors c'est à vous d'en proposer des meilleures.

En dernière analyse, les groupes pacifistes n'ont-ils pas raison sur ces deux plans, à savoir que le bureau cratie, l'establishment, est stupide, et qu'un accident est inévitable ?


Le mauvais bouton et ce sera la fin de l'humanité.

Tôt ou tard, avec ce foisonnement de missiles, quelque un va appuyer sur le bouton ? La seconde raison, bien entendu, est la crainte de l'accident. Alors, comment peut-on faire confiance aux héritiers de cet *establishment* ? La seconde raison, bien entendu, est la crainte de l'accident. Tôt ou tard, avec ce foisonnement de missiles, quelque un va appuyer sur le mauvais bouton et ce sera la fin de l'humanité.

R.G. : Partons des raisons qui poussent le mouvement pacifiste à s'élever contre les autorités, les pouvoirs établis, les professionnels... Il y a, je crois, deux raisons. En premier lieu, cet *establishment*, qui impose des raisons, en premier lieu, nous nous en sommes assez avis. Nous nous en sommes assez bien tirés jusqu'ici. Lorsque les deux camps se sont approchés du gouffre, ils ont su réfléchir et reculer. La crise de Cuba en 1962 - c'est la seule fois depuis 1945 où j'ai vraiment eu un retour. Ce n'est pas dire point de non-retour. Ce n'est pas dire que l'on puisse faire pour créer un monde où ce risque n'existerait plus franchement des armes nucléaires, c'est-à-dire un monde très différent de celui où nous vivons.

Car dans ce monde-là, il n'y aurait pas d'États souverains. Le pouvoir serait entre les mains d'un gouvernement mondial dont la légitimité serait reconnue par toutes les cultures différentes, par les Russes comme par les Américains et les Britanniques, par les Arabes comme par les Israéliens. Bref, ce n'est pas notre monde à nous, et berceur l'illusion de voir naître un tel monde.

actuels qui demandent toute notre attention. □



Volait ce qui m'irritait d'ailleurs chez les groupes pacifistes. De façon générale, ils se contentent de critiquer. Quant à la possibilité d'un accident, c'est tout le monde qui s'en inquiète, pas seulement le mouvement pacifiste. En fait, le problème consiste à faire des éléments, d'abord, il y a le risque d'une anomalie technologique (Comment faire pour empêcher que le monde ne se désintègre ?). Or, jusqu'à présent, on ne s'est pas trop mal débrouillé... Le faux calcul. L'erreur de jugement en cas de crise. Voilà ce qui m'inquiète vraiment. Le risque que nous nous attaquer en priorité est « gestion » des crises, pour reprendre l'expression des spécialistes. À mon avis, nous nous en sommes assez bien tirés jusqu'ici. Lorsque les deux camps se sont approchés du gouffre, ils ont su réfléchir et reculer. La crise de Cuba en 1962 - c'est la seule fois depuis 1945 où j'ai vraiment eu un retour. Ce n'est pas dire point de non-retour. Ce n'est pas dire que l'on puisse faire pour créer un monde où ce risque n'existerait plus franchement des armes nucléaires, c'est-à-dire un monde très différent de celui où nous vivons.

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UNE ENTREVUE AVEC MICHAEL HOWARD

Un éminent spécialiste de l'histoire militaire nous parle des mouvements pacifistes et de ce qu'on entend par le mot «paix».

Cet entretien est extrait de l'émission *Realities*, diffusée pour la première fois sur les ondes de TV-

Ontario en décembre 1986. Sir

Michael Howard est professeur

Régius d'histoire moderne à l'Uni-

versité d'Oxford. Il est l'auteur de

plusieurs ouvrages dont le plus

célèbre, *The Causes of War*, a été

publié par la *Harvard University*.

Press en 1983. Cet entretien a été

animé par Richard Gwyn, corres-

pondant européen du *Toronto Star*.

RICHARD GWYN : Si vous le voulez

bien, nous allons d'abord parler de

la guerre et de la paix, et de leur

cet par poser la plus évidente de

toutes les questions : la guerre sera-

elle toujours avec nous ? Nos en-

fants et les enfants de nos enfants

seront-ils condamnés à compter avec

la guerre, à s'en inquiéter, à essayer

de la prévenir ?

MICHAEL HOWARD : La guerre sera

nous tant et aussi longtemps

qu'il y aura des gens disposés à user

de la violence pour atteindre leurs

objectifs politiques. La violence

n'est pas forcément pour eux une

solution de choix : ils peuvent se

sentir acculés à y recourir s'il n'y a

pas d'autres moyens d'obtenir ce

qu'ils recherchent. Les gens qui ne

sont pas satisfaits de l'état actuel du

monde, qui se sentent lésés, qui

s'estiment contrariés par leurs fron-

tières, qui jugent leur idéologie in-

suffisante en soi, ces gens-là donc,

auront toujours tendance à user de la

violence s'ils ne peuvent parvenir à

leurs fins par la négociation, dans la

mesure où, pour eux, la négociation

revient tout simplement à s'accom-

moder du statu quo. C'est pourquoi

les peuples seront toujours portés à

employer la violence. Et qu'il s'agisse

de conflits déclarés, de guerilla ou

que la guerre existera toujours.

R.G. : Et la paix ? Est-ce que la paix

est tout simplement l'absence de

guerre ?

MICHAEL HOWARD : La paix, c'est

deux choses. En premier lieu, c'est

l'absence de guerre. Or, cela n'est

pas une mauvaise chose, loin de là.

Les gens qui, de nos jours, répètent

à souhai «Ah, si seulement nous

avions la paix», vivent généralement

dans des conditions de paix profonde.

Et ceux d'entre nous qui ont connu

la Seconde Guerre mondiale sont

très heureux de ce genre de paix.

Mais il est vrai que cette paix n'est

par là une paix véritable. Je veux dire

par une paix véritable ne s'ins-

taure qu'à partir du moment où il

régne entre les peuples une telle

entente, une telle communion de

sentiments et d'objectifs, qu'il n'y a

plus de conflit. Or, ce n'est pas le

cas actuellement, et il serait très dif-

ficile de réaliser cet état de choses.

Mais la paix en tant qu'absence de

guerre constitue dans la plupart des

esprits un préalable essentiel à cet

autre état de paix que je décrirais

comme étant la «réconciliation des

conflits».

R.G. : A vous entendre définir ce

qu'est la paix véritable... C'est un

peu comme si vous parliez du

Royaume de Dieu sur terre.

MICHAEL HOWARD : Oui. Et je crois

que c'est ce sens-là que retiennent la

plupart des mouvements pacifistes

lorsqu'ils disent «Nous voulons la

paix». Ils aspirent à une situation où

il n'y aura plus jamais de conflit, où

la menace cessera d'exister, où le

lion ira côtoyer l'agneau, et où

Shalom, est celle qui inspire les

grands saints et les grands martyrs

du monde actuel. Et l'ennui avec les

mouvements pacifistes, et avec le

conflit entre les diplomates d'une

part et les mouvements pacifistes de

l'autre, c'est que les diplomates,

lorsqu'ils parlent de paix, parlent en

fait d'absence de guerre. La perfec-

tion n'étant pas de ce monde, ils

entendent se débrouiller du mieux

qu'ils peuvent avec les moyens dis-

posés. Or, les mouvements pacifistes

ne veulent pas s'arrêter là. Ils ven-

lent un monde parfait...

R.G. : Vous parlez des raisons qui

poussent les hommes à combattre

... D'après vous, ces raisons ne

tiennent pas forcément à l'instinct de

possession ni à l'agressivité, mais

elles procèdent plutôt d'un calcul

rationnel. Je trouve cela plutôt sur-

prenant, car la guerre me semble

être une manifestation de l'agressi-

visité chez l'homme - le malé qui

s'affirme, le machisme à outrance,

l'impératif territorial. La guerre ne

puise-t-elle pas ses racines dans le

... côté animal de notre nature ?

MICHAEL HOWARD : Je ne le crois

pas, non, pas de nos jours. Le

chez les supporters déchâinés du

football anglais n'a pas grand-chose

à voir avec les calculs de guerre et de

paix auxquels se livrent nos hommes

d'Etat. J'ai d'ailleurs un exemple

à vous donner. En 1939, c'est la

Grande-Bretagne qui a déclaré la

guerre à l'Allemagne, et non vice-

versa. Or, les Britanniques étaient

un peuple profondément pacifiste

qu'une guerre, vingt ans plus tôt,

avait bien failli saigner à blanc. Nous

n'en voulons plus. C'est à notre

corps défendant que nous nous som-

mes laissés entraîner dans un conflit

avec l'Allemagne. Pourtant, la déci-

sion a été prise en 1939 avec la

caution massive du peuple. Le ra-

sonnement était le suivant : si nous

n'entrons pas en guerre maintenant

avec les Allemands, nous ne serons

jamais en mesure de le faire; ils de-

viendront de plus en plus forts, ils

conqueront l'Europe de l'Est, puis

ils submergeront l'Europe de l'Ouest;

nous aurons en face de nous un

adversaire tellement puissant qu'il

C'est donc ce calcul rationnel, pri-

mant sur notre désir instinctif d'éviter

la guerre, qui nous a poussés dans le

conflit. Cet élément rationnel, vous

pourvez le retrouver dans presque

toutes les décisions menant à la

guerre. Il était même présent en

1914, bien qu'à cette époque le

machisme jouait un rôle beaucoup

plus important.

Cela dit, on constate que du côté

des Etats-Unis, les calculs stratégique-

nucéaires comportent une multitude

de «si» hypothétiques. C'est sans

doue la même chose du côté sovié-

tique... Que se passerait-il «si»

l'autre camp acquiesçait un avantage

qualitatif et quantitatif tellement

écrasant en matière de missiles qu'il

pourrait détruire tous nos missiles

sol-sol ? Certes, nous pouvons tou-

jours nous rabattre sur nos missiles

mer-sol. Mais «si» les Russes nous

disaient alors : N'employez pas vos

missiles mer-sol ou nous attaquerons

américain était faible au point de

céder au chantage et de capituler ?

«si», admettant que le président

américain était faible au point de

céder au chantage et de capituler ?

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inspirées par l'égoïsme et l'étrénesse des «préoccupations au sujet de la stabilité de notre société».

IL N'EXISTE AUCUN ÉTALON SCIENTIFI-
que permettant de mesurer l'ampleur
de l'opposition aux vues de M. Gor-
batchev ou de calculer les risques
pour que ses réformes, comme celles
de Nikita Khrouchtchev, soient
bloquées prématurément par une in-
tervention conservatrice. Nous pou-
vons conjecturer, néanmoins, que
ses idées sont moins populaires
auprès des groupes plus âgés, des
personnes attachées à l'idéologie et
aux comportements soviétiques
orthodoxes, et de celles qui risquent
de subir des pertes matérielles,
avançant une réforme économique
profonde (et cela inclut de nombreux
ouvriers ainsi que des administra-
teurs) et un politicien plein de res-
sources et un prestre tacticien; jus-
qu'ici, il a déjoué ses adversaires à
chaque occasion. Nous pouvons en
outre déduire que les écarts les plus
dangereux pour lui surgissent l'an
prochain. Ses réformes, surtout dans
le domaine économique, en sont
encore au stade embryonnaire, et il
faudra encore un certain temps avant
qu'elles donnent des résultats; en
revanche, c'est en 1988 qu'il a
l'intention de convoquer une assem-
blée spéciale du Parti (la première
en son genre depuis 1941) pour pro-
mouvoir des changements politiques
(et vraisemblablement évincer les
conservateurs de l'établissement
soviétique). Si ses détracteurs ven-
lent entrayer son action pour de bon,
ils devront le faire au cours des
prochains mois, car ce sera sans
doute la meilleure occasion, sinon la
seule, qui s'offrirait à eux à cet égard.

Heureusement, certains des
changements élan opérés chez
M. Gorbatchev lui-même nous aide-
ront probablement à suivre l'évolu-
tion des choses et à prédire le sort
que son programme connaîtra. La
politique du *glasnost* (ouverture,
publicité, candeur) prend de l'ampleur
chaque semaine, et son application
en a principalement été confiée à
M. Aleksandr Yakovlev, secrétaire
national du Parti pour la propagande
et les affaires culturelles et ancien
ambassadeur de l'URSS au Canada.
Bien des questions sont encore
publiées (par exemple, dans les re-
certaines informations récemment
et certains informations récemment
nouveau parti pris (pro-Gorbatchev),
taboues, les médias de masse ont un
ment s'exerce le contrôle sur le fonc-
tionnement des organes du Parti, des soviets et des
entités économiques, et sur leur personnel. En ce qui concerne la domination des «instances
supérieures», des changements sensibles se sont produits récemment, comme nous le savez.
Il était autrefois interdit de critiquer divers aspects du système, mais cela est de plus en plus
chose du passé.

La démocratie et l'«ouverture»

La démocratisation de la société pose, en des termes nouveaux, la question de savoir com-
ment s'exerce le contrôle sur le fonctionnement des organes du Parti, des soviets et des
entités économiques, et sur leur personnel. En ce qui concerne la domination des «instances
supérieures», des changements sensibles se sont produits récemment, comme nous le savez.
Il était autrefois interdit de critiquer divers aspects du système, mais cela est de plus en plus
chose du passé.

Surmonter la résistance aux réformes

De toute évidence, certains camarades ont de la difficulté à comprendre que la démocratie
n'est pas seulement un slogan, mais bien l'essence de la reconstruction. Ils doivent modifier
leurs points de vue et leurs habitudes, s'ils ne veulent pas se faire dépasser par les grands
courants de la vie. C'est le conseil pressant que nous donnons aux sceptiques et aux traîtres.
Le revenu de l'entreprise, toutes les formes d'encouragements à l'intention des membres
des groupements ouvriers, et la mesure où l'on satisfera aux exigences sociales dépendront
entièrement des résultats finaux du travail ainsi que de la quantité et de la qualité du pro-
duit fabriqué et des services rendus.

Réformes économiques

Les paragraphes suivants sont de courts extraits d'un long discours que Mikhail Gorbatchev a
prononcé devant le Comité central du Parti communiste, à Moscou en janvier 1987. Mais la
question est de savoir comment il faut lire ces extraits. S'agit-il de propositions sérieuses ou
d'une habile prestidigitation? Comment doit-on effectivement faire le bilan de ce qui se
passe aujourd'hui dans l'URSS de M. Gorbatchev?

PROPOS DE M. GORBATCHEV



minimum d'information sur la poli-
tique, et non pas seulement sur les
questions économiques et techniques,
et c'est là un aspect fort encourage-
geant pour les soviologues. Selon
cette dernière, c'est là une condition
sine qua non pour que les sujets
citoyens plus actifs qui participent
à l'occasion au processus décision-
nel et que les cadres surveillés –
certains dans des cadres surveillés –
à l'occasion au processus décision-

nel et que le moral plus élevé et le
sens plus aigu des responsabilités
aurent en fin de compte une incidence
sur les résultats économiques. Ainsi,
les fonctionnaires, journalistes et
sociologues soviétiques ont com-
mencé au cours des derniers mois à
écrire et à parler sur la façon dont
les décisions politiques sont et de-
vraient être prises, et ils le font avec
une franchise jamais vue dans les
médias soviétiques depuis les
années 1920.
M. Gorbatchev lui-même a dé-
claré que le Comité central du Parti,
organisme censément tout-puissant,
est inerte depuis des années et se
désintéresse des questions fonda-
mentales. Des critiques acerbes ont
été publiées sur les soviets locaux,
conseils municipaux qui disposent
en théorie de droits absolus mais
qui, en réalité, obéissent servilement
à leurs dirigeants. Des secrétaires
locaux du Parti ont accordé des en-
trevues au cours desquelles ils ont
fait allusion précautionneusement
au jeu du pouvoir dans les bureaux
mystérieux du Parti. Les journalistes
et les historiens se sont de nouveau
penchés sur le mode de gouverne-
ment de Staline, et il semble qu'on
ait décidé de réviser ce qui concerne
la période brejnevienne dans les
manuels d'histoire du Parti et, en
fait, de mener sur les premières an-
nées de l'histoire politique soviétique
des recherches plus approfondies
que ce ne fut jamais possible, même
sous Khrouchtchev.

Pour en savoir plus

Nous n'assistons en fait qu'à un
début d'une nouvelle ère, mais c'est
un début envouissant dans une société
où la politique a presque toujours été
synonyme de domination par les
paliers supérieurs de la hiérarchie.
Dans le secteur de l'information au
moins, les analystes occidentaux
devraient profiter sensiblement des
changements opérés par la popula-
tion soviétique et destinés, en fin de
compte, à faire du système soviétique
une entité moins névrosée, plus
moderne et plus compétitive. Si
M. Gorbatchev parvient à ses fins,
ni la vie politique soviétique ni
l'option qu'en a l'Occident ne seront
plus jamais les mêmes. □

Jean-Marie Chauver, «Le printemps de
Moscou, Transparence des débats opacités
des réformes», *Le Monde diplomatique*,
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Timothy J. Colton, *The Dilemma of
Reform in the Soviet Union*, édition
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GORBATCHEV : LE BILAN DU CHANGEMENT

Une génération d'observateurs du Kremlin prise au dépourvu par le nouveau régime soviétique.

PAR TIMOTHY J. COLLTON

L'avènement du changement à Moscou a pris la majorité d'entre nous au dépourvu. Non seulement il oblige les érudits et les milieux gouvernementaux à suivre l'évolution des choses avec une attention jugée inutile pendant la longue ère Brejnev ou tout semblait invariable, mais encore il nous incite à examiner sous un nouveau jour les hypothèses concernant la moralité personnelle, la culture et également la politique, la culture et la moralité personnelle.

L'A PENSEE DE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

certain le rapport qui existe entre le pouvoir politique et la capacité du système. Dans le passé, nous avons eu tendance à croire que c'était précisément la grande concentration de pouvoir au cœur du régime qui le rendait si résistant au changement. Mais que penser quand les instances suprêmes du système se donnent pour mission de le changer au lieu de le conserver tel quel, contrairement à ce qui fut le cas pendant les années soixante-dix ?

Sur le plan économique, par exemple, l'Union soviétique n'a pas exagérément ses plans.

« Je suis bien « un jour », car nous n'en répondons à cette question.

Il admetra peut-être un jour à trouver la possibilité de concilier mais que ces deux objectifs qu'il est en principe la réconciliation de la bureaucratie, une expérience fascinant qui nous gouvernément réformiste se livrent à

nomme ? M. Gorbachev et son amies libérales l'époque brej-

exemple, M. Gorbachev semble priver à la fois la décentralisation et

M. Gorbachev favorise l'attribution d'une plus grande liberté aux entreprises individuelles et aux coopératives, et de nouvelles lois qui prendront effet en 1987 concéderont cette idée, mais les entrepreneurs se heurtent encore à des restrictions à

devrait changer d'orientation. A son arrivée au pouvoir en mars 1985, il a surtout mis l'accent sur la modernisation technologique et le resserment de la « discipline » étatique face aux déviances telles que l'alcoolisme, la corruption, l'absentéisme, d'un amphiquet qui ne s'était pas vu depuis Khrouchchev, et par là

[illegible]

économiques. À l'été de 1986, il a été décidé de lancer une grande campagne de reconstruction nationale (la *perestroïka*) avec encore plus de verve la même année. À l'été de 1986, il a été décidé de lancer une grande campagne de reconstruction nationale (la *perestroïka*) avec encore plus de verve la même année.

MIKHAÏL GORBATCHEV
remet en question non
seulement de nom-
bres structures et
politiques établies de
longtemps dans son
pays, mais aussi les
cadres intellectuels qui
nous servent à
interpréter les affaires
soviétiques. Pendant
une génération, les
sociologues occidentaux
ont surtout

concentrent leur attention sur les questions du pouvoir et de l'influence. Quelle est vraiment l'ampleur du prestige politique du Secrétaire général ? Comment se compare-t-il à celui de ses collègues du Kremlin ?

ethniques ont-ils leur mot à dire et, tel est le cas, dans quelle mesure ? Il n'existe aucune réponse universelle-ment acceptée à toutes ces questions. Cependant justes d'affirmer que

...s'intéressant davantage au rôle politi-
que de groupes et de cercles autres
que la gauche du Parti à Moscou,
à percevoir le gouver-
nement soviétique comme étant très
et autoritaire, compara-

Si toutes ces questions n'ont en fin de compte rien perdu de leur importance, elles ont tendance à être éclipsées, à la fin des années 1980, par les systèmes que suscitent la montée de M. Gorbatchev et le fait qu'il an-

annonce avec force la nécessité d'opérer une réforme systémique. Ce qui retient maintenant notre attention, ce n'est pas tant la répartition du pouvoir que la capacité du système soviétique d'innover et de dépasser l'Union soviétique pour

adaptes. D'où un souverain peut-
être effectivement et économiquement
plus efficace que les institutions poli-
tiques et, comme M. Gorbachev le
propose maintenant, peut-elle vrai-
ment les «démocratiser»? Quels
éléments favorisent la réforme et

Quels sont ceux qui l'entraînent ?
Jusqu'à quel point le système peut-il
être réformé sans perdre son essence
marxiste-léniniste ?

n intensifierait les divergences de

opposaient les États-Unis à l'Europe

occidentale.

Washington et les pays ouest-

européens, principaux piliers de la

politique canadienne en matière de

sécurité, ne généraliseraient pas sur les

stratégies de non-prolifération, ni

sur les pourparlers concernant la

limitation des armes de théâtre et

des armes stratégiques, ni sur les

défenses stratégiques. Chaque fois

que les débats ont abordé la question

éprouvée du parapluie nucléaire

américain protégeant les membres

européens de l'OTAN, le Canada a

cherché à ne pas prendre parti. Cette

attitude est attribuable au fait que le

Canada, comme l'a fait observer

John Holmes, présente des caracté-

ristiques uniques au sein de l'Alliance,

en ce sens qu'il n'appartient ni à

l'Europe, ni à l'Amérique, tout en

participant des deux à la fois. Notre

pays a toujours soutenu qu'il incombe

aux puissances européennes de

l'OTAN les plus directement touchées

de évaluer les enjeux et de décider de

la marche à suivre, chaque fois qu'il

est question d'armes nucléaires et de

limitation des armements et que les

débats concernent directement la

sécurité de l'Europe. Pourtant, le

Canada demeure un pays nord-

atlantique, et il n'est pas évident que

les conseils stratégiques qu'il lui

américain redonne aux États-Unis

juste valeur le fardeau dont les

Américains se sont chargés en se

sion occidentale.

Pendant les débats que l'OTAN a

menés sur la limitation des arme-

ment, le fer de lance de la dissua-

tion occidentale.

Américains se sont chargés en se

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armements, l'accord intervenu entre

les membres de la CDE n'influera

pas sensiblement sur les activités

militaires du Canada en Europe; en

effet, il est très rare que notre pays y

déploie plus de 13 000 militaires,

chiffre qui constitue le seul au delà

duquel une notification et la pré-

sence d'observateurs sont exigés.

Toutefois, les dispositions de Stock-

holm auront sans doute une inci-

dence sur les manœuvres militaires

multinationales de l'OTAN et du

Pacte de Varsovie. Par conséquent,

l'accord conclu par la CDE devrait

favoriser la progression vers un autre

objectif qui a toujours été au cœur

de la pensée canadienne relative-

ment à la limitation des armements

et à la sécurité en Europe.

AUX YEUX DU CANADA, LA LIMITA-

tion des armements n'est pas unique-

ment une dimension de la défense de

l'OTAN, mais aussi un moyen d'en

arriver à mieux coordonner et à

mieux planifier les activités mili-

taires de l'Alliance. Ottawa doit con-

tinuer à maintenir la limitation des

armements en Europe non seule-

ment comme un palliatif politique

dans le contexte des décisions

épineuses concernant le matériel de

l'Alliance, mais aussi comme un élé-

ment contrebalançant le penchant de

l'OTAN pour les pis-aller face aux

multiples problèmes que pose la

défense de l'Europe occidentale. Il

est à espérer que l'Est et l'Ouest en

mesures propres à accroître la con-

fiance et la sécurité en Europe et

militaire sensible une solution de

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STOCKHOLM : RÉUSSITE ET SOULAGEMENT

L'an dernier, le Canada, les États-Unis et tous les pays de l'Europe, l'Albanie exceptée, ont convenu de mesures destinées à réduire les risques d'une guerre qu'une attaque surprise ou une erreur de calcul pourrait déclencher.

PAR MICHAEL TUCKER

Il s'agit de dispositions qui lient les trente-cinq signataires de l'entente de Stockholm, lesquels ont ainsi convenu d'annoncer les mouvements de troupes dans des délais bien précis, chaque fois que le nombre des participants doit dépasser certains obligations dans les installations militaires mêmes et à pour objet la vérification de l'observance du Traité SALT II. L'entente permettrait donc d'évaluer l'efficacité des mesures de l'Occident, l'entente – et c'est là un aspect important – permettra de voir jusqu'à quel point les Soviétiques acceptent ce principe et dans quelle mesure ils sont disposés à lever le voile dont ils ont toujours entouré les choses militaires. Il convient de signaler que l'Atlantique à la chaîne de l'OTAN, la zone qui comprend par conséquent tout le secteur européen de la Russie. Pour bien comprendre ce que l'Accord de Stockholm représente pour le Canada, il faut se situer dans le contexte plus vaste de l'adhésion de notre pays à l'OTAN et dans celui de son ferme attachement à ce qu'on appelle le «processus de la CSCÉ». Des l'origine, le Canada a participé aux dialogues amorcés après 1972 dans le cadre de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCÉ); en outre, il a énormément contribué à la préparation de l'Acte final d'Helsinki en 1975, document dont il est signataire. Les pourparlers de Stockholm faisaient partie intégrante du processus de la CSCÉ, car ils avaient débuté à l'issue de la Conférence d'examen de la CSCÉ, laquelle s'était tenue à Madrid en 1983 pour renforcer et élargir les mesures propres à accroître la confiance dont les parties avaient con-

venu à Helsinki. Le Canada a été invité à prendre part aux pourparlers

qui ont abouti à l'accord d'Helsinki, parce qu'il appartenait à l'OTAN. C'est d'abord et avant tout son adhésion à cette dernière qui lui a permis d'assister aux négociations de la CSCÉ. À Helsinki, puis à Stockholm plus tard, et à toutes les conférences d'examen par la suite, notre pays s'est conduit comme un membre loyal de l'OTAN. Ce ne fut pas toujours facile sur le plan diplomatique, cependant, à cause des divergences de vues qui existaient au sein de l'Alliance au sujet des objectifs de la CSCÉ.

DES POINTS DE VUE POLITIQUES ET MILITAIRES ET DANS LA PERSPECTIVE DE LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS, LE CANADA A TOUJOURS VU DANS LES DÉBATS DE LA CSCÉ L'OCCASION D'AFFIRMER SON INTÉRÊT, EN TANT QUE PUISSANCE NORD-AMÉRICAINE, POUR LA SÉCURITÉ ET LA COOPÉRATION EN EUROPE. À L'ÉPOQUE DE LA CONFÉRENCE D'HELSINKI, LE CANADA S'EST SURTOUT PRÉOCCUPÉ DE FAIRE VALOIR UNE CONCEPTION HUMANA-

nisme de la détente Est-Ouest, consistant à engager pleinement dans cette entreprise ont rendu la participation canadienne nécessaire et utile. À certains moments, les États-Unis devaient faire preuve d'une plus grande souplesse, par exemple au sujet des mesures fort indésirables d'inspection sur place qu'ils jugeaient essentielles. Et Ottawa a reconnu, sans doute mieux que Washington, que la CSCÉ concrétisait pour les Soviétiques la possibilité de réduire l'insécurité d'un régime pan-européen en Europe, perspective qu'ils espéraient depuis longtemps.

Pour le Canada, la CSCÉ était à bien des égards un exercice difficile. L'OTAN l'occasion de pratiquer la diplomatie de coalition dans le contexte de la limitation des armements. Cela signifiait, bien sûr, que notre pays resterait fidèle à l'Occident au lieu d'appuyer les propositions de l'Est et qu'il ne révélerait ni

E 19 SEPTEMBRE 1986, ON A arrêté les horloges à la Kulturhuset de Stockholm pour donner aux trente-cinq délégations nationales qui s'y trou-

vaient à Stockholm l'occasion de se réunir. Les participants ont assisté à la réunion de Stockholm dans le cadre de la Conférence de désarmement en Europe (CD) : en fait, ils ont pu parvenir à un accord sur les MPACS le 22 sep-

tembre, c'est à dire quelques jours avant le début de la Conférence en janvier 1984. Ce

la fait important, bien que des et peu remarquable, dans l'histoire contemporaine des relations

l'ouest et de la limitation des

LA CONFÉRENCE DE STOCKHOLM

avait commencé dans un climat peu

propre, les tensions entre l'Est et

constitue le premier et le seul accord

importantes que le symbolisme poli-

UNE DÉFAITE DE RONALD REAGAN ET
une victoire sandiniste encourage-
raient peut-être les guérillas sala-
vadoriennes à redoubler leurs efforts
pour opérer dans leur pays une révo-
lution à la nicaraguayenne. En outre,
les chefs de guérilla, qui ont perdu
l'expectatif de voir un changement s'ef-
fectuer par des voies pacifiques tant
que les Etats-Unis seront résolus à
donner tous les ordres, verraient
alors une occasion d'amorcer des
pourparlers avec le gouvernement
du Salvador.

«No hay un salvador para El
Salvador», déclare le président
Duarte, «El Salvador, le Sauveteur, n'a
pas de sauveur». M. Duarte espère
pour autant faire mentir ce dicton. C'est
un pays magnifique ayant une triste
histoire. La chance s'offre mainte-
nant à lui de construire un avenir sur
ses ruines fumantes d'un passé mou-
vement, et aux Etats-Unis, de se
protéger contre un front méridional
hostile en préconisant judicieuse-
ment une troisième voie, en dehors
de la dictature communiste et de la
tyrannie de la droite qui en sont venues
au cours de notre siècle à représenter
les seuls choix accessibles aux
peuples d'Amérique centrale. Ce
sera une tâche délicate, une tâche
que ne comprennent pas bien toutes
les forces façonnant aujourd'hui le
gouvernement des Etats-Unis, et une
tâche dont se soucie peu la majorité
de la population américaine qui n'a
en général que deux préoccupations
au sujet de la région : elle ne veut
pas d'un autre Viet-Nam, ni d'une
autre Cuba. On peut supposer qu'elle
accueillirait favorablement une troi-
sième option pour les pays du tiers-
monde situés non loin des frontières
méricaines. □

Pour en savoir plus

Steven Baranyi, *La paix est-elle possible
en Amérique Centrale ?* ICPSI Exposé
numero 8, octobre 1986.

Centre québécois des relations inter-
nationales, *L'Amérique centrale, pouvoirs
régionaux et enjeux mondiaux*, 1986.

Michael Stuehnenberg et Eric Venturini,
«Ni paix ni guerre au Salvador», *Le
Monde diplomatique*, décembre 1986.

de nobles sentiments, mais il fait place à d'énormes problèmes, et ces chances de succès sont plutôt minces.

Le peuple est fatigué de la guerre, certes, mais après avoir tant lutté et avoir payé un si lourd tribut, il n'est pas prêt de renoncer à ses exigences concernant un nouvel ordre social et à une redistribution radicale des ressources. Pour que cela se produise, toutefois, M. Duarte devra réussir à relancer l'économie et à s'assurer que le changement profite au peuple.

Mais les obstacles foisonnent : les Etats-Unis insistent sur l'emploi de la force militaire, la droite et les hommes d'affaires sont intraitables, les chefs de guérilla refusent d'accepter rien de moins qu'une restructuring gauchiste radicale du gouvernement, et d'aucuns soutiennent que des membres du parti de M. Duarte ont cédé à la corruption.

Le fait que M. Duarte doive compter avec cinq cents ans d'oppression coloniale et de dissensions qui sur la corruption, la tricherie et la violence, et très peu sur l'évolution pacifique et la démocratie, constitue sans doute pour lui l'obstacle le plus formidable.

Comme les autres pays centra américains, le Salvador subit profondément les contrecoups de ce qui se passe au Nicaragua, où les Etats-Unis mènent l'action militaire pour renverser le gouvernement de Daniel Ortega. Cependant,

es soldats hors du camp pour voir
ments jusqu'à quel point le gouverne-
ment était résolu à la harceler.

Au siège de la Commission des
droits de la personne à San Salvador
il ne sagit pas de la Commission
personnelle des droits de la
personne), de jeunes enfants jouent
ensemble dans une petite cour inté-
rieure poussiéreuse, parmi les piles
de documents et d'affidavits, tandis
que des bénévoles préparent à man-
ger aux gens qui se sont temporairement réfugiés là. Sur un mur sont
affichées les photos de neuf person-
nes qui ont été abattues ou sont
disparues » récemment. Sur un autre
mur, un tableau révèle le nombre de
personnes sont mortes depuis 1981
- 56 626 en tout, et 1 821 l'an der-
nier. Le gouvernement admet qu'il y
a encore des tueries, mais «c'est la
guerre», fait-il valoir. Au bureau des
Droits de la personne on nous som-
mes, on soutient toutefois que c'est
l'oeuvre de l'armée.

Le demandeur de combi de civils les
guérillas ont tué. «Aucun, a notre
connaissance», me répond-on. Mais
jour même, les journaux mention-
nent l'exécution des maîtres de deux
villages par des guérillas. L'existence
de deux commissions des droits de
la gauche, et une
de la droite) atteste de la polarisation
politique du Salvador.

DEPUIS L'ÉLECTION DU PRÉSIDENT
DURANTE EN 1984 ET LA VICTOIRE DE SO-

Un peu partout dans le monde. « Les critiques de la politique américaine au Salvador affirment que, dans l'ensemble, la présence des États-Unis a des effets plus négatifs que positifs. Pour corroborer leurs dires, ils précisent que la guerre se poursuit toujours et que le pays se militarise de plus en plus, tandis que l'économie s'affaiblit. Le président Duarte déclare que la reprise économique ne pourra s'opérer tant que la guerre durera, mais d'autres font valoir que les combats continuent de faire rage tant que le peuple n'aura pas le sentiment d'avoir obtenu une certaine justice sociale. M. José Luis Galdeaz est professeur de sociologie à l'université du Salvador : « Personne ne sait exactement comment mettre fin au conflit. Tous les éléments du peuple salvadorien, tous ceux qui ont quelque chose à dire, à savoir le gouvernement, le FMLN, le FDR, l'opposition légitime et les syndicats, doivent négocier ensemble pour trouver la solution. Notre pays doit découvrir cette dernière, mais elle doit d'abord et avant tout être salvadorienne. Il faut en premier lieu faire en sorte que les États-Unis cessent de se mêler de nos affaires. Ensuite, les Salvadoriens pourront discuter de la guerre et chercher une solution pour établir une paix véritable et juste. »

ENTRE TEMPS, LA GUERRE ABSORBE les ressources et fauche les vies. Les guerillas sont moins nombreuses qu'elles étaient, mais elles sont encore actives dans de vastes régions du pays : Morazan, San Miguel, Usulután, La Libertad, Chalatenango... et Oaxaca. À peine trente kilomètres à l'extérieur de San Salvador, Oaxaca a été la cible de l'Opération Phoenix : des attaques aériennes massives contre les guerillas, dont on dit qu'elles sont retranchées dans des galeries creusées dans les flancs du volcan. Dans les villages juste en dehors de la zone visée, les habitants montrent du doigt des nuages de fumée s'élevants du volcan et nous disent : « C'est là qu'il ont bombardé la nuit dernière. » Ou : « C'est là que l'armée incendie tout. » Les maisons, les huttes et tout ce qui pourrait être utile à l'ennemi. Les villageois se sont plus ou moins habitués à ce scénario.

* Le FMLN et le FDR sont les guerillas politico-militaires du Salvador.

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ÉTABLIR UNE PAIX VÉRITABLE ET JUSTE. »

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LE SALVADOR EST-IL CONDAMNÉ ?

L'existence au Salvador de deux commissions des droits de la personne, l'une de la droite et l'autre de la gauche: une indication de la polarisation politique du pays.

PAR MARY LOU FINLAY

canon Duarte doit soutenir le prix du sucre; autrement, toutes les fermes de canne à sucre seraient fermées. Le gouvernement américain est de collision avec le régime Duarte pour exploiter une entreprise collective dirigée par ce dernier et s'intégrant à la lutte globale qu'on mène pour faire échec au communisme, mais personne n'a dit quoi que ce soit au sujet de cette ironie apparente. Après la visite de la ferme, nous nous sommes retrouvés dans l'après-midi à San Salvador et nous avons assisté à une manifestation estudiantine bruyante qui avait cours devant l'ambassade américaine.

L'ambassade est située au centre de la ville, à quelques coins de rue de l'université du Salvador où les manifestants, portant peintures de guerre et masques, s'étaient regroupés avant d'annoncer leur marche. Ils étaient à peine deux cents, bien qu'il y ait 30 000 étudiants inscrits à l'université. Mais à entendre leurs cris et leurs invectives, on aurait pensé qu'ils étaient beaucoup plus nombreux. Munis de haut-parleurs et de peinture en cannettes, ils proféraient des obscénités et barbouillaient des slogans sur le mur de béton :

YANÚ LO GO HOME (Vas-t'en, ren-tre chez vous) et AMÉRICA IS SHIT (!) (Amérique, c'est du fumier).

LA PRÉSENCE AMÉRICAINE AU Salvador est une médaille qui a son revers, c'est le moins qu'on puisse dire. Quand il était maire de San Salvador, José Napoleón Duarte a appliqué sévèrement les politiques appliquées par les États-Unis en Amérique centrale. Aujourd'hui, il a baissé le ton, comme il convient à tous les jours de Washington une aide valant presque 2 millions de dollars : « Au National Press Club de Washington, j'ai déclaré que les États-Unis vivaient depuis toujours dans une démocratie mais qu'ils n'exportaient la dictature. Cela est en train de changer, car il nous faut

Un rapport de l'Agence pour le développement international (E.-U.) souligne que la plupart des coopératives ont du mal à faire leurs versements hypothécaires à temps et que le gouvernement ne respecte pas l'échéancier des paiements dus aux anciens propriétaires. Bon nombre des terres expropriées font encore l'objet de litiges. Les guerillas y effectuent encore de fréquents raids, ce qui rend les fermes peu rentables au mieux, et au pire, tout simplement inhabitables. Mais fournir encouragements et conseils aux autorités chargées d'opérer la réforme agraire ne représente qu'un aspect de la politique complexe que les Américains mènent au Salvador, et c'est là une preuve que ces derniers ont en partie substitué à la diplomatie de la force armée une action plus raffinée.

Deux travailleurs américains de l'Agence pour le développement international, venus de l'Iowa et de l'Arkansas, m'ont accompagnée lors d'une visite d'une des coopératives installées juste au sud de San Salvador.

Les ouvriers ont surtout planté de la canne à sucre, du riz et des haricots et ils cultivent aussi quelques autres produits vivriers. Cette ferme compte parmi celles qui sont «prosperes»; de toute évidence, on veut ici nous en mettre plein la vue. Sous les rayons brillants du soleil de midi, une poignée d'hommes, dont les bras sont étalés et noircis par les tiges de vingt pieds qui tombent sous les coups de leur machette, comptent encore de la canne à sucre. On a incendié les champs Américain, mais à tort, car les cannes perdent beaucoup de leur valeur quand on les brûle ainsi; ce procédé rend cependant la coupe plus facile. Quoi qu'il en soit, le prix du sucre est tellement bas que la marchandise ne vaut à peu près rien. Le gouver-

D'un peu d'argent et de quelques bons. Surtout que les bons ne valent rien, de dire M. Steiner, et que le prix payé était trop bas : il était fondé sur la valeur des terres telle qu'elle avait été déclarée dans les rapports d'imôt que le propriétaire avait déposés en 1976. Quant aux paysans, la réforme agraire les a déçus tout autant, car elle ne va pas assez loin.

DE PRÈS PLUSIEURS DÉCENNIES, LES mouvements révolutionnaires dans la région promettent tous une réforme agraire. Au Salvador, les grands propriétaires terriens ont particulièrement bien réussi à résister. En 1932, les *campesinos* étaient ré-*malianza*, de dix à vingt mille pay-sans sont alors tombés sous les coups de l'armée. En 1975, le taux de population sans terres par rapport la population totale était, au Salvador, le plus élevé de toute l'Amérique latine.

En 1980, le gouvernement a pro-tecté comme il suit pour appliquer la réforme agraire : il a acheté un cer-tain nombre de grandes fermes, puis du jour au lendemain, tous les ouvriers qui y vivaient en sont deve-nus les co-propriétaires; dès lors, ils mettent une partie de leurs revenus nouveaux bypothèques, cette formule a suscité des relations plutôt houleuses. Les anciens propriétaires n'ont pas ac-cepté d'être ainsi dépouillés de leur-farmes. Les paysans qui tra-vaillaient la terre mais qui ne vivaient pas là se sentent lésés par le régime arbitraire en vertu duquel les coopé-ratives ont été créées. Par ailleurs, en quittant les fermes, les anciens propriétaires ont évidemment em-porté avec eux toutes les compé-tences gestionnelles nécessaires pour bien les exploiter.

EN NE SURPREND PLUS LE
ministre qui arrive au
Salvador. La capitale et la
contre environnante sont
incendées comme il l'avait imaginé :
induite, la pauvreté, les pous les mal
heureux, et partout l'image lami-
nère de jeunes gens au teint basané
portant la tenue des commandos et
une mitrailleuse qui, depuis toujours,
symbolise un monde affligé par la
guerre et la guerre, et fait honneur le
général.

Le secteur militaire est le seul qui
soit en croissance au Salvador. On
estime qu'environ 50 000 personnes
sont en armes, sans compter les
milliers, qui sont au nombre de
un million.

où je suis arrivée, le prési-
dent Napoléon Duarte s'adres-
sant à un groupe d'hommes d'affaires
et les suppliant de
dire à la situation...
officielle, à endiguer un
mouvement généralisé et à met-
tre fin à la guerre civile qui dure depuis
plus de sept ans. Une semaine plus
tard, les hommes d'affaires lui ont
fait part de leur réponse en boycott-
ant les entreprises étrangères inter-
nationales bisannuelles qui se tenait
dans la capitale.

Le président de la Chambre de
commerce, M. Victor Steiner, accuse
M. Duarte de socialisme à l'économie,
d'étouffer la libre entreprise par des
lois et des taxes, par la réglementation
des importations et par la corruption :
Le gouvernement n'a aucun respect
pour le rôle que le secteur privé peut
jouer sur le plan économique.»

M. Steiner formule des propos
particulièrement mordants à l'endroit
du président Duarte. A l'occasion de
la réforme agraire qui a commencé
en 1980 (et qui se heurte à d'innom-
brables difficultés), la belle-famille
de M. Steiner a tout perdu. Le gou-

on fait automatiquement la militarisation croissante du tiers-monde à l'augmentation vertigineuse des dépenses militaires et des importations d'armes. Le principe qui liait désarmement et développement reposait sur une hypothèse inconsistente, à savoir que si l'on pouvait réduire les dépenses militaires et les importations d'armes, on inverserait le processus de la militarisation. Suivant la logique des avocats du désarmement, le problème avait une solution évidente et simple : les pays du tiers-monde devaient renoncer à moderniser leurs arsenaux, réduire leurs dépenses militaires et affecter les ressources ainsi économisées à des projets de développement. En réalité, la situation est beaucoup plus complexe que cela. Depuis le début des années 1980, il semble que le tiers-monde ait réduit ses dépenses militaires et ses

DES ARMES POUR LE TIERS-MONDE

... d'importants problèmes de sécurité, et les solutions ne

R I S S W I T H

chats d'armes. Mais bien peu osaient prétendre qu'il est moins munitier que l'Etat dans les années 1970 - à preuve, les conflits terribles et coûteux qui sévissent en Afrique australe, en Amérique centrale et dans le Sud-ouest asiatique. Ajoutez à cela les affrontements ethniques toujours plus nombreux et une récession économique tenace, et vous voyez qu'il paraissent tout aussi sous-développés et militaires les pays qu'elles l'étaient dans les années 1970. Les derniers chiffres que l'Institut international de recherches pour la paix de Stockholm (SIPRI) a fournis sur le commerce des armes révèlent effectivement que les exportations d'armes à destination du tiers-monde ont cessé d'augmenter, la moyenne mondiale des cinq dernières années traduisant une légère diminution depuis 1982. Si l'on y regarde de plus près, cependant, on constate que si l'on exclut des calculs les cinq principaux importateurs, à savoir l'Irak, l'Inde, l'Egypte, l'Arabie saoudite et la Syrie,

ampleur de cette diminution dans les autres pays du tiers-monde de- vient manifeste. Les tendances à la baisse sont marquées en Amérique du Sud, mais non en Amérique cen- trale. Au Moyen-Orient, le surplus de pétrole et la chute des revenus d'exportation ont grandement limité les activités de défense, sauf en Iran et en Irak. En Afrique aussi, la diminution est graduelle, bien que la conjoncture existant dans le Sud du continent ait un effet inverse. En Asie australe, l'Inde et le Pakistan poursuivent sans relâche leur course aux armements, tandis qu'à Sri Lanka, les dépenses militaires, qui étaient très faibles, montent main- tenant en flèche. Dans le Sud-est asiatique, les importations d'armes semblent se maintenir au même niveau, bien qu'une baisse semble sur le point de s'amorcer.

lour simplement leurs importations. Et tandis que le marché des équipements de défense continue à fléchir et que la diminution des commandes inquiète de plus en plus les exportateurs, il devient beaucoup plus difficile de faire respecter les restrictions. Sur un plan plus général, le problème du contrôle tient au fait que la vente de technologies militaires remplace peu à peu le commerce des armes: il ne convient donc plus d'envisager ce dernier simplement dans le contexte du transfert de systèmes d'armes. On ne se limite plus à vendre des chars d'assaut ou des canons ou encore des techniques de fabrication et des installations industrielles.

Les contraintes économiques et sans doute aussi de nouvelles priorités expliquent bien, il est vrai, pourquoi le commerce des armes a tellement changé au cours des dernières années. Mais il y a peut-être lieu de prendre aussi en compte la conjoncture qui a permis aux pays du tiers-monde d'accroître leurs moyens de défense vers le milieu des années 1970.

A ce moment-là, le Moyen-Orient était le plus grand importateur régional de gros systèmes d'armements — la formation de l'OPEP et la montée rapide des prix du pétrole expliquent ce phénomène. En outre, la crise du pétrole a créé des conditions qui ont permis à des pays n'appartenant pas à l'OPEP d'obtenir du crédit, et c'est ainsi que tous les pays du tiers-monde ont réussi à accroître leurs moyens de défense.

Entre-temps, les besoins en programmes de modernisation militaire s'étaient accumulés. Au moment de leur accession à l'indépendance, la plupart des pays du tiers-monde se sont trouvés face à des problèmes régionaux et locaux de sécurité et ils disposaient de piètres moyens pour contrer la menace. Les pays n'ont pas tous résolu de la même façon le dilemme de la sécurité et de la défense. Des organisations militaires du tiers-monde se sont associées à des décideurs américains, car ceux-ci percevaient l'institution militaire comme un élément moderne et anti-communiste garant du progrès; renforcer ces organisations avec de l'aide et des crédits militaires devenait un principe clef des politiques. Des pays voisins de l'Union soviétique, tels que l'Irak et le Pakistan, firent la cour aux partisans de la Guerre froide, à Washington, et obtinrent

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Chris Smith est chercheur à l'*Institute for Development Studies*, à l'Université du Sussex; Mary Lou Finlay est reporter et réalisatrice à la télévision anglaise de Radio-Canada, dans le cadre de l'émission *The Journal*; Michael Tucker est professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université Mount Allison et membre associé (Recherche) de l'ICPSI; Timothy Colton est professeur de sciences politiques et Directeur du Centre des études russes et est-européennes à l'Université de Toronto; David Cox est membre du corps enseignant de l'Université Queen's et Directeur de la recherche à l'ICPSI.

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NOTE DE LA RÉDACTION

Trois articles du présent numéro

décrivent les dilemmes que l'achat et

la fabrication de matériel militaire

présentent aux pays qui ont de la dif-

ficulté à satisfaire aux besoins essen-

tiels de leur population. Nous fait part

de ses impressions sur le Salvador,

après s'y être rendu pour préparer

une série documentaire filmée pour

la société Radio-Canada. Elle décrit

le triste état dans lequel l'économie

du pays se trouve après huit ans de

guerre civile, et elle signale que le

secteur militaire est le seul qui soit

en expansion.

Dans le cadre d'une entrevue qui

touché à bien des sujets et qui a été

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Realities de la Télévision

ontarienne, l'historien militaire **Str-**

Michael Howard présente une thèse

(qu'il décrit lui-même comme étant

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entre l'Irak et l'Irak par exemple,

soient entretenus par le commerce

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du tiers-monde ne sont pas des en-

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simples fantoches des fabricants

d'armes équivaut à... les insulter

carrement.»

13. Les négociations de

Genève sur la réduction des

armes stratégiques par

1. La rivalité entre les super-

puissances et la politique

soviétique dans le bassin des

Caribbes par Neil MacFarlane.

2. La défense continentale:

analyse des tendances et

limitation des armements au

désarmement, à la défense

et à la solution des conflits,

1985-1986, 285 pages.

7. La surveillance par satellite

des capacités du Canada

dans ce domaine par Ronald

10. Le débat sur l'éducation

à la paix par Elizabeth

19. Le désarmement

nucléaire et l'initiative

Corbachie par John Walker,

janvier 1987.

12. Qui est en tête? Analyse

sur l'équilibre nucléaire par

Jane Boulden, mars 1987.

13. Les négociations de

Genève sur la réduction des

armes stratégiques par

14. Les négociations de

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armes stratégiques par

15. Les négociations de

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PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

DES ARMES POUR LE TIERS-MONDE

Autres voies, autres moyens
Par Chris Smith



Dans le présent numéro:

Mary Lou Finlay
Tandis que la guerre civile
continue à déchirer le
Salvador, la société se
polarise et le pays s'ap-
pauvrit toujours davantage.

Michael Tucker
L'autisme dernier les pays
d'Europe, le Canada et les
États-Unis ont convenu de
moyens à prendre pour
réduire les risques
de guerre.

Timothy J. Colton
Le régime Gorbatchev
modifie la façon dont les
observateurs occidentaux
professionnels de l'URSS
considèrent la Russie et
sa capacité de changer.


Michael Howard
Un éminent historien
militaire s'en prend aux
mouvements pacifistes
et essaie de définir ce
qu'est la paix.

PEACE & SECURITY

THE UN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Discredited and some would say decrepit, can the UN Security Council become a useful mechanism in the search for peace?

By Brian Urquhart



Robert Malcolmson

The American tendency to moralize questions of international relations has undermined the long-term security of the West.

Paul Létourneau

West Germany's debate about defence policy takes on renewed vigour with the possibility of a Soviet-American missile treaty.

Charles Doran

Canada's defence policy seeks to use the dispute with the US over the Arctic to drum up support for increased defence spending.

James Eayrs

The Defence White Paper looks pretty, but the commitment to build nuclear-powered submarines is unsound and unnecessary.

Also in this issue:

Institute Publications 1986-87

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

1. **Superpower Rivalry and Soviet Policy in the Caribbean Basin**, by Neil MacFarlane, June 1986, 70 pages.

2. **Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective**, by David Cox, December 1986, 50 pages.

ANNUAL REVIEW

A **Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1986-87**, 270 pages.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

8. **Peace in Central America?**, by Steven Baranyi, October 1986.

9. **A Second Look at First Use**, by Fen Osler Hampson, November 1986.

10. **The Debate About Peace Education**, by Elizabeth Richards, December 1986.

11. **Nuclear Disarmament: The Gorbachev Initiative**, by John R. Walker, January 1987.

12. **Who's Ahead: Examining the Nuclear Balance**, by Jane Boulden, March 1987.

13. **Review of the Geneva Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions**, by David Cox, June 1987.

14. **The Stockholm Agreement: An Exercise in Confidence Building**, by C.A. Namiesniewski, August 1987.

15. **Peacekeeping and the Management of International Conflict**, by Henry Wiseman, September 1987.

POINTS OF VIEW

1. **East/West Relations: Values, Interests, Perceptions**, by Geoffrey Pearson, March 1986.

2. **Nuclear Weapons and the Averting of War**, by Robert Malcolmson, October 1986.

3. **Canadian Press Coverage of Arms Control and Disarmament Issues**, by John R. Walker, March 1987.

4. **Maintaining Peace With Freedom: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control**, by Lorne Green, March 1987.

CONFERENCE REPORTS

3. **The Risk of Accidental Nuclear War**, Proceedings of Conference, Vancouver 26-30 May 1986, by Andrea Demchuk.

4. **Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean: Perspectives to the Year 2000**, Proceedings of a Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 22-25 March 1987, by Lloyd Searwar.

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

UN bashing is a perennially favourite pastime among just about any group one cares to name. In high school we used to hold earnest debates for which a typical resolution went something like, "we resolve that the since the UN accomplishes nothing and solves no problems it should be abolished." More recently, a new category of criticism has arisen that is ideological in nature and purposeful in tone – from people and organizations who don't like the idea of a UN and never did. However, most antipathy to the UN is the old-fashioned variety born of cynicism and disappointment. In this setting, our cover article by an ex-UN Under-Secretary General on the UN's role in finding a solution to the Middle East dispute would seem to be fatuous in the extreme.

Yet there is an alternative operating assumption that is helpful to consider when reading this piece by **Brian Urquhart**. That is the idea that the Arab-Israeli conflict is so dangerous there is no way efforts to solve it can *not* be made using whatever tools are handy and potentially useful. In Urquhart's view the Security Council is such a tool, and while not sanguine about solving the problem he is

certain about the need to try, precise in defining the minimum conditions needed to find a solution and persuasive in showing how a revitalized Security Council can meet those conditions better than any other arena.

The Security Council is on a bit of roll these past weeks. For the first time since anyone can remember, the five permanent members agreed in resolution 598 passed by the Council in July to threaten a mandatory arms embargo on belligerents – in this instance, Iran and Iraq. As this issue of *Peace&Security* went to press UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was off to Teheran and Baghdad to discuss the implementation of a cease fire. He will probably not succeed, but then again maybe he will. In any event, he went because nobody has any better ideas on how to end a seven-year war that threatens international peace, which, as Urquhart points out, is why the Security Council was created in the first place. Of course, the Security Council only gets the power the five permanent members choose to give it. In the case of Iran-Iraq they have given a lot. What are they now prepared to

give in order to begin to resolve the other Middle East dispute?

In other articles for this issue of *Peace&Security* two authors comment on the new Canadian defence policy tabled in the House of Commons this past June. Both are writing from outside the country. **Charles Doran** runs the Canadian Studies programme at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. and until September of this year **James Eayrs** was Visiting Professor of Political Science at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand.

Paul Létourneau's article looks at the roots of the West German security dilemma and also gives a roster of parties and personalities prominent in that nation's debate over its role in the Western alliance. Mr. Létourneau teaches strategic studies at Collège Militaire Saint-Jean and is currently on a research sabbatical in the Federal Republic.

Finally, historian **Robert Malcolmson** reflects on what he perceives as moralizing traits in American political culture and how these have prejudiced both the United States' and its allies' understanding of how nuclear weapons can be used.

Michael Bryans

CANADIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY

307 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0P7
(613) 990-1593

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Design and Production:

The Spencer Francey Group,
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BY BRIAN URQUHART

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1987 IS A year of poignant anniversaries. It is the 90th anniversary of Theodor Herzl's first Zionist Congress, the 70th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the 50th anniversary of the Peel Report suggesting separate Arab and Jewish States in Palestine, the 40th anniversary of the UN partition plan, the 20th anniversary of the Six Day War and Resolution 242, the 10th anniversary of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, and the 5th anniversary of Israel's invasion of Lebanon.

This list give a mere glimpse of the tangled skein of history which constitutes the Arab-Israeli or, as it used to be called, the Palestine problem. So far, none of the many efforts, violent or peaceful, to disentangle this skein have been effective, and a mood of resignation, fatigue, or even of fatalism, seems prevalent, while strong partisanship in the outside world – always the bane of efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli problem – persists.

Once again there is talk of a Middle East peace conference. It seems to be assumed, in the West at any rate, that this conference will take place outside the UN framework, although it may include the permanent members of the Security Council. There have been many recent exchanges on this subject – two years ago between Jordan and the PLO, more recently between Israel and the US, and, apparently, clandestinely between Israel and Jordan. The majority of the members of the UN are in favour of a Middle East peace conference *within* the UN framework, but this is of little relevance if Israel and the US are determined that it should be *outside* the UN framework. The conference is also a controversial question in Israel itself, Prime Minister Shamir opposing it, while Foreign Minister Peres supports it. This fact alone renders the idea, at least for the time being, moot.

A new Middle East conference is an uncertain and controversial

THE UN'S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Arab-Israeli dispute is a standing threat to international peace and security. Existing United Nations machinery, created over forty years ago, should be used in the search for a solution.

proposition. Even if the preliminary organizational and procedural questions were resolved and the conference convened, the subject matter remains as disputed and intractable as ever. The purpose of this article is to suggest a more modest and unfashionable course: to use existing UN machinery, as it was originally intended, to solve the Arab-Israeli problem.

THE ESSENCE OF THE PALESTINE problem is relatively simple; its implications immensely complex. Historical fate has made the Palestinians and the Israelis compete for the same, small, precious homeland. Their struggle is dramatized and made more tragic by the disasters which have befallen both peoples. It is possible to make a powerful argument for the claims and aspirations of both, and both believe passionately in the justice of their cause. Since neither can avoid the other, and neither will abandon their aspirations or go away, they must eventually learn to live together in peace. That is, and must be, the main objective of the peace process.

The deep historical roots and high emotional content of the Arab-Israeli conflict are not the only reasons for the obligation of the international community to help in its solution. The UN has

been intimately involved in this matter since 1947, when it voted the partition plan. Throughout the history of the problem the world community has given undertakings to both sides – obligations which, on the Palestinian side in particular, have never been fulfilled. In addition, this is a conflict where a few mistakes, miscalculations or misunderstandings can very easily and rapidly lead to a confrontation of the nuclear superpowers.

Nor can Israel or the Arabs afford to abandon the negotiation process. The problem will not solve itself. With its present occupied territories, Israel is faced with a demographic time bomb which every year becomes more threatening and also constitutes an intolerable situation for the Palestinian inhabitants.

The issues involved are well known. Broadly speaking they involve Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories; the evolution of a permanent peace which includes the recognition of the right of Israel, as well as the other states of the region, to live in peace within recognized borders; the practical recognition of the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinians; and the future of Jerusalem.

No lasting solution to these complex and interlocking problems can be totally satisfactory to

any of the parties concerned. Compromise, concessions and some degree of mutual understanding and tolerance will be necessary if progress is to be made. Unfortunately these elements are notably lacking on the Middle East scene. Instead, rigid positions, frustration and strong rhetoric breed extremism and violence on all sides, while the forces of moderation are steadily undermined. This tendency is particularly notable when no negotiating process is being attempted.

For this reason, if for no other, it is vital to maintain the effort to negotiate a solution. It has long been evident that the parties directly concerned will not be able to make progress towards a negotiated solution without outside help and pressure. Negotiating skill is not enough, as the experiences of Gunnar Jarring, the UN representative under Resolution 242, among many others, have indicated. What is required is a benevolent framework of pressure, assurance and encouragement which can offer tangible benefits for concessions and compromises. The 1973 Middle East Peace Conference, short though its only formal session was, is a good example of such a framework – presided over, incidentally by the United States and the Soviet Union. At that time, superpower sponsorship of the conference and the unanimous support of the world community, made it easier for the conflicting parties to negotiate a cease fire and disengagement agreement without loss of face, and to agree to UN peacekeeping and conflict-control mechanisms. The Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel, presided over by the United States, were another example on a more limited scale.

A FRAMEWORK IS NOW DESPERATELY required to encompass the remaining elements of the problem – the other occupied territories, and the future of the Palestinians and of Jerusalem. If Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian leadership, Lebanon

and Israel are to be drawn into a practical and effective process of negotiation, a wider more comprehensive framework of negotiation will obviously be required.

In theory the obvious core of such a framework would be the Security Council of the United Nations. Indeed this kind of task, the peaceful solution of a dispute which is also a threat to international peace, was precisely what the Security Council was set up to do. Unfortunately the Council's credit is sadly depleted. East-West rivalry and distrust have deprived it of that unanimity of its permanent members which was to have been its main driving force and authority.

In recent years the Council has tended to be divided seriously in most matters related to the Palestine problem. On the other hand its recent unanimity on a resolution designed to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq War may indicate a new dawn of perception among the permanent members that there are some international conflicts which are simply too dangerous for them *not* to cooperate on. The Arab-Israeli problem certainly qualifies for this category. In fact the Security Council embodies most of the prerequisites for a framework to deal with the Arab-Israel question. It has a well-defined mandate, and broad geographical representation. It has recognised rules of procedure and ways of conducting business. It is – or can be – a relatively flexible body – able to set up sub-organs to do particular jobs. It has a permanent staff and high level executive officer, the Secretary General.

For all its frustrations, the Security Council has sometimes managed, in times of crisis, to reach a vital consensus. It has shown a capacity to improvise and innovate – in mediation, conciliation efforts, good offices, fact-finding, observation and peacekeeping. Its permanent members, and those closely associated with them, are protected from runaway majorities by the veto, or unanimity rule. Thus Israel would be protected, as it often has been in the past, by the US veto and, Syria and perhaps others as well by the Soviet veto.

For all its shortcomings and checkered history it is not to be

dismissed as a serious crisis-management mechanism. In fact there is nothing else like it. It is the more regrettable that in the Western world the Security Council has become unfashionable as a vehicle for seeking a Middle East solution, for it has more of the essential prerequisites than any other mechanism.

WHAT ARE THOSE PREREQUISITES?

First, there is the balanced representation of the main powers without whose active and constructive involvement it is unlikely that a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem can be evolved. This particularly applies to the US and the USSR. Although in recent years there has been an insistence, in the United States and in some quarters in Israel, that the Soviet Union be excluded from serious dealings about the Middle East problem, its exclusion is not only unrealistic but goes against the lessons of historical experience. When the Soviet Union *has* been actively involved, in 1948 during the establishment of the State of Israel, or in 1967 for Resolution 242, or in 1973 after the October War when the USSR and the US were co-chairmen of the Middle East Peace Conference, the best basis for some constructive work on a settlement existed. Refusal to take account of Soviet views or the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and as a permanent member of the Security Council, as for example, in the period during and after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, have tended to have at best negative, and at worst disastrous, consequences.

All the parties to the Arab-Israeli problem must be represented in a form which is acceptable to them. The problem here, of course, is Palestinian representation and, specifically, the participation of the PLO. It was this which eventually aborted the initially promising 1973 Middle East Peace Conference, and goes to the heart of the negotiating dilemma. In recent years more energy has been expended on this question than on any other part of the Palestine dilemma but a solution remains elusive.

The problem resides not only in the PLO's stated aim to establish in Palestine a secular state for Muslims, Christians and Jews and in the factions of the PLO which stress armed struggle, which some maintain is the PLO's only means of being taken seriously at all. An equally important difficulty is that the recognition of Israel's right to exist – regarded in Israel and in the West as a pre-requisite for the PLO's participation – is also the main negotiating card available to the PLO. Thus, the argument goes, it would be foolish for the PLO to play this card *before* negotiations start. On the other hand the PLO will not be admitted to the negotiating table before it plays it.

It will take an extraordinary degree of consensus, persuasion and cooperative effort in the outside world to break this vicious circle. Here again the Security Council might provide the essential framework. The Council is, incidentally, the only forum in the world where Israel and the PLO from time to time sit at the same table.

The negotiating framework must take account of both the Arab states' determination to negotiate the problem as a whole and Israel's insistence on separate negotiations with the states involved. The United Nations, an organization of independent sovereign states, is especially designed to be acutely sensitive to the preeminence of national sovereignty. Indeed, this is one of the grounds on which it is most often criticized in public debate. Any fear that the Council could engage in undesirable coercion on the Arab-Israeli problem is belied by its entire historical record. On the other hand, the Security Council has a great potential capacity for persuasion, conciliation and face-saving. It has provided an acceptable pretext for cease fires, withdrawals and changes of policy on numerous occasions in the past, not only in the Middle East, but on the Indian subcontinent, Africa and elsewhere. If the Council approaches problems in a spirit of unanimity it can help conflicting parties to be reasonable without appearing to be weak.

BECAUSE THE STAKES ON THE table in the Middle East negotiations are so high – security and survival for the states involved – there should be international assurance behind any arrangements that may be agreed. Collective guarantees of security were one of the main objectives of the Charter system. In the Middle East, bilateral guarantees, even if powerful governments were prepared to give them, would be far less satisfactory and could even pose a hazard to international peace.

It would certainly be an extraordinary step for the five permanent members to guarantee a Middle East settlement, but is such a development totally inconceivable? A Middle East negotiation framework *outside* the UN, will have to overcome most of the same difficulties that arise *inside* the UN. It would be easier to try to use the UN Security Council as it was originally intended to be used. Is it idle to ask whether, on an international question of such importance, the great powers might, after forty years, be prepared to consider such a revolutionary step? □


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MORAL VIRTUE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The American disposition to moralize nuclear politics at the expense of realistic analysis has undermined the security of the West.

BY ROBERT W. MALCOLMSON

AT THE HEIGHT OF THE Cold War, in the early 1950s, the distinguished political scientist and exponent of "realism," Hans Morgenthau, pointed to a crucial dimension of US foreign policy. He said of his government: "We have acted on the international scene, as all nations must, in power-political terms; but we have tended to conceive of our actions in non-political, moralistic terms." This has not been simply a matter of treating one's own intentions kindly, an understandable and virtually universal conceit. Rather, it has involved a persistent inclination to *moralize* relations of power at the expense of realistic analysis. This moralizing, however comforting in the short term, has not served the West well.

Weapons of destruction are inherently amoral. They acquire "moral" significance only contextually and as instruments of political purpose. This has always been so. Nuclear weapons are novel in only one fundamental respect: They make mass killing spectacularly easy. There is no longer any technical constraint on the capacity to kill. The power to destroy is so unlimited – so unbounded, so expansive, so nearly instantaneous – that no defence is possible. Indeed, in the face of such lethal power the notion of "defence" has no meaning. Destruction has become so easy that unilateral defence in any meaningful sense is not simply difficult, it is logically impossible (barring perfection). This is the new technological reality of the late twentieth century. It has nothing to do with morality, religion, or any other values.

The West got a head start in the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Air power was a traditional Anglo-American strength and saturation bombing was central to the Western Allies' conduct of the Second World War. The USSR and (for a while) Germany had strength on the ground, but overwhelming air-superiority was enjoyed by the West. The atomic bomb reinforced this American commitment to a security policy premised on the pre-eminence of air power. Given the mailed fist of postwar Stalinism, the policy of containment primarily through air-atomic supremacy seemed to most citizens in the United States and the rest of the West to be warranted, convenient (it was relatively cheap), coherent, and in the light of Stalin's tyranny, at least adequately moral.

Serious problems only arose when, as scientists and a few others had predicted in 1945, the capacity for massive destruction spread quickly from West to East. Air-atomic supremacy lasted for less than a generation. The Americans didn't lose this supremacy; the Soviets took it from them, and there was nothing that Washington could have done about this development, aside from launching a preventive war. The newly-discovered ease of killing meant that the details of weapons systems lost much of their importance, for the essential mutuality of vulnerability was not (and still is not) amenable to purely technical change. The goal of "technological superiority," though still espoused rhetorically, was largely drained of political-strategic significance. The USSR created for itself essentially the

same destructive capacities as the United States had. On this level it became an equal. But in most other respects, in American eyes, it remained unequal and inferior, especially in terms of its intentions and "morality."

HERE, THEN, WAS THE SOURCE OF much befuddlement. The Soviet Union had once been seen as inferior in both intentions and capabilities. This congruence served to simplify policy-formation. But how should Washington deal with a rival great power that had overcome the latter liability but was still perceived by many Americans as being beyond the moral pale?

In response to the emerging reality of Soviet nuclear might there was a kind of bifurcation in American thinking. One tradition took shape that accepted Soviet nuclear capability as a fact of life. This capability was seen as a given that could be neither wished away, nor defeated, nor in any meaningful sense overcome; it could only be offset. Whatever America's views of the men in the Kremlin and their domestic agenda, it was argued, the state they ruled possessed the power to command political respect abroad. Moral preferences were, for the most part, irrelevant to one's understanding of this relationship of power between mighty states. The point was to manage the relationship prudently and to prevent it from degenerating into the sort of cataclysmic war that now loomed large as an ever-present possibility. The nuclear threat (known as "our deterrent"), according to this view, was inescapable but insufficient; this weaponry would have to be supplemented by arms control, agreements for mutual restraint,

and other strategies of collaboration for survival. Moreover, there were signs, it was said, that Moscow had come to similar conclusions and was shedding crude Stalinism in favour of policies of peaceful (though still competitive) coexistence.

The other dominant outlook rejected or at least depreciated these conclusions. In most respects it was a continuation of the Cold War thinking that had flourished during the early 1950s and which embraced a deeply Manichaean view of the world. The starting point for these thinkers and their followers was not power but morality. Their political arguments were normally framed primarily in terms of values, and "freedom" was the value most often mentioned. Values – or at least certain values – were and are at the centre of world politics, not material interests or self-centred ambitions or embodiments of physical power. The world, according to this view, is the arena for a kind of moral struggle, a contest between incompatible value-systems. Nuclear weapons are seen to derive their political meaning, not so much from their intrinsic lethality, but rather from the presumed moral purposes of their possessors.

THIS MORALIZED CONCEPTION of nuclear weaponry was enunciated before World War II had even ended. On 9 August 1945 President Truman, in a radio address, said to his countrymen: "We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new force – to prevent its misuse, and to turn it into the channels of service to mankind. It is an awful responsibility which has come to us. We thank God that it

has come to us, instead of to our enemies; and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His ways and for His purposes." Such extraordinary power was, in some sense, frightening, but at least it was in good hands. As Truman put it in his Navy Day speech of 27 October 1945 "In our possession of this weapon, as in our possession of other new weapons, there is no threat to any nation . . . (Our) possession . . . of this new power of destruction we regard as a sacred trust. Because of our love of peace, the thoughtful people of the world know that trust will not be violated, that it will be faithfully executed."

These were early assertions of themes and presumptions that have become commonplace in American thinking about nuclear weapons. There is the notion that the United States has both the right and the duty to act in the interest of *all* mankind. American state power, unlike the power of other states, should not be distrusted. Since US intentions are benign, its military capabilities pose no problems – except for "aggressors." Only "evil" powers have any grounds for fearing American strength. Nuclear weapons, according to this view, are unobjectionable when held by a strictly defensive power, such as the United States.

It is even claimed sometimes that the non-threatening nature of the American arsenal is acknowledged by adversaries. Eugene Rostow, a former Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, wrote in 1984: "The Soviet government has long understood that it does not face the risk of armed attack." "We can be sure," asserted the authors of *A Forward Strategy for America*, a strategic text published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute in 1961, "that Soviet strategists understand full well that the US overseas base structure is a defensive-retaliatory instrument and not an offensive-preemptive one. They can properly estimate our strategic intentions."* (Preemption, in fact,



as David Alan Rosenberg and others have shown, was a crucial component of US strategy.) The essential notion in such thinking was that foreigners ought to understand America in the same way that America understands itself. As former President Richard Nixon remarked in 1984, "I know the Russians. We don't have to convince them that we are for peace. They know that." He concluded from these propositions (as have many others) that American military superiority was in the interest of world peace.

THIS PERVERSIVE MORALIZING OF superpower relations has had several consequences. First, it has discouraged a realistic and judicious examination of both Soviet intentions and likely Soviet responses to US initiatives. The other side of the coin of presumed American righteousness is the image of an incorrigibly aggressive and sinister USSR. One stark image demands the other. Conceptual opposites have fed on each other. The result is a profusion of worst-case assumptions about the Soviets and an indifference to studying actual Soviet policy and objectives. If one already knows what drives Moscow (e.g., the quest for world domination), there is no need for laborious enquiries into the complexities of Soviet politics. Moreover, these moral presumptions lead to recurrent misanticipations of Soviet responses to American "defensive" nuclear buildups. There has been a tendency, rooted in moral presumption, to treat Soviet culture with contempt and to depreciate or

be indifferent to what it can or is likely to accomplish. Moscow, however, has not only declined to be tamed or morally cowed; it has always matched Washington's upping of the nuclear ante, thereby undermining further Western security.

Second, moralizing has militated against diplomacy. It has deflected attention from the possibility of collaboration based on mutual interests (such as the prevention and management of regional crises) by its stress on the alleged incompatibility of fundamental values. It has made it difficult to reach any accord that fails to enshrine American predominance: After all, can one really expect a moral superior to be content with parity? And the consequence of such moralizing has been a number of missed opportunities – opportunities that have arisen to reduce tensions and restrain the military rivalry. One of the major missed opportunities occurred in the later 1950s, when a reformist and de-Stalinizing Nikita Khrushchev was in charge in Moscow and making a variety of promising overtures. Moralism inhibited the sort of positive US responses which, in the long run, would almost certainly have enhanced American security.

Finally, presumptions of moral superiority encourage a confusion of ends and means. If one's purposes are inherently good (e.g., the defence and extension of "freedom"), the military means chosen to achieve these ends will likely be considered more legitimate than the same means in the hands of other states. Only the

adversary's nuclear arsenal is truly threatening, for on "our side" the honourable ends justify the lethal means. There is a deep reluctance in America to view the superpower relationship in terms of self-interest and the reciprocity of threats and counter-threats – that is, in classically power-political terms. Moreover, this disposition to moralize politics has led to ironic results. For while the United States prides itself on its "reverence for life" and high estimation of human rights, it is Washington and most of its allied capitals that have highlighted the utility of nuclear threats and championed the political value of technologies of mass destruction. The civilized West has been in the forefront in promoting remarkably uncivilized means of waging war.

IN THE SAME SPEECH IN WHICH HE spoke of the atomic bomb as a "sacred trust," President Truman also offered an admonition. "For our own part," he said, "we must seek to understand the special problems of other nations. We must seek to understand their own legitimate urge toward security as they see it." This was an observation that was both politically wise and a precondition for effective American diplomacy. Unfortunately, it was a seed that fell on hostile soil. Ideological righteous and chauvinist dogmas continued to flourish, and they were not confined to Bolsheviks. In their American populist expressions, reinforced by a pronounced technological hubris, we find some of the roots of a frenzied arms race that is still largely out of control. Pride may, in a sense, be a healthy emotion; but undisciplined nationalist pride has been a persistent enemy of the American national interest. □

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WHERE IS GERMANY GOING?

The possibility of a Soviet-American missile agreement has reinvigorated West Germany's domestic debate about its future within the Western alliance.

BY PAUL LÉTOURNEAU

THE ONGOING SECURITY debate in West Germany has been given an added dimension with Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals on arms control and the US reaction to them. Germany is concerned that Washington and Moscow might go over its head to settle the problem of European security. The Germans clearly think they must act decisively to avert this scenario, but how? Should they withdraw into the nationalistic neutral stance which seems to be gaining support? Where is Germany going?

SINCE ITS CREATION IN 1949 THE German Federal Republic has chosen to align itself with the West. Situated where East meets West and lacking nuclear weapons, West Germany is unable to defend its territory and freedom without the help of its NATO allies. Until now Bonn has been a strong supporter of strategic unity and allied solidarity. Although it has opted for closer ties with France in order to balance American ascendancy, it is well aware that French nuclear protection cannot replace the US nuclear umbrella.

Since 1969, successive West German governments have attempted to reduce tensions in central Europe, encourage East-West détente, develop links between the two Germanies, and promote arms control. Moreover within NATO, of which Germany has been a member since 1955, they have attached importance to strengthening the deterrent and sharing the nuclear risk with their allies by ensuring that nuclear weapons are not deployed exclusively on German territory.

Widespread domestic opposition to these strategic priorities has grown, particularly in the last few years. Germans are particularly conscious – more than North Americans or other Europeans – of the dangers inherent in nuclear war. They have on their territory, in the armies of half a dozen allied countries, a military force whose size is unprecedented for a democracy in peace time. To this impressive military presence can be added approximately 4,600 nuclear warheads, all under foreign control, sixty percent of which have a range of less than thirty kilometres. West Germans are aware that this is the greatest concentration of military force anywhere in the world and that they are potential targets for an imposing array of Soviet nuclear and conventional weapons across the river Elbe and just inside the Czechoslovak frontier.

The NATO doctrine of “flexible response” also gives West Germans cause for alarm, since it threatens the early use of nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities. In a war with the USSR, NATO may be forced to destroy Germany in order to defend itself against Soviet forces. This fear of nuclear weapons strengthens the pacifist movement and provides ammunition for other political parties.

BETWEEN 1983 AND 1987 THE GREEN party – which includes pacifists and ecologists from across the political spectrum – increased its share of the vote in Federal elections from 5.6 to 8.3 percent. The Greens' platform calls for Germany's withdrawal from NATO, the rejection of nuclear deterrence, the renunciation of nuclear arms, and the withdrawal of US forces.

It rejects the West's emphasis on economic growth, and would like Germany to adopt a neutral position while actively exploring the possibility of reconciliation between the two Germanies. The Greens are the most open supporters of nationalistic neutralism; a typical supporter is young, urban, well-educated and dissatisfied with the indecision of the social-democratic party, the SPD.

Since returning to opposition in the fall of 1982, the SPD quickly disassociated itself from the positions held by its most recent representative in the Chancellor's office, Helmut Schmidt. In August 1986, the SPD put forward a defence policy which included the withdrawal of Pershing II and cruise missiles from Germany, revoking agreements with the United States over SDI, a cut-back in defence expenditure, and a long-term restructuring of the *Bundeswehr* (armed forces) aimed at creating a purely defensive force. The SPD has also adopted what its opponents characterize as a “parallel” foreign policy – a unique procedure for a Western democratic party. It has concluded several draft treaties with communist parties of Eastern Europe, (thus effectively with the governments of these countries), which envisage the creation of nuclear and chemical weapon-free zones in both Germanies and beyond. The SPD has thus committed itself in advance to concrete measures to reduce the nuclear threat. These agreements are not binding; if the SPD were to come to power it would have to discuss these matters with its partners in a coalition government.

The leader of the SPD, Willy Brandt, retired in 1987 and was replaced by a moderate, Hans-

Jochen Vogel. At the same time, however, the minister-president of the Saar, Oskar Lafontaine, was elected by a large majority to the party's three-man directorate. Lafontaine has spoken openly of West Germany's gradual withdrawal from NATO and of the need for Germany to act as a bridge between East and West. The left wing, which holds nationalist neutralist ideas very close to these, is increasingly influential in the SPD.

When the Liberal-Conservative coalition (FDP and CDU-CSU) came to power in the autumn of 1982, it identified two new priorities in defence and foreign policy; to persuade the *Bundestag* (Parliament) to confirm the deployment of the euromissiles unless the Soviet Union accepted the so-called zero option; and to re-establish good relations with Washington. By accepting the euromissiles it brought to an end a debate of unprecedented intensity. The second objective was more difficult; the government wanted to appear conciliatory in its dealings with the Reagan Administration. Thus while the government found it very difficult to be openly critical of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), they were afraid that SDI would compromise various elements of the strategic balance, particularly strategic parity, deterrence, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the arms control negotiations. Bonn would have preferred to imitate the Canadian model, and allow German industry to pursue contracts with the Pentagon as it saw fit without the direct involvement of the government.


This dilemma was finally resolved in the spring of 1985 when

Chancellor Kohl's government expressed its support for SDI. Then a further difficulty arose. Soviet proposals to dismantle medium- and short-range missiles in Europe were accepted in principle by the Americans, and after some hesitation, by the British and French as well. After a great deal of wavering and an open split within the coalition government, the Federal Republic followed suit, but this only intensified the debate.

For the Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a member of the Liberal party (FDP), the Federal Republic could not decline this opportunity to take a step towards arms reduction, a move consistent with longstanding German foreign policy. The Soviet proposals had the additional merit of meeting the demands which Bonn had consistently put forward since the end of the 1970s. Genscher also emphasized that Germany could not isolate itself or oppose the desire of the two superpowers to change the military configuration of Europe.

On the other hand, the Minister of Defence and Christian Democrat, Manfred Wörner, argued against the American proposals. His arguments and those of the right wing of the CDU may be summarized as follows: France and Britain can afford to favour the double-zero option because they can provide for their own security. The Americans have a natural interest in the withdrawal of all medium- and long-range weapons which can penetrate the Soviet Union and risk embroiling them in uncontrollable nuclear escalation. With the double-zero option the only missiles left would have a range of less than five hundred kilometres. In other words, the Soviet short-range missiles remaining could be used only against West Germany. One of the CDU deputies in the *Bundestag*, Volker Ruhe, expressed it this way: "The more feeble the range of the missiles, the greater their affect on Germany."

To Christian Democrats this situation seems all the more unacceptable because the double-zero option will see the dismantling of only three percent of the super-



Wojtek Gorczyński

power nuclear weapons in Western Europe. The great majority of nuclear weapons are short-range tactical weapons intended for use on German soil. Not only do the superpowers retain some 50,000 nuclear warheads in their arsenals, but by eliminating the medium and short-range weapons they are simply getting rid of the systems which burden their strategy with incalculable risks. Double zero makes it easier to control any future conflict and confine it to the European territories which the superpowers "protect." In strategic terms this form of nuclear disarmament leads to fears that the US will abandon the strategy of nuclear deterrence it now extends to Europe. Germans who support the double-zero option maintain that these fears are not justified. According to them the US and its allies continue their commitment to Europe by their physical presence and by the vast number of warheads and other weapons they keep there.

THE CDU PAID A HEAVY PRICE IN the regional elections which took place in the Rhine-Palatinate and in Hamburg in May of this year for the government's hesitation con-

cerning the superpowers' arms control proposals. The results forced them to admit that disarmament proposals are popular with the German electorate. In June the *Bundestag* adopted a resolution in favour of a significant and verifiable reduction in Europe of all US and Soviet ground-based nuclear weapons with a range of from zero to one thousand kilometres, together with the achievement of a balance in conventional weapons and a world-wide ban on chemical weapons.

The euromissile crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s gave rise to increasing support for nationalism on the part of the left. A meeting of minds from left and right in support of nationalism could pose serious problems for NATO and for the European Economic Community if it gained momentum.

The leader of the CSU (the Christian Socialist Union – essentially the right-wing of the CDU based in the state of Bavaria) Franz Josef Strauss, has been one of the chief participants in this important political debate. He believes there is no need to be obsessive in reminding the new generation of Germany's responsibility for the last war and the Holocaust. In addition, he keeps his distance from the government's disarmament policy and supports German arms exports to non-NATO countries.

THERE IS A CONVICTION IN Germany, which is quite widespread in the various political parties, that the structure of NATO is out of date. Strauss, like many Germans, believes that US nuclear "decoupling" from Europe is only a matter of time and that the day may come when it will withdraw part of its forces from the Continent. The debate over the double-zero option has increased the distance between Americans and Germans. As the American journalist, Elizabeth Pond, pointed out in the weekly magazine, *Die Zeit* (June 1986) a dangerous myth is arising according to which the West Germans have been abandoned to their fate. Nothing, she says, is being done to nip this notion in the bud.

This feeling of betrayal by its allies leads many West Germans to embrace nationalism. The Greens and certain elements in the SPD are discussing the ways in which Germany can best keep its distance from the East-West rivalry, and leaders of the SPD have begun to revive the expression "Central Europe." In the conservative camp Chancellor Kohl has taken advantage of this nationalist revival; in his speeches he talks of unity and patriotism and of the German identity. In July of this year one often heard in Germany the question: What will happen if Gorbachev decides to offer reunification of the two Germanies in exchange for neutrality (In 1952 Stalin made such a proposition to the three occupying powers – the US, Britain and France)? The conservatives devoutly hope that such a situation does not arise.

Recent polls show that two-thirds of West Germans would like to see reunification, but only eight percent believe that this will come about in less than ten years. They are wary of such an outcome because most of them remain profoundly western in outlook. And the Soviet Union, for its part, has no wish to lose its most dependable ally in Europe, the German Democratic Republic. For the West, the Federal Republic remains the most important ally in Europe and the keystone of the strategic balance between the two blocs. It is important that its allies understand German sensibilities. On the other hand, Germans must not forget that their country's freedom and security depend on remaining part of the West. □

translation by Mary Taylor

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SOVEREIGNTY DOES NOT EQUAL SECURITY

Canada's new defence policy is designed to channel public anxiety about territorial sovereignty into support for increased defence spending. In the process, basic priorities have been confused.

BY CHARLES F. DORAN

THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S White Paper on defence is artful and innovative. While not neglecting traditional Canadian concerns such as peacekeeping and arms control, it attempts to channel the anxieties of the Canadian people regarding territorial sovereignty into new support for increased Canadian commitment for defence. It tries to balance the emphasis on North American sovereignty by reinforcing the Canadian presence on the European Central Front. It seeks to use the legal ruckus with the United States over the North West Passage to drum up support for an active submarine defence against the Soviet Union. The White Paper also proves at least one thing about defence behaviour in the Alliance. The more immediate and territory-related the role, the more ready a government is to face its own electorate with plans for a greater defence effort.

Canadians may wonder about how all of this plays in Washington. But the real Canadian concern ought to be how these actions affect the American capacity to extend deterrence to Europe, and whether the Europeans continue to place confidence in this deterrence and therefore in the unity of the Alliance upon which all depend.

SO WHAT IS THE AMERICAN REACTION to the new Canadian proposal? On the one hand, almost any increase in defence spending by wealthy Canada is welcome and greeted with relief. Provided that generally understood principles are observed, the US can accommodate itself at the tactical

level to virtually any defence policy that Ottawa chooses to implement. Although actual US-Canada defence coordination may not correspond to the public image, because the reality of it concerns "security" while the image has to do with "sovereignty," coordination of tasks will follow the new policy quickly.

On the other hand, without asking themselves a subsidiary question, "how much are we ourselves responsible for the Canadian confusion?" some Americans ask, "Is Canada confusing security with sovereignty?" Underlying the concept of the undefended border is a notion of mutual respect for the airspace and under-sea space of both polities. But parallel to the notion of mutual respect is a confidence in the common defence against hostile third parties. Although the White Paper skates over this issue with finesse, it is an issue that will not go away. This is the area where sovereignty and security come together and where recent misunderstanding has arisen.

Some Canadians, for example, cling to the idea that Canada has no enemies. Presumably, in that view, the US is the only member of NORAD that has enemies either because of a lack of skill in its diplomacy or because of innate challenge to interests of otherwise benign third parties. This habit of thought is further reinforced by a conscious or unconscious propensity toward a free-rider mentality which assumes that the United States will involuntarily supply strategic security to Canada because in defending itself it must also defend Canada. The other aspect of the free-rider notion is that even a substantial increase in

Canadian defensive effort will have little impact upon Alliance thinking.

Seductive though the free-rider mentality and the "Canada has no enemies" notions are, and difficult though they are to answer as the White Paper gamely reveals, they contribute to the confusion over the relationship between sovereignty and security. South of the 49th parallel, these notions look different. The US perspective is that Canadian interests and political values are pretty much the same as the American and that together they help provide the basis for the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, if Canada had the leadership responsibilities the US is expected to assume, it too would be the focal point for hostilities. Yet as policy-makers in Ottawa and Washington are aware, Toronto is as much a nuclear target as Chicago.

As far as the free-rider idea goes, the American perspective is that real defence contributions in the collective interest of the Alliance purchase a genuine seat at the table; free-riderism does not. The key is not only to spend defence dollars, but to pick the areas where those dollars will count, namely where the contribution is most indispensable to the Alliance as a whole.

THE ORIGIN OF CONFUSION BETWEEN sovereignty and security is now clear. Each airspace and under-sea space is equivalent to the other in terms of defensive value. One cannot be defended in the absence of a defence of the other. But each *must* be defended, either by indigenous capability or by the capability of the Alliance partner. In the past, Canada has neither wanted to make a propor-

tionate defence effort nor felt that its air-space and under-sea space could be adequately defended alone. If it now wants to assume more of this defensive responsibility, that is fine with the US. But the defence effort ought to be designed to meet the needs of security, not the political imagery of sovereignty. And the defence effort must be high-grade and credible, not shadows on the walls of Plato's cave. Moreover, the question of what kind of effort is foregone, and what impact the foregone effort will have on the thinking of European Alliance partners, is as grave as any other aspect of defence decision-making, since Alliance security begins and ends in Europe. European confidence in turn is shaped by the perceived willingness of both North American partners to retain their trigger forces in Europe on the one hand, and by the capacity of the US to sustain the credibility of extended deterrence on the other.

This brings us to the crux of the European concern, and therefore of the American concern, regarding the North American under-sea space. Here claims to sovereignty and security must not be allowed to clash. Monitoring, identification, and defence functions ought to be carried out in such a way as to reinforce, not impede, extended deterrence – for example the transit of fleets.

Finally, for a maximum political return on investment, defence spending ought to occur where it is most needed. From the Alliance perspective, Canada's partners will therefore ask whether expenditures on a nuclear submarine force are of the sort that will enhance Alliance security overall to

the greatest extent. The European viewpoint may well be that Canada is making choices on the grounds of sovereignty that not only do not contribute much to Alliance security, but fail to maximize continental security, and may indeed at some future date become a deficit if costs force Canada to reduce its presence in Europe, first in Norway, subsequently in Germany.

WHAT IS THE RESPONSE OF ALLIES to the new Canadian defence paper? Whatever the terms that had been worked out in advance to legitimize the transit of the US Coast Guard vessel *Polar Sea* through the Arctic, American officials must now be asking themselves whether they fully understood the domestic political implications in Canada of making this trip. Certainly the voyage gave a boost to the sovereignty debate. However, whereas sovereignty deals with legal rights, security involves the capacity to defend those rights through the use of force if necessary. The problem for Canada is that security begins, as it does for the US on the Elbe, not on the St. Lawrence. Submarines will not make much difference to the determination of Arctic sovereignty. This will ultimately be determined not by unilateral action but by international law as has been true in North America at least since the 1816 Rush-Bagot Agreement between Britain and the US which limited naval forces on the Great Lakes.

One US concern is that Canada is imitating American mistakes. Under the Reagan build-up, the US has committed itself to a substantial increase in hardware while forgetting to some extent about the costs of operation, maintenance and logistics. Purchase of a dozen nuclear submarines is one thing. Maintenance of command and control, logistical support, training, modernization, and upkeep is quite another. Auxiliary costs could bankrupt the Canadian armed forces. If Canada really is going to buy a Class 8 Icebreaker, finance new frigates, update Tribal Class destroyers, provide replacements for lost CF-18s, assume its share of the costs of the North Warning System, properly equip its European forces, increase its

reserve to 90,000 men, all on a budgeted two percent annual increase in defence spending after inflation, magic will have to be performed. In the absence of magic, political leverage to increase budgets must suffice, and that too, in Ottawa as in Washington, is in short supply these days.

A second concern is cost-related but essentially technological. At present, the capacity of submarines to elude, exceeds their capacity to trace and monitor. The danger here is that Canadian purchases

propeller technology. But the likelihood of getting trapped in underwater ice canyons by American subs, guided by very sophisticated command and control systems on the surface and in space is sufficiently worrisome so that most Soviet subs probably will remain at home. Canadian subs may find very little to hunt for.

A GREAT DANGER IN DEFENCE thought is to contrive for political reasons a defence where there is no threat and to remove a defence



will be made at the lower-end of the technology scale because of cost. With new technology in the area of passive and active sensors, data handling networks, and command and control systems evolving rapidly, there is the risk of early obsolescence. Canada may find itself able to deploy its own nuclear submarines but unable to find or identify Soviet attack submarines.

A third concern involves the mission the subs are supposed to perform. Suppose a Canadian submarine does find and identify a Soviet submarine, what next? Is Canada prepared to use force to deny that submarine access to its territorial waters? If a show-down did occur, which submarine would have the advantage, the heavily-armed Soviet attack submarine or the smaller Canadian defender?

A fourth concern is the suspicion that this may be a deployment without a mission. At present, Soviet submarines for the most part remain near bastions such as the Kola peninsula. They have the capacity to operate under the Arctic ice and they may become more venturesome as they become quieter, thanks to gifts of Western

effort – even a marginal one – from a location where the threat is more real. The White Paper proposes to “consolidate” Canadian forces along the Central Front by integrating the CAST (Canadian Air Sea Transportable) Brigade destined for Norway. CAST had problems ever getting across the Atlantic in time to figure in any confrontation. The proposal to consolidate must come as a surprise to those analysts who trumpeted the weaknesses of CAST, with the objective of eliminating them, only to find that instead the commitment itself has been eliminated.

The threat on the Central Front is real enough. But so is the threat on the Northern Flank. How the Alliance meets defence needs in Norway without permanently stationing troops there (which would be anathema to the Norwegian Left and is contrary to longstanding Norwegian government policy) will send echoes through Norway and Denmark as far away as neutral Sweden. Very easily one gets into a debilitating spiral where an Alliance member refuses external assistance because of local political opposition. The country in turn finds out that because of the

lack of sufficient Alliance help a sense of malaise sets into the public mind which abets the neutralist argument even more.

The consolidation of Canadian force deployment is long overdue, and the Mulroney government should be congratulated for taking up the challenge. The anxiety is, however, that consolidation can mean so many things, including the possibility that when tough decisions over budgets must be made, it leads to a net reduction of actual defence effort. We know this is not the intention of the White Paper. But the realities of politics are such that the drive to establish a credible submarine force for continental defence may come at the expense of the commitment to Europe.

For the United States, the pre-occupation is that the new Canadian emphasis on continental defence will be seen in Europe as the first step toward greater North American isolation. Sovereignty and security are not identical. Indeed, the search for the former may lead to decline of the latter. Fragmentation of the Alliance, unwanted but driven by implicit priorities, is the most fundamental American concern. It should also be Canada's. □

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ASSESSING THE ICE-PACK RATIONALE

Canada should forego its unsound commitment to purchase nuclear submarines and create a maritime version of the Canada-US air defence agreement.

BY JAMES EAYRS

WITHIN HOURS OF *The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act's* passage through New Zealand's House of Representatives, the House of Commons in Ottawa accepted *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* – the first white paper in sixteen years and, as such, a tribute to the negotiating skills of the Minister of National Defence, Perrin Beatty, under whose auspices a rationale has been devised and a consensus formed around it. The coincidence is telling, for the doctrine by which the two documents are underpinned could scarcely be more at odds.

For the government of Canada, nuclear strategic forces are the solution to the central problem of security, "a Soviet nuclear attack on North America." It sees the "survivability of United States strategic nuclear forces" as "the keystone of NATO's assured retaliatory capability." To ensure its survival, Canada is prepared to continue to contribute personnel, weapons, funds, technology and territory. "The structure of mutual deterrence today is effective and stable. The Government believes that it must remain so."

For the government of New Zealand, nuclear strategic forces are the problem, not the solution. Its doctrine is articulated by Prime Minister David Lange:

The nuclear arms race can only be brought to an end by an act of political will. Governments must decide for themselves that they will no longer submit themselves to nuclear escalation but will instead commit themselves to the limitation of nuclear weapons.

New Zealand has made that commitment. New Zealand cannot be defended by nuclear weapons and does not wish to be defended by nuclear weapons. We have disengaged ourselves from any nuclear strategy for the defence of New Zealand.

Viewed, then, from "Godzone," (a Kiwi contraction of "God's own country") where a majority of New Zealanders (seventy-three percent to be precise) recoil from a small nuclear research reactor – never mind a nuclear warhead – as one of "Einstein's monsters," the White Paper's proposed acquisition of ten to twelve conventionally-armed but nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) seems unreal, even inane. It is the most bizarre decision in Canadian weapons policy since the premier of British Columbia bought two submarines originally built in Seattle for Chile.

But bizarre is not necessarily inane. In 1915, the premier's submersible navy protected B.C. passengers on coastal ferries from depredation by German raiders. What is the rationale for Canada's submersible navy?

According to *Challenge and Commitment*, Canada needs SSNs because "they are the only proven vehicle, today or for the foreseeable future, capable of sustained operation under the ice The SSN is the only vessel able to exercise surveillance and control in northern Canadian ice-covered waters." Made aware by instant ridicule of the inadequacy of this "ice-pack rationale," the Minister informed the House some days later of an additional desideratum of his Navy planners: "We would like to have nuclear powered submarines

to be able to do the job better in the Atlantic and the Pacific."

But what, exactly, is the job? What conceivable missions might HMCS SSN perform for Canada in future and how well may she be expected to perform them?

Here are half-a-dozen possibilities.

CONTRIBUTING TO GENERAL DETERRENCE. Years ago, Winston Churchill spoke of "that vague menace which capital ships of the highest quality, whose whereabouts are unknown, can impose upon all hostile naval calculations," and the White Paper follows this idea: "Through their mere presence, nuclear-powered submarines can deny an opponent the use of sea areas." It does not say how – short of starting the war they are intended to deter. (In the event of war they could add to convoy capability – except that in the event of war there is likely to be nothing to convoy.) It is hard to see how a few additional boats – at most three in each ocean, three in refit – would make much difference to the Soviet planners' calculation of the overall 'correlation of forces.'

CONTRIBUTING TO IMMEDIATE DETERRENCE. During severe superpower confrontation of the Cuba missile variety, the major Canadian naval base is peculiarly at risk: Halifax, with few inhabitants relative to many major installations of vital use in wartime (dockyards, container ports, refineries, communications facilities, ammunition dumps), is a tempting target of opportunity for Soviet strategists to test a US president's resolve. No number of conventionally-armed SSNs can help to provide what is required

to deter this dire eventuality, namely, a credible threat to retaliate likewise against Murmansk or Vladivostok. For this purpose the Navy would be better advised to acquire some second-hand Polaris ballistic missile submarines from the British as their boats give way to Tridents.

SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL In the Defence White Paper, these two separable functions are too glibly linked. It looks towards "a credible navy capable of monitoring activity in its three contiguous oceans and of deterring their use by adversaries." But being there may as easily lead to adventurous attempts at entry as to keeping trespassers away. What does a Canadian SSN skipper do when he hears a Soviet missile sub throbbing on his sonar beneath the Arctic ice? Is he to make his ship audible to the enemy, the sonic version of a shot across the bow? What then? Is he to order the enemy to surface? What then, short of risking World War III – or risking the spreading of radio-activity all over the "true North, strong and free," an unimaginable ecological disaster. Someone has yet to think this thing through.

What then to do about the nuclear missile submarine force of each superpower on whose present invulnerability – invulnerable because undetectable – mutual security is held largely to depend? Years ago I tried unavailingly to convince a conference of NATO nabobs that as a policy of deterrence by Mutually Assured Destruction requires an indestructible strategic nuclear force for each side, the prudent and self-interested superpower will strive for a moratorium on anti-submarine warfare research

and development. The thing to do about nuclear-weapons submarines, is, in the words of a Cape Breton fisherman, "Leave 'er lay where Jesus flang 'er."

RECONNAISSANCE. In 1940, HMS *Regulus* slipped submerged into Shibushi Bay to photograph the Japanese combined fleet at anchor in the base. (The negatives, with their valuable clues about gun emplacement and the like, only got as far as Singapore where they were found by the Japanese.) This is risky business – as the crew of the Soviet submarine detected in Swedish waters recently discovered – best left to riskless and efficient satellite photography.


COMMERCE RAIDING. The original role of the submarine was to shut down the enemy's fighting capacity by blocking or sinking his shipping, so reducing sea-borne commerce and supply. Here is a strategy for Mackinder's heartland states – the Warsaw Pact – not for Mahan's (and NATO's) oceanic empire. The vulnerability of a container ship or super-tanker to an SSN (or almost any other type of submarine) is incontestable. But, in the foreseeable future, should our H.M.C.S.SSN go after such a vessel, she will be sinking our side's treasure, not the other's.

CHIP BARGAINING. The history of acquiring weapons to use as bargaining chips in an arms control negotiation is dispiriting. Time and again neither side cashes in its chips. Rather, it ups the ante and the game goes on.

But Canada's projected SSN fleet, as yet unbought and unbuilt, could become an exception to this rule, for the bargaining partner would be on our side, this time, not the other – Uncle Sam, not Uncle Ivan. Could Uncle Sam be made to call "uncle" in the on-going dispute between Canada and the United States over whether the Arctic waters of the Archipelago are Canadian, as Ottawa insists, or international, as Washington insists?

I believe there is a way. The key to a negotiated settlement is the United States' known distaste for the proposed acquisition by Canada of nuclear-powered submarines. American officials don't like the idea at all. According to the *New*

York Times, American officials said "it was possible that a future Canadian government would use the existence of its own submarine force to challenge the passage of American submarines along the protected routes through the archipelago. . . . The officials suggested that the Canadian proposal . . . raised questions about where Canada would get the submarines, how . . . [the Canadian navy] would learn to operate them and whether they would act in concert with the United States."



RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

What will our sub captains' orders be if a foreign submarine is detected in waters claimed by Canada?

In testimony to the Commons Standing Committee on National Defence after tabling his White Paper, the Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty addressed this subject in response to questions from Liberal MP Douglas Frith.

Mr. Beatty: . . . In terms of what instructions will be going to the crews of our submarines, exactly the same instructions as go to the crews of our frigates and of our submarines today. We are not during peacetime going to be firing upon vessels in our waters. What we will do, though, is establish a sovereign presence there. We will indicate that intruders are in Canadian waters, and we will protect our sovereignty. Obviously, the picture would change dramatically in times of war.

Mr. Frith: . . . What the Minister is now saying to the committee, Mr. Chairman, is that in order for us to log, in essence, the presence of other submarines from other sovereign nations, it is going to cost the Canadian taxpayer somewhere in the neighbourhood of between \$5 billion and \$16 billion.

Mr. Beatty: Mr. Chairman, I am not saying that. Far from it. The purpose for purchasing the submarines is to meet our security needs as a country. And the reason for purchasing them is to provide for the defence of Canada.

In so doing, we exercise both our rights and our responsibilities as a sovereign nation. We protect our sovereignty as a people. But the purpose of them is to protect our security in exactly the same way as we have CF-18s, whose function it is to intercept foreign aircraft in the Canadian air defence identification zone, to escort them out of Canada, and in times of war, to be able to defend Canada should we come under attack. It is exactly the same principle; and those people who would argue that we should not protect our seas but should protect our air are, I think, very inconsistent.

The point about learning to operate them is well taken: it was hard enough in 1915, when the crews of the British Columbia subs *CC1* and *CC2* spent weeks "of learning to live in the strange new warships, of mastering directions which were in the Spanish language, and of practicing diving, firing and surfacing to pick up torpedoes." (The Canadian crews fared better than the fourteen Japanese of IJN *No.6* that in 1910 had sunk in the mud of Hiroshima Bay in only fifty-two feet of water:

her skipper had time to write his final report expressing his "sincere hope that the accident will give you material to study diligently the problems of submarine design. . . .")

THE ELEMENTS OF A SOLUTION to what Canadian planners persist in regarding as their Arctic security problem are now in place. The solution is to contrive a maritime version of the Canada-United States air defence agreement of 1958, an AWSA alongside NORAD – AWSA for Arctic Waters Sovereignty Agreement. By its terms, the United States would recognize Canada's claim to sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago, in exchange for Canada's granting regulated access to American submarines in those waters – they have unregulated access anyway – and foregoing acquisition of her own SNN fleet.

Such a deal would be trebly advantageous for Canada. It would remove an intractable and dangerous irritant from the bilateral agenda. It would provide a face-saving retreat from an unsound commitment. And it would set an example for other states, such as India, whose military establishments are urging the advantages of nuclear-powered over diesel-powered submarines upon governments that can ill-afford either.

Challenge and Commitment brings to three the number of white papers on defence issued within four months by governments of widely separated but closely like-minded countries whose armed forces have fought together in four wars of this century – all (until recently) allies of the United States, two allied to each other, liberal democracies, founding members of the Commonwealth, in straitened economic circumstances. Compared to its New Zealand and Australian counterparts, the Canadian White Paper is as a Bluejay to a pair of dowdy sparrows. Its format and design are striking. There is a lavish use of coloured maps and photos. It could be used as an effective recruiting manual for the armed forces. Its graphics are spiffy. But its polemics are "iffy." □

LETTER FROM PARIS BY JOCELYN COULON



From mid-April to mid-June, bitter cold, relentless rain and a dull grey twilight weighed heavily on all sectors of French society, including, of course, its institutions.

From the man in the street to the nation's political leaders, from strategists to the captains of industry, all gave vent to their ill humour in a consensus not often seen in France. Business leaders and politicians decided to launch a debate over the decline of France, based on nothing more than rumours. A few enlightened minds wisely ridiculed this new fad, denouncing its partisan nature. Since the turn of the century, however, the decline has been a very fashionable topic in this country, and as in many others, it is trotted out as a political platform when there is nothing left to say.

Strategists and military experts, comfortably ensconced in their policy of independent defence since Charles de Gaulle's arrival in 1958, watched the skies open when the two superpowers recently reached agreement on European security. They had, of course, expected this to some degree, as Moscow and Washington struggled over the past few years to revive the arms control process. And they suspected with good reason that the Americans were tired of spending astronomical sums on the defence of western Europe.

The bad news came last 14 April, when US Secretary of State George Shultz, leaving a meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, announced to the allies that the two superpowers had agreed to eliminate not only medium-range missiles (Pershing II, cruise and SS-20) but also short-range (500 to 1,000 km) missiles. Washington gave NATO fifteen days to respond. Two months later, on 12 June, in Reykjavik, the same place where Reagan and Gorbachev had made these decisions, the Europeans gave their reluctant approval to the double-zero option.

Oddly enough, the French objected loudest, although there isn't a single US missile on French soil and despite the fact France is protected from any possible Soviet attack by its independent nuclear force. The West Germans could be expected to oppose the Soviet-US agreement, because it would make no cuts in very short-range (less than 500 km) missiles, which could strike only West Germany in the event of war. Yet only the French accused the Americans of betrayal and abandonment.

The French Minister of Defence, André Giraud, spoke of a "nuclear Munich," while some members of the press warned of a resurgence of defeatism and neutralism rem-

Germany and the Benelux countries would shift to a neutralist policy incompatible with western interests.

Second is the belief that the creation of nuclear "sanctuaries" on the territories of the superpowers and their programmes to build anti-missile defences would strike a deadly blow to the French deterrent force. What good would be France's nuclear missiles, acquired at such great expense, once the Soviets had completed an ABM system?

Finally, French leaders think the denuclearization of Europe would lead, in subsequent US-Soviet negotiations, to the inclusion of the French and British nuclear arsenals in possible reductions. France is fiercely opposed to any meddling with its nuclear strike force and suggests that the superpowers make significant cuts in their own strategic nuclear forces before attempting to lecture the

creating the "common front" with the socialists, thus cementing national unity on the strike force. In recent months, however, Communist Party leaders have had a change of heart and now don't know what they want.

Few countries can boast such a solid, stable consensus on military issues. Unlike the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and Japan, France is without a well-organized pacifist movement. It was almost untouched by anti-nuclear opposition in what for the rest of Europe was the debate of the decade. None of the major political parties currently advocates "labourist" unilateral disarmament or neutralist ideas like those of the West German social democrats.

This unusual position on the international chess-board has placed France in the enviable position of a world power on which NATO and especially the United States, can rely in times of crisis. The Americans were particularly grateful for Paris' intervention with Bonn during the euromissile crisis in 1983. President Mitterrand, with the solid backing of the public and other politicians, urged the Germans to accept deployment of missiles on German soil, repeating the slogan, "The pacifists are in the West, the missiles in the East."

France has its moods and quirks of character; some of which can prove quite bothersome. But the country is well aware of its pivotal place on the European map, as a solid ally of the US in the most difficult moments, with broad domestic support for its defence policy. France no longer seriously questions its own destiny, but instead that of Europe as a whole. It patiently seeks ways to preserve the continent's security, which has become an increasingly heavy burden on the United States. □

Jocelyn Coulon is foreign affairs editor for Le Devoir and French review page editor of Peace&Security.

... France is without a well-organized pacifist movement. It was almost untouched by anti-nuclear opposition in what for the rest of Europe was the debate of the decade...

iniscent of the 1930s. One of France's best known strategists, Pierre Lellouche, even argued that "the two superpowers had achieved mutual security at the expense of the Europeans," paving the way for dismemberment of the NATO alliance and the imminent withdrawal of American troops.

This general outcry against what the French termed the "suspicious dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union," is dictated by three factors. First, Paris does not believe the elimination of nuclear arms in Europe would strengthen the continent's security. Quite the contrary: without the American guarantee, the Soviet Union would be in a position to exert enormous political and military pressure that might lead to war in Europe. Denmark, West

other nuclear powers. This proposal is so comprehensive it will never see the light of day, as the French know full well.

France's inflexible stand on the nuclear question arises from the unusual consensus among political leaders and the general public on defence issues. The major strategic principles developed by General de Gaulle in the 1960s survived socialist government rule from 1981 to 1986. De Gaulle succeeded in rallying to his cause part of the political right-wing and the general public when he decided to make France a nuclear power and withdraw from NATO. While supporting the latter measure, the left at first denounced the "bombinette," but changed its mind a few years later. Amazingly, the Communist Party supported the policy of nuclear deterrence in 1977 when

REPORT FROM THE HILL



Defence Issues and Press Comment

■ With the tabling in the House of Commons of the government's Defence White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment* on 5 June and the release of the New Democratic Party's response, "Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence" at the beginning of August, the media has been remarkably busy this summer covering defence issues. A sampling of newspaper comment shows some of the themes that ran through press reaction to evolving defence issues.

It was the submarines that attracted the most press attention. Montreal's *La Presse* of 10 June queried whether Canadian liberties were really at risk in the Arctic. Canada, it declared, should pressure the superpowers to find a way of guaranteeing these waters "a peaceful future." The *Toronto Star's* response was favourable, describing the document as "thoughtful but cautious" (6 June), though twitting the government on the lack of specifics on spending.

Both the *Montreal Gazette* (11 June) and the *Ottawa Citizen* (6 June) were largely favourable, the latter taking a slightly more critical line over the amount of notice paid to arms control in the White Paper: "the government should take great care that its military programs jibe with its arms control views." In its editorial following the White Paper's release, the *Globe and Mail* of 6 June worried about the imbalance the nuclear-powered submarines would create in the navy. The *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* of 6 June praised the new policy. Its editorial's only negative note was that the White Paper had said nothing about the "commitment and sacrifice this country got dur-

ing the lean years" from the members of the armed forces who worked and planned and trained in the "frustrated hope that one day a government would wake up."

Most newspapers supported the decision to drop the CAST brigade (Canadian air-sea transportable) commitment to north Norway in favour of consolidating our NATO forces in Germany. An exception was *Le Devoir* which, in a signed editorial entitled "Mission Impossible?" doubted whether we could defend our own north if the defence of Norway proved too difficult. It called the White Paper a long confession of weakness and incapacity to defend our frontiers. Another exception was the *Winnipeg Free Press* which said that the decision to end the CAST commitment to Norway was a "backing away from NATO." Its editorial of 9 June went on to say that "there is no indication that Canada intends to discover whether it has any greater capability to send troops to Germany" than it does to send them to Norway.

While most commentators agreed that Perrin Beatty, the Minister of National Defence, had done well in political terms, Jonathan Manthorpe of Southam News described in the *Ottawa Citizen* of 6 June the process of writing the White Paper as a major political and bureaucratic victory by Beatty over External Affairs Minister Joe Clark. Some columnists zeroed in on what they perceived as weaknesses in the policy itself. *Ottawa Citizen* columnist Marjorie Nichols observed on 9 June that the spending estimates provided by National Defence would fall short of the levels of the Trudeau years "as a percentage of budgetary spending, gross national product or annual after-inflation increments." Jocelyn Coulon suggested in *Le Devoir* (10 June) that the disengagement from Norway pointed to an eventual total withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe. Europeans would realize

that, faced with mounting costs for home defence, Canada might well opt a few years from now to sever its commitment to the Central Front altogether.

The amount of media attention to the NDP's statement on defence policy reflected the rise in party fortunes (if polls and by-elections were any indication). However, judging by the overall tone of media response to the statement, historian Desmond Morton's prediction in a 20 July commentary for the *Toronto Star* – "Watch for the media to turn on the NDP" – appeared to be borne out by events.

Accusing it variously of "defeatism" (*Regina Leader-Post* 4 August), "neutrality" (*Toronto Star* 2 August), "naivete" (*Le Devoir* 4 August) and of being "Canada-centric at best, illusory and isolationist at worst" (*Globe and Mail* 3 August), a number of commentators nevertheless pointed to the NDP defence critic Derek Blackburn's commitment to military preparedness (the paper was issued under his name). Others speculated on the tension between him and the party's disarmament wing.

(See *Defence Notes* page 16 for an outline of the New Democratic Party statement.)

Central American Peacekeeping Advice

■ Following the announcement on 7 August of a peace plan signed by Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark sent two officials to convey to the foreign ministers of the five countries Canada's support for their plan and to reiterate our willingness to give technical advice on peacekeeping mechanisms, including verification and control.

Such advice would likely be given to an international verification commission that was created at a meeting in Caracas on 22-23 August consisting of the foreign ministers of thirteen states (the five Central American nations plus the *Contadora* group of

Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama and its support group of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay) as well as representatives of the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

Senate Defence Committee

■ The Senate Special Committee on National Defence is continuing its tradition of in-depth studies of Canada's military capabilities. Currently, the Committee is pursuing a study of Canada's land forces with an October trip planned to view Canadian troops at first hand in Cyprus and Germany as well as hearings in the fall with DND officials and outside witnesses.


Southern Africa Trip

■ External Affairs Minister Joe Clark spent five days in mid-August visiting Ivory Coast, Zambia, Mozambique, and South Africa in preparation for the francophone and Commonwealth summits of heads of state in Canada in September (Quebec City) and October (Vancouver) respectively. Apartheid is expected to figure prominently on the agendas of both conferences. Mr. Clark met with the heads of state of each country but South Africa where he conferred with his counterpart, Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha. He also met officials of the African National Congress (ANC), at its headquarters-in-exile in Lusaka, Zambia and with leaders of the major legal anti-apartheid organization in South Africa, the United Democratic Front. It was the first official Canadian ministerial visit to Mozambique since it became independent from Portugal in 1975.

In a follow-up to Mr. Clark's trip, the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo arrived in Canada on 26 August for meetings with Mr. Clark, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and other political leaders. □

- GREGORY WIRICK

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



Nuclear and Space Arms Talks

On 29 July the Soviet Union presented a detailed written proposal on the testing of missile defences in space. The proposal repeated a continuing Soviet proposal for both sides to pledge adherence to the ABM Treaty for ten years. Soviet negotiator Aleksei Obukhov stated that research on strategic defences would be confined to laboratories and institutions "both indoors and out of doors." Most importantly the proposal called for negotiations between the two sides to determine what objects should be banned from space and presented a proposed list of those objects. This is the first time the Soviets have formally detailed the types of objects it would like to prohibit. Some observers think the proposal implies that some limited form of testing in space might be acceptable to the Soviets.

US negotiators expressed disappointment at the Soviet proposal saying that there had been no change in the Soviet position. President Reagan has ruled out any negotiation on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty and what might be allowed in space.

Two days later, on 31 July, the Soviets presented a draft treaty on reductions in strategic nuclear arms. Reductions in strategic weapons remain linked to limitations on activities in space. A new element included in the draft treaty was a proposal for a limit of 400 on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with a range of over 600 kilometres. In June 1986 the Soviets had proposed including SLCMs under the proposed war-

head ceiling of 6,000 but American negotiators have been unwilling to consider limits on SLCMs unless the Soviets can offer proposals for effective verification.

The US and Soviet Union continue to agree on the basic outlines of a fifty percent reduction in strategic arms. Both agree to a ceiling of 1,600 on intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles and bombers and a ceiling of 6,000 on nuclear warheads. Each bomber will also count as one warhead under the 6,000 ceiling in order to take account of the bombs and cruise missiles they carry. The Soviet Union has also agreed to reduce its heavy intercontinental missiles (such as the SS-18) by half.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces

On 4 June the West German parliament endorsed the decision made by Chancellor Kohl to support what is known as the "double zero" option – the complete elimination of all intermediate range nuclear missiles (INF) and shorter-range INF (SRINF) from Europe. This position was then endorsed by NATO ministers at a meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland on 12 June.

Although this was an important step forward, negotiations seemed to stall while both sides traded allegations of foot-dragging via an exchange of letters between US and Soviet negotiators in the editorial pages of the *New York Times*. Although the US never tabled the proposal formally, American officials stated through public channels their preference for the complete elimination of all INF and SRINF missiles world-wide. This proposal would make verification easier since the existence of even one missile would be a violation.

On 22 July, in an interview with the Indonesian press, Secretary General Gorbachev recognized the US concern on this issue and stated that the Soviet Union would be

willing to eliminate all INF and SRINF world-wide. Four unresolved issues then remained:

The time frame for dismantling of the missiles – the US wanted the Soviets to reduce down to the level of US missiles before they began to dismantle; the Soviets wanted both sides to dismantle on a proportional basis.

Verification – the US was demanding continuous on-site inspection of missile assembly plants.

Conversion or refitting – the US reserved the right to convert the Pershing II missiles into shorter-range Pershings and refit the ground-launched cruise missiles into sea-launched cruise missiles. The Soviets were unwilling to allow this.

The West German Pershing IA missiles – the Soviet Union insisted that the 72 Pershing IA missiles deployed in West Germany should be dismantled under the treaty because their warheads are controlled by the United States. The US maintained that the missiles are third-country missiles and therefore not affected by the treaty.

After the Gorbachev announcement US administration spokesmen stated that the US was willing to compromise on three of the four remaining issues. They began refining their verification demands and adjusting the timing provisions in their draft treaty. Because they were now working a global elimination of INF and SRINF, Pershing II missiles could no longer be converted to shorter-range missiles because the shorter-range missiles were now also banned.

By the end of July the key remaining issue was the question of the West German Pershing IA missiles. As in May, Soviet concessions put pressure on the West German coalition government

which had been divided on the issue. Pressure increased on 28 July when the US agreed that all missiles and launchers covered by the treaty would be destroyed and the Soviets agreed to a visit by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Washington in mid-September. In early August there were some hints from the chief Soviet negotiator Obukhov that the Soviets would consider a compromise which would involve formal US assurances that the West German Pershing missiles would not be replaced or modernized when they became obsolete in the early 1990s. However, on 6 August Foreign Minister Shevardnadze made a strong speech to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in which he made clear that these missiles were the only remaining obstacle to agreement and suggested there was no room for compromise. If the missiles really are third-country missiles, he suggested, then the West Germans must be in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On 26 August the *New York Times* reported that the US had offered a new verification plan to monitor an INF/SRINF accord. The plan would involve fewer intrusive on-site inspections. It also modified an earlier proposal that called for surprise inspections conducted on short notice. These "challenge" inspections would, under this latest proposal, be restricted to facilities which were known to house the medium- and shorter-range missiles. The *Times* cited senior American officials as saying that there were still difficult details to be negotiated on the verification issue.

Meanwhile, Chancellor Kohl announced on 26 August that the Federal Republic would get rid of its Pershing IA missiles on the condition that the United States and the Soviet Union agree, ratify and put into effect, an accord which would dismantle all their

medium- and short-range missiles. The Soviets reacted guardedly, expressing reservations about the "preconditions" that the West Germans had set for scrapping the missiles. Later TASS issued a more detailed report which described Chancellor Kohl's conditions without mentioning whether they were acceptable to the Soviet Union.

The next major event in the rapidly moving INF negotiations is the widely anticipated meeting between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz in Washington on 15 to 17 September. As this issue of *Peace & Security* goes to press, there is considerable speculation that the two foreign ministers will agree on the date for a late Autumn summit meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev – a summit where, it is presumed, a treaty on short- and medium-range missiles would be signed.

Comprehensive Test Ban

Early in June 1987, US administration officials revealed that the chief CTB negotiator for the Soviet Union, Andronik Petrosyants, had agreed in bilateral talks on the issue, that the US could use their on-site cable method (CORTEX) to measure Soviet nuclear tests. This would be part of a larger agreement on monitoring which would include both sides conducting a test on each others territory. Using CORTEX during Soviet tests has been a consistent US demand. However, the Soviets stated that they would only allow the US to use CORTEX if they agreed to begin talks on limiting the size and number of tests. The US position is that they will only begin such talks after additional monitoring has been agreed and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and Threshold Test Ban have been ratified by the US Senate. Talks between the Soviet Union and the US on the question of exchanging nuclear tests continued in mid-July.

On 9 June at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the socialist countries submitted a draft CTB treaty entitled "Basic

Provisions of a Treaty on the General and Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests." The draft treaty called for the creation of an institute of international inspectors along with an international seismic network and mandatory on-site inspection. The Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Affairs stated that although the treaty was for a comprehensive test ban they were willing to take US interests into account and negotiate a one-kiloton threshold and a limited number of tests.

Early Warning

Autumn	ABM Treaty Review Conference, Geneva
December	NATO meeting, Brussels

The agreement between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the private Washington-based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) on seismic monitoring has been renewed for another fourteen months. The agreement was originally signed in the summer of 1986 and allowed US scientists to set up seismic monitoring stations near the Soviet test site and Soviet scientists to do the same in the US. When the Soviet testing moratorium ended last February the US scientists were told that the seismic monitors would have to be turned off during Soviet tests. The new agreement will allow the scientists to monitor Soviet tests but the seismic stations will have to be moved to locations 600 miles away from the test site (approximately five times farther than their previous location).

On 1 September the *Associated Press* reported that an official of the Soviet Defence Ministry speaking in Washington invited the US to test a nuclear device on Soviet territory. The Soviets would expect in return to be permitted to explode their own weapon at the American test site. Exchange tests are intended to calibrate each side's test monitoring equipment and aid in the verification of a possible test ban treaty. The AP report said that

an official US response to the offer would wait until the Soviet proposal is presented at negotiations in Geneva.

Chemical Weapons

In a speech to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that the Soviet Union was willing to accept the "principle of mandatory challenge inspections without right of refusal." Mr. Shevardnadze also stated that the Soviet Union would invite nations

to inspect a secret Soviet chemical weapons facility at Shikhany. The Shikhany plant is considered to be the largest chemical weapons plant in the world. Western countries at the CD welcomed the invitation as a gesture of goodwill by the Soviets and stated that agreement to mandatory inspections was an important step forward. Negotiators continue to say that a chemical weapons treaty is possible in 1988.

Conventional Arms Reductions

Discussions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on a new mandate for negotiations on conventional arms and forces began in February 1987. On 10 July NATO submitted a proposal for a new forum for negotiating conventional arms reduction to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Previously, NATO countries had been unable to agree on a proposal. The French wanted all thirty-five nations of the CSCE, including neutral and non-aligned nations, to be included in the talks. The US had disagreed, saying that only members of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances should be involved.

A compromise was reached and NATO has proposed a two-tier format. The proposal suggests negotiations between all thirty-five nations on questions of verification, the exchange of military information and the observation of military exercises. Negotiations

on actual reductions of conventional arms and troops would take place between the two alliances. The ongoing discussions between the two alliances on the question of a new forum recessed at the end of July and will resume again in September.

Disarmament and Development Conference

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the fifteen members of the United Nations Security Council hold a summit meeting to discuss how money saved through disarmament could be spent on economic development. He further proposed that the UN create an international fund to hold savings which could be distributed to developing countries. The suggestion came on 25 August in the form of a message read by Vladimir Petrovsky, a Soviet deputy minister, to the United Nations International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The US State Department rejected the Soviet proposal on the basis that disarmament and Third World development are not related issues. The US did not attend the conference.

Canadian External Affairs Minister, Joe Clark addressed the opening session of the International Conference. While he endorsed the goals of arms reductions and increased aid to developing countries he was also skeptical about the usefulness of the proposed international development fund. Mr. Clark told a press conference (*Canadian Press*, 25 August) before his address to the UN that the new fund "would not mean new funds for development... it would mean new bureaucrats for development." Mr. Clark told the Conference, "We must understand why governments spend on arms, and understand also that there is simply no evidence, no reason to believe, that governments are likely to disarm at the expense of what they consider their security in order to divert funds to development." □

- JANE BOULDEN

DEFENCE NOTES



NDP Defence Policy

On 31 July the New Democratic Party presented its response to the Government's White Paper on Defence. The NDP agreed with the White Paper that a "commitment-capability gap" exists and also came out strongly in favour of revitalizing the navy. As expected, however, there were substantial differences on other issues.

While the White Paper placed a great deal of emphasis on Canada's role in Europe, the NDP stated that "Canada can now make a more effective contribution to peace and security outside of NATO." The stationing of Canadian forces there is "no longer militarily significant." Instead Canadian troops should be brought home, upgraded and equipped for air transport so that they can respond "quickly and effectively." The NDP statement does not make clear the circumstances in which this mobile force would be used.

In the view of the NDP Canada should refuse to allow testing of US cruise missiles in Canada, terminate the use of Canadian territory for low-level flying exercises by the air forces of NATO allies, forbid the use of Canadian territory as a base for any element of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and decline participation in SDI or the US Air Defense Initiative (ADI).

Although the NDP advocates withdrawing from NORAD they suggest that Canada should negotiate a new agreement with the US that would apparently have the same purpose but under which Canada would assume full responsibility for "the conventional defence of its portion of the northern half of North America." This would involve "controlling" the new North Warning System (it is already

agreed that Canadians will operate the stations, it is not clear whether this means the NDP would have Canada buy the stations from the US, control the information they generate, or both). The North Warning System would then be supplemented by "Canadian-controlled" airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS) and CF-18s.

According to the NDP, the navy should have a second batch of patrol frigates and a third should be considered. New anti-submarine helicopters should be purchased along with new long-range patrol aircraft and minesweepers. In the Arctic, fixed sensors should be combined with icebreakers and aircraft to provide surveillance. Instead of the nuclear submarines proposed by the Government the NDP statement suggests that twelve state-of-the-art conventionally-powered submarines could provide adequate monitoring of any possible intruder at the Arctic "choke points."

White Paper Implementation Schedule

In an interview with David Cox, the Institute's former Director of Research, for an article in the October issue of *Canadian Business Review*, Perrin Beatty, the Minister of National Defence, indicated that a decision on the type of nuclear submarine will be made later this year or early next; a decision on the prime contractor will be made within the following twelve months.

In principle, the CAST (Canadian air-sea transportable) brigade commitment to Norway remains in place until a replacement unit is found. The Minister said that NATO is expecting to receive a recommendation on a replacement for the brigade by the end of this year.

Reduced Service Life for the CF-18s?

The service life of Canada's CF-18 fighter aircraft is being questioned according to an article

in 17 August *Aviation Week and Space Technology*. The article reports that data gathered from the testing of one aircraft indicates that there are structural problems with the "aft wing attachment bulkhead." This component acts to counteract stresses borne by the wings during aircraft operation. In the worst-case scenario this problem could reduce the useful life of the aircraft by about one-third or from twenty years to twelve. In addition, the article says that turbine and compressor fan blades in the aircrafts' engines will have to

be replaced as much as twenty percent earlier than expected. The article says senior DND officials have called the tests and resulting estimates "entirely theoretical and premature at best."

A *Canadian Press* report of 18 August cites a senior officer from Air Command in Winnipeg as saying that CF-18 pilots have been instructed to fly the planes with restraint in order to extend the life of the aircraft. These instructions, the report continued, were part of the regular maintenance guidelines and not the result of tests

ALLIANCE NEWS

Ministers Meeting

The Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council took place at Reykjavik on the 11-12 June. The statement arising from the meeting noted the possibility of real progress being made in the condition of East-West relations, and in arms control in particular. The Ministers reiterated their wish to see all Soviet and US long-range INF missiles eliminated and supported elimination of short-range INF (500-1000 km) missiles as an integral part of an INF agreement. The communiqué stated that an effectively verifiable INF agreement of this nature would be considered an important element in "a coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament." Other elements of a broader arms control agreement would include a fifty percent reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the US and the Soviet Union, global elimination of chemical weapons, and the establishment of "stable and secure levels of conventional forces" in Europe.

Carrington Retires

NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington, has announced he will be stepping down from his post in June 1988. Carrington has held the position since 1984. To date, two candidates have been officially nominated for the position by their respective governments: former Norwegian Prime Minister Kaare Willoch, and West German Defence Minister Manfred Wörner. The *New York Times* reported (2 July) that Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans has also been suggested as a possible candidate.

The article noted the apparent limitation on choices the Alliance has in choosing Carrington's replacement. Continuing tensions between Greece and Turkey precludes either nation accepting a citizen of the other, and the fact that Britain and the Netherlands have each provided two Secretaries-General in the past makes it difficult for them to nominate another.

New Military Head of NATO Takes Command

US Army General John R. Galvin assumed command from General Bernard W. Rogers as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) on 26 June. General Rogers held the post for eight years. General Galvin comes to SACEUR from his post as Chief of the US

noted in the *Aviation Week* story. The officer in charge of the programme to acquire CF-18s told *Canadian Press* that doubts raised by *Aviation Week* were, "literally shots in the dark... We're not going to cancel the order because of this."

Security Fears and Technology Transfer

Recent improvements in Soviet submarine-building technology have led to renewed American concern about the effect on US and NATO security of technology transfers to the East bloc. This concern was raised by a Pentagon report which describes the Soviet's ability to build improved propellers. These make their submarines significantly quieter and more dif-

ficult to track. The fact that the Soviets are now building such propellers has been attributed by intelligence officials to the sale to the Soviet Union of milling machines built by Japan's Toshiba Machine Co. The *New York Times* reported on 12 June that the US Navy has estimated the cost of overcoming this Soviet advance in submarine technology to be in excess of \$1 billion.

Toshiba made two sales to the Soviets, the first in 1981 and the second in 1984-85. Both violated restrictions of the Coordinating Committee for Export Controls (COCOM) on the sale of such machinery to communist countries. COCOM, which is based in Paris, oversees technology exports by NATO countries and Japan to the

East bloc. Also involved in these shipments was Norway's Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk (KV) which delivered control systems to Toshiba to be incorporated into the milling machines.

According to the *New York Times* of 30 June, US Defense Secretary Weinberger met with Japanese officials in late June and it was agreed that the US and Japan would upgrade their efforts in anti-submarine warfare in order to overcome the impact of this breach in technology security. The Norwegian and Japanese governments have pledged to tighten their export inspection procedures.

Canada and Star Wars

Reports by CP and the *Ottawa Citizen* (14 July) that Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) received an SDI-related contract in the fall of 1986 raised once again the question of Canadian involvement in SDI research. The US \$200,000 contract from the Los Alamos National Laboratory is for particle beam research, one of the exotic technologies being examined by the American SDI researchers. AECL (a crown corporation) claims the research is not directly related to Star Wars and is similar to research AECL has been carrying out on its own for over twenty years.

Critics of the AECL contract recalled Prime Minister Mulroney's September 1985 decision not to engage in government-to-government research in support of SDI. In an editorial on 17 July, *The Toronto Star* contended that the AECL case points out the need for clear guidelines as to how agencies which operate at arms-length from the government should deal with SDI contracts. The *Ottawa Citizen* of 16 July added that the case also illustrates the quandary of dealing with research which has military and non-military applications.

Defence Research at Canadian Universities

On instructions handed down by the federal Cabinet in the summer of 1986, the Department of National Defence (DND) has stepped up its funding of university-

based research. The *Globe and Mail* of 2 July reported that twenty-eight universities have signed contracts for a total of more than a hundred defence projects in the past two years. The top recipient of DND money has been the University of Toronto. Despite recent increases, DND sponsored work is still a small portion of total university research.

While this research does not appear to be a major issue on Canadian campuses, some students and professors are uneasy with particular DND projects. At McGill University in Montreal, work on fuel-air explosives led to student protest in March. The *Montreal Gazette* of 17 March reported that the Board of Governors of the university responded by reviewing the guidelines covering such defence-related activities.

Changes in Soviet High Command

One result of the 28 May landing of a West German Cessna airplane on Red Square in Moscow was a major shake-up in the Soviet military high command. Two senior officers were replaced – Defence Minister Marshall Sergei Sokolov, and Air Defence Forces Chief Marshall Alexander Koldunov. According to *Jane's Defence Weekly* (13 June), the Soviet Politburo is holding the officers directly responsible for the incident. Replacing Sokolov as Defence Minister was General Dimitri Yazov – he most recently held the position of Deputy Defence Minister responsible for personnel and cadres. He is now a non-voting member of the Politburo. Koldunov was replaced by General Ivan Tretyak. Tretyak formerly commanded the Soviet Far Eastern forces and was made a Deputy Minister of Defence in August, 1986. A third related change occurred recently with the replacement of Marshall A. Konstantinov, Chief of Moscow Air Defence District, by Colonel-General V.G. Tsarkov. It is not certain, however, whether this change took place before or after the Cessna incident. □

Southern Command based in Panama. General Galvin was quoted in the *Washington Post* (31 July) as saying he had little reservation about the on-going INF arms control talks and the possibility of an agreement: "There is no reluctance on my part in accepting the changes in the nuclear face-off in Europe. NATO's strategy of flexible response will still be valid, however, the means to implement NATO strategy will require buttressing. Otherwise there will be a higher risk than we in the West should accept." The same article noted that General Rogers was harshly critical of a potential INF agreement and claimed this issue led to Rogers being replaced.


Persian Gulf

As the US commitment to protect merchant ships in the Persian Gulf region grew over the summer, the Americans, according to *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (6 June) began to approach their NATO allies for military assistance in the region. By the end of July the US had made formal requests to the governments of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands for the purpose of increasing minesweeping abilities in and around the Gulf. As reported in the *New York Times* (5 August), all those asked denied the original request. They did not, however, preclude the possibility of providing either direct or indirect assistance at some point in the future.

The US was by no means left alone in providing a Western military presence in the area. The British have permanently stationed the "Armillar Patrol" consisting of two frigates, one destroyer and one support ship in the region. And the French have had five warships assigned to the region since an attack by Iranian gunboats on the French merchant ship, *Ville D'Anvers* on 13 July. Both forces have the task of accompanying their nationally-registered merchant ships through the region. The West Germans are restricted constitutionally to use their armed forces for national defence purposes only; thus their participation in operations in the Gulf region itself was not a consideration.

However, on 11 August both Britain and France reversed their initial decisions and began preparations for sending reinforcements – including minesweepers – to the area. The *New York Times* meanwhile reported (5 August) that the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands considered the possibility of increasing their European regional naval commitments to allow the US greater flexibility in re-deploying its own ships.

REVIEWS



Managing Nuclear Operations

Ashton B. Carter,
John D. Steinbruner, and
Charles A. Zraket, editors

Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1987, 751 pgs. US \$18.95 paper

Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy

Morton H. Halperin.

Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger/Harper
and Row, 1987, 173 pgs. US \$19.95 cloth

Managing Nuclear Operations, edited by Harvard's Ashton Carter, John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution, and Charles Zraket of the MITRE corporation, is a landmark study which builds on the important earlier work of Desmond Ball, Bruce Blair and Paul Bracken on nuclear command and control. Although the basic message of the book is similar to these earlier studies: there are serious deficiencies in the organizational, operational, and military command structures of the United States' nuclear forces and the risks of inadvertent or accidental war in a major crisis if those forces were placed on full alert is considerable; it contains a wealth of information and detail that is new. In part, the reason for this is that the book contains contributions by former Defense Department officials and policy planners who had first-hand experience with, and in some instances were directly responsible for, US nuclear operations.

Some of the most interesting and useful essays in the volume are by Paul Bracken on "War Termination" (a much-neglected issue), Russell E. Dougherty on "The Psychological Climate of Nuclear Command" (an insider's account of the pressures and constraints on decision-makers), a conceptually

useful chapter on the "Sources of Error and Uncertainty" by Ashton Carter (which builds on some of the important insights of sociologist Charles Perrow on the kinds of synergisms which magnify failure in complex organizations), and a well-researched piece on "Soviet Nuclear Operations" by MIT's Stephen Meyer. One notable omission in this otherwise exhaustive study is the lack of detailed consideration of nuclear operations at sea, including operations by US surface ships carrying sea-launched cruise missiles. There is a growing consensus in the strategic studies community that the risks of escalation at sea are probably greatest because these weapons are not subject to the same strict technical controls as land- or air-based forces.

It must also be said that this is a book which is written by and for the specialist. And it is a book which, given its length, is not digestible in one – or for that matter several – sittings. As primers go, Desmond Ball's *Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?* (Aelphi Paper No. 169 published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in 1981), is still the best introduction to the subject.

Morton Halperin's *Nuclear Fallacy*, by contrast, is a lively and entirely approachable critique of US nuclear weapons policies. Halperin is a former Pentagon official who was one of the first civilians to glean some details about the SIOP (the single integrated operational plan which is prepared by the Pentagon in utmost secrecy and contains the list of targeting options an American president would have in the event of nuclear war). He subsequently worked for the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger.

Halperin believes that there are far too many nuclear weapons lying around and that it is time to put them, quite literally, back into the basement. Several years ago, this view was labelled by McGeorge Bundy as the "existential" or

"minimalist" view of deterrence wherein only a few hundred nuclear weapons are necessary to maintain a credible deterrent. Halperin believes that there is an increasingly dangerous tendency on the part of the military to view nuclear devices as ordinary weapons and that war-fighting doctrines and concepts of "escalation dominance," "escalation control," or "war termination" are worrying manifestations of this trend.

But Halperin carries the argument an intriguing step further. He argues that nuclear weapons have not helped in superpower crises and that every major confrontation between the superpowers since 1947 was resolved by negotiation and conventional military strength. Halperin also makes the case for an operational no-first-use policy which would eliminate nuclear weapons from Europe and from US forces (like ships and aircraft carriers) around the world. He also suggests that the United States create a special military command for its few remaining nuclear weapons that would be modelled much along the lines of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Force (an independent organization from the rest of the military). This would effectively take nuclear weapons out of the hands of the armed services and establish independent lines of control to civilian authorities. In some respects, this would represent a return to the situation in the late 1940s when US nuclear weapons were kept under the lock and key of the Atomic Energy Commission and could only be released to the military on direct orders from the president.

Halperin believes that the current mix of nuclear and conventional forces is dangerous for crisis stability and increases the risks of nuclear escalation and accidents. There is certainly ample justification for this view in the above-mentioned Brookings study. As recent developments in the intermediate-range nuclear talks in Europe suggest, however, reductions or the elimination of certain

classes of nuclear weapons, must proceed in tandem with conventional forces arms control. Over the years, nuclear weapons have become a substitute for improvements in conventional forces and capabilities – an insurance policy intended to provide reassurance to the NATO allies. Although the policy has become somewhat threadbare in recent years, persisting doubts about the state of the "conventional balance" will have to be addressed either through conventional force improvements, or arms control, or some combination of the two. Alas, Halperin fails to give these issues the considered attention they deserve.

As the United States continues its naval build-up in the Persian Gulf, one wonders whether the task force is equipped with nuclear weapons. There is no way of knowing because these are tightly kept secrets. But Halperin is right to raise the kinds of questions he does about precisely this kind of military operation or policing exercise which is fraught with risks of military confrontation. There is little doubt that the provocative ideas in this short volume merit further study by policymakers and members of the interested public alike.

– Fen Osler Hampson

Mr. Hampson is a research associate at the Institute and teaches international affairs at Carleton University.

Psychology and Deterrence

Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, 270 pgs. US \$28.50 cloth

This book contains a very sophisticated and comprehensive attack on deterrence which Jervis, Lebow and Stein argue is flawed as a theory of international relations and highly unpredictable and risky as an instrument of foreign policy. Although it has all the appeal of an abstract deductive theory which allows for elegant and parsimonious explanations, deterrence theory in its present

form is both incomplete and inaccurate, particularly in its core axiom that rational criteria govern policy evaluation and choice.

What gives this work such penetrating insight is the systematic application of theories of psychology to the analysis of a variety of historical conflict situations in which deterrence considerations figured prominently. The authors demonstrate how calculations of deterrence are much more inner-directed, in the sense of being influenced by decision-makers' psychological biases and beliefs and by domestic political constraints, rather than being exclusively determined by the assessment of the commitment and capability of one's adversary, as existing deterrence theory would have it.

The historical record of deterrence miscalculations is uncomfortably rich, although not all errors have necessarily led to an escalation of international conflict as they often reinforce the natural inclination of decision-makers toward caution. Stein offers a particularly thorough and fascinating analysis of deterrence outcomes in Egyptian-Israeli relations between 1969 and 1973. She finds that on at least two occasions the strategy failed even though all of the objective conditions of deterrence had been met by the defender. In 1969, this failure was largely attributable to insufficient weight being given to the interests of the opposing party, while in 1973 perceptions of the political costs of inaction came to dominate the challenger's legitimate fears of his military inferiority.

In contrast to the prevailing political view which regards deterrence as the 'only show in town,' the authors treat it as a useful strategy only when it is applied to buy time to address grievances and frustrations. The preferred approach, as they see it, would be a mixed strategy which supplements the punitive measures of deterrence with the more positive attributes of reassurance. Having done much to undermine confidence in deterrence theory as it has been developed, the authors might have wished to give some indication whether a reconstructed theory of deterrence is at all pos-

sible and what would be its format. Although some of the historical interpretations contained in the book might be challenged – Lebow's treatment of the Falklands war as a breakdown of deterrence may be questioned on the grounds that British negligence and excessive caution prevented the creation of an effective deterrence strategy by the defender – one cannot escape the persuasive and powerful impact of this study.

– *Harald von Riekhoff*

Mr. von Riekhoff is Professor of Political Science at Carleton University and a CIIPS Research Fellow.

Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled Gordon K. Lewis

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, 239 pages, US \$25.00 cloth

It is not yet possible for any West Indian to write dispassionately, or in a non-partisan fashion about the Grenada crisis of 1983. Gordon Lewis, British by birth, West Indian by passion and a democratic socialist by political persuasion has recently added his own contribution to the debate on the events in Grenada. As one of the grand old men of West Indian history, he brings a formidable artillery of intellectual skills and a profound knowledge of Caribbean society to bear on the subject; as a convinced socialist he has produced in this book one of the better argued left-wing critiques of the failure of the revolution and the intervention; and in the chapter entitled "Lessons for the Caribbean Left" he has drawn several unusually pragmatic conclusions about democracy in the Caribbean from the collapse of the Grenada experiment.

But running right through this book is also the rage of the Caribbean nationalist who saw in 1983 both an island jewel and a dream of independence despoiled. The fury he unleashes at the United States and the collaborating elites of the other OECS (Organization of Eastern Caribbean States) countries threatens to overwhelm with invective and rhetoric what is otherwise a masterful account of the tragedy of Grenada. For example, he calls the chapter on the American intervention "The Empire Strikes Back."

This book may therefore be read in two ways: first as a well documented and researched account of the Grenada issue from a socialist perspective; and second as an account of a tragedy from which the author is as yet unable to distance himself.

Not surprisingly the chapters that are most readable are those that are the most historical and the least rhetorical. The descriptions of the ideological debates and the ideological naivete of the Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG), the political counterpoint between Prime Minister Bishop and his Finance Minister Bernard Courd and the relationship between the ultra-left faction and the military, place the events of 1983 within a convincing context. Lewis argues that the betrayal of the revolution was not "Victorian hero and villain melodrama, for all of the leading actors, starting with Bishop and Courd (were) . . . caught up in an awful current of events over which ultimately they (had) no control so that . . . the observer rather than allocating blame, can only perhaps feel pity and compassion."

But the sensitivity with which he describes the weakness of the revolution disappears almost completely when he describes the role of the OECS in facilitating the American intervention. There is no sympathy here for the panic that the events in Grenada created in the other countries of the Eastern Caribbean. He has no time for the concerns of the leaders of the OECS about the demonstration effects of a coup by Courd nor for the anger of their constituencies at what they saw as principally a question of murder of the Prime Minister and some of his cabinet. And in the attempt to argue that there were other options to intervention he gives far too much credence to "alternatives" proposed by Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana at the contentious Caribbean Community (CARICOM) summit held just before the intervention. Negotiations with a regime that had shot itself into power was as undesirable to many of the Caribbean countries as intervention by an external power. The difference was that intervention by

the US was likely to be quicker and more successful in bringing criminals to justice. That perspective is surely worthy of more subtle analysis than a dismissive polemic against culturally colonised elites.

And yet with all its flaws this book has described in the author's words both the dark and the bright side of the moon – "for any account of the Grenada Revolution must end by remembering it and its achievement in mobilizing a mass enthusiasm for revolution in the Caribbean that no country save Cuba has managed to do." He has paid the Grenada revolution the compliment of taking it seriously, and brought valuable perspective (admittedly marred by his personal disappointment) to the study of the events of 1983. – *Fauzaya Moore*
Ms. Moore is a grants officer at the Institute.

BRIEFLY NOTED

Canada and Common Security: The Assertion of Sanity

George Ignatieff,
Leonard V. Johnson *et al*
Ottawa: The Group of 78, 1987, 88 pgs., \$10 paper

The Group of 78 is an energetic NGO which aims to influence the process of foreign policy-making in Canada. This slim volume is a collection of twenty-nine short essays about various aspects of international affairs and Canada's defence and foreign policies.

Ordering the Oceans: The Making of the Law of the Sea Clyde Sanger

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987, 225 pgs., \$14.95 paper/\$30.00 cloth

The process of creating the Law of the Sea was a major exercise in what political scientists call 'international institution building'. *Ordering the Oceans* explores the myriad complex issues that confronted the negotiators through the fifteen years of meeting and bargaining which culminated in 1982 in the Law of the Sea Convention. □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* 'Livres' section.

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



During the first week in September, CIIPS and the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR organized a symposium in Moscow on issues of international peace and security. The Canadians who took part were: **Timothy Colton**, Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto; **John Holmes**, Counsellor with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; **Robert Matthews**, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto; **Geoffrey Pearson**, Executive Director of CIIPS; **Ernest Regehr**, Director of Research at Project Ploughshares and Conrad Grebel College; **Bernard Wood**, Executive Director of the North/South Institute. The symposium was the first step in a developing relationship between the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow, and CIIPS. Soviet academics will visit Canada in the spring of 1988.

Subjects discussed at the symposium included the prevention of nuclear war, arms control and disarmament, regional conflicts, the international system, the global economy and humanitarian questions.

David Cox was one of three Canadians making presentations at the second Harvard Nordic Conference in Iceland, August 7 to 10. Also making presentations were **Robert Fowler**, Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence, and Professor **Franklyn Griffiths** of the University of Toronto. Canadian naval policy in the Arctic was the subject of considerable interest in a context where participants from Scandinavia and North America discussed the increasing

military significance of the High North, and the responses of the Northern countries to this change.

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs organized a Round Table Seminar on Canadian and Nordic Approaches and Policies towards Arctic Security and Co-operation in Helsinki September 1 and 2. Included in the CIIPS delegation were: **David Cox**, Director of Research; **Harriet Critchley**, of the University of Calgary; **John Merritt**, of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee; **Geoffrey Pearson**; **Ron Purver**, Research Associate at CIIPS. Representatives from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden participated in discussions of papers on the following topics: national security policies and Arctic developments, prospects for arms control and confidence building in the Arctic, prospects for regional co-operation in the Arctic.

David Cox left his position as Director of Research at the Institute in September in order to return to

Queen's University as Professor of Political Studies. **Jane Bouden**, a Research Assistant since the summer of 1985, will begin studies in the fall towards a Masters Degree in International Relations at Queen's. **Michael Tucker**, a Fellow at the Institute last year, has returned to Mount Allison University in Sackville, N.B.

Roger Hill assumed the position of Director of Research in September. He came to the Institute from the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, where he was Deputy Director. **Michael Holmes** joined the staff of the Institute in August as a Research Assistant. Mr. Holmes, who studied at the University of Alberta and at Dalhousie, has most recently worked as an economist for the Government of Alberta. **Carl Jacobsen**, a Canadian who has been working for the past three years with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has returned to Canada to take up a joint appointment with the Institute and Carleton University. Mr. Jacobsen will be a

Research Associate at CIIPS, specializing in East/West relations. **Robert Mitchell**, a Colonel in the Canadian Armed Forces, is a Research Fellow at the Institute for the next year. He is a career artillery officer whose last post was with Mobile Command Headquarters in St. Hubert, Quebec.

The Commonwealth Conference for Young Leaders took place in Ottawa, September 6 to 12. Eighty young people (ages 25-35) from forty Commonwealth countries met on Parliament Hill and in the Gatineau Hills and discussed leadership, foreign affairs, peace and security. The programme focussed on leadership development, cross-cultural communication, the resolution of conflict and the potential for private and public sector co-operation towards economic and social development. Ideas generated by the group were sent to the Commonwealth Heads of Government prior to their Summit in Vancouver in October. Major sponsors of the Conference were the Royal Commonwealth Society in Ottawa, CIIPS, the Paterson Centre for International Programs, CIDA, and Magna International. Speakers included: **Sonja Bata**, Rt. Hon. **Joe Clark**, **Ernest Corea**, **John Harker**, **Gerald Helleiner**, **Huguette Labelle**, **Robert Moore**, **Indar Rikhye**, **Michael Rosberg**, **Archbishop Edward Scott**, **John Sigler**, **Frank Stronach** and **Maurice Strong**.

On 8 September **Geoffrey Pearson** visited and gave a lecture on new conceptions of international security to the Polish Institute for International Affairs in Warsaw. At the end of the month he spoke to the Project Ploughshares group in Calgary, and in Ottawa, to the Ontario Advisory Council on Multiculturalism and Citizenship. □

New Publications from the Institute

SECOND ANNUAL GUIDE

A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1986-87, 270 pages.

CONFERENCE REPORT

4. Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean: Perspectives to the Year 2000, Proceedings of a Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 22-25 March 1987, by Lloyd Searwar.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

14. The Stockholm Agreement: An Exercise in Confidence Building, by C.A. Namiesniowski, August 1987.

15. Peacekeeping and the Management of International Conflict, by Henry Wiseman, September 1987.

WORKING PAPER

4. Conference on Militarization in the Third World, papers by Paul Rogers, Michael Klare and Dan O'Meara presented at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, January 1987.

Also available is the **CIIPS Annual Report for 1986-87**.

*Canadian Institute for
International Peace and Security*
307 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K2P 0P7

Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5V1

Scholarships Awarded

The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security recently awarded seven scholarships of a total value of \$120,000 to Canadians who wish to further their studies in the subject areas of international peace and secu-

urity. The scholarships are awarded annually as part of the CIIPS Awards Programme.

The seven award holders come from different disciplines and will pursue a variety of studies.

Walter Dorn will study aspects of control and verification of chemical and biological weapons. He will study under the aegis of the University of Toronto and conduct part of his research in Sweden.

Allan Hertz will prepare a manuscript on the history of legal dimensions of international peace and security. He will carry out this work at the University of Toronto.

Kevin Leppmann will begin studies towards a doctorate in political science with special emphasis on the social psychology of international conflict theory. He will study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Doug Mohr will pursue studies at the University of Waterloo on the social psychology of activism in international peace and security.

James Rochlin will continue his doctoral work on Central America at the University of Alberta, and will conduct research in Central America.

Erika Simpson will attend the Institute of Peace Studies at Cornell University and subsequently Philipps Universität, Federal Republic of Germany. She will study issues of alternative defence.

Brian Stevenson will pursue research on Central America at Queen's University and in Mexico.

Deadlines

year instead of four times as is currently the case. Please note the following deadlines:

er 1987 decision

1988 decision

ision

id Disarmament, Ottawa	\$10,000
vention	
mswick, Fredericton	10,000
al Terrorism	
Calgary	6,000
s, Toronto	9,500
udies, London	8,500
ie Western Allies	
l Consultants and	10,000
ork University, Toronto	
Canada's National Security Interests in the Pacific	
Timothy M. Shaw, Dalhousie University, Halifax	8,000
Liberation, Security and Development in Southern Africa	
TOTAL	\$62,000

PUBLIC PROGRAMMES GRANTS - First Quarter 1987-88

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa	\$ 5,500
Public Speaking Programme	
Canadian Disarmament Information Service (CANDIS), Toronto	6,000
PEACE Magazine	
Carleton University, Ottawa	4,500
Lecture series "Social Psychological Contributions to the Understanding and Resolution of Conflict"	
Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe (CIDMAA), Montréal	5,000
Séminaire Namibie et Angola, la guerre oubliée en Afrique australe	
Cinefort Inc., Montréal	6,500
Film "An Unholy Alliance: Low Intensity Warfare and Humanitarian Aid"	
Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa	10,000
Forum Magazine	
Educating for Peace, Ottawa	6,000
Teacher In-Service Training Project	
Educators for Peace, Torbay, Nfld.	3,000
Infusion Technique Workshops (October 18-24, 1987)	
Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Ottawa	10,000
Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone	
NGO Committee on Disarmament, New York	2,000
Publication of <i>Disarmament Times</i>	
Operation Dismantle and The Foundation for Global Peace, Ottawa	5,000
Publication of syndicated column "The Peace Race"	
Project Ploughshares, Corner Brook, Nfld.	4,000
Conference "Canada and the Arms Race: Is Atlantic Canada Concerned" (October 30 - November 1, 1987)	
Project Ploughshares, Waterloo	5,000
Conference "Common Security and Defence Alternatives" (September 18-19, 1987)	
University of Manitoba, Continuing Education Division, Winnipeg	2,000
Lecture/discussion series "Perspective on Conflict and Peace" (October - November 1987)	
University of Toronto, Emmanuel College, Toronto	3,000
Symposium "Theology and Peace" (November 6-7, 1987)	
TOTAL	\$77,500



During the first week in September, CIIPS and the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR organized a symposium in Moscow on issues of international peace and security. The Canadians who took part were: **Timothy Colton**, Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto; **John Holmes**, Counsellor with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; **Robert Matthews**, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto; **Geoffrey Pearson**, Executive Director of CIIPS; **Ernest Regehr**, Director of Research at Project Ploughshares and Conrad Grebel College; **Bernard Wood**, Executive Director of the North/South Institute. The symposium was the first step in a developing relationship between the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow, and CIIPS. Soviet academics will visit Canada in the spring of 1988.

Subjects discussed at the symposium included the prevention of nuclear war, arms control and disarmament, regional conflicts, the international system, the global economy and humanitarian questions.

David Cox was one of three Canadians making presentations at the second Harvard Nordic Conference in Iceland, August 7 to 10. Also making presentations were **Robert Fowler**, Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence, and Professor **Franklyn Griffiths** of the University of Toronto. Canadian naval policy in the Arctic was the subject of considerable interest in a context where participants from Scandinavia and North America discussed the increasing

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tives from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden participated in discussions of papers on the following topics: national security policies and Arctic developments, prospects for arms control and confidence building in the Arctic, prospects for regional co-operation in the Arctic.

David Cox left his position as Director of Research at the Institute in September in order to return to

research assistant. **Mr. Holmes**, who studied at the University of Alberta and at Dalhousie, has most recently worked as an economist for the Government of Alberta. **Carl Jacobsen**, a Canadian who has been working for the past three years with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has returned to Canada to take up a joint appointment with the Institute and Carleton University. Mr. Jacobsen will be a

and security. The programme focussed on leadership development, cross-cultural communication, the resolution of conflict and the potential for private and public sector co-operation towards economic and social development. Ideas generated by the group were sent to the Commonwealth Heads of Government prior to their Summit in Vancouver in October. Major sponsors of the Conference were the Royal Commonwealth Society in Ottawa, CIIPS, the Paterson Centre for International Programs, CIDA, and Magna International. Speakers included: **Sonja Bata**, Rt. Hon. **Joe Clark**, **Ernest Corea**, **John Harker**, **Gerald Helleiner**, **Huguette Labelle**, **Robert Moore**, **Indar Rikhye**, **Michael Rosberg**, **Archbishop Edward Scott**, **John Sigler**, **Frank Stronach** and **Maurice Strong**.

On 8 September **Geoffrey Pearson** visited and gave a lecture on new conceptions of international security to the Polish Institute for International Affairs in Warsaw. At the end of the month he spoke to the Project Ploughshares group in Calgary, and in Ottawa, to the Ontario Advisory Council on Multiculturalism and Citizenship. □

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Background Paper				
Points of View				
Other?				

New Publications from the Institute

SECOND ANNUAL GUIDE

A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1986-87, 270 pages.

CONFERENCE REPORT

4. Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean: Perspectives to the Year 2000, Proceedings of a Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 22-25 March 1987, by Lloyd Searwar.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

14. The Stockholm Agreement: An Exercise in Confidence Building, by C.A. Namiesniowski, August 1987.

15. Peacekeeping and the Management of International Conflict, by Henry Wiseman, September 1987.

WORKING PAPER

4. Conference on Militarization in the Third World, papers by Paul Rogers, Michael Klare and Dan O'Meara presented at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, January 1987.

Also available is the **CIIPS Annual Report for 1986-87**.

CIIPS Awards Programme

The Institute invites applications for the CIIPS Awards Programme, which is now in its second year. The programme is open to both academics and non-academics who wish to enter or continue their work in the field of international peace and security. The programme is intended to encourage expertise and scholarship in questions of international peace and security and to develop contacts with the international community by supporting Canadians who wish to pursue their studies at institutions abroad, or exceptionally, in Canada.

Applicants must be Canadian citizens and hold at minimum a first degree or equivalent experience in order to apply.

The Institute has set aside \$120,000 to award seven scholarships; two of which will be valued at a maximum of \$25,000 and five at a maximum of \$14,000. Applications will be assessed by an independent selection committee and decisions will be announced in May 1988.

The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada administers the programme on behalf of the Institute. The deadline for applications for the 1987-88 academic year is 1 February 1988.

For further information and application forms please write to:

The Awards Division
Association of
Universities and
Colleges of Canada
151 Slater Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5V1

Scholarships Awarded

The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security recently awarded seven scholarships of a total value of \$120,000 to Canadians who wish to further their studies in the subject areas of international peace and secu-

urity. The scholarships are awarded annually as part of the CIIPS Awards Programme.

The seven award holders come from different disciplines and will pursue a variety of studies.

Walter Dorn will study aspects of control and verification of chemical and biological weapons. He will study under the aegis of the University of Toronto and conduct part of his research in Sweden.

Allan Hertz will prepare a manuscript on the history of legal dimensions of international peace and security. He will carry out this work at the University of Toronto.

Kevin Leppmann will begin studies towards a doctorate in political science with special emphasis on the social psychology of international conflict theory. He will study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Doug Mohr will pursue studies at the University of Waterloo on the social psychology of activism in international peace and security.

James Rochlin will continue his doctoral work on Central America at the University of Alberta, and will conduct research in Central America.

Erika Simpson will attend the Institute of Peace Studies at Cornell University and subsequently Philipps Universität, Federal Republic of Germany. She will study issues of alternative defence.

Brian Stevenson will pursue research on Central America at Queen's University and in Mexico.

1988 Grants Procedures and Deadlines

Beginning in January 1988 the Institute will make decisions on and allocate grants twice a year instead of four times as is currently the case. Please note the following deadlines:

6 November 1987 for a December 1987 decision

31 December 1987 for a March 1988 decision

30 June for an October 1988 decision

RESEARCH GRANTS -

First Quarter 1987-88

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament , Ottawa Implementing a Chemical Weapons Convention	\$10,000
David Charters , University of New Brunswick, Fredericton The Democratic Response to International Terrorism	10,000
Harold Coward , University of Calgary, Calgary Civilization and Rapid Climate Change	6,000
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies , Toronto Static Analysis of Combat Power	9,500
International Institute for Strategic Studies , London The Cyprus Dispute and Its Impact on the Western Allies	8,500
Robert Reford , Reford-McCandless Int'l Consultants and York University, Toronto Canada's National Security Interests in the Pacific	10,000
Timothy M. Shaw , Dalhousie University, Halifax Liberation, Security and Development in Southern Africa	8,000
TOTAL	\$62,000

PUBLIC PROGRAMMES GRANTS -

First Quarter 1987-88

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament , Ottawa Public Speaking Programme	\$ 5,500
Canadian Disarmament Information Service (CANDIS) , Toronto PEACE Magazine	6,000
Carleton University , Ottawa Lecture series "Social Psychological Contributions to the Understanding and Resolution of Conflict"	4,500
Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe (CIDMAA) , Montréal Séminaire Namibie et Angola, la guerre oubliée en Afrique australe	5,000
Cinefort Inc. , Montréal Film "An Unholy Alliance: Low Intensity Warfare and Humanitarian Aid"	6,500
Conference of Defence Associations , Ottawa Forum Magazine	10,000
Educating for Peace , Ottawa Teacher In-Service Training Project	6,000
Educators for Peace , Torbay, Nfld. Infusion Technique Workshops (October 18-24, 1987)	3,000
Inuit Circumpolar Conference , Ottawa Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone	10,000
NGO Committee on Disarmament , New York Publication of <i>Disarmament Times</i>	2,000
Operation Dismantle and The Foundation for Global Peace , Ottawa Publication of syndicated column "The Peace Race"	5,000
Project Ploughshares , Corner Brook, Nfld. Conference "Canada and the Arms Race: Is Atlantic Canada Concerned?" (October 30 - November 1, 1987)	4,000
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University of Toronto , Emmanuel College, Toronto Symposium "Theology and Peace" (November 6-7, 1987)	3,000
TOTAL	\$77,500

A DIRECTORY TO INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS

To obtain Institute publications please use the reader response card attached to this issue of *Peace & Security*.

ANNUAL GUIDE

The Guide, published annually, is designed to provide Canadians with a readily accessible collection of materials which will give to the interested reader a basic reference source on Canadian policies in the field of peace and security. It seeks to identify the major policy issues to which Canada responded in the year, place them in context, and, where appropriate, cite a range of Parliamentary comment on these issues.

A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1985-86, 285 pages. (Out of print)

A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1986-87, 270 pages.




PEACE & SECURITY MAGAZINE

Peace & Security is a quarterly magazine published since Spring 1986 to let Canadians and others know what the Institute is doing and to provide a forum for the full range of Canadian viewpoints on issues of peace and security.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

The Institute intends to publish between six and eight Occasional Papers each year. These monographs aim for both scholarly excellence and policy relevance, and will deal with subjects that fall within the areas defined in the



Institute's mandate: arms control, disarmament, defence, and conflict resolution.

1. Superpower Rivalry and Soviet Policy in the Caribbean Basin, by S. Neil MacFarlane, June 1986, 70 pages.

2. Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective, by David Cox, December 1986, 50 pages.

CONFERENCE REPORTS

One of the ways CIIPS seeks to encourage public discussion of issues of peace and security is to sponsor and, on occasion, organize conferences which address these subjects. From time to time the Institute publishes a report of conference proceedings in order to make the matters discussed available to a much wider public.

1. Negotiations for Peace in Central America, Proceedings of the Roundtable on Negotiations in Central America, Ottawa, 27-28 September 1985, by Liisa North. (Out of print)

2. Challenges to Deterrence: Doctrines, Technologies and Public Concerns, Proceedings of the Conference on Challenges to Deterrence, Ottawa, 17-19 October 1985, by Dianne DeMille.

3. The Risk of Accidental Nuclear War, Proceedings of the Conference on the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War, Vancouver, 26-30 May 1986, by Andrea Demchuk. (Out of print)

4. Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean: Perspectives to the year 2000, Proceedings of a Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 22-25 March 1987, by Lloyd Searwar.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

This series is intended for readers interested in issues of peace and security, but who have neither the time nor the expertise to read long papers on them. The series explores fundamental aspects of peace, conflict and international relations, and is a medium for

timely analysis of major events and emerging issues that fall within CIIPS mandate.

1. Canadian Responses to the Strategic Defense Initiative, by Gregory Wirick, October 1985.

2. A Nuclear Freeze? by David Cox, January 1986.


3. Nuclear Winter, by Leonard Bertin, March 1986. (Out of print)

4. Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by William Epstein, March 1986. (Out of print)

5. Conventional Arms Control Negotiations in Europe, by John Toogood, April 1986.

6. The Origins of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, by Gilles Grodin, August 1986.

7. Satellite Surveillance and Canadian Capabilities, by Ron Buckingham, September 1986.



8. Peace in Central America? by Steven Baranyi, October 1986.

9. A Second Look at No First Use, by Fen Osler Hampson, November 1986.

10. The Debate About Peace Education, by Elizabeth Richards, December 1986.

11. Nuclear Disarmament: The Gorbachev Initiative, by John R. Walker, January 1987.

12. Who's Ahead? Examining the Nuclear Arms Balance, by Jane Boulden, March 1987.

13. A Review of the Geneva Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions, by David Cox, June 1987.

14. The Stockholm Agreement: An Exercise in Confidence Building, by C.A. Namiesniowski, August 1987.

15. Peacekeeping and the Management of International Conflict, by Henry Wiseman, September 1987.

POINTS OF VIEW

Points of View are the same length as Background Papers, however, authors are encouraged

to write more of a personal essay than a factual description.

1. East/West Relations: Values, Interests and Perceptions, by Geoffrey Pearson, March 1986. (Out of Print)

2. Nuclear Weapons and the Averting of War, by Robert W. Malcolms, October 1986.

3. Canadian Press Coverage of Arms Control and Disarmament Issues, by John R. Walker, March 1987.

4. Maintaining Peace with Freedom: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control, by Lorne Green, March 1987.

WORKING PAPERS

Working Papers are the result of research work in progress, often intended for later publication by the Institute or another publication, and are regarded by CIIPS to be of immediate value for distribution in limited numbers - mostly to specialists in the field. Unlike all other Institute publications, these papers are published in the original language only.

1. Nuclear Weapons, Counter-Force, and Arms Reduction Proposals: A Guide to Information Sources and Force Calculations, 57 pages. (Out of print)

2. A Survey of Peace Education in Canada, by Wytze Brouwer, 71 pages. (Out of print)

3. Strategic Stability and Mutual Security in the Year 2000: Getting There from Here, Proceedings of a Meeting, Erice, Italy, 25-27 April 1986, 113 pages. (Out of print)

4. La France et l'initiative de défense stratégique, by Charles-Philippe David, January 1987, 87 pages.

5. Conference on Militarization in the Third World, papers by Paul Rogers, Michael Klare and Dan O'Meara presented at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, January 1987.

ANNUAL REPORT

The Annual Report sets out for the Parliament and the people of Canada the record of accomplishment of the preceding year of operation of the Institute.

First Annual Report 1984-85.

Annual Report 1985-1986.

Annual Report 1986-1987. □

Programme de bourses de l'ICPSI

L'Institut invite les personnes intéressées à lui faire parvenir des demandes dans le cadre de son programme de bourses, qui en est à sa deuxième année d'existence. Le programme est ouvert tant aux universitaires qu'aux non-universitaires qui désirent entreprendre ou continuer des travaux dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationale. Par ce programme, l'ICPSI vise à encourager la recherche et l'approfondissement des connaissances dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationale, et à favoriser l'établissement de contacts avec la collectivité internationale, en appuyant des Canadiens et des Canadiennes qui veulent poursuivre leurs études dans des institutions étrangères, ou exceptionnellement, au Canada. Les candidat(e)s doivent être citoyens(nes) canadiens(nes) et détenir au minimum un diplôme universitaire de premier cycle ou montrer qu'ils possèdent une expérience équivalente.

L'Institut a constitué un fonds de 120 000 \$ devant servir à attribuer sept bourses, soit deux d'une valeur maximale de 25 000 \$ et cinq d'une valeur maximale de 14 000 \$. Les demandes seront étudiées par un comité de sélection indépendant, dont les décisions seront annoncées en mai 1988. Ce programme est administré au nom de l'Institut par l'Association des universités et collèges du Canada. La date limite de réception des demandes pour l'année universitaire 1987-1988 a été fixée au 1^{er} février 1988. Pour obtenir de plus amples détails, ainsi que des formulaires de demande, prière d'écrire à l'adresse suivante :

Les services d'administration des bourses d'étude, Association des universités et collèges du Canada
151, rue Slater
Ottawa (Ontario) K1P 5V1

Bourses accordées par l'Institut

Les bourses sont accordées à des boursiers nationaux. Ces bourses sont accordées chaque année dans le cadre du programme des bourses de l'ICPSI. Les sept boursiers appartiennent à différentes disciplines, et ils compilent entreprendre des études diverses.

Walter Dorn se penchera sur des aspects du contrôle et de la vérification dans le contexte des armes chimiques et biologiques. Il travaillera sous l'égide de l'Université de Toronto et effectuera une partie de ses recherches en Suède.

Allan Hertz compte préparer un manuscrit sur l'histoire des aspects juridiques de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Il travaillera à l'Université de Toronto.

Kevin Leppmann va entreprendre des études en vue d'obtenir un doctorat de sciences politiques qui portera plus particulièrement sur la psychologie sociale et la théorie des conflits internationaux. Il étudiera au *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*.

Doug Mohr compte entreprendre des études à l'Université de Waterloo sur la psychologie sociale de l'activisme dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.

James Rochlin va poursuivre ses études de doctorat sur l'Amérique centrale à l'Université de l'Alberta, et il se rendra sur place pour effectuer une partie de ses recherches.

Errika Simpson compte s'inscrire à l'Institut des études sur la paix à l'Université Cornell, puis à la *Phillips University*, en République fédérale d'Allemagne. Elle va étudier diverses formules de défense.

Brian Stevenson va poursuivre des recherches sur l'Amérique centrale à l'Université Queen's et au Mexique.

Attribution des subventions en 1988 – Modalités et dates limites

À partir de janvier 1988, l'Institut statuera sur les demandes jusqu'ici. On est prié de noter les dates limites suivantes :

6 novembre 1987 – décision prise en décembre 1987

31 décembre 1987 – décision prise en mars 1988

30 juin 1988 – décision prise en octobre 1988


SUBVENTIONS À LA RECHERCHE -

10 000 \$	Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa
10 000 \$	David Charters, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton
6 000 \$	Harold Coward, University of Calgary, Calgary
9 500 \$	Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Toronto
8 500 \$	International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
10 000 \$	Robert Reford, Reford-McCandless Int'l Consultants and The Cyprus Dispute and its Impact on the Western Allies
10 000 \$	Canada's National Security Interests in the Pacific
8 000 \$	Timothy M. Shaw, Dalhousie University, Halifax
62 000 \$	TOTAL

SUBVENTIONS AUX PROGRAMMES PUBLICS -

5 500 \$	Premier Trimestre 1987-88
5 500 \$	Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa
6 000 \$	Public Speaking Programme
6 000 \$	Canadian Disarmament Information Service (CANDIS), Toronto
4 500 \$	PEACE Magazine
4 500 \$	Cartoon Unites, Ottawa
5 000 \$	Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe (CIDMAA), Montréal
5 000 \$	Séminaire Namibie et Angola, la guerre oubliée en Afrique australe
6 500 \$	Cinefort Inc., Montréal
6 500 \$	Film "An Unholy Alliance: Low Intensity Warfare and Humanitarian Aid"
10 000 \$	Conférence of Defence Associations, Ottawa
6 000 \$	Educating for Peace, Ottawa
3 000 \$	Teacher In-Service Training Project
3 000 \$	Educators for Peace, Torbay, Nfld.
10 000 \$	Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Ottawa
2 000 \$	NGO Committee on Disarmament, New York
5 000 \$	Operation Dismantle and The Foundation for Global Peace, Ottawa
5 000 \$	Publication of syndicated column "The Peace Race"
4 000 \$	Project Ploughshares, Corner Brook, Nfld.
5 000 \$	Conference "Canada and the Arms Race: Is Atlantic Canada Concerned?"
5 000 \$	Project Ploughshares, Waterloo
2 000 \$	Conference "Common Security and Defence Alternatives" (September 18-19, 1987)
2 000 \$	University of Manitoba, Continuing Education Division, Winnipeg
3 000 \$	Lecture/discussion series "Perspective on Conflict and Peace" (October - November 1987)
3 000 \$	Symposium "Theology and Peace" (November 6-7, 1987)
77 500 \$	TOTAL

NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



Au cours de la première semaine du mois de septembre, l'ICPSI et l'Institut des affaires canado-américaines à l'Académie des sciences de l'URSUS ont organisé à Moscou un symposium sur des questions touchant la paix internationale et la sécurité. Parmi les Canadiens présents à cette manifestation, mentionnons notamment **M. Timothy Colton**, Directeur du Centre des études russes et est-européennes à l'Université de Toronto, **M. John Holmes**, consultant pour le *Canadian Institute of International Affairs*, **M. Robert Matthews**, professeur adjoint de sciences politiques de l'Université de Toronto, **M. Geoffrey Pearson**, Directeur général de l'ICPSI, **M. Ernest Regehr**, Directeur de recherche du Projet Ploughshares et au Collège Conrad Grebel, et **M. Bernard Wood**, Directeur général de l'Institut Nord-Sud. Le symposium constituait la première étape dans l'établissement d'une relation entre l'Institut des affaires canado-américaines de Moscou, d'une part, et l'ICPSI, d'autre part. Des universitaires soviétiques viendront au Canada au printemps de 1988. Au nombre des sujets évoqués dans le cadre du symposium, mentionnons la prévention de la guerre nucléaire, la limitation des armements et le désarmement, les conflits régionaux, le système international, l'économie mondiale et diverses questions humanitaires.

M. David Cox a été l'un des trois Canadiens à faire un exposé à la deuxième *Harvard Nordic Conference* qui s'est tenue en Islande du 7 au 10 août dernier. Ont également présenté des mémoires **M. Robert Fowler**, sous-ministre adjoint de la Défense nationale et le professeur **Franklyn Griffiths**, de l'Université de Toronto. La politique navale du Canada dans l'Arctique a suscité un intérêt considérable, dans le cadre des discussions menées par les participants des pays scandinaves et d'Amérique du Nord sur l'important

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de la recherche à l'Institut pour reprendre ses fonctions de professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université **Queen's, Mlle Jane Bouden**, auxiliaire de recherche à l'Institut depuis l'été 1985, entreprendra à l'automne des études en vue d'obtenir une maîtrise en relations internationales à l'Université **Queen's, M. Michael Tucker**, qui était l'année dernière membre associé de l'Institut, est retourné à l'Université Mount Allison, à Sackville, au Nouveau-Brunswick. **M. Roger Hill** a pris en septembre le poste de Directeur de la recherche. Il était jusqu'à présent sous-Directeur adjoint au Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur. **M. Michael Holmes** s'est joint en août dernier au personnel de l'Institut, en qualité d'auxiliaire de recherche. **M. Holmes**, qui a étudié à l'Université de l'Alberta et à l'Université de Dalhousie, travaillait jusqu'ici pour le gouvernement de l'Alberta en qualité d'économiste. **M. Carl Jacobsen**, un Canadien employé depuis trois ans par l'Institut de recherche sur la paix de Stockholm, est rentré au pays, et il a accepté de travailler simultanément pour l'Institut et l'Université Carleton. **M. Jacobsen** sera chercheur adjoint des relations Est-Ouest. **M. Robert Mitchell**, un colonel des Forces

canadiennes, sera membre associé (Recherche) de l'Institut pour l'année prochaine. Le colonel Mitchell a fait carrière dans l'artillerie et il servait au Quartier général de la Force mobile à Saint-Hubert, au Québec, avant de prendre son affectation à l'Institut.

La Commonwealth Conference for Young Leaders s'est déroulée à Ottawa du 6 au 12 septembre dernier. En tout, quatre vingt jeunes adultes (âgés de 25 à 35 ans), originaires de quarante pays du Commonwealth, se sont retrouvés sur la Colline parlementaire et dans les collines de Gatineau pour parler ensemble de leadership, des affaires étrangères, de la paix et de la sécurité. Le programme portait essentiellement sur le développement des qualités de chef, sur les communications inter-culturelles, sur le règlement des conflits et sur l'éventualité d'une coopération entre les secteurs privé et public en faveur du développement économique et social. Les idées formulées par les membres du groupe ont été présentées aux chefs de gouvernement des pays du Commonwealth, à la veille du sommet qui doit les réunir à Vancouver en octobre prochain. Les principaux commanditaires de la conférence étaient la *Royal Commonwealth Conference* et l'*Inter-Center la Bourse Centre*

militaire croissante du Grand-Nord et sur la réaction des pays septentrionaux face à cette évolution.

Les 1^{er} et 2 septembre dernier, l'Institut finlandais des affaires internationales a organisé à Helsinki une table ronde sur les formules et les politiques adoptées par le Canada et les pays nordiques en matière de sécurité et de coopération dans la recherche. Mme **Harriet Critchley**, de l'Université de Calgary, **M. John Merritt**, du *Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, **M. Geoffrey Pearson** et enfin, **M. Ron Purver**, chargé de recherche, étaient quelques-uns des membres de la délégation de l'ICPSI. Des représentants du Danemark, de la Finlande, de l'Islande, de la Norvège et de la Suède ont participé aux discussions sur les exposés consacrés aux thèmes suivants : les politiques nationales de sécurité et l'évolution de la situation dans l'Arctique, les perspectives d'avenir en matière de limitation des armements et le renforcement de la confiance dans l'Arctique, et enfin, les perspectives de coopération régionale dans cette région.*

En septembre dernier, **M. David Cox** a quitté son poste de Directeur

■ L'Institut invite les personnes intéressées à lui faire parvenir des demandes dans le cadre de son programme de bourses, qui en est à sa deuxième année d'existence. Le programme est ouvert tant aux universitaires qu'aux non-universitaires qui désirent entreprendre ou continuer des travaux dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationale. Par ce programme, l'ICPSI vise à encourager la recherche et l'approfondissement des connaissances dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationale, et à favoriser l'établissement de contacts avec la collectivité internationale, en appuyant des Canadiens et des Canadiennes qui veulent poursuivre leurs études dans des institutions étrangères, ou exceptionnellement, au Canada. Les candidat(e)s doivent être à des Canadiens désireux de poursuivre leurs études dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationale.

■ L'Institut a constitué un fonds de 120 000 \$ devant servir à attribuer sept bourses, soit deux d'une valeur maximale de 25 000 \$ et cinq d'une valeur maximale de 14 000 \$. Les demandes seront étudiées par un comité de sélection indépendant, dont les décisions seront annoncées en mai 1988. Ce programme est administré au nom de l'Institut par l'Association des universités et collèges du Canada. La date limite de réception des demandes pour l'année universitaire 1987-1988 a été fixée au 1^{er} février 1988. Pour obtenir de plus amples détails, ainsi que des formulaires de demande, prière d'écrire à l'adresse suivante :

Les services d'administration des bourses d'étude, Association des universités et collèges du Canada
151, rue Slater
Ottawa (Ontario) K1P 5V1

Bourses accordées par l'Institut

L'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales a récemment attribué sept bourses, d'une valeur totale de 120 000 \$, à des Canadiens désireux de poursuivre leurs études dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationale. Ces bourses sont accordées chaque année dans le cadre du programme des bourses de l'ICPSI. Les sept boursiers appartiennent à différentes disciplines, et ils comptent entreprendre des études diverses.

Walter Dorn se penchera sur des aspects du contrôle et de la vérification

Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales
307, rue Gilmour
Ottawa (Ontario) K2P 0P7

SUBVENTIONS À LA RECHERCHE -	
Premier Trimestre 1987-88	10 000 \$
Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa	
Implementing a Chemical Weapons Convention	
David Charters, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton	
The Democratic Response to International Terrorism	
Harold Coward, University of Calgary, Calgary	6 000
Civilization and Rapid Climate Change	
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Toronto	9 500
Static Analysis of Combat Power	
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London	8 500
The Cyprus Dispute and Its Impact on the Western Allies	
Robert Reford, Reford-McCandless Int'l Consultants and	
York University, Toronto	10 000
Canada's National Security Interests in the Pacific	
Timothy M. Shaw, Dalhousie University, Halifax	8 000
Liberation, Security and Development in Southern Africa	
TOTAL	62 000 \$

Attribution des subventions en 1988 - Modalités et dates limites	
■ À partir de janvier 1988,	
l'Institut statuera sur les demandes	
et non plus quatre, comme il l'a fait	
jusqu'ici. On est prié de noter les	
dates limites suivantes :	
6 novembre 1987 - décision prise en décembre 1987	
31 décembre 1987 - décision prise en mars 1988	
30 juin 1988 - décision prise en octobre 1988	

Clark and Humanitarian Aid"	6 500
10 000	
2 000	
5 000	
5 000	
for Global Peace, Ottawa	
Race"	
Atlantic Canada Concerned"	4 000
5 000	
Alternatives"	
on Division, Winnipeg	2 000
Conflict and Peace"	
3 000	
77 500 \$	

Reviuws de Peace&Security.

Iran-Irak, la diplomatie du conflit


- Jocelyn Coulon

Le couple franco-allemand et la
défense de l'Europe
Pierre Lellouche
Economica, Paris, 1986.
333 pages, 48,95 \$

part de ses premiers adversaires. L'ambiguïté de l'armement nucléaire n'a pas été compris ainsi que l'association d'une guerre nucléaire, la dimension planétaire cher à l'auteur qui préconise une prise de conscience et des actions coordonnées à l'échelle mondiale. L'auteur constate l'échec de la politique américaine au début de 1987. Les Etats-Unis sont dans une impasse complète mais l'Union soviétique ne peut en profiter en raison de la crise sociale et institutionnelle à laquelle elle est confrontée. D'autres sociétés ne peuvent ni plus émerger à cause de plusieurs facteurs dont le moindre n'est certes pas l'économie américaine. Le livre de Rousset comprend une foule de données techniques et historiques fort intéressantes mais qui n'aurait pu être mieux exploitées dans un cadre d'analyse plus rigide. Sans compter que l'auteur fait, consciemment, de graves entorses à la grammaire ce qui est inexcusable pour importer les raisons invoquées.

qu'apportent des recherches scientifiques et techniques planifiées centralement. La manière dont fut conçu l'IDS est aussi expliquée. Enfin, il relève les principales conséquences

LIVRES



L'engrenage de la violence

Jeanne Henriette Louis

342 pages, 43,50 \$

Pavot, Paris, 1987

« La guerre psychologique aux

Franco-Tunis pendant la Deuxième

Guerre mondiale est le sous-titre

du livre de Mme Jeanne Henriette

Louis. L'auteur s'est proposée de

rendre compte des modalités de la

propagande de la guerre psycholo-

gique et de la dynamique qui l'a

produite.

Lors du premier conflit mondial

(1914-1918), la propagande avait

été orchestrée d'abord à partir de

l'Angleterre, et les Américains y

avaient répondu par un rejet global à

partir de 1920. L'auteur recherche la

source de ce refus dans l'histoire de

la tradition anglosaxonne. La coloni-

sation du nouveau continent fut

l'oeuvre des réalités de la Nouvelle-

Angleterre et d'utopies religieuses

qui, dans la lignée de W. Penn et des

Quakers voulaient bâtir une autre

société. À la fin du XVIII^e siècle,

cette Pennsylvanie « banalisée » s'in-

tegrait dans l'Union, mais il subsistait

une alternative idéalisée dans la tra-

dition américaine. Le président

Wilson en est-il le représentant, de-

mande l'auteur? La société améri-

caine refuse de s'y reconnaître et

répond plutôt à l'absurdité des mas-

sacres européens par l'isolationnisme

des années 20 et 30.

Selon Mme Louis, c'est la poli-

tique « d'apaisement » d'Hitler qui a

fait resurgir la question. Contre les

isolationnistes, mais en dissidence

vis-à-vis l'administration Roosevelt

qui prône l'intervention, un discours

« non-violent » tente de se faire en-

tendre. La thèse de l'auteur consiste

à l'identifier et à l'utiliser comme

révélateur de la « violence » de fait du

discours officiel.

La notion de guerre psychologique,

1939 à deux significations. Pour les

politiciens, elle est la défense contre

l'agressivité des dictateurs. Pour les

M. Sherwin et G. Herken qui ont

étudié les modalités, complexées et

contradictions du processus qui

mène à la décision d'utiliser la

bombe comme une arme nouvelle.

Mais il s'agit ici d'une nuance sur la

conclusion d'un ouvrage qui dans

son propos et dans son exposé est

tout à fait acceptable.

M. Jean-René Chouard est professeur

de l'histoire à l'Université de Sherbrooke.

Sur la guerre

David Rousset

Ramsay, Paris, 1987

478 pages, 39,95 \$

David Rousset ouvre les hostilités:

«... ces enclaves de supranationalité

limitées et déséquilibrées, où se

heurtent des souverainetés nationales

amputées, amplifient les disparités

et discontinuités du marché mondial,

et contrecarrent, autant que l'agita-

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tend prendre. Selon lui, la société se

trouve dans un état de crise et c'est là

que se situe le danger de guerre

nucéaire.

Tout au long de ce qu'il appelle un

« entrelien », l'auteur s'efforce de

dénoncer l'importance de l'émer-

gence d'une société planétaire et les

nombreuses contestations du système

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La méthode utilisée aux fins de la

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La première partie, trop longue

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Armes chimiques


Dans un discours prononcé devant la Conférence du désarmement le 6 août dernier, le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Chevardnadze, a annoncé que son pays était disposé à accepter le «principe des inspections obligatoires par mise en demeure sans droit de refus». M. Chevardnadze a également fait savoir que l'Union soviétique ouvrirait ses portes aux pays étrangers désirant visiter l'usine

Nous accepteront d'entreprendre ces opérations quand on aura pris des dispositions supplémentaires en matière de surveillance et que le traité américain aura ratifié le Traité sur les explosions nucléaires à buts pacifiques et le Traité sur la limitation des essais nucléaires.

Dans le cadre de la Conférence du désarmement à Genève, les pays socialistes ont présenté le 9 juin premier un projet de traité sur l'ITTEN intitulé «Dispositions fondamentales relatives à l'interdiction générale et complète des essais d'armes nucléaires». Le projet de traité prévoit la création d'un institut des

Calendrier

CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



Pour parler sur les armes nucléaires et spatiales (NST)

Le 29 juillet dernier une proposition détaillée portant sur la mise à l'essai de systèmes de défense antimissiles dans l'espace. Elle réitérait ainsi une proposition qu'elle avait lancée les deux parties s'engage- raient à respecter pendant dix ans les dispositions du Traité ABM. Le négociateur soviétique, M. Aleksei Choukhov, a déclaré que les recherches sur la défense stratégique ne se feraient que dans l'enceinte de laboratoires et d'institutions, « tant dans le cas des recherches menées à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur ». Et surtout, le texte proposait d'amorcer des négociations bilatérales en vue de déterminer quels engins devraient être interdits dans l'espace, et il contenait une liste de ces derniers. C'est la première fois que les Soviétiques exposent officiellement et en détail le type d'objets qu'ils aimeraient voir interdire. Certains observateurs pensent pouvoir déduire de cette proposition que certains essais limités dans l'espace seraient peut-être acceptables aux yeux des Soviétiques. Les négociateurs américains se sont dits déçus de la proposition de l'URSS, et ils ont déclaré que celle-ci n'avait aucunement modifié sa position. Le président Reagan a précisé qu'il était hors de question d'entamer une quelconque négociation sur l'interprétation du Traité ABM et sur les activités ou objets à autoriser dans l'espace.

Deux jours plus tard, soit le 31 juillet, les Soviétiques présentaient un projet de traité sur la réduction des armements nucléaires stratégiques. Les réductions sur ce plan restent toutefois liées à la question de la restriction des activités dans l'espace. Éléments nouveaux dans le projet de traité, une proposition visant à limiter à 400 le nombre des missiles de croisière lancés d'un navire ou d'un sous-marin (SLCM) 600 km. En juin 1986, les Soviétiques et ayant une portée supérieure à

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Forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire (INF)

Le 4 juin dernier, le Parlement ouest-allemand a sanctionné la décision prise par le Chancelier Kohl de souscrire à ce qu'on appelle l'option «double zéro», soit l'élimination complète de tous les missiles nucléaires à moyenne portée (INF) et des forces nucléaires de théâtre à courte portée (SRINF) basées en Europe. Cette position a par la suite été reprise par les ministres de l'OTAN réunis le 12 juin dernier à Reykjavik, en Islande. Malgré cet important pas en avant, il semble que les négociations se soient mises à piétiner lorsqu'on se servait des pages éditoriales du *New York Times*, les négociateurs américains et soviétiques ont échangé des lettres dans lesquelles ils s'accusaient mutuellement de faire preuve de mauvaise volonté. Même si les États-Unis n'ont jamais présenté de proposition officielle dans ce sens, les représentants américains ont déclaré publiquement favoriser l'élimination totale et à l'échelle mondiale de tous les missiles INF et SRINF. Le travail de vérification serait en effet rendu plus simple, puisque la possession ne serait-ce que d'un seul missile constituerait une violation.

Le 22 juillet dernier, le Secrétaire général Gorbatchev reconnaissait, dans une entrevue accordée à la presse indonésienne, comprendre la préoccupation des États-Unis à ce sujet, et il a déclaré que l'Union soviétique serait disposée à accepter la suppression de tous les INF et SRINF dans le monde entier. Il restait à cette date quatre questions en suspens :

La conversion ou la transformation des missiles – les États-Unis se réservent le droit de convertir les Pershing II en missiles Pershing à plus courte portée, et de transformer les missiles de croisière basés au sol en missiles de croisière lancés à partir d'un sous-marin ou d'un navire. Or, les Soviétiques ne sont pas disposés à autoriser ces opérations. Les missiles ouest-allemands Pershing IA – l'Union soviétique insiste pour que l'on inclue dans le traité une clause prévoyant le démantèlement des 72 missiles Pershing IA déployés en Allemagne de l'Ouest, compte tenu du fait que leurs ogives appartiennent aux États-Unis. Les États-Unis retournent en disant qu'il s'agit de missiles d'un pays tiers qui ne tombent par conséquent pas sous le coup du traité.

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Le 26 août, le *New York Times* a fait savoir que les États-Unis avaient proposé un nouveau plan de vérification relatif à l'application d'un éventuel accord sur les INF/SRINF. Le plan suggérait notamment de réduire le nombre des inspections intensives menées sur place. Par ailleurs, le texte constituait une évolution par rapport à une proposition faite antérieurement, dans laquelle il était prévu d'effectuer des inspections surprises, après un très bref préavis. Aux termes de la dernière proposition, on ne procéderait à ces inspections «par mise en demeure» que dans les installations dont on savait qu'elles abritaient les missiles à après le court port-tionnée. D'après le *Times*, certains hauts fonctionnaires américains haut placés

EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE



Les réactions de la presse aux questions de défense

■ Avec le dépôt du Livre blanc sur la défense intitulé «*Défis et engagements*», que le gouvernement a présentée à la Chambre des communes le 5 juin 1987, et après la publication, au début du mois d'août, du document «Souveraineté canadienne, sécurité et défense», dans lequel le Nouveau Parti démocratique répondait au Livre blanc, les médias ont eu fort à faire cet été pour couvrir les questions d'actualité relatives à la défense. Voici un aperçu des commentaires parus dans la presse en réaction aux changements survenus dans ce domaine de la politique gouvernementale.

C'est la question des sous-marins qui a le plus retenu l'attention des médias. Dans un article paru le 10 juin dans *La Presse* de Montréal, Guy Cormier se posait la question de savoir dans quelle mesure les libertés du Canada étaient réellement menacées dans l'Arctique, et il poursuivait en disant que le Canada devrait faire pression sur les super-puissances pour les inciter «à rechercher en commun les moyens de garantir à ces eaux une vocation véritablement pacifique». La réaction du *Toronto Star* a été positive, puisque le document y a été qualifié de «sérieux, mais prudent» (édition du 6 juin); le journal a toutefois reproché au gouvernement d'avoir donné trop peu de précisions sur les dépenses. *La Montreal Gazette* (11 juin) et *l'Ottawa Citizen* (6 juin) ont tous deux fait au Livre blanc un accueil dans une large mesure favorable. Toutefois, le quotidien d'Ottawa s'est montré légèrement plus critique, reprochant au gouvernement de n'avoir pas accordé suffisamment d'attention à la limitation des armements et l'invitant à veiller soigneusement à ce que ses programmes militaires soient conformes à ses positions en la matière. L'auteur de l'éditorial paru dans le *Globe and Mail* du 6 juin a la suite de la publication du Livre blanc s'est inquiété dans la marine l'acquisition de sous-

marins à propulsion nucléaire. En revanche, l'édition du 6 juin du *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* a fait l'éloge de la nouvelle politique. Seul point négatif soulève dans l'éditorial, le fait que le Livre blanc ait passé sous silence «le dévouement des membres des Forces armées, qui, pendant les années de disette, avaient fait pour le pays tant de sacrifices, entrainés, dans l'espoir déçu qu'un jour un gouvernement prendrait conscience de la réalité».

La plupart des journaux ont approuvé la décision du gouvernement de ne pas déployer le Groupe-brigade CTAM dans le nord de la Norvège, pour consolider plutôt ses forces affectées à l'OTAN, en République fédérale d'Allemagne. Quelques exceptions cependant, notamment celle du *Devoir*, dont un éditorial signé intitulé «Mission impossible?», posait la question de savoir comment le Canada allait bien pouvoir défendre le Nord de son territoire alors qu'il avait déjà du mal à défendre la Norvège. Aux yeux du reporter, le Livre blanc était «un long aven de la faiblesse du pays et de son incapacité à défendre ses frontières». Autre exception à signaler, celle du *Winnipeg Free Press*, pour qui la décision du Canada de ne plus déployer le groupe CTAM en Norvège équivaut à abandonner l'OTAN. L'auteur de l'éditorial du 9 juin poursuivait en disant : «Rien ne porte à croire que le Canada ait l'intention de s'interroger pour savoir s'il a davantage les moyens d'envoyer des troupes en Allemagne» qu'en Norvège.

Si la plupart des commentateurs se sont entendus pour dire que Défense nationale, s'était bien défendu sur le plan politique, M. Jonathan Manthorpe, de l'Agence *Southern News*, a indiqué dans l'édition du 6 juin de l'*Ottawa Citizen* que la rédaction du Livre blanc avait représenté pour le Ministre une importante victoire politique et bureaucratique remportée sur M. Joe Clark, ministre des Affaires extérieures. Dans l'édition du 9 juin de l'*Ottawa Citizen*, la journaliste Marjorie Nichols faisait observer que les prévisions de dépenses avaient par là en-deçà des niveaux établis sous le régime Trudeau, si l'on considère le «pourcentage des dépenses budg-

Le Canada «expert-conseil» pour le maintien de la paix en Amérique centrale

■ Après l'annonce le 7 août dernier d'un plan de paix signé par le Guatemala, le Nicaragua, le Salvador, le Costa Rica et le Honduras, le ministre des Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, a chargé deux de ses représentants de rendre visite aux ministres des Affaires étrangères. M. Joe Clark a approuvé ce plan et pour les cinq pays pour leur confirmer que le Canada appuie ce plan et pour

l'aille pro-désarmement de son parti. possibles entre M. Blackburn et évoqué le problème des frictions militaires du Canada. D'autres ont pour assurer l'état de préparation pour la Défense et au sein du document, semblait déterminé à tout faire même souligné le fait que M. Derek Blackburn, critique neo-démocrate bre de commentateurs ont tout de *and Mail*, 3 août). Un certain nombre de discussion à l'ordre du jour, M. Clark s'est réuni avec les dirigeants de tous les pays où il s'est rendu, sauf dans le cas de l'Afrique du Sud, où il s'est entretenu avec son homologue, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Roelof (Pik) Botha. Il s'est également entretenu avec des représentants de l'*African National Congress* (ANC), dans ses quartiers généraux en exil, à Lusaka (Zambie) et avec des dirigeants de la principale organisation légale de lutte contre l'apartheid en Afrique du Sud, soit le *United Democratic Front*.

Peu après le voyage de M. Clark, M. Oliver Tambo, président de l'ANC est arrivé le 26 août dernier au Canada, pour entreprendre une visite au cours de laquelle il s'est entretenu avec M. Clark, le premier ministre Brian Mulroney et d'autres chefs politiques. □

- GREGORY WIRICK

Visite en Afrique du Sud

■ A la mi-août, le ministre des Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, a effectué un voyage de cinq jours en Afrique, plus précisément en Côte d'Ivoire, en Zambie, au Mozambique et en Afrique du Sud, en prévision des deux prochains sommets canadiens. L'un à Québec, qui a réuni les pays francophones en septembre, et l'autre auquel participeront les chefs d'Etat du Commonwealth à Vancouver en octobre prochain.

L'apartheid devait dans les deux cas figurer parmi les principaux thèmes de discussion à l'ordre du jour. M. Clark s'est réuni avec les dirigeants de tous les pays où il s'est rendu, sauf dans le cas de l'Afrique du Sud, où il s'est entretenu avec son homologue, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Roelof (Pik) Botha. Il s'est également entretenu avec des représentants de l'*African National Congress* (ANC), dans ses quartiers généraux en exil, à Lusaka (Zambie) et avec des dirigeants de la principale organisation légale de lutte contre l'apartheid en Afrique du Sud, soit le *United Democratic Front*.

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la sécurité mutuelle ? Voici quelques années, j'ai tenté sans succès de convaincre les cadres de l'OTAN réunis en conférence que les superpuissances serviraient mieux leurs propres intérêts en préconisant un moratoire sur la recherche et le développement dans le domaine de la guerre anti-sous-marin, puisqu'une politique de dissuasion fondée sur la destruction mutuelle assurée exige, pour chaque camp, une force strati- tégique nucléaire indétruite.

RECONNAISSANCE. En 1940, le HMS *Regulus* s'est glissé submergé dans la baie de Shibusshi pour photographier la flotte japonaise mouil- lant à cette base. (Les négatifs, qui offraient notamment de précieux renseignements sur les emplace- ments d'artillerie, n'ont pas été plus loin que Singapour avant que les Japonais s'en emparent.) Mais ce genre d'entreprises est très risqué comme l'ont découvert les membres d'équipage du sous-marin soviétique récemment décédé dans les eaux suédoises. Mieux vaut s'en remettre au travail sûr et efficace des satellites.

ATTITUDE CONTRE LA MARINE MARCHANDE. À l'origine, le sous-marin avait pour rôle d'étouffer le potentiel militaire de l'ennemi en bloquant ou en coulant ses navires marchands de manière à réduire le commerce et l'approvisionnement assurés par voie maritime. Voilà une stratégie qui convient parfaitement aux États continentaux de Makhinder - le Pacte de Varsovie - mais non à l'Empire océanique de Mahan.

l'OTAN, en l'occurrence. La vul- néralité d'un grand cargo ou d'un superpétrolier face à un SSN (ou à tout autre type de sous-marin) est incontestable. Mais dans l'avenir prévisible, si notre SSN prend un tel navire en chasse, il risquera de couler notre trésor, et non celui de l'adversaire.

ARTS DE NÉGOCIATIONS. Se doter de nouvelles armes pour s'en servir comme atouts dans le cadre de négocia- tions sur la limitation des armements est une technique qui n'a jamais donné de bons résultats. Car au lieu de mettre leurs atouts sur la table, l'un et l'autre surenchérisse- ront, et c'est ainsi que la course se poursuit.

Mais la flotte SSN du Canada, qui pour l'instant reste à l'état de projet, pourrait devenir une exception à cette règle, car l'autre partie aux négocia- tions serait cette fois-ci dans notre camp - il s'agit de l'oncle Sam, et non de l'oncle Ivan. Serait-il possible d'obliger les États-Unis à s'avouer

opposés au Canada quant à savoir si les eaux arctiques de l'Archipel sont de juridiction canadienne, comme le dit Ottawa, ou internationale, comme le croit qu'il y a une solution.

La clé d'un accord négocié réside dans le fait que les États-Unis n'ont pas caché leur mécontentement au sujet des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire que le Canada se propose d'acheter. Les dirigeants américains s'accrochent fort mal de l'idée.

Selon le *New York Times*, des digni- taires américains auraient dit : « Il est possible qu'un gouvernement cana- dien futur profite de l'existence de sa propre flotte de sous-marins pour barrer le passage aux sous-marins américains le long des routes proté- gées qui traversent l'Archipel... Ces porte-parole ont donné à entendre que la proposition canadienne... soulève plusieurs questions : où le Canada obtiendra-t-il ses sous-marins ? Comment... la Marine canadienne apprendra-t-elle à s'en servir ? Le Canada agira-t-il de con- cert avec les États-Unis ? »

TOUS LES ÉLÉMENTS SONT MAIN- tenant réunis pour élaborer une

Les règles de l'engagement

Quels seront les ordres que les capitaines de nos sous-marins devront suivre si l'on détecte un sous-marin étranger dans des eaux revendiquées par le Canada ?


Devront le Comité permanent de la Chambre des communes sur la défense nationale après le dépôt de son Livre blanc, le ministre de la Défense nationale, M. Perrin Beatty a évoqué ce sujet pour répondre aux questions que lui avaient posées le député libéral, M. Douglas Firth.

M. Beatty : ... Nous donnerons aux équipages de nos sous-marins les mêmes instructions que celles que nous donnons aujourd'hui aux équipages de nos frégates et de nos sous-marins. Nous n'allons pas cela ne nous empêche pas d'y affirmer notre souveraineté. Nous allons faire savoir aux intrus qu'ils sont dans les eaux canadiennes et que nous voulons protéger notre souveraineté. Il est évident que notre réaction changerait considérablement en temps de guerre.

M. Firth : ... Le ministre est-il en train de nous dire que, pour tenir un registre des fois où des sous-marins d'autres pays se trouveront dans nos eaux, il en collera aux contribuables canadiens entre 5 et 16 milliards de dollars ?

M. Beatty : Monsieur le président, non, ce n'est pas ce que je dis, loin de là. Nous voulons acheter ces sous-marins nucléaires pour assurer la sécurité de notre pays et défendre le Canada.

Le faisant, nous exerçons nos droits et nos responsabilités en tant que nation souveraine. Nous protégeons notre souveraineté. Mais les sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire servent à nous protéger, tout comme les CF-18 dont le rôle est d'intercepter les avions étrangers dans l'espace du Canada, de les escorter jusqu'à l'extérieur de la zone canadienne et, en temps de guerre, de défendre le Canada s'il est attaqué. C'est exactement le même principe. Ceux qui prétendent que le Canada ne devrait pas protéger ses eaux, mais qu'il devrait uniquement protéger son espace aérien, font preuve d'un illogisme flagrant.



solution à ce que les planificateurs canadiens tiennent à considérer comme étant leur problème de sécurité dans l'Arctique. Cette solution consiste à établir une version mar- time de l'Accord canado-américain sur la défense aérienne conclue en 1958. Au NORAD correspondrait donc l'ISAE (Accord sur la sou- veraineté des eaux arctiques). En vertu d'un tel accord, les États-Unis feraient droit aux revendications du Canada et reconnaîtraient sa sou- veraineté sur les eaux de l'Archipel Arctique, en échange de quoi notre pays accorderait aux sous-marins américains l'accès réglementé à ses eaux (ils y ont déjà accès de toute façon, avec ou sans notre permission) et renonceraient à acquérir sa propre flotte de SSN.

Un accord de ce genre serait avan- tageux pour le Canada à trois égards. D'abord, il ferait disparaître un con- tentieux nuisible et dangereux dans les rapports entre nos deux pays. Il sans honte d'un engagement incon- sidéré. Enfin, il serait un exemple à suivre pour d'autres pays, comme l'Inde, dont les milieux militaires chantent les mérites des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire comparative- ment aux sous-marins diesel, après de gouvernements qui peuvent diffi- cilement se payer les uns ou les autres.

Défis et engagements porte à trois le nombre des Livres blancs sur la défense déposés dans les quatre der- nières mois par des gouvernements alliés des États-Unis et dont deux sont allés l'un à l'autre. Enfin, tous trois sont des démocraties libérales qui comptent parmi les pays fonda- teurs du Commonwealth et qui se trouvent dans des circonstances économiques difficiles. À comparer aux documents néo-zélandais et australiens, le Livre blanc canadien fait figure de géant-bleu entre deux moineaux.

réalisé à grand renfort de cartes et de photographies en couleurs et il pour- rait servir de manuel de recrutement pour les Forces armées. Sous des dehors tape-à-l'œil, il présente cependant des raisonnements pro- blématiques. Encore une fois donc, il faudrait se méfier des apparences.

SUBMERGEONS LES SOUS-MARINS NUCLEAIRES...

Le Canada devrait renoncer à sa promesse inconsistée d'acheter des sous-marins nucléaires et s'attacher plutôt à établir une version maritime de l'accord Canada-américain de défense aérienne.

PAR JAMES EAYRS

UNES HEURES À PEINE après l'adoption de la *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act* par la Chambre des représentants de la Nouvelle-Zélande, la Chambre des communes à Ottawa entérinait le premier Livre blanc sur la défense en seize ans, intitulé *Défense pour le Canada: elle faisait et engagements : Une politique de*

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La Nouvelle-Zélande a pris cet engagement. La Nouvelle-Zélande ne peut être défendue par des armes nucléaires et ne souhaite nullement être défendue par des armes nucléaires. Nous nous sommes dissociés de cette stratégie nucléaire visant à la défense de la Nouvelle-Zélande.

Ainsi, dans la perspective de la Nouvelle-Zélande, où la majorité de la population (73 p. 100 pour être plus précis) rejette l'idée d'un petit réacteur de recherche nucléaire (il ne s'agit même pas d'ogives nucléaires), d'«étranger maudit» qui elle assimile à un «étranger maudit» (l'acquisition (proposée dans le Livre blanc) de dix douze sous-marins à armement conventionnel mais à propulsion nucléaire (SSN) comporte quelque chose d'irrél, et même d'insipie. Cette décision compte parmi les plus bizarres dans la politique militaire canadienne, depuis que le premier ministre de la Colombie-Britannique a acheté deux sous-marins construits à Seattle et initialement destinés au Chili.

Mais bizarre ne veut pas nécessairement dire inopie. En 1915, la flotille de sous-marins de premier ministre a protégé les bases côtières de Colombie-Britannique contre les incursions de sous-marins allemands. Comment donc justifier la création d'une flotte de sous-marins Canada à besoin de SSN parce que ces derniers «constituent, aujourd'hui et pour un avenir prévisible, le seul moyen éprouvé de mener des opérations prolongées sous les glaces... Le SSN est le seul bâtiment capable d'assurer surveillance et contrôle prises par les glaces dans le Nord canadien.» La dérision immédiate qui accueilli cette justification fit comprendre au Ministère qu'elle était insuffisante. Aussi, quelques jours plus tard, il a informé la Chambre des planificateurs de la Marine :

«Nous aimerions disposer de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire pour l'Atlantique et dans le Pacifique.» Mais en quoi, exactement, consiste cette mission ? De quelles tâches les SSN pourraient-ils bien s'acquitter dans l'avenir pour le compte du Canada: pourraient-ils les exécuter de façon satisfaisante ? Voici une demi-douzaine d'hypothèses.

CONTRIBUER À LA DISSUASION GÉNÉRALE. Voici de nombreuses années, Winston Churchill faisait allusion à la vague menace que les gros bâtiments de guerre perfectionnés, dont la position est inconnue, peuvent faire planer sur toute planification navale dans le camp adverse. Le Livre blanc reprend cette notion :

«Par leur seule présence, les sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire peuvent empêcher un adversaire d'utiliser les zones maritimes où ils se trouvent.» Comment ? Le Livre blanc n'apporte là-dessus aucune précision; espérons que ce n'est pas en commençant la guerre qu'ils sont censés conjurer. (Dans l'éventualité d'une guerre, ils pourraient s'ajouter aux convois, sauf qu'alors il n'y aurait probablement rien à convoier.) Il est difficile de concevoir que quel-ques navires de plus – au maximum trois par océans et trois en radoub – puissent changer grand-chose aux calculs des planificateurs soviétiques au chapitre de la «corrélation des forces».

CONTRIBUER À LA DISSUASION IMMÉDIATE. Lors d'un affrontement grave entre les superpuissances, comme la crise des missiles de Cuba, la principale base navale canadienne est particulièrement vulnérable : Halifax, qui compte peu d'installations qui assureraient une importance vitale en temps de guerre (chantiers navals, ports de conteneurs, raffineries, installations de

pour une composante essentielle de la défense de la région. Il faut reconnaître que chaque superpuissance déploie et dont l'actualité inévitable (parce qu'ils sont indestructibles) passe pour une composante essentielle de la défense de la région. Il faut reconnaître que chaque superpuissance déploie et dont l'actualité inévitable (parce qu'ils sont indestructibles) passe pour une composante essentielle de la défense de la région.

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
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fait différent. Les coûts auxiliaires pourraient bien ruiner les Forces canadiennes. Si le Canada compte réellement acheter un bris-glace de la classe 8, financer l'achat de nouvelles frégates, moderniser les destroyers de la classe Tribal, remplacer les CF-18 perdus, payer sa part des coûts du système d'alerte du Nord, avoir un équipement ses forces en Europe et porter les effectifs de la réserve à 90 000 hommes, le tout avec une augmentation annuelle de 2 p. 100 des budgets militaires en termes réels, le gouvernement devra réussir un tour de magie. Or, la

aurait l'avantage : le bâtiment soviétique puissamment armé, plus petit ? défenseur canadien, plus petit ? En quatrième lieu, on craint que ce déploiement ne soit assorti d'aucune mission. À l'heure actuelle, les sous-marins soviétiques ne s'élèvent guère des bastions tels que la péninsule de Kola. Ils sont capables de naviguer sous la calotte polaire et pourraient devenir plus aventureux à mesure qu'ils deviendront plus silencieux, grâce aux hélices ultrasilencieuses, et à l'absence de bruit de propulsion. Mais les risques pour eux de se faire coincer dans des défilés de



Bob Centre

La menace pesant sur le front d'Europe centrale est réelle. Mais elle pèse sur le flanc Nord l'est tout autant. Les mesures que l'Alliance prendra pour répondre aux besoins de la Norvège en matière de défense, sans y baser des troupes permanentes (ce qui provoquerait une levée de boucliers dans les rangs de la gauche norvégienne et serait de tout façon contraire à la politique traditionnelle d'Oslo) auront en Norvège et au Danemark des répercussions qui ne peuvent bien atteindre la Suède neutre. Il est très facile de tomber dans une spirale de débaïllante lorsqu'un pays membre de l'Alliance refuse une aide extérieure en raison d'une opposition politique locale. À son tour, le pays allié en cause se rend compte que l'insuffisance des appuis accordés par l'Alliance engendra chez l'opinion publique un sentiment de malaise qui étaye en core plus les arguments neutralistes. La consolidation du déploiement des Forces canadiennes s'impose depuis déjà longtemps, et le gouvernement Mulroney mérite d'être félicité pour avoir relevé le défi. Mais les réalités politiques sont telles que l'établissement d'une force sous-marine crédible pour défendre le continent nord-américain risque de se faire au dépens de nos engagements envers l'Europe. Aux États-Unis, on craint que la mise en relief de la défense continentale dans la nouvelle politique canadienne soit perçue en Europe comme le premier pas sur la voie de l'isolement de l'Amérique du Nord. Souveraineté et sécurité ne sont pas identiques. En fait, la recherche de la première peut conduire au déclin de la seconde. La fragmentation éventuelle de l'Alliance, conséquence inévitable des priorités retenues, est la grande préoccupation des Américains. Le Canada devrait aussi la faire sienne. □

Pour en savoir plus

Jocelyn Coulton, «Une autre voie pour le Canada : La politique de défense», *Paix et Sécurité*, vol. 2, numéro 1, printemps 1987.
David Cox, *La défense continentale : analyse des tendances et perspectives canadiennes*, Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationale, Les Cahiers de l'Institut, No. 2, Ottawa, 1986.
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Joel Sokolsky, «Changement de Cap: La Marine américaine et la sécurité du Canada», *Paix et Sécurité*, Vol. 2, numéro 1, printemps 1987.

COMMENT LES ALLIÉS ONT-IL RÉAGI À la nouvelle politique canadienne en matière de défense ? Quelles que fussent les conditions préalablement convenues pour légitimer le passage du navire de la Garde côtière américaine *Polar Sea* dans l'Arctique, les autorités américaines doivent être en train de se demander si elles avaient bien saisi l'ampleur des répercussions politiques de ce voyage au Canada. Chose certaine, ce voyage a ramené le débat sur la souveraineté. Toutefois, si la souveraineté se rapporte à des droits juridiques, la sécurité suppose l'aptitude à défendre ces droits par la force si les circonstances l'exigent. Le problème, pour le Canada comme pour les États-Unis, c'est que la frontière à protéger commence sur les rives de l'Elbe, et non sur celles du Saint-Laurent. La présence de sous-marins ne changera pas grand-chose aux revendications de souveraineté dans l'Arctique, car en définitive, cette question sera réglée non pas par une intervention technologique en raison du coût. Vu l'évolution rapide des nouvelles technologies relatives aux sondes passives et actives, aux réseaux de traitement de données et aux systèmes de commandement et de contrôle, le risque d'une désuétude prématurée existe véritablement. Le Canada pourrait se trouver en mesure de déployer ses propres sous-marins nucléaires, sans pour autant être capable de trouver ou d'identifier les sous-marins d'attaques soviétiques. Une troisième préoccupation concerne la mission précise qui serait dévolue à ces sous-marins. S'appuierait-elle sur des renseignements recueillis par un accroissement massif de leur matériel, sans toutefois tenir entièrement compte de ce que contient le fonctionnement, la maintenance et la logistique. L'achat d'une douzaine de sous-marins nucléaires est une chose. Le maintien du commandement et du contrôle, le soutien logistique, la formation, la modernisation et l'entretien en sont une autre, tout à

moins, lequel de deux submersibles sous-marins ? Et en cas d'affrontement, l'accès de ses eaux territoriales à ce point à user de la force pour barrer le passage-t-il alors ? Le Canada serait-il un sous-marin soviétique. Que se passerait-il si un sous-marin canadien réussissait à repérer et à identifier un sous-marin soviétique. S'appuierait-elle sur des renseignements recueillis par un accroissement massif de leur matériel, sans toutefois tenir entièrement compte de ce que contient le fonctionnement, la maintenance et la logistique. L'achat d'une douzaine de sous-marins nucléaires est une chose. Le maintien du commandement et du contrôle, le soutien logistique, la formation, la modernisation et l'entretien en sont une autre, tout à

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SOUVERAINETÉ ET SÉCURITÉ: DEUX RÉALITÉS DIFFÉRENTES

*La nouvelle politique du Canada en matière de défense a pour but de
canaliser l'inquiétude du public à propos de la souveraineté terri-
toriale en faveur d'un accroissement des budgets de défense.*

PAR CHARLES F. DORAN

E LE LIVRE BLANC DU GOUVERNE-
ment canadien sur la défense
est un document à la fois
ingénieux et novateur. Sans
négliger les axes d'intervention
traditionnels du Canada comme le
maintien de la paix et la limitation
des armements, l'effort de cana-
dais l'angoisse du peuple canadien
concernant la souveraineté terri-
toriale et d'amener celui-ci à accorder
un soutien renouvelé aux engagements
accrus du Canada au chapitre
de la défense. Tout en mettant l'accent
sur la souveraineté de l'Amérique du
Nord, il prône en contrepoint un
renforcement de la présence cana-
dienne sur le front de l'Europe
centrale. Il cherche à exploiter le
différend juridique avec les États-
Unis à propos du passage du Nord-
Ouest afin de mobiliser l'opinion en
faveur d'une défense sous-marine
à l'égard de l'Union soviétique. Le
livre blanc prouve au moins une
chose quant à la conduite des pays
membres de l'Alliance lorsque il est
question de défense : en l'absence
d'un rôle bien défini sur le plan de
la sécurité, aucun gouvernement ne
sera disposé à accroître sensibi-
lément sa contribution à l'effort de
défense commun. Et plus ce rôle
sera directement lié à la défense du
territoire national, plus un gouver-
nement se risquera à proposer des
augmentations du budget militaire
à son électeur.

Les Canadiens se demandent
peut-être comment tout cela est
perçu à Washington. Mais ils de-
vraient plutôt se poser la question de
savoir quelle sera l'incidence de cette
nouvelle politique sur la capacité des
États-Unis d'assurer la dissuasion en
Europe, et si les Européens con-
tinueront de miser sur cette dissu-
sion et donc sur l'unité de l'Alliance
dont tout dépend.

QUELLE EST DONC LA RÉACTION DES
Américains à la nouvelle proposi-
tion du Canada ? D'une part, il est
sûr que toute augmentation des
budgets militaires proposée par le

Canada. Un autre aspect de la notion
d'assistance militaire est qu'une aug-
mentation, même considérable, des
efforts déployés par le Canada au
chapitre de la défense n'aura qu'une
incidence limitée sur la philosophie
de l'Alliance. Dans cette optique, le
Canada n'est pas un « meneur », mais
un « suiveur ».

Pour séduisant que soit la men-
talité d'assistance militaire et la notion
que « le Canada n'a pas d'ennemis »,
et pour difficile qu'il soit de com-
poser avec elles, comme en font foi
les finesses du Livre blanc, elles
favorisent la confusion qui régit
quant aux rapports entre la souve-
raineté et la sécurité. Au sud du 49e
parallèle, ces notions s'inscrivent
dans une perspective différente. Aux
yeux des États-Unis, les intérêts et les
valeurs politiques du Canada s'as-
sistent à leur, et cette convergence
est à la base même de l'Alliance. Qui
plus est, si le Canada devait assumer
le fardeau des responsabilités dont
on se décharge volontiers sur les
États-Unis, il serait lui aussi en butte
à l'hostilité générale. Pourtant,
Ottawa et à Washington, Toronto
constitue une cible des armes
nucléaires tout autant que Chicago.
En fait, les Américains estiment
que seule une contribution valable
en matière de défense peut donner
aux intérêts collectifs de l'Alliance
des sommes accrues à la défense,
mais aussi de dépenser ces sommes
à-dire dans les domaines où elles
favoriseront le plus les objectifs
de l'Alliance.

DÈS LORS, L'ORIGINE DE LA CONFUSION
entre la souveraineté et la sécurité
devient évidente. Sur le plan de la
défense, l'espace aérien et les terri-
toires sous-marins s'équivalent. Faute
de défendre l'un, impossible de
défendre les autres, et vice-versa.

Mais tous deux doivent être défendus,

soit par des moyens nationaux, soit
par les moyens du partenaire au sein
de l'Alliance. Dans le passé, le
Canada n'a pas voulu déployer
des efforts proportionnés en matière
de défense, mais il n'estimait pas
non plus qu'il pouvait défendre seul
son espace aérien et ses territoires
sous-marins. Si le Canada souhaite
maintenant assumer une plus grande
part de responsabilité à cet égard, les
États-Unis n'y verront rien de bien
inconvenant. Mais cet effort de
défense doit être destiné à répondre
aux besoins de la sécurité, et non
mis au service d'une conception
politique de souveraineté. Parallèle-
ment, cet effort doit être authentique-
ment, et non s'apparenter aux
ombres sur les parois de la grotte de
Platon. Par ailleurs, les aspects de la
défense commune que l'on néglige et
les répercussions de cette négligence
sur la pensée des alliés européens
importent tout autant que n'importe
quelle autre dimension du processus
décisionnel en matière de défense.
Car la sécurité de l'Alliance passe
d'abord par l'Europe. Or, la con-
fiance des Européens est condition-
née par la volonté qu'ils deviennent
leurs partenaires nord-américains de
maintenant des forces d'avant-garde
en Europe et par la capacité des
États-Unis de soutenir la crédibilité
de la dissuasion élargie.

Voilà qui nous amène à l'essentiel
des inquiétudes de l'Europe, et donc
des États-Unis, en ce qui concerne
l'espace sous-marin nord-américain.
À cet égard, il faut absolument em-
pêcher toute dissuasion contre les
impératifs de la sécurité et ceux de la
souveraineté. La surveillance, l'iden-
tification et la défense en tant que
telle sont des activités qui doivent
être menées de façon à renforcer
plutôt qu'à entraver la dissuasion
élargie – dans le cas par exemple
d'Enfin, pour que l'investissement
au chapitre de la défense rapporte un
maximum d'avantages politiques, les

journaliste américaine Elizabeth Pond dans l'hebdomadaire *Die Zeit* du 26 juin 1987, «une légende potentiellement très dangereuse est en train de se constituer: celle qui voudrait que les Allemands ont été abandonnés à leur sort. Et rien n'est fait pour étouffer cette légende dans l'ouest». Ce sentiment d'avoir été «trahi et vendu» par ses alliés accentue chez plusieurs le repli sur la nation. Les verts et certains éléments du SPD discutent de la meilleure façon d'éloigner la RFA des rivalités provoquées par la politique de force entre l'Est et l'Ouest. C'est dans ce contexte que l'on voit resurgir, chez les leaders du SPD, l'expression «Europe centrale».

Dans le camp conservateur, le chancelier Kohl exploite une rennaissance du sentiment national allemand: ses discours traitent de l'unité, de l'identité allemande et du patriotisme.

Selon des sondages récents, deux-tiers des Allemands souhaitent la réunification, mais seulement 8 pourcent croient que ceci se réalisera d'ici dix ans. Non seulement les Allemands recrutaient présentement devant une telle éventualité, mais l'URSS ne voudrait pas se départir de son allié le plus solide en Europe, la République démocratique allemande. Pour les Occidentaux, la République fédérale demeure l'allié le plus important en Europe et le pivot de l'équilibre stratégique entre les deux blocs. Quoiqu'en rêvent les partisans du national-neutalisme, dans un monde essentiellement bipolaire, l'Allemagne ne peut opter qu'entre l'Est ou l'Ouest.

La politique étrangère joue un rôle déterminant pour les Allemands; il est important que ses alliés occidentaux comprennent cette sensibilité. D'autre part, il faut aussi que les Allemands se rappellent que la sécurité et la liberté de leur pays dépendent de son inclusion avec l'Occident. □

Pour en savoir plus

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ont coûté cher à l'Union lors des deux élections régionales tenues le 17 mai 1987 en Rhénanie-Palatin et à Hambourg. Les recrus sensibles enregistrés par les conservateurs les ont contraints à admettre que les propositions de désarmement sont en fait hors d'un débat sur cette question au *Bundstag*. Dans un texte adopté par le *Bundstag*, le gouvernement se prononce «pour une réduction nette et vérifiable en Europe de tous les systèmes nucléaires américains et soviétiques basés au sol et d'une portée de 0 à 1 000 km, en liaison avec l'établissement d'un équilibre conventionnel et avec la suppression planétaire des armes chimiques».

Lors de la crise des euro-missiles à la fin des années 70 et au début des années 80 on a pu observer la monnaie du national-neutalisme sur la scène internationale. Le rapprochement de la gauche et de la droite sur le thème du désarmement a été l'un des principaux participants dans le débat politico-historique d'importance qui agite l'Allemagne depuis juillet 1986. Pour lui, la responsabilité de la guerre et de l'holocauste n'a pas à être rap- portée de façon obsessionnelle à la nouvelle génération. De plus, il prend ses distances par rapport à la politique de désarmement suivie jusqu'ici et se prononce pour l'exportation des armements en dehors des pays de l'Otan.

IL EXISTE EN ALLEMAGNE FÉDÉRALE le sentiment, assez répandu dans les différents partis politiques, que les structures de l'Alliance sont dépassées. La nouvelle génération de politiciens ne s'accoutume pas aussi bien que leurs aînés des impératifs traditionnels de modération en politique extérieure et des invocations constantes du poids du passé. Pour Strass comme pour plusieurs Allemands, on croit que le «découplage» ne sera qu'une question de temps et qu'il n'est pas impossible que les Américains retirent un jour une partie de leurs troupes de l'Europe. Le débat sur la double option zéro a accru la distance entre Allemands et Américains. Comme le soulignait la



Wolfgang Gierzyński

ces termes cette perception de la situation en République fédérale, plus la portée des missiles est faible, plus les effets sont nuisibles. Cette situation leur paraît d'autant plus inacceptable que la double option zéro ne liquidera que 3 pourcent des armes nucléaires des super-puissances stationnées en Europe occidentale. La majorité des armes nucléaires, qui se trouvent pour la plupart en République fédérale, seront destinées, à cause de leur portée «classique», à exploiter sur le sol allemand. Non seulement les super-puissances conservent pour le moment environ 50 000 têtes nucléaires dans leurs super-arsenaux, mais en éliminant les missiles à moyenne et à courte portée, de 500 à 5 500 km, ils liquident uniquement les systèmes qui grèvent le calcul stratégique d'un risque incalculable et facilitent ainsi la limitation ou le contrôle d'un conflit éventuel aux territoires européens à «protéger». Par rapport aux priorités politico-stratégiques, ce désarmement nucléaire laisse craindre le «découplage» nucléaire des États-Unis et la renouveau de la stratégie de dissuasion en Europe.

LES PARTISANS ALLEMANDS DES options zéro affirment que ces craintes ne se justifient absolument pas. Les Américains et leurs alliés garantissent toujours le «couplage» par leur présence physique et conservent encore 4 600 ogives en Europe avec les pièces d'artillerie, bombardiers (F-111) et les sous-marins lanceurs de missiles de croisière. Les hésitations du gouvernement devant les initiatives des super-puissances sur le contrôle des armements

stratégique, la dissuasion, le traité (ABM) de 1972 et les négociations sur le contrôle des armements. Le «modèle canadien» aurait eu la préférence de Bonn s'il était en cours à l'industrie allemande de rechercher des contrats du Pentagone. Le gouvernement du chancelier Helmut Kohl a finalement endossé l'IDS au printemps 1985. De plus, les propositions soviétiques de démantelement des missiles à moyenne et à courte portée en Europe, ont été acceptées par les Américains, puis par l'Angleterre et la France après quelques hésitations, et enfin par la République fédérale après de longues hésitations et une querelle ouverte dans la coalition gouvernementale. Cette dernière préoccupation n'a fait que rendre plus animée encore le débat sur la sécurité en Allemagne.

Pour le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, les termes des Affaires étrangères, la RFA ne peut se permettre de refuser cette occasion d'amorcer la réduction des armements. Cette politique s'inscrit d'ailleurs pour lui dans la communauté de la politique extérieure allemande et les propositions soviétiques ont de plus le mérite de répondre directement aux exigences exprimées par Bonn depuis la fin des années 70. Enfin, Genscher rappelle que la République fédérale ne peut pas s'isoler ni s'opposer à la volonté des deux superpuissances de modifier la situation militaire en Europe.

Les députés de l'Union chrétienne démocrate (CDU-CSU), ont fait front aux États-Unis pendant plusieurs semaines. Les arguments du ministre de la défense, Manfred Wörner (CDU), peuvent se résumer ainsi. La France et l'Angleterre peuvent permettre d'être en faveur du «double zéro» car ils produisent eux-mêmes leur propre sécurité. Les Américains, pour leur part, ont un intérêt naturel à retirer toutes les armes à moyenne et à longue portée qui pourraient toucher l'URSS et qui risqueraient de les entraîner presque automatiquement dans une escalade incontrôlable en cas de guerre. Avec la double option zéro il ne subsiste-rait plus que les missiles d'une portée inférieure à 500 km. En d'autres termes, les responsables de la politique de sécurité de l'Union redoutent que les missiles à courte portée soviétiques qui restent en puissance frappent que la République fédérale et en entraînent du même coup un des pays les plus menacés d'Europe occidentale. L'un des députés de la CDU, Volker Rühe, a exprimé en

OU VA L'ALLEMAGNE?

Les initiatives de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev en matière de contrôle des armements, et les réactions américaines à celles-ci, ont semblé donner une nouvelle dimension au débat sur la sécurité et l'identité en Allemagne de l'Ouest.

PAR PAUL LETOURNEAU

Gorbatchev en matière de contrôle des armements, et les réactions américaines à celles-ci, ont semblé donner une nouvelle dimension au débat sur la sécurité qui agite l'Allemagne de l'Ouest depuis plusieurs années. L'idée de par-dessus leurs têtes en matière de sécurité européenne inquiète les Allemands. Ceux-ci ressentent visiblement le besoin de réagir, mais comment ? Se réfugièrent-ils dans le national-neutralisme qui semble avoir fait beaucoup de gains récemment ?

DEPUIS SA CRÉATION EN 1949, L'A
RFA a opté pour l'ancrage à l'Ouest.
Située au point de rencontre entre le
bloc de l'Est et celui de l'Ouest,
dénudatrice, elle ne peut se dé-
fendre toute seule et à absolument
besoin d'alliés pour préserver sa
liberté. Elle compte beaucoup sur
l'OTAN à cet égard. Bonn s'est
jusqu'ici très attachée à
l'Union soviétique et à la solidarité
entre alliés ; elle a parfois opté pour
un resserrement particulier des liens
avec Paris afin de limiter quelque
peu l'emprise américaine. Mais elle
est bien consciente que la protection
nucléaire française ne peut être un
substitut au parapluie nucléaire

Depuis 1969, les gouvernements qui se succèdent à Bonn se sont efforcés généralement d'éviter les tensions en Europe centrale, de contribuer à la détente Est-Ouest, de développer les liens entre les deux Allemagnes et de favoriser la politique de contrôle des armements. De plus, à l'initiative de l'Otan, dont ils sont membres depuis 1955, ils ont insisté sur le renforcement de la dissuasion, sur la nécessité de partager le risque nucléaire avec leurs partenaires occidentaux en les déployant pas uniquement les armes nucléaires sur leur territoire.

Ces dernières années, un fort mouvement de remise en question

S'il est vrai qu'au début de l'été 1987 le chef du parti, Willy Brandt, s'est retiré et qu'il a été remplacé par un modeste, Hans-Jochen Vogel, il est aussi juste de rappeler que le ministre président de la Sarre, Oskar Lafontaine, a été élu à la même occasion avec une forte majorité dans le triumvirat dirigeant du parti. Ce dernier partit ouvertement du retrait graduel de la RFA de l'OTAN et de la nécessaire pour l'Allemagne d'adopter un rôle de «pont» entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Ces idées sont aussi celles d'Egon Bahr, d'Erhard Eppler et de plusieurs autres membres influents du SPD. L'aile gauche du parti, qui est fort proche des idées nationales-neutrialistes, impose de manière croissante ses vues dans le SPD.

Lorsque le gouvernement de coalition libérale-conservatrice (FDP et CDU-CSU), a pu le pouvoir à l'automne 1987, la politique extérieure et de sécurité s'est inscrite dans la continuité avec l'ère Schmidt.

A ceci se sont ajoutées deux priorités bien identifiées : faire entrer par la *Bundesrat* le détroitement des euro-missiles si l'URSS n'acceptait pas l'option zéro et le réajail de bonnes relations avec Washington. La première mesure, lorsqu'elle fut acceptée par la nouvelle majorité gouvernementale, mit fin à un débat sans précédent en Allemagne fédérale. La seconde en revanche était beaucoup plus délicate. Le gouvernement désirait se montrer plus conciliant envers l'administration Reagan, quoiqu'il redoutait l'impact qu'aurait l'initative de défense stratégique (IDS) sur les relations Est-Ouest. Il lui était très difficile de critiquer ouvertement l'IDS. A Bonon redoutait que par cette mesure plusieurs composantes de l'équilibre stratégique soient remises en question : plus particulièrement la partie

tendance à placer la politique dans un contexte moral a entraîné des résultats ironiques. Alors même que les Etats-Unis se targuent de «vénération la vie» et de tenir en haute considération les droits de la personne, c'est en fait Washington et la plupart de ses alliés qui ont fait ressortir l'utilité de la menace nucléaire et qui ont, les premiers, défendu la valeur politique des technologies de destruction de masses. L'Occident civilisé est le promoteur numéro un d'un moyen très peu civilisé de faire la guerre. Le pharisaïsme des Etats-Unis (et, de façon plus générale, de l'Occident) a contribué dans une large part à cet aveuglement qui nous empêche, nous les «peuples libres», de voir que nous avons choisi de lier la sécurité de nos nations à une machine de destruction planétaire.


DANS LE MÊME DISCOURS OÙ IL définit la possession de l'arme atomique à une «mission sacrée», le président Truman a également lancé un avertissement. «Pour notre part», a-t-il dit, «nous devons chercher à comprendre les problèmes spéciaux des autres nations. Nous devons légitimement à la sécurité telle qu'ils la conçoivent.» Cette observation, très perçante sur le plan politique, définit la condition *sine qua non* d'une diplomatie américaine efficace.

Malheureusement, la graine est tombée dans une terre hostile. Les dogmes pharisaïques et chauvins étaient toujours très prisés, et pas uniquement chez les Bolcheviks. Dans leur expression populiste américaine, renforcée par un orgueil technologique très marqué, nous

trouvons quelques-uns des racines d'une course aux armements effrénée qui échappe encore à toute maîtrise. La fierté peut être, parfois, une émo-

tion nationale. □
encore un ennemi tenace de l'intérêt national. Les visées d'un pays sont bonnes en soi (par exemple, la défense et l'élargissement des «libertés»), les moyens militaires sélectionnés pour parvenir à ces fins seront probablement jugés plus légitimes que si ces mêmes moyens se trouvaient aux mains d'autres Etats. C'est l'arsenal nucléaire de l'Occident qui fait peser la vraie menace, car de «notre côté», les fins hono-

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l'accent sur l'incompatibilité présumée des valeurs fondamentales, ce moralisme tend à occulter les possibilités de collaboration fondées sur des intérêts mutuels (comme la prévention et la gestion des crises régionales). À cause de lui, il s'est avéré très difficile de conclure tout accord entre les Etats-Unis : après tout, qui ne fasse pas droit à la prédominance des Etats-Unis : après tout, peut-on vraiment attendre ce qu'un pays moralement supérieur se contente de la simple partie ? Toujours à cause de ce moralisme, on a également manqué un nombre important d'occasions de réduire les tensions et de limiter la rivalité militaire. Une de ces occasions s'est

notamment présentée vers la fin des années 1950, lorsque Moscou se trouvait sous la houlette de Nikita Khrouchtchev, partisan de la réforme et de la déstalinisation, qui faisait des ouvertures prometteuses en direction de l'Occident. Le moralisme des Etats-Unis a nui à la formulation de réponses positives qui, à long

terme, auraient presque sûrement favorisé la sécurité des Etats-Unis. Enfin, la prétention à la supériorité morale facilite la confusion entre les fins et les moyens. Si les visées d'un pays sont bonnes en soi (par exemple, la défense et l'élargissement des «libertés»), les moyens militaires sélectionnés pour parvenir à ces fins seront probablement jugés plus légitimes que si ces mêmes moyens se

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C'est une certaine responsabilité que nous devons assumer. Remercions le Seigneur qu'elle retombe sur nos épaules plutôt que sur celles de nos ennemis, et prions qu'il nous aide à exploiter cette force comme il l'entend. La puissance extraordinaire du nucléaire était terrifiante, d'une certaine façon, mais au moins elle était entre de bonnes mains. Cions ici les propos tenus par Truman dans son discours du 27 octobre 1945, jour de la Marine : «Le fait que nous possédions cette arme, et toute autre arme nouvelle, ne pose aucune menace pour quelque nation que ce soit... Que nous soyons les détenteurs... de cette nouvelle force de destruction nous apparaît comme une mission sacrée.»

Des le début se sont esquisssés les thèmes et les présomptions qui, de nos jours, caractérisent souvent la pensée américaine sur les armes nucléaires. Il y a, par exemple, la notion que les Etats-Unis ont le droit et le devoir d'agir dans l'intérêt de toute l'humanité. La puissance de l'Eat américain, contrairement à celle d'autres Etats, doit inspirer confiance. Comme les Américains n'ont que des intentions bénignes, la puissance militaire de ce pays ne pose aucun problème, sauf pour les «agresseurs». Seuls les pays incarnant «le mal» ont raison de craindre la force des Américains. Les armes nucléaires, donc, n'ont rien de répréhensible tant qu'elles sont détenues par une puissance strictement défensive comme les Etats-Unis.

Parfois, on va jusqu'à prétendre que les adversaires eux-mêmes reconnaissent la nature passive de l'arsenal américain. Eugene Rostow, un ancien directeur de la US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a écrit en 1984 : «Le gouvernement soviétique a compté depuis belle lurette qu'il ne court pas le risque d'une attaque armée.» «Nous pouvons être certains», affirment les auteurs de *A Forward Strategy for America*, «texte publié par le Foreign Policy Research Institute en 1961, «que les stratégies soviétiques comprennent fort bien que le réseau des bases américaines d'outre-mer constitue un instrument de défense et de représailles, et non un instrument offensif-préemptif. Nos véritables intentions stratégiques sont donc faciles à deviner pour eux.» (En fait, comme l'ont montré David Alan Rosenberg et d'autres, la préposition d'un élément essentiel de la stra-

d'avantage la sécurité de l'Occident. En deuxième lieu, le moralisme entraînera la diplomatie. En mettant

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PHARISAÏSME ET STRATÉGIE NUCLEAIRE

La propension des Etats-Unis à placer le débat nucléaire sur des assises morales aux dépens de l'analyse pragmatique a compromis la sécurité de l'Occident.

PAR ROBERT W. MALCOLMSON

AU PLUS FORT DE LA GUERRE froide, vers le début des années 1950, le distingué politologue et praticien du

réalisme, Hans Morganthau, a fait ressortir une dimension essentielle de la politique étrangère américaine.

Il a dit à propos de son gouvernement : « Notre conduite sur la scène internationale a été régie, comme il se doit pour toute nation, par le principe de l'affirmation politique; mais nous avons été portés à concevoir nos actions de manière non politique et moralisatrice. » Il n'est pas simple-

ment question, ici, de cette prétention compréhensible et quasi universelle qui consiste à juger ses propres intentions sous un jour favorable. Ce qui est plutôt en cause, c'est la tendance persistante des Etats-Unis à moraliser les rapports de puissance aux dépens de l'analyse pragmatique. Et pour rassurant qu'il puisse être à court terme, ce moralisme n'a pas joué en faveur de l'Occident.

Les armes de destruction sont amoralées en soi. Elles n'acquiescent le signification « morale » que dans un certain contexte et comme instrumentes au service de visées politiques. Les armes nucléaires ne sont guère différentes, si ce n'est à un égard fondamental : avec elles, les tueries massives sont détrôinées et la capacité de destruction est à ce point illimitée, terrifiante et quasi instantanée qu'aucune défense n'est envisageable. Meux, devant un tel instrument de mort, la notion de «défense» n'a plus aucune signification. Il est maintenant si facile de détruire qu'une défense unilatérale n'a tant soit peu efficace n'est pas seulement difficile à réaliser : elle est logiquement impossible (la perfection n'étant pas de ce monde). En cette fin de 20^e siècle, telle est la nouvelle réalité technologique. C'est une réalité qui n'a rien à voir avec la moralité, la religion, ou d'autres valeurs.

L'Occident a été le premier, avec une bonne longueur d'avance, à posséder des armes de destruction massive. La puissance aérienne était un atout anglo-américain traditionnel, et le bombardement de saturation a compté parmi les éléments clefs de la stratégie alliée occidentale durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

L'URSS et l'Allemagne étaient fortes sur le terrain, mais l'Occident jouissait d'une supériorité écrasante dans les airs. La bombe atomique est venue renforcer l'attachement des Etats-Unis à une politique de sécurité

fondée sur la prédominance aérienne. Etant donné la brutalité du stalinisme dans l'après-guerre, une politique axée sur la suprématie aéro-atomique semblait, aux yeux de la plupart des citoyens des Etats-Unis et du reste de l'Occident, à la fois justifiée, pratique (c'est-à-dire relativement peu coûteuse), cohé-

rente et, vu la tyrannie de Staline, suffisamment morale.

De graves problèmes n'ont com-

mené à se faire jour qu'au moment, prédit en 1945 déjà par des scientifiques et d'autres experts, où l'Est a pu acquérir à son tour cette capacité de destruction massive. La supré-

matie aéro-atomique des Etats-Unis avait duré moins d'une génération. Les Américains n'ont pas perdu cette

suprématie; ce sont plutôt les Soviétiques qui la leur ont arrachée, et il n'y avait rien que Washington eût pu faire pour les en empêcher, sauf de

clencher une guerre préventive. La nature même de la menace nucléaire voulait que l'aspect technique des

systèmes d'arme perde beaucoup de la vulnérabilité n'était conditionnée par les seules évolutions techniques.

L'objectif de la «supériorité technologique», même s'il en était tout-à-fait vide de presque toute signification politico-stratégique, L'URSS

s'est essentiellement dotée des

mêmes capacités destructrices que les Etats-Unis. Sur ce plan, elle a accédé au rang d'égale. Mais sous la plupart des autres rapports, du moins pour les Américains, l'URSS demeurait inférieure, surtout en ce qui avait trait à ses intentions et à

ON PEUT IMAGINER LA CONFUSION QUI s'est installée dans bien des esprits. Apparaissant, l'Union soviétique pas-

sait pour inférieure au plan de ses intentions et de ses moyens de les mettre en oeuvre. Cette convergence

des politiques. Mais de quelle façon les Etats-Unis devaient-ils s'y prendre pour composer avec une supériorité

sauve rivalité qui était désormais inévitable sur le plan moral ? La réalité naissante de la puissance

nucéaire soviétique a en quelque sorte fait bifurquer la pensée améri-

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12 **LETTRE DE PARIS** PAR JOCELYN COULON *Observations sur l'unique consensus national existant en France au sujet de la politique de défense.*

Brian Urquhart était autrefois Secrétaire général adjoint aux affaires politiques spéciales, aux Nations-Unies. Il est actuellement expert invité à la Fondation Ford, à New York; Robert Malcolmson est professeur d'histoire à l'Université Queen's, à Kingston; Paul Létourneau est professeur d'études internationales et stratégiques au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, à Saint-Jean (Québec); Charles Doran est professeur de relations internationales et Directeur du Center of Canadian Studies à la Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, à Washington (D.C.); James Eayrs est professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université Dalhousie, à Halifax; Jocelyn Coulon est chargé de la chronique des affaires internationales au journal *Le Devoir* et de la rubrique des livres pour le magazine *Paix et Sécurité*.

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14 **CONDENSE SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS**

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18 **LIVRES**

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LES CARIÈRES DE L'INSTITUT

1. La rivalité entre les super-puissances et la politique soviétique dans le bassin des Caraïbes par Neil MacFarlane, juin 1986, 70 pages.

2. La défense continental: analyses des tendances et perspectives canadienne par David Cox, décembre 1986, 64 pages.

GUIDE ANNUEL

Introduction aux politiques étrangères relatives à la limitation des armements, au désarmement, à la défense et à la solution des conflits, 1986-1987, 300 pages.

PROPOS

9. Le scénario du non-recours à la première frappe nucléaire: remise en question et hypothèses par David Cox, novembre 1986.

10. Le débat sur l'éducation à la paix par Elizabeth Robinson, décembre 1986.

11. Le désarmement nucléaire et l'initiative Gorbatchev par John R. Walker, janvier 1987.

12. Qui est en tête? Analyse sur l'équilibre nucléaire par Jane Boulden, mars 1987.

13. Les négociations de Genève sur la réduction des armes stratégiques par David Cox, juin 1987.

14. Document de Stockholm: Historique, bien-fondé et instances politiques par C.A. Namiesniowski.

15. Le maintien de la paix et la gestion des conflits internationaux par Henry Dufour, octobre 1987.

OPINIONS

2. Les armes nucléaires et la prévention de la guerre par Robert Malcolmson, octobre 1986.

3. La limitation des désarmement dans les médias canadiens par John Dufour, mars 1987.

4. Sauvegarder la paix et la liberté: la dissuasion nucléaire et la limitation des armements par Lorne Green, mars 1987.

RAPPORTS

3. Les risques de guerre nucléaire accidentelle par Andra Demchuk, 1986.

4. Paix, développement de sécurité dans le Bassin des Caraïbes : Perspectives d'évolution d'ici l'an 2000. Compte rendu de la Conférence sur la paix, développement et sécurité dans le Bassin des Caraïbes, Kingston, Jamaïque, du 22 au 25 mars 1987, par Lloyd Seawar.

Dénigrer l'ONU est depuis

toujours un passe-temps favori d'a

peu près n'importe quel groupe

des critiques d'un nouveau genre,

à caractère idéologique et au ton

résolu, ont été formulées; elles

émanant de personnes et d'organisations

qui n'aiment pas l'ONU et qui ne l'ont

jamais aimée. Cependant, la plupart

des reproches qu'on adresse à l'ONU

sont, comme toujours, inspirés par

le cynisme et la déception. Dans ce

contexte, notre article-thème rédigé

par un ancien secrétaire général

adjoint de l'ONU sur le rôle que

celle-ci joue dans les efforts de

ployés pour trouver une solution au

conflit du Moyen-Orient pourrait

sembler, à prime abord, tenir de la

sortisse la plus pure.

Il existe pourtant un autre point de

vue utile à prendre en considération

quand on lit ce texte de Brian

Urquhart, à savoir que le conflit du

Moyen-Orient est tellement dangereux

qu'on ne peut se permettre de

ne pas tout mettre en oeuvre pour

essayer de le régler. Et aux yeux de

M. Urquhart, le Conseil de sécurité

constitue une des voies possibles.

M. Urquhart n'est pas plein d'espoir

quant aux chances de résoudre le

dilemme, mais il est convaincu qu'il

faul essayer; il définit avec précision

les conditions minimales à remplir

pour trouver une solution, et il

montre avec persuation comment un

Conseil de sécurité revivifié peut

satisfaire à ces conditions mieux que

n'importe quelle autre instance.

Les choses bougent au Conseil de

sécurité depuis quelques semaines.

Pour la première fois autant qu'on se

souviennne, les cinq membres per-

manents se sont entendus sur la réso-

lution 598 que le Conseil a adoptée

en juillet et par laquelle il menace

d'imposer un embargo obligatoire

sur les ventes d'armes destinées à

des belligérants (dans ce cas-ci,

l'Iran et l'Iraq). Au moment où nous

allions mettre sous presse, le Secré-

taire général de l'ONU, M. Javier

Pérez de Cuellar, partait pour Téhéran

et Bagdad afin de discuter des mesu-

res à prendre pour instaurer un

cesses-le-feu. Il échouera sans

doute, mais sait-on jamais? Comme

le fait observer M. Urquhart, c'est

précisément pour qu'il intervienne

dans de pareilles situations qu'on a

créé le Conseil de sécurité à l'origine,

c'est-à-dire pour qu'il «règle par des

moyens pacifiques des conflits cons-

tituant par ailleurs une menace pour

la paix internationale». Bien sûr, le

Conseil de sécurité n'exerce que les

pouvoirs que les cinq membres per-

manents décident de lui donner. Dans

le cas du conflit irano-irakien, ils lui

en ont conférés beaucoup. Quelles

concessions sont-ils maintenant

disposés à faire pour commencer à

PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

Bureau de rédaction : Nancy Gordon, David Cox, Diane DeMille, Mary Taylor, John Walker

Rédacteur en chef : Michael Bryans

Rédactrice en chef adjointe : Hélène Sanson

Rédacteur de la chronique : Jocelyn Coulon

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appliquer l'autre différend qui divise

le Moyen-Orient?

Dans d'autres articles du présent

numéro de *Paix et Sécurité*, deux

auteurs analysent la nouvelle poli-

tique canadienne de défense déposée

à la Chambre des communes en

juin dernier. Charles Doran dirige le

programme de études canadiennes

Washington (D.C.); jusqu'à septem-

bre 1987, James Fayrs était profes-

seur invité de sciences politiques à

l'Université d'Ottago, à Dunedin

(Nouvelle-Zélande).

L'article de Paul Léourneau

aide les étrangers à comprendre les

causes profondes du dilemme ouest-

allemand et présente les partis et les

personnalités qui interviennent dans

le débat que ce pays tient sur son

rôle dans l'Alliance occidentale.

M. Léourneau est professeur

d'études stratégiques au Collège mili-

taire royal de Saint-Jean; il est actuel-

lement en congé sabbatique pour

effectuer des recherches dans la

république ouest-allemande.

Enfin, l'historien Robert Mal-

colmson, de l'Université Queen's,

réfléchit sur ce qu'il perçoit comme

étant l'influence négative du parti-

sisme dans la culture politique

américaine.

Michael Bryans

Paix et Sécurité paraît tous

les trois mois; ce bulletin vise

à informer la population

canadienne sur les activités

des questions susmention-

nées. Les opinions formulées

dans chaque article sont ex-

clusivement celles de l'auteur.

N'hésitez pas à nous faire part

de vos observations et idées.

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
PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

L'ONU ET LE

MOYEN-ORIENT

Discrédité, voire délabré
l'après certains, le
Conseil de sécurité
peut-il devenir un
mécanisme utile dans
la recherche de la paix ?

Par Brian Urquhart



Dans le présent numéro:

Robert Malcolmson
La propension des États-
Unis à placer sur des as-
sises morales les questions
concernant les relations
internationales à compro-
mis la sécurité de l'Ouest.

Paul Létourneau
La possibilité d'un traité
américano-soviétique
sur les missiles INF a
redonné de la vigueur, en
Allemagne de l'Ouest, à
la politique de défense.

Charles Doran
La politique du Canada en
matière de défense cherche
à exploiter le différent op-
posant Ottawa à Washington
afin de favoriser l'accroisse-
ment du budget de défense.

James Eayrs
L'engagement que le gou-
vernement a pris de cons-
truire des sous-marins à
propulsion nucléaire n'est
pas justifié.

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PEACE & SECURITY

WHERE DOES CANADA'S SECURITY LIE?

*An extensive survey
sponsored by CIIPS looks
at how Canadians view
peace, security and
the superpowers.*

By Don Munton



Gérard Hervouet

Vietnam faces a grim future outside the community of nations.

Jane Boulden

After the INF Treaty in December attention now shifts to strategic arms reductions and the future of Star Wars.

Boyce Richardson

Nations are ready to fight over water. Can the UN Environment Programme help resolve disputes?

Francine Lecours

Iran's revolutionary government has inherited the Shah's vision of Iran as regional superpower.

Also in this issue:

Institute Publications 1987-88

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

2. **Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective**, by David Cox, December 1986, 50 pages.

3. **Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities**, by Ronald G. Purver, January 1988.

ANNUAL REVIEW

A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1986-87, 270 pages.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

9. **A Second Look at No First Use**, by Fen Osler Hampson, November 1986.

10. **The Debate About Peace Education**, by Elizabeth Richards, December 1986.

11. **Nuclear Disarmament: The Gorbachev Initiative**, by John R. Walker, January 1987.

12. **Who's Ahead: Examining the Nuclear Balance**, by Jane Boulden, March 1987.

13. **Review of the Geneva Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions**, by David Cox, June 1987.

14. **The Stockholm Agreement: An Exercise in Confidence Building**, by C.A. Namiesniowski, August 1987.

15. **Peacekeeping and the Management of International Conflict**, by Henry Wiseman, September 1987.

16. **Accidental Nuclear War: Reducing the Risks**, by Dianne DeMille, January 1988.

POINTS OF VIEW

2. **Nuclear Weapons and the Averting of War**, by Robert Malcolmson, October 1986.

3. **Canadian Press Coverage of Arms Control and Disarmament Issues**, by John R. Walker, March 1987.

4. **Maintaining Peace With Freedom: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control**, by Lorne Green, March 1987.

5. **Towards a World Space Organization**, by Elisabeth Mann Borgese, November 1987.

CONFERENCE REPORTS

4. **Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean: Perspectives to the Year 2000**, Proceedings of a Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 22-25 March 1987, by Lloyd Searwar.

5. **Measures for Peace in Central America**, 8-9 May 1987, by Liisa North, December 1987.

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

With this issue's cover story by **Don Munton**, CIIPS releases results of a public opinion survey of Canadian attitudes and opinions on a wide variety of peace and security issues. Unlike omnibus public opinion surveys that ask a few questions on everything from Party loyalty to preference in laundry detergent, the CIIPS poll deals solely with Canadians' concerns about international peace and security.

Munton's article concentrates on one element of the survey – Canadian views on the policies and behaviour of the superpowers. A piece of the poll not mentioned in the article attracted this writer's attention. The survey probes the extent to which Canadians see increased military power by the Western nations as adding to their security or to the chance for peace. Most believe that it does not. However, when asked specifically about the size of the Canadian military effort, more than six out of ten said it should be "larger."

This seems at first glance a flat contradiction. How can people hold these two ideas in their heads at the same time? One can only speculate on how each individual

rationalizes the apparent contradiction; here are a few guesses:

Military power is intimately connected to national pride; could the Canada-US free trade deal, impending for many months, cause people to compensate for what they perceive as a 'loss' of national esteem by bolstering it in another area? Canadians want Canada to be taken seriously on the world stage, if it is seen that we are 'not pulling our weight,' is that a reason to increase the size of our forces? Canadians have a benign self-image; unlike the great powers we have never threatened anyone. Is it therefore alright for Canada to increase its forces while it is not alright for other nations?

None of these conjectures may be correct; nevertheless, the attitudes revealed in the survey are another reminder of how military power and citizens' feelings about their own and their country's security, are bound up in the history and politics of a people.

In the other articles for this issue, **Gérard Hervouet** of Université Laval reports on the grim situation he found during a recent visit to Vietnam; **Jane Boulden**, author of CIIPS Background Paper *Who's Ahead: Examining The*

Nuclear Balance, looks at prospects for more progress on arms reductions in light of the superpower dispute over the real meaning of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty; **Boyce Richardson**, Ottawa freelance writer and filmmaker, points to the United Nations Environment Programme as a potentially useful mechanism for settling international disputes over water resources; and **Francine Lecours**, CIIPS research assistant, shows how the desire of Iran to influence the politics of the entire Middle East transcends the differences between the Shah's regime and Khomeini's revolutionary government.

Peace & Security has a new Editorial Board. The chairman is **Nancy Gordon**, CIIPS Director of Public Programmes. New to the Board are: **Roger Hill**, CIIPS Director of Research; **Hilary Mackenzie**, member of the Ottawa bureau of *Maclean's Magazine*; and **Madeleine Poulin**, journalist and co-host of Radio-Canada's *Le Point*. **David Cox**, formerly of the Institute, remains a member of Editorial Board.

Michael Bryans

CANADIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY

307 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0P7
(613) 990-1593

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Don Munton is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia; **Gérard Hervouet** is Professor of Political Science at Université Laval. Mr. Hervouet was in Hanoi in the summer of 1987 at the invitation of Vietnam's Institute for International Relations; **Jane Boulden** was a research assistant at CIIPS and is currently a graduate student in political studies at Queen's University; **Boyce Richardson** is a filmmaker and writer based in Ottawa; **Francine Lecours** is a research assistant at the Institute; and **David Gollob** is CBC Radio News Latin American correspondent.

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MOST CANADIANS NOW perceive the policies and weaponry of both superpowers, not just the USSR, as the major problem in East-West relations. The present nuclear stockpiles of both superpowers are regarded as increasing the likelihood of war rather than decreasing it. These are among the major findings of a 1987 public opinion poll sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

The survey, carried out prior to December's Soviet-American treaty on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, shows a striking tendency overall to evaluate negatively the

seem, disagree. Few apparently regard a Soviet nuclear attack as likely. The greatest threat, most seem to be saying, lies in an unstable relationship between the superpowers and in the possible escalation of a regional conflict.

THE CIIPS SURVEY RESULTS ARE borne out by another survey done at about the same time for the Department of External Affairs. Asked which of a list of possible causes was most responsible for tensions between East and West, a near majority of the External Affairs survey respondents chose "a lack of trust" between East and West. Once again, only a small minority pointed to Soviet policies.

Canadians currently are as likely to blame the US as the USSR for recent tensions and to view certain American policies as negatively as Soviet policies. In the External Affairs survey, while about one in every seven or eight (13%) indicated East-West tensions had arisen from Soviet attempts to increase their power and influence, a similar proportion (13%) thought tensions were caused by American attempts to increase their power and influence.

Respondents to the CIIPS survey were less even-handed in their evaluations of responsibility for the state of relations between East and West. Of those who saw an improvement in these relations in recent years, many more (40%) regarded the USSR as responsible for this improvement than thought the US responsible (10%). Of those who saw deterioration in relations, at least up to mid-1987, most blamed the United States.

Canadians seem to be rather wary, at best, of the basic thrust of both superpowers' policies. Eight out of ten (79%) believe the USSR is trying to increase its influence in the world today. But eight out of ten (81%) also believe the US is trying to increase its influence. Few, only 20%, believe either power is more or less content with its present influence.

Confidence in the ability of each superpower to deal wisely with present world problems is also low. Once again, Canadians' skepticism is clear and the same parallelism emerged almost as strongly. Less than four out of every ten Canadians

(38%) expressed very great or considerable confidence in the ability of the United States. Over six in ten expressed little, very little or no confidence (62%). On the other hand, and even more surprisingly, almost three in ten expressed very great or considerable confidence in the Soviet Union's ability to deal wisely with the world's problems while seven in ten expressed little, very little or no confidence (28% vs 73%).

In short, overall confidence in American policy was not much higher than that in Soviet policy. (See chart) Although historical public opinion data are thin it seems that forty years of cold peace with the USSR, including a decade of detente, as well as a few years of Mikhail Gorbachev's appealing diplomacy, have persuaded Canadians that Soviet handling of world problems is not all bad. Conversely, a few decades of US foreign policy problems, including Vietnam and Nicaragua, topped by a term or two of Ronald Reagan's simplistic and sometimes bellicose rhetoric, have persuaded Canadians that American handling of world problems is not all good.

Identical questions were also asked in the CIIPS survey regarding how trustworthy Reagan and Gorbachev were on nuclear and arms control issues. Few found either of them very trustworthy. About half perceived the two leaders "somewhat" trustworthy and half regarded them as not very or not at all trustworthy. Fewer of those questioned regarded the American leadership as genuinely interested in disarmament than regarded the Soviets as such (37% to 46%).

During the cold war period most Canadians had essentially positive perceptions about the US and essentially negative perceptions of the USSR. It is no longer so. Perhaps most striking of all in the 1987 survey is an evident tendency on the part of many individual Canadians to be negative about both superpowers' policies.

Fully one in three (32%) found neither leader trustworthy on arms control. In contrast, 11% regarded Ronald Reagan as trustworthy and

SUPERPOWERS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A recent survey commissioned by CIIPS shows most Canadians perceive the policies of both superpowers, not just the Soviet Union, as the major threat to national security.

policies, nuclear and otherwise, of both superpowers. While some of these perceptions of Canadians may have already become more positive as a result of the Washington summit agreement, it is unlikely this dramatic event has much affected the apparent balance in these views or the tendency to perceive Soviet and American policies in a similar light.

Respondents to the survey were asked what posed the greatest threat to world peace. Very few pointed to the USSR. Only one in every twenty (5%) said Soviet actions on the international scene were the greatest threat. About the same number (8%) thought it to be American actions. On the other hand, fully one quarter believed the superpower arms race was the greatest threat. Finally, approximately equal groups thought that the spread of nuclear weapons to smaller countries and the Middle East situation were the greatest threats (29% and 27%, respectively).

These findings, it might be noted, contradict the assumption of the Canadian government's White Paper on Defence that "the principal direct threat to Canada continues to be a nuclear attack on North America by the Soviet Union." Canadians, it would

BY DON MUNTON

Gorbachev as not trustworthy; that is, only one in ten Canadians seem to have the traditional cold war set of perceptions. More, in fact, have the opposite view; 17% regarded Reagan as not trustworthy and Gorbachev as trustworthy. The rest, around 40%, found both at least somewhat trustworthy on arms control. (See chart)

THIS "PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR policies" sentiment emerges even more prominently on the other parallel questions. Almost half of those surveyed (46%) believed neither superpower leadership was genuinely interested in disarmament. Nearly six in ten (57%) expressed little or no confidence in both the American and the Soviet ability to handle world problems. And almost seven in ten (68%) believed both the US and USSR are trying to increase their areas of influence.

How then to best preserve the peace? Asked about the measures that would best do so, Canadians rejected increased weaponry and supported reductions of nuclear weapons. The CIIPS survey posed the following alternative statements: "Some people think that the best way to prevent war is for the West to increase its military strength so as to be more powerful than the Soviets. Others think that this would speed up the arms race and may lead to war." They were then asked: "What do you think? Should the West try to increase its military strength or not?" By more than a three to one margin (71% to 29%) Canadians said the West should not increase its military strength.

This prescription represents a substantial shift in attitude from the early 1960s. Exactly the same question was asked in a 1962 national survey conducted by the Canadian Peace Research Institute. At that time, almost six out of ten Canadians (58%) believed the best way to prevent war would be for the West to increase its military strength and gain superiority. Only about one in three (32%) thought the West should not increase its military capability. This pattern, twenty-five years later, is now reversed.

The CIIPS respondents were also asked in the mid-1987 survey whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that "the security of Western countries could best be increased by substantial reductions in both American and Soviet nuclear weapons." Over 80% agreed or strongly agreed. The spring 1987 External Affairs survey posed two related questions – whether the "existence" of nuclear weapons and whether current nuclear practices and developments make war less likely or more likely. A clear majority said both make war more likely (54% and 59%, respectively). Distinct minorities thought these factors made war less likely (33% and 28%, respectively). (The pattern of responses to the second of these questions, that concerning nuclear

"practices and developments," would likely be different following December's missile agreement.) IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE CLEAR WHAT these findings about Canadian attitudes do not show. They do not suggest a rampant anti-Americanism. It is not America Canadians are negative about, nor Americans. It is certain American policies. Nor do these findings provide evidence of some sort of "moral equivalence" thinking. There is no equivalence of Soviet and American social or political systems implied here. There is strong evidence, however, of a new tendency to distrust and be critical of both superpowers – of a new 'anti-superpowerism.' It would also be tempting but wrong to cast Canadians' negative images of American policies as

entirely a product of the Reagan era. The American defence build-up of the 1980s and the tough talk of various US spokesmen have undoubtedly had some impact on Canadian and other allied publics' views. But the sources of discontent are also deeper. The new mood would seem to arise from the high hopes, but ultimate failure, of the detente period, and especially from the promise, but now widely recognized illusion, of US-USSR arms control in the 1970s. The first two strategic weapons agreements (SALT I and II), most people appear to understand, controlled only the rate of growth of superpower nuclear weapons. The consequences of this fact, the enormous arsenals which are yet to be reduced even after December's summit, and the technological race which continues as yet unabated, are widely deplored by the public in Canada as in other Western countries. And the argument that the weapons are, on our side, necessary for maintaining our security, is simply no longer accepted. That a start has been made to reducing these arsenals may well cause a shift in some perceptions. No radical alteration should be expected in the present tendency to perceive the two superpowers' policies in a more equivalent light. Rather, the December summit in Washington will probably result in a more positive view of both Soviet and American arms control and foreign policies alike. The intermediate-range missile agreement, however welcome, is unlikely to be seen by most Western publics as an American accomplishment. It is therefore unlikely to be of relative advantage to Washington in influencing Western publics. Nor is the agreement likely to be seen as sufficient by itself to solve the security problem central to Canadians and others today – an overabundance of military weaponry and decided lack of political accommodation. These attitudes, distinctly post-cold war and post-detente in nature, seem destined to play a continuing and key role in future policy debates within Canada and the Western alliance. □



Survey Results

The survey, the most extensive examination of these topics ever in Canada, was designed by the author and funded by CIIPS. It was conducted in June through September, 1987 by the Longwoods Research Group with a national sample selected randomly to be representative of Canadian households and chosen from a panel of 30,000 households maintained by Market Facts Ltd. The survey was conducted by mail and comprised a total of 1015 respondents. The response rate to the survey was 48%. The margin of error with a sample of this size is approximately $\pm 4\%$, 95 times out of 100. Survey data and more detailed analysis based on the whole survey are available from the Institute in a Working Paper also written by Don Munton. The survey data used in this article, as well as in the Working Paper belong to CIIPS; the opinions and interpretations are those of Professor Munton.

Some people think that the best way to prevent war is for the West to increase its military strength so as to be more powerful than the Soviets. Others think that this would speed up the arms race and may lead to war. What do you think? Should the West try to increase its military strength or not?



How much confidence do you have in the ability of the – United States/Soviet Union – to deal wisely with present world problems?



VIETNAM AT THE CROSSROADS

The bottom has dropped out of the Vietnamese economy; Canada could help Vietnam end its isolation and re-enter the world political and economic system.

BY GÉRARD HERVOUET

WHEN ASKED, "WHAT, IN your opinion, is the most serious threat now facing Vietnam?", a colonel with the army newspaper *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* was quick to answer, "Under-development!" In the capital, Hanoi, sweltering under the oppressive July heat of this past summer, the economy is clearly the top concern. The fiercest battle of all is being waged on the domestic front. The external threats have not disappeared, but there is now an effort by the government to reduce the emphasis on both the war in Kampuchea and the recurrent skirmishes along the border with China.

Vietnam's extreme under-development is disturbing for the visitor, and the peoples' pride and dignity make their suffering all the more painful. That pride leads them to stifle complaints and visitors from the West are often troubled by looks of pain or contempt. Vietnam is one of the twenty poorest countries in the world. In 1985, the International Monetary Fund estimated annual per capita income at about US \$160. The agricultural sector can barely satisfy domestic demand for rice, and only does so because there was a good harvest in 1986. Between 1977 and 1980, 700,000 to 1 million metric tons of rice had to be imported each year. Even these figures are misleading because the current self-sufficiency in food production is apparently based on consumption levels dictated by rationing and very low purchasing power; they fall far short of real needs. As recently pointed out by Vo Van Kiet, Chairman of the Planning Commission, rice production has stagnated for the last

three years while the population has grown by more than a million each year.

In December 1986, the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam openly admitted the failure of the policies introduced since 1975. Its findings are damning:

Failure to meet a number of major targets in the last five-year plan affected all sectors of the economy... Output generally amounted to only half of capacity. Our country's natural resources have been wasted... The environment is being destroyed.

The Sixth Congress report also observes that there are millions of unemployed or under-employed workers and says that "in rural areas (which have more than eighty percent of the population), there is a serious shortage of basic necessities and medications." Hygiene and health conditions are very poor; in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon), 195,000 homes reportedly lack water, 120,000 have no sanitary facilities and more than 100,000 are without electricity.

No Vietnamese official tries to hide the truth. One told us, "We are short of everything: we need paper, books, tractors, fertilizer... We know our country is rich, and has enormous potential, but how can we tackle all of our problems at once?"

SELF-CRITICISM IS THE ORDER OF the day in Hanoi, with the blame for poorly defined goals, bad choices or hasty decisions placed squarely on the Party. In interviews, Vietnamese officials expressed particular concern about the best way to transform a civilian

society, on how to reorganize an administration in which no one is willing to accept responsibility, and ways to deal with a lack of discipline throughout the society.

Even now worrying were the "negative demonstrations" by the people – in other words, the anti-socialist tendencies of the public and a crisis of confidence about the nation's leaders. Despite appearances and the strict control the government exercises over its people, the government turns a blind eye to corruption, black marketeering, and the hoarding of medical supplies; these at least make the harsh living conditions tolerable.

How have things come to such a pass? The official line is not kind to the Party. Truong Chinh, a prominent leader and past General Secretary, stated in no uncertain terms at the Sixth Congress that the failure of the economic reforms was due "above all to the central committee, the Politburo and the government."

Unlike other Socialist countries, Vietnam's Communist Party has never really been racked by bloody purges or marked by open strife between rival factions. In the past year, however, the Party and State apparatus has brought in several reformers, the most notable being Vo Van Kiet, ranked fifth in the Party hierarchy. Unfortunately, customary professions of faith in continuing to build a socialist society give them little room for manoeuvre. In addition, since the average age of the new communist party leadership is still over seventy, the Party is in no way representative of what is a very young society (more than fifty percent under twenty years of age). Vietnam's adults remain severely trau-

matized by successive wars, while the younger generation, eager for access to consumer goods, view the current conflicts with apprehension and skepticism.

Just as Vietnam has failed to curb population growth so it has failed to absorb the conquered South. The disparities in development between North and South are too large to eliminate through political will alone. Despite purges, re-education and political conversion, the population of the South continues to prove more dynamic than the North. Integration of the South has done nothing to end either traditional rivalries or the scars of the more recent civil war. The Spartan northerners cannot easily forget all they endured to "liberate" their brothers in the South, whose sufferings were of relatively little account compared to those of the North Vietnamese.


Finally, the war in Kampuchea, aggravated by conflict with China, remains one of the basic factors in the deterioration of Vietnam's economy. Since 1979, Vietnamese intransigence in refusing to make even the smallest concession in order to settle the situation in Kampuchea, has cost it dearly. The anti-Vietnam coalition, which includes such strange bedfellows as China, the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), the rebel coalition of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), many Western European countries, the United States and Canada, has raised the anti even further. The stakes are now too high for Vietnam to back down. Vietnam has already suffered staggering losses, and the price of the Cambodian occupation can be measured in the following terms: the suspension of Chinese

aid, the American refusal to provide economic assistance, a US trade embargo, a halt or reduction in aid from other Western countries, the suspension of loans from international organizations, substantial losses of investment from and trade with many countries and finally, the diversion of Soviet aid to military use.

SINCE CHINA CUT OFF ITS AID IN May 1978, Soviet influence over the Vietnamese economy has grown steadily. In June of the same year, Hanoi joined the Economic Council for Mutual Assistance and in November signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation tying its future to the Soviet Union for the next twenty-five years. Since then, the Soviet presence has extended to all sectors of Vietnamese society and the two economies are now so integrated that it is difficult to foresee a serious rift arising between them. Of course, Vietnam is an expensive ally for the Soviets, but it occupies a key strategic position on the globe and offers some worthwhile economic advantages as a supplier of tropical commodities that do not require payment in hard currency.

There are two standard assumptions about Soviet-Vietnamese relations which closer study shows are false. The first is the belief that resumption of normal relations between Vietnam and the West, Japan and members of the Association of South East Asian Nations might loosen or even strain Vietnam's close relations with the USSR. The second is the assumption that Hanoi is content to become increasingly dependent on Moscow and the Socialist camp in general. The first position ignores the importance of "socialist brotherhood" between the two countries and under-estimates the current Vietnamese leaders' unwavering loyalty to the teachings of Ho Chi Minh which are still viewed as the one true beacon guiding Vietnam's future. The second overlooks Vietnam's extraordinary attachment to independence and its endurance over the centuries. These have combined to create a ferocious nationalist pride that is intolerant of outside interference.

Despite the overwhelming Soviet presence and Vietnam's sincere gratitude to the USSR, the Vietnamese have serious reservations about the Soviet model. This is not as paradoxical as it might seem if one considers the pragmatic Vietnamese attitude which, in recent years and despite current conflicts, reflects a fascination with China's drive for modernization. Despite the recent past, China is the relevant model for Vietnam. The shared values of Confucianism, adherence to an



identical cultural structure and somewhat similar revolutionary experiences all explain why the Vietnamese feel more affinity with the Chinese than with the Soviets.

Nevertheless, there are still some basic differences in the two countries' situations. On the one hand, the military adventure in Kampuchea prevents any genuine integration of Vietnam into the world economy. On the other, while Mao's tomb in China is now quite often closed and ignored, Vietnam's leaders still look for inspiration to the disconcerting image of Ho Chi Minh's mausoleum.

OPINION ON THE PRESENT SITUATION is divided. Should we continue to take a firm stance with Vietnam in order to exact concessions on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, or would it be wiser to end the quarantine, in the hope that Hanoi will gradually normalize relations and adopt a policy of modernization?

The dilemma does not really apply to Canada, since in 1979 it decided to give unconditional support to the anti-Vietnam coalition. It cut off aid in February 1979 and recognized the Kampuchean rebel

coalition in 1982. This stance may be logical or even desirable in the light of Canada's past experience with Vietnam, as a participant in the trying and ultimately frustrating work of the International Control and Supervision Commissions in Indochina from 1954 to 1973. It is also worth noting that Canada has accepted more than 100,000 Indochinese refugees and that it is not prepared to risk offending its American neighbour, its trading partners in South-East Asia and especially the

spect of Indochinese governments by launching a dialogue which would prove that we were not simply a mouthpiece for Washington.

If Canadian strategy in South-east Asia is based primarily on economic interests, it is unwise to underestimate the long-term development potential of Indochina. Why should Canada take a more extreme position towards Vietnam than some of the most anti-communist countries in Asia? Japan, for example, has become Vietnam's first non-communist trading partner and Singapore, one of the most hard-line states in the anti-Vietnam coalition, has followed suit. South Korea is another example, and despite confrontations with Vietnamese troops on the Kampuchean border, Thailand also trades indirectly with Hanoi. Without appearing to condone Vietnam's policy in Kampuchea, Canada could still encourage the growth of private contacts and replace its current policy of isolation with measures designed to slowly bring Vietnam back into the international community.

There is, in fact, no reason why Canada should shun Vietnam as the US does. Without condoning Vietnam's military presence in Kampuchea and Laos, the Canadian government could follow the lead of several European countries in promoting trade and cultural links; it might thus persuade some provincial governments to establish links and thereby expand real Canadian influence with Hanoi. Canada is a member of la Francophonie and it is Vietnam which coined what subsequently became that organization's formal description of itself: "countries using French as a common language." It is unfortunate that Canada has yet to open a dialogue with Vietnam in French, or any other language. □

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THE END OF ARMS CONTROL BASHING?

The Reagan Administration now has an unprecedented agreement on reducing strategic nuclear arms within its grasp. However, progress is tied to the future of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty.

BY JANE BOULDEN

IN THE EUPHORIA THAT SURROUNDED the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in Washington in December, interest focussed on the fact that the Euro-missiles were being dismantled and eliminated. Further, the Treaty was achieved by Reagan "the Cold Warrior," and in circumstances where there is a widespread perception of a new era in Soviet politics. But more importantly, the summit held out the tantalizing possibility of agreement on major cuts in strategic offensive weapons. The stumbling block to that greater achievement, however, is the lack of agreement on the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The Soviet Union and the United States continue to hold fundamentally different views about what this agreement actually means. The way the leaders dealt with the problem in Washington was to agree to ignore it while their negotiators got on with other parts of a strategic weapons deal. The summit final communiqué instructed negotiators on both sides to:

... work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time.

The language of the communiqué carefully avoided the issue of whose Treaty interpretation was right; as a "senior Administration official" later told the *New York Times*, "We explained our position. They explained their position. We got some fudged language." In the months to come,

therefore, the complex dispute about the meaning of the Treaty terms is likely to be centre stage in Soviet-American arms control negotiations.

The ABM Treaty prohibits each side from building a territorial defence against ballistic missiles and specifies what kind of limited defences are permitted. The Treaty provides for review conferences at five-year intervals; two conferences have been held, one in 1977 and another in 1982. A third must occur, according to the language in the Treaty, by the end of the fifth year or in this case before October 1988. What are the events that have brought us to the point where the ABM Treaty is the key to future reductions in the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals? What role could the review conference play in moving towards strategic reductions?

AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST REVIEW conference in 1977, the Soviet Union and the United States were in the midst of negotiating the SALT II treaty. As a result there was little question that both sides wanted to continue to abide by the Treaty's terms and they issued a joint statement emphatically confirming their support for its provisions. A different atmosphere surrounded the 1982 review. The new Reagan administration had come to power with an anti-Soviet, anti-arms control attitude, raising questions about Soviet arms control compliance. Although the 1982 statement was somewhat less enthusiastic than its predecessor, both parties "... reaffirmed [their] commitment to the aims and objectives of the Treaty ..."

In October 1985, unilaterally and two years ahead of schedule, the Reagan administration undertook its own review of the Treaty's provisions. The review claimed that, contrary to general belief, the ABM Treaty allowed development and testing of ABM technologies based on new physical principles (those that would form the base for the "Star Wars" shield). Only deployment of such systems was prohibited.

Under the US Constitution international treaties must be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the US Senate. When the Senate ratified the Treaty in 1972, it did so based upon the understanding, communicated to it by Administration officials of the day, that the Treaty restrictions applied in a way that is now known as the traditional or narrow interpretation. With the announcement that its own "broad" interpretation of the Treaty was legally valid and that the US had the right to act on that interpretation, the Reagan administration effectively overrode the Senate's constitutional role.

Two extensive reports have been released as part of the internal battle that has ensued between Congress and the Administration. State Department legal advisor Judge Abraham Sofaer has released previously classified sections of the negotiating record to prove the legality of the Administration's position. Senator Sam Nunn has had access to the negotiating record and has led the counter-attack. In response to the Sofaer report he stated: "... the Reagan administration is in serious error on its position ... wrong in its analysis of the Senate ratification debate; wrong in its analysis of the record of subsequent practice, ... and

wrong in its analysis of the negotiating record itself."

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has taken the issue further. In a report issued in September 1987 the Committee reiterated that the reinterpretation was a challenge to the Senate's constitutional role. It warned Reagan that if he continued to hold to the broad interpretation it would delay ratification of the INF treaty. And in November, after efforts by Congress to legislate its narrow interpretation of the Treaty, the Administration and Congress reached a compromise on future testing of Star Wars technologies which effectively restricts testing in the near-term (fiscal year ending October 1988) to that which falls strictly within the traditional, narrow interpretation of the Treaty.

After the reinterpretation announcement, the US was quick to reassure nervous allies. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would continue within the "traditional" interpretation of the Treaty. Changes would only be implemented after consultation with the allies. Canada and the Western European allies have always made it clear that they want the narrow interpretation to be maintained. However, in late February 1987 the Soviets announced that the US had put the broad interpretation on the table at Geneva. In a seemingly half-hearted response to NATO indignation over the announcement, President Reagan sent two of his arms control envoys on tours of "consultation" with the allies.

Arms control advisor Paul Nitze visited Canada and a statement released by Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark after the meeting reflected Canadian

support for the traditional or narrow interpretation: "... Any unilateral action by either party to the Treaty that could have a negative impact on the current strategic balance would be regarded by Canada with profound concern..."

FROM THE BEGINNING THE SOVIETS have insisted that cuts in strategic nuclear forces can only be undertaken if limits on SDI are agreed. The USSR's position has been that the traditional interpretation is the only valid one and that both parties should continue to abide by its terms. At Geneva they have asked for a ten-year commitment of non-withdrawal from the Treaty as part of their negotiating position. Recently, the Soviets revised their position somewhat and now appear willing to allow some space-based testing as long as specific limits are negotiated and the ABM Treaty as a whole remains intact.

Within the US Administration the proposal received a mixed response. Paul Nitze advocated a positive response to the proposal. He apparently lost out to other Reagan advisors (including Weinberger) who argued that such limits (or any limits) would hamper progress on SDI. These same actors in the Administration have consistently refused Soviet offers to discuss what the Treaty does and does not allow and refuse any sort of discussion on the issue in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), the treaty mechanism established precisely for this purpose. They believe that participating in any form of discussion of the issue would give undue credence to the traditional interpretation and threaten the viability of the broad interpretation.

In the midst of this debate, the ABM Treaty Review Conference has become something of a lost issue. The US is not anxious to have its intentions with respect to the ABM Treaty subject to more than the usual public attention and the State Department has said little about plans for the conference. Secretary of State Shultz has said that the review could be anytime in the next year. The Soviets, by contrast, have suggested that the review conference be chaired by

the defence ministers of the two countries giving it more formal standing than previous sessions.

When the review conference does take place, three alternative scenarios seem possible: first, the US might use the review conference as an occasion to withdraw from the Treaty. A report prepared by the US Congressional Research Service in September 1987 stated that while there was no evidence of imminent withdrawal, the groundwork for withdrawal had been laid.



Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would not be simple. Article XV of the Treaty allows for withdrawal on six months notice if "... extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized [a party's] supreme interests." Notice of withdrawal must be accompanied by a statement outlining those extraordinary events. The Soviet Union has gone a long way in recent months to make it very difficult for the US to find "extraordinary events" that jeopardize supreme American interests. The only significant potential Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty has been construction of a large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk. In September a team of US Congressmen inspected the radar at the invitation of the Soviet Union. Since then Gorbachev has announced a unilateral one-year moratorium on construction and has invited inspection of two other small radars that have become the subject of US concerns.

In sum, it would be very difficult for the US to justify withdrawal from the Treaty on the basis of Soviet activities. Withdrawal from military treaties of this kind with-

out a threat to supreme interests is traditionally interpreted by the other parties as an act of hostility.

A second scenario is that the US could take up the Soviet offer to discuss what is and is not permitted by the Treaty. Specifically, the issue of mutually-agreed technical limits on testing in space could be negotiated. Again, the US has been unwilling to agree to such discussions because it would be interpreted as an admission of the validity of the traditional interpretation. The prime opponent of dis-

cussion of any kind on limits was Secretary of Defense Weinberger who has now left the scene. His absence, coupled with significant cuts in the SDI budget, may have created a situation in which this option could be pursued. Lack of progress on this issue at the summit need not be interpreted as failure. Under heavy pressure from his right wing about being co-opted by Gorbachev, Reagan may have postponed moves that could be interpreted as concessions until they can be pursued in a more distant forum.

Finally, the review conference might simply be a quiet exchange of well-worn positions. Under these circumstances, with no movement from the US, it would be unlikely that any kind of a joint statement would be issued.

WHETHER THERE IS A REVIEW conference or not, its absence as a serious mechanism of negotiation is an important indication of the changes wrought by the Reagan Administration in American thinking about nuclear weapons. A consistent theme can be traced through events on the bilateral arms con-

trol agenda: that the Soviets can not and must not be trusted on arms control. The Administration says that Soviet violations of arms control treaties prove this. The answer, according to Reagan and his advisors when they first obtained power, was not to develop more or better treaties but to ensure that national security was no longer dependent on the effectiveness of arms control treaties. Decisions about numbers and kinds of nuclear weapons should not be limited or dictated by arms control treaties with a country that would not abide by the rules.

These ideas have taken form most obviously in the creation of the SDI programme. They are also evident in the end of adherence to existing strategic arms limitation agreements, the refusal to allow limits on underground testing and, with respect to the ABM Treaty, an apparent decision to proceed with SDI whatever the cost.

In this perspective, it is not clear whether December's Washington summit treaty is a breakthrough or an aberration from the basic thrust of the Reagan policy. Reagan's use of the Russian phrase "trust but verify" may indicate a change of heart has occurred. On the other hand, the INF Treaty may simply have been a low-cost concession to arms control.

Up to now, Reagan Administration activities have been tempered by an overriding political reality. Congress, the allies and at this point the Soviet Union care too deeply about arms control to allow it to be pushed aside as a mechanism for dealing with the nuclear threat. Progress on the ABM issue would indicate that these forces have driven home their point. It is surely not beyond the ingenuity of the US Administration to construct a rationale for entering ABM negotiations without seeming to back away from previous positions. □

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Bob Finner

FIGHTING OVER WATER

It is not merely alarmist to recognize that water is something that countries are ready to fight over. Canada should do more to support the United Nations Environment Programme's efforts to resolve existing disputes and head-off new ones.

BY BOYCE RICHARDSON

THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT Programme is not usually thought of as a peace-keeping organization. Yet it is quietly working away to create institutions whose purpose is to prevent nations from quarrelling over shared environmental capital. True, it has done little enough so far, but that is mainly because it has such limited means.

UNEP's budget for effective work in the field is a mere US \$30 million provided through voluntary contributions by member countries, and with that it has to collect information, monitor environmental changes around the world, propagate the environmental message and at least stimulate others to take some sort of effective action. With more money it could do more work, and much of it would be important for peace and security.

Take, for example, UNEP's programme, scarcely more than an acronym so far, called EMINWA, a programme for the environmentally sound management of inland waters, meaning rivers, lakes and aquifers. This programme is designed to bring together nations that share international river basins. It is important because it is not merely fanciful or alarmist to recognize that water is something that people are ready to fight over.

A map published in 1980 in the World Conservation Strategy (produced by UNEP and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature) shows that only five or six of the world's non-island nations are not touched by international river basins. (Canada has nine.) There are more than two hundred major international basins in all; more than a third are not covered by an international

agreement, and fewer than thirty have any co-operative institutional arrangements. This is no small matter for many countries: almost a quarter of all nations have their entire national territory as part of an international river basin, and therefore, at least in theory, whole nations are vulnerable to actions taken beyond their borders.

Last year the Brundtland Commission recommended that the development of "arrangements for the protection and sustained use of trans-boundary ecological systems" should be an international priority. This had also been suggested seven years before in the World Conservation Strategy (WCS):

"New... demands on water quantity have risen more or less simultaneously with a dramatic decline in water quality in most international basins... Forest clearance, hydro-electric installations, irrigation and water supply works, and pollution in one country can rob another of water, increase its costs of making water suitable for different uses, and destroy, degrade, or deplete its valuable ecosystems and species."

WCS added that failure to reconcile upstream and downstream use had already generated considerable political friction in many parts of the world.

THERE HAVE BEEN INTERSTATE basin commissions in some places for a long time – covering the Rhine and Danube, and the Great Lakes, notably – but the Strategy's warning that such arrangements are poorly adapted to the realities of water use in the modern world was certainly underlined by the

recent dramatic poisoning of the Rhine.

Early treaties regulating water use from international rivers have proved unsatisfactory. For example, after several American states have withdrawn water from the Colorado to meet the needs of the cities of Denver, Los Angeles and San Diego, and of irrigated agriculture, the river enters Mexico for its last one hundred and fifty kilometres on the way to the Gulf of California. A 1944 treaty between the US and Mexico guaranteed that at least twelve per cent of the river's water should cross the frontier in usable condition, but so intensively used is this water that on entry into Mexico it is already quite salty. The story seems to indicate that the fellow who is upstream holds the whip-hand.

Disputes over river water have occurred between countries using the Rio de la Plata and Parana rivers in South America, between India and Pakistan over the Ganges, between the countries of Indo-China over the Mekong, at various times between Egypt and the Sudan over the Nile, and in the Middle East over the Jordan, which forms the boundary between Jordan and Israel.

The danger of international conflict about water prompted President Carter's Global 2000 report, issued in 1980, to recommend that the US should take a lead in establishing "conflict resolution arrangements." Though this report was shelved by the Reagan administration, the problem has not gone away. EMINWA aims to do something about it, but so far on too limited a scale.

Though our knowledge of the workings of nature should not be exaggerated, at least we now know

after the many river control schemes built around the world that to make better use of water is not merely a question of withdrawing water from river courses, diverting it into canals, or building dams, but is a complicated matter involving many scientific disciplines. We have come by that knowledge the hard way.

Many of the major water control projects of recent years have shown only too clearly that hasty developments, not founded in a sound knowledge of the basin's ecosystem, can create terrible and unforeseen side-effects. The example cited most often is the Nile: though Egypt and the Sudan do now work together so that each might extract maximum benefit from the river's relatively small year-round volume, the hydro-power and freedom from seasonal flooding that the dam has brought Egypt has been attained at considerable cost. Fertilization of downstream soils through deposit of silt has been reduced, the offshore sardine fishery destroyed, salinization and water-logging of the delta increased, and schistosomiasis (a debilitating parasitic disease) has exploded around the lake and irrigation canals. None of these effects was foreseen.

To deal with such problems UNEP drew up and recommended to the UN a set of principles that should govern states in conserving and utilizing shared natural resources. These principles emphasize the need for states to:

- co-operate in controlling, preventing, reducing or eliminating adverse environmental effects that may arise from use of shared resources;

- avoid environmental damage that could affect the use of a resource by another state;

make impact assessments before doing anything that might affect a shared resource or the environment of another state; give advance warning of detailed plans to affected states, and consult with them; compensate for any damage caused other states, and provide affected nationals of other states with the same administrative and judicial treatment as is available to their own citizens.

The WCS recommended that some international organization should take up the task of reviewing the conservation needs and problems of international river basins, giving priority to basins that are scheduled for major development or subject to severe erosion. UNEP took up the challenge five years later, with the setting up

tries in the Gulf took years to decide even on a name for the plan. Eventually they agreed: and so, rather oddly, in the list of regional seas programmes – Caribbean, Mediterranean, and so on – is found the Kuwait Action Plan, a name safely devoid of political overtones. Meetings on the esoteric subject of Gulf water pollution have been attended by participants from countries which were otherwise not on speaking terms.

The Zambezi Plan is an important diplomatic achievement, so far as it goes. But Africa is only one part of the problem. Every continent has international river basins, and a dozen of these are numbered among the rivers carrying the greatest sediment load – that is, basins experiencing the world's worst soil erosion – and most of these support very heavy populations.

Sometimes an international scheme to modify and control a


The Mekong project covers irrigation, electricity, flood control, watershed management and so on, with a possible thirteen control dams, and a price tag estimated in 1970 at US \$12 billion. Fifteen years later only four per cent of this had been committed, largely because violent political changes that overtook much of Indo-China made it impossible to undertake any activities on the river's main stream.

Of course, when countries do get together to act on trans-boundary resources, they do not always act wisely. Somehow when river development is in prospect, giantism gets a deadly grip on the brains of politicians (in Canada, as elsewhere). When billions of dollars are poured into a scheme the emphasis is placed on an adequate return on investment, otherwise known as profit. There are many questions, for example, about the three-nation plan to control the Senegal river, to build two dams, two ports, generate electricity, irrigate land, and replace tradi-

Nairobi in June that no one there expects governments actually to give more. I asked William Mansfield, deputy executive director, how much money UNEP could use if governments responded to the Brundtland recommendation, and he said that, given their present programmes, they could probably use half as much again as they now have – not a large sum in a world that spends as much on armaments in twenty minutes as UNEP spends in a year.

Canada's total contribution to UNEP last year was US \$818,148 – a little over C\$1 million – a pathetic figure when weighed against the lip-service the Canadian government always pays to environmental concerns in international meetings.

UNEP also raises quite a bit of money through its Clearing House, which puts countries that are in need of support for particular projects directly into touch with donors. Some countries maintain a permanent trust fund in the Clearing House so that it is available for use at any time. But here again, Canada seems a rather niggardly presence, if a presence at all. The most generous supporters of the



of EMINWA. But ironically – and not surprisingly – it was not able to begin with the basins where the need was most urgent.

Indeed it chose to attack a river, the Zambezi, which so far has not given rise to any major problems, and in which the affected nations (the South African Front-Line States), far from being at each other's throats, are already working together. An Action Plan was agreed earlier this year by six of the seven affected countries.

EMINWA FOLLOWS A PATTERN established by UNEP's successful Regional Seas programme, which has in the last fifteen years involved one hundred and twenty governments in improving coastal and marine environments around the world. These programmes have brought countries to work together which are far from friendly, as in the Persian Gulf.

I was told by a Kuwaiti environmentalist whom I met on a recent trip to UNEP headquarters in Nairobi that the participant coun-

try river basin can be scuttled by straight political upheaval. For example, there has been for thirty years an organization known as the Interim Committee for Co-ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (another delightfully vague name!) whose aim is to bring that river under control. The Mekong rises at 5,000 metres on the Tibetan plateau, passes from China through or along the borders of Burma, Laos, Thailand, Kampuchea and Vietnam before discharging into the South China sea, 4,000 kilometres from its source.

Since this immense river basin receives most of its annual rainfall in only five months, it is subject to droughts and floods even in normal years. The inhabitants of the basin are mostly farmers – and they are among the poorest people in the world. They have good soils, plenty of sunshine – their main problem as farmers is the erratic availability of water.

tion local crops with crops for export. Environmental factors appear to have been overlooked in this massive scheme, which seems unlikely to have happened had UNEP been able to act as catalyst, as it hopes to do in other parts of the world.

SINCE PRESSURE ON INTERNATIONAL river basins is increasing in step with the deterioration of their waters, it could be regarded as a matter of some urgency to provide UNEP with the resources it needs if it is to initiate the creation of more co-operative institutions of the Regional Seas and EMINWA type. The Brundtland Commission recommended that UNEP be strengthened and given more money, but I found on my visit to

Clearing House are the Scandinavians, the Netherlands, Germany, and the EEC.

Since the work of UNEP has been given a rather generous mark of confidence by the Brundtland Commission, Canada, which has accepted the report so fulsomely, should add substantially to its voluntary contribution. If the government looked at UNEP's work as the peace and security effort it really is, perhaps Canada's monetary contribution would match its rhetoric. □

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KHOMEINI'S IRAN

Khomeini's Iran is very different from the Shah's, but pretensions to being a local great power and the desire to influence the politics of the entire Middle East are characteristics they both share.

BY FRANCINE LECOURS

WHEN THE AYATOLLAH Khomeini took power from Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran in

1979, he transformed the country from a secular state to a Moslem fundamentalist one. Iran is a country of forty-five million people, eighty-five per cent of whom are Shi'ite Moslems. While Khomeini's Iran is vastly different from the Shah's, they share one characteristic, namely, an ambitious political design for Iran in regional politics.

During the 1960s the Shah's policy was dictated by strategic considerations and laid its emphasis on regional stability, especially in the Persian Gulf. With this strategy and the goal of territorial expansion, Iran conferred on itself the role of policeman of the Gulf, particularly after Britain gave up the job.

In addition to occupying three islands in strategic locations in the Persian Gulf, Iran, with its aspirations to regional superpower status, intervened frequently in the internal affairs of other countries of the region, particularly when their central governments were threatened by rebel groups. This was often accomplished through economic and technical assistance, but occasionally involved direct military intervention. The dispatch of Iranian troops to the Dhofar, in order to assist the Sultan of Oman in his struggle against Popular Front guerrillas, is one example.

The Shah backed his ambitions with a sophisticated military arsenal which made the Iranian army one of the most powerful in the world. Iran's security policy also relied on diplomacy. Political or military alliances resulted in

reconciliations with Ankara, Islamabad, Riyadh and Cairo. And even while establishing close working relationships with most of the Arab countries, it continued to maintain good relations with Israel in the economic and military fields.

The 1979 crisis led to the creation of a Shi'ite Moslem government and, as a consequence, changed the rules of the game in the Middle East. Iranian foreign policy now reflects the revolution and as such, contains some new elements. The advancement of Islam is the cornerstone of this policy and the restoration of Islam as the basis for political legitimacy is the ultimate objective. The preamble to the Constitution of the new republic advocates the founding of an Islamic world order, and the re-unification of the community of believers, the *oumma*, has become a priority. According to the fundamentalists, this entails the liberation of Moslem countries ruled by godless governments (read secular governments), and involves a reconciliation of the ethnic, regional and other differences between all Moslem nations.

GIVEN THAT THE KHOMEINI REGIME will be unable to achieve this ambitious plan in the near future, it has chosen to base its hopes on the creation of a regional Islamic order, more or less controlled by Teheran, in which Islam will determine both the political nature of the various countries and their foreign policies.

Teheran furthers its goals by indirect methods such as the

spreading of "revolutionary" propaganda in several Middle Eastern countries (especially Iraq and Lebanon), through the proselytizing of Moslem religious leaders in other countries, activism by Khomeini supporters during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, and the provision of financial and logistic assistance to foreign Islamic organizations (particularly for the training of militants in Iranian camps). The best organized among these are the *Hezbollah*, a group of pro-Iranian Lebanese Shi'ites.

Iranian activities often take on a more violent character. Responsibility for both the attempt to overthrow the government of Bahrain in 1981 and the assault on the American Embassy in Kuwait in 1983, has been laid at the door of pro-Iranian elements. Moreover, since the occupation of Lebanon by Israeli troops in 1982, Teheran has supported a contingent of revolutionary guards in that country. The Lebanese government estimates that there are currently several thousand *Pasdarans* in Syria. They make periodic forays into the Bekaa Valley (populated largely by Shi'ite Moslems) in order to spread propaganda and provide military training to activists.

The seven-year-old war between Iran and Iraq can be attributed only indirectly to this "revolutionary" Islamic policy since it was Iraq that launched the hostilities. Moreover, the refusal of Iran to accept a negotiated settlement to the conflict can be explained by the secular tensions which exist between the two capitals, as well as the open animosity between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Khomeini. An additional fac-

tor is the Khomeini regime's effort to maintain social cohesion by rallying the population to confront a common enemy.

This effort by Iranian leaders since 1979 to export ideology and revolution is a significant component in Iran's regional activism. The rise of a Moslem fundamentalist regime continues to cause major repercussions in the Arab and Islamic world. In the years following the revolution, riots broke out in Moslem countries, from Bangladesh to Morocco. Portraits of Khomeini and slogans inspired by his ideas were always evident on those occasions. The example of Iran appears to have influenced Shi'ite communities in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in their demands for increased rights. Since the late 1970s events in Iran have constituted the most important manifestation of the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East.

Governments in the region have adopted various strategies to protect themselves from this fundamentalist wave which threatens them as much from within as without. In 1981, the conservative monarchies of the Persian Gulf formed the Council for Co-operation in the Gulf (CCG) not only to guard against a possible expansion of the Iran-Iraq war (which had begun to swing in Iran's favour) but also out of fear of fundamentalist groups emerging among their own populations. Following the Iranian revolution, countries such as Egypt and Pakistan placed more emphasis on the significance of Islamic values in setting government policy. By contrast, other


countries – one example is Tunisia – have declared an open war on Islamic fundamentalism.

IRANIAN DIPLOMACY COMBINES revolutionary fervour with a pragmatic stance made necessary by the economic difficulties in which the country has found itself. The costs of the war, as well as the decline in both local oil production and in oil prices have depressed the economy. An array of other economic problems has emerged: industry operates well below capacity and the unemployment rate has risen to twenty-five percent in some areas; oil revenues serve in large part to finance the war, to rebuild what the war has destroyed and to support the day-to-day costs of a very inefficient economy. Long planned investments in infrastructure and extensive development projects have been postponed, as have improvements in social services and agriculture.

Given Iran's restricted economic relationship with the United States and its fear of dependence on the Soviet Union, it is easy to see why it wants closer economic links with its immediate neighbours. Within the region, Turkey and Pakistan, both pro-Western regimes, are its major trading partners. In 1985, these three countries formed the Organization for Economic Co-operation to encourage trade and the transfer of technology. A 1987 agreement between Teheran and Ankara envisioned a trade volume in the range of two billion dollars. It should be added that a large proportion of Iran's exports pass through Turkish and Pakistani territory.

Despite the hostility of the Iranian regime towards the Arab monarchies of the Gulf – as a result of their "anti-Islamic" leadership and their financial and material support of Iraq in the war – Iran has tried to establish co-operative economic links with them. Significant among these are the existing commercial ties with the United Arab Emirates and the agreement concluded with Saudi Arabia at the OPEC meeting last year on a new strategy on prices and quotas.

The Iranian attitude towards the Gulf monarchies continues to be



ambiguous, and is linked to the on-going power struggle in Teheran between radicals and moderates. The riots in the summer of 1987 during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca which resulted in several hundred casualties, mostly Iranian, did not improve the situation. These bloody confrontations are a reminder that Iran and Saudi Arabia, centres of power respectively of Shi'ite and Sunni Moslems, are struggling for leadership of the Islamic world.

Iranian nationalism – nationalism in the conventional sense – was central to the policy of the Shah, and has not completely disappeared, even though it is formally incompatible with Khomeini's ideology. Iran's press often stresses the importance of the "national interest" and Iranian leaders draw upon nationalist feeling to justify elements of the country's foreign policy.

It is important to recognize that the regional policy of Iran is also based on wider international imperatives. It is in the country's best interests to escape from the diplomatic isolation into which it fell after the demise of the Shah. Regardless of its intentions in the Middle East, Iran cannot continue to play a solitary hand – solitary even if one counts the links with Syria and Libya. Teheran is particularly opposed, and has been for a long time, to the presence of the US and the USSR in the Persian Gulf. The view is widespread among the Iranian leadership that almost any scenario is preferable to the continuous presence of either of those countries in the Gulf. In this setting, Iran would certainly seek advantage from shifting its alliances, even to the point of a

rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the proximity of the Soviet Union, and its invasion of Afghanistan, creates fears in Teheran similar to those felt by its neighbours Pakistan and Turkey. In short, whether its goal is to oppose Western or Soviet "imperialism" or to pursue its own designs in the region, Iran can only benefit from having some solid allies in the area.

GIVEN THE UPHEAVALS THAT FOLLOWED the rise of Khomeini the successful exportation of the Iranian Revolution cannot be excluded, especially if Iran wins the war with Iraq. A Shi'ite fundamentalist wave could sweep through the Gulf states, to Jordan and Lebanon and even to Syria and Egypt. Nevertheless, the ideological expansionism pursued by the Khomeini regime is not necessarily destined for success. The search for economic partners and the need for allies is likely to temper Teheran's revolutionary fervour. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how Iran can continue its war effort indefinitely, when its economy is failing and its access to military resources remains precarious.

To these fundamental factors one must add other considerations. The conditions which favoured the unfolding of the Iranian revolution are not found in other countries of the region. The modernization programme undertaken by the Shah encouraged the emergence of a social model copied from the West, a model which proved to be incompatible with the traditional structure of Iranian society.

The Shi'ite branch of Islam led by Khomeini differs sharply from

the Sunni branch which predominates in the area. One of the main points of divergence between the two Moslem groups relates to the type of government deemed suitable to govern the civil state. There would probably be considerable resistance from Sunni communities to orders given by the religious leadership in Teheran. Even the Shi'ites in the region (and in Iraq Shi'ites have not responded to appeals from Khomeini) would not necessarily be won over to the cause, since ethnic and cultural loyalties could prove more important than religious ones.

Finally, the leadership of Khomeini will not last forever and dissension is already evident among different factions of the current regime. Radicals and moderates disagree on how to interpret Islam, on what model of economic development to adopt and on the possibility of reconciliation with either Washington or Moscow. Ayatollah Montazeri, the designated successor to Khomeini and main promotor of exporting revolution, has many enemies. With Khomeini's death, the political cohesion of the regime could be seriously compromised.

Despite all the differences between the regime of the Shah and that of the Ayatollah Khomeini, both have deeply influenced the politics of the region. Khomeini's Middle East policy, which contains ideological and pragmatic elements, is conditioned both by the revolution which has shaken the country, and by the war against Iraq. Opinions vary on the degree of influence of one factor or the other on the events since 1979. Nevertheless, the transition from secular state to a fundamentalist Moslem one has not altered the basic factors which govern Teheran's relations with its neighbours. □


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LETTER FROM MANAGUA BY DAVID GOLLOB



The Contras have attacked Abisinia, a settlement in Northern Nicaragua. In a humble peasant shack, a woman and her five children wail over the body of *Papito* –

“Little Father.”

The body is laid out in a coffin with a glass window over the face. The glass is smeared with finger smudges and tears. Decomposition is swift in the tropics, and the stench of death is overpowering. On the roof, the steady, drumbeat of a tropical rainstorm. It is late afternoon, the shack is dark, lit only by a few candles.

In the ruins of the community medical centre, a woman is giving birth. Her husband was killed, her home burned down. Labour was brought on prematurely by the trauma, the nurse explains. The woman is only eighteen and her baby is all she has left.

In a clandestine radio broadcast from neighbouring Honduras, the Contras claimed the attack on Abisinia was a great success, because, they said, they managed to destroy a military barracks and command post located on the fringe of the settlement. This is true. But the Contras did not explain why the bulk of the casualties were civilians, why twenty houses were burned down, or why several peasants, including two women, were kidnapped.

I used the sounds and images of the mourning family and the woman giving birth to illustrate my report on this attack, a report that I prepared for CBC Radio and also filed to an American Public Radio network. I was surprised to learn that the American network did not run the story – because, they said, the sound was too emotional. “We have made a policy decision,” an editor later explained, “To avoid dramatising or sensationalising this aspect of the war.”

I could see nothing “sensational” about the use of sound. It illustrated a basic truth about war. War is suffering, pain, and death – ugly and

unpleasant. But this war is also the policy of the US government. The highly-charged ideological climate that the Reagan Administration has created to justify its policies and to embarrass reluctant congressman into supporting them has made reporting on Nicaragua extremely difficult. At least three American reporters have been fired or forced to resign because of their coverage of Nicaragua.

“The Sandinistas have a record of broken promises,” President Reagan tells the world. Few jour-

The highly-charged ideological climate that the Reagan Administration has created to justify its policies ... has made reporting on Nicaragua extremely difficult.

nalists have attempted to challenge this judgement. To do so, would be to engage in advocacy on the part of the Sandinistas. So the statement goes unchallenged. When President Ortega signs a peace plan, the journalist's question becomes, “Will he comply?” The assumption is, he won't; after all, Ortega's is a record of broken promises.

The Nicaraguan government is a “totalitarian dictatorship of the left,” Reagan tells us. Few journalists working in Nicaragua actually believe that. Nevertheless this is a society that has some repressive mechanisms. Middle-level opposition leaders have been jailed on flimsy or trumped-up charges. Censorship was in force for nearly five years. Opposition media have been shut down by the authorities, and so on. But this kind of repression is innocuous in comparison with the terror and intimidation that reigns in El Salvador, which receives two million dollars a day in aid from the US. The worst thing that has ever happened to a human rights activist in Nicaragua,

is to have been jailed for fifteen days for taking part in an anti-government demonstration. In El Salvador, human rights activists are kidnapped or gunned down in the street in front of their children.

But we are not in El Salvador, we are in Nicaragua, where democratic freedom has become an issue, because, once again, it is one of the issues the Reagan Administration has seized on to justify its policies. As journalists in Nicaragua we must report on human rights violations in *Nicaragua*. It is not our job to point out the hypocrisy of launching a war to topple this government when the United States supports governments that are guilty of much worse.

The phrase “Contra aid” is another example of how we are

mercenaries. However, that's not the point: no Western journalists would ever refer to the Contras as “mercenaries,” while the use of the word “aid” is universal, and surreptitiously promotes a distorted concept of the nature of the conflict.

An American journalist speculated in a conversation last November on how certain Contra leaders might react to the Sandinistas' offer to hold indirect ceasefire talks. “What does it matter what the Contras think?” I asked him. “Surely they will do whatever the State Department or the CIA tells them to do.” The journalist, who has years of experience in the region and knows the story much better than I do, went silent for a moment. “I suppose you are right,” he said. Nevertheless, in the report he filed that day, Contra leaders were quoted as if they were in positions of authority, with the power to make weighty decisions on the course of the war.

Part of this derives from what journalists call “balance.” Every story has more than one side. We seek out the prime players, and highlight their contrasting views. However, to deny that the Contras are players in their own right is to make a political evaluation. The safest course of action is just to play along.

CBC Radio listeners heard the report on Abisinia, and to its credit, the American network later reversed its decision and ran the same story. Unfortunately, that network has a minority audience. Unfortunately, in the United States, the debate over Nicaragua is dominated by the unchallenged assumptions of the Reagan Administration, framed in empty, cold war rhetoric – not in the reality of a woman and five children wailing over the loss of their father, as rain drums on the roof, and the last candle dies. □

David Gollob lives in Managua, Nicaragua and is CBC Radio News Latin American correspondent.

REPORT FROM THE HILL



Defence Policy

The New Democratic Party's defence policy, first unveiled on 31 July, came under attack from some unusual sources early in September. During a visit to Canada, French premier Jacques Chirac called the NDP's proposal to withdraw from NATO utopian and unrealistic. His critique was followed by that of British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe who told reporters on 8 September after a meeting with External Affairs Minister Joe Clark that pulling Canadian troops out of Europe would severely weaken NATO.

In the matter of the government's Defence White Paper, the Cabinet was expected to approve a more detailed capital defence budget in October. However, delay in the decision led to increasing speculation in the press about struggles within Cabinet to set priorities. There were also continuing reports that the US administration opposed the submarine plan – rumours fueled by a 29 October, *Globe and Mail* article by Charles Bennett, a Florida congressman and chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. One of the two subs the government is considering is a British design that is subject to US restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology. Bennett wrote that Congress might have qualms about such a transfer, particularly if the submarines are to be used to keep US ships out of what Washington regards as international waters. His view was echoed by the US Naval Attache in Ottawa speaking to defence contractors on 18 November, although the US embassy labelled those remarks as

"a personal view." (See *Defence Notes* for more on this topic.)

South African Policy

From 13 to 17 October Canada hosted the Commonwealth heads of government conference in Vancouver. No major surprises were in store since British Prime Minister Thatcher's opposition to stronger sanctions against South Africa was well known. Unanimity was achieved regarding increased economic aid to the six front-line states bordering that country. A related idea to provide non-lethal military assistance to bordering states – first aired publicly in September by Canada's High Commissioner to Britain, Roy McMurtry, who chaired a Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa – did not gain favour at this time. The conference also struck a committee of foreign ministers to provide "impetus and guidance." That committee, which is chaired by Joe Clark but which does not include the British Foreign Secretary, is scheduled to meet in February in Lusaka, Zambia to study ways to police economic sanctions already imposed.

Clark had told the House on 9 September that, while the government was prepared to sever economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa, to do so would end any Canadian influence on ending *apartheid*. The time was not considered right for such drastic action. This approach was implicitly rejected by Liberal Leader John Turner who called, on 10 September, for Canada to end relations by the year's end unless "clear progress" had been made in dismantling *apartheid*.

Cruise Missile Testing

On 1 October Liberal leader John Turner called for an end to cruise-missile testing in Canada, an issue that had split his caucus in March when four members broke ranks with Turner by voting in favour of a NDP resolution calling for an immediate halt to the

tests. In the House he described the "concrete results in the negotiations between the two super-powers" on intermediate nuclear forces as the reason for his change. Mr. Clark responded that the government did not accept "a policy that could destroy the unity of NATO" and "be a threat to what we have accomplished so far in reducing levels of nuclear arms."

Central America

A possible Canadian role in an eventual Central American peace settlement preoccupied both politicians and the media in the wake of the 7 August signing by five Central American countries of the plan named for Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. In his address to the UN General Assembly on 22 September, Clark described the root problem in Central America as "poverty not ideology" and the real need as "development assistance not military activity." He commented that "intervention by outside powers will only aggravate the tensions." Yet he did not call directly for an end to US support for the Contra rebels against the Nicaraguan regime.

Clark's visit to Central America 21-29 November had its share of controversy, most notably his comment that Canada might be willing to accept Contras as refugees if such action would help support a larger regional peace settlement. This prompted a question in the House from NDP MP Dan Heap and an assurance from Monique Landry, Minister for External Relations, that, in the event Canada decided to admit Contras, the Commons would be told beforehand of measures the government would take to prevent Contra war criminals from entering the country. Mr. Clark was also questioned by Canadian aid workers in Nicaragua about the level of Canadian assistance (which has amounted to \$40.9 million since 1982) and about an earlier announcement that Canadian aid to

Guatemala would be resumed after a suspension in 1981 because of widespread human rights abuses.

On 2 December upon his return from Central America Mr. Clark spoke at length in the House on his impressions and expressed his desire to have a parliamentary committee investigate further Canada's future role in the peace process.

Short Notes From the Hill

On 16 September twenty-three nations plus the European Community signed at Montreal a global agreement to control the chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) pollution (chemicals used in refrigeration, dry-cleaning, plastic foam and building insulation) that is destroying the earth's ozone layer. A number of countries, including Canada, will have to pass laws enabling them to put the pact into force.

Bill Blaikie was appointed the NDP's external affairs critic in the House in mid-September replacing Pauline Jewett who was shifted to federal-provincial relations and constitutional affairs while retaining responsibility for arms control and disarmament.

On 3 November Senator Paul Lafond resigned, for reasons of ill health, as chairman of the Senate Special Committee on National Defence which he had presided over since its inception in 1980.

The proposed Emergencies Act – Bill C-77 – received second reading on 18 November and was referred to committee for fine-tuning. It would replace the 1914 War Measures Act under which the federal cabinet has unchecked powers to suspend civil liberties in time of real or apprehended insurrection. Under the new law the government would be able to respond selectively to four classes of emergency: public welfare crises such as floods or other natural disasters; public order threats caused by terrorist acts; international emergencies falling short of war; and war itself. □

– GREGORY WIRICK

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



INF Agreement at Summit

On 8 December at their summit meeting in Washington, President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev signed a treaty banning all of their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) – those of a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Under the agreement, shorter-range missiles, with a range of five hundred to one thousand kilometres (SS-23s and SS-12/22s on the Soviet side, Pershing IIs on the American) will be destroyed within eighteen months of the Treaty's ratification. Longer-range missiles (SS-4s and SS-20s on the Soviet side, ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs on the American) will be destroyed within three years. Of missiles currently deployed in Europe and Asia, the USSR will be forced to destroy 857, carrying over 1,700 warheads; while the US will dismantle 429 single-warhead missiles. In addition, West Germany will rid itself of seventy-two Pershing IA missiles designed to carry American warheads. Because missiles in storage are also banned, a total of 1,752 Soviet missiles and 859 American ones will be destroyed in all.

A "zero-option" on longer-range INF missiles had first been proposed by President Reagan in November 1981, but was refused by the USSR and deemed unrealistic by most arms control analysts on the grounds that the Soviets already maintained a large force while the US had not yet deployed any. Last July, General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the USSR would accept the global elimination of both longer- and shorter-range INF missiles. Since that time, negotiations have focused on verification.

As finalized at a meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Geneva on 24 November, the verification provisions are unprecedented. All installations where INF missiles have been stored, repaired, based and deployed, as well as one factory on each side producing launchers for ground-launched cruise missiles, will be open to short-notice, on-site inspection by the other side. This includes both US bases in Europe and the bases for Soviet long-range SS-25 missiles where SS-20s have also been deployed. Each side will be limited to twenty such inspections per year during the first three years, dropping to fifteen per year for the next five years, and ten per year for a further five years. Other inspections would be conducted to check the data provided by each side about the current size of its forces, and to "close out" bases from which missiles have been removed. Finally, for a full thirteen years, each side will station inspectors outside one missile production site on the other's territory – in the US case, a Soviet factory in Votkinsk used to assemble both SS-20s and SS-25s; and in the Soviet case, a former Pershing II production plant in Utah.

The agreement has already been criticized from both right and left. Critics on the left point out that it covers only a small fraction of the total nuclear warheads possessed by the superpowers (variously estimated at between three and five percent); that the targets of the missiles to be destroyed can be hit by the longer-range, strategic missiles no longer limited by the Strategic Arms Limitations agreements; and that NATO is already talking of "compensating" for the INF reductions by deploying additional nuclear weapons systems in Europe. Critics on the right – including most of the Republican Party's 1988 Presidential contenders – argue that the verification provisions are still insufficient, given what they consider to be a Soviet

penchant for cheating; and that the withdrawal of the US missiles will weaken Western Europe's security, given the perceived superiority of Soviet conventional forces.

Supporters of the Treaty consider it a historic breakthrough in eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons; and incorporating the most far-reaching verification measures ever negotiated by the two sides. They hope that the latter will serve as a model for other arms control negotiations, particularly those covering strategic (long-range) nuclear forces.

Krasnoyarsk Visit

From 5 to 6 September a group of eight Americans – including three Congressmen, four electronics and military experts, and a journalist – were allowed to tour a controversial Soviet radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk, in central Siberia. The Reagan Administration charges that the radar is for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) battle-management, in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty; the USSR maintains that it is for space-tracking (unrestricted by the Treaty); and most independent experts believe it is intended for early warning of ballistic missile attack. If the latter, according to the Treaty, it should be located "along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward." Yet the Krasnoyarsk site is over six hundred kilometres from the nearest border and faces northeast across five thousand kilometres of Soviet territory.

During the visit, the group was allowed to video tape the site and to take more than a thousand photographs. In a report to Congress afterwards, it stated that, because of a lack of hardening against nuclear blast or independent power generation, as well as an inappropriate operating frequency, the probability of the radar being for battle-management

was "extremely low." It could not decide whether the radar was for early-warning or space-tracking (former weapons engineer Anthony Battista judging it as "not very good" for either purpose). However, it estimated that the facility was at least two years from completion, and therefore "not a violation of the ABM Treaty at this time." Other arms control experts maintain that, if indeed an early-warning radar, its location and orientation make it a violation even before being "turned on." However, they agree that it is only a technical violation, without much military significance because of its vulnerability to attack.

Soviet officials have offered to "mothball" the radar if the US does likewise with two similar facilities in Greenland and Britain which Moscow considers (with some backing from Western experts) to be violations of the Treaty. In a letter to President Reagan in mid-September, General Secretary Gorbachev asked him to permit Soviet inspection of the Greenland radar (in operation since June), but was refused. During Secretary of State Shultz's visit to Moscow in late October, Gorbachev announced a one-year moratorium on construction at Krasnoyarsk, while noting that he expected the US to reciprocate with its UK radar. Shultz rejected the idea.

New Talks on Nuclear Testing

In Washington on 17 September, Shultz and Shevardnadze announced new talks on nuclear test limits. According to a joint statement, the two sides will begin by negotiating additional verification measures to enable ratification of the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, which limit underground nuclear testing to a yield of one hundred and fifty kilotons. They

will then seek "intermediate limitations on nuclear tests, moving toward the final goal of the complete cessation of nuclear tests as part of an effective disarmament process." Regarding "intermediate" measures, the Soviets proposed a limit of four tests per year of no more than one kiloton each. However, an American official stated that such a low threshold could not be verified, and that tests of at least twenty to thirty kilotons were required to ensure the reliability of existing weapons.

The first round of the new talks began 9 November and ended two weeks later. The negotiators reported reaching agreement on carrying out one or two joint nuclear test explosions on each side during 1988, in order to compare monitoring methods.

Canada at the UN General Assembly

Canada played its usual active role in the deliberations of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on disarmament issues this fall. The Committee passed a total of sixty-three resolutions, of which twenty-five were adopted by consensus. A date and agenda were set for the Third Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD III), to be held 31 May to 25 June 1988. Of thirty-eight resolutions brought to a vote, Canada voted in favour of seventeen, against nine, and abstained on twelve. Canada introduced three resolutions of its own, on chemical and bacteriological weapons (with Poland), "Verification in all its aspects," and the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The first two of these were adopted by consensus, the last by a vote of 125 to 1 with six abstentions. In addition, Canada co-sponsored eleven other resolutions, ranging from the comprehensive test ban to the relationship between disarmament and development.

Disarmament and Development Conference Concludes

After three weeks of debate, the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development adopted a consensus final document in New York on 11 September. The

document was considered a major achievement by many delegates, as marking the first time the international community had ever drafted a common position on the subject. Canada welcomed its

cluding newer chemical agents, were not shown. Until last April Soviet authorities had refused to acknowledge that they possessed any chemical weapons at all.

For the first time the USSR has

Early Warning

January 19 to 29	Conference on Disarmament session on chemical weapons.
Early March	US Senate ratification vote on the INF Treaty expected.
March 7 to 18	Group of Seismic Experts meeting on verification of a comprehensive test ban.
Spring	NATO Nuclear Planning Group session

endorsement of a broadening of the concept of "security" to include its political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights, and ecological aspects. Some delegates criticized the Conference for rejecting a proposal, supported by the USSR and Third World countries, to set up a special fund or mechanism to transfer money saved by disarmament to development aid. Western delegates argued that, while their countries continued to provide more aid than the Soviet bloc, significant reductions in military spending would have to await reduced international tension, which could be a long way off.

Chemical Weapons

From 3 to 4 October over one hundred representatives from forty-five countries involved in chemical weapons negotiations, including three Canadians, visited the Soviet chemical warfare centre at Shikhany, believed to be the largest of its kind in the world. They were shown a display of what Soviet officials maintained was the complete array of Soviet chemical weapons; allowed to question Shikhany workers and take photographs; and witnessed a demonstration of the destruction of chemical weapons agents. However, the Soviets refused to reveal the size of their chemical weapons stockpile (believed in the West to far exceed that of NATO), and some Western participants maintained that certain types of weapons, in-

also accepted longstanding invitations to visit Western chemical weapons installations. In late November, Soviet military experts visited the principal American chemical weapons centre at Tooele, Utah, and a chemical weapons destruction plant in Muenster, West Germany.

Stockholm Treaty Compliance

The US, UK, and USSR have all availed themselves, for the first time, of a provision in last year's Stockholm Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe that allows "on-demand" inspection, at short notice, of a country's military exercises by foreign observers. According to the Stockholm Agreement, signatories must invite foreign observers to all exercises of 17,000 or more troops. The purpose of the first "on-demand" inspection, conducted by the US in late August, was to verify that a Soviet exercise near Minsk, pre-announced as involving 16,000 troops and hence not requiring foreign observation, did in fact keep under the threshold of 17,000. The Soviets responded to the US request within twenty-one hours, and four US Army inspectors had arrived in Minsk within thirty-six hours, as required by the agreement. In the end they judged the exercise to be even smaller than announced. The UK was granted a similar inspec-

tion of a combined East German-Soviet exercise in East Germany from 10 to 12 September, while Soviet officers likewise inspected US maneuvers in West Germany at the end of October.

Gorbachev's Arctic Peace Zone

In a speech in Murmansk on 1 October, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed that the Arctic become a "zone of peace." He reiterated previous support for a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northern Europe, including an offer to withdraw several old, diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines from the Baltic. While proposing NATO/Warsaw Pact consultations on force reductions and confidence-building measures in the Baltic, North, Norwegian, and Greenland seas, he also called on "all countries concerned" to "embark on talks on the limitation and scaling down of military activity in the North as a whole, in both the eastern and the western hemispheres."


Norwegian Defence Minister Johan Holst was quoted by *Associated Press* on 2 October as describing the proposals as "an important step forward." Canadian officials appeared less enthusiastic, but still cautiously receptive. In a *Canadian Press* item of 3 October, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark was quoted as calling the proposals "interesting." He said that Canada was willing to discuss possible Arctic arms control measures with the Soviets.

Nuclear Risk-Reduction Centres

On 15 September the US and USSR signed an agreement to establish "nuclear risk-reduction centres" in their national capitals. Each country will staff its own centre, intended mainly to transmit pre-notification of ballistic missile launches under the 1971 Accident Measures and 1972 Incidents at Sea agreements. It is thus not meant to duplicate the work of the existing "Hot Line," although making use of similar high-speed satellite communications with a facsimile capability enabling the direct transmission of charts, graphs, and maps. □

- RON PURVER

DEFENCE NOTES



Implementing the White Paper

One of the important proposals in the White Paper, largely unnoticed in the debate about nuclear submarines, concerns the annual review of defence policy. In effect, the Government has established a rolling five-year expenditure plan for defence – “rolling” because each annual review updates the defence plan and projects it five years ahead. It remains to be determined how closely the annual assessment and the five-year plan will follow the proposals set down in the White Paper itself.

During the summer Perrin Beatty made it clear that the first review – due in the early fall but clearly delayed by continuing Cabinet discussions about funding implications – would include the request for authorization of the second batch of frigates. According to the Minister, this request would be for funds over and above the two percent real growth promised in the White Paper. The second batch of six frigates, and the new helicopters, which are an essential complement to the frigate programme, may cost around \$10 billion. But in reviewing the request, Cabinet must at the same time approve a five-year spending plan for defence in which the purchase of nuclear submarines looms large. During the summer, the Minister said that the choice of submarine would be made early in 1988, a date which has since slipped to the spring. The project definition phase, ending in the choice of a Canadian prime contractor, will follow in about a year.

How much will the defence plan cost? Reports now indicate that the

actual proposals in the White Paper would require five percent real growth for fifteen years, somewhat more than indicated in the White Paper which suggested that the policy would require two percent real growth with intermittent “bumps” for special programmes. The Cabinet is faced, therefore, with a policy question which goes beyond the actual decision on the second batch of frigates. Should the annual review modify the White Paper in the light of financial realities, or does it simply provide the five-year framework in which the White Paper decisions are implemented?

Nuclear Submarines

The nuclear submarine acquisition programme faces difficulties other than the threatened cancellation of the programme by the two opposition parties should they win the next election. Warning shots by US Congressman Charles Bennett, known to be close to the US Navy, suggest that Congress may insist on reviewing the potential transfer of technology to Canada (the British Trafalgar class submarine uses a nuclear propulsion unit derived from 1950s US technology). Whether or not the Reagan Administration approves the deal, says Bennett, Congress may assert its legal claim to review the transfer. Although the US Administration has been studiously neutral about the decision, some informed observers maintain that the US Navy is not sympathetic to the plan, and would much prefer that Canada concentrate on supporting allied efforts to ensure naval superiority in the North Atlantic, where the principal US deficiency is in frigates and destroyers.

The cost of the submarines is also still at issue. Indications are

that the Department of National Defence now estimates the total cost at around \$8 billion, but even this estimate may be well below the final cost if the Government sticks to its plan to buy between ten and twelve submarines.

On the other hand, Canada is not the only state to conclude that it has a need for nuclear submarines. Brazil has recently acknowledged that its naval research programme has moved significantly ahead in developing the technology for a nuclear submarine propulsion system. The Brazilian Navy plans to build the first submarine by the mid-1990s, which would about coincide with the Canadian timetable. Unlike the Brazilian civilian nuclear programme, which is conducted in co-operation with West

Germany, the naval nuclear submarine programme is not safeguarded, which means that Brazil will not allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspections or monitoring of the programme.

The CF-18

The extraordinary cost and complexity of modern weapons systems has been brought home once again by the trials and tribulations of the CF-18. In addition to the recent crashes involving the CF-18, a series of technical difficulties have plagued it. These have ranged from bulkhead fatigue problems to the current concerns about the engine and the continuing unreliability of the inertial navigation system. Despite the crashes, the attrition rate of the

ALLIANCE NEWS

Franco-German Co-operation

In exercise ‘Cheeky Sparrow’, conducted in mid-September, 20,000 French troops from the Rapid Reaction Force moved to reinforce the German Second Army Corps before being relieved in turn by the Second French Corps which is permanently stationed in southern Germany. The exercise had considerable practical value – different equipment, procedures and maintenance make it very difficult for the two armies to operate in concert. But there was also political significance. The French forces were placed under the command of the German Second Corps, and, at lower levels, units from the different national forces were combined under both French and German commanders. The exercise effectively reinforced the declared political statement that “both countries form a common security zone.”

At the end of the exercise the two governments announced the formation of a bilateral Defence Council, emphasizing that a variety of such arrangements are compatible with the multilateral framework of NATO. Other countries are not so sure: Italy was invited to consider participation, but noted that it preferred to operate in the multilateral framework and to emphasise US-European co-operation rather than to promote intra-European arrangements.

Aftermath of the INF Agreement

As the superpowers moved laboriously towards the INF agreement, the NATO Council met in California to consider the military implications of the withdrawal of the nuclear-tipped Pershing IIs and cruise missiles. Suggestions to compensate for the removal of the NATO missiles included the increased use of submarine or ship-launched nuclear cruise missiles, which are not covered by the agreement, and the use of

CF-18 is not unexpected. The initial contract with McDonnell Douglas of St. Louis allowed a follow-on purchase at the original price, but several years ago the Canadian Forces gave up this right, lacking the funding to proceed with the order. Present plans to purchase additional aircraft will not be cheap – the unit cost is now around \$40 million, so the purchase of fifteen will add about \$600 million to the defence bill.

Low-Level Air Defence

When the Department of National Defence made the decision to buy the Oerlikon Air Defence Anti-tank (ADATS) system for use with the Canadian Armed Forces in Europe, defence officials were optimistic about the prospects for further sales in the US. Their confidence has been justified; the US has chosen the Oerlikon system. Canadian partner firms in the Oerlikon programme, including Litton and

Spar Aerospace, will share contracts valued at \$950 million.

Soviet Lasers

Gorbachev's comment, during a live television interview before the Washington summit, that the Soviet Union has its own Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) may have been an unusual public admission, but the programme itself has been watched closely by Western analysts for several years. Unconfirmed reports have circulated for much of the past year that the Soviets have developed a very large laser facility at Dushambe, in Kazakhstan. Recent satellite photographs appear to confirm the existence of a military facility on a mountain top in this remote area, although there is little to indicate the potential military capabilities of the facility. The Pentagon has not commented officially on the Dushambe facility, but, one day after photographs appeared in the US press, General Pietrowski, Commander-in-Chief

US Space Command, expressed public concern about the capabilities of the known Soviet laser facilities at Sary Shagan, in Soviet Central Asia.

General Pietrowski stated that Soviet lasers could destroy US satellites in low earth orbit, and damage intelligence and communications satellites even if they were in high earth orbit. He called for the resumption and acceleration of the US anti-satellite programme, which uses a miniature homing vehicle to smash into Soviet low earth satellites at velocities approaching 58,000 kilometres per hour. If the Dushambe facility proved to have a capability against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) it would constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty since it is not at the designated test site (Sary Shagan). Anti-satellite weapons which can attack slower moving satellites but not ICBMs would not constitute a violation, although this has long been recognised as a gap in the ABM Treaty.

US Nuclear Weapons Developments

The US is also proceeding with the development of exotic weapons, mainly but not entirely through the SDI programme. Recent discussions about the need for continued nuclear weapon tests have provided important statements on the kind of weapons which are now under development. "Third generation" nuclear weapons are of two kinds. First, there are weapons to mate with the new delivery systems now coming on stream: the Trident D-5, the Midgetman, new short-range attack missiles and possibly the advance cruise missile come under this category. Typically, development is required so that the stresses to which a new device are subject, such as an earth-penetrating warhead, do not affect the explosive yield of the weapon.

Second, special effects warheads are under development which would include, for example, the X-ray laser and devices intended to maximize microwave emissions for purposes of damaging the electronic components of enemy mis-

siles and communications systems. The indications are that such developments will require lengthy development programmes involving several hundreds of tests.

SDI Research Developments

The thrust in SDI research appears to have moved to mid-course interception. Because it is in this phase of a ballistic missile's flight that the tracking of nuclear warheads is the most difficult, mid-course interception has long been thought the most intractable problems of a ballistic missile defence. In the early fall Caspar Weinberger approved the accelerated development of six technologies relating to mid-course interception, including a ground-based "pop-up" sensor system for tracking ICBMs in mid-course, and a missile interceptor that destroys the target by smashing into it at high speed. The research demonstration and validation phase is expected to last several years, which would likely put off a decision on full-scale deployment until the mid-1990s. In the meantime, the costs of a first generation ballistic missile defence have almost doubled in the last six months: General Abrahamson advised Congress in the spring that such a system, relying primarily on known technologies, would cost US\$40-60 billion, but his more recent statements put the price at \$70-100 billion. □

- DAVID COX

Editor's Note

This issue marks the departure of one author of a regular department and the debut of two others. Jane Boulden began the "Arms Control Digest" segment in the first issue of Peace&Security and researched and compiled it in every subsequent issue. With her departure for Queen's University, Ron Purver, CIIPS Research Associate, takes over the column. In addition, David Cox, Professor of Political Studies at Queen's University and formerly CIIPS Director of Research, will write "Defence Notes."

nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise missiles from European-based aircraft which are not covered by strategic arms talks.


More broadly, the INF agreement has sharpened the debate about NATO's defence posture, and focussed attention again on the controversial question of the conventional force balance. Representative Les Aspin, the influential chairman of the US House Armed Services Committee, has said that the ten extra divisions that NATO would need to achieve parity with the Warsaw Pact would involve an initial expenditure of US\$70 billion, and \$20 billion per year thereafter. Nuclear weapons, in short, are cheaper.

Other defence commentators have said that the force imbalance is not critical. In testimony to Congress they argued that defence planners need to reallocate resources to bolster the NATO stockpile of anti-armour weapons, to create defensive barriers to tank attack, and to improve re-supply and reinforcement. They have received unexpected support from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who recently completed an assessment of the force balance in Europe, and concluded, apparently with the concurrence of Caspar Weinberger (the recently departed Secretary of Defense), that NATO's forces were adequate to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe.

NATO Appointment

Kaare Willoch, a former Norwegian prime minister, has abandoned his effort to become Secretary-General of NATO, thus clearing the way for the appointment of West German Manfred Wörner. Mr. Wörner's appointment is seen as ensuring that, in the aftermath of the INF agreement, the Federal Republic of Germany's security concerns will be strongly represented in NATO councils.

REVIEWS



Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace

Edward N. Luttwak

Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1987,
283 pgs., US \$20.00 cloth

Edward Luttwak sets himself a grand objective: "to uncover the universal logic that conditions all forms of war as well as the adversarial dealings of nations in peacetime." Ultimately, he fails, but in so doing he provides an entertaining and thought-provoking commentary on Western defence policies.

From the study of military history and contemporary military questions, Luttwak has concluded that the realm of strategy, which he defines broadly as "the conduct and consequences of human relations in the context of actual or possible armed conflict," is conditioned by a peculiar logic that is unlike the linear logic we are accustomed to applying in everyday life. Strategy, he writes, "tends to reward paradoxical conduct while confounding straightforwardly logical action."

Luttwak cites numerous examples to support his contention that much of strategy is blatant contradiction, beginning with the overworked Roman dictum, "If you want peace, prepare war." In the logic of strategy, common sense notions of what is best are violated. A bad road ("narrow, circuitous, unpaved") is likely to be a good road in combat, because it is less likely to be guarded by the enemy than the wide, straight, and smooth road. A course of action will tend to induce a reaction that defeats the original purpose. A successful new weapon loses its utility as the enemy devel-

ops countermeasures. A successful advance becomes harder to sustain as the victorious army moves farther from its homeland.

Luttwak takes the reader through the levels of strategy – which he divides into the technical, tactical, operational, theatre, and grand – illustrating at each the workings of the paradoxical logic. The defence of Western Europe is his case study; in particular, he examines the claim that NATO forces could successfully oppose a Soviet offensive in Europe by relying on "high-technology" non-nuclear defenses. While an infantry equipped with anti-tank missiles would be technically and tactically adequate against a tank offensive, Luttwak argues that at the operational level it would be overrun by the Warsaw Pact.

Luttwak also criticizes defence-in-depth (as opposed to forward defence), defensive defence (local militias), and deep-attack alternatives (e.g., NATO's Follow on Forces Attack Strategy) for NATO on the central front because they fail to allow for the reaction they are apt to evoke in the form of a new Soviet strategy. His message is that NATO's reliance on inadequate conventional forces supplemented by the threat of nuclear counter-attack, though flawed, is a lesser evil than reliance on a strong non-nuclear defence.

The reader need not be a strategic specialist to understand *Strategy*, but should be a military history buff to properly enjoy it. Luttwak is most comfortable talking about the details of conventional battle and draws extensively from examples ranging from the ancient Roman domination of Greece to the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, although World War II seems to be his favourite.

The portentous writing style – to be expected from someone attempting to deliver the authoritative tome on such a weighty subject – is, at times, annoying, particularly when the writer fails to be authori-

tative. Luttwak does not, in the end, convince the reader that he has divined a theory of peace and war, specifying precisely the relationship between variables and from which one can infer and test hypotheses. What Luttwak has really delivered is a testimony to the essential indeterminacy of combat and the persistence of change in human affairs.

Luttwak, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, is a self-described hawk, and readers may quarrel with some of his assertions. Few would deny, however, that *Strategy* is useful in reminding us of the complexity of military calculations, and highly contingent outcomes of battles. The book is a refreshing antidote to works that concentrate on the technical or tactical merits of a particular weapon or strategy, while ignoring how it will fare at the broader levels of combat. Above all, Luttwak provides a warning against looking for simple, straightforward solutions to strategic problems. – Shannon Selin

Ms. Selin is a research assistant at the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament.

No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958

Joseph T. Jockel

Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987, 166 pgs., \$19.95 cloth

This book can be read on three relatively distinct levels. It can be taken, in the first instance, as a recounting and analysis of the events that led to the creation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in 1958. At this level, Jockel's study makes a valuable contribution to what is admittedly a sparse literature on the genesis of bilateral cooperation in air

defence; indeed, it is fair to say that it will become the authoritative source for the period 1946 to 1958.

At another level, *No Boundaries Upstairs* constitutes a revisionist treatment of what has come to be taken as conventional wisdom regarding NORAD, on both sides of the Canada-US border. It is unusual to find such analytical fireworks embedded in a monograph that is at once both meticulously balanced and studiously non-emotional. Nevertheless, there are at least three orthodox assumptions about North American air-defence arrangements that Jockel sets out to shatter. The first of these is the now standard (at least in this country) view that NORAD in an important sense must date back to 1946, a year in which, or so it is held, a fearful and zealous US began to pressure a rather more Laodicean Canada to join it in the active pursuit of comprehensive air defence of the North American continent. Not true, says Jockel; for while a few over-excited US military planners did entertain visions of a grandiose continental air-defence system in the immediate postwar period, those who really made policy in Washington tended to be as unconcerned with air defence as their counterparts in Ottawa.

The second of the intriguing revisions argued by Jockel concerns the *purpose* of the surveillance and defence networks that had begun to proliferate by the mid-1950s. It is usually maintained that the primary purpose of continental air defence then, as later, was to provide warning for the US strategic deterrent – initially the bombers of Strategic Air Command – to get airborne in the event of a Soviet attack on North America. Whatever could be done to protect the continent's cities from Soviet bombers would only be of marginal importance, for the expectation was that, as Stanley Baldwin had

put it two decades earlier, "the bomber will always get through." This version, writes Jockel, is similarly flawed, at least insofar as the partisans of early-warning radar lines were concerned. By the time such warning systems began to seem necessary to Washington (that is, by 1952 and 1953), it was in large measure because of the conviction that the bomber need *not* get through. Notes Jockel: "It is striking how little consideration of the need to protect SAC had gone into the decisions to build the DEW and Mid-Canada Lines or into the American decision to augment active defences."

Thirdly, Jockel takes on those who see Canada augmenting its influence with the US as a result of participation in NORAD. The Canadian government believed, in 1958 and later, that NORAD would be a pillar of a security regime that enshrined the principles of partnership and consultation; one that in addition would be in some manner (never adequately explained) linked with NATO. The American perspective, however, differed radically; not only would NORAD not be hobbled by incarceration in the entangling Atlantic alliance, it would also not endow Canada with any influence over American security policy in areas other than the air defence of North America. It would take the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 to make this apparent to Ottawa.

The final way in which this book can be read is as a kind of allegory for contemporary issues in Canadian-American security relations. Are we, it might be asked, seeing the future of bilateral co-operation in the military use of space prefigured in this study of the evolution of air-defence collaboration? Some, no doubt, fear we are. Much more interesting, however, are the potential policy implications that Jockel's historical account might contain for the recently mooted "maritime NORAD." Jockel shows that two conditions had to be fulfilled before a unified air-defence command could be achieved: each country had to possess tangible assets (which in Canada's case meant a fairly substantial inter-

ceptor capability by the early 1950s); and there had to be a commonality of interests between the major bureaucratic champions of integration (the RCAF and the USAF).

In the case of the controversial maritime NORAD suggestion, it might be argued that our getting ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines will give us the assets, but it is hard to see how they will create a commonality of interests with the US Navy. Indeed, it is likelier that discord, not collaboration, would attend their purchase. If Jockel's analysis is any guide to the future, it appears as if the sort of arrangements that can and do work above sea level may not be very relevant below it.

— David G. Haglund

Mr. Haglund is Professor of Political Science at Queen's University and Director of Centre for International Relations.

Watershed In Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation Jonathan Dean

*Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books/
Union of Concerned Scientists, 1987,
286 pgs., \$13.95 paper*

There are really two books here: one on arms control and the other on European political relationships in the military security field. Because the former consists mostly of a briefing on negotiations it is Dean's political perceptions that provide the greatest interest. He is one of the few American observers who understands the European viewpoint. He wisely ascribes much of NATO's internal tension to a Western European acceptance of the need to live with a long-term East-West confrontation and a US search for some overall resolution of it. His own opinion is that the peak of the confrontation has passed and the challenge now is to set about a long-term process of dismantling the contending military establishments. In noting the pivotal role of the two Germanies in Europe, he appraises their ripening relationship as unlikely to change the political map of Europe, but as having

the potential to round off the sharper edges of the confrontation.

As for military affairs, Dean is more or less content with NATO's current doctrines because they are demonstrably defensive in nature. He counsels some familiar military improvements, while acknowledging that they are unlikely to occur, and cautions against any dramatic change in the strategies of flexible response and forward defence.

These are difficult times to write about arms control because events are developing swiftly. Dean's historical descriptions of arms control negotiations in Europe remain valuable but, like everybody else these days, his situation reports on the current states of play are overtaken before they get into print. Nevertheless, his discussion of core issues is essentially timeless.

Experts will already be familiar with virtually all of the factual material in this book but they can learn from Dean's lucid observations. Non-experts can learn from all of it; the style is relaxed and complex issues are presented with admirable simplicity and clarity.
— John Toogood

Mr. Toogood is Secretary-Treasurer of CIIPS and was deputy-head of the Canadian delegation to the MBFR talks in Vienna from 1980 to 1983.

The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada Douglas Bland

*Kingston, Ont.: Ronald P. Frye, 1987,
252 pgs., \$21.95 paper*

A comprehensive look at what the author calls "the random management system" of Canada's Department of National Defence has long been needed. Earlier attempts had been frustrated by difficulties in getting access to documents and to persons in the know. Colonel Bland has his ways, and in this semi-authorized appraisal (the researcher was provided with "special support" from two generals) of defence policy, he lifts a corner of the blanket that generally covers anything military and classified "for DND eyes and ears only."

In fact, this book is not so much about the administration of defence policy in Canada since WW II as it

is about the difficulties and conflicting loyalties, faced by military personnel of all ranks, engendered by constant administrative reorganization since 1964. Col. Bland reveals much about the internal mechanics of the system, and no doubt many old wounds will be re-opened by this study, but this reader is disturbed by what the author has not attended to: the influence of the various "types" of Chiefs of Defence Staff and Deputy Ministers. These offices are certainly as important to examine as the assorted types of Ministers of Defence which the author describes so well. In addition, the author does not discuss the influence of the government's policy on arms control, nor does he deal with the bilingualism controversy which became entangled with the debate over Forces unification.

Unfortunately, this hurriedly assembled book has many faults: the tone is often patronizing — Col. Bland is nearly always critical of Ministers and Deputy Ministers and consistently unforgiving of public servants. The colloquial English is irritating and the frequent use of unexplained military terminology is aimed only at the initiated.

Nevertheless, the author has a story to tell and recommendations to make. For the reader in a hurry, the final two chapters provide the essence of the message. Col. Bland gets full marks for attempting what military officers do best: provide military advice. This is modern military history, written by an active inside observer. No attempt is made at objectivity, nor is it claimed. The basic message is valid; that what has been called "defence by ministry" — facing new challenges and commitments by reorganization of the head office — does not work. Instead, one needs additional resources — both people and money. — Rychard Brûlé
Mr. Brûlé is a grants officer at the Institute. □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* 'Livres' section.

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



The terms of office of four members of the Board of Directors expired in 1987. **Norman Alcock**, **William Barton**, **George Bell**, and **Harriet Critchley** left the Board in August. New Directors were announced by the Minister of External Affairs, **Joe Clark**, for a three-year term. They are: **Gisèle Côté-Harper**, of Quebec City, Professor of Law at Université Laval; **John Halstead**, of Ottawa, former Canadian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and to NATO, and presently a Research Professor at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.; and **Jacques Levesque**, Professor of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal. **William Barton**, Chairman of the Board, was reappointed for a two-year term.

Beth Richards left the Institute in December and is now working in Toronto. Taking her place in the Public Programmes section is **Margaret Bourgeault**, until recently the co-ordinator of the Commonwealth Conference for Young Leaders. **William George** has decided to resume his studies at the London School of Economics. **Katherine Laundy** assumed the position of Director of Information Services in October. Ms. Laundy came to the Institute from the National Library where she was a Senior Reference Librarian. **Michel Proulx**, until recently a student at the University of Ottawa, has joined the administrative support staff of the Institute.

Geoffrey Pearson attended the Sixteenth Williamsburg Conference in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia in November. Organized by the Asia Society of New York, the conference focussed on issues of political, military and economic cooperation in the Pacific area. There were forty-six participants from both sides of the Pacific.

Generally speaking, participants were optimistic about regional security and pessimistic about global economic prospects. A number of specific warnings were issued, especially over trends towards ethnic and religious confrontation in Malaysia, the Philippines and in the South Pacific. The issues of American bases, and of nuclear weapons in the Pacific were also thought by some to be potentially serious, given the rise of nationalism amongst the new elites. The unity of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an organization to promote political as well as economic utility was debated without any clear consensus emerging.

The other Canadian participants were **Robert Blair** of Nova Corporation and **Melville Couvelier**, Minister of Finance of British Columbia.

"Arms Transfers" was the subject of a conference organized by the Institute in October. In the responses of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations (the Simard-Hockin Report 1986), emphasis was placed on the need to examine various ideas, including that of an international arms export and import register. The Institute arranged the conference on Conventional Arms Transfers to enable parlia-

mentarians, senior government officials and representatives of non-governmental organizations to hear experts on the subject, and to have the opportunity to exchange ideas.

Michael Klare from Hampshire College, Amherst, Massachusetts spoke on the global patterns in the arms trade. **Chris Smith** of the University of Sussex, UK, addressed the question of why suppliers supply. **Gehad Auda** of the Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo looked at why recipients receive. The economic consequences of the arms trade were discussed by **John Treddenick** of Royal Military College, Kingston. **James Taylor**, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs spoke on "Global Arms Transfers: Issues and Perspectives." **Jo Husbands** of the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., and **Sergei Karagamov** of the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow, discussed the problems, prospects and ideas for the control of arms transfers. **John Lamb** of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament in Ottawa focussed on the Canadian experience in arms transfers and its effect on arms control. At the closing lunch **Ernie Regehr** of Project Ploughshares summed up the discussion and conclusions of the conference. The Institute will publish a conference report in the new year.

"Rethinking International Governance" is the subject of a project sponsored by the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota, and directed by **Harlan Cleveland**. **Geoffrey Pearson** and **Peter Gizewski** gave a paper at a project meeting in November in Long Lake, Minnesota. The project is looking at the implications for international institutions of four "revolutions" – bio-technology,

information, global environmental change, and explosive power. The Pearson/Gizewski paper looked at the fourth development in terms of nuclear weapons and security.

"Peace, Food Security and Development" is the title of a conference cosponsored by CIIPS, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, the International Development Information Program of Carleton University, and the World Food Day Association. Held in December in Ottawa, the conference brought together representatives of organizations working on these issues, and specialists in the field. Participants also included Members of Parliament, journalists, diplomats, academics, and government officials. Guest speakers and panelists were **Micheline Beaudry** of the University of Moncton; **David Hopper** of the World Bank; **Augustin Mahiga** of the Tanzanian High Commission; **Ali Mazrui** of the Universities of Michigan and Jos, Nigeria; and **Ruth Engo** from the UN. **Bruce Steele**, host of CBC radio's *The Food Show*, was the moderator of a panel discussion. Portions of the conference were taped for later broadcast.

The Information Services section of the Institute organized and sponsored a conference for librarians and resource centre managers from across Canada in Ottawa in November. The conference, entitled "Peace and Security: Information Resources in Canada" was designed to bring together those librarians and resource centre managers who are responsible for the acquisition, dissemination and retrieval of information on issues of international peace and security. The conference discussed ways to cooperate and share expertise in

order to extend and improve services. In addition, various conference speakers spoke of the new work being done with directories, databases, new technologies, and of the possibilities of sharing data and documents.

Speakers included **Norman Alcock**, former chairman of the Information Services Committee of the CIIPS Board of Directors; **Gunnel von Dobeln** of SIPRI; **William Kincade** of ACCESS, a security information service in Washington, D.C.; and **Carol Davies-Nador**, a database manager at the Dag Hammarskjöld Library at the UN. Panelists who addressed the subject of on-line resources in Canada were **Robert Penner** of the Canadian Peace Alliance, **Christine Peringer** of Peace Research Institute-Dundas, **Ken Epps** of Project Ploughshares and **Susan Connell** of CIIPS. **Jane Beaumont** spoke on database development. **Paul Bennett** of the Department of External Affairs and **David Code** of the Department of National Defence made a presentation on the information resources of the Canadian Government in this field; **Hélène Galarneau** of the Centre québécois de relations internationales, **Gretchen Cheung** of Collège militaire de royal de Saint-Jean and **Cathy Murphy** of the Canadian Forces College in Toronto spoke about information resources in their respective fields.

In early November the first of a series of co-sponsored seminars between the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament and CIIPS featured **Raymond Garthoff** who spoke on the future of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. Mr. Garthoff, who is now at the Brookings Institution, was part of the American team which negotiated the SALT/ABM treaties in the early 1970's.

New Publications from the Institute

CONFERENCE REPORT

5. Measures for Peace in Central America, 8-9 May 1987, by Liisa North, December 1987.

OCCASIONAL PAPER

3. Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities, by Ronald G. Purver, January 1988.

POINTS OF VIEW

5. Towards a World Space Organization, by Elisabeth Mann Borgese, November 1987.

WORKING PAPER

5. The Conventional Force Balance in Europe: Understanding the Numbers, by Jim Moore, January 1988.

BACKGROUND PAPER

16. Accidental Nuclear War: Reducing the Risks, by Dianne DeMille, January 1988.

CIIPS and the Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton are cooperating on a project entitled "Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third Party Mediators." A seminar on the subject was held in November in Ottawa under the direction of **Fen Hampson** of CIIPS, **Brian Tomlin** of the Paterson School, and **Brian Mandell** also of the Paterson School. **Janice Stein** of the University of Toronto led a seminar on the Middle East; she and **Richard Ned Lebow** of Cornell later spoke on the future of deterrence. The following day participants focussed on four regions: Southern Africa, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Central America, and India-Pakistan. Papers were given by **Robert Matthews** of the University of Toronto, **Dan O'Meara** of Montreal, **Christopher Brown** of Carleton University, **Gérard Hervouet** of Université Laval, **Martin Rudner** of the Paterson School, **Liisa North** of York University, **Tim Draimin** of the Jesuit Centre, **David Haglund** of Queen's University, and **Ashok Kapur** of the University of Waterloo.

"Challenges to Canadian Security" is the subject of a project jointly sponsored by the Research and Public Programmes sections of the Institute. Progressing through the winter of 1987 and spring of 1988, the project involves a series of inter-disciplinary seminars which will result in a book geared to a general audience. **Ian Burton**, a Professor of Geography at the University of Toronto began the series in October with a discussion about climatic and environmental changes, and their effects on Canadian security. In November, **Robert Jenness** of the Economic Council of Canada focussed on the challenges to the domestic economy in the next twenty years, discussing Canada's vulnerability to global trends as well as the readjustments which will be necessary as a result of demographic changes within Canada. **Morris Miller**, an economic consultant with M&M Associates and formerly with the World Bank, led a discussion in December which concentrated on various facets of the international debt crisis, and the effects of these developments on the Canadian economy.

Brad Feasey and **Dianne DeMille** of the Public Programmes section of the Institute spoke at a number of meetings of teachers and students during the autumn. These included a workshop sponsored by "Educating for Peace" in Ottawa, a day-long session for gifted elementary school students from West Quebec, and a meeting to discuss audio-visual resources for peace and security education sponsored by the Quebec Catholic and Protestant Teacher's Associations and the National Film Board.

Geoffrey Pearson spoke at a meeting organized by Project Ploughshares in Corner Brook, Newfoundland in October on "The Institute and Peace and Security Education." Also speaking at the meeting were former Board member **Gwynne Dyer**, and **Lois Wilson**, who is a current member of the Board. In November, Mr. Pearson spoke at the University of Calgary on Western reactions to "new thinking" in the USSR.

In October **Harald von Riekhoff**, CIIPS Research Fellow and Professor at Carleton University, organized a workshop at the Institute on the future of the UN system. Participants included those with practical and academic experience with or at the UN. **John Holmes**, **King Gordon**, **Margaret Doxey**, **John Trent**, **David Pollock**, **Robert Boardman**, **Andrew Cooper**, **Robert Cox**, **André Donneur**, **James Sewell**, **Frank Stone**, **Carl Pedersen** and **Geoffrey Pearson** exchanged views on practical means of increasing the usefulness of the UN and ways to stimulate research on the subject in Canada. □

SECOND QUARTER GRANTS

1988 Grants Procedures and Deadlines

Beginning in January 1988 the Institute will make decisions on and allocate grants twice a year instead of quarterly. Please note the following deadlines:

30 June	for an October 1988 decision
31 December	for a March 1989 decision


RESEARCH GRANTS - Second Quarter 1987-88

Jean Pierre Derrienic , Université Laval, Québec Les sociétés occidentales face aux conflits périphériques	\$ 10,000
Walter Dorn , Science for Peace, Toronto Canada and Space-Based International Verification and Monitoring	2,200
Pierre Fournier , Université du Québec à Montréal L'industrie militaire au Canada et au Québec	20,000
Dieter Heinrich , Toronto Nuclear Weapons Legal Action (Research Phase)	15,000
ISEES , Carleton University, Ottawa M.S. Gorbachev's Reforms: A Bibliography, Index and Annotation of His Speeches	1,000
James Keeley , University of Calgary Interstate Civilian Nuclear Co-operation Networks	5,000
Albert Legault , CQRI, Université Laval, Québec L'influence de la technologie sur la stratégie	35,000
Kevin McMahon , Niagara Falls The Inuit and the Military	5,000
Naval Officers Association of Canada (Ottawa) An Integrated Maritime Policy	28,000
Liisa North , CAPA, Jesuit Centre, Toronto The Canadian Policy Options for Peace and Security in Central America	82,000
Morris Saldov , Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's A Proposed Curriculum for Social Work Education on Peace and Disarmament	4,500
Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute India and Canada - Partners for the Future	20,000
Janice Stein, R.N. Lebow , University of Toronto Deterrence and Reassurance: Approaches to Conflict Resolution	8,000
Maurice Torrelli Institut du droit de la paix et du développement (France) Métastratégie	10,000
TOTAL	\$245,700

PUBLIC PROGRAMMES GRANTS - Second Quarter 1987-88

Les Ami-e-s de la Terre de Québec , Conférence "Paix et sécurité : vers le désarmement et le développement"	\$ 10,000
Au Carrefour des cèdres , Montréal <i>Bulletin</i>	10,400
Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament , Ottawa <i>Arms Control Chronicle</i>	29,000
Canadian Forces Logistics Association , Ottawa Seminar "In Defence of Canada's Oceans"	4,000
Canadian Institute of International Affairs , National Office, Toronto Second Workshop "Promoting Compliance with Arms Control Treaties"	4,200
Canadian Peace Educators Network , Drayton Valley, Alberta <i>Peace Education News</i>	24,000
Centre d'Animation Saint-Pierre de Montréal, Inc. , Montréal Colloques "Paix et qualité de vie"	9,000
Club de relations internationales , Montréal Colloque "Les négociations Est-Ouest et l'Europe devant l'option zéro"	1,500
Centre d'entreprises de paix au Canada , Alexandria, Ontario Projet de paix et d'amitié, Canada-USSR, "Le train de la paix"	15,000
Development Education Centre Films , Toronto Film "The Journey"	6,000
Les Films du Crépuscule Inc. , Montréal Film "Le Voyage"	6,000
Forum on Nuclear Politics , Ottawa Debate "The Nuclear Submarine Aspect of the White Paper"	400
Groupe de recherche et de réflexion sur la paix et la sécurité , Montréal Séminaires et présentations de notes de recherches sur la paix et sécurité.	500
David Kattenburg , Hamilton The Peace and Conflict Radio Project	10,000
McGill University, Centre for Research of Air and Space Law , Montreal Symposium "Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification: Options"	4,000
The North American Model United Nations , Toronto Conference "North American Model United Nations, 1988"	7,000
Peacefund Canada , Ottawa Leaflet <i>Peacefund Canada</i>	5,000
Project Peacemakers , Winnipeg Newsletter <i>Peace Projections</i>	1,100
Quaker Peacemakers; Pacifiques Quakers , Ottawa A USSR - Canada Exchange	3,500
University of Calgary, Peace and Conflict Resolution Group , Calgary Film/lecture series "What about the Russians?"	2,400
University of Calgary Conference "US - Canadian Foreign Policy and Defence Perspectives"	5,850
TOTAL	\$158,850

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SUBVENTIONS - DEUXIÈME TRIMESTRE

Attribution des subventions en 1988 - Modalités et dates limites

À partir de janvier 1988, l'Institut statuera sur les demandes de subventions deux fois par année, et non plus quatre, comme il l'a fait jusqu'ici. On est prié de noter les dates limites suivantes:

30 juin 1988 - décision prise en octobre 1988

31 décembre 1988 - décision prise en mars 1989

SUBVENTIONS À LA RECHERCHE - Deuxième trimestre 1987-88

10 000 \$

Jean Pierre Derrin, Université Laval, Québec

Les sociétés occidentales face aux conflits périphériques

2 200

Walter Dorn, Science for Peace, Toronto

Canada and Space-Based International Verification and Monitoring

20 000

Pierre Fournier, Université du Québec à Montréal

L'industrie militaire au Canada et au Québec

15 000

Dieter Heinrich, Toronto

Nuclear Weapons Legal Action (Research Phase)

1 000

ISEES, Carleton University, Ottawa

M. S. Gorbachev's Reforms: A Bibliography, Index and Annotation

5 000

James Keeley, University of Calgary

Interstate Civilian Nuclear Co-operation Networks

35 000

Albert Legault, CQRI, Université Laval, Québec

L'influence de la technologie sur la stratégie

5 000

Kevin McMahon, Niagara Falls

The Inuit and the Military

28 000

Naval Officers' Association of Canada (Ottawa)

An Integrated Maritime Policy

82 000

Lisa North, CAPA, Jesuit Centre, Toronto

The Canadian Policy Options for Peace and Security in Central America

4 500

Morris Saldivy, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's

A Proposed Curriculum for Social Work Education on Peace

20 000

Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute

India and Canada - Partners for the Future

8 000

Janice Stein, R.N. Lebow, University of Toronto

Deterrence and Reassurance: Approaches to Conflict Resolution

10 000

Maurice Torrelli

Institut du droit de la paix et du développement (France)

TOTAL 245 700 \$

SUBVENTIONS AUX PROGRAMMES PUBLICS - Deuxième trimestre 1987-88

10 000 \$

Les Amis de la Terre de Québec,

Conférence « Paix et sécurité : vers le désarmement et le développement »

10 400

Au Carrefour des cèdres, Montréal

29 000

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa

4 000

Seminar « In Defence of Canada's Oceans »

4 200

Canadian Institute of International Affairs, National Office, Toronto

Second Workshop « Promoting Compliance with Arms Control Treaties »

24 000

Canadian Peace Educators Network, Drayton Valley, Alberta

Centre d'Animation Saint-Pierre de Montréal, Inc., Montréal

Colloques « Paix et qualité de vie »

1 500

Club de relations internationales, Montréal

Colloque « Les négociations Est-Ouest et l'Europe zéro »

15 000

Centre d'entreprises de paix au Canada, Alexandria, Ontario

Projet de paix et d'amitié, Canada-USSR, « Le train de la paix »

6 000

Development Education Centre Films, Toronto

Film « The Journey »

6 000

Film « Le Voyage »

Forum on Nuclear Politics, Ottawa

Debate « The Nuclear Submarine Aspect of the White Paper »

400

Groupe de recherche et de réflexion sur la paix et la sécurité,

Séminaires et présentations de notes de recherches sur la paix et sécurité,

10 000

David Kattenburg, Hamilton

The Peace and Conflict Radio Project

4 000

McGill University, Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, Montréal

Symposium « Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification: Options »

7 000

The North American Model United Nations, Toronto

Conference « North American Model United Nations, 1988 »

5 000

Peacefund Canada, Ottawa

Leaflet Peacefund Canada

Project Peacemakers, Winnipeg

Newsletter Peace Projections

3 500

Quaker Peacemakers: Pacific Quakers, Ottawa

Quaker Peacemakers: Pacific Quakers, Ottawa

University of Calgary, Peace and Conflict Resolution Group, Calgary

Film/lecture series « What about the Russians? »

Conference « US - Canadian Foreign Policy and Defence Perspectives »

5 850

TOTAL 158 850 \$

LES DROITS TERRITORIAUX...

CONTESTES...

PROBLÈMES RÉELS

M. Brad Reasey et Mme Dianne DeMille, de la direction des Programmes publics de l'Institut, ont souvent pris la parole devant des enseignants et des étudiants au cours de l'automne. Ils ont ainsi participé à un atelier parrainé par le groupe *Educating for Peace*, à Ottawa; il s'agissait d'une séance d'une journée destinée aux élèves doués des écoles primaires de l'Ouest québécois; ils ont par ailleurs assisté à une réunion qui visait à discuter des moyens audio-visuels pouvant servir à l'éducation sur la paix et la sécurité, et que parrainerait l'Office national du film et les associations catholique et protestante des enseignants du Québec.

En octobre, à Corner Brook (Terre-Neuve), M. Geoffrey Pearson a pris la parole pendant une réunion organisée par Projet Ploughshares sur le thème «L'Institut et l'éducation sur la paix et la sécurité». Ont également prononcé des allocutions à cette occasion M. Gwynne Dyer, ancien membre du Conseil, et Mme Lois Wilson, qui y siège toujours. En novembre, M. Pearson a pris la parole à l'Université de Calgary et il a alors analysé les réactions de l'Occident aux propositions de M. Gorbatchev.

En octobre, M. Harald von Riekhoff a organisé et dirigé un atelier à l'Institut sur l'avenir du système de l'ONU. Au nombre des participants figuraient des personnes qui avaient une expérience pratique et théorique concernant l'ONU; Mme Margaret Dooey, ainsi que MM. John Trent, David Pollock, Robert Boardman, Andrew Cooper, Robert Cox, André Donneur, James Sewell, Frank Stone, Carl Pedersen et Geoffrey Pearson ont alors échangé des points de vue sur les moyens pratiques qui permettraient d'accroître l'utilité de l'ONU et sur les mesures à prendre pour favoriser des recherches sur la question au Canada. □

Publications nouvelles de l'Institut	
RAPPORT DE CONFÉRENCE	
5. Vers l'instauration de la paix en Amérique centrale, 8 et 9 mai 1987, par Lisa North, décembre 1987.	
CHAPRE DE L'INSTITUT	
3. La limitation des armements et perspectives par Ronald G. Purver, janvier 1988.	
OPINIONS	
5. À quand la création d'une Organisation mondiale	
16. Limiter les risques d'une guerre nucléaire accidentelle, par Dianne DeMille, janvier 1988.	
EXPOSE	
6. «The Conventional Force Balance in Europe: Understanding the Numbers», par Jim Moore, janvier 1988.	
DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL	
l'Espace? par Elisabeth Mann Borgese, novembre 1987.	

ancien économiste de la Banque mondiale, a dirigé un débat en décembre sur les tendances de l'économie mondiale; il a accordé beaucoup d'importance à la crise de l'endettement et aux effets qu'elle a sur l'économie canadienne.

L'ICPSI et la *Pearson School of International Affairs* de l'Université Carleton réalisent ensemble un projet intitulé «Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third Party Mediators». Un colloque sur la question a eu lieu en novembre à Ottawa, sous la gouverne de M.M. Fen Hampson (ICPSI), Brian Tomlin et Brian Mandell (tous deux de la *Pearson School*). Mme Janice Stein (Université de Toronto) a dirigé un colloque sur le Moyen-Orient; plus tard, en compagnie de M. Richard Ned Lebow (Cornell), elle a parlé de l'avenir de la dissuasion. Le lendemain, les exposés ont principalement concerné quatre régions: l'Afrique australe, le Vietnam et l'Asie du Sud-Est, l'Amérique centrale, l'Inde et le Pakistan. Des exposés ont été présentés par M. Dan O'Meara (Montréal), M. Robert Matthews (Toronto), M. Gérard Rudner (*Pearson School*), Mme Lisa North (York), M. Tim Draxmin (*Jesuit Centre*), M. David Haglund (Queen's), et M. Ashok Kapur (Waterloo).

anti-missiles balistiques, dans le cadre du premier colloque d'une série co-parrainée par le Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement et par l'ICPSI. M. Garthoff, qui travaille maintenant au *Brookings Institution*, a fait partie de l'équipe américaine qui a négocié les traités SALT et ABM au début des années 1970.

«La sécurité canadienne menacée» voilà le thème d'un projet mené conjointement par la direction de la Recherche et la direction des Programmes publics de l'Institut. Le projet se poursuivra au cours de l'hiver 1987 et du printemps 1988 et il comportera des colloques interdisciplinaires qui se solderont par la publication d'un ouvrage destiné à un auditoire non spécialisé. M. Ian Burton, professeur de géographie à l'Université de Toronto, a lancé la série en octobre en s'interrogeant sur les changements climatiques et environnementaux et sur leurs conséquences pour la sécurité canadienne. En novembre, M. Robert Jeness, du Conseil économique du Canada, s'est penché sur les défis que l'économie canadienne devra relever au cours des vingt prochaines années et il s'est demandé dans quelle mesure l'évolution de la conjoncture mondiale risquait de la toucher et quels redressements seront nécessaires par suite des changements démographiques que qui se produiront au Canada.

M. Morris Miller, économiste-conseil chez *M&M Associates* et M. Raymond Garthoff à partir de l'avenir du Traité sur les missiles

des administrateurs de centres de documentation à qui l'incombe l'information sur les questions concernant la paix et la sécurité internationale. Les participants ont cherché à définir les moyens de coopérer et de partager les connaissances et la documentation de façon Par ailleurs, divers intervenants ont participé des nouveaux travaux qui portent sur les répertoires, les bases de données, la technologie et les mécanismes permettant de partager des données et des documents en direct et autrement.

Parmi les orateurs, citons M. Norman Alcock, ancien président du Comité des services d'information au Conseil d'administration de l'ICPSI, M. Gunnel von Döbeln (SIPRI), M. William Kincaide (ACCESS, service d'information sur la sécurité basé à Washington, aux États-Unis), Mme Carol Davies-Nador, administratrice d'une base de données à la bibliothèque Dag Hammarskjöld, à l'ONU. M. Robert Penner (Alliance canadienne pour la paix), Mme Christine Ferniger (*Peace Research Institute* de Dundas), M. Ken Epps (Projet Ploughshares) et Mme Susan Connell (ICPSI) ont fait partie des ressources accessibles en direct au Canada. Mme Jane Beaumont a traité de l'établissement des bases de données, tandis que M. Paul Benneil, du ministère des Affaires extérieures, et M. David Code, du ministère de la Défense nationale, ont fait des exposés sur les services d'information offerts par le gouvernement du Canada dans ce domaine; Mme Hélène Galarneau, du Centre québécois de relations internationales, Mme Greichen Cheung, du Collège des Forces canadiennes à Toronto, ont parlé des moyens d'information existant dans leur domaine.

Au début de novembre, M. Raymond Garthoff a parlé de l'avenir du Traité sur les missiles

la géopolitique contemporaine. Si l'ouvrage de M. Zоргібіse veut une introduction à la géopolitique, il offre plutôt une recension des diverses zone de tension sur la scène internationale.

Après un bref chapitre d'introduction sur la définition de la géopolitique, l'auteur divise son étude en deux parties. La première est consacrée à la «périphérie proche», s'étendant géographiquement de la Méditerranée au golfe Persique. Elle retrace essentiellement le rôle des superpuissances dans cette partie du monde. Zоргібіse passe en revue la région méditerranéenne, le conflit israëlo-arabe, la «guerre civile» au Liban, l'affaire de Chypre et la région du golfe Persique avec une attention particulière pour la question de l'Afghanistan et celle du conflit Iran-Irak.

La seconde partie traite de ce que l'auteur appelle la «périphérie éloignée», rassemblant sous cette dénomination trois continents : l'Afrique, l'Asie et l'Amérique latine. Toutefois, le champ assez étendu de son étude ne lui permet de traiter que de façon succincte certaines zones de tension au sein de ces trois entités géographiques. Après une brève analyse des régions sensibles de l'Afrique, l'auteur attire l'attention du lecteur sur le continent asiatique avec le problème de la Corée et de Taiwan, sur les Caraïbes avec le conflit de la Grenade et sur l'Amérique du sud avec la guerre des Malouines. L'auteur introduit enfin la notion d'«extrême périphérie» pour traiter plus spécifiquement de l'océan Indien. On aurait aimé que Zоргібіse fasse une plus grande place aux problèmes du tiers monde et qu'il n'analyse pas tous les différents internationaux dans le cadre des relations Est-Ouest. Il perçoit la scène internationale comme un échiquier où Soviétiques et Américains avancent leurs pions et où il n'y a de place que pour un gagnant. Il faut aussi reconnaître que le livre souffre des limites d'un *Que sais-je?*. Une étude aussi brève et concise risque toujours de tomber dans une simplification des proportions, obligeant le lecteur soit à connaitre a priori les dimensions du problème, soit à recourir à d'autres sources d'informations afin de garder une vision objective.

— William L. George

LES TEMPS MODERNES
numéros 492-93-94 (juillet-août-sept. 1987) 495 pages.

Depuis que Mikhaïl Gorbatchev a accédé au pouvoir, voilà maintenant trois ans, et que son vocabulaire réformiste est bien à la mode en Occident, pas une seule revue populaire ou publication spécialisée n'a

Les grandes puissances au lendemain de Reykjavik

Centre québécois de relations internationales, Université Laval, 1987. 172 pages, 10,00 \$

Le livre du Centre québécois de relations internationales fait partie de la collection *Études stratégiques et militaires du CQRI*, et il rassemble les interventions d'une douzaine de conférenciers invités en mars dernier, à Québec, pour commenter les résultats du deuxième sommet Reegan-Gorbatchev dans la capitale islandaise en octobre 1986. La plupart des spécialistes réunis émettent un jugement favorable sur la politique étrangère soviétique. Jack Mendelson, de l'*Arms Control Association*, va jusqu'à dire «que le bon ou risqué-elle d'échouer d'un seul homme. Ira-t-elle jusqu'au bout ou risque-t-elle de retourner comme ce fut le cas avec l'ère Khrouchchev? On en donne pas de réponse mais on suggère simplement «que le fait que les choses bougent en soit positif» et «qu'une réglementation n'effacerait pas les effets et encore moins le souvenir».

Parmi les contributions les plus remarquables, il faut souligner Karol, qui, après plusieurs voyages en URSS, son pays d'origine, lui ont permis de mesurer l'ampleur des changements sur une période de vingt-cinq ans. Il conclut, prudemment, que si «des surprises de Gorbatchev, si elles ne garantissent pas encore l'avenir et si le fait pas encore l'avenir et si le fait pas pendant prouver qu'une dynamique de changement, pour reprendre l'expression d'Adrei Sakharov, est à l'œuvre et ne restera sans doute pas sans suites». Suivent, des textes de physiciens et d'économistes, dont le principal conseiller du numéro un soviétique, Abel Agabegian.

Alertes en Méditerranée

Hérodote, 2^e trimestre 1987, numéro 45, 175 pages.

Berceau de civilisations millénaires, centre du monde pendant des siècles, la Méditerranée n'a pour les médias et de nombreux observateurs de la scène internationale, plus le même attrait qu'auparavant. Le pouvoir s'est déplacé à l'Ouest, de l'autre côté de l'Atlantique, et bientôt,

disent certains utopistes, il s'exercera dans la région du Pacifique. Et pour-tant, la Méditerranée devrait être le point de mire car ce qui s'y passe en ce moment déterminera notre futur.

Yves Lacoste, qui dirige cette revue de géographie et de géopolitique, donne un aperçu en introduction que, des différents problèmes, conflits, et conflits au Liban, au Tchad, au Sahara espagnol et à Chypre; rebel-lions de minorités en Yougoslavie, en Turquie, en Irak et en Bulgarie; résurgence du fondamentalisme islamiste qui menace la plupart des pays arabes; explosion démographique au Maghreb; xénophobie dans certains pays européens; présence des flottes américaines et soviétique, etc. Une poudrière quoi!

Avec une telle litane de maux, Lacoste constate que «parmi les grandes zones de tension que l'on peut recensar à la surface du globe, celle de la Méditerranée qui se prolonge vers le Moyen-Orient apparaît aujourd'hui comme la plus dangereuse, non seulement pour les populations directement concernées, mais aussi au plan mondial. Des tensions anciennes s'accroissent de nouvelles se développent; elles se propagent, s'enchevêtrent et s'envoient s'engager dans une période de détérioration en Europe».

De nombreux articles de la revue sont consacrés à la situation politique et sociale dans les pays du Maghreb qui pose une menace directe au continent européen et principalement à la France. Hervé Coutau-Begarie trace l'esquisse d'une géostratégie de la Méditerranée alors que Dominique Vidal-Sephina signe deux textes sur les conflits au Liban. — Jocelyn Coulon

Voir l'analyse sommaire d'ouvrages publiés en anglais dans la rubrique Reviews de Peace&Security.

prévoyait une option d'achat sur un second lot d'appareils au prix d'ort

gine, mais les Forces canadiennes ont dû y renoncer voici plusieurs années, faute des crédits budgétaires voulus. Les projets d'acquisition

actuels représentent une grosse dé-

que l'Union soviétique poursuivait son propre programme de défense

stratégique. Cette révélation publi-

que inhabituelle n'a surpris en rien

les spécialistes occidentaux qui, sui-

vent le programme de très près. Le

bruit a couru l'année dernière que

les Soviétiques ont mis au point une

très importante installation laser à

Dushambé, dans le Kazakhstan. De

récentes photographies prises par

satellite semblent confirmer l'exis-

tence d'une installation militaire sur

un sommet montagneux de cette

région éloignée, mais on ne peut

pour l'instant que conjecturer sur

son potentiel militaire. Le Pentagone

n'a émis aucun commentaire officiel

sur le complexe de Dushambé, mais

le lendemain de la parution des

photographies dans la presse améri-

Spaer Aerospace, se partageront des

gramme Oerlikon, dont *Liton* et

canadiennes participant au pro-

système Oerlikon. Les entreprises

que les Etats-Unis ont opté pour le

ments à justifié leur confiance, puis-

sur l'acquisition de ce système par

les autorités du Ministère misaient

(ADATS) Oerlikon pour en équiper

les Forces canadiennes en Europe,

nationale a décidé d'acheter le sys-

ème de défense aérienne anti-chars

La défense aérienne à basse altitude

Lorsque le ministère de la Défense

note de défense.

de 600 millions de dollars la

lars, l'achat de quinze CF-18 gonflera

desormais quarante millions de dol-

pensé; comme le prix unitaire atteint

actuels représentent une grosse dé-

Washington. M. Gorbatchev a déclaré

en direct avant le Sommet de

Au cours d'une entrevue télévisée

Les lasers soviétiques

contrats d'une valeur de 950 millions

de dollars.

de la Défense

pour la République fédérale d'Allemagne, dont le point de vue sera fortement

représenté dans les conseils de l'OTAN.

les FNI, la nomination de M. Manfred Wörner, d'Allemagne de l'Ouest. Au lendemain de l'Accord sur

M. Manfred Wörner, d'Allemagne de l'Ouest. Au lendemain de l'Accord sur

prendre au poste de Secrétaire général de l'OTAN, laissant ainsi la voie libre à

le Nord, ancien premier ministre de la Norvège, a cessé de pré-

Nomination à l'OTAN

attaquer l'Europe de l'Ouest.

Défense), que l'OTAN dispose de forces suffisantes pour dissuader l'URSS

avec la caution de M. Caspar Weinberger (Secrétaire démissionnaire à la

un appui inattendu, celui des *US Joint Chiefs of Staff* qui viennent de terminer

les dispositifs de ravitaillement et de renforcement. Ces arguments ont reçu

anti-blinds, de dresser des obstacles défensifs contre les chars et d'améliorer

plutôt se soucier de réaffirmer les ressources afin de grossir les stocks d'armes

Ils ont soutenu devant le Congrès que les planificateurs militaires devraient

Pour d'autres observateurs, le déséquilibre des forces n'a rien de critique.

suite. Bref, les armes nucléaires sont meilleur marché.

liards de dollars américains et une dépense annuelle de vingt milliards par la

Pacte de Varsovie supposerait une dépense initiale de soixante-dix mil-

les dix divisions supplémentaires dont l'OTAN aurait besoin pour égaliser le

Aspin, président influent du *House Armed Services Committee*, a déclaré que

sur la question controversée de l'équilibre des forces classiques. M. Les

sujet des capacités défensives de l'OTAN et focalisé de nouveau l'attention

D'un point de vue plus général, l'Accord sur les FNI a précisé le débat au

caine, le général Pietrowski, com-

mandant en chef du *US Space*

inquiet au sujet des capacités d'une

autre installation laser soviétique

connue, érigée à Sary Shagan, en

Asie centrale soviétique.

Le général Pietrowski a déclaré

que les lasers soviétiques seraient

capables de détruire des satellites

américains sur orbite basse et d'en-

dommager les satellites de renseignement et de communications, même

s'ils étaient placés sur orbite haute.

Il a réclame la reprise et l'accéléra-

tion du programme américain

d'armes anti-satellites, qui prévoit

l'utilisation d'un véhicule miniature

autonome pour heurter les satellites

soviétiques sur orbite basse des

vitesse frisant les 58 000 kilomètres

à l'heure. L'installation de Dushambé,

si elle s'avère dotée d'une capacité

anti-missiles balistiques intercon-

tinuents (ICBM), contreviendrait

aux dispositions du Traité ABM.

n étant pas implantée dans un poly-

gone d'essais désigné (Sary Shagan).

Les armes anti-satellites pouvant at-

taquer les satellites lents mais non

violation, mais c'est là, on le recon-

naît depuis longtemps, une lacune

du Traité ABM.

Evolution des armes nucléaires

américaines

Les Etats-Unis procèdent aussi à

la mise au point d'armes exotiques,

principalement les essais d'armes

ment à la faveur du programme de

l'IDS. Le récent débat sur la néces-

sité de poursuivre les essais d'armes

nucléaires a révélé d'importants in-

dices sur la nature des armes en voie

d'élaboration. Les armes nucléaires

de «troisième génération» se rangent

dans deux catégories. À la première

appartiennent les armes qui seront

mariées aux nouveaux vecteurs en-

trait actuellement en service : le

Trident D-5, le *Midgeman*, les nou-

veaux missiles d'attaque à faible

portée et, éventuellement, le missile

de croisière perfectionné. On se s'en

mise au point s'impose afin que la

étonnante guerre, un long travail de

puissance explosive d'armes comme

les ogives pénétrantes ne soit pas

amplifié par les contraintes agis-

sant sur l'engin.

Sont également en voie d'élabora-

tion des ogives à effets spéciaux;

itions, par exemple, le laser à

rayons-X et les dispositifs conçus

pour maximiser les émissions de

micro-ondes en vue d'altérer les

composantes électroniques des mis-

stiles et des systèmes de commu-

cations ennemis. Il semble que la

concentration de ces projets exigera

de longs programmes de mise au

point qui supposent des centaines

d'essais.

Evolution des recherches dans

le cadre de l'IDS

Le gros des travaux de recherche

dans le cadre de l'IDS semble main-

tenant porter sur l'interception à mi-

parcours. Du fait que la poursuite

des ogives nucléaires est la plus

problématique pendant cette phase

précise de la trajectoire des missiles

ballistiques, l'interception à mi-

parcours constitue depuis longtemps

l'un des problèmes les plus difficiles

relativement à la mise en place de de-

tenses ABM. Au début de l'automne,

M. Caspar Weinberger a donné son

aval à l'élaboration accélérée de six

projets concernant l'interception

dans la phase balistique; mention-

nons ici un capteur éjecté basé au sol

pour la poursuite des ICBM à mi-

parcours, et un missile d'interception

qui détruit sa cible en la heurtant à

grande vitesse. On prévoit que la

démonstration et la validation des

recherches dureront plusieurs an-

nées, ce qui retardera vraisemblable-

ment jusqu'au milieu des années

1990 toute décision sur un éventuel

déploiement complet. Entretemps,

le coût estimé d'un système de

défense ABM de première généra-

tion à presque double au cours des

six derniers mois : au printemps, le

général Abrahamson a informé le

essentiellement sur des technologies

connues, coûterait de quarante à

soixante milliards de dollars améri-

cains, mais d'après ses dernières

déclarations, le prix se situerait plu-


tôt entre 70 et 100 milliards. □

- DAVID COX

17

MI ET SECURITE

CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



Accord sur les FNI conclu au Sommet de Washington

Le 8 décembre, à l'occasion de leur réunion au sommet à Washington, le président Reagan et le premier secrétaire soviétique Gorbachev ont signé un traité abolissant tous leurs missiles nucléaires de portée intermédiaire (FNI) basés au sol, c'est-à-dire ceux dont la portée est comprise entre 500 et 5 500 kilomètres. En vertu de l'accord, les missiles à plus courte portée, capables de frapper un objectif situé de 500 à 1 000 kilomètres de distance (les SS-23 et SS-12/22 du côté soviétique, les Pershing I du côté américain) seront éliminés dans les dix-huit mois qui suivront la ratification du traité. Quant aux missiles à plus longue portée (SS-4 et SS-20 soviétiques, Pershing II et SS-20 américains), ils seront détruits au cours d'une période de trois ans. Sur le total des missiles actuellement déployés en Europe et en Asie, l'URSS sera tenue de détruire 857 vecteurs transportant plus de 1 700 ogives, tandis que les États-Unis démantèleront 429 missiles à ogive simple. En outre, l'Allemagne de l'Ouest se débarrassera des soixante-douze missiles Pershing I-A conçus pour recevoir des ogives américaines. Du fait que les missiles en stock soient également interdits, quelque 1 752 missiles soviétiques et 859 engins américains seront éliminés en tout. Une «option rétro» concernant les missiles FNI à plus longue portée avait été formulée par le président Reagan en novembre 1981, mais l'URSS avait rejeté cette proposition, que la plupart des spécialistes de la limitation des armements jugeaient irréaliste parce que les Soviétiques disposaient déjà d'une force importante alors que les États-Unis n'avaient encore déployé aucun vecteur de cette catégorie. En juillet dernier, le premier secrétaire Gorbachev a révélé que l'URSS accepterait l'élimination globale de tous les missiles FNI, tant à longue qu'à courte portée. Depuis lors, les négociations ont essentiellement porté sur la vérification.

Les critères de vérification dont le secrétaire d'État Shultz et le ministre des Affaires étrangères Chevardnadze ont convenu à Genève le 24 novembre sans précédent. Toutes les installations ayant servi au stockage, à l'entretien et au déploiement des missiles FNI, ainsi qu'une usine de chaque camp où sont fabriqués des lanceurs terrestres de missiles de croisière, feront l'objet d'une inspection directe par l'autre camp moyennant un très court préavis. Sont visées, entre autres, les bases américaines en Europe et les bases soviétiques en Europe et les bases soviétiques pour la mise en batterie des SS-20. L'un et l'autre camp sera limité à vingt inspections de ce genre par année pendant les trois premières années, à quinze par année par la suite. Les inspections de ce genre prévues, pour vérifier les données fournies par chaque camp sur la taille actuelle de ses forces, et pour assister à la fermeture définitive des bases après l'élimination des missiles. Enfin, pendant treize ans, chaque camp postera des inspecteurs à l'extérieur d'une installation de production de missiles sur le territoire de l'autre, soit, dans le cas des États-Unis, une usine soviétique de l'assemblage des SS-25 et des SS-25 et, dans le cas de l'URSS, une ancienne usine de fabrication du Pershing II dans l'Ural. L'accord est déjà en butte aux attaques de la droite et de la gauche. Les critiques de la gauche font observer qu'il s'applique uniquement à une toute petite fraction du total des ogives nucléaires détenues par les deux superpuissances (de trois à cinq pour cent selon diverses estimations), que les objectifs assignés aux missiles à détruire peuvent être frappés par les missiles stratégiques à longue portée, dont le nombre n'est plus plafonné par les accords SALT, et que l'OTAN parle déjà de déployer de nouveaux systèmes nucléaires en Europe. Les detracteurs de droite, au nombre desquels figurent la plupart des candidats républicains aux présidentielles de 1988, soutiennent que les clauses de vérification sont encore insuffisantes, étant donné le penchant qu'ils pré-

tent aux Soviétiques pour la duplicité, et que le retrait des missiles américains affaiblira la sécurité de l'Europe occidentale, vu la supériorité présumée de l'URSS au chapitre des forces classiques.

Pour les partisans du Traité, celui-ci pose un jalon historique du fait qu'il prévoit, pour la première fois, l'élimination d'une catégorie entière d'armes nucléaires et qu'il édicte les mesures de vérification les plus exhaustives jamais négociées par les deux camps. Ils espèrent que ces mesures serviront de modèles dans les autres rondes de négociations sur la limitation des armements.

Visite à Krasnoyarsk

Les 5 et 6 septembre, un groupe de huit Américains constitué de trois membres de la Chambre des représentants, de quatre experts électroniques militaires et d'un journaliste s'est vu autoriser à visiter l'enceinte du radar soviétique contre-Krasnoyarsk, en Sibirie centrale. Le gouvernement Reagan prétend que le radar est conçu pour diriger la lutte anti-missiles balistiques (ABM) et qu'il viole donc le Traité ABM de 1972. L'URSS maintient qu'il doit servir à suivre des objets dans l'espace (ce qui n'est pas interdit par le Traité). La plupart des experts indépendants sont d'avis que le radar est destiné à donner l'alerte en cas d'attaque par missiles balistiques. Si la dernière hypothèse est exacte, le radar devrait, aux termes du Traité, être situé à la périphérie du territoire national et être orienté vers l'extérieur des frontières. Pourtant, le site de Krasnoyarsk se trouve à plus de 600 kilomètres de la frontière la plus proche et fait face au nord-est, couvrant ainsi le territoire soviétique sur une distance de 5 000 kilomètres. Pendant la visite, les membres du groupe ont pu filmer les lieux sur bande vidéo et prendre plus de 1 000 photographies. Dans un compte rendu présenté par la suite au Congrès, ils ont déclaré que l'absence de protection contre le soufflet nucléaire et de groupe électrogène autonome rendait «très improbable» la thèse que le radar puisse servir à diriger les combats, d'autant plus que la fréquence d'exploitation était imprévue à cette tâche. Ils ne sont pas arrivés à cette tâche.

Nouveaux pourparlers sur les essais nucléaires

Le 17 septembre à Washington, MM. Shultz et Chevardnadze ont révéilé la tenue de nouveaux pourparlers sur les limites applicables aux essais nucléaires. Aux termes d'une déclaration conjointe, les deux camps commenceront par négocier des mesures de vérification supplémentaires pour permettre la ratification du Traité de 1974 sur la limitation des essais nucléaires et du Traité de 1976 sur les explosions nucléaires à but pacifique, en vertu desquels la puissance explosive des engins



Politique de défense

Politique de défense
La politique du Parti néo-
Du 13 au 17 octobre s'est tenue à
Vancouver la Conférence annuelle

Politique envers l'Afrique du Sud

neurs du secteur de la défense; l'ambassade américaine a précisé que ces remarques expriment une opinion personnelle». (Pour plus de détails sur cette question, voir la Chronique de la Défense).

Du 13 au 17 octobre s'est tenue à Vancouver la Conférence annuelle des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth. L'opposition du premier ministre britannique Thatcher à l'alourdissement des sanctions

contre l'Afrique du Sud était bien reconnue. L'unanimité s'est faite sur l'accroissement de l'aide économique aux six Etats partageant une frontière avec ce pays. L'idée analogue de fournir une assistance militaire non offensive aux Etats limitrophes,

idée qui a divulgué en septembre le
Grand-Bretagne, M. Roy McMurtry,
qui présidait alors un comité du
Commonwealth concernant l'Afrique
accueillie. Les participants à la Con-

Le conseil d'administration a été présidé par le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Jean-Pierre Godeaux, qui a également été chargé de la présidence de la séance. Le conseil a été présidé par le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Jean-Pierre Godeaux, qui a également été chargé de la présidence de la séance.

M. Clark avait déclaré en Chambre le 9 septembre que, si le gouvernement était prêt à envisager la rupture des relations économiques et diplomatiques avec Cuba, il ne pouvait pas le faire sans que les sanctions économiques déjà imposées ne soient renforcées. M. Clark a déclaré en Chambre que, si le gouvernement était prêt à envisager la rupture des relations économiques et diplomatiques avec Cuba, il ne pouvait pas le faire sans que les sanctions économiques déjà imposées ne soient renforcées.

diplomatiques avec l'Afrique du Sud, un geste aussi draconien serait prématuré et enlèverait au Canada toute possibilité d'influer sur l'apartheid. Ce raisonnement a été implicitement rejeté par le chef libéral John Turner qui, le 10 septembre,

à demander que le Canada coupe toute relation avec l'Afrique du Sud avant le début de la nouvelle année, à moins de « progrès manifestes » vers l'abolition de l'apartheid.

Le 1^{er} octobre, le chef libéral John Turner a lancé un appel en faveur de la cessation des essais de missiles de croisière au Canada, question qui avait divisé son caucus mars lorsque quatre députés libéraux avaient tourné casaque en volant

dant que les essais prennent fin immédiatement. En Chambre, M. Turner a invoqué comme motif de son changement d'opinion les

«résultats concrets des négociations entre les deux superpuissances» sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire. M. Clark a répondu que le gouvernement ne pouvait accepter une «politique qui risque de briser l'unité de l'OTAN» et «de compro-

Amérique centrale

central a suscité beaucoup d'intérêt dans les milieux politiques et chez les médias, après que cinq États américains eurent signé, le 7 août, un plan portant le nom du président costaricien Oscar Arias. Dans

l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, le 22 septembre, M. Clark a déclaré que le problème fondamental en Amérique centrale était « la pauvreté et que l'idéologie » et que s'imposait « une aide au développement, plutôt qu'une assistance militaire ».

Il a fait observer que « l'ingérence des puissances extérieures ne fera qu'aggraver les tensions ». Pourtant, il n'a pas été jusqu'à exhorter directement les Etats-Unis à ne plus appuyer les rebelles *contras* luttant contre le régime sandiniste.

La visite de M. Clark en Amérique centrale du 21 au 29 novembre n'aura pas été sans susciter des controverses, notamment lorsqu'il a suggéré que le Canada serait peut-être disposé à accueillir des *contras* comme réfugiés si cela pouvait favo-

riser la conclusion d'un traité plus général de paix dans la région. Répondant à une question posée en Chambre par le député néo-démocrate Dan Heap sur cette possibilité, Mme Monique Landry, ministre des Relations extérieures, a garanti que,

si le Canada décidait d'admettre ainsi des rebelles chez lui, la Chambre serait prévenue des mesures envisagées par le gouvernement pour barrer l'accès du pays aux criminels de guerre *contras*. M. Clark a également été pris à partie par des coopé-

stants canadiens au Nicaragua au sujet de l'insuffisance de l'aide canadienne (40,9 millions de dollars

depuis 1982) et d'une déclaration antérieure annonçant une reprise de l'aide canadienne au Guatemala, suspendue en 1981 en raison de vio-

relations systématiques des droits de la personne.

un accord global visant à lutter contre la pollution par les chlorofluorocarbones, ou CFC (produits chimiques utilisés dans la réfrigération, le nettoyage à sec, la production de mousse plastique et d'isolants pour bâtiments), qui effritent la couche d'ozone atmosphérique.

positions du Traité.

Affaires extérieures en Chambre; il a remplacé Mme Pauline Jewett qui est passée aux Relations fédérales-provinciales et aux Affaires constitutionnelles. Mme Jewett continuera de s'occuper du désarmement et de

la limitation des armements.

Le 3 novembre, pour des raisons de santé, le sénateur Paul Lafond a démissionné de son poste de président du Comité spécial du Sénat sur la défense nationale, qu'il occupait depuis la création du Comité en

1980. Un nouveau président devrait être nommé sous peu.

Le projet de loi C-77 sur les situations d'urgence a reçu seconde lecture le 18 novembre et a été renvoyé au Comité pour qu'il le raffine. Le document est destiné à remplacer la

Loi de 1914 sur les mesures de guerre, qui confère au Cabinet fédéral des pouvoirs illimités pour suspendre les libertés civiles en période d'insurrection réelle ou appréhendée. En vertu de la nouvelle loi, le gouvernement pourrait réagir sélectivement à

des catégories différentes : crises inter-
ressant le bien-être public et causées
par des inondations ou d'autres
désastres naturels ; menaces pesant
sur l'ordre public et provoquées par
des actes terroristes ; crises inter-

nationales continuant à la guerre; et enfin, la guerre même. ☐



Les contras ont attaqué Abisima, petit village dans le nord du Nicaragua. Dans une humble cabane, une femme et ses cinq enfants pleurent sur le corps de Papito, «petit papa».

LETTRE DE MANAGUA PAR DAVID GOLLOB

Il est étendu dans un cercueil, et son visage est visible au travers d'un hublot de verre. Des larmes et des traces de doigt marquent le verre. Dans les tropiques, la décomposition est rapide, et la puanteur de la mort, sulfocane. Une pluie tropicale torréfiante martèle sans arrêt le toit de la cabane. C'est la fin de l'après-midi, la nuit est sombre éclairée seulement par quelques chandelles. Dans les ruines du centre médical communautaire, une femme est en train d'accoucher. Son mari a été tué, sa maison brûlée. Le travail a commencé prématurément à cause du traumatisme, précède l'infirmière. Cette femme n'a que dix-huit ans, et son enfant est tout ce qui lui reste au monde.

Au cours d'une émission diffusée depuis le Honduras par une station radiophonique clandestine, les contras déclarent que l'attaque d'Abisima a été couronnée de succès, car ils ont réussi à détruire une caserne et un poste de commandement situés aux abords du village. C'est vrai. Cependant, les contras n'expliquent pas pourquoi les morts et les blessés sont pour la plupart des civils, pour-quoi une vingtaine de maisons ont été rasées, ni pourquoi plusieurs paysans, dont deux femmes, ont été kidnappés.

Je me suis servi de la bande sonore et visuelle recueillie auprès de la famille en deuil et de la jeune ac-couchée pour illustrer mon reportage sur cette attaque. Celui-ci était destiné à la radio anglaise de la CBC et aussi à un réseau américain de radio communautaire. À ma grande surprise, j'ai appris que le réseau américain n'avait pas diffusé mon reportage parce que, ma-t-on dit, la bande sonore était trop chargée d'émotions. «Nous avons peur polittique», a précisé plus tard un réalisateur, «éviter de dramatiser cet aspect de la guerre et de refuser d'exploiter le sensationnel.»

Je ne vois pas ce qu'il y avait de sensationnel à utiliser la bande de dollars. Au Nicaragua, la pire

sonore de mon reportage qui illustre simplement une vérité fondamentale au sujet de la guerre : la guerre est souffrance, douleur et mort, la guerre c'est laid, intolérable. Pourtant, cette guerre traduit la politique des États-Unis. Le lourd climat idéologique que le gouvernement Reagan a créé pour justifier ses politiques et amener les membres pou-enthusiastes du Congrès à les appuyer rend extrêmement difficile le travail des reporters au Nicaragua. Au moins trois journalistes Américains ont été renvoyés ou forcés de démissionner à cause de leurs reportages sur le Nicaragua.

Les journalistes affectés au Nicaragua doivent faire des reportages sur les violations des droits de la personne observées au Nicaragua. Il ne leur appartient pas de dénoncer toute l'hyppocrisie d'une guerre menée dans le seul but de renverser les États-Unis soutiennent des gouvernements coupables de crimes beaucoup plus graves. L'expression «aide aux contras» illustre bien comment nous sommes pris au piège des idées véhiculées par les mots. Toutes les fois que

chose qui soit jamais arrivée à un activiste défendant les droits de la personne a été un emprisonnement de quinze jours pour avoir participé à une manifestation antigouvernementale. Au Salvador, les activistes sont kidnappés ou abattus dans la rue sous les yeux de leurs enfants.

Les États-Unis ne font pas que financer cette guerre, ils la dirigent; ils vont jusqu'à trier eux-mêmes sur le volet les chefs de la contra.

nous'utilisons, nous acceptons sans le savoir l'une des thèses fondamentales du gouvernement Reagan : la guerre au Nicaragua se fait entre Nicaraguayens, les États-Unis ne faisant que «soutenir» une insurrection anti-totalitaire parfaitement légitime. Quand on sait tout ce qui s'est passé depuis le début de ce conflit, cette belle notion vole en éclats. Les États-Unis ne font pas que financer cette guerre, ils la dirigent; ils vont jusqu'à trier eux-mêmes sur le volet les chefs de la contra. Il ne s'agit pas «d'aide», mais d'autre chose. Comme ce mot est gravé dans la pierre, en contester l'emploi et le sens aujourd'hui serait chercher la bagarre non seulement avec le Département d'État des États-Unis, mais aussi avec l'univers des opinions reçues.

Bien sûr, les déclarations du gouvernement sandiniste voulant que les contras soient des mercenaires au service du gouvernement américain sont tout aussi fausses. Le lamassin contra moyen ne se bat pas pour de l'argent. Les chefs des insurgés reconnaissent que, sans «l'aide» des Américains, leur révolte aurait

avorté il y a longtemps, ce qui ne fait pas d'eux des mercenaires pour autant. Mais la n'est pas la question : il ne viendrait à l'idée d'aucun journaliste occidental d'employer le mot «mercenaires» pour désigner les contras, tandis que l'utilisation du mot «aide» est, elle, universelle et présente insidieusement une image déformée de la nature du conflit.

En novembre dernier, un journaliste américain avec qui je m'entre-tenais spéculait sur les réactions que pourraient avoir certains chefs contras si les Sandinistes offraient de leur des pourparlers indirects sur l'établissement d'un cessez-le-feu. «Qui est-ce que ça dérange, ce que les contras pensent ?», lui ai-je demandé. «Ils feront sûrement ce que le Département d'État ou la CIA leur demanderont de faire.» Ce jour-là, il a quand même présenté ce jour-là, il a quand même cité la position des chefs contras comme si ceux-ci étaient en pleine possession de leurs moyens et en mesure de prendre des décisions importantes sur le cours de la guerre.

Les auditeurs de la station de radio de la CBC ont écouté le reportage sur Abisima, et le réseau américain a finalement changé d'avis et décidé de le diffuser lui aussi, ce qui est tout à son honneur. Malheureusement, ce réseau n'a qu'une faible cote d'écoute et, aux États-Unis, le débat sur la question du Nicaragua est dominé par les hypothèses incorrectes du gouvernement Reagan, testées par une rhétorique vide encadrées par une rhétorique vide typique de la guerre froide et ne tenant aucunement compte de la réalité : une femme et cinq enfants pleurant sur le corps de leur père, à la faible lueur d'une dernière chandelle, dans une cabane battue par la pluie. □

David Gollob vit à Managua au Nicaragua. Il est correspondant de la radio anglaise de la CBC en Amérique latine.

sation économique entreprise par le Shah encourageait l'émergence d'un

modèle social copié sur l'Occident, modèle qui s'est avéré incompatible avec la structure traditionnelle de la société iranienne.

L'Islam chiite de Khomeiny diffère nettement de l'Islam sunnite, prédominant dans la région. Un des principaux points de désaccord entre les deux confessions musulmanes porte sur le type de gouvernement habilité à régir la société civile. On imagine aisément la résistance inégalement opposée par les communautés sunnites aux directives des chefs d'État chiites.

Enfin, le leadership de Khomeini tenace et religieux.

ne durera pas éternellement. Des dissensions apparaissent déjà entre différentes factions du régime. La lutte pour la succession est commencée depuis un certain temps.

Radicaleux et modérés s'opposent sur l'interprétation de l'Islam, le modèle à adopter, et les possibilités de rapprochement avec Washington ou Moscou. Avec la mort de Khomeiny, la cohésion du régime politique

[illegible]

régimes du Shah et de l'ayatollah Khomeiny auront profondément marqué la politique de la région. Le passage d'un Etat séculier à un Etat fondamentaliste musulman n'a pas altéré les prétentions de Téhéran vis-à-vis ses voisins même avec les différences idéologiques et pragmatiques apportées par la révolution contre l'Irak. □

Pour en savoir plus

Mohammed E. Ahrari, «Iran and the Superpowers in the Gulf», *S&S Review*, hiver – printemps 1987.

Ralph King, «The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications», *Adelphi Papers* 219, IISS, printemps 1987.

Bassima Kodmani, (sous la dir. de)
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temps. Cette idée est compréhensible chez les dirigeants iraniens au point de suggérer que bien des scénarios devraient être préférables à l'éventualité d'une présence perséverante de l'un ou l'autre dans le Golfe. Dans un tel contexte, l'Iran pourrait sûrement tirer profit du jeu des alliances, même avec l'Arabie Saoudite. De plus, la menace que représentent pour Téhéran la proximité du territoire soviétique et l'invasion de l'Afghanistan rejoignent les craintes de ses deux voisins, le Pakistan et la Turquie, face à Moscou. Bref, que ce soit dans le but de s'opposer à «l'imperialisme» occidental ou à l'ennemi soviétique, ou de poursuivre des velléités hégémoniques, l'Iran ne pourrait pas que bénéficier de la présence d'apprais solides dans la région.

SI L'ON PREND EN COMPTE LES bouleversements qui ont suivi l'avènement du régime Khomeiny, l'éventualité d'une exportation de la révolution iranienne ne peut être exclue. On peut imaginer qu'en cas de victoire iranienne, la vague indégéniste chite se répandrait dans les États du Golfe, en Jordanie et au

Liban, et même en Syrie et en Égypte. Cependant, le projet d'expansionnisme idéologique poursuivi par le régime de Khomeiny n'est pas nécessairement voué au succès, loin de là. La recherche de partenaires économiques et la nécessité d'avoir recours à des alliances risquent de tempérer les ardeurs révolutionnaires de Téhéran. De plus, on voit mal comment l'Iran pourrait poursuivre son effort de

guerre indéfiniment alors que son économie est défallante et que

ses moyens militaires demeurent
précaires.

d'autres données importantes. Les conditions qui ont favorisé le déclen-

chément de la révolution iranienne
 risquent peu de se retrouver dans les
 autres pays de la région. La moderni-

maintien des relations diplomatiques avec ces pays, il semble peu probable à court terme que ceux-ci comprennent parmi ses partena-ires économiques privilégiés. Il demeure que l'attitude iranienne vis-à-vis les monarchies arabes du Golfe est souvent ambiguë et n'est pas étrangère à la lutte de pouvoir qui a cours à Téhéran entre radicaux et modérés, les émeutes de l'été 1987 pendant le célébrage annuel à la Mecque qui ont fait quelques centaines de victimes, surtout des iraniens, n'ont pas amélioré la situation. Ces affrontements sanglants ont rappelé que l'Iran et l'Arabie saoudite, respectivement capitaux du chiisme et du monde islamique,

L'Etat n'a pas totalement renoncé à ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler ses interventions nationales. Le nationalisme français, central dans la politique du Shah, ne semble pas avoir complètement disparu bien qu'il soit formellement incompatible avec l'idéologie communiste. La presse fait souvent état de l'importance que l'il a, encore aujourd'hui, dans la société iranienne.

Par delà toute autre considération, l'Iran comprendre que la politique régionale de l'Iran répond aussi à des impératifs éco-politiques. Le

Le pays a tout intérêt à sortir de l'isolement diplomatique auquel il se trouve

réduit depuis la chute du Shah. Qu'il ait ou non l'intention de peser sur l'évolution politique du Moyen-

Orient, l'Iran ne peut continuer à

la Libye. Téhéran est particulière-
ment opposé à la présence des États-
Unis et de l'Union soviétique dans le

LA DIPLOMATIE IRANIENNE DANS LA
région alliée à la ferveur révolution-

naire une attitude pragmatique
rendue nécessaire d'abord par les
difficultés économiques que connaît
le pays. Les coûts de la guerre ainsi

que la baisse de la production locale et du prix du pétrole ont beaucoup appauvri les coffres de l'Etat. En plus des difficultés suscitées par une structure économique édifiée essentiellement en fonction de la production pétrolière du pays, une myriade de problèmes économiques nous nous surmonte, l'industrie fonctionne bien en dépit de sa capacité et le taux de chômage est de 100 %.

à long terme préalablement prévus
investissements dans les infrastruc-
tures et les projets de développement
d'une économie peu efficace. Les
soutenir les dépenses quotidiennes
de destruction qu'elle entraîne et à
part à financer la guerre, à pallier
dans les villes l'absence de services
et de pétroliers servent pour une large

ont été remis à plus tard tout comme le financement des services sociaux et de l'agriculture. Comme l'Iran a restreint ses relations économiques avec les États-Unis et craint de se retrouver à la remorque de l'Union soviétique, on comprend facilement qu'il veuille établir des liens économiques avec ses voisins. Dans la région, la Turquie et le Pakistan, tous deux pro-occidentaux, sont ses principaux

partenaires commerciaux. Les trois pays ont formé en 1985 l'Organisation de la coopération économique afin d'encourager le commerce et les transferts de technologie. En 1987, la signature d'un accord entre Téhéran et Ankara prévoyait notamment un volume d'échanges commerciaux de l'ordre de 2 milliards de dollars pour l'année. Il faut ajouter qu'une large

part des exportations iraniennes
transité par les territoires turc
et pakistanaïsi.

Malgré l'antimiosité du régime
iranien à l'endroit des monarchies
arabes du Golfe, engendrée par leur
gouvernement «anti-islamique» et
leur appui financier et matériel à
l'Irak en temps de guerre, l'Iran
semble chercher à établir depuis
quelques années une coopération

économique avec ces pays. Au nombre des réalisations importantes dans

ce domaine citons les liens commer-
ciaux existant avec les Émirats
Arabes Unis et l'éminente compagnie

avec l'Arabie Saoudite conclue à la réunion de l'OPEP l'année dernière,

au sujet d'une nouvelle stratégie sur les prix et les quotas. Cependant, il ne s'agit encore que de démarches

L'IRAN DE KHOMEINY

La politique régionale iranienne de Khomeiny est-elle bien différente de celle qui existait sous le régime du Shah ?

PAR FRANÇOISE LECOURS



VELOC LA RÉVOLUTION ISLAMIQUE de 1979, l'ayatollah Khomeiny succède à Pahlavi à la tête de l'Iran, pays qui compte environ 85 p. 100 de musul-

mans chiites (sur un total de 45 millions d'habitants). Malgré la transformation de l'Etat séculier moderniste du Shah en un Etat fondamentaliste musulman, un élément de continuité demeure : l'ambitieux dessein politique des deux hommes en matière de politique régionale. Cela dit, le projet de Khomeiny diffère à plusieurs égards de celui de son prédécesseur.

À partir du début des années soixante, la politique moyen-orientale du Shah d'Iran traduit sa perception de besoins du pays en matière de sécurité. Cette politique est dictée par des considérations stratégiques et elle vise à favoriser la stabilité régionale, surtout dans la zone du golfe Persique. Cette stratégie et des objectifs d'expansion territoriale confrontent à l'Iran un rôle de grande puissance dans la région du Golfe, surtout après le départ de l'Angleterre. Outre qu'il occupe trois îles stratégiques du golfe Persique, l'Iran, qui à cette époque aspire au statut de puissances régionales, intervient fréquemment dans les affaires intérieures des pays de la région, particulièrement les forces des gouvernements centraux sont menacées par des groupes rebelles. Cela se fait au moyen d'une aide économique et technique, ou encore par des interventions militaires. L'envoi de troupes iraniennes dans le Dhofar pour aider le Sultan d'Oman dans sa lutte contre les guérilleros Cette politique s'appuie sur un arsenal militaire sophistiqué qui fait de l'armée du Shah une des plus puissantes au monde. La politique de sécurité de Téhéran repose aussi sur le jeu diplomatique. Des alliances politiques ou militaires donnent lieu à des rapprochements avec Ankara, Islamabad, Riyad et le Caire (à partir du milieu des années

soixante-dix). Par ailleurs, même si l'Iran établit des rapports constructifs avec la plupart des pays arabes, il entretient des relations étroites avec Israël dans les domaines économi-

que et militaire. En menant la création d'un gouvernement islamique chiite, la crise de 1979 a imposé de nouvelles règles du jeu au Moyen-Orient. Par référence à des motivations idéologiques, la nouvelle politique extérieure iranienne prend un aspect original. Formellement, le leitmotiv de cette politique s'avère l'islam et sa restauration comme fondement de la légitimité politique en constitue le but. Le préambule de la Constitution de la jeune république préconise l'instauration d'un ordre mondial islamique. La réunité de la communauté, communautaire des croyants, est devenue une priorité.

Aux dires des fondamentalistes, cela devrait s'accompagner de la libération des pays islamiques gouvernés par des gouvernements impies versés par des gouvernements impies. Il faudrait aussi que les sociétés musulmanes puissent reconstruire leurs différences ethniques, régionales et autres. À DÉFAUT DE POUVOIR RÉALISER CETTE ambition, le régime khomeiniste fonde d'ailleurs ses espoirs sur la création d'un ordre islamique régional, plus ou moins orchestré par Téhéran, où l'islam détermine la nature des régimes politiques pour réaliser cette politique inspirée de la réunité du monde musulman sont multiples. Téhéran a le plus souvent recours à des procédés indirects tels la diffusion d'une propagande « révolutionnaire » dans plusieurs pays du Moyen-Orient (surtout en Irak et au Liban), le prosélytisme visant à rallier des chefs religieux musulmans étrangers, les dirigeants iraniens cherchent à réaliser depuis 1979, est donc un élément très important de l'activisme

l'activisme des partisans de Khomeiny pendant le pèlerinage annuel à la Mecque en Arabie Saoudite, et l'assistance financière et logistique accordée à des organisations islamiques étrangères (notamment en ce qui concerne l'entraînement de militants dans des camps iraniens). Parmi ces organisations, celle des *hezbollahs*, chérites libanais pro-iraniens, semble être la mieux structurée.

Les entreprises iraniennes ne se limitent pas aux activités énumérées ci-dessus. Elles ont souvent un caractère plus belliqueux. La tentative de renversement du gouvernement de Bahrein en 1981 et l'attentat contre l'ambassade américaine au Koweït en 1983, tous deux attribués à des éléments pro-iraniens, en font la plus importante manifestation de la résurgence d'un courant fondamentaliste islamique à l'échelle du Moyen-Orient.

Les gouvernements de la région ont adopté des stratégies diverses pour se prémunir contre la vague fondamentaliste qui les menace tant en Syrie, plusieurs d'entre eux faisant périodiquement des incursions dans la vallée de la Bekaa (peuplée surtout de musulmans pagane et fournir un entraînement militaire aux activistes. La guerre opposant l'Iran à l'Irak depuis sept ans ne découle qu'indirectement de cette politique islamique « révolutionnaire », si l'on considère que c'est l'Irak qui a déclenché les hostilités. De plus, le refus iranien d'accepter un règlement négocié du conflit s'explique par les tensions séculaires existant entre les deux capitales, auxquelles s'ajoutent l'animosité déclarée entre la président de l'Irak, Saddam Hussein, et Khomeiny, de même que la violence sociale par le ralliement de la population face à un ennemi commun. L'expansionnisme idéologique que les dirigeants iraniens cherchent à réaliser depuis 1979, est donc un élément très important de l'activisme

régional iranien. L'avènement d'un régime fondamentaliste musulman en Iran continue à avoir des répercussions importantes dans le monde arabe et islamique. Dans les années qui ont suivi la révolution, des émeutes ont éclaté dans plusieurs pays musulmans, du Bangladesh au Maroc. On y retrouvait immanquablement des portraits de Khomeiny et des slogans inspirés de sa pensée. L'exemple iranien semble avoir influé sur les communautés chiites de

Liban par les troupes israéliennes en 1982. Téhéran maintient dans ce pays un contingent de Gardiens de la révolution. Aujourd'hui, le gouvernement libanais évalue à quelques milliers le nombre de ces *Fasdlmans* postés en Syrie, plusieurs d'entre eux faisant périodiquement des incursions dans la vallée de la Bekaa (peuplée surtout de musulmans pagane et fournir un entraînement militaire aux activistes. La guerre opposant l'Iran à l'Irak depuis sept ans ne découle qu'indirectement de cette politique islamique « révolutionnaire », si l'on considère que c'est l'Irak qui a déclenché les hostilités. De plus, le refus iranien d'accepter un règlement négocié du conflit s'explique par les tensions séculaires existant entre les deux capitales, auxquelles s'ajoutent l'animosité déclarée entre la président de l'Irak, Saddam Hussein, et Khomeiny, de même que la violence sociale par le ralliement de la population face à un ennemi commun. L'expansionnisme idéologique que les dirigeants iraniens cherchent à réaliser depuis 1979, est donc un élément très important de l'activisme

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de se jeter dans la mer de Chine méridionale, à 4 000 km de sa source. Etant donné que cet immense bassin fluvial reçoit le gros de son apport pluvial en l'espace de cinq mois seulement, il s'y produit des inondations et des périodes de sécheresse, même dans une année normale. Les habitants du bassin, qui vivent de l'agriculture, sont particulièrement vulnérables à la répartition inégale des précipitations. Les terres agricoles sont souvent inondées, ce qui entraîne la perte de récoltes et la destruction des infrastructures. Les habitants du bassin, qui vivent de l'agriculture, sont particulièrement vulnérables à la répartition inégale des précipitations. Les terres agricoles sont souvent inondées, ce qui entraîne la perte de récoltes et la destruction des infrastructures.



de servir et exploiter les ressources naturelles partagées. Ces principes, présentés à l'ONU sous forme de recommandations, exhortent les pays à faire ce qui suit :

collaborer en vue d'empêcher, de réduire ou d'éliminer les conséquences néfastes pour l'environnement pouvant résulter de l'exploitation de ressources communes ;

éviter les dégâts environnementaux susceptibles d'influer sur l'exploitation d'une ressource par un autre Etat ;

évaluer les incidences possibles avant de prendre des mesures pour l'environnement d'une ressource partagée ;

l'environnement d'un autre Etat ; communiquer à l'avance aux Etats concernés le plan détaillé des mesures envisagées et consulter ces Etats ;

indemniser les autres Etats de tout dommage causé, et consentir aux ressortissants touchés des autres pays le même traitement administratif et juridique qu'à leurs propres citoyens.

Dans la SMC, on avait recommandé qu'un organisme international se voit confier le soin d'analyser les impératifs et les problèmes en matière de conservation dans les bassins fluviaux internationaux, en accordant la priorité à ceux qui devaient subir des réaménagements d'envergure ou qui étaient soumis à une forte érosion. Le PNUB a relevé le défi cinq ans plus tard avec la mise sur pied d'EMINWA. Mais il est ironique et guère surprenant – de constater que le PNUB n'a pu commencer par les bassins où les besoins étaient les plus pressants.

Le PNUB a plutôt choisi le fleuve Zambezi, qui n'a suscité jusqu'à présent aucun problème digne de mention. Et les Etats touchés (les pays partageant une frontière avec l'Afrique du Sud), loin d'être à con- teaux tirés, travaillaient déjà ensemble. Sur les sept pays en cause, six ont sanctionné un plan d'action.

L'EMINWA reprend une formule que le PNUB avait établie avec un programme couronné de succès (le Programme des mers régionales) auquel 120 gouvernements du monde entier ont participé au cours des quinze dernières années en vue d'améliorer les milieux côtiers et marins. Ces programmes ont amené à faire ouvrir commune des pays qui sont tout sauf amis, tels que ceux du golfe Persique.

Un spécialiste koweïtien de l'environnement, avec qui je me suis entretenu dernièrement à Nairobi lors d'un passage au siège social du PNUB, m'a même raconté que les listes des programmes des mers régionales, parmi des noms géographiques bien connus comme «mer des Caraïbes» ou «Méditerranée», on tombe sur «Plan d'action du Koweït», titre plutôt insolite qui présente l'avantage d'être dénué de sous-titre politique. Les réunions sur la question électorale de la pollution des eaux du Golfe regroupent ainsi des participants qui, à l'extérieur de cette enceinte, ne se parlent pas.

servent un fonds de fiduciaire permanent au bureau d'échange, fonds auquel ils peuvent toujours recourir en cas de besoin. Les plus généreux des pays scandinaves, les Pays-Bas, l'Allemagne et la Communauté économique européenne (CEE). Si le gouvernement se rendait compte que le travail du PNUB favorisait beaucoup la paix et la sécurité internationale, la contribution financière du Canada serait peut-être à la mesure de ses paroles. □

Pour en savoir plus

Arthur H. Westing (sous la dir. de), *Global Resources and International Conflict*, Oxford: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 1986.



La contribution totale du Canada au PNUB s'élevait à 818 148 \$ US, soit un peu plus d'un million de dollars canadiens, somme dérisoire lorsqu'on pense aux belles paroles que notre pays ne manque jamais de prononcer en faveur de réunions internationales. Le PNUB recueille également des fonds assez importants par l'entremise de son bureau d'échange, grâce auquel les pays qui ont besoin d'argent pour des projets particuliers sont mis en rapport direct avec les Etats donateurs. Certains pays con-

de voir l'une ou l'autre partie au
Trait^é prendre une quelconque
mesure unilatérale qui risquerait de
perturber l'équilibre stratégique
actuel... »

L'abandon du Traité ABM ne serait pas chose simple. L'article 15 du Traité donne à chaque partie le droit de le résilier avec un préavis de six mois si «... des circonstances ex-

riques relativement aux essais dans l'espace. Si les États-Unis ne se sont pas montrés très disposés à tenir ces discussions, c'est qu'ils craignent que ce geste soit interprété comme

ne soit plus tributaire de l'efficacité des traités sur la limitation des armements. Les relations seraient plus stables, prétendait-on, si les décisions concernant les armes nucléaires

LES SOVIÉTIQUES ONT DÉJÀ LE DÉBUT
annoncé qu'il y aurait de réduction
des forces nucléaires stratégiques
dans la mesure où Washington
déciderait de limiter le développe-
ment de l'IDS. L'URSS a toujours
reconnu l'interprétation «tradition-
nelle» comme étant la seule valable,
et elle estime que les deux parties
doivent continuer de s'y conformer.

contenu du Traité, menaçait ses intérêts supérieurs. Le préavis en question devait comporter l'annonce des circonstances exceptionnelles que la partie considère comme ayant menacé ses intérêts supérieurs. Au cours des derniers mois, l'Union soviétique s'est donnée bien mal pour empêcher les États-Unis de trouver des «circonstances excep-

validité de l'interprétation «traditionnelle». Avec le départ du Secrétaire d'Etat à la Défense, M. Caspar Weinberger, qui était de tous le plus hostile à l'idée d'une discussion sur les limites, et compte tenon des importantes réductions apportées au budget de l'IDS, il est possible que la conjoncture soit désormais plus favorable à cette option.

fonction des intérêts nationaux. La matérialisation la plus évidente de ces nouvelles idées a été le lancement du programme de l'IDS. D'autres manifestations patentes de changement d'orientation ont été la décision des Etats-Unis de démontrer les accords existants en matière de limitation des armements stratégiques, leur refus d'accepter qu'on

Genève, l'URSS a demandé que les parties au Traité s'engagent à y adhérer pour une période de dix ans. Récemment, les Soviétiques sont quelque peu revenus sur leur position, et ils semblent désormais disposés à accepter certains essais dans l'espace, à condition que l'on négocie certaines limites précises et que l'on ne touche pas au Traité ABM dans son ensemble.

en ce qui concerne le traité ABM, leur décision apparente de poursuivre le développement de l'IDS coïncide que coïncide.

Dans cette perspective, il est difficile de savoir dans quelle mesure le Traité conclu en décembre au Sommet de Washington constitue une véritable percée diplomatique, ou tout simplement une déviation dans la politique fondamentale de M. Reagan. Dans

Washington a réservé à cette proposition un accueil mitigé. Plutôt bien disposé à l'égard de cette option, M. Paul Nitze n'a semble-t-il pas refusé à faire prévaloir sa position face aux autres conseillers de M. Reagan (y compris M. Weinberger), qui ont prétendu que l'imposition de limites, (quelles qu'elles soient), entraverait les progrès de l'IDS.

Au milieu de ce débat, la confé-

Troisième et dernière possibilité, la conférence d'examen pourrait tout simplement se résumer à un échange de positions rebattues. Dans ces conditions, si les États-Unis ne pren-

la bouche de ce dernier, l'expression « faire confiance mais vérifier » pourrait bien indiquer un véritable changement d'attitude. Mais le Traité sur les FNI pourrait tout aussi bien n'être en fin de compte qu'une concession relativement peu onéreuse aux apôtres de la limitation des armements.

semble être devenue une cause per-
tinentes d'examen du Traité ABM
due. Les États-Unis ne tiennent pas
particulièrement à donner à leurs
intentions au sujet du Traité plus
de publicité que d'habitude, et le
Département d'État n'a pas encore
divulgué grand-chose au sujet des
préparatifs de la conférence. Le
Secrétaire d'État George Shultz a
simplement annoncé que la con-

dernier, des membres du Congrès américain ont été invités par l'Union soviétique à inspecter le radar. M. Gorbatchev a depuis cette date annoncé l'imposition d'un moratoire unilatéral d'un an sur la construction de l'insalation, et il a invité les Américains à inspecter deux autres petits radars qui commençaient à inquiéter les Etats-Unis.

Quelle que soit la déclaration commune quelconque.

« Il n'y a aucune initiative, il est peu probable que la Conférence débouche sur une déclaration commune quelconque.

QUE LA CONFERENCE D'EXAMEN AIT lieu ou non, le fait même que les États-Lamis n'envisagent pas sérieusement d'en faire un cadre de négociations constitue une importante indication des changements s'étant

Aux yeux du Congrès, des alliés et même, pour l'instant, de l'Union soviétique, la limitation des armements constitue un mécanisme préliminaire qui permet aux pays de se prémunir contre la menace nucléaire et, à ce titre, elle ne doit pas être abandonnée. Les progrès accomplis au sujet des missiles ABM semblent montrer que les partisans de la limit-

l'année prochaine. Les Soviétiques, en revanche, ont proposé que la conférence soit présidée par les ministres de la Défense des deux pays, ce qui donnerait à la rencontre un caractère plus officiel que par le passé. Au moment même de la conférence d'examen, il pourrait se produire trois choses différentes : premièrement, les États-Unis pourraient pro-

« On a un traité militaire de cette nature, mais pas d'intérêts supérieurs, on ne peut pas élever des menaces, les autres parties interprètent généralement ce geste comme un acte d'hostilité. C'est très probablement la façon dont réagiraient les autres membres de l'Otan et le Congrès américain. Quoi qu'il en soit, c'est une possibilité qu'il ne faut pas écarter, même si elle paraît improbable ».

En analysant les différents points inscrits à l'ordre du jour des négociations bilatérales sur la limitation des armements, on relève un même leitmotiv, qui revient régulièrement : en matière de limitation des armements, les Etats-Unis ne peuvent pas et ne doivent pas faire confiance aux Soviétiques. La Maison Blanche

l'absence d'arguments. Nul doute que le gouvernement américain souffrait d'un manque de crédibilité. Il était difficile de croire que les négociations sur les ABM sans pour autant paraître revenir sur ses positions antérieures. ☐

qu'il se retire du Traité. Un rapport préparé en septembre 1987 par le Service de recherche du Congrès révélait que, même si rien ne laissait supposer un retrait imminent, les Etats-Unis avaient tout de même entrepris des travaux préliminaires dans cette direction.

Deuxième scénario possible, les États-Unis pourraient saisir l'offre qui leur a été faite par l'URSS d'examiner en détail ce que le Traité autorise et interdit. Ils pourraient plus précisément envisager de négocier l'imposition de restrictions tech-

soutient que les violations des traités commises par les Soviétiques en sont d'ailleurs la preuve. Au moment de leur arrivée au pouvoir, M. Reagan et ses conseillers ont prétendu que la solution à ce problème consistait non pas à rédiger d'autres traités, ou de meilleurs traités, mais plutôt à

Sam Nunn, «The ABM Reinterpretation Issue», *Washington Quarterly*, automne 1987.

Pour en savoir plus

L'ardeur du gouvernement Reagan à jusqu'à présent été refrenée par une réalité politique prépondérante. Aux yeux du Congrès, des alliés et même, pour l'instant, de l'Union soviétique, la limitation des armements constitue un mécanisme pré-cieux qui permet aux pays de se défendre contre la menace nucléaire et, à ce titre, elle ne doit pas être abandonnée. Les progrès accomplis au sujet des missiles ABM semblent montrer que les partisans de la limitation des armements ont réussi à faire valoir leur argument. Nul doute que le gouvernement américain est suffisamment ingénieux pour continuer à l'aider une théorie qui lui permettrait d'absorber sans pour autant paraître les ABM sans pour autant paraître venir sur ses positions antérieures.

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violation par les Soviétiques du Traité ABM a été la construction à Krasnoyarsk d'un radar géant à balayage électronique. En septembre dernier, des membres du Congrès américain ont été invités par l'Union soviétique à inspecter le radar. M. Gorbatchev a depuis cette date annoncé l'imposition d'un moratoire unilatéral d'un an sur la construction d'installations, et il a invité les Américains à inspecter deux autres pistes radars qui commençaient à être construites.

(quelles qu'elles soient), entraveraient les progrès de l'IDS. Au milieu de ce débat, la conférence d'examen du Traité ABM semble être devenue une cause perdue. Les États-Unis ne tiennent pas particulièrement à donner à leurs intentions au sujet du Traité plus de publicité que d'habitude, et le Département d'État n'a pas encore divulgué grand-chose au sujet des préparatifs de la conférence. Le Secrétaire d'État George Shultz a simplement annoncé que la conférence aurait lieu au courant de l'année prochaine. Les Soviétiques, en revanche, ont proposé que la conférence soit présidée par les ministres de la Défense des deux pays, ce qui donnerait à la rencontre un caractère plus officiel que par le passé. Au moment même de la conférence

Bob Fortier



L'EUPHORIE DU SOMMET DURERA-T-ELLE?

Le gouvernement Reagan est désormais en position de faire adopter un accord sans précédent sur la réduction des armes nucléaires stratégiques.

PAR JANE BOULDEN

U MILIEU DE L'ALLÈGRESSE générale provoquée par la signature au mois de décembre à Washington du Traité

sur les F.N.I., c'est bien sûr la perspective d'un prochain démantèlement

des euro-missiles et de leur destruction qui a principalement retenu

l'attention. Autre élément significatif, le traité a été négocié par

M. Reagan lui-même, celui qu'on surnomme «le Chevalier de la guerre froide».

Mais le Sommet et surtout l'année prochaine, soit avant octobre 1988. Comment expliquer que ce

traité soit devenu aujourd'hui l'élément clé des réductions que les

deux superpuissances pourraient faire à l'avenir dans leurs arsenaux

nucléaires stratégiques? Quel pourrait être à cet égard le rôle de la

conférence d'examen?

EN 1977, LORS DE LA PREMIÈRE CONFÉRENCE D'EXAMEN, l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis étaient occupés à négocier le Traité SALT II. Compte

tenu des circonstances, les deux parties ne pouvaient guère faire autrement que de réaffirmer leur intention de respecter les termes du

Traité; ainsi, dans leur déclaration commune à la fin de la conférence, elles ont catégoriquement réitéré

leur adhésion aux clauses du texte. Mais en 1982, au moment de la

deuxième conférence d'examen, l'atmosphère avait quelque peu

changé. Reagan, récemment arrivé au pouvoir, était extrêmement hostile à l'Union soviétique et à la limitation

des armements, et il émettait des doutes quant à la probité des Soviétiques. Même si elles étaient moins

confiantes en 1982 qu'en 1977, les deux parties se sont tout de

même dites dans leur déclaration commune d'être déterminées à atteindre les buts et objectifs du Traité...

En octobre 1985, le gouvernement Reagan a entrepris d'effectuer une série de révisions des dispositions du Traité et ce, deux ans

plus tôt que prévu par le calendrier.

signification exacte à donner aux termes du Traité.

Les États-Unis ont prétendu que,

contrairement à ce que l'on croyait généralement, le Traité ABM autoris-

ait la mise au point et l'expérimentation des technologies de défense

contre les missiles balistiques, dans la mesure où elles faisaient interve-

nir de nouveaux principes physiques

(c'est-à-dire celles qui allaient servir à l'édification du bouclier de l'IIDS).

Seul le déploiement en tant que tel des systèmes était interdit.

En vertu de la Constitution des États-Unis, tout traité international

doit être ratifié par une majorité des deux tiers du Sénat américain. Mais

au moment où les sénateurs ont ratifié le Traité en 1972, il était bien en-

tendu, d'après les renseignements communiqués par les porte-parole

du gouvernement, que l'on se con-

formerait à l'interprétation dite «traditionnelle» ou «rigoureuse»,

pour ce qui concernait les restrictions imposées par le Traité. Par

conséquent, en déclarant aux Américains que les États-Unis étaient tout à fait en droit de suivre leur

propre interprétation «élargie», le gouvernement Reagan a en fait foule

aux pieds le rôle constitutionnel

La polémique interne qui s'est

admnistraton américaine a donné lieu à la publication de deux impor-

tants rapports. Pour prouver le bien-

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juge Abraham Sofaer, conseiller

juridique au Département d'État, a rendu publics certaines pièces du

dossier de la négociation. La contre-

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... ou encore, de son analyse du

dossier de la négociation lui-même.

Le Comité des relations exté-

rieures du Sénat américain a décidé de pousser l'affaire plus loin. Dans

un rapport publié en septembre 1987,

il a répété que la «ré-interprétation»

équivalait en fait à une contestation

du rôle constitutionnel du Sénat. Le

Comité a averti M. Reagan que s'il

s'obstinait à vouloir appliquer cette

interprétation «élargie», la ratifica-

tion du traité sur les F.N.I. risquait

de faire prévaloir son interprétation

1987, après que le Congrès eût essayé

de faire prévaloir son interprétation

«rigoureuse» du Traité. L'Administra-

tion «traditionnelle» ou «rigoureuse»

Après avoir annoncé leur intention

de «ré-interpréter» le Traité, les

États-Unis se sont empressés d'apap-

ser les inquiétudes de leurs alliés.

Le gouvernement a promis que le

développement de l'IIDS se ferait

conformément à l'interprétation

«traditionnelle» du Traité. Les

changements éventuels n'entraînaient

en vigueur qu'après consultation

avec les alliés. Le Canada et les pays

alliés d'Europe occidentale ont en

effet toujours clairement indiqué

leur volonté de s'en tenir à l'interpré-

ration «rigoureuse».

Dans la déclaration qu'il a faite

après s'être réuni avec Paul Nitze,

conseiller américain en matière de

limitation des armements en visite

au Canada, le secrétaire d'État aux

Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark,

a fait savoir qu'Ottawa favorisait

«l'interprétation» ou «rigoureuse».

Canada serait extrêmement inquiet

Vietnam dans le système international des positions d'exclusion actuelles et de substituer aux contacts privés et de multiplier des tentatives pour la multiplication des tentatives possible pour le Canada namienne au Kampuchéa, il serait en aucune façon la politique vietnamienne avec Hanoi. Ainsi, sans cautionnement bodge commercerait indirectement namiennes sur la frontière du Cam-afirmations avec les troupes viet aussi les Thaïlandais qui, malgré les ment noter les Coréens du Sud mais contre le Vietnam. On peut également noter que les États les plus virilents au sein de la coalition communiste du Vietnam et il est Premier partenaire commercial non Le Japon est devenu, par exemple, le tiques les plus anti-communistes ? radicales que certains des pays asiatique se comporter d'une façon plus éminence sino-américaine. Alors pour-

IL NOUS SEMBLE EN EFFET QUE LE Canada n'a pas à être absent du Vietnam comme le sont les États-Unis. En s'assurant d'une plus grande visibilité au Vietnam, les Canadiens pourraient, malgré les craintes que cette politique peut inspirer à Ottawa, donner plus de crédibilité à leurs intérêts en Asie orientale. Sans con-

nommer la présence militaire vietnamienne au Kampuchéa et au Laos, le gouvernement canadien pourrait également, comme plusieurs pays européens, encourager des échanges commerciaux et culturels et faire en sorte que certains gouvernements provinciaux jugent à propos d'établir des rapports à l'inverse (lesquels il

plus significative en multipliant sur tout les possibilités d'interventions politiques véritables sur le gouvernement de Hanoï. Le Canada apparaît à la francophonie et le Vietnam a inventé l'expression désormais admise : «des pays qui ont en commun l'usage de la langue française». Il est regret-


tenant cherché à dialoguer en français avec les Vietnamiens. □

«question» du Vietnam par le Canada», *Études internationales*, volume XVIII, no 3, septembre 1987, pp. 523-544.

Douglas PIKE, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union, Anatomy of an Alliance*, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1987.

nux valeurs communes du confucia-
 nisme, l'appartenance à un système
 spatio-culturel identique et une
 expérience révolutionnaire un peu
 semblable sont autant d'éléments qui
 expliquent que les Vietnamiens
 comprennent bien mieux les Chinois
 que les Soviétiques.
 Bien entendu, les contextes sont
 différents, d'une part l'hypothèque
 de Kamoupecha paralyse toute ouver-
 ture véritable sur l'économie inter-
 nationale, d'autre part, c'est encore
 dans l'atmosphère un peu troublante
 d'un mausolée d'Ho Chi Minh que
 les dirigeants vietnamiens

des parties sont fort différents



et surtout, dans la plupart des cas, bien éloignés des intérêts du Canada. En d'autres termes, la politique canadienne pèche par excès de zèle; elle renoue avec une attitude d'indifférence que l'on avait observée à l'égard des problèmes du monde.

[illegible]

A court terme, rien de tangible très certainement, à moyen terme cependant, la reconnaissance par tous les acteurs asiatiques que le Canada a bien une politique spécifique dans la région et que cette politique n'est infondée à aucune autre. À moyen terme également, le Canada

Canada a contribué à l'expérience difficile et frustrante des commissions internationales de contrôle et de surveillance en Indochine de 1954 à 1973, qu'il a accueillies plus de 100 000 réfugiés indochinois et qu'il n'est pas prêt à risquer pour le Vietnam de contraindre son voisin américain, les membres de l'ASEAN et autres à accepter les mêmes principes.

Des fins militaires de l'aide soviétique. Depuis que la Chine a mis fin à son aide au mois de mai 1978, le Vietnam n'a cessé d'être happé par l'économie soviétique. En juin de la même année, le gouvernement d'Hanoi se joignait au Conseil Economique d'Assistance mutuelle puis, au mois de novembre, le signalait traité d'amitié et de coopération liant pour vingt-cinq ans l'avenir du Vietnam à celui de l'URSS. Désormais la présence soviétique se fait sentir dans toutes les sphères de la société vietnamienne et l'implication des deux économies est trop étroite pour que l'on puisse spéculer ou tabler sur d'éventuelles contradictions entre les deux pays. Certes, le Vietnam cède cher aux Soviétiques mais c'est fondamentalement le plan géopolitique et non négociable sur le plan économique comme fournisseur de denrées tropicales que l'URSS n'a pas à payer en devises fortes. Dans l'analyse des rapports entre la Vi

rapports normaux entre le Vietnam et les pays occidentaux, le Japon et les membres de l'ASEAN pourrait distendre les liens étroits établis avec l'Union soviétique ; la seconde est de penser que le gouvernement d'Hanoi se saisissait aisément des rapports de

pas en prise avec le monde extérieur. La première attitude minimise la fraternité sociale entre les deux pays et sous-estime l'attachement indélébile des dirigeants actuels à la pensée d'Ho Chi Minh qui continue à guider, dans une orthodoxie sans faille, les destinées du Vietnam. La

attachement du Vietnam à son indépendance et ne se situe pas dans la tradition plusieurs fois séculaire de la résistance vietnamienne, résistance qui a forgé un nationalisme farouche peu réceptif à tout empirisme. Ainsi, malgré l'omniprésence des Soviétiques et la sincère gratitude


tain constaté au Vietnam une certaine réserve à l'endroit du modèle soviétique. Paradoxe peut-être mais pas vraiment si l'on se place dans la perspective du pragmatisme vietnamien qui, ces dernières années, malgré les rapports antagonistes existants semble être assez fasciné par la démodée idéologie chinoise.

...le modèle pertinent est bien en effet celui de la Chine; l'attachement

LE VIETNAM À L'HEURE DES DÉCISIONS

L'économie vietnamienne est en chute libre, le Canada pourrait contribuer à la réinsertion graduelle du Vietnam dans le système international.

PAR GÉRARD HERVOUET



LA QUESTION : « QUELLE EST selon vous la plus grave menace à laquelle doit faire face le Vietnam? », le colonel

du *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* (journal de l'Armée) n'hésite pas et répond : « Le sous-développement ».

Dans la capitale Hanoi, accablée par la tourmente du mois de juillet 1987, la priorité est en effet à l'éco-

nomie. La plus grande bataille se situe désormais sur le front intérieur. Les menaces aux frontières demeu-

rent, mais l'on cherche à banaliser le conflit au Kampuchéa tout en mini-

perduant à la frontière chinoise. L'extrême sous-développement du

Vietnam est affligeant; la misère est d'autant plus vive qu'elle est con-

tenue et digne. La fièvre vietnamienne inhibe les plaintes et les visiteurs

occidentaux sont souvent perturbés en croisant les regards de détresse

ou de mépris. Le Vietnam figure parmi les vingt pays les plus dénu-

nis dans le monde. Le Fonds moné- taire international (FMI) a estimé en 1985 que le revenu annuel *per capita*

était d'environ 160 \$ US. L'agricul- ture parvient à peine à couvrir les

besoins alimentaires en riz et cela encore parce qu'il y eut une bonne

récolte en 1986. Les statistiques sont toutefois relatives car l'auto-

suffisance actuelle est, dit-on, calculée selon des niveaux de con-

sommation nettement inférieurs aux besoins, niveaux imposés par le

« l'incapacité de remplir un nom- bre d'objectifs majeurs du dernier plan quinquennal à affecté tous les aspects de l'activité économique

... En règle générale, la capacité des entreprises n'a été utilisée qu'à moitié. Les ressources

naturelles de notre pays ont été gaspillées... L'environnement

est en voie de destruction. » Les rapports du sixième Congrès

notent par ailleurs que des millions de travailleurs sont sans emploi ou

sous-employés et qu'il « existe en milieu rural (plus de 80 p. 100 de la

population) une grande pénurie de biens de première nécessité et de

hygiène et de santé sans par ail- leurs très durs; on rapporte ainsi

qu'à Hô Chi Minh-Ville (autres villes Saigon) 195 000 maisons n'ont pas

d'eau, 120 000 disposent d'aucune installation sanitaire et plus de

100 000 n'ont pas d'électricité. Aucun officiel vietnamien ne

cherche à dissimuler la situation : « Nous manquons de tout, il nous

faute du papier, des livres, des trac- teurs, des engrais... Nous savons

que notre pays est riche, le potentiel est énorme mais comment s'attaquer

à tous les problèmes à la fois? ». L'HEURE EST À L'AUTO-CRITIQUE À

Hanoi, le Parti est reconnu respon- sable des objectifs mal définis, des choix erronés ou des décisions trop

populaire et la crise de confiance à l'endroit des dirigeants. Au-delà des

apparences et malgré le contrôle très strict de la population, le gouverne-

ment ferme les yeux sur bon nombre de pratiques douteuses, corruption,

simple volonte politique. Eppure, Nord et le Sud étaient trop impor-

ants pour être comblés par une rééduquée, rectifiée, la population

du Sud continue malgré tout à faire preuve de plus de dynamisme que

celle du Nord. L'intégration du Sud n'a en aucune façon fait disparaître

d'anciennes rivalités ou encore les cicatrices d'une guerre civile plus

récente. Les séparatistes du Nord n'oublent pas facilement avoir tout

enduré pour « libérer » leurs frères du Sud dont les privations n'étaient que

bien légères en comparaison des conditions de vie du Nord Vietnam.

ENFIN ET CERTAINEMENT, UNE DES raisons les plus fondamentales de la

dégradation de l'économie viet- namienne demeure le conflit au

Kampuchéa aggravé du différend avec la Chine. Depuis 1979, l'intran-

sigeance vietnamienne, dans son refus d'accepter la moindre conces-

sion pour un règlement de la situa- tion au Kampuchéa, lui coûte très cher. La coalition anti-vietnamienne qui réunit bien d'étranges partenaires

comme la Chine, l'Association des Etats de l'Asie du Sud-Est, le gouver-

nement de coalition du Kampuchéa démocratique (GCKD), de nom-

breux pays d'Europe occidentale, les Etats-Unis et le Canada s'emploient

à faire monter les enchères. L'enjeu pour le Vietnam est devenu trop

élevé pour qu'il soit maintenant en mesure de reculer. En fait, le Viet-

nam a déjà enregistré ses pertes les plus lourdes et le prix de l'occupa-

tion au Cambodge peut se ventiler de la façon suivante : suspension de

l'aide chinoise, refus de l'aide et embargo commercial de la part des

Etats-Unis, suspension ou dimi- nution de l'aide des autres pays occi-

dentaux, suspension des prêts des organismes internationaux, pertes

De la même façon qu'il ne par-

viens pas à contrôler la croissance et scepticisme les nouveaux conflits.

que les plus jeunes, avides de con-

sommation, considèrent avec crainte

démontre profondément trauma-

20 ans), une société dont les adultes

jeune (plus de 50 p. 100 de moins de

donc la population est extrêmement

soixante-dix ans si bien que le Parti

n'réflecte en aucune façon une société

namien demeure supérieure à

direction du Parti communiste viet-

la moyenne d'âge de la nouvelle

ments plus fondamentaux. En outre,

tempèrent la possibilité de change-

rien de la construction du socialisme

faible marge de manœuvre puisque

technocrates n'ont toutefois qu'une

hiérarchie du Parti. Les nouveaux

placé en cinquième position dans la

d'entre eux étant M. Vo Van Kiet

et certains réformateurs, le plus notable

toutefois introduit depuis un an plu-

appareils du Parti et de l'Etat ont

Les nouveaux

ouvriers entre factions rivales. Les

les ne marquent par des antagonismes

ment secoué par des purges sanglan-

viétnamien n'a jamais été véritable-

camp socialiste, le Parti communiste

Contratement aux autres pays du

politique et au gouvernement».

tout au comité central, au bureau

miques était attribuable « par dessus

grès que l'échec des réformes écono-

sans ambiguïté lors du sixième Con-

et secrétaire général sortant déclarait

M. Truong Chinh, leader historique

n'est pas indulgent envers le Parti.

cette situation? Le discours officiel

POURQUOI EN EST-ON ARRIVÉ À

vie particulièrement difficiles.

lation de tolérer des conditions de

mettent en fin de compte à la popu-

produits médicaux, puisqu'elles per-

marché noir, ou encore rétention de

de pratiques douteuses, corruption,

ment ferme les yeux sur bon nombre

stricte de la population, le gouverne-

apparences et malgré le contrôle très

à double de 1955 à 1980, le Vietnam

Les écarts de développement entre le

am absorbé la conquête du Sud.

démographique d'une population qui

L'insensibilisation de l'effort militaire des États-Unis durant les années 1980 et les durs propos tenus par divers porte-parole américains ont certes influé sur l'attitude du public au Canada et dans d'autres pays alliés. Mais les racines du mécontentement sont plus profondes. Le nouveau pessimisme semble être le contre-coup des espoirs trompés qu'avait fait naître la période de détente et, surtout, du fait qu'on ne peut pas penser que les Canadiens acceptent au pair les valeurs du système socio-politique soviétique. Par contre, tout semble indiquer l'apparition d'une tendance nouvelle à se montrer méfiant et critique à l'égard des deux superpuissances. D'aucuns seraient également tentés de croire, à tort, que la mauvaise opinion des Canadiens sur les politiques américaines a été entièrement façonnée par l'être réagissant. Les constatations ne donnent pas certaines politiques américaines. Elles suggèrent que les Canadiens ne sont pas d'accord avec les valeurs du système socio-politique soviétique. Par contre, tout semble indiquer l'apparition d'une tendance nouvelle à se montrer méfiant et critique à l'égard des deux superpuissances. D'aucuns seraient également tentés de croire, à tort, que la mauvaise opinion des Canadiens sur les politiques américaines a été entièrement façonnée par l'être réagissant.

Le fait qu'on ait commencé à réduire ces arsenaux pourrait bien modifier certaines perceptions. Toutefois, il serait inconsider de s'attendre à un changement radical de l'attitude à percevoir les politiques des deux superpuissances sous le même jour. Plutôt, il semblerait probable que les Canadiens à continuer de la manière plus favorable les orientations des deux superpuissances en matière de politique étrangère et de limitation des armements. Il est peu probable que le gros du public dans les pays occidentaux voient dans l'accord sur les FNL une réalisation américaine. Par voie de conséquence, l'accord ne permettra sans doute pas à Washington de marquer des points dans l'esprit du public. Il y a peu de chances aussi pour que les Canadiens et d'autres jugent l'accord suffisant pour atténuer les problèmes qui les préoccupent — une pléthore d'arsenaux militaires et l'absence de compromis politiques.

Ces attitudes, caractéristiques de l'après-guerre froide et de l'après-détente, semblent destinées à jouer un rôle clé dans le débat politique au Canada et au sein de l'Alliance occidentale.

IL EST IMPORTANT DE PRÉCISER


quelles sont les conclusions à ne pas tirer des résultats de ce sondage sur l'attitude des Canadiens. Ces résultats ne suggèrent pas un anti-américanisme généralisé. Ce n'est pas aux États-Unis que les Canadiens s'en prennent, pas plus qu'aux Américains. Ils dénoncent plutôt certaines politiques américaines. Ces constatations ne donnent pas non plus à penser que les Canadiens acceptent au pair les valeurs du système socio-politique soviétique. Par contre, tout semble indiquer l'apparition d'une tendance nouvelle à se montrer méfiant et critique à l'égard des deux superpuissances. D'aucuns seraient également tentés de croire, à tort, que la mauvaise opinion des Canadiens sur les politiques américaines a été entièrement façonnée par l'être réagissant.

Résultats du sondage


Le sondage, qui constitue l'examen le plus approfondi de l'opinion publique sur ces sujets jamais effectué au Canada, a été conçu par l'auteur et financé par l'ICPSI. Il a été conduit de juin à septembre 1987 par le *Longwoods Research Group* auprès d'un échantillon national sélectionné au hasard de 30 000 foyers détenus par la *Market Facts Ltd.* Les questionnaires ont été distribués par la poste à 1 015 répondants en tout. Le taux de réponses a été de 48 p. 100. La marge d'erreur pour un échantillon de cette taille est d'environ ± 4 p. 100, 95 fois sur 100.

Le lecteur trouvera les données du sondage et une analyse plus détaillée fondée sur l'ensemble de ce dernier dans un Document de travail distribué par l'Institut et rédigé par M. Don Munton. Les données citées dans le présent article, tout comme le Document de travail, appartiennent à l'ICPSI; les opinions et interprétations sont cependant celles du professeur Munton.

Certaines personnes pensent que la meilleure façon d'empêcher la guerre est que l'Ouest accroisse sa force militaire de sorte qu'il soit plus puissant que les Soviétiques. D'autres personnes pensent que ceci accélérerait la course aux armements et pourrait aboutir à la guerre. Qu'en pensez-vous ? Est-ce que l'Ouest devrait essayer d'accroître sa force militaire, ou non ?



Comment qualifiez-vous le niveau de confiance que vous avez en l'aptitude — des États-Unis/de l'Union soviétique — à s'occuper sagement des problèmes mondiaux actuels ?





effectué en 1962 par l'Institut canadien de recherche sur la paix. À l'époque, près de six Canadiens sur dix (58 p. 100) étaient convaincus que la meilleure façon de prévenir la guerre était d'accroître la puissance militaire du camp occidental et de viser à la supériorité. Seulement un répondant sur trois (32 p. 100) pensait que l'Occident ne devait pas renforcer ses capacités militaires. Vingt-cinq ans plus tard, les proportions sont inversées. Les répondants du sondage ICPSI se sont vu demander s'ils étaient d'accord ou non avec l'énoncé suivant : « La sécurité des pays de l'Ouest serait accrue de façon optimale par des réductions substantielles des arsenaux nucléaires Américains et Soviétiques. » Plus de 80 p. 100 des répondants se sont dits d'accord ou tout à fait d'accord.

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
Pour non moins d'un répondant

sur trois, ni l'un ni l'autre des dirigeants de recherche sur la paix. À l'époque, près de six Canadiens sur dix (58 p. 100) étaient convaincus que la meilleure façon de prévenir la guerre était d'accroître la puissance militaire du camp occidental et de viser à la supériorité. Seulement un répondant sur trois (32 p. 100) pensait que l'Occident ne devait pas renforcer ses capacités militaires. Vingt-cinq ans plus tard, les proportions sont inversées. Les répondants du sondage ICPSI se sont vu demander s'ils étaient d'accord ou non avec l'énoncé suivant : « La sécurité des pays de l'Ouest serait accrue de façon optimale par des réductions substantielles des arsenaux nucléaires Américains et Soviétiques. » Plus de 80 p. 100 des répondants se sont dits d'accord ou tout à fait d'accord.

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ne devait pas augmenter sa puissance militaire. Cette assertion représente une inversion sensible des attitudes comparativement au début des années 1960. Car la même question avait été posée dans un sondage national

LES SUPERPUISSANCES ET LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE

PAR DON MUNTION

Un récent sondage commandé par l'ICPSI révèle que pour la plupart des Canadiens, ce sont les politiques et les dispositifs militaires des deux superpuissances, et non de l'URSS seule, qui mettent en péril la sécurité nationale.

A PLURIPART DES CANADIENS estiment que les politiques et l'appareil militaire des deux superpuissances — les États-Unis autant que l'URSS — constituent le problème déterminant dans les relations Est-Ouest. L'actuel stock nucléaire détenu par les deux grands passe pour accroître les risques d'une guerre au lieu de les réduire. Voilà quelques-unes des principales constatations qui ressortent d'un sondage d'opinion publique effectué en 1987 pour le compte de l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales.

L'enquête, conduite avant la divulguation en décembre d'un traité américano-soviétique sur les armes nucléaires à portée intermédiaire, souligne une nette tendance générale à repousser les politiques, nucléaires ou autres, des deux superpuissances. Et même si les Canadiens auront leurs perceptions négatives par suite de l'accord signé au sommet de Washington, il est peu probable que ce changement grand-chose à l'équilibre apparent de ces opinions, ni à la tendance à contredire les politiques soviétiques et américaines.

Les répondants se sont vu demander quel facteur fait peser la plus grande menace sur la paix mondiale. Très peu d'entre eux ont mis en cause l'URSS. Seul un répondant sur vingt (5 p. 100) a jugé que le comportement soviétique sur la scène internationale représente le principal danger. À peu de chose près, le même nombre d'enquêtés (8 p. 100) a blâmé les États-Unis. En revanche, non moins du quart ont pointé du doigt la course aux armements entre les superpuissances. Enfin, deux tranches plus ou moins de même taille croyaient que la prolifération des armes nucléaires dans les petits pays et la situation au Moyen-Orient constituaient la plus lourde menace (29 p. 100 et 27 p. 100 respectivement). On notera au passage que ces constatations vont à l'encontre de l'hypothèse sous-tendant le Livre blanc du gouvernement canadien sur la défense, à savoir que «la principale menace directe qui continue de planer sur le Canada est celle d'une

attaque nucléaire soviétique contre l'Amérique du Nord». Les Canadiens, peu d'entre eux croient à l'éventualité d'une attaque nucléaire soviétique. Aux yeux de la majorité, le principal danger résiderait dans l'instabilité des rapports entre les superpuissances et dans les risques d'escalade d'un conflit régional.

Les résultats du sondage ICPSI se trouvent corroborés par une autre enquête effectuée durant la même période pour le compte du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Invités à choisir, parmi une liste de facteurs possibles, celui suscitant les plus grandes tensions entre l'Est et l'Ouest, près de la moitié des répondants à ce sondage ont cerné «le manque de confiance» entre les deux blocs. Une fois de plus, les politiques soviétiques n'ont été mises en cause que par une faible minorité.

À l'heure actuelle, les Canadiens sont aussi nombreux à imputer les récentes tensions Est-Ouest aux États-Unis qu'à l'URSS et à juger certaines politiques américaines sous un jour aussi défavorable que les politiques soviétiques. Dans le sondage des Affaires extérieures, 13 p. 100 expliquait les tensions Est-Ouest par la volonté de l'URSS d'accroître sa puissance et son influence, une tranche analogue (13 p. 100) jugeait que les tensions étaient dues aux efforts déployés en ce sens par les Américains.

Les RÉSULTATS DU SONDAJE ICPSI sur la question de savoir quel est le plus grand problème des relations Est-Ouest. Parmi les répondants selon qui ces rapports s'étaient améliorés au cours des dernières années, un bien plus grand nombre (40 p. 100) en attribuait le mérite à l'URSS qu'aux États-Unis (10 p. 100) des enquêtes seulement. Et parmi ceux qui croyaient à une dégradation de ces rapports, du moins jusqu'à l'été de 1987, la majorité s'en prenaient aux États-Unis.

Pour beaucoup de Canadiens, l'aptitude des États-Unis et de l'URSS à composer avec les problèmes actuels du monde est sujette à caution. Le scepticisme domine une fois de plus, ce dont témoigne le parallélisme très évident des réponses. Moins de quatre Canadiens sur dix (38 p. 100) accordent une confiance

très grande ou considérable aux États-Unis à cet égard. Plus de six répondants sur dix ont exprimé un degré de confiance faible, très faible ou nul (62 p. 100). Par contre, on peut s'en donner davantage encore, la démarche soviétique face aux problèmes du monde inspire une confiance très grande ou considérable chez près de trois Canadiens sur dix (28 p. 100); sept répondants sur dix ont indiqué un degré de confiance faible, très faible ou nul (73 p. 100). Bref, la politique américaine suscite un degré de confiance à peine plus élevé que la politique soviétique. (Voir le diagramme.) Les données de sondage permettant de retracer le cheminement de l'opinion publique sont rares, mais il semble qu'après 40 ans de paix empreinte de menace auxquelis la politique étrangère américaine s'est heurtée, dont les écueils vietnamien et nicaraguayen, et le discours simpliste et parfois belliqueux de Ronald Reagan ont convaincu les Canadiens que la démarche des États-Unis relative-

ment aux problèmes mondiaux n'est pas entièrement bonne.

La question de savoir dans quelle mesure M.M. Reagan et Gorbachev étaient dignes de confiance sur les questions du nucléaire et de la limitation des armements. Peu de répondants ont trouvé l'un ou l'autre dirigeant très digne de confiance. La moitié des enquêtés a jugé les deux «quelque peu» dignes de confiance, et le reste a estimé qu'ils n'étaient pas très dignes de confiance, ou pas du tout. Les répondants ont été plus nombreux à croire que les dirigeants soviétiques s'intéressent réellement au désarmement, en comparaison de leurs homologues américains (46 p. 100 contre 37 p. 100).

Durant la guerre froide, la plupart des Canadiens avaient des perceptions essentiellement positives au sujet des États-Unis et essentiellement négatives au sujet de l'URSS. Tel n'est plus le cas. La tendance marquée chez de nombreux Canadiens à se montrer défavorables aux politiques des deux superpuissances constitue sans doute la révélation la plus frappante qui se dégage du sondage de 1987.

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Don Munton est professeur de science politique à l'Université de Colombie-Britannique, à Vancouver; **Gérard Hervouet** est professeur de science politique à l'Université Laval, à Québec, et il a fait un séjour à l'Institut des relations internationales de Hanói, à l'été 1987; **Jane Boulden** était autrefois auxiliaire de recherche à l'Institut. Elle fait présentement des études en relations internationales à l'Université Queen's, à Kingston; **Boyce Richardson** vit à Ottawa, et il est cinéaste et auteur; **Francine Lecours** est auxiliaire de recherche à l'Institut, et **David Gollob** est correspondant de la radio anglaise de la CBC en Amérique latine.

NOTE DE LA RÉDACTION

Dans l'article principal du présent

Le lecteur trouvera les données du

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2. La défense continentale:

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David C. Cox, décembre 1986,

64 pages.

3. La limitation des arme-

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par Ronald G. Purver, janvier

1988.

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Introduction aux politiques

limitation des armements,

et à la solution des conflits.

1986-1987, 300 pages.

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10. Le débat sur l'éducation

à la paix par Elizabeth

Richards, décembre 1986.

11. Le désarmement

nucélaire et l'initiative

Gorbatchev par John R.

Walker, janvier 1987.

12. Quel est en tête? Analyse

sur l'équilibre nucléaire par

Jane Boulden, mars 1987.

13. Les négociations de

Genève sur la réduction des

armes stratégiques par

David Cox, juin 1987.

14. L'Entente de Stockholm ou

l'Internationale par Henry

Wiseman, octobre 1987.

15. Le maintien de la paix

et la gestion des conflits

Internationaux par Henry

Wiseman, octobre 1987.

16. Limiter les risques d'une

guerre nucléaire accidentelle

par Dianne DeMille, janvier

1988.

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3. La limitation des

armements et le

désarmement dans les

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R. Walker, mars 1987.

4. Sauvegarder la paix et

la liberté: la dissuasion

nucélaire et la limitation des

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mars 1987.

5. À quand la création d'une

Organisation mondiale de

l'espace? par Elisabeth Mann

Borgese, novembre 1987.

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4. Paix, développement et

sécurité dans le Bassin des

Caribbes: Perspectives

d'évolution d'ici l'an 2000.

Compte rendu de la Con-

férence sur la paix, dévelop-

pement et sécurité dans le

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Jamaïque, du 22 au 25 mars

1987, par Lloyd Seawar.

5. Vers l'instauration de la

paix en Amérique centrale,

8 et 9 mai 1987, par Lissa

North, décembre 1987.

INSTITUT CANADIEN
POUR LA PAIX ET
LA SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALES
307, rue Glenour
Ottawa (Ontario) K2P 0P7
(613) 990-1593

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4. Paix, développement et
sécurité dans le Bassin des
Caribbes: Perspectives
d'évolution d'ici l'an 2000.
Compte rendu de la Con-
férence sur la paix, dévelop-
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5. À quand la création d'une
Organisation mondiale de
l'espace? par Elisabeth Mann
Borgese, novembre 1987.

RAPPORTS

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férence sur la paix, dévelop-
pement et sécurité dans le

Bassin des Caraïbes, Kingston,
Jamaïque, du 22 au 25 mars
1987, par Lloyd Seawar.

5. Vers l'instauration de la
paix en Amérique centrale,

8 et 9 mai 1987, par Lissa

North, décembre 1987.

Le lecteur trouvera les données du
sondage et une analyse plus détaillée
fondée sur l'ensemble de ce dernier
dans un Document de travail dis-
tribué par l'Institut et rédigé par
M. Don Munton.

Dans un autre article du présent
numéro de *Paix et Sécurité*, Gérard
Hervieux nous fait part de ses im-
pressions sur le Vietnam où il a
séjourné l'été dernier. Il parle du
sous-développement et de la misère
qui y règnent et explique pourquoi.
On en est arrivé à une telle situation,
Le Canada aurait un rôle à jouer.
selon l'auteur, pour favoriser la réin-
tégration du Vietnam dans le système
international. Une étude plus poussée
sur le sujet rédigée par M. Hervieux,
sera distribuée par l'Institut au prin-
temps 1988.

Jane Boulden, qui est l'auteur
d'un *Exposé* de l'ICPSI intitulé «Qui
a la limitation des armements à la
nucélaire», s'interroge sur l'équilibre
est en tête? Analyse sur l'équilibre
d'un *Exposé* de l'ICPSI intitulé «Qui
a la limitation des armements à la
nucélaire», s'interroge sur l'équilibre
lumière des récents différents ayant
opposé les superpuissances au sujet
ABM. Boyce Richardson explique
sommatoirement comment le Pro-
gramme des Nations-Unies pour
l'environnement (PNUE) pourrait
aider à résoudre les conflits au sujet
des cours d'eau internationaux.

Francine Lecours, auxiliaire de
recherche à l'ICPSI, montre com-
ment le désir de l'Iran d'influer sur

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paix et la sécurité interna-
tionales a été créé par une loi du
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pour accroître la connais-
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questions relatives à la paix et
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la politique régionale au Moyen-
Orient s'est maintenant après l'arrivée
de l'ayatollah Khomeiny au pouvoir.
La parution du présent numéro
marque le départ de l'année d'une
chronique régulière et l'arrivée de
deux autres rédacteurs. Jane Boulden
s'occupait du «Condensé» depuis sa
création dans le premier numéro de
Paix et Sécurité, et c'est également
elle qui faisait toutes les recherches
de recherche à l'ICPSI, remplace
Mme Boulden qui pourrît des études
à l'Université Queen's. Par ailleurs,
David Cox, professeur de sciences
politiques à l'Université Queen's et
ancien directeur de la Recherche
à l'Institut, rédigera la «Chronique
de la Défense».

Le conseil de rédaction de *Paix et
Sécurité* a changé. Nancy Gordon,
directrice des Programmes publics à
l'ICPSI, en est la présidente. Les
nouveaux membres sont Roger Hill,
directeur de la Recherche à l'ICPSI,
Hilary Mackenzie, membre du bu-
reau d'Ottawa de la revue *Maclean's*
et Madeline Poulin, journaliste et
co-animatrice de l'émission *Le Point*
diffusée sur les ondes de Radio-
Canada. David Cox, autrefois men-
bre de ce conseil de rédaction.

Hélène Samson

PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE : QU'EN PENSE LA POPULATION CANADIENNE ?

Une enquête parrainée par
l'ITCPSI révèle comment les
Canadiens et Canadiennes
perçoivent la paix, la sécurité,
et les superpuissances.

Par Don Munton

Dans le présent numéro :

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Le Vietnam se prépare
un avenir sombre, en
marge de la collectivité
des nations.

Jane Boulden
Le Traité sur les armes
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bre, et l'attention se tourne
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Boyce Richardson
Le Programme des
Nations-Unies pour l'en-
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à résoudre les conflits au
sujet de l'exploitation des
cours d'eau internationaux ?


Françine Lecours
Le gouvernement révolu-
tionnaire d'Iran a repris
l'objectif du Shah qui vou-
lait faire de son pays une
superpuissance régionale.



PEACE & SECURITY

STRANGERS IN THE LAND... AGAIN

A southern reporter finds
Canadian Inuit of two
minds about attention
paid to their homeland
by the Armed Forces
By Kevin McMahon



Michael Bryans

"Deterrence" is under serious challenge as a way to manage or explain conflict between nations.

Gilles Paquin

Central American politics are complex and lethal. Canada should think twice about getting involved in peacekeeping.

Steve Godfrey

South Africa depends on the weakness of its neighbours. Frontline States are co-operating to secure their economies and their borders.

Tony Rogers

The peace movement needs new strategies to remain a potent force.

Shannon Selin

Could women really run the world better?

Also in this issue:

Institute Publications 1987-88

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

2. **Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective**, by David Cox, December 1986, 50 pages.

3. **Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities**, by Ronald G. Purver, February 1988.

ANNUAL REVIEW

A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1986-87, 270 pages.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

11. **Nuclear Disarmament: The Gorbachev Initiative**, by John R. Walker, January 1987.

12. **Who's Ahead: Examining the Nuclear Balance**, by Jane Boulden, March 1987.

13. **Review of the Geneva Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions**, by David Cox, June 1987.

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18. **Has the ABM Treaty a Future?** by Ronald G. Purver, February 1988.

POINTS OF VIEW

2. **Nuclear Weapons and the Averting of War**, by Robert Malcolmson, October 1986.

3. **Canadian Press Coverage of Arms Control and Disarmament Issues**, by John R. Walker, March 1987.

4. **Maintaining Peace With Freedom: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control**, by Lorne Green, November 1987.

5. **Towards a World Space Organization**, by Elisabeth Mann Borgese, November 1987.

CONFERENCE REPORTS

4. **Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean: Perspectives to the Year 2000**, Proceedings of a Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 22-25 March 1987, by Lloyd Searwar.

5. **Measures for Peace in Central America, 8-9 May 1987**, by Liisa North, December 1987.

6. **The International Trade in Arms: Problems and Prospects**, by Keith Krause, March 1988.

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

In 1981 while filming interviews for the National Film Board film series *War*, we did one in a Washington hotel room with Fritz Ermarth, then an independent strategic analyst and Sovietologist, who went on to fill various positions in the CIA and National Security Council. Alas, as so often happens in movie making the entire interview ended up on the cutting-room floor. I say alas, because he spoke well and convincingly about how the Soviets view the world in military terms.

While writing the piece inside on deterrence, one small moment of this interview came to mind again. When, inevitably, the subject of the Cuban Missile Crisis came around Ermarth spoke in almost wistful tones about the bygone days of American nuclear superiority. The fact that the US was able to push the Russian missiles out of Cuba without suffering some form of retaliation in a place where the Soviets had local military superiority on the ground – Berlin was his example – was proof of the usefulness of having a lot more nuclear weapons than the other side. What happened to the Russians in 1962, he went on

to say, is the answer to Henry Kissinger's question, "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"

If Ermarth's attitude is representative, then this "lesson" from Cuba has indeed been absorbed into the highest levels of military planning in the West. And more than a few commentators in recent years have seen implicit in the buildup of US nuclear forces a desire to return to the halcyon days when the West was way ahead in the bomb count. Just as many have ascribed the Soviet nuclear buildup since Cuba to their fierce determination never to let the Cuban "humiliation" happen again. The subject of *The Banality of Deterrence* is the nature of this lesson and the conclusions of some who think we all learned the wrong one.

The cover story this issue is by **Kevin McMahon**. McMahon travelled through the Canadian Arctic during the autumn of last year, interviewing northerners, mostly Inuit. Among the communities he visited were Iqaluit, Hall Beach, Resolute Bay, Cambridge Bay and Gjoa Haven.

Gilles Paquin's story is a cautionary one about the dangers of sending Canadian peacekeeping troops into Central America. Included is an excerpt from the first and final report of the short-lived Verification Commission; an international body that was charged with the difficult task of evaluating how well each of the Central American countries was living up to the peace agreement signed last year.

Steve Godfrey looks at the economic condition of the states that border on South Africa, and the vital role he believes Canada could play to help the Frontline states secure their frontiers.

The future of the Canadian peace movement in the post-cruise missile era is the subject of **Tony Rogers'** article. In his view, the peace movement needs to adjust its strategy if it is to rally Canadians and influence government policy.

And finally, **Shannon Selin** asks the question – then answers it in a personal essay – whether women could run the world better than men.

– Michael Bryans

CANADIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY

307 Gilmour Street
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(613) 990-1593

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
Kevin McMahon is a free-lance journalist and filmmaker, and author of a forthcoming book on Arctic sovereignty; Michael Bryans is editor of *Peace&Security* and was co-creator of the NFB film series *War*; Gilles Paquin is a reporter for *La Presse* and former correspondent in Central America; Steve Godfrey is a project officer at *Inter Pares*, an Ottawa-based international development organization; Tony Rogers is a graduate of Carleton University's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and currently studies law at the University of British Columbia; Shannon Selin, formerly a research assistant at the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, is a writer for Newbridge Communications Networks Corporation; Robert Lee is a journalist with the *Ottawa Citizen*.

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STRANGERS IN THE LAND ... AGAIN

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN EXTRAORDINARY sight in most Canadian towns, yet one that is increasingly familiar to northerners: one day last winter the skies above Iqaluit, NWT began to fill with the swollen profiles of C-130 Hercules, signalling an invasion code-named Operation Lightning Strike. Sweeping down, the planes deposited hundreds of troops and the various paraphernalia they needed to "secure" the town on the premise that foreign saboteurs had attacked power and communication facilities. For weeks, Iqaluit was filled with rumbling armoured vehicles, marching soldiers and the booming of gunfire bouncing off the surrounding hills. "It brought to life what we see on TV," said a town official, "I think that shocked people a little." Nevertheless, none of the 3,200 townsfolk complained about the inconvenience or the graphic, if benign, demonstration of the growing militarization of Canada's north. Nor did they when Iqaluit learned it will be one of the five "forward" operating locations for CF-18 fighters. What makes this strange is that Iqaluit is also a town where many people say they oppose Arctic militarization and where the council has expressed this recently by unanimously passing a resolution declaring the town "nuclear free" and supporting a proposal to make the Arctic a nuclear weapon-free zone.

Seemingly paradoxical, these reactions are actually typical of the ambivalence one finds talking to people who live in the north, particularly the Inuit, about military developments there. As the Arctic has become the new growth area for the superpower nuclear confrontation – and Canada's role in it has thus increased – native



On visiting the North, a southern reporter finds Canadian Inuit are of two minds about the increasing attention paid to their homeland by the Armed Forces.

BY KEVIN McMAHON

political groups have increased their calls for the demilitarization of the region. Yet it is not likely that these are much troubling either the federal government or the Armed Forces. Both know that many ordinary Inuit actually welcome military developments, despite a culture and a variety of grievances with the military which would lead an outsider to think just the opposite.

OF ALL HUMAN SOCIETIES, THE Inuit are amongst the least culturally disposed to accepting military rationale. Aside from the occasional skirmish with Indians, their remote homeland has blessed them with a history free of war, an absence of enemies and a deep belief in sharing and harmonious relations as basic survival skills.

In recent years, much of the work of Inuit politicians has been trying to translate those values into

multilateral agreements among the nations that now dominate their land. "We see ourselves as a people who are trying to bring people together instead of fighting each other," says John Amagoalik, who has worked with the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, representing Canadian Inuit, and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), made up of natives from Alaska, Greenland and Canada. Since forming in 1977, the ICC has continually called for the demilitarization of the Arctic. In 1986, it launched a study of the social and environmental impacts of military activity and an examination of the viability an Arctic nuclear weapon-free zone: ICC lawyer Paul Joffe says the organization quickly realized that the Soviet dependence on its Arctic submarine bases makes a nuclear weapon-free zone unlikely. But it continues to work on more limited proposals, with the intention of drafting an actual

treaty text to propose to the circumpolar states.

The ICC's motivation is not, of course, wholly philosophic. Traditionally nomadic, the Inuit resent borders to begin with and none more so than the superpowers' nuclear wall dissecting the Arctic. In the face of a southern onslaught they see circumpolar co-operation as their prime hope for cultural survival. But the Cold War makes this a slow business. The Soviet Union has consistently refused to allow Siberian Inuit to even attend ICC meetings. Only very recently, says Amagoalik, has the organizations' persistence "started to open doors" on the other side.

More immediately, the Inuit worry over the environmental damage of military developments. No other government agency has undertaken such huge engineering projects in the north as has the military and none has littered the tundra with so much dangerous garbage. In 1963, when half the original sixty-one Distant Early Warning Line sites became technologically redundant, they were simply abandoned to pillage and rust. For more than twenty years electrical transformers drip-fed the land with toxic PCBs. The federal government finally ordered the chemicals cleaned up in 1985 to forestall local concerns over the North Warning System agreement. But the Inuit are not so easily appeased and many believe further militarization of the Arctic means its further pollution. Explaining his fear of nuclear weapons accidents, one hunter told me he believed southerners don't comprehend the fragility of the northern environment. "Your trees and gardens would be affected [by radiation] ... but it wouldn't last that long. We are so far up here in the north, the wildlife is very delicate."

Like many Inuit, he knew little about the superpowers' Arctic strategies, but he was clear on their relative geography. "If nuclear rockets start flying over our heads, then for sure each one of them will try to shoot down the others' rockets... and our region will be all contaminated."

"We don't have any enemies that we hate so much that we want to kill them," he said, adding, as northerners often do: "we don't want any part of a war because they are not our enemies."

Yet the Inuit are part of the war and eagerly so – largely out of necessity. As their traditional economy has collapsed, they have become almost wholly dependent on government handouts. Most families still hunt for food but need cash for the basic amenities of an increasingly southern lifestyle. With jobs few and far between, military developments mean economic promise to most natives. Ironically, the military is providing a solution to a problem it did much to create, albeit unintentionally.

DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER the Second World War, when most Inuit still lived in hunting camps and there were only a handful of whites in the region, the American military "opened up" the Arctic with a string of huge projects. In rapid succession, it built the Alaska Highway, Canol pipeline, a chain of American air force bases and, finally, the DEW Line. Each attracted Inuit to work, earning what they considered easy money. Fearing for Canadian sovereignty, the federal government countered the US presence with schools and nursing stations. In a few cases, it also physically relocated Inuit hundreds of miles, plopping them down beside American installations to serve as Canadian flag poles. Throughout the Arctic, the changes meant Inuit were soon living year-round in large communities for the first time in their history. They were also developing the immense social problems and sense of cultural loss they now struggle with, problems which have much to do with feelings of poverty and worthlessness.

Thus when government officials toured the Arctic in 1986 for com-

munity meetings on the North Warning System, which will replace the DEW Line, they repeatedly heard two concerns. One was that site fences be designed so that caribou could not be trapped by them and the other was that Inuit be given work on the line. Currently about seventeen of the more than six hundred workers on the line are Inuit. All have menial jobs but are nonetheless the economic elite of their communities. A large part of each bid for the recently-awarded \$150 million North Warning System operational contract was a promise to hire more Inuit and the NWT government is planning to train natives for its high-paying electronics jobs. One of the four bids actually came from an Inuit-owned company, in partnership with the ITT subsidiary now running the DEW Line. Meanwhile, the Canadian Rangers programme, touted as the Armed Forces' "eyes and ears" in the north, is popular with natives mainly because the rifle and ammunition it provides amount to an income subsidy. The Rangers' prime duty is to attend an annual "training" excursion from which they return with \$400 and, usually, a caribou. Inuit involvement with the military is also made easier by the cynicism they feel about control over Armed Forces activity in the north. An Inuk TV producer, who opposed Arctic militarization, nevertheless felt that "it's going to come up here anyways, so why shouldn't Inuit benefit?"

AT THE SAME TIME, THE INUIT HAVE a good deal of respect and goodwill for the military people who have worked in the Arctic. For example, the people of Resolute Bay, who were moved there to establish a sovereignty beachhead, are bitter about Ottawa but nostalgic about American airmen. The flyers made friends by allowing the Inuit to pick through their garbage for building materials after the government brought them north from Quebec and left them to fend for themselves. Elsewhere, the favours have been more direct. In Hall Beach the DEW Line provides the community water supply. When the local pastor recently requested help getting a part for his church, the DEW Line manager had it

flown up from Winnipeg the next day. "Some of the nicest, most generous people we have ever known," says John Amagoalik, "were American military personnel."

And while the Inuit see themselves as having no enemies, they know that southerners are not so lucky. Simon Keanik, who is roughly eighty, said he had always been told that the Russians "want to go to war... the reason is because they want to take over our country after they kill off all the white people." After years of such tales, says Amagoalik, many Inuit have developed an emotional distrust of Russians and many still maintain one for the Japanese and Germans. Grateful for the benefits southerners have brought them, the Inuit are amongst the most patriotic of Canadians and so feel a duty to help protect their apparently embattled countrymen. During the Second World War, young Inuks with experience of white culture volunteered for battle.

"[I] was told what was going on," said one, "and I knew they were not going to have war in the north... but [I] was prepared to protect Canada." Many still feel that consenting to the military use of their territory is something "we can do for Canada."

Ultimately most Inuit consent to that use because they don't really know what it means. They see bits and pieces of an extraordinarily powerful and complex system run by men who appear to know exactly what they are doing. Their lives are deeply rooted in isolated communities where the prime source of "outside" information is the constant and peculiar flicker of TV images beaming in from (of all places) Detroit accompanied by an English commentary that only the children really understand. Ironically, the Inuit were first given an image of war with the introduction of television in the mid-1970s. But, being what it is, TV has done little to explain that image since. The majority of Inuit have no real notion of the extent of the jousting that takes place daily above and beneath the ice as American and Soviet nuclear submarines, bombers and fighters rehearse their moves. Nor, in any real way,

are they aware of the technological developments, the strategies or, most importantly, the stakes of the game.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE INUIT ARE typical Canadians. Their ambivalence is striking because of the huge cultural gulf between them and the nuclear systems sprouting up in their area. But their acceptance of a relentless nuclear arms competition is really just a mirror image of our own with a bit of fur trim. Where they buy in to gain a temporary job on a radar site, we do so to keep the people of Rexdale gainfully employed at Litton; where they get the spinoff benefit of a new airstrip built for fighter jets, we get cheap computer technology and lasers for eye surgery. For us, as for them, acceptance is made easier by a belief in authority and in technology, by feelings of duty and of fear, by the daily demands of the immediate and by a sort of willful ignorance fed by the soft blue light that helps us forget what we feel we cannot change.

And for both, too, there is a certain fatalism in which to take final comfort. In the South it is called Armageddon theology or Eighties nihilism, depending on who describes it. In the north, especially amongst elders, it is the Word: "He heard it first from the shamans and also from the religious groups," said a translator who was relating something I often heard when I asked the old Inuks about militarization. "The Bible says the world's gonna end. It's just going to turn into a big ball of fire. And nobody can go against the Bible." □

Further Reading

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THE BANALITY OF DETERRENCE

Just how many variations can the meaning of the word "deterrence" accommodate before it ceases to have any meaning at all?

BY MICHAEL BRYANS

THERE HAS GROWN UP AN enormous gap between the public use of the word "deterrence" – its everyday use in print and broadcast media and by governments explaining their policies – and whatever legitimacy it may have. The fact of this gap is not trivial; when meaning is slippery or vague, words become either useless, since they mean different things to different people, or dangerous; they can be used to manipulate discussion and distort intention.

The popular use of "deterrence" is now so banal as to raise serious questions about its meaning. Consider its infinite variability; it is a verb – you can deter ("discourage or hinder by fear") someone from doing something. It is a noun – you can own it yourself or like a garden hose borrow someone else's; and it is an adjective – as in "Canada must have a deterrent capability."

Deterrence is useful in all kinds of actual or impending military situations at all levels of conflict whether the weapons are missiles with nuclear warheads, speedboats full of enthusiastic soldiers, or even slingshots.

Deterrence even helps sell things: the British shipbuilding company Vickers runs newspaper advertisements extolling the virtues of its submarines in fulfilling the Canadian government's need to "deter intrusions into our waters."

The invention of nuclear weapons probably has a lot to do with the reason deterrence has such wide currency. It was apparent early on that H-bombs were not really useful to fight and win wars, but you could threaten a potential enemy with destruction in order to convince him to do what you wanted

or prevent him from doing something undesirable (like using nuclear weapons on you). While nations used threats in order to influence the decisions of adversaries all through history, nuclear weapons have transformed deterrence into a goal in itself.

This metamorphosis makes sense given the remarkable human capacity for making virtue of necessity. Since what we have with nuclear weapons is deterrence, a once rarely employed verb is now an object of desire – a tangible commodity that you can measure like gold or buggie whips. However, there are some academics taking a hard look at our notions of deterrence in a way that deserves serious attention from government and the public. Among this group of deterrence "revisionists" are Richard Ned Lebow of Cornell University and Janice Gross Stein of the University of Toronto. The power of their work comes from their return to the psychological roots of deterrence, using the evidence of historical events combined with what is known about how people make decisions and perceive the world around them. But what they are up against is more than just the muddled use of a handy concept, they are also (whether they realize it or not) confronting myths that are deeply rooted in popular culture.

AMONG NON-EXPERTS THERE ARE two primary – even primal – responses to the invocation of the word "deterrence." The first arises when thinking grownups are confronted with that most rarified form – "nuclear deterrence." At this level, deterrence is not only

entirely psychological but metaphysical as well, since the moment one carries through the threat (blowing up the world) the conflicting interests – however profound – cease to exist. This gives almost any discussion of nuclear deterrence an absurd quality. Fiction captures this lunacy most poignantly – the film *Dr. Strangelove* was so good it spawned an adjective, "Strangelovian," all its own.

More recently the British sitcom *Yes, Prime Minister* ventured into the deep water of deterrence. Here, the ever-scheming civil servant Sir Humphrey explains to the hapless Prime Minister Hacker why Britain must have new ballistic missile submarines (Trident) and how they can be used to frighten (deter) the Russians:

"With Trident we could obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe."

"I don't want to obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe."

"But, its a deterrent"

"It's a bluff, I probably wouldn't use it."

"Yes, but they don't know that you probably wouldn't"

"They probably do."

"Yes, they probably know that you probably wouldn't, but they can't certainly know."

"They probably certainly know that I probably wouldn't."

"Even though they probably certainly know that you probably wouldn't, they don't certainly know that although you probably wouldn't, there's no probability that you certainly would."

While this inspired satire is as lucid an explanation of nuclear deterrence as one is likely to find, *Yes, Prime Minister* is not the reaction governments explaining their policies count on. Instead,

they rely on being able to push another button in the minds of citizens – the one marked "bully in the playground." This reaction is as strong as the first and depends on the hard lessons of childhood.

Common sense tells adults who were child "victims" that looking and acting vulnerable earns the attentions of the bullies of the world. They know that if they had possessed the ability to inflict pain on their tormentors, life as a child would have been a lot easier. They also know that attempting to appease the bully usually failed. A "deterrent capability" in the form of a widely known ability to administer a sharp kick to a soft spot helped get one through the day.

When it comes to international politics, the "playground" caricature of deterrence is nowhere more powerfully etched into the collective memory than with the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the public Cuban missile fable the US catches the USSR at a dirty trick, and a calm, but resolute JFK stares down domineering yet feckless Russians, who, humiliated in world opinion and awed by overwhelming US nuclear superiority, slink home with their tails and missiles between their legs. DETERRENCE 1. APPEASEMENT 0!

In a stroke, we had proof that being tough with, and having more bombs than the Russians meant we could "deter" them from doing things we didn't like. Boy, those were the days.

The result of these and other "lessons" – the often repeated phrase about deterrence having kept the peace for forty years and the pointed analogies with Munich and Neville Chamberlain (the

archetypal hapless British P.M.) – is that deterrence logic occupies the high ground of any discussion of conflict between states. Our own White Paper on Defence uses deterrence or its variants twenty-six times – and Canada doesn't even own any nuclear weapons.

THE QUESTIONS LEBOW AND STEIN ask about deterrence are deceptively simple: When does deterrence deter? When does it cause reactions not intended by the country doing the deterring? Is it possible to tell in advance when deterrence will help and when it will hurt? While their studies of wars and crises go all the way back to the turn of the century, we can clearly see what they are getting at in Lebow's interpretation of events surrounding that old standby, the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Deterrence, in his view, far from being the reason for its successful conclusion and proof of its utility in the hands of wise leaders, was the principle cause of the crisis. Each side's efforts to "deter" not only led towards war and not away from it, but often had an effect exactly opposite to the one intended.

Lebow draws three lessons about deterrence from the crisis and they all run directly counter to those reinforced by the Cuban Crisis of popular fable. First, and perhaps most important, between countries and leaders that are already suspicious of each other, efforts to "deter" more often than not look like mere threats and confirm suspicions that the other side is dangerous.

Second, deterrence tends to "elicit challenges." To an adversary, deterrence often looks like a dare. And dares are very difficult to pass up without looking foolish. A common result is the creation of a pattern in which every action is followed by a reaction which in turn must be reacted to, and so on.

Third, this momentum puts pressures on national leaders to act. All leaders, even totalitarian ones, work inside military and civilian bureaucracies attempting to influence the leader's decisions one way or another. An external challenge, at the worse possible moment, adds to the pressure to "do something."

How, according to Lebow, were these unwelcome effects of deterrence at work in 1962? At a recent meeting in Ottawa, Lebow bolstered his and Stein's theoretical attack on deterrence by relaying recent revelations from Soviet sources about how the Soviet leadership of 1962 perceived events at the time. According to Sergei Mikoyan (son of Anastas Mikoyan who was Khrushchev's close advisor and first deputy premier) and Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev's speech writer, the USSR had three motives for putting missiles in Cuba. The first was to protect their new client Castro whom they believed (correctly as we now know) to be under threat from the US. The second was to redress the nuclear balance which was overwhelmingly in American favour and, for the Russians, getting worse. And third, Khrushchev wanted Kennedy to feel the same threat from missiles in Cuba that he (Khrushchev) felt from US missiles in nearby Turkey; he wanted to give Kennedy a spoonful of his own soup.

There are lots of people who will claim that the Soviets' portrayal of their motives in 1962 are just so many self-serving lies. This could be true, but as Lebow remarked in Ottawa, it seems unlikely since their comments do not put Soviet actions at the time in a very flattering light. More important is the overwhelming evidence now available from public sources showing that the Cuban Missile Crisis embedded in popular culture never happened. The unintended and wholly deleterious result of all the "detering" that was going on was to convince each side of the other's evil intent and to elicit even more efforts to deter.

In the matter of US nuclear superiority, the Russians knew they were inferior, but they did not know the Americans knew. When the new technology of spy satellites told the US that the USSR had relatively little in the way of nuclear

missiles (missiles were not coming off Soviet production lines "like sausages" as Khrushchev had boasted, presumably in an effort to "deter" the US), and where those few were located, they promptly let the Russians know that they knew. To the Soviets this seemed an attempt at political intimidation. It appeared the US was saying, "We see how feeble you are, so just watch out."

The para-military training of anti-Castro Cubans in the US, and the generally bellicose anti-Castro language of Washington was an effort to deter the Russians from using Cuba to export revolution. However, the Soviets believed that they were being challenged to back away from a public commitment to a new client and ally, and that to do so would be an unacceptable loss of prestige.

And last, we now know that with regards to the US missiles in Turkey (the infamous "Jupiters") the impression left in Robert Kennedy's account of the crisis, that JFK ordered the missiles taken out and was angry upon discovering that they had not been removed, is incorrect. Indeed, JFK was partly responsible for their installation in the first place, rejecting the chance to halt their deployment (a process begun but not completed by Eisenhower in his second term) on the basis that not proceeding with the Jupiter plans would appear weak in the eyes of the Soviets and demonstrate in Lebow's words, "a lack of resolve" – resolve being a necessary condition for deterrence.

To Khrushchev the Turkish missiles were a personal affront and added to the pressure to deal with overall Soviet inferiority. The result was a quixotic attempt by Khrushchev to solve his domestic and international problems at a stroke. Put missiles in Cuba and this will "deter" the Americans from invading Cuba, restore Soviet prestige in the eyes of the world

and show the Americans that they cannot intimidate the USSR. Action-reaction momentum sets in at this point, for from the US point of view, Khrushchev's action represented a radical change in the status quo which could not go unanswered.

There is a last poignant irony: former *Washington Post* diplomatic correspondent Murrey Marder has uncovered documents showing that President Eisenhower worried that plans for US Jupiters in Turkey would be equivalent to the Soviets putting missiles into a "communized Cuba" – a concern expressed well before Castro came to power. So much for the efficacy of deterrence.

PROFESSORS LEBOW AND STEIN ARE not proposing that deterrence be entirely abandoned as a strategy. Instead, they argue that deterrence is inherently unpredictable, and useful in a very limited set of circumstances. "A little deterrence goes a long way," says Lebow. The trick for scholars, political leaders and citizens is to decide whether in a particular international circumstance "deterrence" will make things better or worse.

A helpful first step would be to clean-up our use of language in the arena of public discourse; governments, political pundits, and the media in general should all be a lot more careful about the way we toss around vacuous notions like deterrence. For those who make defence and foreign policy abandoning deterrence as a cure-all will require an expenditure of effort – which probably explains at least part of the universal appeal of the word. Among its many attributes, deterrence is an excellent substitute for thought. □


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THE PERILS OF PEACEKEEPING

Canada should think twice before sending its peacekeepers into the quagmire of Central America's wars.

BY GILLES PAQUIN

ANADIAN PEACEKEEPING forces first arrived in Cyprus over twenty years ago. In theory, their assignment was to be relatively short, of sufficient duration to allow the two parties in conflict to negotiate a settlement to the crisis. Even today, no one knows when they will leave. The Canadian government renews their mandate every six months, and still cannot envisage the end of the longest temporary assignment ever undertaken by the Canadian Forces.

Why raise this issue? Simply because the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, seeks to engage in a similar crusade, this time in Central America. And he has already consulted officers of the Canadian Forces in this regard. In a document prepared before his visit to the area last November, military experts briefed Mr. Clark on all the problems that could arise in this kind of operation. They made no mention, however, of how Ottawa might extricate itself from such a hornet's nest. The question is worth asking, in view of the complexity of Central American affairs and the stubbornness of opposing factions.

The problems encountered in Cyprus pale in comparison to those found in Central America. The total area of Cyprus is only half that of El Salvador, and its population is twenty-five times less than that of Central America as a whole. In the isthmus of Central America, just as in Cyprus, confrontations exist between peoples, especially in Guatemala; between ideologies, in Nicaragua and El Salvador; and finally between social classes in all five countries.

To add to this dismal picture,

the heavy hand of Washington and the somewhat less obtrusive hand of Moscow weigh on all the governments. Following many years of authoritarian rule, most Central American states are still under the watchful eye of the military. Before the Canadian Forces embark on another short-term venture which could extend to the end of the century, some brief consideration should be given to what strategists refer to as the "theatre of operations."

THE TURBULENT HISTORY OF THE five sister republics of Central America is punctuated with deadly conflict, brutal repression and chronic social injustice. And yet these countries have never been so bruised and bloodied as during the past two decades. The facts speak for themselves:

EL SALVADOR – Eight years of warfare, 60,000 dead and over a million displaced or exiled persons. A conflict in total deadlock where the army, bound to the oligarchy in power, refuses to negotiate with a still powerful guerrilla force. The most densely populated country of the area, El Salvador, also has the doubtful honour of being the leading recipient of US military aid.

GUATEMALA – Almost twenty years of warfare, 70,000 dead and hundreds of thousands exiled. A military regime ran the country from 1954 to 1986, when the current president, Vinicio Cerezo, was elected. This is a president who admits in scarcely veiled terms that the army still holds the reins. A large proportion of Guatemala's eight million inhabitants are Indians and, as a result,

are virtually excluded from any participation in the country's political and economic life.

NICARAGUA – A bloody revolution in 1979 and six years of warfare since 1982 has produced close to 40,000 dead. Nicaragua is fighting an irregular force of some ten thousand troops financed and supported by the United States through Honduras. Although the economy is in ruins, the Sandinista government must devote over half of its budget to defence. The state of emergency restricting civil liberties was imposed in 1982 and lifted only in January of this year.

HONDURAS – The poorest country in the region and the quintessential banana republic as a result of an epidemic of coups d'état which have plagued its political life. For two years, Honduras has had an elected president, José Azcona Hoyo, who "shares" power with the US embassy and the army. The presence of Contra troops in Honduras has a destabilizing influence, notwithstanding the benefits which accrue to the state treasury.

COSTA RICA – The only haven of peace in the area, Costa Rica has not maintained an army since 1948. It has, however, tolerated the presence of Contra forces on its territory for years. It was plunged into an unprecedented economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, and its 2.3 million inhabitants are now burdened with a national debt of over US \$5 billion. The arrival of some 200,000 refugees, driven from neighbouring countries by war, has compounded the problems of the homeland of Nobel Peace Prize winner, Oscar Arias.

THE FIVE CENTRAL AMERICAN governments finally reached an

agreement (the Guatemala Accord) on 7 August 1987 in Guatemala, aimed at starting the lengthy and delicate process of re-establishing peace in the area. In this accord, the five presidents undertook to establish a National Reconciliation Commission to initiate dialogue with "disarmed opposition forces," to grant amnesty to the combatants and to guarantee democratic freedoms.

In addition, each president must prohibit the use of his own territory to irregular forces fighting another government. Foreign aid to these groups must also be ended. To ensure that their commitments were carried out, they formed an International Commission of Verification and Follow-up. Its membership comprises the foreign ministers of the five signatories, the members of the Contadora Group, the Support Group, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States. The eyes and ears of the Commission would be provided by those Western nations with the will and the means to defray the costs. Countries that have been mentioned so far in this regard include Sweden, Canada, Spain and the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the days following the signing of the Accord, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs dispatched emissaries to Central America to offer his support. In Mr. Clark's view, the Canadian Forces have vast experience in monitoring and control operations in areas of conflict and could, therefore, contribute to the success of the peace process.

Early in December, Mr. Clark met the presidents of the five

Central American republics to reiterate his proposal. To convince them of the seriousness of his offer, Clark took with him Lieutenant-Colonels Don Ethell and Jerome Thompson, both specialists in peacekeeping operations. On the strength of their experience in various hot spots of the world, the Department of National Defence had earlier prepared a document of some twenty pages on the possible organization of a peacekeeping force. The draft was intended for consideration by the International Verification Commission, and while it raises more questions than it answers, it gives some idea of Ottawa's concerns. Among the major points made were:

The government should assess both the military and political considerations before taking a commitment to provide troops to the Commission.

From a political standpoint, Ottawa should ensure that there is a sincere desire by all parties to participate in the peace process.

The peacekeeping endeavour should be associated with an agreement for a political settlement, or at least a reasonable expectation of a negotiated settlement.

It is essential that the Commission report to an international and neutral executive authority, such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States or the Contadora Group. It should have a "clear and well-defined" mandate with adequate power to fulfil its assigned function with total freedom.


A ceasefire agreement must be reached in principle and in fact.

In light of the waverings of the five presidents and the hesitations of some governments to allow inspection of their territories, it would appear that a consensus has not yet been reached that would satisfy these conditions. The peacekeeping mission has not been clearly defined; a task which must become a priority for the governments involved. One possibility the Canadian report mentions is a monitoring and observation force, which would simply "report on violations." Another is a force given the job to "restore or to keep peace." A monitoring and obser-

vation force would restrict its activities to inspection of territories, while peace restoring and peacekeeping forces could "interpose themselves between opposing factions and even use force."

The military analysts went on to

assess the strength of the force required for such operations and the equipment necessary to guarantee the contingent's autonomy. While noting that "it is impossible at this stage to determine precise numbers without knowing the



The following is excerpted from the International Verification and Monitoring Commission report on compliance with the Central American peace plan. The Commission was composed of the foreign ministers of the Contadora and Support Group countries (Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina), United Nations and Organization of American States representatives and members from each of the five Central American countries party to the agreement.

The Commission was disbanded after presenting its report to the five Central American presidents at their summit meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, 15 and 16 January.

Responsibility for future verification and monitoring is in the hands of the five Central American foreign ministers sitting as the Executive Committee of the peace plan.

The demise of the Verification Commission has not affected Canada's position on peacekeeping. According to the Department of External Affairs, the government will examine an invitation to participate in peacekeeping when and if it receives one, and make a decision based on the merits of the case at that time.

The section of the report excerpted below deals specifically with efforts to achieve a cease-fire in areas of hostility. — The Editor

There has been no success with the appeals to irregular forces or insurgent movements in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua to agree on a cease-fire or to avail themselves of the amnesty and join the political process in their respective countries, as foreseen in the Guatemala Procedure.

In spite of the exhortation of the Central American presidents the government of the United States of America maintains its policy and practice of providing assistance, military in particular, to the irregular forces operating against the government of Nicaragua. The definitive cessation of this assistance continues to be an indispensable requirement for the success of the peace efforts and of this Procedure as a whole.

At the same time we have received the accusation of the government of El Salvador that Nicaragua secretly sends help to the irregular forces in its country and that the suspension of this aid is an indispensable prerequisite for the success of the peace efforts of the Procedure as a whole. The International Commission on Verification and Follow-up has received the denial given by the government of Nicaragua in relation to this accusation.

... the International Commission has noted accusations by certain governments of the region and the testimony of non-governmental sources about the aid to irregular forces or insurgent movements which other Central American governments are providing and the use of territory of certain states to attack others. In this sense, it has received accusations by El Salvador against Nicaragua and by Nicaragua against Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica. ... The International Commission is still not in a position to verify what was said above because to date it has no power to set up mechanisms for on-site inspection.

actual number of military installations and sensitive areas requiring fixed teams," they put forward some suggestions. The organization chart annexed to the document envisages headquarters in the five countries, a minimum of 300 officers, eleven helicopters, 289 vehicles and an indeterminate number of transport aircraft.

In conclusion, Lieutenant-Colonel Ethell reiterates the urgent need to define clearly the mandate of the peacekeeping force, to make it accountable to a neutral organization and to make provision for independent financing.

THERE IS STILL A LOT TO BE accomplished if the various parties to the peace plan are to fulfil their engagements. Honduras, for example, has taken no action so far to expel the Contra mercenaries from its territories and cut their lines of supply. El Salvador has actually established a National Reconciliation Commission, but with no participation from the insurgents. The government seems to have abandoned any inclination to negotiate with them. Meanwhile, the death squads continue their sinister work with impunity.

The government of Guatemala has only met once with the guerrilla forces to demand, purely and simply, their surrender. Meanwhile, political assassinations attributed to the army continue to decimate the opposition. Nicaragua has complied with most of the conditions of the Arias Plan, but has not yet sent back its Cuban or Soviet military advisors, arguing that action must first be taken by Honduras.

Some military observers believe that it would be unthinkable to establish a peacekeeping force or an observer mission until there is a complete halt in the fighting that is tearing the region apart. In view of the behaviour of the various opposing groups, this seems a sensible conclusion. Intervention by peacekeepers of any kind, at this point, would be pure folly.

If Canada were to risk such a venture at a later time, it would be important for Canadians to know whether this "temporary" operation would last as long as the one in Cyprus. □

KEEPING SOUTH AFRICA AT BAY

South Africa's strategy of resisting change depends on the weakness of its neighbours. Canada has a role in helping the Frontline African states secure their borders and boost their flagging economies.

BY STEVE GODFREY

SINCE THE CONSERVATIVE government took office in 1984, Canada has adopted a policy towards South Africa in sharp contrast to the accommodationist attitude of its main western allies. Driven by the personal convictions of the Prime Minister, the viewpoints of the leaders of the Frontline States and of the leadership of South Africa's black majority have permeated official policy through a virtual flood of private exchanges and meetings with Mulroney, Clark and other Canadian Ministers. Canada has shifted the focus of its political ties ever closer to the neighbouring states, and also begun to transform its economic ties away from South Africa towards them. During this same period violence in southern Africa has risen inexorably. Inside South Africa thousands, and in the region hundreds of thousands, have died. No one – black or white – has been untouched by the economic and political turmoil of a region which is in a state of war.

South Africa, as its President and Foreign Minister frequently proclaim, is a regional superpower in southern Africa. With half the population of the nine neighbouring states, South Africa has twice their annual production. In military terms, its regular forces and reservists (613,000) outnumber the armed forces of its neighbours by about four to one. Seven neighbouring states are dependent on South Africa for supplies of strategic goods such as energy, food or foreign exchange; and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are effectively integrated into the South African economy.

Despite this overwhelming power, South African influence over its neighbours has eroded significantly during the 1980s. In the late 1970s, South Africa developed a regional policy based on the creation of a "constellation" of southern African states locked into a dependent economic and political alliance with South Africa. The Frontline States have successfully challenged this strategy for increased dependence on South Africa by creating the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)* in 1980.

SADCC WAS BORN WITH THE TWIN aims of reducing economic dependence – particularly on South Africa – and building economic co-operation between its members. This concept won the support not only of the Frontline States but also of Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi, and it bound the independent states of the region in an experiment which has slowly shifted the political centre of gravity away from Pretoria.

SADCC's initial focus was to rehabilitate the railways through Mozambique and Tanzania that are its alternatives to using South Africa. SADCC's Programme of Action also includes energy, food and agriculture, mining, industry, fishing and other sectors. To date, nearly 500 projects have been developed, at a cost of US \$6.4 billion, and \$2.2 billion attracted in financing. The results are visible in a myriad of ways. Phone calls within SADCC now go direct – rather than through London,

Lisbon or Johannesburg. Power lines to share electricity are being erected, scientists and experts from the region work together on agricultural projects, or combine efforts to tackle deforestation.

By developing closer economic ties SADCC addresses the need for collective economic security against South Africa, and appeals to the national interests of all nine member nations. The more subtle political consequence has been to overcome the colonial legacy of isolation among the nine members – who related more to South Africa and to their colonizing powers than to each other.

South Africa has been unable to derail SADCC by political or economic means and even the conservative or most dependent member nations have continued to back SADCC. Despite differences of opinion on many issues, regional solidarity is preferred to greater reliance on Pretoria.

For South Africa, the political failure of its regional strategy was a setback, not a defeat. The foreign policy doctrines of the South African government dictate that the region is a natural sphere of influence, and an important market for South Africa. Friendly or dependent neighbours are seen as bulwarks against sanctions, and collaborators in the suppression of political or armed resistance to *apartheid*.

This rationale, acquiesced to by the major western powers during the period 1980 to 1985, underpinned an ambitious and successful response of regional destabilization by South Africa, which continues today. It combines direct military intervention, support to the rebel

movements in Mozambique and Angola, and the use of economic blackmail and sabotage.

THE SCALE OF THE HUMAN AND economic damage caused by this policy has still not been fully registered in the West. According to SADCC and UN estimates, during the period 1980 to 1984 South African destabilization cost SADCC over US\$10 billion with the total rising to over \$25 billion by the end of 1986. This amount exceeded total aid flows into the region over the same period and is equivalent to about one-third of total export earnings. The human reality behind these figures is brutal: according to UNICEF some 535,000 Angolan and Mozambican children have died between 1980 and 1986 as a direct result of South African policy. In parts of Mozambique and Angola normal life has been totally destroyed, and more than a hundred thousand people starved in Mozambique in 1984 and 1985 because insecurity prevented the movement of relief supplies. In Angola, 60,000 people, mainly women and children, have lost limbs in explosions of land mines planted by South African-sponsored rebels.

South African policy is a complex strategy designed to maintain South Africa's dominance in the region. Angola and Mozambique have been made particular targets because of their strategic importance. The Mozambique transport corridors are the key to SADCC's efforts to reduce the amount of its trade passing through South Africa; and Angola has the richest re-

*The Frontline state members are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SADCC includes all the Frontline States plus Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland.

source base in the region. These ex-Portuguese colonies are multi-racial and avowedly socialist states, and Pretoria is determined that they will not flourish.

SADCC has succeeded in improving collective economic security through closer co-operation, beginning the move towards integration of its economies and markets, and providing a rallying point for greater self-reliance. It has not, however, significantly reduced economic dependence on South Africa. In the first five years of its existence, South Africa's destruction of transport routes raised the proportion of trade of the six landlocked countries which passes through the Republic from 50 to 85 percent. Zimbabwean trade transported through Mozambique fell from 54 percent in 1983 to under 10 percent in 1987.

Not surprisingly, security has become a major preoccupation for the SADCC countries. The defence budgets of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were 50 percent, 42 percent and 16 percent respectively of government spending in 1986. The South African Defence Force is a formidable opponent which has struck as far north as Lusaka and Cabinda and is fighting a large conventional campaign inside Angola – actions over two thousand kilometers north of its borders. Seven of the nine SADCC capitals, and some of the most important SADCC infrastructure – the Beira corridor, the Luanda oil refinery, Maputo port – have been attacked by South African special forces.

SADCC representatives have raised the issue of non-lethal military assistance on two separate occasions in Canada. Last November, the Executive Secretary of SADCC, Simba Makoni, pointed out that it is in the interests of countries funding SADCC projects to help protect their investments. "We're not talking about Canadian forces defending the Beira corridor," he stated. "No bullets. No rifles. But there's a need for support – uniforms for troops, food."

This appeal has not met with a positive response from the Canadian government, despite expectations that a Commonwealth plan

for military aid might emerge following the Summit in Vancouver last October. At that time, Commonwealth Secretary General, Shridath Ramphal, seemed to be urging a more active Commonwealth role by calling for help with helicopter surveillance and communications equipment for the key Beira corridor. At the recent SADCC meeting in Tanzania, Mr. Clark turned down a request from Mozambique for help in defending the rail lines, some of which are funded by Canada.

The call for military aid has practical significance, particularly in Mozambique. The Mozambican army is poorly equipped and lacks food and other essential supplies. There are already thousands of troops from Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Malawi deployed in Mozambique. Britain is providing military training for the Mozambican army and has supplied rifles and night sights to Mozambique.

CANADIAN POLICY HAS TRADITIONALLY disavowed military aid in the developing world, and the mandate of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) specifically excludes it. In the past forty years decolonization has created a new world of nations, but military growth in the Third World has seemingly been an instrument to repress development, drain national treasuries and trans-

form the Third World into an arena for dozens of wars. The argument that military aid exacerbates underdevelopment rather than resolving it is generally persuasive. Military aid to the countries hardest hit by South African aggression, however, has special relevance in a situation in which development projects – clinics, factories, dams and railroads – are the specific targets of destruction.

Canada's position on this question is not yet finalized. Most Canadians would be hesitant about Canada taking a major role in the provision of military aid, or allowing this issue to dominate Canadian policy efforts in the region. Logic, however, requires that Canadian assistance recognize the legitimacy of self-defence and take account of the security needs of aid programmes. For example, the Mozambican emergency aid programme has lost 200 supply trucks in the past six months; armour plating and radio equipment for these civilian trucks is needed to increase protection. Such examples demonstrate that if aid is to proceed, donors need to adopt a pragmatic attitude to helping with the costs of security. There is a precedent of Canadian military aid to Tanzania during the 1960s, and funding for training of army officers from Commonwealth SADCC countries which continues.

Whatever the government de-

cides, military aid is at best a limited response to South African aggression, although it has great symbolic significance. The Frontline States have repeatedly made the point that the only way to sustain development and end conflict throughout the region is to eliminate *apartheid*. Their defence cannot rely solely on arms, because they cannot match the military power of South Africa in the foreseeable future. In this context the most vital security assistance which the outside world can provide the Frontline States is to restrain Pretoria and accelerate the achievement of majority rule. Robert Mugabe underlined this point on the eve of the Vancouver Summit by putting the issue into sharp relief: "If we get rid of *apartheid* then our other headaches will also go – we must not only restrain the hand that is destroying the bridges, but, if we can, we must reverse the whole process."

THE NEW-FOUND SIGNIFICANCE OF Canada in international diplomacy opens up additional avenues for putting pressure on South Africa to change its ways, and help maintain the stability of the Frontline States in the meantime. Of these, sanctions remain the most important. To date Canadian sanctions have eliminated about 25 percent of total trade between the two countries. At the Commonwealth Summit, the government made it clear that it believes sanctions are effective as a means of pressure. Although it is not likely that current governments in Britain and the US will accept sanctions, Canada should now proceed with the commitment made by the Prime Minister at the UN in 1985 to sever all economic and political ties if South Africa did not move to dismantle *apartheid*.

South Africa has answered this call for reform with greater repression. If Canada now reneges on its commitments it will strengthen the view of those white South Africans who believe that violence can be used to maintain the status quo. The demonstration effect – to South Africans, to western countries, as well as to our friends in the region – is now the most important dimension of Canadian policy. □



Stephen Priestley

DILEMMAS FOR THE CANADIAN PEACE MOVEMENT

In a country where most people want nothing to do with nuclear weapons, but everything to do with NATO, the peace movement needs to come up with new strategies in order to remain a political force.

BY TONY ROGERS

IN 1987, TWO EVENTS OCCURRED in Canada over which one might have expected more public protest. The Mulroney government announced that it would renew the bilateral agreement entered into by the Trudeau Liberal Cabinet with the United States in 1983, permitting the testing of unarmed US Air Force air-launched cruise missiles. It also announced plans to involve Canada in the development of "walls" as envisaged under the US Air Defence Initiative, to block incoming Soviet cruise missiles and bombers. This despite the fact that the Conservatives in 1985 had precluded Canadian government participation in the American Strategic Defence Initiative's research effort to develop an impenetrable "roof" to shield against incoming Soviet ballistic missile warheads.

In stark contrast to the early 1980s, neither of these developments commanded much public attention. The first attracted a handful of protesters; the second occupied one sentence in the government's long-awaited White Paper on defence.

That these programmes should proceed was obvious to their supporters, who felt vindicated that their sober and rational arguments had won out over a well-meaning but emotional peace movement. Canada was, after all, part of the NATO and NORAD alliances; nuclear weapons were not involved in cruise missile testing or the Air Defence Initiative; and these policies were only prudent for the defence of the West, given similar Soviet weapons developments. However, it may be equally pos-

sible that the advance of these programmes in spite of mass anti-nuclear demonstrations of the early 1980s signals a need for the Canadian peace movement to rethink the strategies it uses to promote disarmament policies.

SINCE THE PEACE MOVEMENT'S differences with those in government go deep enough to strike at certain basic values, it is not surprising that peace activists have tended to exercise little influence over the policy process through direct representations to politicians and bureaucratic officials. They may be successful in winning the ear of parliamentarians who happen to share their view of the world. Even if they gain access to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, access does not equal influence. Canadian governments have traditionally been wary about adopting measures counter to the political and military interests of the United States, whose values they frequently share, and with whom they are destined to manage a precarious relationship on other bilateral issues.

Instead, the main focus of Canadian peace groups has been to engage the government in a battle to sway public opinion to its cause. The strategy of peace groups in the early 1980s ran as follows: educate and mobilize enough people about the dangers of the arms race, and Canada's participation in it, and governments will have to listen. However, as the cruise and air defence decisions make abundantly clear, peace groups who pursue this route

will have to keep constantly in mind that three factors work against them.

First, on issues of war and peace, governments operate with relative autonomy from publics. Historically, state control over military policies has generally gone unchallenged, punctuated only by brief convulsions of public protest. Peace movements in the nuclear age thus represent a challenge not only to particular policies, but also to a particular brand of Western parliamentary democracy permitting governments to unilaterally develop military policies which may increase the risk of nuclear war, without any meaningful consultations with the publics whom they were elected to defend.

Second, the very process through which defence policies are made militates against the success of peace groups. Canadian defence policies tend to be conceived by a closeknit network of American and Canadian defence bureaucrats, and progress in a technical environment, secluded from public scrutiny. Once military policies gain sufficient momentum at the bureaucratic level, they are rarely reversed at the political level without direct intervention by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Often, by the time peace groups even learn of proposed policies, they may simply have insufficient time to educate themselves, mobilize public opposition and reverse the trend. Canadian-American bilateral discussions on cruise testing started long before these developments were revealed to the public in 1982. Though successful in arousing massive demonstrations, Canadian peace groups were

unable to forestall the signing of the cruise missile testing agreement the following spring.

Third, even where governments cannot operate with absolute immunity in fashioning security policies, they nonetheless have various means of deflating, deflecting or rechannelling public opposition. The government can frequently take advantage of public apathy or divisions in public views on defence issues. When the Trudeau Cabinet took the decision in 1982 to allow cruise testing, it did so confident in the knowledge that while Canadians wanted nothing to do with nuclear weapons, they wanted everything to do with NATO. Marrying the issue of air-launched cruise missile testing to a test of Canada's resolve in supporting the NATO Two-Track Decision to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe was politically attractive, notwithstanding the fact that the cruise missiles Canada was agreeing to test belonged to the US Air Force, and not to NATO; that the US government and not NATO, had requested the testing agreement; and that Pentagon officials confirmed that the Euromissile deployment decisions were in no way conditional upon Canadian cruise testing – a fact made more relevant in light of the government's decision to continue testing the cruise in spite of the recent superpower agreement eliminating the Euromissiles.

WHAT IMPLICATIONS DO THESE findings hold for Canadian peace groups? While understandably the peace movement approaches the

peace and security debate from an ethical perspective, it may be necessary for it to keep in mind that for its strategies to have real influence, they must reflect not only its own values, but also an understanding of what will work in the political arena. This is less a matter of becoming more "reasonable" than a concern for its own political future.

Calls by the peace movement for nuclear disarmament appeal to a public convinced that the risks of nuclear war have become intolerably high in a world armed with some 50,000 nuclear weapons.

The dilemma for peace groups has been to convince Canadians that the number of nuclear weapons in the world can be drastically reduced without giving the Soviet Union a military advantage over the West. More important than numbers, however, in the assessment of this risk, is the purpose governments assign to nuclear weapons through their military strategies. The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) limits nuclear weapons to a retaliatory role designed to prevent their own use. Conversely, the "nuclear war-fighting" conception suggests that no deterrent is credible unless every possible battle scenario of the other side is deterred; thus, each side reciprocates whenever the other deploys.

That neither superpower would want an all-out nuclear battle is obvious. But despite statements from superpower leaders that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, nuclear strategies continue to be premised on the idea that, should deterrence fail, their forces must also be capable of waging and terminating nuclear war on "favourable" terms. Each side deploys not only more nuclear weapons, but purposely develops destabilizing types of weaponry designed to gain early advantage in a nuclear confrontation.

Why are these military strategies politically relevant to the peace movement? Because until governments limit the purpose of nuclear weapons to a purely retaliatory role, initiatives to reduce their numbers will not make us proportionately safer from the

threat of nuclear war. War-fighting strategies currently place such an exaggerated value on nuclear weapons that their negotiated removal is made all the more difficult for political leaders who must play to domestic publics. Cruise missiles of East or West thus become "essential" to the security of either side. Undoubtedly, it would offend the values of many peace groups to be actively promoting the virtues of Mutual Assured Destruction. But they can create wider political support for an interim step that would lessen the

that the Soviet Union is a great power. Like any great power, it is a collection of different bureaucracies with conflicting interests. Whatever the Soviet Union's true intentions are, many of its actions will be interpreted by conservatives in the West as evidence of expansionist designs, and as rationales for undermining the peace movement's critiques and advancing the arms race. Better to admit there are some Soviet defence officials who would prefer to expand military programmes, and attempt instead to seek out and


can articulate, without leaving NATO, its opposition to this conception of nuclear deterrence, and to policies such as cruise missile testing and the Air Defence Initiative which flow from it.

THE PEACE MOVEMENT'S PRIMARY goal is to radically alter the values that mould our priorities and our thinking about war and peace. But in its policy alternatives, the Canadian disarmament movement has in fact been decidedly less "radical" than its European counterpart. Only a handful of Canada's 1,500 peace groups advocate unilateral disarmament; and even fewer are unabashedly sympathetic towards the Soviet regime.

Still, the Canadian peace movement does face a dilemma in translating its values into policy alternatives. The argument here for a stricter interpretation of deterrence is not offered as a panacea for all peace groups; nor will it likely be accepted as such. Groups with radically different ways of looking at the world are often needed in a democracy to nudge forward the values of the majority who would otherwise remain silent. But given the inherent advantages of the state over disarmament groups, the Canadian peace movement will need to critically analyze its strategies if it is to continue to be a politically relevant force in the peace and security debate. □

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risk of nuclear war by calling greater attention to the distinction between these two approaches and to their consequences for Canadian security policies.

The task of peace movements must be to create public pressure forcing political leaders to act on their statements, so that military policies reflect the futility of nuclear war. Thus, cruise missile testing, Air Defence Initiative and other such non-nuclear ventures should be challenged, not on the basis of whether they involve nuclear weapons directly, but on the ground that each of these pull Canada further into participation in a nuclear war-fighting strategy.

Drawing this distinction might also help the peace movement decide appropriate responses to Soviet foreign policy. Public fear of nuclear war continues to be circumscribed by mistrust of Soviet intentions. Peace movement literature has rightly questioned the more hysterical Western interpretations of Soviet foreign policy aims; but it must be remembered

to promote the position of those who accept the principle that nuclear weapons have little use.

All of this brings us to one final commonly-voiced complaint, that Canada can do little about the arms race so there is little point in trying. It is precisely because Canada's options are limited that we had better do some clear thinking and decide our future actively. Debates about Canada's participation in NATO and NORAD frequently lose sight of why, presumably, such alliances were created in the first place: the preservation of international security. While it is likely that Canadian governments will continue to view nuclear weapons as forming some part of any security arrangement between East and West for the foreseeable future, Canada can become more active in advocating a more limited role for nuclear weapons. Here, it must be noted that no Canadian government has yet gone on record as opposing the US strategic nuclear modernization programme, or more importantly, the nuclear war-fighting doctrine that underlies it. Canada

COULD WOMEN REALLY DO A BETTER JOB?

BY SHANNON SELIN

THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT HAS turned its sights on issues of international peace and security. In the United States, one finds a proliferation of groups with names such as Women for a Meaningful Summit, Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament, Mothers Embracing Nuclear Disarmament – even Grandmothers for Peace. In Canada, we have a recent report (this writer was the co-author) issued by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament bemoaning the sparse representation of women in the arms control field. At the latest meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, the government congratulated itself on having increased the percentage of women participants, yet came under pressure to include even more.

What is this issue about? Like past feminist campaigns, is it primarily a drive to achieve equal representation and opportunities for women? No one can deny that foreign and defence policies are typically male-run. But while the question of numerical representation certainly plays a role, many arguments in favour of increasing women's voice in the nation's security policy, implicitly, if not explicitly, centre on the claim that women have something unique to offer to the policy process.

Women are peacemakers, some say, pointing to the high proportion of women in the peace movement and to public opinion polls which show a gender gap on peace and security questions. Women by nature (according to Australian doctor and lecturer Helen Caldicott, for example) or by nurture (see Norwegian peace researcher Birgit Brock-Utne) are less violent than men and less interested in the "toys" of war. Moreover, women have a "truer" vision of peace and security. For women, peace is far more than the absence of war. It is the absence of all violence and injustice. It is an end to the battering of women

and children. It is every human on the planet commanding a full belly, four walls and a roof, a doctor and a school.

Lurking not far beneath the surface of this claim is the notion that women, if only given the chance, could do things better. If women ran this world, they would save it. It's an attractive thought – that women could get together and abolish weapons and war, end poverty and hunger. "We can't do any worse than the men have done," is the cry. Well... in fact we could. We could blow ourselves up. Not that women are any more likely than men to trigger Armageddon. But in setting up a dichotomy between women/peace and men/war, these "moral mothers," as a friend calls them, make light of the security dilemmas that men have had to deal with, create false expectations about what women can do, and provoke a confrontation with men – and with other women.

IN MAKING BLANKET ASSERTIONS about women's nature, the moral mothers neglect a whole category of women who are working for peace and security outside of the peace movement framework. These are women in the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence, in arms control and defence-related research institutes, and in strategic studies and political science departments at universities. While some of these individuals may agree that women bring an intrinsically different approach to peace and security questions, many of them do not. They – and I would include myself in this category – find that they bring to the field much the

same perspective as do their male colleagues.

Of course they do, is the moral mother rejoinder. They have taken male-created strategic studies courses from male professors and are working in male-dominated institutions. Their true female perspective has been smothered under the weight of male baggage but, were this weight to be removed, they would no doubt see things as we, the moral mothers, do. The argument that one is the victim of a male socialization process is difficult to combat, and anyone who tries to do so is treated as a poor, deluded young thing or greeted with outright hostility. The moral mothers overlook, however, that women working in research or policy positions are typically students of international relations who have examined (and chosen to reject) alternative world paradigms, some – although propounded by men – that looked suspiciously like the women's perspective.

One has only to read Richard Falk – taking but one example – to recognize that women do not have a monopoly on notions of an underlying global harmony of interests, of security not based on military strength, of the need for redistribution of wealth. If the objective of the moral mothers is to insert more women into the peace and security field, by emphasizing the gender angle they alienate their greatest assets, namely those women already working in the field, who are proving to both men and women that women are capable researchers and analysts. The moral mothers do not gain my sympathy by insinuating that I am somehow less than female because I see merit in arms control as opposed to disarmament, perceive no easy end to arms races, take

comfort in the fact that the West deploys a military defence, and regard peace as the absence of war, rather than a broad mishmash of other things.

Nor do they make my task easier. Rather, they increase the likelihood that women, as they enter the field, will be sidelined into investigating "soft" topics such as peace education or the social consequences of increased military spending and shut out of "hard" discussions about missile accuracy, verification techniques, and the like. Granted that the moral mothers find technical discussions about war and peace issues inappropriate, but they should not allow their proclivities to restrict the options of all women in the field. There is an old boys' club in this business, and a major difficulty women have to overcome is male stereotypes about women's capabilities and interests when it comes to arms control and defence matters.

THE QUESTION OF WOMEN'S participation in the peace and security field is not a trifling one. There is only a handful of women professionals in the relevant divisions of the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence. In Ottawa, where I work, the non-government institutes are not much better; at the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament and the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security combined the number of women professionals is in the single digits. Seminar and conference speakers on security-related topics are almost uniformly male. The moral mothers are correct in bringing this gender imbalance to public attention. It is unfortunate that by focusing on women's supposedly unique view, the moral mothers obscure what should be the true issue, which is the right of women – regardless of ideological perspective – to have an equal say to men in issues that affect the future of us all. □

REPORT FROM THE HILL



Eyes on the North

Several government initiatives designed to address concerns about northern sovereignty and security made news during the winter. On 11 January External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and US Secretary of State George Shultz signed an Arctic Cooperation Agreement binding the United States to seek Canadian consent before sending Coast Guard ice-breakers through the Northwest Passage – waters Canada claims as its own. Other government or privately-owned vessels would not need permission to travel through the passage. It appeared to be the best that Canada could do, given American refusal to recognize Canadian sovereignty in the area even if given unlimited access for their warships and submarines.

As Southam News analyst Jonathan Manthorpe noted, the US perspective is that of a super-power with a large navy that uses the full leeway of international law to travel the seaways of the world. To accede to Canada's claim would create a precedent that would put their navy's rights of passage through other more strategic straits at risk.

Opposition spokesmen were quick to compare the limited agreement to Mr. Clark's statement in the Commons on 10 September 1985 that "any cooperation with the United States or with other Arctic nations shall only be on the basis of full respect for Canada's sovereignty." Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy characterized the government as "the mouse that roared." On the other hand, columnist William Johnson argued in the *Montreal Gazette* that the agreement strengthened Canada's claim

to the Arctic waters while *Maclean's* quoted international legal scholar Gerald Morris who said that if Canada took its claim to the International Court of Justice members might inquire, "Why would the United States agree to ask permission for ice-breakers to use these waters unless they conceded there was substantial validity to the Canadian case?"

Early in February, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced plans to locate a permanent military base at Nanisivik, at the north-western end of Baffin Island. Currently the site of a lead and zinc mine which will close when the ore runs out by 1993, Nanisivik would be used to train soldiers and test equipment for Arctic warfare. The base is contingent upon the results of a study of the environmental and cultural impact upon Inuit and wildlife. The Minister also announced that the Canadian Rangers, a part-time paramilitary force of about 700 men, mainly Inuit, will be given better equipment and expanded to a force of 1,000.

Mikhail Gorbachev's Murmansk speech of 1 October, in which he called for an Arctic zone of peace, continued to interest and trouble Canada and its northern neighbours in Scandinavia. Both press and politicians remained skeptical, balancing the Soviet "charm offensive," as a *Toronto Star* article called it, with the reality of the USSR's Kola Peninsula bristling with weaponry. The Soviet proposal caused Jocelyn Coulton to remark in the 20 February *Le Devoir* that while "the Soviets are hardly in a position to preach" about disarmament in the Arctic, combined with a larger treaty of co-operation covering the region, the idea was promising. The *Calgary Herald* warned in a 31 January editorial that, while the Soviet proposals warranted further investigation, the "buildup of capabilities to put

muscle into Canadian sovereignty" – such as nuclear-powered submarines and forward basing of interceptors – were overdue and must not be compromised.

Liberals Meet on Foreign Policy

Liberal Leader John Turner took issue with this viewpoint in a speech in Vancouver on 7 February before his party's foreign policy conference which had as its theme, "Building the Canadian Nation: Sovereignty and Foreign Policy in the 1990s." Turner called for an international treaty to "halt the militarization of the Arctic" and reiterated his opposition to the nuclear submarine purchase and to the testing of cruise missiles on Canadian territory. He proposed that Canada again seek a seat on the UN Security Council (something the government is actively pursuing) and that the financial commitment to the development of new technologies for monitoring and verification of arms control agreements be substantially increased.

At the same time, Turner reaffirmed his party's commitment to NATO and NORAD, while rejecting the NDP "view that we in Canada should be neutralist in our commitments, isolationist in our policies, and anti-American in our rhetoric," as well the "Conservative view that we must blindly follow the dictates of the largest member of the Alliance."

House Committee in the Middle East

In mid-February, members of the House Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade visited Jordan, Egypt and Israel on a fact-finding mission for External Affairs Minister Joe Clark. In a meeting with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel, the delegation members voiced Canada's opposition to the building of civilian settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, of the need to convene an international peace con-

ference on the Middle East, and of Canada's support for the basic principle of exchanging land for peace.

On 17 February the Committee Chairman, William Winegard, Conservative MP for Guelph, was quoted by the *Globe and Mail* on the subject of the Prime Minister's observation in December that the Israelis were showing restraint in handling Palestinian disturbances in the occupied territories. Winegard said, "When the Prime Minister made those remarks, none of us realized how serious the situation was. We are learning now that it's not just isolated disturbances. The occupation is leading to real distress."

Short Notes from the Hill

Senator Henry Hicks of Nova Scotia was elected Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on National Defence in December replacing Paul Lafond. A former minister of education and Premier of Nova Scotia, Hicks was president of Dalhousie University for seventeen years. The Senate Committee is continuing its study of Canada's land forces.

Defence Minister Beatty announced on 9 December that the proposed Emergencies Act, which had received second reading in the Commons on 18 November would be amended to strengthen the protection of human rights. This would include guarantees that its implementation could be appealed to the courts and that it could not be used to put down a strike.

The NDP's international affairs committee reviewed the party's policy of withdrawal from NATO at a meeting on 29 and 30 January and decided on further study before making recommendations to the NDP federal council. The council will have the final say on the approach to be adopted prior to the next election. □

- GREGORY WIRICK

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Some progress was made on strategic offensive arms reductions at the Washington summit in December. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev instructed their negotiators to complete work on a joint draft treaty "at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature" at the next summit in Moscow in May or June.

As discussed in Washington, the agreement would include the following:

- a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on no more than 1,600 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and bombers;

- a sub-ceiling of 4,900 ICBM and SLBM warheads (permitting up to 1,100 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs);

- a 50% cut in the number of Soviet "heavy" ICBMs (the US has none), to 154 with 1,540 warheads;

- a ceiling on the aggregate throw-weight of ICBMs and SLBMs, at 50% of the current Soviet level ("throw-weight" is the total weight that can be thrust over a given range by a ballistic missile. In general, Soviet ICBMs have been built with larger throw-weights than American ICBMs).

- a separate ceiling (outside the 6,000 warhead limit) on long-range, nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), to be verified by such methods as "National Technical Means, co-operative measures and on-site inspection"; and

- a range of verification measures, including continuous, on-site

monitoring of production and support facilities; various short-notice, on-site inspections; and a ban on the encryption of telemetry from missile flight-tests (a contentious issue in the SALT II treaty).

The two sides also agreed on so-called "counting rules," in which the parties agree for the purposes of the treaty on how many warheads would be assumed to be carried by each different missile type.

The ninth round of negotiations began in Geneva on 14 January. A month later they were characterized as being "bogged down," with President Reagan's special adviser Edward Rowny accusing the Soviets of having "squandered four weeks of valuable time." Differences persisted on the following issues:

ICBM warhead sub-limits: the US proposes a ceiling of 3,000 to 3,300; the Soviets prefer a "freedom-to-mix" as between ICBMs and SLBMs;

SLCM limits and verification: the Soviets propose a ceiling of 400 nuclear-armed SLCMs, restricted to two types of submarine and one type of surface ship, plus an additional limit of 600 on conventionally-armed SLCMs.

The US opposes any limits on the latter, and maintains that no adequate verification measures have yet been devised;

ALCM counting rules: the US wants six ALCMs to be attributed to each ALCM bomber in the 6,000-warhead count, regardless of the number actually carried; the Soviets insist on counting the number "each type is equipped for";

mobile missiles: the US wants a ban, but has indicated that it might drop this demand if the Soviets can offer an adequate verification scheme;

ALCM range: the US wants ALCMs with a range of less than 1,500 kilometers to go unrestricted; the Soviets insist on the SALT II definition of a long-range ALCM as exceeding 600 kilometers in range;

heavy ICBMs: the US wants a ban on production, flight testing, modernization and replacement; the Soviets are opposed;

reductions period: the US wants the reductions to occur over seven years; the Soviets, five.

One of the key remaining tasks is the elaboration of detailed verification provisions. The US emphasizes that these will have to be much stricter than those of the INF Treaty, since numerical limits are more difficult to verify than an absolute ban (when detection of just one illicit weapon constitutes proof of violation). After meeting in Moscow from 21 to 23 February Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that their negotiators had been instructed to work out the key elements of the verification provisions in time for their next meeting 22 to 23 March in Washington.

Most observers agree, however, that the greatest stumbling block to completion of the Treaty is the continuing disagreement between the two powers on defence and space arms.

Defence and Space Arms

As reported in the last *Peace&Security*, the Washington summit failed to resolve the issue of defence and space arms. After some initial confusion, it became clear that the Soviets had not changed their basic position making reductions in offensive weapons conditional on adherence (non-withdrawal) for a specified period to the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The two sides did agree at the Washington summit that "intensive discussions of strategic stability" would begin no later than three years before the end of the non-withdrawal period, "after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action."

On 15 January, apparently signalling abandonment of their draft treaty on defence and space arms

introduced last May, the Soviet delegation in Geneva tabled a draft protocol to the START Treaty which would commit the two sides to a ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty "as signed in 1972." The US immediately rejected the proposal, tabling a draft treaty of its own a week later on "Certain Measures to Facilitate the Cooperative Transition to the Deployment of Future Strategic Ballistic Missile Defenses." Specific "predictability measures" contained in the draft include an annual exchange of data on each other's strategic defence programmes, visits to each other's laboratories, and observation of each other's tests. The US delegation was also, reportedly, instructed to seek Soviet acceptance of the so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty sanctioning SDI testing in space.

In Washington on 29 January, senior Soviet official Georgi Kornienko charged the US with reneging on a Washington summit understanding to leave the "conceptual dispute" over SDI to be resolved at "some later time." He stated that it would be impossible to resolve the dispute over the meaning of the ABM Treaty before the Moscow summit, and repeated that the Soviets would never accept the Reagan Administration's "broad" interpretation of the Treaty. The Soviets have made it clear on numerous occasions that, in the words of US National Security Adviser Colin Powell, they reserve the "option to suspend implementation of negotiated reductions, and perhaps even begin increasing their strategic offensive forces, if the United States were to take actions which went beyond the Soviet Union's view of the obligations of the [ABM] Treaty."

Arctic Zone of Peace

Canada provided its first formal response to Mikhail

Gorbachev's Murmansk proposals of last October in a speech by External Affairs Minister Clark in Tromsø, Norway, 9 December. While welcoming the Soviet leader's offer of non-military co-operation in the North, Mr. Clark noted that Canada had "serious reservations" about the proposals for a Northern European nuclear weapon-free zone; a limitation of military activity in the waters of the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland Seas; and a ban on naval activity in mutually agreed zones. In Clark's words: "Declaring the Arctic a nuclear weapon-free zone or restricting certain naval movements there would do nothing to reduce the threat from [nuclear] weapons. It would be destabilizing for other regions."

While appearing to rule out any so-called "Arctic-specific" arms control measures, he did not specifically address the issue – also raised in Gorbachev's Murmansk speech – of naval confidence-building measures.

Early in the New Year the USSR stepped up its diplomatic campaign on behalf of the "Murmansk programme." In Stockholm on 10 January, Soviet Premier Ryzhkov announced that the USSR intended, as a "unilateral confidence-building measure," to invite observers from the Nordic countries to a Soviet naval exercise in 1988, and was "counting on reciprocity." He proposed that the question of arms control in the North be examined at the second stage of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (the first stage of which concluded in Stockholm in 1986); that Nordic neutrals Sweden and Finland be invited to participate in the envisaged Warsaw Pact-NATO consultations; and that, in response to "the wishes expressed by the Northerners," the Barents Sea could be included within the "zone of confidence-building measures."

The Murmansk programme was further elaborated in an interview with Maj.-General Yuriy Lebedev published in the 13 January issue of *Moscow News*, as well as a second speech by Ryzhkov in Oslo the following day. Among the measures proposed were: (1) limiting

"large-scale" naval and air exercises in the "zone of confidence-building measures" to one every two years; (2) banning anti-submarine warfare activities in "agreed-upon regions" of the North and West Atlantic, for the

neighbouring countries" before formulating a position. However, various unnamed military analysts and diplomats in the Nordic countries predicted that NATO would find the proposals unacceptable. One Norwegian defence ministry

Early Warning

April	Nuclear Planning Group meeting of NATO defence ministers, Copenhagen
Late May/early June	fourth Reagan-Gorbachev summit, Moscow
May 2-20	UN Disarmament Commission, annual session, New York
May 31-June 25	Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSOD III), New York
June 9-10	North Atlantic Council meeting of NATO foreign ministers, Madrid

USSR and US respectively; (3) bilateral and multilateral agreements to prevent "incidents at sea"; (4) a ban on naval exercises on main shipping routes and in regions of "intensive seasonal fishing"; (5) prohibiting the "concentration of naval groupings in international straits or the approaches to them," including the Baltic straits, the Denmark Strait, the English Channel, and the "Iceland-Faeroe Islands-Scandinavia region"; (6) limiting the "maximum parameters of these groupings in terms of the number and classes of ships and other characteristics"; and (7) northern European confidence-building measures "at a lower level" than those of the 1976 Stockholm Agreement, "including elements of 'nonaggressive defense,' a sharp limitation of the scale of military exercises and of other activity in the agreed regions." In Oslo, Ryzhkov also proposed an early meeting of Warsaw Pact and NATO military experts to prepare for the joint consultations on naval confidence-building measures.

The early reaction from Ryzhkov's Scandinavian hosts was positive but cautious. Swedish Prime Minister Carlsson promised to "carefully study" the Soviet proposals and "where applicable, consult and confer with our Nordic

official said they were "completely in conflict with most NATO nations' views on freedom of the seas, and could threaten the alliance's internal lines of communication."

Nuclear Testing

Following an agreement reached at the US-Soviet talks on nuclear testing in Geneva in November and signed at the Washington summit, a team of twenty American experts made the first official US visit to the Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk from 10 to 15 January. A US official later described the visit as "mind-boggling," noting that the Soviet hosts had been "exceptionally forthcoming." Two weeks later, a group of Soviet experts made a reciprocal visit to the US test site in Nevada.

The purpose of the exchange was to familiarize each side with the other's nuclear testing facilities and procedures, in preparation for a "joint verification experiment" in which each will be allowed to observe and measure one or two nuclear explosions by the other. The experiment is intended to pave the way for US Senate ratification of the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, by resolving a debate over appropriate verification techniques. At the end of the Soviet visit to Nevada, the leaders of the two teams expressed hope that the tests would be conducted in May. Forty-member teams of US and

Soviet scientists will then be in place at each other's test sites to conduct the experiment.


European Arms Control

In the aftermath of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty's elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles, attention has turned to short-range nuclear forces (SNF) in Europe – those with a range of under 500 kilometers. As feared by many in NATO, the East has called for a total ban on short-range forces. First, East German leader Erich Honecker, in a 16 December letter to West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl, stated that if NATO renounced the modernization of its SNF, "steps could be taken on the basis of equality and equal security to remove imbalances through disarmament leading to further zero solutions." Then, on a visit to Bonn 18 January, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze called for a "complete removal of tactical nuclear weapons." West German Foreign Minister Genscher declared that his government would "continue to work for a mandate for" negotiations on "land-based nuclear short-range missiles," with the goal of "significant and verifiable reduction of these nuclear systems to equal upper limits." Other NATO governments oppose this emphasis on the limitation of SNF, arguing that they are necessary to counter a perceived Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces, and should not be limited until the conventional imbalance has been corrected. NATO spokesmen did, however, welcome Shevardnadze's announcement in Bonn that SNF could be discussed separately from conventional arms – a shift away from earlier Soviet insistence that the two be negotiated together.

On 19 February, after meeting President Reagan in Washington, Chancellor Kohl announced agreement to defer the modernization decision while supporting an "overall concept" for arms control including the limitation, but not elimination, of SNF. □

- RON PURVER

DEFENCE NOTES



Canadian Defence Budget

On 23 February Michael Wilson presented the government's spending plans for fiscal year 1988. The defence budget was increased by 6.1%, bringing defence expenditures to \$11.2 billion. The increase breaks down into three categories: a 3.3% adjustment for inflation, based on the Gross National Expenditure deflator used by the government; a 2% real increase as promised in the Defence White Paper, and an increase over and above 2% amounting to approximately \$60 million. After inflation, therefore, the real increase in defence spending is 2.8%.

The White Paper proposed a long-term funding programme in which a basic 2% real increase per annum would be augmented by funds for particular capital projects (so-called above-the-line expenditures). The estimates identify the \$60 million as additional funds for the implementation of projects discussed in the White Paper, but do not earmark the funds for particular projects. The White Paper did not comment on the total above-the-line expenditures that would be necessary for the implementation of all the projects proposed. However, press comment (*Financial Post*, 21 December 1987) has suggested that the full implementation of the White Paper would require 5% real increase per year for fifteen years.

The largest part of the defence budget (about \$8 billion) goes to personnel, operations and maintenance. Capital programmes will receive about \$3 billion, of which

almost \$1 billion will be committed to the first batch of patrol frigates now being built, preliminary work on the second batch, and modernization of the existing Tribal-class destroyers. The estimates include \$23 million for the project definition phase of the nuclear submarine programme. Typically, in the project definition phase of a weapons programme, the detailed specifications of the weapons system are identified so that complete requirements for the contract can be determined.

Two major defence contracts were announced in December and February. UTDC Inc., of Kingston, has been awarded a contract worth almost \$300 million to build up to 1,400 supply trucks. UTDC has previously concentrated on vehicles for mass transit systems, but with the award of the truck contract it is aiming for a mix of civilian and military contracts. In December, St. John Shipbuilding of New Brunswick was awarded a \$2.7 billion contract to build the second batch of new frigates. Citing savings of several hundred millions, the government announced that St. John Shipbuilding will not be required to split the work with Marine Industries Limited of Quebec, as happened with the construction of the first batch of six ships.

In February senior officials from the Department of National Defence testified before Parliament on the proposed nuclear submarine purchase. Eldon Healey, Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), indicated that the project definition phase, now beginning, would last until 1990, at which point the implementation stage would require contractual commitments to spend the bulk of the funds. Prior to that, Healey stated, "governments have an off ramp, and can change course as they have in the past." Assuming that the purchase is for the full twelve subs, the first will be delivered in 1996 and the last in the year 2014. In the meantime, DND

is encouraging the five potential prime contractors to form two competing project definition teams.

Department of National Defence officials told the Standing Committee on National Defence that Canada's existing Oberon-class diesel submarines already operate in a barrier role in the seas between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom (the G-I-U.K. gap). In coordination with other NATO navies, blocks of sea-space are assigned to each submarine to create an area defence designed to detect and track Soviet submarines entering the Atlantic from Soviet bases around the Kola peninsula. The proposed nuclear-powered submarines would have similar roles, but in addition, the range and flexibility of the nuclear sub would permit operations beyond barrier defence. In response to questioning, National Defence officials indicated that other tasks, such as operations in waters close to the USSR in support of the US Maritime Strategy, could only be determined by the government of the day. On the subject of naval operations in the Arctic, it was stated that the Department of National Defence had not "come to any arrangements with NATO or with the United States regarding the command, control and employment of nuclear submarines."

US Defence Budget

With only a two-month interval between them, the US Administration finally came to terms with the Congress on one defence budget, and new Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci submitted another for fiscal year 1989.

In December, almost three months after the 1988 fiscal year began (on 1 October in the United States, compared with 1 April in Canada), President Reagan approved the 1988 defence spending authority for US\$ 291 billion – some \$21 billion less than the

President had requested from Congress. The President initially requested a 3% increase in defence spending after inflation, whereas the amount finally approved constituted a loss after inflation of about 3.5%.

In terms of weapons procurement, the Navy was the big winner, receiving additional funds for two new aircraft carriers. In preparing to face budget cuts, the Air Force offered to abandon the proposed new small inter-continental ballistic missile (Midgetman). The missile is not popular with the Pentagon because, its critics argue, with only one warhead it is considered too expensive for the amount of nuclear firepower it can deliver. Congress, however, funded both the continued engineering development of Midgetman and the new mobile basing system for the ten-warhead MX missile which would put the missiles on railway cars.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) received US \$3.6 billion, considerably less than the \$5 billion requested. Additionally, the Department of Energy received US \$300 million for nuclear weapons development related to SDI projects.

In mid-February Secretary Carlucci began the long process of negotiation on the defence budget for 1989 by sending a request to Congress for US \$299 billion – a departure from previous practice since in doing so the Pentagon has accepted from the outset a budget which would not keep pace with inflation. The major new weapons projects of the three services survived the cuts with the exception of the Midgetman, which the Pentagon clearly intends to sacrifice. The budget includes an increase of US\$1 billion for SDI.

As a part of the cost-cutting, the Navy will retire early sixteen of its older frigates. Within a week of the publication of the budget, James Webb, Secretary of the Navy, resigned in protest. Webb opposed the Pentagon decision to stop short of the six-hundred ship

Navy which his predecessor, John Lehman, had coined as a slogan when taking office. Although the Carlucci budget is seen as an attempt to make a more realistic start in the coming negotiations with Congress, it is expected that major belt-tightening lies ahead as the Pentagon seeks to meet the Administration goals for spending reductions in the years ahead.

Air Defence Initiative

The development of the Air Defence Initiative (ADI) research programme has assumed greater significance to Canada following the White Paper announcement that the government was prepared to participate in ADI research. In contrast to SDI, ADI is a very small programme, with planned funding of under US \$300 million in fiscal year 1988. The programme appears to be concentrating on research into radar technologies that offer the promise of reliable detection and tracking of cruise missiles with stealth characteristics. In the future, submarine-launched cruise missiles will greatly complicate this task since, unlike the bomber, the submarine itself will be difficult to locate. At the moment there is little room for optimism about the prospects of intercepting future generations of Soviet cruise missiles. However, the ADI programme appears to be placing increasing emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, which may be of considerable interest to Canada, particularly in the light of the White Paper's concern with the surveillance and control of Canada's three-ocean coastline.

New Radars

In January the United States Air Force announced that the Over-the-Horizon-Backscatter (OTH-B) radar facility located in Maine, and intended to give long-range surveillance of the Atlantic approaches to North America, was operational. The OTH-B radar achieves its wide-area coverage by bouncing signals off the ionosphere. This gives it a long range, but also leaves a large "dead space"

(about 800 kilometers) adjacent to the radar itself. This will be covered either by another OTH-B radar located in the centre of the United States, or by coastal radars working in co-ordination with the OTH-B.

The Maine facility has tracked Soviet air reconnaissance flights at a distance of 2,000 kilometers. It is now about to be tested against drones with much smaller radar cross-sections than Soviet bombers. However, the real test of the OTH-B radar in the future will be against aircraft or cruise missiles with stealth characteristics. The OTH-B radar was not designed to cope with objects as small and difficult to identify as twenty-foot long cruise missiles, but this increasingly is the surveillance challenge ahead. In particular, Soviet submarines deployed off the US and Canadian coasts, and armed with cruise missiles, will constitute a formidable detection problem in the 1990s.

Satellite Surveillance Systems in Doubt

While the capabilities of the OTH-B radar and the North

Warning System against predicted Soviet cruise missile developments remain to be fully determined, two futuristic surveillance systems seem to have fallen into limbo. Teal Ruby is an infra-red satellite surveillance system. In the early days of SDI it attracted some attention because, although it was already under development, it was brought into the SDI programme. Teal Ruby was intended to demonstrate the capability to identify airplanes and cruise missiles from space. Although not directly involved in the research, Canada was to participate by providing chase planes for the experiment.

However, with the demise of the Challenger Shuttle in January 1986, Teal Ruby lost its launch position, and now has no scheduled launch date. Expensively warehoused, the multi-million dollar satellite appears to be obsolescent before even being launched. Follow-on experiments based on infra-red sensors do not seem to be imminent. Similarly, space-based radar, once thought likely to be ready for initial demonstration tests in the early 1990s, also seems

to have lost favour. The uncertainties of the technology, the costs, and the competition for launch positions have combined to make space-based radar a distant prospect.

Advanced Cruise Missile

In January, press reports indicated that the production schedule of the advanced cruise missile was significantly delayed. Prototypes of the missile are now being tested, but scheduled deployment at B-52 bases may not now take place until 1989. The performance of the Advanced Cruise Missile against the OTH-B and North Warning radars will be a major test of the surveillance systems being built for the 1990s.

The Persian Gulf

The United States Navy has begun to reduce its naval forces in the Persian Gulf. The move was precipitated by the need to reduce the costs of maintaining a large task force in the area, and military analysts have also noted that the British and Soviet navies are protecting shipping with considerably fewer warships than is the United States. But there seems little inclination in Washington to follow up proposals that the United Nations create a naval peacekeeping force.

Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan?

On 8 February General-Secretary Gorbachev proposed a timetable for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Subject to agreement in Geneva on a settlement of the Afghan issue, Soviet troop withdrawals will begin on 15 May, and be completed ten months after. The package proposal under discussion would include international guarantees that the agreement be honored, but there are no indications that there would be a UN or international presence in Afghanistan. □

DAVID COX

ALLIANCE NEWS

Conventional Balance After INF

In the aftermath of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the US is preparing to present to NATO a plan to offset the alleged conventional imbalance of forces in Europe. The plan emphasizes technological advances in unmanned drones, electronic warfare systems and precision guided missiles rather than tanks and aircraft, and is described as a modernization and upgrading of forces rather than a build-up. However, NATO is also discussing new nuclear-armed missiles with ranges up to 500 kilometers – the range not covered by the INF Treaty. Air-to-surface missiles with ranges of 160 kilometers and an increase in the number of nuclear artillery shells are also under discussion.


British/French Nuclear Co-ordination

Britain and France continue to discuss co-ordinated nuclear planning, but with little progress. The issues include the joint construction of a air-launched cruise missile, and the co-ordination of nuclear targeting by their respective submarine fleets. France is not a participant in the NATO nuclear planning group – a consultative body which discusses NATO nuclear weapons deployment.

Relocating the US Air Force in Spain

With the decision by Spain to require withdrawal of the 72 US F-16 fighters from Torrejon within three years, the future basing of the aircraft remains a matter for NATO consideration. The European allies have been asked to share the cost of relocating the F-16s, which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The most likely move is to Italy, which has indicated that it is willing to accept the aircraft.

REVIEWS



Arms Canada

Ernie Regehr

Toronto: James Lorimer, 1987, 273 pgs., \$15.95 paper

Arms Canada provides a history of Canadian military production, a description of current Canadian government policy and an overview of the decision-making process. Regehr argues that Canadian defence industries support a continental defence system rather than a national one. There is insufficient government procurement of defence products in Canada to sustain the defence industry. Canadian defence industry has therefore survived for the same reason it has developed to its current stage – the industry itself is completely integrated into the US system and relies on US procurement to keep it going.

Faced with the need to conduct trade on a reciprocal basis (Canada must buy from the US an amount equivalent to what it sells there) and increasing Congressional protectionism, Canadian industry is now turning to the Third World market. If Canadian industry and the Canadian government are working to increase arms exports, then important questions need to be asked about the policies governing where those exports go.

Two areas of policy come into play here. Regehr argues that the continental integration of the defence industry has resulted in a substantial loss of Canadian independence in defence policy. "In effect, Canada is a military satellite," he writes. Second, Canada's policy on arms exports to the Third World is on the surface a restrictive one, but, in practice this has not been the case.

Regehr suggests that the restrictions imposed by the government are in fact guidelines rather than binding limits and he gives examples of cases where Canadian arms products have gone to countries guilty of human rights violations and involved in conflicts. According to government policy arms exports to countries falling into either of the above categories are prohibited.

Regehr makes no effort to conceal his position on the issue and the first few chapters suffer from an unnecessary use of expressions such as "international war machine" where "global arms trade" would have sufficed; or, "Canadian naivete" and "apparently boundless innocence" when referring to industry efforts in dealing with the US in the 1950s. Such phrases are likely to put off some readers.

This is an important subject which has been given relatively little attention in Canada. In part this lack of attention or analysis is due to government secrecy on the issue. In *Arms Canada* Ernie Regehr combats this problem by providing a well documented examination of what actually goes on with respect to arms exports.

– Jane Boulden

Ms. Boulden is a former research assistant at the Institute.

Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War

Victor Levant

Toronto: Between the Lines Press, 1986, 322 pgs., \$14.95 paper

During a visit to Washington in March 1969, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau produced a new metaphor for Canadian-American relations. "Living with you," he told the National Press Club, "is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant; no matter how friendly and even-tempered the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt."

Quiet Complicity suggests that Trudeau's metaphor was misplaced – that during the long, sad history

of the Vietnam War, Canada was a pretty good elephant itself. Victor Levant, a teacher at John Abbott College in Montreal, has written a book that argues that the large elephant to the south did not use its superior power to push Canada into supporting American policy in Vietnam. Indeed, from 1954 until Saigon's fall in 1975, Ottawa itself not only buttressed Washington's military and diplomatic initiatives in Southeast Asia, but did so with alacrity. Only in the early 1970s, Levant concludes, when a more nationalistic politics emerged in Canada, did the United States find it necessary to exert pressure to keep Ottawa "on side."

Levant defends his thesis by producing evidence to demonstrate a powerful Canadian economic stake in South Vietnam, separate from that of the United States. Where recent scholarship stresses the unimportance of this stake in both countries, Levant takes it seriously, albeit more in symbolic than real terms. Canada, he argues, was less a branch-plant extension of the American economy – less subject, therefore, to Washington's leverage – than an advanced industrial society in its own right. Canadian economic involvement in Southeast Asia generated a singular policy, reflecting in turn the ideological link between the economic interests of the ruling indigenous elite, and the government in Ottawa that represented it.

Levant devotes most of his attention to the role of the Canadian delegation on the International Control Commission, which, he finds, belied Ottawa's claim to impartiality. Canada consistently sided with Saigon and against Hanoi, and systematically violated the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Canadian claims to objectivity were not merely hypocritical; they provided a shrewd shroud for Ottawa's involvement in Washington's strategy of intervention.

Quiet Complicity finds dirty hands everywhere Ottawa engaged itself in Southeast Asia. Throughout both the first Indo-China War and the second, Ottawa remained active in the areas of war production, development assistance, diplomatic support, and intelligence gathering – all in the service of Washington's goals in Vietnam. Levant indicates, for example, that Canada's defence ties with the United States led to plush times in the 1960s for producers of petroleum, copper, nickel, and, especially, arms and munitions. To the author's credit, he has done much homework, a lot, he explains (to the point of special pleading), under establishment duress in both Washington and Ottawa. Indeed, Levant has nothing positive to say about any Canadian leaders – be they elected officials, civil servants, or diplomats. Whether defoliating New Brunswick forests to test agents orange, purple, or blue; allowing B-52 bombers to make practice runs over Saskatchewan and Alberta to perfect carpet-bombing technique; carrying diplomatic messages for, and reporting to, Garcia (the US State Department); or providing developmental aid to Saigon – Ottawa's position was consistently partisan – reflecting its own perceived interests which dovetailed neatly with Washington's.

Levant's book recalls the most polemic of radical historiography that characterized the American debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As such, the book encounters problems similar to work by American revisionists like John Gerassi, David Horowitz, and Gar Alperovitz. For one thing, indicating substantial Canadian investment and trade with Southeast Asia does not necessarily prove that Ottawa policy makers defined the national interest in economic terms alone. *Quiet Complicity* assumes but does not demonstrate these links. For another, Levant's own evidence does not establish Ottawa's independence from American pressure.

Another problem with Levant's treatment lies in its one-dimensionality. Granted that economics loom hugely in Canadian-American relations, *Quiet Complicity* ignores other sources of friction and leverage, most notably the importance of the nuclear weapons employment policy, especially during the Korean War. Levant includes nothing of this, despite evidence that the Kennedy administration moved to destabilize the administration of John Diefenbaker over the issue. Indeed, there is precious little of "Dief" in *Quiet Complicity*, perhaps because of Levant's inability – much lamented – to gain access to the military file "Vietnam-MAAG-US Military Assistance Group 50052-A-13-40 June 1958-1963." But this is not good enough. No one will question Diefenbaker's anti-communist credentials, but one still recalls bitter policy disagreements with Washington. And, as Jocelyn Ghent shows, evidence is available.

Hence one has difficulty with the notion that Canadian Prime Ministers and their Ministers of External Affairs were just so many interchangeable parts, all labouring mightily in the service of a formidable Canadian capitalism. Levant also uses his evidence selectively in other ways. He plays fast and loose with dates, providing evidence from 1954, then from 1965 – or from 1965, then 1973. One does not encounter a focused assessment of developing policy, over time, on either side of the forty-ninth parallel.

What we are left with is an angry book – which is understandable given Washington's cynical venture into the politics of Southeast Asia. Still, despite Levant's ill-mannered criticism of Douglas Ross's recent *In the Interests of Peace* ("an apologetic intellectual work excusing Canadian wrongdoing and dismissing any notion of international responsibility for the East-West conflict"), it is Ross's Vietnam volume – not Levant's – to which serious scholars should turn.

– Geoffrey S. Smith

Mr. Smith teaches the history of United States foreign relations at Queen's University.

In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973

Douglas A. Ross

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, 484 pgs., \$35.00 cloth

☐ "Appropriately enough," Douglas Ross states, "the Vietnam war has come to symbolize American defeat, frustration and humiliation. For many Canadians it connotes shame as well because of perceived Canadian complicity in American war crimes." This certainly encapsulates the view of other scholars of the role of Canada in the Vietnam War, notably James Eayrs, Charles Taylor and Victor Levant. For them, Canadian involvement in Southeast Asia was not the story of an impartial and objective peacekeeper, the "Helpful Fixer" contributing what it could to the stability of the region; rather, it was the sordid tale of an American surrogate wilfully tending the imperialistic interests of successive American governments.

In tough and almost deliberately provocative language, Ross challenges the traditional interpretation of Canada's role in Vietnam, arguing that Canadian policy was generally prudent, realistic and very responsible, given the dangers implicit in the US commitment in Vietnam and the imperative for Ottawa of maintaining harmonious relations with Washington. Ross, a political scientist at the University of British Columbia, does not deny that Canada both co-operated in and sympathized with US containment objectives, but he insists that any apparent complicity must be viewed as part of a broader Canadian policy to work for peace. Terrified of a localized conflict escalating into a wider, super-power confrontation that might even involve nuclear weapons, Canadian policy-makers sought to constrain American hawkishness as best they could. Any acts of compliance are therefore interpreted by Ross as an important element in Canada's strategy of maintaining status as a credible and sympathetic ally. For Canada to have disowned America completely, adding its moral condemnation to that of other nations, would have only alienated it and

encouraged the less moderate elements on Capitol Hill. America allied, Ross asserts, is a far less dangerous animal than an America alone and persecuted.

In addition to exploring the nature, extent, and motivation for Canadian involvement in Southeast Asia, Ross is also concerned with explaining the dimensions of the policy-making process itself. He identifies three basic groups in government and in the Department of External Affairs who fought for control of the policy process between 1954 and 1973. The key group, the liberal-moderates, generally held the high ground in debate for the whole period. For Lester Pearson, John Holmes and other liberal-moderates, the crucial factor was preventing the various sub-conflicts in Indochina from escalating toward nuclear war. Concerned that the US might initiate a nuclear war to secure its interests, liberal-moderates encouraged a close relationship with it in order to maximize their constraining influence. Hence, their willingness to co-operate in serving on truce supervisory operations, and to act as an intermediary between Hanoi and Washington during the 1960s.

Conservatives, whose influence was greatest from 1956-66, generally gave support to a collective Western effort to establish non-Communist rule in South Vietnam. For Jules Leger and Marcel Cadieux, the basic tenets of American containment policy were valid and worth pursuing. A small group of left-liberals, led by Escott Reid and Chester Ronning, stressed moral over strategic concerns. For them, nationalism and communism could be fused legitimately and Vietnam converted into an independent, communist state, similar to Tito's Yugoslavia. But, as Ross emphasizes, left-liberals remained on the fringes of power, and conservative influence on Canadian policy tended to dominate only in periods of reduced threat to nuclear peace. In the author's opinion, it was the reasonableness of such liberal-moderates as Lester Pearson that dominated Canadian policy-making.

Because *In the Interests of Peace* is not as one-dimensional as other books on the subject, notably Victor Levant's *Quiet Complicity*, it should stand as the definitive interpretation of Canadian involvement in Vietnam until all the primary source material is available to scholars. The one disappointment of the book is the author's inability to breathe life into the major policy players. Except for Lester Pearson, we know no more about their personalities, characters and motivation than is conveyed in the official correspondence. The most serious omission of this type is the author's virtual neglect of John Diefenbaker.

In the Interests of Peace is nevertheless, an instructive and highly informative book and, one might say, readable, but the author's penchant for the opaque jargon of the political scientist, his generally turgid prose and curious punctuation hinder the flow and pace. – Brent Slobodin

Mr. Slobodin teaches Modern Canadian History at Queen's University.

BRIEFLY NOTED

Peace-Keeping Satellites

Walter H. Dorn

Dundas, Ontario: Peace Research Institute – Dundas, 162 pgs., \$20.00 paper

The author sets out to explore ways that satellite technology can be used to verify international treaties, monitor conflicts, support peacekeeping operations and help manage natural disasters. These satellites would, in the view of the author, be best placed under the control of an international organization such as that proposed by France in 1978 at the first UN Special Session on Disarmament. The proposal for the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA) continues to gather support from many non-governmental organizations and concerned individuals.

(This book was produced with the financial assistance of CIIPS.) ☐

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



US-Canada Strategic Air Defence was the title of a two-day conference sponsored by the Institute and the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. The sessions, which took place on February 12 and 13 were opened by **Joseph Nye** of CSIA and **Geoffrey Pearson** of CIIPS, chaired by **Ashton Carter** of CSIA and **David Cox**, formerly of the Institute and now at Queen's University. Among the topics examined by the participants were the history and evolving role of Air Defence, NORAD's missions and the Air Defense Initiative, changing technologies, strategic defence and its costs, and the Soviet air defence experience. CSIA and CIIPS will co-publish an Occasional Paper on the subject late in the year.

Geoffrey Pearson gave a paper at a conference sponsored by the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute in New Delhi in March. The theme of the conference was "India and Canada: Partners for the Future." Mr. Pearson's paper focussed on Canada, the UN and the independence of Bangladesh. He was at the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi during the period 1969-1972; the paper elaborated on Canadian policies at the time and the factors that influenced them, particularly Canada's policies towards the creation of Bangladesh.

Later in March Mr. Pearson attended a meeting in Sochi, USSR sponsored by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on "Disarmament Research: Agenda for the 1990s." Participants included Directors of Institutes active in the field of disarmament.

The Institute Moves to New Quarters

Effective 1 July 1988, the Institute's new mailing address will be:

Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security
Constitution Square
360 Albert Street, Suite 900
Ottawa, Ontario
K1R 7X7

(telephone and fax numbers will remain the same)

A CIIPS-SIPRI JOINT PUBLICATION

Nuclear Weapon Tests: Prohibition or Limitation? is the title of the recently released book edited by **David Cox**, formerly of the Institute and member of the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University, and **Jozef Goldblat**, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The book is the result of a study conducted jointly by CIIPS and

SIPRI of the complex technical and political issues involved in a possible cessation or limitation of nuclear tests. The edited volume contains papers by leading physicists, nuclear weapon designers, seismologists, international lawyers, and arms control negotiators.

This book is published and distributed by Oxford University Press of Canada, 70 Wynford Drive, Don Mills, Ontario, M3C 1J9.

New Publications from the Institute

BACKGROUND PAPERS

17. Chemical Disarmament: From the Ban on Use to a Ban on Possession, by Jozef Goldblat, February 1988.

18. Has the ABM Treaty a Future? by Ronald G. Purver, February 1988.

The Challenges to Canadian Security seminar series continued during the winter: **Paul Demeny**, Director and Vice-President of the Population Council Center for Policy Studies, New York, led a discussion of world demographic trends; and **George Lindsey**, formerly Director of the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Department of National Defence, spoke on the future of military technology.

"Peace and Security 1987-88" was the title of a seminar for members of the media sponsored by the

CONFERENCE REPORT

6. The International Trade in Arms: Problems and Prospects, by Keith Krause, March 1988.

WORKING PAPER

6. Peace and Security in the 1980s: The View of Canadians, by Don Munton, January 1988.

Institute at the end of January. **Geoffrey Pearson** gave an overview on issues of peace and security during 1987, and the Canadian response. Following questions and discussion of his statement, the focus shifted to an examination of East/West relations in light of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces agreement. **David Cox** spoke about the implications of some of the provisions of the treaty for future arms control agreements; **John Pike** of the Federation of American Scientists in Washington looked at American views of the

East/West relationship; **Carl Jacobsen** spoke of the Soviet perspective on East/West relations; and **Fen Hampson** examined the changing nature of the Atlantic Alliance in the post-INF world.

Roger Hill, Director of Research at the Institute, visited Europe in February and exchanged views with a number of research Institutes in Munich, Bonn, Geneva, Paris and London.

Visitors to the Institute during the winter included several high school teachers in Ontario who are interested in issues of peace and security. **Gary O'Dwyer** from Campbellford regularly organizes special sessions on world issues for his students, and brings in Ambassadors and other representatives to discuss their countries' views. **Paul Gray** from Parry Sound brought his Grade 13 class to Ottawa for briefings by officials and others: **Brad Feasey** and **Dianne DeMille** of the Institute's Public Programmes section spoke to them. Ms. DeMille also led a session at an "Educating for Peace" workshop in Ottawa in March for teachers.

In early February, the grants section of the Institute organized a consultation on the Institute's Public Programmes grants for a number of grant recipients and others. **John Toogood**, Secretary-Treasurer of the Institute chaired the session: **Nancy Gordon**, the Director of Public Programmes spoke about the intent of the grants, **Rychard Brûlé** gave an analysis of the grants to date. The purpose of the meeting was to allow an exchange of information amongst grant recipients, as well as between grant recipients and the Institute.

Geoffrey Pearson spoke briefly at a dinner for CBC foreign correspondents in Ottawa in January. He also addressed a meeting at York University on peace studies at the University level and spoke at the National Defence College,

Kingston, on East/West relations. Later in February Mr. Pearson spoke at a meeting of the Project Ploughshares Maritime Groups in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, and at the Collège Militaire Royal in St-Jean, Québec.

The Institute organized a working dinner with **Ted Warner** of the Rand Corporation who spoke on the Gorbachev reforms. In his view the new Soviet political thinking has several components: an emphasis on global problems and interdependence which has led to a more co-operative approach to dealing with international problems; the idea that the Soviets have relied too long on military power and that they now need to concentrate on diplomacy; and the notion that security is gained only through mutual, not unilateral security and that they should therefore concentrate more on arms control and disarmament. Mr. Warner went on to elaborate on the effect of this new thinking on military strategy.

Benjamin Yanoov of the Department of Social Work, Bar-Ilan University in Ramat-Gan, Israel visited the Institute in January. During the past ten years, Professor Yanoov has been a member and former co-chairman of *Partnership*, an Israeli peace organization co-chaired by an Arab and a Jew, which seeks to reconcile Arabs and Jews living in Israel. Mr. Yanoov led a discussion of conflict resolution and internal Arab-Jewish relations.

Ambassador **Henning Wegener**, Assistant Secretary-General, Political Affairs at NATO spoke at the Institute in early February. He outlined his views on developments in the Alliance following the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty. Mr. Wegener emphasized the necessity for reasonable responses from NATO to changes in the Soviet actions in Europe. He spoke of the possibilities of an agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, about which he was moderately optimistic, and about the need to seek agreements on conventional forces. Mr. Wegener said that NATO govern-

ments are coming to the view that stability can be achieved at lower levels of both nuclear and conventional forces. The question of the perception of the Soviet threat, in these changing circumstances, is one with which the Alliance will have to come to terms.

Nuclear Weapons Tests: Prohibition or Limitation? a book co-edited by **Jozef Goldblat** of SIPRI and **David Cox** of CIIPS was published by Oxford University Press in January. The Institute held a small reception to launch the book in Canada. David Cox spoke briefly to the assembled guests. He and Mr. Goldblat recommend that all but the smallest nuclear weapons tests be banned – that is, that all tests over five kilotons be banned and only one or two less powerful tests for each country be allowed each year. Such a ban would make further nuclear weapons development difficult – it would thus be a major international achievement with considerable confidence-building effects.

Katherine Laundy, the Institute's Director of Information Services, and **Susan Connell**, Librarian, attended a Consultative Group Meeting on the thesaurus and database project in Quebec City in mid-January.

John Toogood gave a lecture at the National Defence College in Kingston at the end of January on the Future of Arms Control.

In February, **Carl Jacobsen**, of the Institute's Research staff, organized a meeting at the Institute to discuss guidelines for his project: "Strategic Power USA/USSR." Participants included **William Kincade** of ACCESS, a security information service in Washington; **Ken Booth**, University of Wales; and **David Jones**, Dalhousie University.

Sally Curry of the World Information Clearing House in Geneva recently met with members of the Institute staff to discuss the work of the Centre. Its mandate includes peace, the arms race, disarmament, and development; and its task is to build a world informative system for co-operation

and information-sharing among non-governmental and international organizations. The Centre receives and disseminates information from participating organizations, including the UN's Departments

of Public Information and Disarmament Affairs, a number of press agencies and NGOs. During 1988 several national and international consultations will co-ordinate and expand the system. □

1988 Grants Procedures and Deadlines

Beginning in January 1988 the Institute began making decisions on and allocating grants twice a year instead of quarterly. Contact the Institute for a copy of updated criteria and application forms. Please note the following deadlines.

30 June	for an October 1988 decision
31 December	for a March 1989 decision

PUBLIC PROGRAMMES GRANTS – Third Quarter 1987-88

Association of Canadian Community Colleges (Toronto) Workshop "The Role of Canada's Community Colleges in Peace and World Order Education"	\$ 4,000
Briarpatch Magazine (Regina) Peace and Security Issues in the Canadian and International Arenas (Part II)	3,000
Canadian Student Pugwash (Ottawa) Special issue of <i>Pugwash Papers</i> "The Arms Race"	4,300
Canadian University Society for Intercollegiate Debate (Montréal) 1988 APN-Novosti Press Agency International Debate and Speech Championships: "Students for Peace and Trust Between East and West"	4,850
The Defence Research and Education Centre Ltd., the United Nations Association of Nova Scotia and Henson College of Public Affairs – Dalhousie University (Halifax) Conference "The United Nations, Peacemaker and Peacekeeper"	8,500
Goldberg, Kim (Nanaimo, BC) Nanose Book Project: CFMETR – A Matter of Choice	5,000
The Group of 78 (Ottawa) Publications "Beyond the Balance of Power: An Alternative Defence for Canada"	1,200
Mouvement Option Paix Québec (Hull) Publication d'Option Paix (deuxième partie)	5,000
Radio Centre-Ville St-Louis Inc. (Montréal) Série d'émissions "Paix et désarmement; Une perspective canadienne"	4,000
Tumbleweed (Altona, Manitoba) Publication of a quarterly newsletter <i>Tumbleweed</i> (Part II)	700
Vues d'Afrique (Montréal) Cinéma anti-apartheid	5,000
TOTAL	\$45,550

RESEARCH GRANTS – Third Quarter 1987-88

Jean-Thomas Bernard, Université Laval, Québec Production militaire et productivité sectorielle au Canada	\$ 8,500
Walter C. Soderlund, University of Windsor, Windsor Press Images of the Nicaraguan Revolution, 1978-1980: A Canadian-American Comparison	1,500
Michael Tucker, Mount Allison University, Sackville Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945: The Quest for Security	5,400
David Wurfel, University of Windsor, Windsor Vietnam and the Indochina Conflict	10,000
TOTAL	\$25,400

LETTER FROM PORT-AU-PRINCE BY ROBERT LEE



The Eastern Airlines jet descends over the western tip of Hispaniola Island. From above, the hills of Haiti are brown and bare. Surrounded by lush Caribbean islets, this patch alone appears cursed.

An occasional road scratches its way across the blasted landscape; settlements come into view, far from water or wood. Few countries so dramatically announce their poverty.

The cabin of the aircraft is packed with "p'tit mamans," each carrying a stereo ghetto-blaster and bags crammed with clothing. Imports to Haiti are now irregular, and these treasures will be taken to the exclusive homes of Petionville, where many will be sold or traded. One has to respond to the realities of despotism: the shopping in Port-au-Prince is simply awful.

A steel band meets the incoming passengers at the airport, plays a few spiritless bars, and departs. It is a reminder of busier days. Haiti was a popular tourist centre in the 1950s, before the Duvalier rot set in. The tourist trade, what was left of it, suffered with the AIDS scare in the early 1980s. A few commercial travellers reappeared after Baby Doc fled for France two years ago, then disappeared again with the violence last November. Now, as election day neared, even the residents were fleeing Port-au-Prince by bus. Journalists enjoy the privilege of flying into places as they are being evacuated.

Isolation does not much bother Haitians. Their society has always been more than mildly xenophobic. The island was settled by French plantation owners, who were among the most barbaric in the history of the slave trade. Haitians still call all foreigners "blancs," though a smile or a scowl can dramatically alter the meaning of the word.

There is not a peaceful page in the Haitian history. Most of the

blancs were slaughtered in the slave revolt of 1804, a singularly successful black revolution which was organized by secret societies and sustained by the voodoo religion – both of which are contemporary forces in Haitian politics. The blancs came back again with Napoleon's army, which was beaten off. The US Marines managed to occupy the island from 1915 to 1934, though their influence did not extend much beyond Port-au-Prince. A succession of black dictators failed to control the countryside or the night until Papa Doc.

...even the residents were fleeing Port-au-Prince by bus. Journalists enjoy the privilege of flying into places as they are being evacuated.

The blancs were partly responsible for the private army which gave Dr. Francois Duvalier's dictatorship its unique edge of horror. In 1958, eight mercenaries, led by two maverick US lawmen, launched the Dade County Deputy Sheriff Invasion. The eight drove a commandeered truck-taxi, known as the "tap-tap," into the central Dessalines barracks. Guns blazing, they quickly seized the barracks and demanded the surrender of the presidential palace. They very nearly succeeded.

They erred in sending out a young soldier to buy cigarettes. He informed that there were only eight invaders, the barracks were stormed, and the mercenaries were killed. But Duvalier had learned the necessity of a private army. He formed the Tonton Macoutes.

The Macoutes were originally called the Volunteers for National Security, but quickly adopted the nickname, which translates as "Uncle Knapsack" – a familiar

bogeyman who roams the countryside at night, snatching errant little boys and girls and stuffing them in his bag. Their leadership was recruited from the elite of voodoo and the secret societies.

Duvalier had studied his country's folklore. He was probably a voodoo initiate, and once proclaimed himself "immaterial." He realized the superstitious fears of his people, the dread of the Macoutes, the power of voodoo. He appeared in public in the black formal dress of Baron Samedi, the god of the graveyard. His Macoutes stole the bodies of enemies before burial. He once had the head of an enemy preserved in ice on his desk, for contemplation. "There is something peculiarly Roman in the air of Haiti," Graham Greene wrote in 1971. "Roman in its cruel-

ty, in its corruption, and in its heroism."

Greene's Haiti – the country he described so precisely in *The Comedians* – is everywhere. The deserted splendour of the Trianon Hotel exists at the Olaffson, which is operated by the half-brother of Haiti's military ruler. The empty casino still operates, still in danger of one moderately lucky player breaking the bank. Beggars still crowd, deformed by elephantiasis, crippled by leprosy, disfigured by tropical tumors. Traffic still does not move at night. The extravagant characters abound.

Henri, the waiter, makes a splendid rum punch at the Hotel Splendid. He owns a shirt patterned with hot-air balloons, a magical conveyance he would one day love to see. Gerard, the manager, sips scotch from a tumbler daintily wrapped in a napkin, and philosophizes. One night a pistol was fired in the hotel driveway, not twenty yards from the open-air dining room. The report was

answered, and a brief gun battle ensued. Robert Hurst and the CTV television crew were expected to drive up at any moment. What to do? "It is best," Gerard advised, "to continue eating."

As the elections approached, information became more than a precious commodity. It became the mythical object of desire, like El Dorado or the Holy Grail. Telephones often did not work. The electoral commission had a wraith-like existence, never appearing quite where one expected. Candidates dropped in and out like guests at a tea party. The Canadian ambassador, quite wisely, retired to his residence under armed guard. The only independent observers to the election were the blanc journalists. For part of the morning, journalists and dogs were the only unarmed presence on the streets. The dogs were not frightened.

The journalists were relieved that they were not once again shot down by the soldiers and Macoutes. They responded to this largesse with bitter attacks on the electoral process, which they judged a fraud.

At the hotel, Hurst wondered – and I agreed with him – if some measure of success couldn't be granted to the fact that voters were not slaughtered at the polling booths. The lesson of Haiti, after all, is not western notions of overnight democracy. It is that terror is so easy to introduce, and so simple to maintain. And it is important to remember that the Macoutes still outnumber the army at least five-to-one; anyone who thinks that they will suddenly become a benevolent sort of Tonton Kiwanis is dreaming.

The calm and circumspect Gerard was not quick to judge the election, or the blood which failed to flow. "In Haiti," he had suggested, "everything is chance – but nothing is coincidence." □

Robert Lee is a reporter for the Ottawa Citizen. He visited Haiti during the January 1988 elections.

25 400 \$	TOTAL
10 000	David Wurfel, University of Windsor, Windsor Vietnam and the Indochina Conflict
5 400	Michael Tucker, Mount Allison University, Sackville Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945: The Quest for Security
1 500	Walter C. Soderlund, University of Windsor, Windsor Press Images of the Nicaraguan Revolution, 1978-1980: A Canadian-American Comparison
8 500 \$	Jean-Thomas Bernard, Université Laval, Québec Production militaire et productivité sectorielle au Canada

Subventions à la recherche - Troisième trimestre 1987-88

45 550 \$	TOTAL
5 000	Vues d'Afrique (Montréal) Cinéma anti-apartheid
700	Tumbleweed (Altona, Manitoba) Publication of a quarterly newsletter <i>Tumbleweed</i> (Part II)
4 000	Radio Centre-Ville St-Louis Inc. (Montréal) Série d'émissions « Paix et désarmement: Une perspective canadienne »
5 000	Publication d' <i>Option Paix</i> (deuxième partie) Mouvement Option Paix Québec (Hull) An Alternative Defence for Canada
1 200	The Group of 78 (Ottawa) Publications « Beyond the Balance of Power: Nanosoe Book Project: CFMEIR - A Matter of Choice
5 000	Goldberg, Kim (Nanaimo, BC) Conference «The United Nations, Peacemaker and Peacekeeper» of Public Affairs - Dalhousie University (Halifax)
8 500	The United Nations Association of Nova Scotia and Henson College The Defence Research and Education Centre Ltd., East and West»
4 850	1988 APN-Novost Press Agency International Debate Canadian University Society for Intercollegiate Debate (Montréal) «The Arms Race» Special issue of <i>Pugwash Papers</i>
4 300	Canadian Student Pugwash (Ottawa) Arenas (Part II) Peace and Security Issues in the Canadian and International
3 000	Briarpatch Magazine (Regina) and World Order Education» Workshop «The Role of Canada's Community Colleges in Peace
4 000 \$	Association of Canadian Community Colleges (Toronto)

Subventions aux programmes publics - Troisième trimestre 1987-88

31 décembre 1988	décision prise en mars 1989
30 juin 1988	décision prise en octobre 1988
limites suivantes :	
d'admissibilité et les formules de demande. On est prié de noter les dates	
deux fois par année, et non plus quatre, comme il l'a fait jusqu'ici.	
Depuis janvier 1988, l'Institut étudie les demandes de subventions	

Attribution des subventions en 1988 - Modalités et dates limites

de l'information émanant des organismes participants (y compris le Service d'information et le Département des affaires du désarmement de l'ONU), de diverses agences de presse et d'ONG. □

possible de garantir la stabilité même en abaissant le niveau des forces nucléaires et classiques. L'Alliance va devoir accepter de modifier sa perception de la menace soviétique, dans cette conjoncture en évolution.

Les Presses de l'Université

d'Oxford ont publié en janvier un ouvrage de M.M. Jozef Goldblat (SIPRI) et David Cox (ICPSI) intitulé *Nuclear Weapons Tests: Prohibition or Limitation?* L'Institut a offert une petite réception pour souligner le lancement du livre au Canada, et M. David Cox a alors pris brièvement la parole. Les deux auteurs recommandent d'interdire tous les essais d'armes nucléaires, excepté ceux concernant les engins d'une très faible puissance; plus précisément, ils préconisent d'interdire tous les essais d'armes de cinq kilotonnes et plus et de n'autoriser pour chaque pays qu'un ou deux essais par année avec des engins d'une puissance inférieure à ce seuil. Partielle interdiction rendrait difficile la mise au point d'armes nucléaires dans l'avenir; elle marquerait un grand pas en avant pour la collectivité internationale et elle favoriserait l'accroissement de la confiance entre les deux principaux blocs.

À la mi-janvier, M^{me} Katherine Laundy, directrice des Services d'information à l'Institut, et M^{me} Susan Connell, bibliothécaire, ont assisté à une réunion du groupe consultatif au sujet du théseurs et de la base de données, à Québec.

À la fin de janvier, M. John Toogood a présenté un exposé sur l'avenir de la limitation des armements, au Collège de la Défense nationale, à Kingston.

En février, M. Carl Jacobsen, chercheur à l'Institut, a organisé une réunion au siège de ce dernier pour discuter des lignes directrices relatives à son projet intitulé «Strategic Power USA/USSR». Au nombre des participants figuraient M. William Kincaide du groupe ACCESS, service d'information sur la sécurité basé à Washington, M. Ken Booth, de l'Université du pays de Galles, et M. David Jones, de l'Université Dalhousie.

Sally Curry, de la *World Information Clearing House* (WICH) à Genève, s'est récemment réunie avec des membres du personnel de l'Institut pour discuter du travail de son organisme. La WICH s'intéresse à la paix, à la course aux armements, au désarmement et au

des relations Est-Ouest au Collège de la Défense nationale, à Kingston. Plus tard, en février, M. Pearson a présenté des exposés à une réunion des groupes de Projet Ploughshares dans les Maritimes, à Wolfville (Nouvelle-Écosse), et au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean (Québec).

L'Institut a organisé un dîner-causée avec M. Ted Warner

(Société Rand), qui a parlé des réformes de M. Gorbachev. Selon M. Warner, la nouvelle pensée politique soviétique comporte plusieurs volets : l'importance accordée aux problèmes mondiaux et à l'interdépendance des nations, ce qui a conduit à une attitude plus coopérative face aux problèmes internationaux; l'idée que les Soviétiques ont trop longtemps compté sur la puissance militaire et qu'il leur faut maintenant recourir davantage à la diplomatie; et la notion que la sécurité ne peut être acquise que par des efforts mutuels et non unilatéraux, et que l'URSS doit par conséquent accorder plus d'importance à la limitation des armements et au désarmement.

M. Benjamin Yanoov, du département des études sociales de l'Université Bar-Ilan, à Ramat-Gan en Israël, a visité l'Institut en janvier. Au cours des dix dernières années, le professeur Yanoov a été membre et co-président de *Paniner*, un organisme pacifiste israélien co-présidé par un Arabe et un Juif qui cherche à réconcilier Arabes et Juifs vivant en Israël. M. Yanoov a dirigé un débat sur le règlement des conflits et sur les relations arabo-juives.

L'ambassadeur Henning Wegener, Secrétaire général adjoint chargé des affaires politiques à l'OTAN, a pris la parole à l'Institut au début de février. Il a expliqué sommairement l'Alliance évo- luerait désormais par suite de la conclusion du traité sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire. M. Wegener a insisté sur la nécessité pour l'OTAN de réagir avec mesure, face à la nouvelle orientation de la stratégie soviétique en Europe. Il s'est interrogé sur les chances pour que soit conclu un accord sur la réduction des armements nucléaires stratégiques (il a manifesté un optimisme modéré à cet égard), et il a parlé de la nécessité d'en arriver à des ententes sur les forces classiques. M. Wegener a déclaré que les gouvernements des pays membres de l'OTAN savent maintenant qu'il est

NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT

L'Institut cemménage dans de nouveaux locaux

À compter du 1^{er} juillet 1988, la nouvelle adresse de l'Institut sera :

Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales

Place de la Constitution

360, rue Albert, Bureau 900

Ottawa (Ontario)

K1R 7X7

(Les numéros de téléphone et de télécopieur resteront les mêmes.)

Une publication conjointe de l'ICPSI et du SIPRI

complexes auxquelles il faudrait

répondre pour faire cesser ou limi-

ter les essais d'armes nucléaires.

L'ouvrage publié sous la direction

de MM. Cox et Goldblat contient

des articles rédigés par d'éminents

physiciens, concepteurs d'armes

nucléaires, sismologues, experts

du droit international et négociat-

teurs spécialisés de la limitation

des armements.

L'ouvrage est publié et distribué

par les Presses de l'Université

Oxford au Canada, 70, Wynford

Drive, Don Mills (Ontario),

M3C 1J9.

Publications nouvelles de l'Institut

EXPOSÉS

17. Le désarmement chimique :

de l'interdiction d'employer des

armes chimiques à l'interdiction

d'en posséder par Josef Goldblat,

février 1988.

18. Le Traité ABM a-t-il encore

un avenir ? par Ronald G. Purver,

février 1988.

La série de colloques sur les défis

que le Canada doit relever en matière

de sécurité s'est poursuivie pendant

l'hiver. M. Paul Demy, directeur

et vice-président du *Population*

Council Centre for Policy Studies

(New York), a dirigé une discussion

sur l'évolution de la démographie

mondiale; M. George Lindsey,

autrefois Directeur du Centre d'ana-

lyse et de recherche opérationnelle,

au ministère canadien de la Défense

internationale (FNI), M. David Cox

s'est intéressés à l'incidence de cer-

taines dispositions du traité sur les


armements; M. John Pike, de la

Federation of American Scientists

(Washington), a examiné la façon

dont les États-Unis perçoivent les

relations Est-Ouest; M. Carl



Le Programme canado-américain

de défense atriennne stratégique a fait

l'objet d'une conférence de deux

jours organisée par l'Institut et le

Center for Science and International

Affairs (CSIA), à Harvard. Les

séances ont eu lieu les 12 et 13 février

et ont été ouvertes par MM. Joseph

Nye et Geoffrey Pearsons, respec-

tivement du CSIA et de l'ICPSI; les

délibérations se sont déroulées sous

la présidence de M. Ashton Carter

(CSIA) et de M. David Cox, qui tra-

vaillait autrefois à l'Institut et qui

enseigne maintenant à l'Université

Queen's. Les participants se sont

penchés sur divers thèmes, dont

l'histoire et le rôle changeant de la

défense atriennne, les missions du

NORAD et l'Initiative de défense

atriennne, l'évolution des technolo-

gies, la défense stratégique et ce

qu'elle coûte, et le programme

soviétique de défense atriennne. Le

CSIA et l'ICPSI publieront ensem-

ble un Cahier sur ce thème vers la

fin de l'année.

M. Geoffrey Pearson a présenté

un exposé lors d'une conférence

intitulée *India and Canada: Partners*

for the Future et parrainée par le

Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, à la

Nouvelle-Delhi, en mars. Les pro-

pos de M. Pearson ont porté sur le

Canada, l'ONU et l'indépendance

du Bangladesh. M. Pearson était en

poste au Haut-Commissariat du

Canada à la Nouvelle-Delhi, entre

1969 et 1972; il a parlé des politiques

que le Canada suivait à l'époque et

des facteurs qui ont influé sur elles;

il s'est arrêté plus particulièrement

sur l'attitude que le Canada a adoptée

à l'égard de la création du Bangladesh.

Plus tard en mars, M. Pearson

a assisté, à Sochi (URSS), à une

réunion organisée par l'Institut des

Nations-Unies pour la recherche sur

le désarmement et ayant pour thème

«La recherche sur le désarmement :

programme pour les années 1990».

Au nombre des participants figu-

raient les directeurs d'instituts occu-

rant activement dans le domaine

du désarmement.

Jacobsen a analysé la perspective

soviétique à l'égard de ces mêmes

relations, et M. Fen Hampson s'est

penché sur l'évolution de l'OTAN,

au lendemain de l'accord sur les FNI.

M. Roger Hill, directeur de la

Recherche à l'Institut, s'est rendu en

Europe en février et a échangé des

points de vue avec des représentants

de divers instituts de recherche

à Munich, Bonn, Genève, Paris

et Londres.

Plusieurs enseignants ontariens

qui s'intéressent aux questions de

paix et de sécurité sont venus à

l'Institut au cours de l'hiver.

L'ouvrage publié sous la direction

de MM. Cox et Goldblat contient

des articles rédigés par d'éminents

physiciens, concepteurs d'armes

nucléaires, sismologues, experts

du droit international et négocia-

teurs spécialisés de la limitation

des armements.

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M3C 1J9.

Mme Dianne DeMille, de la direc-

tion des Programmes publics à

l'Institut, se sont entretenus avec eux.

Au début de février, l'Institut a

consulté des représentants de sub-

ventions et d'autres personnes sur

les subventions accordées par la

direction des Programmes publics.

M. John Toogood secrétaire-

trésorier de l'ICPSI, a présidé la

séance; Mme Nancy Gordon, direc-

trice des Programmes publics, a

parlé du but que l'Institut vise en

attribuant des subventions, et

M. Rychard Brûlé a présenté une

analyse rétrospective sur le pro-

gramme des subventions. L'objet

de la séance était de favoriser un

échange de vues entre les recipien-

tes et l'Institut. Grâce à cette initia-

tive, tous les participants ont pu

se renseigner sur le programme

de subventions.

M. Geoffrey Pearson a briève-

ment pris la parole pendant un dîner

offert à Ottawa, en janvier, à l'incen-

tion des correspondants de Radio-

Canada à l'étranger. Il a par ailleurs

traité des études universitaires sur la

paix à l'Université York et il a parlé

de relations Est-Ouest; M. Carl

(Washington), a examiné la façon

dont les États-Unis perçoivent les

relations Est-Ouest; M. Carl

Les individus et les groupes qui

constituent ce que Xavier Raufert

appelle la «nébuleuse» terroriste

proche-orientale ont découvert «le

secret de ce qui nous fait peur». Ils

exploitent le génocide insupportable du quotidien et de l'épouvante.

L'auteur, pour des raisons qu'on

peut facilement comprendre, ne

divulgue pas les sources qui lui ont

permis de faire son enquête. Il faut

n'est pas trop difficile; les recoupe-

ments qu'on peut effectuer avec

d'autres sources d'information sont

plutôt probants. L'auteur «connaît

le terrain».

Le livre de Raufert s'adresse aux

familiers du Proche-Orient. Non pas

qu'il est difficile d'accéder mais les

lecteurs non avertis risquent de se

perdre dans les multiples ornières de

la «nébuleuse». L'auteur nous pré-

sente une liste assez complète des

organisations et groupes terroristes

les plus importants oeuvrant au

Proche-Orient et à partir du Proche-

Orient. Il entend contribuer à

accueillir suffisamment de don-

nées et de faits sur les vecteurs du

terrorisme moyen-oriental» au point

qu'on puisse «tendre à empêcher

ceux-ci d'agir», et, «le cas échéant,

les frapper avec une précision

chirurgicale». Ainsi «on aura (...)

résolu une bonne partie de notre

problème. On aura tout d'abord

gagné en respect dans la région du

Moyen-Orient et montré concrète-

ment que de telles méthodes ne

paient plus, ou, en tout cas, paient

moins».

«On» représente ici l'Occident et,

plus précisément les gouvernements,

Raufert interpelle et renseigne les

«responsables». Il fait du «renseigne-

ment» au sens le plus professionnel

du terme, au point que le lecteur en

arrive inévitablement à se demander

si cet ouvrage ne constitue pas im-

plètement un camoufler pour les

divers services européens et améri-

cains censés surveiller la scène

proche-orientale et prévenir les

menées des groupes terroristes

contre les intérêts occidentaux.

L'effort de Raufert constitue bel et

bien une leçon : dans le cadre res-

treint qu'il s'est fixé, sa démarche est

intelligente et susceptible d'éviter

aux dirigeants bien des faux pas aux

conséquences parfois tragiques.

La leçon est divisée en deux par-

ties. Pour commencer, Raufert iden-

tifie les groupes extrémistes qui ont

émergé à partir des mouvements de

renouveau nationaliste (dont le

principal exemple est fourni par le

mouvement palestinien) et qui par

leurs méthodes se sont inscrits en

marge du courant principal (en

l'occurrence l'OLP ou plus précisé-

ment le courant majoritaire qui en

partage ou non, l'idéologie qui sous-

tend les agissements de ces groupes

«C'est distordu, falsifié, rendu pres-

que méconnaissable par le langage

et le jargon, notre bon vieux principe

des nationalités, notre droit des

peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes»,

écrit l'auteur.

Dans la deuxième partie, en re-

vanche, intitulée Islam et révolution,

on ébauche dans un autre monde où

«deux et deux (ne font plus) quatre».

Raufert souligne que «le monde où

nous allons pénétrer ne nous est pas

directement compréhensible. Les

difficultés de communications entre

nous et ceux qui y vivent sont énor-

mes, même si elles ne sont pas in-

surmontables. Ceux qui, dans notre

univers (celui ou deux et deux font

quatre), en possèdent les clés - les

savants, les érudits, les explorateurs

- ne sont pas ceux qui en charge

les affaires de l'Etat et de la sécurité

comme «victime» du terrorisme et

comme arbitre des normes de com-

portement admises au niveau inter-

national dans un monde que ce

système finit par accepter, c'est qu'on

difficilement acceptable, c'est qu'on

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comme arbitre des normes de com

six cents navires, chiffre dont son

prédécesseur, M. John Lehman,

avait fait un slogan quand il avait as-

sumé ses fonctions. Même si le

budget de M. Carlucci est perçu

comme un effort visant à lancer sous

un jour plus réalisées les prochaines

négoiations avec le Congrès, on

pense que des restrictions marquées

sont à prévoir, tandis que le

Pentagone s'efforcera d'atteindre les

objectifs que le gouvernement aura

fixés relativement à la réduction des

dépenses dans les années à venir.

L'initiative de défense

aérienne (IDA)

Le laboratoire du programme de

recherche lié à l'IDA a revêtu plus

d'importance pour le Canada, après

que le gouvernement eut annoncé,

dans le Livre blanc, qu'il était dis-

posé à y participer. Par rapport à

l'IDA, l'IDA est d'une envergure très

limitée, le budget prévu pour l'exer-

cice 1988-1989 n'atteignant pas tout

à fait 300 millions de dollars US. Le

programme semble mettre l'accent

sur les technologies des radars qui

permettraient de détecter et de pour-

suivre de façon fiable les missiles de

croisière dits «furtifs». Dans l'avenir,

l'entrée en service des missiles de

croisière lancés d'un sous-marin

car contrairement aux bombardiers,

les sous-marins eux-mêmes sont dif-

ficiles à repérer. À l'heure actuelle,

on n'a pas grand espoir de pouvoir

intercepter les missiles de croisière

soviétiques des générations à venir.

Cependant, le programme de l'IDA

semble insister de plus en plus sur

la guerre anti-sous-marin, ce qui

pourrait bien intéresser considéra-

blement le Canada, étant donné

l'importance que le gouvernement a

accordée, dans le Livre blanc, à la

surveillance et à la protection de ses

trois littoraux maritimes.

De nouveaux radars

En janvier, l'Aviation américaine

a annoncé que le radar transhorizon

à rétrodiffusion troposphérique

(OTH-B), installé dans le Maine et

offrant une surveillance des ap-

proches de l'Amérique du Nord à

grande distance au-dessus de l'Atlan-

tique, était opérationnel. Le radar

réussit à couvrir une aussi vaste

région en réfléchissant les signaux

sur l'ionosphère. Cette technique lui

crée une «zone morte» d'environ

800 kilomètres à proximité du radar

lui-même. Ce secteur sera protégé au

centre des États-Unis, ou par des

radars côtiers fonctionnant en tan-

dem avec les installations OTH-B.

Le radar du Maine a repéré des

avions soviétiques de reconnaissance

à une distance de 2 000 kilomètres.

On s'apprête maintenant à le mettre

à l'essai contre des avions-robots

offrant une surface détectable beau-

coup plus petite que celle des bom-

bardiers soviétiques. Toutefois, la

véritable épreuve se présentera

quand il s'agira de détecter les avions

et les missiles de croisière dits

«furtifs». Ces derniers n'ont pas été

conçus en fonction d'objets aussi

petits et aussi difficiles à détecter que

des missiles de croisière mesurant

vingt pieds de long, mais ce sera la

maîtrise tout, le défi à relever en

matière de surveillance. Plus parti-

culièrement, les sous-marins sovié-

ques déployés au large des côtes

américaines et canadiennes et armés

des missiles de croisière posent un

problème de détection dans

les années 1990.

Les systèmes de surveillance par

satellite remis en question

On n'a pas encore établi complè-

tement quelles seront les capacités

des radars OTH-B et du Système

d'alerte du Nord contre les missiles

de croisière soviétiques à venir, mais

NOUVELLES DE L'OTAN

L'équilibre des forces classiques après l'accord sur les FNI

Au lendemain de la conclusion du Traité sur les forces nucléaires à portée

intermédiaire (FNI), les États-Unis se préparent à présenter à l'OTAN un

plan visant à compenser le supposé déséquilibre existant en Europe au chap-

itre des forces classiques. Le plan met l'accent moins sur les chars d'assaut et

les avions que sur les progrès technologiques accomplis dans les domaines

guidage de précision; on y voit plutôt une modernisation qu'un accroisse-

ment des forces. Cependant, l'OTAN songe aussi à acquérir de nouveaux

missiles nucléaires d'une portée maximale de 500 kilomètres (ces engins ne

sont pas visés par le Traité sur les FNI). Elle s'intéresse également à des

missiles air-surface capables de frapper à 160 kilomètres, et à une augmenta-

tion du nombre des obus d'artillerie nucléaire.

Coordination franco-britannique en matière nucléaire

La Grande-Bretagne et la France continuent de discuter de planification

nucléaire coordonnée, mais sans progresser beaucoup. Les pourparlers

concernent notamment la construction d'un missile de croisière air-surface et

la coordination de l'attribution des objectifs des engins nucléaires équipant

leurs flottes sous-marines respectives. La France ne fait pas partie du Groupe

déploiement des armes nucléaires de l'OTAN (organisme consultatif qui discute du

Déménagement des forces aériennes américaines basées en Espagne

L'Espagne ayant demandé aux États-Unis de retirer de son territoire, d'ici

trois ans, leurs soixante-douze chasseurs F-16 basés à Torrejón, l'OTAN doit

maintenant choisir un nouvel aéroport d'attache pour ces derniers. Elle a

sans doute sur l'Italie, car ce pays a déjà fait savoir qu'il était disposé à

accueillir les avions sur son territoire.

on semble avoir plus ou moins aban-

donné la mise au point de deux

systèmes de surveillance futuristes:

Il y a d'abord le *Teal Ruby*, qui est un

satellite de surveillance à l'infrarouge. À l'origine de l'IDS, on avait

accordé une certaine attention à ce

système; en effet, bien qu'il en fût

déjà au stade de la mise au point, il

avait alors été intégré au programme

de l'IDS. Le *Teal Ruby* devait démon-

trer qu'il était possible d'identifier

des avions et des missiles de croi-

sier depuis l'espace. Le Canada ne

participait pas directement à la re-

cherche, mais il devait jouer un rôle

en fournissant des avions-cibles

pour les expériences.

Cependant, à cause de l'écra-

sement de la navette *Challenger* en

janvier 1986, le système *Teal Ruby* a

perdu sa place sur la liste des lance-

ments, de sorte qu'aucune date n'est

encore prévue pour sa mise en

orbite. Le satellite, qui a coûté plu-

sieurs millions de dollars, est entre-

posé à grands frais et il semble déjà

vétuste avant même d'avoir été lancé.

Aucune expérience de suivi qui

ferait appel à des détecteurs infra-

rouges n'est imminente. De même,

les radars spatiaux, dont on a déjà

fait des essais de démonstration au

début des années 1990, semblent eux

aussi avoir perdu de leur attrait.

L'incertitude sur le plan technologi-

que, les coûts et la concurrence

qu'on se livre pour s'armer les

places sur la liste des lancements

sont autant de facteurs qui rendent

très problématique la mise en orbite

de radars spatiaux.

Le missile de croisière

avancé (ACM)

En janvier, des rapports de presse

faisaient savoir que le calendrier de

production des missiles de croisière

avancés (ACM) accusait des retards

importants. Les prototypes de ces

engins subissent actuellement des

essais, mais le déploiement des mis-

siles n'est pas dans les bases des B-52

1989. La performance des ACM face

aux radars OTH-B et au Système

d'alerte du Nord constituera un

important critère pour l'évaluation

des systèmes de surveillance pour les

années 1990.

Le golfe Persique

La Marine américaine a com-

mené à réduire ses forces navales

dans le golfe Persique. Cette déci-

sion prise soudainement découle de

la nécessité d'abaisser ce qu'il en

coûte pour maintenir un groupement

opérationnel d'envergure dans la

région; par ailleurs, des analyses

militaires ont constaté que les

marines britannique et soviétique

affaiblissent beaucoup moins d'unités

marchands que les États-Unis. À

Washington, cependant, on se mon-

tre peu intéressé par les propositions

voulant que les Nations-Unies

créent une force navale de maintien

Afghanistan : retrait possible des

troupes soviétiques

Le 8 février, le Secrétaire général

Corbachev a proposé un calendrier

pour le retrait des troupes sovié-

ques de l'Afghanistan. Sous réserve

qu'une telle décision soit con-

clue sur la question afghane, les

éléments soviétiques commenceront

à quitter ce pays le 15 mai pour com-

Aux termes du plan actuellement à

l'étude, des membres de la collecti-

vie internationale garantirait le

respect de l'accord, mais rien ne


porte à croire que des contingents

onustiens ou internationaux seraient

postés en Afghanistan. □

- DAVID COX

CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



Le budget de la Défense canadienne

Le 23 février, M. Michael Wilson a présenté le plan de dépenses du gouvernement pour l'exercice 1988-1989. Le budget de la Défense a augmenté de 6,1 p. 100, ce qui le porte à 11,2 milliards de dollars. Si l'on analyse cette hausse, on constate que ce qui suit : 3,3 p. 100 compense l'inflation, en fonction de l'indice national des prix à la consommation, et une somme de 2 p. 100 équivaut à l'accroissement réel promis dans le Livre blanc sur la défense, et une somme d'environ 60 millions de dollars s'ajoute à ce dernier accroissement. Après déduction du taux d'inflation, l'augmentation réelle des dépenses au chapitre de la Défense atteint 2,8 p. 100.

Le Livre blanc présentait un programme de financement à long terme suivant lequel des fonds destinés à des projets d'investissement particuliers (les dépenses dites «en réel» s'ajoutent à une augmentation réelle de base de 2 p. 100 par année. D'après les prévisions budgétaires, les 60 millions sont des fonds supplémentaires réservés à la mise en oeuvre de projets décrits dans le Livre blanc, mais aucune somme n'est expressément allouée à tel ou tel projet en particulier. Le Livre blanc reste muet sur le total des «dépenses en sus» qu'il faudrait pour réaliser tous les projets proposés; cependant, des experts (*Financial Post*, 21 décembre 1987) ont exprimé l'avis que la réalisation de tout ce que le Livre blanc propose nécessiterait une augmentation réelle de 5 p. 100 par année pendant quinze ans.

La plus large part du budget de la Défense (environ 8 milliards) est consacrée au personnel, aux opérations et à l'entretien. Les programmes d'investissement reçoivent trois milliards, dont presque le tiers sera réservé au premier groupe de frégates de patrouille qui sont en construction, et à la modernisation des destroyers existants de la classe *Triбал*. Le budget prévoit vingt-trois millions de dollars pour l'étape de définition du projet général, dans tout programme d'acquisition d'armements, cette étape sert à définir en détail les spécifications des armements voulus, en suite toutes les conditions du contrat. Le lancement de deux importants contrats de défense a été annoncé en décembre et en février. La *UTDC Inc.* de Kingston a obtenu un contrat de presque 300 millions de dollars portant sur la construction de 1 400 camions de ravitaillement. Dans le cadre de la construction de 1 400 véhicules de transport en commun, mais à cause de ce nouveau marché, elle recherchera désormais des contrats civils et militaires. En décembre, le gouvernement a adjugé à la *St. John Shipbuilding* du Nouveau-Brunswick un contrat de 2,7 milliards pour faire construire le deuxième groupe de frégates. Soulignant qu'il économiserait ainsi des centaines de millions de dollars, le gouvernement a annoncé que la *St. John Shipbuilding* ne sera pas tenue de partager le travail avec la *Marine Industries Limitée* (Québec, comme elle avait dû le faire pour la construction des six premières frégates.

En février, des hauts fonctionnaires du ministère de la Défense nationale ont témoigné devant le parlement au sujet du plan concernant l'achat de sous-marins nucléaires. Eidon Healey, Sous-ministre adjoint (Matériel), a souligné que l'étape de la définition du projet qui s'amorçait durait jusqu'en 1990, année où il faudra obtenir des engagements contractuels, dans le cadre de l'étape de mise en oeuvre pour pouvoir dépenser la majeure partie des fonds. Auparavant, M. Healey a cependant déclaré que les gouvernements ont toujours la possibilité de changer d'orientation, comme ils l'ont d'ailleurs déjà fait dans le passé. À supposer que le gouvernement commande douze sous-marins, le premier lui serait livré en 1996 et le dernier, en l'an 2014. Entre-temps, le MDN encoeurage les cinq principaux entrepreneurs potentiels à former entre eux deux équipes concurrentes pour l'étape de la définition du projet.

Des porte-parole du ministère de la Défense nationale ont informé le Comité permanent de la défense nationale que les sous-marins diesel actuels de la classe *Oberon* remplissent déjà des missions de barrage dans les mers situées entre le Groënland, l'Islande et le Royaume-Uni (le corridor G.I.U.K.). Coordonnant ses efforts avec d'autres marines de l'OTAN, la Marine canadienne affecte chaque sous-marin à un secteur maritime où le bâtiment est chargé de détecter et de poursuivre les sous-marins soviétiques entrant dans l'Atlantique après avoir quitté les bases de la presqu'île de Kola. Les sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire, dont on envisage l'achat, auraient un rôle semblable, mais leur rayon d'action et leur souplesse d'emploi leur permettraient aussi d'exécuter des opérations autres que les patrouilles de barrage. Répondant à diverses questions, les représentants de la Défense nationale ont précisé que seul le gouvernement au pouvoir pourrait définir les autres missions (par exemple, des opérations à proximité de l'URSS, pour appuyer la stratégie américaine de déploiement naval avancé) dont les sous-marins nucléaires pourraient être chargés. Au sujet des opérations navales dans l'Arctique, il a été précisé que le Canada n'en était venu à aucun accord avec l'OTAN ou les États-Unis relativement au commandement, au contrôle et à l'utilisation des sous-marins nucléaires.

Le budget américain de la Défense

Le gouvernement américain a finalement réussi à s'entendre avec le Congrès au sujet d'un budget de défense, et le nouveau Secrétaire à la Défense, M. Frank Carlucci, en a présenté un autre pour l'année financière 1989; deux mois à peine ont séparé les deux événements.

En décembre, presque trois mois après le début de l'exercice 1988 (le 1^{er} octobre aux États-Unis, comparativement au 1^{er} avril au Canada), le président Reagan a approuvé le budget de défense de 291 milliards de dollars US (soit environ vingt et un milliards de moins que ce qu'il avait demandé au Congrès). À l'origine, M. Reagan avait sollicité une réduction de 10 p. 100 du budget de la Défense, mais le Congrès a refusé de le faire. Le budget de 1989 prévoit une augmentation réelle de 3 p. 100 du budget de défense, mais le montant de l'augmentation est de 3,5 p. 100 moins élevé, compte tenu de l'inflation. Au chapitre de l'acquisition d'armements, la Marine a remporté la palme puisqu'elle a reçu des fonds supplémentaires pour la construction de deux nouveaux porte-avions. Anticipant des coupures budgétaires, l'aviation a offert d'abandonner le programme proposé concernant le *Midgenum*, nouveau missile balistique intercontinental de petite taille. Cet engin ne plait pas au Pentagone, car, aux dires des critiques, il ne porte qu'une ogive et est par conséquent trop coûteux si l'on prend en compte sa puissance de feu nucléaire. Toutefois, le Congrès a accordé des fonds pour la poursuite des études techniques sur le *Midgenum* et pour le nouveau système mobile destiné aux dix missiles *MX* porteurs de dix ogives chacun; ces engins seront ainsi montés sur des wagons de chemins de fer. Par ailleurs, 3,6 milliards de dollars US ont été accordés à l'Initiative de défense stratégique (IDS), soit nettement moins que les cinq milliards demandés au départ. En outre, le ministère de l'Énergie a reçu 300 millions pour des travaux relatifs à l'IDS et portant sur la mise au point d'armes nucléaires. À la mi-février, M. Carlucci a amorcé le long processus des négociations sur le budget de défense de l'exercice 1989, en demandant au Congrès d'approuver un montant de 299 milliards de dollars US; c'est la une démarche inusitée, car ce fait-départ un budget ne grandissant pas au même rythme que l'inflation. Les principaux projets concernant l'acquisition de nouveaux armements ont survécu aux coupures, mais une exception faite du *Midgenum* que le Pentagone a clairement l'intention d'augmenter d'un milliard de dollars le budget de l'IDS.

Dans le cadre des coupures budgétaires, la Marine retirera du service seize de ses plus anciennes frégates, et ce avant la date prévue. Dans la semaine qui a suivi la publication du budget, M. James Webb, Secrétaire à la Marine, a démissionné en signe de protestation. Il a dénoncé la décision du Pentagone de ne pas doter le pays d'une marine de

augmentation réelle de 3 p. 100 du budget de défense, mais le montant approuvé en définitive est de environ 3,5 p. 100 moins élevé, compte tenu de l'inflation.

Le budget de l'IDS, en demandant au Congrès d'approuver un montant de 299 milliards de dollars US; c'est la une démarche inusitée, car ce fait-départ un budget ne grandissant pas au même rythme que l'inflation. Les principaux projets concernant l'acquisition de nouveaux armements ont survécu aux coupures, mais une exception faite du *Midgenum* que le Pentagone a clairement l'intention d'augmenter d'un milliard de dollars le budget de l'IDS.

Dans la semaine qui a suivi la publication du budget, M. James Webb, Secrétaire à la Marine, a démissionné en signe de protestation. Il a dénoncé la décision du Pentagone de ne pas doter le pays d'une marine de

favorablement l'offre de coopération non militaire dans le Nord formulée par le dirigeant soviétique, M. Clark a déclaré que le Canada avait de «sérieuses réserves» au sujet des propositions visant à faire de l'Europe du Nord une zone de-dénucléarisée, à limiter les activités militaires dans la Baltique et dans les mers du Nord, de Norvège et du Groenland, et à interdire l'activité navale dans des zones qui auraient fait l'objet d'ententes. M. Clark a en effet déclaré : «Faire de l'Arctique une zone de dénucléarisée ou y restreindre certaines manœuvres navales ne contribuerait en rien à réduire la menace que les armes (nucléaires) représentent. Cela risquerait de déséquilibrer d'autres régions». Tout en semblant écarter les mesures de limitation des armements dites «proches à l'Arctique», il ne s'est pas expressément penché sur la question des mesures navales propres à accroître la confiance, question que M. Gorbatchev avait aussi abordée dans son discours de Mournansk. Au début de 1988, l'URSS a intensifié sa campagne diplomatique en faveur du «programme de Mournansk». A Stockholm le 10 janvier, le premier ministre soviétique Ryzhkov a annoncé que l'URSS envisageait, en guise de «mesure de confiance», d'inviter des observateurs des pays nordiques à assister à un exercice naval en 1988 et qu'elle «comptait sur un geste réciproque». Il a formulé diverses propositions, dont les suivantes : examiner la question de la limitation des armements dans le Nord, à la deuxième étape de la Conférence du désarmement en Europe (la première étape s'est terminée à Stockholm en 1986) ; inviter les pays nordiques neutres, à savoir la Finlande et la Suède, à participer aux consultations que l'on songe à organiser entre le Pacte de Varsovie et l'OTAN ; pour répondre aux souhaits exprimés par les pays du Nord, inclure la mer de Barents dans la zone où s'appliqueraient les mesures propres à accroître la confiance.

Le programme de Mournansk a été précisé encore davantage dans un second discours de M. Ryzhkov prononcé le 13 janvier à Oslo et lors d'une entrevue qu'a accordée le major-général Yuriy Levadev et dont le texte a été publié le même jour dans *Moscow News*. Au nombre des mesures proposées, il y avait les suivantes : (1) limiter de tous les deux ans le nombre des manœuvres navales et aériennes «de grande envergure» dans la «zone où s'appli-

gueraient les mesures de confiance ; (2) interdire les activités de guerre anti-sous-marin dans «des secteurs déterminés» de l'Atlantique Nord et de l'Atlantique occidental, pour que ces dernières aillent carrément à l'encontre des vues de la plupart des pays de l'OTAN sur la liberté des mers et que leur mise en oeuvre menacerait les voies de communication internes de l'Alliance.

Les essais nucléaires

Par suite d'un accord conclu pendant les pourparlers soviéto-américains sur les essais nucléaires, à Genève en novembre, et signé au sommet de Washington, une équipe de vingt experts américains a effectué une première visite officielle au centre d'essais de Semipalatinsk (URSS), du 10 au 15 janvier. Plus tard, un porte-parole du groupe a qualifié la visite de «stupéfiante» et a souligné que les Soviétiques avaient été des plus accueillants. Deux semaines plus tard, un groupe d'experts soviétiques s'est rendu à son tour en visite au Nevada, où se trouve le centre d'essai américain. L'échange avait pour but de renseigner les deux camps sur les installations et méthodes d'essai. L'un de l'autre, en prévision d'une «expérience conjointe de vérification» dans le cadre de laquelle chaque partie pourra observer une ou deux explosions nucléaires provoquées par l'autre et en mesurer la puissance. Par suite de cette expérience, qui est censée résoudre un différend au sujet des techniques appropriées de vérification, on espère que le Sénat américain acceptera de ratifier le Traité de 1974 sur la limitation des essais nucléaires et le Traité de 1976 sur les explosions nucléaires à buts pacifiques.

La limitation des armements en Europe

Après la conclusion du Traité sur les forces nucléaires à portée inter-

médiaire (FNL), qui entraînera l'élimination de tous les missiles nucléaires à courte portée, l'OTAN renoncera à moderniser ses SNF, on pourrait prendre des mesures pour garantir partie et sécurité et pour rétablir ainsi l'équilibre par le biais du désarmement, lequel mènerait à d'autres options zéro. Puis, lors d'une visite qu'il effectuait à Bonn le 18 janvier, le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Chevardnadze, a préconisé l'entièrement complet des armes nucléaires tactiques. Son homologue ouest-allemand, M. Genscher, a déclaré que son gouvernement continuerait à demander la tenue de négociations sur les missiles nucléaires à courte portée basés au sol, de façon à obtenir des réductions significatives et vérifiables du nombre de ces engins et à en ramener l'arsenal à des niveaux égaux de part et d'autre. D'autres gouvernements de l'OTAN ne veulent pas inviter les pays nordiques à assister à un exercice naval en 1988 et qu'elle «comptait sur un geste réciproque». Il a formulé diverses propositions, dont les suivantes : examiner la question de la limitation des armements dans le Nord, à la deuxième étape de la Conférence du désarmement en Europe (la première étape s'est terminée à Stockholm en 1986) ; inviter les pays nordiques neutres, à savoir la Finlande et la Suède, à participer aux consultations que l'on songe à organiser entre le Pacte de Varsovie et l'OTAN ; pour répondre aux souhaits exprimés par les pays du Nord, inclure la mer de Barents dans la zone où s'appliqueraient les mesures propres à accroître la confiance.

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
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CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



Pourparlers sur la réduction des armes stratégiques

armes stratégiques

Les deux superpuissances ont accompli des progrès au sujet de la réduction des armes stratégiques offensives, au sommet de Washington en décembre. Le président Reagan et le Secrétaire général Gorbatchev ont terminé d'ordre à leurs négociateurs de définir d'un projet conjoint de traité, préférentiellement à temps pour que le document puisse être signé au prochain sommet, à Moscou en mai ou juin.

L'accord comprendrait les clauses suivantes :

Un mois plus tard, les pourparlers s'étaient enlisés, sans espoir d'aboutir. C'est pourquoi le président Reagan, M. Edward Rowny, en accord avec les Soviétiques, d'avoir littéralement gaspillé quatre précieuses semaines. Des divergences de vues persistaient sur les points suivants : les plafonds secondaires visant les ogives montées sur ICBM ; les Etats-Unis proposent une limite de 3 000 sur ICBM et de 3 300 sur SLBM, mais les Soviétiques préfèrent éliminer toute restriction quant à la répartition ; les limites touchant les SLCM, et

la vérification : l'URSS propose de limiter à 400 le nombre des SLCM nucléaires, qui ne pourraient ékipeter que deux types de sous-marin et un type de navire de surface; à cela, elle ajouterait 600 SLCM armés de charges classiques. Les Etats-Unis refusent de limiter le nombre de ces derniers et soutiennent qu'il n'existe encore aucune mesure de vérifica-

tion valable;
les règles de décompte des
ALCM : aux fins du calcul, les
Etats-Unis viennent attribuer six
ALCM à chaque bombardier, dans
les limites des 6 000 ogives autori-
sées, peu importe le nombre actuel-
lement transporté; les Soviétiques
exigent de faire le décompte d'après
le nombre que chaque type de bom-

Unis voudraient interdire ces engins, mais ils ont fait savoir qu'ils ne pourront peut-être à cette exigence si le URSS peut offrir un programme valable de vérification ; les États-Unis voudraient n'assujettir à aucune restriction les ALCM ayant une

Soviétiques tiennent à la définition que l'accord SALT II donne d'un ALCM à longue portée : tout engin pouvant franchir plus de 600 km ; les ICBM lourds ; les États-Unis veulent en interdire la production.

les essais en vol, la modernisation et le remplacement; les Soviétiques dénoncent ce point de vue; la période de réalisation des ré-

utions : les réductions s'échelonnent sur sept ans, et l'URSS, sur cinq. L'élaboration de modalités détaillées de vérification constitue une des principales tâches à accomplir. Les États-Unis font valoir que les clauses rigides à cet égard devront être beaucoup plus strictes que celles du Traité sur les FNI, car le respect de

interdiction complète (dans ce dernier cas, la détection d'une seule arme non autorisée constitue la preuve qu'il y a eu violation). Après s'être réunis à Moscou du 21 au 23 février, le Secrétaire d'Etat Shultz et le ministre des Affaires étrangères Chervakidze ont annoncé que leurs négociations avaient reçu l'ordre de

de définir les éléments clés des clauses de vérification avant la réunion les 22 et 23 mars.

La plupart des observateurs conviennent, toutefois, que le plus formidable obstacle à la conclusion d'un traité réside dans le désaccord persistant entre nous sur les deux aspects suivants :

Les armes défensives et spatiales

Comme nous l'avons signalé dans le dernier numéro de *Paix et Sécurité*, les deux superpuissances n'ont pu entendre sur les armes défensives et spatiales au sommet de Washington. Après quelques moments de l'expliquons et-après.

confusion, il est devenu évident que les Soviétiques n'avaient pas modifié leur position originale qui liait la réduction des armes offensives à l'adhésion, pour une période déterminée, à l'interprétation traditionnelle du Traité sur les missiles anti-missiles balistiques (ABM). Les deux blocs ont convenu à Washington que des discussions in-

lensives sur la stabilité stratégique commencent à en plus tard trois ans avant la fin de la période d'adhesion au Traité ABM, après quoi chacun pourrait agir à sa guise si aucun accord n'était intervenu par ailleurs.

Le 15 janvier, donnant l'impression qu'elle abandonnait son projet de traité sur les armes défensives et spatiales déposé en mai dernier, la

présenté un projet de protocole qui s'annexerait au Traité START et qui obligerait les deux parties à adhérer pendant dix ans au Traité ABM «tel qu'il a été signé en 1972». Les États-Unis ont immédiatement rejeté l'offre soviétique et déposé, une semaine plus tard, leur propre projet de traité intitulé «Mesures propres à faciliter la coopération dans le domaine de

Le chapitre du développement de défenses stratégiques a vu le jour en 1995, dans le cadre d'un colloque international, intitulé « Les stratégies à venir contre les missiles balistiques ». Parmi les mesures de confiance y étaient énoncées, citons un échange annuel de données sur les programmes de défenses stratégiques, des visites dans des laboratoires, et un de l'autre, et l'observation des essais menés de

Le 29 janvier à Washington, M. Georgi Kornienko, porte-parole soviétique, a accusé les États-Unis de violer une entente conclue au sommet de Washington, selon laquelle les deux parties auraient convenu de résoudre « plus tard » le « différend conceptuel » les opposant au sujet de l'IDS. Il a déclaré qu'il serait impossible de régler litige

seul impossible de recueillir les im-
plicités concernant la signification du Traité
ABM avant le sommet de Moscou,
et il a répété que l'URSS n'accep-
terait jamais l'interprétation «largie»
du Traité adoptée par le gouverne-
ment Reagan. Les Soviétiques ont
précisé à maintes reprises que, pour
reprendre les mots de M. Colin
Powell, conseiller des Etats-Unis
pour la sécurité nationale, ils se ré-

pour un accords négocié, il se servent le droit de suspendre la mise en oeuvre des réductions négociées, afin de commencer à accroître leur arsenal offensif stratégique, si les Etats-Unis prennent des mesures techniques aux obligations contractées en vertu du Traité ABM.

Dans un discours prononcé par le ministre des Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, à Tromsø (Norvège) le 9 décembre, le Canada a donné sa première réponse officielle aux propositions que M. Gorbatchev avait présentées en octobre dernier à Mourmansk. Tout en accueillant

LES FEMMES FERAIENT-ELLES MIEUX ?

Il n'est pas certain que les femmes pourraient mieux faire que les hommes à la tête du monde.

PAR SHANNON SELIN

Leur prendre dans son collimateur les questions intéressantes la paix et la sécurité internationales. Un rapport (dont je suis la co-auteur) paru récemment et diffusé par le Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement dépeint la faible représentation des femmes dans le domaine de la limitation des armements. À l'occasion de la dernière réunion du Groupe consultatif sur le désarmement et le contrôle des armements, j'ai eu l'occasion de discuter avec des femmes participantes, mais on l'a pressé de l'accroître en-core davantage.

Mais quelle est au juste l'essence de la question ? S'agit-il surtout, comme ce fut le cas des campagnes féministes du passé, de démarches formelles et des chances égales ?

Personne ne peut nier que tout ce qui se rapporte à la politique étrangère et à la politique de défense a une saveur typiquement masculine. Ce-

pendant, même si la question de la représentation numérique a effective-

ment son importance, bon nombre des arguments pûnant l'intensifica-

tion de la voix des femmes dans les débats sur la sécurité nationale font

implicitement, sinon explicitement, valoir que les femmes ont quelque chose d'unique à offrir au processus

d'élaboration des politiques.

Les femmes sont des « pacifica-

trices », de dire certains qui attirent l'attention sur la forte proportion de femmes au sein du mouvement

pacifiste et sur les résultats des son-

dages d'opinion révélant un écart important en fonction du sexe au

sujet des questions de paix et de sécurité. De par leur nature (selon la doctrine et la conférence aux-

exemple), ou de par leur éducation (voir les travaux de la chercheuse

norvégienne Birgit Brock-Utile), les femmes sont moins violentes que les hommes et moins intéressées par les « instruments » de guerre. Pour les

hommes et moins intéressées par les questions de toute violence et de toute injustice.

C'est l'absence de toute violence et de toute injustice. Pour les femmes, la paix équivaut à bien plus que la simple absence de guerre.

feraient un meilleur travail que les hommes. Si les femmes dirigeaient le monde, elles le sauveraient ! Voilà une pensée séduisante ! Les femmes se regrouperaient et élimineraient les armes et guerres, pauvreté et famine. « Nous ne pourrions certes pas faire

pire que les hommes », proclamaient les femmes. Et bien, je pense qu'en fait... nous le pourrions. Non pas

que les femmes seraient plus susceptibles que les hommes de pro-

voquer l'armageddon, mais en établissant une dichotomie entre les

hommes et la paix, d'une part, et les hommes et la guerre, d'autre part,

ces « mères pharisiennes », comme on les appelle, n'accor-

dent pas beaucoup d'importance aux hommes de sécurité, elles suscitent de l'au-

espoirs au sujet de ce que les fem-

mes peuvent accomplir, et elles pro-

voquent un affrontement avec les

hommes (et avec d'autres femmes).

EN FAISANT DES DÉCLARATIONS

généralistes sur la nature des femmes, les mères pharisiennes oublient tou-

te une catégorie de femmes qui oc-

cupent pour la paix et la sécurité en dehors des cadres du mouvement

pacifiste. Et je pense ici à celles qui

travaillent aux ministères des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense nationale, limitent des armements et à la recherche en matière de défense, ainsi que dans les départements de études stratégiques et de sciences politiques, dans les universités. D'aucunes aiment à penser que les femmes apportent un point de vue essentiellement différent sur les questions de paix et de sécurité, mais tel n'est pas le cas de bon nombre d'entre elles (et je m'inclus

dans ce dernier groupe) qui consacrent qu'elles voient les choses pas-

ablement sous le même angle que

leurs collègues masculins.

Mais bien sûr, rétorqueront les mères pharisiennes. « Ces femmes

ont suivi, sur les affaires stratégiques, des cours créés par des

hommes et données par des hommes, et elles travaillent dans des institu-

tions dominées par des hommes. Leur point de vue véritablement

féminin a été étouffé sous l'avalanche

des opinions masculines, mais si le poids de ces dernières disparaissait,

les femmes, nul doute, verraient les choses sous le même angle que nous,

les mères pharisiennes. » Il est difficile de réfuter l'argument voulant

que la femme soit la victime d'un

processus masculin de socialisation.

Les mères pharisiennes oublient

cependant, que les femmes occupant

des postes de chercheur ou d'expert

sont typiquement des étudiantes en relations internationales qui ont examiné (et choisi de rejeter) d'autres

modèles du monde, dont certains, bien que proposés par des hommes,

s'apparentent étrangement à la perspective des femmes.

ST LOBBIE DES MÈRES PHARISIEN-

nes est d'accroître la présence des femmes dans le domaine de la paix et de la sécurité, en mettant l'accent sur le « genre », elles s'aliènent leur

plus puissant atout, à savoir les femmes travaillant déjà dans le domaine et prouvant à tous et à toutes que la femme est parfaitement capable d'exécuter des recherches et des analyses valables. Les mères pharisiennes ne recueillent pas mon

appui quand elles insistent que je ne suis pas une femme dans le plein sens du terme parce que j'estime utiles les efforts de limitation des armements par rapport au désarmement, que je n'enrevois aucune

issue facile à la course aux armements, et que pour moi la paix est

effectivement l'absence de guerre

plutôt qu'un salmigondis quelconque d'autre supposées vérités.

Me facilitent pas la tâche non plus ! À cause d'elles, en fait, les femmes

auront plus de chances, à mesure qu'elles entreront dans le domaine,

d'être affectées à l'étude de thèmes « légers » comme l'éducation sur la

paix ou les conséquences sociales de l'accroissement des budgets mili-

taires, plutôt qu'à l'analyse de ques-

tions plus « sérieuses » telles que la

précision des missiles, les techniques de vérification, et le reste.

Je vous accorde que les mères pharisiennes trouvent injustes les

discussions techniques sur la guerre

et la paix, mais elles ne devraient

pas, au nom de leurs préférences,

limiter les options de toutes les

femmes travaillant dans le domaine.

Les hommes sont « très aguerris » à cet égard, et les préjugés qu'ils éprouvent au sujet des capacités et

des intérêts des femmes, lorsqu'il s'agit de défense et de limitation des armements, constituent un des principaux obstacles que ces dernières doivent surmonter.

LA PARTICIPATION DES FEMMES AU

débat sur la paix et la sécurité repré-

sente un problème de taille. Il n'existe

qu'une poignée de femmes spécialistes de ces thèmes dans les divisions pertinentes des ministères

travaillant, la situation n'est guère plus

rose dans les instituts non gouverne-

mentaux : au Centre canadien pour le

contrôle des armements et le désarmement et à l'Institut canadien

pour la paix et la sécurité internationales, il n'y a même pas une dizaine en tout. Dans presque tous

les cas, les personnes prenant la

parole sur les questions relatives à la sécurité, dans les colloques et les conférences, sont des hommes. Les

mères pharisiennes ont raison d'attirer l'attention publique sur ce

déséquilibre. Il est malheureux

qu'en mettant l'accent sur le point de

vue supposé unique des fem-

mes, elles passent sous silence la

question fondamentale, à savoir le

droit des femmes (quelle que soit

leur allégeance idéologique) à se

faire entendre au même titre que les

hommes sur les questions intéres-

sant notre avenir à tous. □

TENIR L'AFRIQUE DU SUD EN RESPECT

Pour mener sa stratégie d'opposition au changement, l'Afrique du Sud compte sur la faiblesse des États voisins. Le Canada peut jouer un rôle important en aidant les États africains de la ligne de front à défendre leurs frontières et à relancer leurs économies affaiblies.

PAR STEVE GODFREY

ÉPUIS L'ARRIVÉE AU POUVOIR en 1984 du gouvernement conservateur, le Canada suit à l'égard de l'Afrique du Sud une politique qui se distingue très nettement de l'attitude pluriot

«accommodante» de ses principaux alliés occidentaux. À la faveur des conventions personnelles du Premier ministre, la politique officielle du Canada s'est peu à peu imprégnée,

au fil des innombrables échanges et rencontres privés tenus avec M.M. Mulroney et Clark et avec d'autres ministres canadiens, des points de vue exprimés par les dirigeants des États de la majorité noire d'Afrique du Sud. Le Canada

s'est efforcé de resserrer ses liens politiques avec les États voisins de la République, et il a également commencé à réorienter ses relations économiques avec ce pays pour se rapprocher de ces derniers. Pendant

ce temps en Afrique australe, c'est l'innexorable escalade de la violence. Les affrontements ont déjà fait des milliers de victimes en Afrique du Sud même, et des centaines de milliers dans la région. Que l'on soit

Blanc ou Noir, il est impossible d'échapper aux troubles économiques et politiques qui secouent une région en état de guerre.

Comme son président et son ministre des Affaires extérieures se plaisent à le répéter, l'Afrique du Sud est une superpuissance régionale en Afrique australe. Sa population

équivalant à la moitié de celle des neuf États voisins, et sa production annuelle est deux fois plus importante. Sur le plan militaire, les effectifs de ses forces régulières et de ses réservistes (613 000) sont environ quatre fois plus nombreux que ceux des

des États situés à proximité de l'Afrique du Sud dépendent d'elle pour leur approvisionnement en

biens stratégiques comme l'énergie, les denrées alimentaires et les diverses étrangères; quant au Botswana, au Lesotho et au Swaziland, ils sont

caractérisés par l'économie sud-africaine. Mais cette omnipotence n'a pas empêché l'Afrique du Sud de perdre

depuis le début des années 1980 une grande partie de l'influence qu'elle exerçait jadis sur ses voisins. Vers la fin des années 1970, elle mis sur

un pied une politique régionale fondée sur la constitution en Afrique australe d'une «constellation» d'États en-

termes dans une dépendance économique et politique à son égard. Les États de la ligne de front ont réussi

à faire échec à la stratégie sud-africaine, qui visait à renforcer cette dépendance, en fondant en 1980 la Conférence de coordination du développement en Afrique australe

(CCDAA)*. La création de la CCDAA répondait à un double objectif : réduire la

dépendance économique de ses membres à l'égard de l'extérieur (et en particulier, de l'Afrique du Sud), et nouer entre eux des liens de

coopération économique. Le concept a séduit non seulement les États de la région dans un processus qui a

et il a entraîné les pays indépendants du Lesotho, le Swaziland et le Malawi. Le centre de gravité politique dans la région, qui était jusqu'alors Pretoria, a été transféré à la CCDAA. S'est attaquée en premier lieu à la remise en état des lignes de chemins de fer qui traversent le Mozambique et la Tanzanie, afin d'éviter d'avoir à passer par l'Afrique du Sud. Le Programme d'action de la Conférence porte également sur des questions liées à

l'énergie, à l'alimentation, à l'agriculture, à l'exploitation minière, à l'industrie, à la pêche et à d'autres secteurs. Près de 500 projets ont été mis sur pied jusqu'à présent, pour un coût total de 6,4 milliards de dollars américains; on a par ailleurs

recueilli 2,2 milliards de dollars sous forme d'investissements. En instaurant entre les pays membres des relations économiques plus étroites, la CCDAA peut opposer à

l'Afrique du Sud un dispositif collectif de sécurité économique et elle répond aux intérêts nationaux de l'ensemble des neuf nations membres. Cette alliance a eu une répercussion politique plus subtile, à

avoir qu'elle a permis à ses membres de rompre la tradition d'isolement héritée de la colonisation. Ces pays, en effet, entretenaient par le

passé d'avaantage de relations avec l'Afrique du Sud et avec leurs métropoles respectives qu'ils n'en avaient entre eux.

L'Afrique du Sud n'a pas réussi jusqu'à présent à faire échec à la CCDAA par des moyens politiques ou économiques, et même les membres les plus conservateurs ou débiles

pendants continuent de la soutenir. Malgré des divergences d'opinion sur de nombreuses questions, on préfère la solidarité régionale à la solution d'une dépendance accrue

à l'égard de Pretoria. Avec l'échec de sa stratégie régionale, l'Afrique du Sud estime avoir perdu une bataille, mais pas la guerre. En vertu des doctrines de

politique étrangère du gouvernement sud-africain, la région constitue pour le pays une sphère d'influence naturelle et un important marché. Des voisins alliés ou dépendants peuvent faire office de «remparts» contre les sanctions et de partenaires dans la lutte contre la résistance

politique ou armée qu'on oppose à l'Afrique du Sud. C'est en partant de ce raisonnement, que les principales puissances

occidentales ont accepté entre 1980 et 1985, que l'Afrique du Sud a mis sur pied avec succès une ambitieuse campagne de désaffectation régionale, qui se poursuit encore aujourd'hui. Elle combine des interventions militaires directes, le soutien de mouvements insurrectionnels au Mozambique et en Angola et, enfin, des actions de sabotage.

EN OCCIDENT, ON N'A PAS ENCORE saisi toute l'ampleur des dégâts humains et matériels de cette politique. Si l'on en croit les estimations de la CCDAA et des Nations-Unies, la stratégie sud-africaine de désaffectation a coûté aux pays membres de la CCDAA plus de dix milliards

de dollars américains entre 1980 et 1984, et ce chiffre s'élève à plus de vingt-cinq milliards à la fin de 1986. Les pertes subies entre 1980 et 1984 sont supérieures au montant total de l'aide injectée dans la région pendant la même période, et elles représentent approximativement un tiers des recettes totales à l'exportation. Derrière ces chiffres, une cruelle réalité

d'après le FIEB, la politique de l'Afrique du Sud aurait directement causé la mort entre 1980 et 1986 de quelque 535 000 enfants en Angola et au Mozambique. Dans certaines régions de ces deux pays, plus rien ne fonctionne normalement, et au

Mozambique, plus de cent mille personnes ont souffert de la famine en 1984 et 1985. Le climat d'insécurité aggrave l'acheminement des ravitaillements de secours. En Angola, 60 000 personnes, principalement des femmes et des enfants, ont perdu un ou plusieurs membres dans l'explosion de mines posées par des guérilleros soutenus

par l'Afrique du Sud. La politique menée par l'Afrique du Sud est une stratégie complexe

CERTAINS MILITAIRES AFFIRMENT qu'il serait impensable de mettre une force de paix ou une mission d'observation sur pied sans l'arrêt total des conflits qui déchirent la région. Quand on voit de quelle manière chacune des forces en présence évolue dans la région, on ne peut que leur donner raison. L'intervention d'un groupe d'observateurs serait, en ce moment, pure folie.

Si on s'y hasarde plus tard, il faudrait bien savoir pour combien de temps on renouera l'air chypriote.

Parallèlement, le gouvernement salvadorien nous a fait savoir qu'il accusait le Nicaragua d'envoyer secrètement de l'aide aux forces irrégulières opérant au Salvador, et que la mise au rancart de cette stratégie était indispensable à la réussite des démarches de paix et de toute la Procédure. Le gouvernement du Nicaragua a informé la Commission internationale de vérification et de suivi qu'il nait cette accusation.

... la Commission internationale a reçu des accusations portées par des gouvernements rebelles; les accusations et déclarations soulignant aussi le fait que ces gouvernements l'aide que d'autres gouvernements centra américains fournissent aux forces irrégulières ou de la région et des témoignages émanant de sources non gouvernementales et concernant la Commission internationale a reçu des accusations portées par des gouvernements rebelles; les accusations et déclarations soulignant aussi le fait que ces gouvernements se servent du territoire d'autres États pour attaquer une tierce partie. Dans ce contexte, la Commission a reçu des accusations du Salvador contre le Nicaragua, et du Nicaragua contre le Honduras, le Salvador et le Costa Rica. La Commission internationale se doit de faire observer que l'utilisation du territoire des États de la région pour attaquer une tierce partie, avec ou sans le consentement du gouvernement dont le territoire est ainsi employé, favorise les activités des forces irrégulières ou rebelles et entrave les démarches de paix. La Commission internationale n'est pas encore à même de vérifier le bien-fondé des accusations, car elle ne dispose toujours pas des mécanismes nécessaires pour mener des inspections sur place.

des lieutenants-colonels Don Ethell et Jerome Thompson, tous deux spécialistes d'opérations de maintien de la paix. L'expérience acquise en divers points chauds du monde, les experts militaires avaient au préalable préparé un document d'une vingtaine de pages sur l'organisation éventuelle d'une force de maintien de la paix. Le texte préliminaire se voulait d'abord un outil de réflexion à l'intention de la Commission internationale de vérification et de suivi. Il pose plus de questions qu'il n'apporte de réponses, mais il donne une idée des préoccupations d'Ottawa :

■ Le gouvernement doit tenir compte de considérations d'ordre politique et militaire avant de s'engager à fournir des troupes à la Commission.

■ Sur le plan politique, Ottawa doit avoir la certitude que «toutes les parties concernées souhaitent sincèrement participer au processus de paix».

■ L'effort de maintien de la paix devrait être lié à un accord en vue d'un règlement politique, ou du moins à un espoir raisonnable de parvenir à un règlement négocié.

■ Il est indispensable que la Commission relève d'une instance supérieure internationale et neutre, telle que les Nations-Unies, l'Organisation des États Américains ou le Groupe de Contadora. Celle-ci doit être dotée de pouvoirs et d'un mandat «clair et bien défini» lui permettant de remplir son rôle en toute liberté.

■ Il faut en venir à un accord de cessez-le-feu en principe et dans les faits.

Devant les tergiversations des cinq présidents et les hésitations de certains gouvernements face à l'inspection de leur territoire, il semble bien que ces conditions ne soient pas encore réunies.

LA MISSION DE PAIX N'A PAS ÉTÉ clairement définie et cela doit devenir une priorité des gouvernements impliqués. On pourrait avoir une force de surveillance et d'observation qui se contente de «rapporter les infractions» ou encore, d'une force chargée de «restaurer ou de maintenir la



factions et peut même recourir aux armes». Les stratégies militaires analysent ensuite l'importance des effectifs requis pour de telles opérations ainsi la paix peut «interposer entre les

La Commission comprend les ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays appartenant aux groupes de Contadora et de Lima (Mexique, Panama, Colombie, Venezuela, Brésil, Uruguay, Argentine), des représentants des Nations-Unies et de l'Organisation des États américains, et des délégués de chacun des cinq pays centra américains étant parties à l'accord.

La Commission a été dissoute après avoir présenté son rapport aux cinq présents centra américains, pendant leur sommet de San José (Costa Rica), les 15 et 16 janvier. Dans l'incertain, les ministres des Affaires étrangères des cinq pays siègent au Comité exécutif chargé d'appliquer le plan de paix de voir à la vérification et au contrôle.

La dissolution de la Commission de vérification n'a pas modifié la position du Canada sur le maintien de la paix. Selon le ministre des Affaires étrangères, le gouvernement étudiera toute invitation qui lui sera présentée au sujet d'une participation à des opérations de maintien de la paix, si jamais il en reçoit une, et il décidera de la marche à suivre en fonction des circonstances qui existeront alors.

La section du rapport citée ci-après porte expressément sur les efforts visant à instaurer un cessez-le-feu dans les zones d'hostilité. — Le rédacteur en chef

Rien n'a pu convaincre les forces irrégulières ou rebelles au Salvador, au Guatemala et au Nicaragua de conduire un cessez-le-feu, ou d'accepter l'offre d'ombrage et de participation au processus politique dans leurs pays respectifs, comme le prévoyait la Procédure de Guatemala.

En dépit des exhortations des présidents centra américains, le gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique continue de prêter main-forte, notamment sur le plan militaire, aux forces irrégulières agissant contre le gouvernement du Nicaragua. La cessation définitive de cette assistance constitue une condition sans laquelle les efforts de paix et la Procédure dans son ensemble échoueraient carrément.

Parallèlement, le gouvernement salvadorien nous a fait savoir qu'il accusait le Nicaragua d'envoyer secrètement de l'aide aux forces irrégulières opérant au Salvador, et que la mise au rancart de cette stratégie était indispensable à la réussite des démarches de paix et de toute la Procédure. Le gouvernement du Nicaragua a informé la Commission internationale de vérification et de suivi qu'il nait cette accusation.

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LA BANALITÉ DE LA DISSUASION

Combien de sens différents le terme «dissuasion» peut-il prendre avant de perdre toute signification ?

PAR MICHAEL BRYANS

LE EST CREUSE UN POSE CON-
sidérable entre l'usage courant
du terme «dissuasion» (la presse
écrite et électronique) l'emploi
quantitativement, et les gouverne-
ments font de même pour expliquer
leurs politiques) et la véritable signi-
fication que l'on se tort d'attribuer à
ce concept. L'existence de cet écart
est plus grave qu'il n'y paraît; en
effet, lorsque le sens d'un terme
deviennet soit inutile, puis qu'il
ne signifie plus la même chose
pour tout le monde, soit dangereux,
un débat ou à déformer une intention.
L'emploi du mot «dissuasion» est
devenu à ce point banalisé qu'on est
en droit de se poser de sérieuses
questions sur sa véritable signifi-
cation. Il suffit de voir le nombre de
formes et de sous-formes qu'il peut
prendre. On peut dissuader quel-
qu'un de faire quelque chose, c'est-
à-dire l'amener à renoncer à un
projet en faisant usage éventuelle-
ment de la menace. Il y a ensuite la
forme substantif: la force de dis-
suasion est quelque chose que l'on
possède ou emprunte à un
voisin, comme on le fait pour un
usage d'arrosage. Et si l'on veut
employer l'adjectif, on parle par
exemple de la «capacité dissuasive
La dissuasion peut servir dans
toutes sortes de situations militaires
différentes, réelles ou virtuelles; ce,
quelque que soit l'intensité du con-
flit ou le type d'arme utilisé: des
missiles nucléaires, des vedettes
transposant d'enthousiasme soldats.
On même des lance-pierres.
La dissuasion peut même devenir
un atout pour la vente: la société
Vickers, une entreprise britannique
de construction navale, diffusée dans
les journaux des annonces publi-
citaires louant les vertus de ses sous-
marins qui vont, prétend-t-elle,
permettre au gouvernement canadien
de «dissuader tout incursion étran-
gère dans ses eaux».

«dissuasion» est sans une large mesure liée à l'invention de l'arme nucléaire. Au moment de l'apparition des bombes à hydrogène, on a usé d'embellie qu'elles ne pourraient jamais vraiment être utilisées pour délivrer ou remporter la guerre, mais Les nations ont toujours utilisé la dissuasion pour influencer sur les décisions de leurs adversaires, mais l'apparition des armes nucléaires a fait de la dissuasion un objectif en soi.

Certains experts portent sur notre conception de la dissuasion un regard sévère, et leurs conclusions méritent toute l'attention des gouvernements et du public. De ce groupe de «révisionnistes» de la dissuasion, le plus partiellement noté Richard Ned Lebow, de l'Université Cornell, et l'ancienne Gross Stein, de l'Université de Toronto. Le mérite de ces auteurs tient au fait qu'ils sont remontés jusqu'aux origines psychologiques de la dissuasion en se fondant, d'une part, sur les événements historiques, et d'autre part, sur ce que l'on sait aujourd'hui de la façon dont les gens prennent des décisions et perçoivent le monde qui les entoure. Mais ces penseurs ne s'attaquent pas uniquement à un concept comme d'un emploi trop fréquent à l'usage; ils affrontent aussi, consciemment ou non, des mythes profondément enracinés dans la culture populaire.

DANS LES MILIEUX PROFANES, l'évocation du terme «dissuasion» évoque deux sortes de réactions fondamentales, voire primitives. La première se produit lorsque les individus se mettent à réfléchir à cette forme rarissime de la dissuasion qu'est la «dissuasion nucléaire». On est alors en présence non seulement d'une forme de dissuasion entièrement psychologique, mais aussi d'un paradoxe, car à partir du moment où la menace est mise à exécution,

Dans le domaine des relations internationales, l'exemple de cette caricature de la « court de récréation » qui est le plus profondément ancré dans la mémoire collective est celui de la Crise des missiles cubains. Dans la fable populaire, les Etats-Unis surprennent l'URSS en flagrant délit, et un John Kennedy calme mais résolu jette un regard méprisant sur des Russes humiliés aux yeux du monde et terrorisés par l'écrasante supériorité nucléaire des Américains; les Russes rentrent pleurnichant chez eux, la queue entre les jambes et leurs missiles dans les bras. Et un point pour la DISSUSA-SION, zéro pour la politique D'APAISEMENT!

D'un coup, nous avons e la

L'égard des Russes et en veillant à ne pas prendre à l'intransigeance à toutjours avoir plus de bombes qu'eux, les «dissuader» de faire quoi que ce soit qui nous déplaissait. C'était la belle époque !

Depuis cette «leçon» et d'autres aussi (songeons à la déclaration souvent entendue selon laquelle la dissuasion a préservé la paix pendant quarante ans), la dissuasion est au centre de toute discussion sur les conflits entre États. Notre propre Livre blanc sur la défense mentionne vingt-six fois le terme «dissuasion» sous une forme ou sous une autre. Et le Canada ne possède même pas d'armes nucléaires ;

LES QUESTIONS QUE LEBOW ET STEIN se posent au sujet de la dissuasion semblent simples en apparence. Dans quelles circonstances la dissuasion fonctionne-t-elle ? Dans quelle mesure suscite-t-elle des réactions indéfectibles ? Peut-on prédire si la dissuasion aura des retombées favorables ou, au contraire, défavorables ? Même si les auteurs ont étudié toutes les guerres et crises survenues depuis le début du siècle, nous ne pouvons comprendre leurs arguments dans la façon dont Lebow interprète le fameux épisode de la Crise des missiles cubains.

D'après Lebow, non seulement la dissuasion n'a rien fait pour favoriser le règlement de la crise ni prouver qu'elle pouvait être utile entre les mains de dirigeants éclairés, mais elle a constitué la principale raison de la crise. Les efforts déployés par chaque partie pour «dissuader» l'autre de se livrer à des activités indésirables ont eu un effet diamétrallement opposé à celui que l'on recherchait.

À partir de la Crise des missiles, Lebow tire au sujet de la dissuasion trois conclusions : toutes trois, vont directement à l'encontre des notions véhiculées dans la fable populaire. Tout d'abord, et c'est sans doute la conclusion la plus importante, lorsque

géographie. « Si les fusées nucléaires

commencent à voler au-dessus de nos têtes, il est certain que les inter-

ceptions se perdent au-dessus de nos têtes également... et note

« Nous n'avons aucun ennemi que nous désignons au point de vouloir le

tuer, » déclare-t-il tout en ajoutant,

comme les habitants du Nord le font souvent : « Nous ne voulons d'aucune

façon être mêlés à une guerre, car ils

ne sont pas nos ennemis. »

Pourtant, les Inuit sont parties à la

guerre, et encore avec enthousiasme,

principalement parce qu'ils n'ont pas

le choix. Comme leur économie tra-

ditionnelle s'est effondrée, ils dépendent désormais quasi entièrement de

l'aide gouvernementale. Le bipart

les familles chassent encore pour

subvenir à leurs besoins alimentaires,

mais il leur faut de l'argent pour se

procurer les éléments fondamentaux

de toutes les consommations ayant été

présentées pour l'obtention du con-

trat opérationnel de 150 millions de

dollars qui vient d'être adjugé rela-

tivement au SAN, tous les entrepre-

teurs ont promis d'embaucher plus

d'Inuit, et le gouvernement des

T.N.-O. envisage de donner aux

autochtones la formation nécessaire

pour occuper les postes rémunéra-

teurs d'électroniciens. Une des

quatre sous-commissions émanant de

la société qui appartient à des

se faire jour, et les Inuit sont encore

aujourd'hui aux prises avec toutes

ces difficultés qui expliquent d'ail-

leur, en bonne partie pourquoi ils se

sentent pauvres et bons à rien.

Ainsi, quand les représentants du

gouvernement ont visité l'Arctique

en 1966 pour tenir dans les collecti-

vités des réunions sur le Système

d'alerte du Nord (SAN), qui rempla-

cerait la Ligne DEW, deux souhai-

ont été formulés à maintes reprises :

tout d'abord, que les citoyens devant

de façon que les caribous ne puissent

pas s'y prendre, et deuxièmement,

que des Inuit soient embauchés

comme travailleurs dans le réseau. À

l'heure actuelle, environ dix-sept des

quelque 600 travailleurs sont des

Inuit, ils occupent tous des emplois

subalternes, mais ils constituent

nanmoins l'élite économique de

leurs collectivités. Aspect important

des collectivités. Aspect important

de toutes les consommations ayant été

présentées pour l'obtention du con-

trat opérationnel de 150 millions de

dollars qui vient d'être adjugé rela-

tivement au SAN, tous les entrepre-

teurs ont promis d'embaucher plus

DEW assure l'approvisionnement en

eau de la collectivité. Récemment,

quand le pasleur de l'endor à

demande de l'aide pour obtenir une

pièce dont il avait besoin pour son

église, l'administrateur de la station

a fait venir l'objet de Winnipeg par

avion dès le lendemain.

Même si les Inuit ne se connais-

sent pas d'ennemi, ils savent que les

habitants du Sud ne sont pas aussi

chanceux. Simon Keanik, qui a

quatre-vingt ans à peu près, déclare

qu'on lui a toujours dit que les

Russes « veulent la guerre... et c'est

parce qu'ils veulent s'emparer de

notre pays après avoir tué tous les

Blancs. » Après avoir entendu de

telles bêtises pendant des années,

de dire M. Amagoalik, de nombreux

Inuit en sont venus à se méfier des

Russes, et beaucoup ont encore une

dent contre les Japonais et les

Allemands. D'ailleurs, les Inuit sont

très de techniques informatiques et

de lasers dont se servent les chi-

urgiens ophtalmologues. Pour nous

comme pour eux, il est plus facile

d'accepter quand on croit en l'auto-

rité et en la technologie, quand on a

le sens du devoir et qu'on a peur,

quand on doit jouer après jour satis-

faire aux excès de la vie, et

quand on se cantonne consciemment

dans une ignorance entretenue par la

douce lumière bleue qui nous aide à

oublier ce que nous estimons ne pas

pouvoir changer.

Également, il existe un certain tata-

lisme dans lequel réside un dernier

reconfort. Dans le Nord, surtout

l'Arctique, dans le Nord, surtout

parmi les anciens, c'est la Parole :

« Il y a d'abord appris des chamanes et

aussi des groupes religieux, » de dire

un interprète qui me répétait des

propos que j'avais souvent entendus

quand je demandais aux vieux Inuit

ce qu'ils pensaient de la nuit-lé-
sa-
monde finira. Il y aura une énorme

boule de feu. Et personne ne peut

contester la Bible. » □

Pour en savoir plus

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DES ÉTRANGERS SUR NOS TERRES



*A l'occasion d'un séjour dans le Grand Nord,
un reporter du «Sud» découvre que les Inuit canadiens
ont une opinion ambivalente au sujet de l'attention
de plus en plus grande que les forces armées
accordent à leurs territoires.*

PAR KEVIN M. MAHON

ET ÊTRE UNE SCÈNE EXTRA-ordinaire dans la plupart des villes canadiennes, mais elle devient de plus en plus banale pour les habitants du Nord : un jour d'hiver dernier, les silhouettes gonflées d'Hercules C-130 ont commencé à envahir le ciel au-dessus d'Inuvik (T.N.-O.) pour marquer le début d'un exercice d'invasion portant le nom de code «Operation Lightning». Après s'être posés comme de gigantesques oiseaux de proie, les avions ont laissé là des centaines de soldats et tout le bataillon qu'il leur fallait pour «protéger» la ville. L'hypothèse étant que des saboteurs étrangers avaient attaqué les centrales électriques et les postes de communications. Pendant des semaines, des chars d'assaut vrombissants ont circulé dans la ville, des soldats y ont défilé au pas de marche, et les collines avoisinantes ont réverbéré le grondement des canons. «Cela évoquait ce que nous voyons à la télévision», a fait observer un porte-parole de la ville. «Cela a un peu surpris les gens.» Malgré tout, aucun des 3 000 habitants ni de la municipalité n'ont manifesté de protestation bien réelle, quoi qu'anodin, de la militarisation grandissante du Grand Nord canadien. La réaction a été la même quand Inuvik a appris qu'elle serait l'une des cinq bases opérationnelles «avancées» des chasseurs CF-18. Ce qui est curieux dans tout cela, c'est qu'Inuvik est une ville où bon nombre des citoyens disent être opposés à la militarisation de l'Arctique et où le conseil a récemment exprimé ce sentiment en adoptant à l'unanimité une résolution déclarant la ville «exempte d'armes nucléaires» et appuyant une proposition dont l'objet est de faire de l'Arctique une zone dénucléarisée. Paradoxes en apparence, ces réactions illustrent en fait très bien l'ambivalence propre aux habitants du Nord, et particulièrement aux Inuit, face à la militarisation de leur territoire. Comme l'Arctique est devenu le nouveau lieu convoité par les superpuissances nucléaires (ce qui y accroît le rôle du Canada), les groupes politiques autochtones

reclament de plus en plus fort la bonne partie de leur temps à essayer de traduire ces valeurs dans des accords multilatéraux qui lieraient les pays dominants maintenant leur territoire. «Nous nous percevons comme un peuple qui favorise l'harmonie entre les humains, et non la guerre», de dire John Amagoalik, qui a travaillé avec l'Inuit Tapirisat du Canada, organisme représentant les Inuit du Canada, et avec la Commission circumpolaire inuit (CCI). Depuis sa fondation en 1977, la CCI réclame la démilitarisation de l'Arctique. En 1986, elle a amorcé une étude sur les incidences sociales et environnementales de l'activité militaire. En 1986, elle a amorcé une étude sur les incidences sociales et environnementales de l'activité militaire. En 1986, elle a amorcé une étude sur les incidences sociales et environnementales de l'activité militaire. En 1986, elle a amorcé une étude sur les incidences sociales et environnementales de l'activité militaire.

Environnement boréal est fragile. Mais nous sommes très au nord ici, et la faune est très délicate. Comme bien des Inuit, le chasseur en savait peu sur les stratégies des superpuissances concernant l'Arctique, mais il connaissait bien sa

dans l'Arctique. Mais la CCI continue d'étudier d'autres propositions moins ambitieuses et elle compte bien rédiger l'ébauche d'un véritable traité qu'elle présentera ensuite aux États circumpolaires. Bien sûr, la motivation de la CCI n'est pas uniquement d'ordre philosophique. Les Inuit ont des normes, ils ont donc horreur des frontières, en particulier du «mur nucléaire» par lequel les superpuissances ont divisé l'Arctique. Devant la perspective de l'annihilation au Sud, ils voient dans la coopération circumpolaire le principal moyen d'assurer leur survie culturelle. Dans l'immédiat, les Inuit s'inquiètent des dommages que la présence des militaires risque de causer à l'environnement. Aucun autre organe gouvernemental n'a entrepris dans l'Arctique des projets techniques aussi vastes que ceux des militaires, et aucun n'a autant souillé la toundra avec des déchets aussi dangereux. En 1963, quand la moitié des résidents et une station de radars sont devenues excédentaires, on les a tout simplement abandonnés aux pilleurs et à la rouille. Pendant plus de vingt ans, les PCB toxiques des transformateurs électriques se sont écoulés goutte à goutte dans le sol. Le gouvernement fédéral a finalement ordonné l'enlèvement de ces produits chimiques en 1985 pour prévenir les arguments des populations locales au sujet de l'accord sur le Système d'Alerte du Nord. Mais les Inuit ne se calment pas si facilement; beaucoup croient que la militarisation plus poussée de l'Arctique entraînera une pollution encore pire. Méthodiquement, un chasseur du Sud ne comprend pas à quel point

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Kevin McMahon est journaliste et cinématographe pigiste; il est l'auteur d'un livre qui doit bientôt paraître sur la souveraineté dans l'Arctique; Michael Bryans est rédacteur en chef de *Paix et Sécurité* et a participé à la création de la série télévisée *War*; Gilles Paquin, ancien correspondant en Amérique centrale, est reporter à *La Presse*; Steve Godfrey est agent de projet chez *Inter Pares*, un organisme d'Ottawa s'occupant de développement international; Tony Rogers, diplômé de la *Norman Paterson School of International Affairs* (Université Carleton), étudie actuellement le droit à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique; Shannon Selin, autrefois auxiliaire de recherche au Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement, est rédactrice pour le compte de la *Newbridge Communications Networks Corporation*; Robert Lee est journaliste à l'*Ottawa Citizen*.

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PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

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Gilles Paquin
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Les femmes pourraient-elles vraiment mieux y faire à la tête du monde ?

Les Inuit canadiens ont une opinion ambivalente sur la présence des militaires chez eux.
Par Kevin McMahon

DES ÉTRANGERS SUR NOS TERRES



PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ


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PEACE & SECURITY

ARMS CONTROL MAGIC... LESS IS MORE



The US and USSR are negotiating arms reductions that will see nuclear arsenals becoming leaner and meaner.

BY DAVID COX



Geoffrey Pearson

Although the West can do little to influence Soviet politics, it is in everyone's interest that Gorbachev's revolution continue.

Cary Hector

Five months after Leslie Manigat was declared President, what are the chances for democracy in Haiti?

Clyde Sanger

Canada could solve its Arctic sovereignty problem by giving the territory away.

Fen Osler Hampson

For the first time in the history of NATO, the Allies disagree over some basic aims.

Vera Murray

A letter from Jerusalem

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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

In May a group of Soviets experts on the West came through Ottawa to talk and to listen. At the top of everyone's list of questions was the prospect for an American-Soviet nuclear arms treaty, the subject of this issue's cover article by **David Cox**. What one of the Soviet experts, Henry Trofimenko, had to say on the subject was arresting not for what he said, but for how he said it.

I am not a professional student of the USSR and like most people I regard the recent avalanche of talk and writing about the place with a combination of curiosity, hopefulness and fatigue – enough *glasnost* already. But unlike many people these conflicting feelings are leavened with the experience of two visits to the USSR in 1982 during the dying days (literally) of the rule of Leonid Brezhnev. I directed a film crew there for a few weeks – an intensely frustrating business because the bombast-to-substance ratio in the resulting interviews was enormous.

Based on my brief but intense exposure five years ago, Soviet society appeared to have a widespread, institutionalized and instinctive capacity for denying

reality. The phenomenon cropped up in almost every social exchange – from Marshals in the Soviet Army to translators.

My favourite lunatic conversation was in a Moscow restaurant on the subject of mushrooms. "Can I have some mushrooms with dinner." "We don't have any." "You had some yesterday." "No, we've never had them." "Yes you did, I was here and I ate some." "Impossible . . . you didn't eat here." In 1982 it was easier for a Soviet citizen to deny the existence of mushrooms or me than to admit that the Soviet central mushroom delivery apparatus had screwed-up.

And in 1988, what has changed in the manner of talk? When asked about the prospects for a US-Soviet agreement to cut nuclear arsenals Trofimenko answered with the kind of directness I never encountered in 1982. There would not be a treaty this year because there were lots of unsolved problems and because a new president would come to power very soon: "I expect that they would be positive – whoever might be the US president – towards continuing this process. But probably any new president who would come to the White House in January 1989 would say

he would want a better deal than has been outlined in the previous negotiations . . ." In other words, the START talks would not succeed until next year not because Americans were the "enemies of all peace-loving people everywhere" (1982-style answer) but because that is the way of high bureaucratic politics.

If the new tone is a true measure of a maturation in Soviet political culture then maybe the super-powers will get on with talking about what really matters.

■ In addition to **Fen Hampson** on the looming political crisis in the Western Alliance, **Clyde Sanger's** novel approach to arctic sovereignty, and **Geoffrey Pearson** on how the West should view Mr. Gorbachev's initiatives to reform Soviet society, **Cary Hector** assesses recent events in Haiti.

Mr. Hector is a professor of political science at Université du Québec à Montréal, and is on the editorial board of the periodical *Collectif Paroles* – published in Montreal. He returned to his native country for two months last year to follow the electoral campaign.

– Michael Bryans

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Design and Production:
The Spencer Francey Group,
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Translation:
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
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David Cox is a member of the Department of Political Studies, Queen's University and former Director of Research at CIIPS; Geoffrey Pearson is Executive Director of CIIPS and was Canadian Ambassador to the USSR from 1980 to 1983; Cary Hector is a Professor of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal; Clyde Sanger is a free-lance writer based in Ottawa; Fen Hampson is a research associate at the Institute and teaches international affairs at Carleton University; Véra Murray has been Paris correspondent for *L'actualité* since 1983 and currently lives in Jerusalem.

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ARMS CONTROL MAGIC... LESS IS MORE

BY DAVID COX

Like the protein-rich power breakfasts offered by fashionable hotels, the superpower arms talks offer a programme to shed fat, build muscle, and eat with pleasure all at the same time.

DESPITE THE PREDICTABLY slow pace of the superpower negotiations on strategic arms reductions (START), on the face of things President Reagan is ending his presidency with an arms control record of some standing. In the bag is the historic accord on intermediate range weapons – not only a fulfillment of the zero-zero option initially proposed by President Reagan in 1982, but a path-breaking agreement in terms of its provisions for on-site verification. And in the START negotiations, even a framework agreement, to be completed by his successor, will be considered a Reagan accomplishment since the ceilings now under consideration – 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads – are very close to the kind of reductions which he called for at the beginning of his presidency. Image-wise, the President looks even better since the media and the public at large seem to accept as a certainty that the result of the treaty will be a fifty percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons.

All this said, why then should the applause be muted? On the part of defence analysts, the reservations stem mainly from con-

cerns about the implications of the provisions for on-site verification in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the more fundamental, long-term question of just how much arms control, particularly in conventional forces in Europe, do we really want. In the case of at least some arms controllers, there is a tension between the desire to applaud the reductions because they are going in the right direction (downwards), and a growing awareness that the post-START nuclear forces will be all the better to fight with, and, in any case, a far cry from fifty percent reductions.

In this debate, the interested citizen should tread warily, and keep a suspicious mind. This is no time to relax with the thought that the great powers have at last cured their habit of nuclear profligacy; all phrases such as “fifty percent reductions” and “halving the nuclear arsenals” should be treated with polite skepticism. On the other hand, opportunities are at hand to achieve arms control measures of surpassing importance. Sustaining the momentum created by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty while avoiding the creation of false expectations about

truly deep reductions in nuclear weapons is the first task that we should require of our government.

In 1984 VICE-PRESIDENT GEORGE Bush presented a draft chemical weapons treaty to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It contained verification provisions so stringent that few believed they were meant to be taken seriously. On-site inspections, said Bush, should be “anytime, anywhere.” Up to that time, the Soviets had resisted any agreement for on-site inspection, so the prospect for agreement seemed remote.

At the beginning of the negotiations on intermediate-range forces, Caspar Weinberger took a similar position: the on-site inspector of the intermediate-range agreement, he argued, should be akin to the bank inspector – able to wander around, to look over shoulders, to poke in corners. But in the spring of 1987 the Soviets responded in a disconcerting way: they accepted the principle of intrusive inspection, and declared that, pursuant to an agreement, their factories would be open to US inspection. Of course, declared Soviet spokesman Yuli Vorontsov, the same would be true for the United States, and he helpfully suggested that the President might need to seek

Congressional legislation to permit Soviet inspectors into US weapons factories.

From that point, the US Administration, under the strong influence of the military Joint Chiefs of Staff, backed away from highly intrusive inspections, and settled instead for the important but carefully limited provisions in the Intermediate-range Treaty. Did the United States really want Soviet inspectors roaming freely through weapons factories and perhaps across military bases? The Pentagon quickly decided that the answer was a firm negative. While the US change of heart did not affect the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the intrusiveness of verification is now an issue in all other arms control negotiations.

For example, a chemical weapons treaty, which is within sight from a technical point of view, is being quietly shuffled off centre-stage while Washington reassesses its commitment to “anytime, anywhere” inspection of chemical factories and weapons facilities. In the approach to conventional force reductions, defence planners ask themselves just how willing they are to see Soviet inspectors crisscrossing Western Europe en route to NATO’s military installations. In START, the superpowers propose to eliminate warheads as well as missiles. This will require detailed verification provisions.

How much inspection is enough? The old question has taken on a new meaning as now both superpowers, committed to negotiate reductions, seek to balance their desire not to be subject to extensive inspection with their need to develop the precise procedures required to implement a START agreement.

From the viewpoint of the national security analyst, the abolition of a class of weapons in the Intermediate-range Treaty, combined with the prospective START agreement, has focussed attention on the ultimate objective that is sought in these across-the-board negotiations. For NATO the ultimate purpose of the intermediate-range agreement is not to denuclearize Western Europe – that purpose has been emphatically rejected by the lead-

ing members of NATO. But this reaffirmation of the continued need for nuclear weapons in Europe contrasts with a new-found uncertainty about reductions in conventional weapons. After fifteen years of negotiating mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, the NATO allies have no clear view of what reductions they actually want. What minimum force levels would meet the security requirements of the allies while de-escalating the confrontation between the two military blocs?

Since these kinds of questions are now at the centre of conventional and nuclear arms negotiations, it is not difficult to see some of the reasons why the defence community would like to brake the arms control momentum. "Trust but verify" is proving to be a more difficult slogan than President Reagan imagined. Intrusive verification was only a *sine qua non* as long as the Soviets resisted it. When arms control begins to bite into valued military forces, it becomes a threatening force which may be best diverted into protracted negotiations.

ARMS CONTROLLERS HAVE THE opposite set of inhibitions. The verification provisions of the treaty on intermediate-range forces are less than sweeping, but they are nevertheless impressive. For the first time, Soviet and US inspectors will examine weapons sites and storage areas. They will have certain rights to mandatory inspections, and there are limited but precedent-setting provisions for the perimeter monitoring of weapons factories wherein inspectors literally watch over everything that goes through the plant gate. But the Intermediate-range Treaty is only the appetizer before the main course, which is strategic arms reductions. For optimistic arms controllers the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has set the precedent, and what is required now is further elaboration of the means for co-operative on-site verification.

This hopeful view of the INF-START process is painfully off-set by the growing realization that the START reductions are a very limited beginning indeed. Two kinds of weapons are so far ex-

cluded from the agreed ceilings of 1,600 launchers and 6,000 warheads. The first includes the traditional gravity bomb and short-range attack missile carried by strategic bombers. The US is in the process of developing a new version of the short-range attack missile, which, when combined with the advanced technology bomber, undoubtedly will play a significant part in a modernized arsenal. The second excluded weapon is the sea-launched cruise missile, which, if the superpowers cannot agree on its limitation and verification, promises to become an increasing threat to all future efforts at arms control.

When these two categories of weapons are added to the 6,000 ceiling, it is reasonable to suppose that both sides will emerge from a START treaty with about 8,000 warheads, suggesting that the actual reductions will not exceed thirty percent of the present arsenals.

Even these reductions would be welcome were it not for the omission from the negotiations of any effort to control modernization. In fact, as critics of the proposals have noted, every weapons system currently under development will be permitted under the new treaty as currently envisaged, with the possible exception of mobile missiles. The United States continues to press for a ban on these – somewhat contradictorily since it is busy developing its own. For the United States, this means that the Trident D-5, the rail-mobile MX, and the advanced cruise missile will proceed, while testing will continue on new weapons such as earth-penetrating warheads, special effects nuclear warheads, and other so-called third-generation nuclear devices. The Soviets will be free to develop in much the same way.

THE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS permissive approach is that the respective sides are, in effect, making their nuclear arsenals more efficient. Older weapons with slower re-entry speeds, such as the early Minuteman, will be retired, and replaced by faster, more accurate, and deadlier launchers and warheads. The

nuclear arsenals are intended to become leaner and meaner. START will permit and even accelerate the on-going search for usable nuclear weapons. Like the protein-rich power breakfasts offered by fashionable hotels to diet conscious guests, START offers a programme to shed excess fat, build muscle, and eat with pleasure all at the same time.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that some arms controllers wonder if these kinds of reductions should be pursued at all. Like the defence experts, they might wonder if the present situation does not offer greater stability and certainty, and less sleight of hand as far as the public is concerned. In any event, it is clear from the START experience that reductions alone are not the answer. Rather, reductions must be designed to achieve some larger political goal. But has anybody enunciated a larger goal? It may come as no surprise to realize that General Secretary Gorbachev has done so.

In his disarmament programme of 15 January 1986, Gorbachev said that his goal was to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, after which they would be declared illegal by international treaty. Gorbachev went further and identified a timetable: he described three overlapping phases. In the first phase, from 1986 to 1992, the superpowers would stop all kinds of nuclear explosions, reduce delivery vehicles by fifty percent, retain no more than 6,000 warheads, and eliminate all medium-range missiles in the European zone. Additionally, they would renounce the development, testing, and deployment of "space strike weapons" – the Soviet phrase for Star Wars. In the second phase, from 1990 to 1995, other nuclear states would join in a freeze on nuclear weapons and stop all nuclear weapon tests. In the third phase, from 1995 to 2000, the superpowers and all other nuclear powers would totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

This grandiose plan can easily be dismissed as propaganda, except it must be conceded that Gorbachev is batting surprisingly well in the early season: the

medium-range missiles have been eliminated, and the formula for strategic arms reductions is in place. Immediate success, of course, is not the relevant point: in general terms, Gorbachev has offered a yardstick by which we might measure the value of arms control proposals – he wants to abolish nuclear weapons within a finite time period.

On the Western side there is no such vision. The allies do not want to abolish nuclear weapons, but are agreeable to reductions – leading where? That question remains to be answered. At the unofficial level, the Soviets appear to be offering some unsolicited assistance. The Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace has concluded that mutual security based on "minimal deterrence" could be achieved with a force of 600 nuclear warheads on single-warhead, mobile missiles. All other nuclear weapons, they argue, should be abolished. Since the NATO governments do not wish to abolish nuclear weapons, such an analysis may be more conducive to Western thinking. Nor do we need to argue about the Soviet numbers. Minimal deterrence based on 1,000 or even 3,000 warheads would be an interesting challenge, particularly when compared with the 8,000 which we are likely to get from the START negotiations.

WHO IS TO DO THE HOMEWORK and develop some of these basic proposals for minimal deterrence? There is no point in leaving everything to US leadership. Canada has long reiterated its commitment to six disarmament principles, one of which is radical reductions in nuclear forces and the enhancement of strategic stability. But what do we mean by "radical reductions," and what radically lower levels would be compatible with "strategic stability"?

Unable or unwilling to answer these questions, Canadian arms control policy is looking increasingly dog-eared. Defining these objectives would contribute to a much needed discussion within the Western alliance. Now that would have been a speech for the Prime Minister to have given this summer to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. □

SO GORBACHEV IS SERIOUS ...NOW WHAT?

It appears that the Soviet leadership, including the military, accepts Gorbachev's diagnosis of Soviet ills and sees no alternative but to attempt a cure. All that is left to discuss is how fast.

BY GEOFFREY PEARSON

MOST OF THOSE WHO study the Soviet Union now admit that significant change is taking place there. The main questions raised are the directions of this change, its duration and the implications for global stability. During a recent visit to the Soviet Union, I was able to explore these questions.

It is important to be clear about the meaning of "significant change." Mr. Gorbachev has described his programme as "a revolutionary re-organization of all aspects of socialist society's life," and "the biggest step in developing socialist democracy since the October Revolution." Perhaps this overstates the case, but even the partial achievement of such goals would indeed mark significant change. Domestically, the programme points towards a decentralization of economic decision-making, new incentives for farmers and small business, a greater choice of candidates for public office, amendment of laws affecting dissent and emigration, more cultural and academic freedom, and a re-examination of Soviet history. In foreign policy, it is intended to substitute the concepts of human survival and interdependence for the doctrine of "imperialist" aggression and international class warfare.

Are these goals being achieved? It is too early to tell whether the re-construction of the Soviet economy will be possible without the dismantling of the central planning system, and even the partial reforms so far underway are unlikely to show results for some years. If anything, the economy shows signs of decline rather than growth.

Consumer goods are as scarce as ever, although consumer services, such as restaurants, are benefitting from greater price competition. Supplies of meat and vegetables remain scarce in Moscow, and the distribution of food generally is unlikely to improve until farmers have both the incentive and the means to market their products. Price reform may well be the key to change, and will be at the centre of political debate in the coming months. If prices are to be even partially de-controlled, so too will

however, and it was apparently for this sin that the Moscow Party head, Boris Yeltsin, was demoted late last year. Clearly, there are limits to *glasnost*, just as there are to social and economic change. But for one who experienced the intellectual conformity of the late Brezhnev years, the degree of change is remarkable. It is hard to believe that this in turn will not lead to change in the political pro-

cess, and that opposition to Party policies will not be able to find wider means of expression. The special Party Congress, to be held in June, will certainly not declare the Soviet Union a multi-party State. But it may well concede that *glasnost* must apply to politics as much as to the press.




cess, and that opposition to Party policies will not be able to find wider means of expression. The special Party Congress, to be held in June, will certainly not declare the Soviet Union a multi-party State. But it may well concede that *glasnost* must apply to politics as much as to the press.

Some argue that change of this kind, if significant, is not fundamental and that the socialist system can never resemble our own traditions of democratic pluralism. Indeed, Soviet leaders agree that this is so. But to go on to say or imply that, without fundamental change, the Soviet Union will remain an expansionist state, (a "brutal adversary" in the words of

an American official) with whom the West cannot expect to have relations of confidence, is to go too far.

THE NEW DIRECTIONS OF SOVIET foreign policy did not emerge *de novo* from Mr. Gorbachev's imagination. Already, in Khrushchev's time, attempts were made to stabilize East-West relations and to reduce the burden of defence spending. The achievement of parity in strategic nuclear weapons with the US in the late 1960s led to



the abandonment of the notion that the USSR could fight and win a nuclear war, and to the concept of "equality and equal security." The Strategic Arms treaties of the 1970s process were the major manifestation of this concept. But Soviet encouragement of "national liberation" and class warfare in the Third World was still regarded as legitimate, and this, together with American suspicion of Soviet intentions, led to the effective demise of detente even before the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

Class foes



bureaucratic control have to be loosened, and this in turn raises fundamental questions about the role of the Communist Party apparatus in directing the pace of change.

Such questions are indeed beginning to be raised publicly. The press is full of tales of official corruption and indifference, and the theatre is becoming a platform for social protest and criticism. The leadership of the Party remains exempt from direct attack,

Gorbachev has built on the Khrushchev legacy, but with greater determination and consistency, and with a better appreciation of the dangers of the nuclear age. He reminds one in some respects of the Lenin of the post-1917 period when the new Soviet state was struggling to survive. Then, as now, dogmatism and adventurism gave way to pragmatism and co-existence. But both Lenin and his brilliant rival, Trotsky, shared the view that Communism in Russia could not endure unless it also triumphed elsewhere. They differed about when and how this would happen. Lenin was cautious. Trotsky played the part of Danton during the French revolution – “*toujours de l'audace*.”

Mr. Gorbachev, on the other hand, appears to have accepted the literal meaning of “peaceful co-

global partnership on issues such as pollution of the environment, famine, and the rules of trade.

Here is an example of this “new thinking,” taken from Gorbachev’s February statement on Afghanistan.

Just as the agreement to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is to be followed by a series of further major steps towards disarmament, with negotiations on them already underway or being planned, likewise behind the political settlement in Afghanistan already looms a question: which conflict will be settled next? And it is certain that more is to follow.

States and nations have sufficient reserves of responsibility, political will and determination to put an end to all regional conflicts within a few years. This is worth working for. The Soviet Union will spare no effort in this most important cause.

None of this means that the Soviet Union will sacrifice core interests. It will not accept deep cuts in its ballistic missile inventory if these are not balanced by US concessions on submarines

ing that every people and every country have freedom of social and political choice.”

Some believe that this change is more apparent than real and that in any case it will not endure. They suspect that Mikhail Gorbachev will lose his job if he threatens the powers of the Party bureaucracy or the status of the armed forces. This may be so. But it would appear that the Soviet leadership, including the military (which no longer has a vote in the Politbureau – the Soviet Communist Party’s senior decision-making body), accepts Gorbachev’s diagnosis of Soviet ills and sees no alternative but to attempt the cure of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. What is at issue is the pace of change. This will vary as the vested interests involved negotiate the terms on each issue – limits of free speech for example. The measure of success is likely to be the productivity of the Soviet economy, which is, as we can see

autarchy. The West cannot be a decisive factor in influencing Soviet politics, except possibly in one respect; we can meet Mr. Gorbachev halfway on questions of arms control and disarmament, which are at the top of his agenda. If the Strategic Arms Reductions negotiations succeed, and lead on to real progress in reducing disparities in conventional arms in Europe, the current Soviet leadership will benefit from strong public support. My own experience has been that no subject interests the ordinary Soviet citizen more (unless it be the price of bread) than the prospect of better relations with the West, in particular the United States. The popular notion that the Soviet bear is in search of prey, with its overtones of invasion and subjugation, is a hold-over from the early days of the Cold War in Europe. The Afghanistan war kept this idea alive. But it ought now to be critically re-examined.

The implications of this brief analysis for global stability are of two kinds: they could mean that East-West relations undergo the kind of change that relations between China and the West experienced in the early seventies, leading to respect and co-operation if not friendship and alliance; but they would be unlikely to mean significant change in the situation of most of the rest of the world, where population growth, poverty, and social tensions will continue to engender conflict and the flight of refugees. Neither of the great powers appear to have the means or the will to eliminate Third World poverty, even if they have to work together. What they *can* do is to co-operate to prevent these conditions from endangering the fragile state we now call “strategic stability.” Preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping through the UN, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and better control of arms exports, to name obvious examples, can all be greatly strengthened in a new era of detente.

None of the above is bound to happen. But if we do not believe it *could* happen, and act accordingly, we should not be surprised if it doesn’t. □

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existence,” without time limits or reservations. He is in favour of reducing or abolishing first-strike weapons and doctrines of counter-force and surprise attack, and accepts that negotiations in Europe should take into account Soviet advantages in tanks and artillery. There is a new willingness to allow rigorous methods of verification, soon to be tested by the intermediate-range missile treaty signed last year but already manifested in the 1986 Stockholm agreements on monitoring of conventional forces in Europe. He supports a role for the UN in peacekeeping and mediation (for example, in the Persian Gulf) and emphasizes the importance of

and bombers. It is unlikely to reduce its forces in eastern Europe without some form of compensation. It will continue to export arms to friends and allies threatened by invasion (Iraq and Angola for example) or by civil war (Nicaragua) if political settlements of such conflicts cannot be found. But such qualifications would apply to the policies of other great powers. What is new is the Soviet readiness to seek stable agreements rather than to gain new advantages or influence. Mr. Gorbachev told the Central Committee in February that the key principle “is recogniz-

from the problem of food prices, in turn closely connected to the process of “democratization.” Unless Soviet citizens see improvement in their standard of living the very legitimacy of the regime could be undermined, as the similar regimes in eastern Europe have already found.

I BELIEVE IT TO BE IN THE INTEREST of the West, and indeed of the rest of the world, that Mr. Gorbachev’s revolution continue. The alternative is a relapse into the fortress mentality of earlier days, if not into the tyranny of Stalinism (which is less likely), with a renewed emphasis on economic and military

★ GLASNOST ★



Bob Timney

HAITI: A NATION IN CRISIS

Five months after Leslie Manigat's installation as President of Haiti, what are the chances for democracy?

BY CARY HECTOR

JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER'S flight from Haiti in the early hours of 7 February 1986, a departure facilitated by the good offices of both Washington and Paris, symbolized the collapse of almost thirty years of Duvalier family dictatorship – "hereditary" since 1971, when Papa Doc died. From 1974 on, the Duvalier administration had been subject to demands for "liberalization" both from inside and outside the country, and was severely shaken during the 1980s by a growth in popular opposition as well as conflict within the regime itself.

The years 1983 to 1985 saw a crisis that had two main ingredients: on the one hand since mid-1970 the government had found itself entangled in irreconcilable contradictions as a result of its counterfeit policy of "liberalization-democratization"; on the other was the widespread opposition to the Duvalier regime, accompanied by spontaneous calls for democratization by ever larger sections of the population.

This crisis came to a head in the summer of 1985 when the regime, which was by then almost at the end of its tether, held a popular referendum to set up a supposedly new government which would be partly parliamentary and partly presidential, all the while retaining the "presidency for life" article of the constitution. This manoeuvre boomeranged because it was so blatantly obvious in its intent, and in fact the tactic hastened the collapse of the dictatorship. It seems generally agreed that the beginning of the end for the regime was in November 1985 when the death of four school children during demonstrations in the city of Gonaïves

provoked a succession of popular uprisings.

What followed is well known: by late January and early February 1986 the game was up, particularly when the US government did an about-face on its earlier policy and decided to increase the pressure on Duvalier by withholding half the economic aid it had allotted to Haiti.

But there is more to it than that. At the root of these events is a crisis in Haitian society. After having been collectively gagged by their institutions for many years, and subjected to a system of state terrorism, Haitian society finally exploded.

There is a catchphrase used to describe Haiti – "the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere." The label is backed up by the standard socio-economic indicators: an illiteracy rate of seventy to eighty percent; a life expectancy at birth of fifty-four years; an infant mortality rate of 120 per 1000; and an average per capita income of about \$300 a year.

On the other hand, it is significant that the popular movement of 7 February 1986 was concerned from the very outset with doing more than simply redressing economic injustice. Large sections of the population, who had become aware of the stark contrast between their own utter poverty and the high standard of living of the privileged – five to ten percent of the population controlled fifty to eighty percent of the wealth – took to heart the expression: *fok kat-la-rebat* – "the cards should be reshuffled and dealt again." The expression is revealing for it means that history, their history,

had gone astray and must be put back on track; a view that was by no means shared by all the various leading figures active in the process of transition from Duvalier.

THE DUVALIER DICTATORSHIP collapsed as the result of actions taken by a variety of political forces:

The series of widespread popular uprisings which took place after the "Hunger Riots" in 1984; the action of the Catholic Church – particularly through the intervention of the *Ti-Legliz* (clerical societies) – in helping promote self-awareness and organization, and in acting as a sounding board for popular protest; and the youth movement, which challenged and defied authority by means of marches, protests, open letters, strikes and other similar activities.

In addition to these major forces there were a few other important ingredients worth noting. Due to the nature of the evolving popular movement – its fragmented leadership, its regional tendencies and its sporadic activities – the leaders of the existing "internal opposition" (Grégoire Eugène, Sylvio Claude, Hubert de Ronceray) showed themselves incapable of controlling it. Internal rivalries between those of different clans, different political views and different generations were causing the Duvalier regime to self-destruct. And the continuous criticism and denunciation of the regime voiced by the opposition groups abroad served to keep international public opinion alive to what was going on in Haiti and undermined the government's credibility.

It is now known that the Haitian Armed Forces (the FAD'H) was a decisive factor in the changeover from Duvalier. The Armed Forces

not only initiated "operation-departure" (Jean-Claude's exodus) but also set up the National Governing Council (CNG) that replaced him.

In the end, other political actors subsequently came to the forefront of the political scene as contenders for the new positions of power. Among these were political leaders who had returned from living abroad or from exile – Leslie Manigat among them, spokesmen for the new political parties (Konakom, the Group of 57 etc.), as well as labour leaders and leaders of the peasant movements.

FROM THE MOMENT THE TRANSITION government took office it was faced with popular demands which dominated the political scene right through to the abortive elections of 29 November 1987:

The dismantling of the Duvalier regime ("de-Duvalierization") – the removal of those who had been principally responsible for carrying out its policy in the various state institutions, and their eventual prosecution for corruption; the breaking up of the Tonton Macoutes – that is to say the legal and effective dissolution of the Volunteers for National Security (the VSN as the Macoutes were called originally); a general rise in the standard of living of the majority to be achieved by such urgent measures as lowering prices for staples, increasing the minimum wage, reducing taxes and creating new jobs; and the creation of democratic institutions which would ensure the election of a legitimate government by universal suffrage.

The effect of these far-reaching basic demands was to make the

transition process particularly difficult. It proved inevitable that there would be a conflict between dealing with these calls for reform and the implicit "mission" of the National Governing Council which was widely seen as being the child of the collapsed dictatorship.

From April 1986 onwards the National Governing Council (CNG) – which for all practical purposes is indistinguishable from the Army – retained the political initiative. After an abortive attempt to achieve a political comeback in November 1986, supporters of Duvalier found themselves politically outlawed by Article 291 of the new Constitution, introduced in 1987.

As for the new forces, these covered a wide range, from the traditional political class which had regrouped, to a nebulous conglomerate of organizations and small groups comprising the popular democratic movement. In the case of the former, they were not really political parties rooted in national life but at best an agglomeration of various platforms, generally at the centre or centre-right of the political spectrum, serving mostly as vehicles for the political aspirations of various contenders for office.

The main features of the popular movements were their fragmentation and absence of a central focus. This despite the fact that they were the ideological polar opposites of the Governing Council and the Duvalieriste rear-guard. From these popular movements would emerge the Group of 57 and later, in the autumn 1987, the National Front for Concerted Action (FNC).

On the margins of this game, which had become particularly lively by June 1987, the Catholic Church sometimes encouraged action and sometimes temporized. Through the Conference of Bishops it adopted positions, interpreted the situation to its followers and tried to intervene, but it did not always speak with a united voice. The unions also, particularly CATH (central autonomous union for Haitian workers), would come to play a very active role, though not always a well-advised one, in the political in-fighting with the Governing Council. Another factor in the situation was the influence,

both direct and indirect, which the United States exercised in order to channel the transition process according to its own best interests.

DESPITE ALL THIS ACTIVITY, AFTER the plebiscite on the Constitution of 29 March 1987, the action focussed on the organization of general elections by the Provisional Electoral Council (Conseil Electoral Provisoire or CEP), as laid down by the new constitution. Various incidents set the Provisional Electoral Council and the National Governing Council at odds with each other. After the latter had given in to the Electoral Council's proposal concerning the electoral law – quite a reverse for the CNG – the confrontation between the two entered its last phase, with devastating political and human results: the cancellation of the November elections and the deliberate massacre of electors in the voting booths in Port-au-Prince.

The "elections" which followed on 17 January 1988 under the auspices of a new Electoral council and under the control of the Governing Council conformed to the earlier pattern. Nonetheless, they did at least have the merit of giving rise to new alignments among the forces that had emerged in the transition period. Thus a Committee for Democratic Understanding brought together the leaders of the centre and the centre-right as well as the National Front for Concerted Action. Likewise, a "Manifesto for democracy after the massacre of 29 November" was signed by a variety of groups including Catholic and Protestant religious organizations, unions

representing both workers and peasants, as well as professional associations. This manifesto – which termed the results of the 17 January elections null and void – marked a new solidarity among the opposition forces.

TODAY, MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS after the installation of President Leslie Manigat (he received thirty-four percent of the votes cast on 17 January), what are the chances for democracy in Haiti? First of all it seems clear that in taking what he himself has called the "calculated risk" of playing ball with the Governing Council, in other words with the Armed Forces, Manigat is playing to win, to the considerable dismay of his opponents who thought they enjoyed the support of key figures in the Armed Forces. And he has had to make various compromises and concessions which sooner or later will catch up with him.

On the other hand, Leslie Manigat must have proved a great help to the Armed Forces in helping them escape from the political deadlock of 29 November, especially since the United States – which was no doubt caught unaware by the unexpected magnitude of the disaster – was attracted by the idea of some solution other than that of a Governing Council led by General Namphy. Indeed, compared to his pro-CNG rivals, Manigat has the double advantage of benefitting from valuable international support (the Christian Democrat International and the Socialist International) and of having shown himself sympathetic to those Haitians who had been "led on" by Duvalier.

And what of Haiti's international relations? Some countries such as France, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and Venezuela have essentially accepted the *fait accompli* of Manigat's accession to power. Canada may follow suit in the wake of a report presented to Parliament in late April by M.P. Jean-Guy Hudon.* The US continues to adopt a position of wait and see, while refraining from applying new economic sanctions against Haiti.

Last but not least are the people whose basic demands will be the real test of any progress towards democracy in Haiti. Is there anything new which can be said to the poor to win back their confidence and attract their support?

Manigat has begun a series of televised talks – *Koze anba tonel* (essentially fire-side chats) – which are exercises in truth telling. Having failed to be elected by a clear popular majority, the president of 17 January 1988 is trying to attain a *de facto* legitimacy in order to enhance his constitutional and executive powers.

Leslie Manigat seems sufficiently sure of himself to have stated recently that he intends to serve his complete term of office, "Not a day more, not a day less." Whether he can do so remains to be seen, given the precarious balance of forces of which he was the main beneficiary. The best test of whether he can survive, and for how long, is still whether he can satisfy the basic demands of the poor. It would be one of the strange ironies of history if he succeeds in doing this thanks to the 17 January end-run which the army took around the Haitian constitution. □

*Report of the Parliamentary Group on Haiti, Jean-Guy Hudon, M.P. – Chairman, Ottawa, April 1988.


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(Translation by Mary Taylor and Michael Bryans)



GIVE THE UN SOME TERRITORY TO RUN

Canada could solve its Arctic sovereignty conundrum with a daring act of internationalism – give ownership of most of the Arctic archipelago to the United Nations.

BY CLYDE SANGER

THIS ARTICLE IS DELIBERATELY provocative. After all, what is there left to be? Many high strategists and others have had a bite at the Arctic, and penned thousands of words about the importance of asserting Canada's sovereign rights against (almost) all comers, or about the possibility of making the Arctic a demilitarized zone or some sort of nuclear weapon-free zone. I shall summarize the most noted of these schemes and then take a wild leap off the ice-cap.

Hanna Newcombe was one of the first into the Circle, in 1980. Her plan for a nuclear weapon-free zone North of 60 has often been cited, and criticized. If the line were rigidly along that parallel, it would include the Kola Peninsula where half the Soviet submarine fleet is based, and the Soviet military would understandably object. If the line were, as she said later, "flexible," all sorts of people would object to its waviness.

The scheme of Owen Wilkes, a New Zealander who worked for a time with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, has been criticized from another standpoint. His Circumpolar Demilitarized Zone left the Barents Sea as a submarine sanctuary and also did not touch the larger radar stations which the United States operates from Alaska to northern England.

Ronald Purver, writing for the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament in May 1987, concluded that "the most promising approach to Arctic arms control is to avoid Arctic-specific measures per se, and to concentrate instead on arms control measures of wider applicability." This

was good cautionary stuff, but not very encouraging for those who say, "We have to start somewhere." Later, in an Occasional Paper for CIIPS, Purver embraced the idea of excluding submarines from a "stand-off zone" of up to 2,500 kilometres off a foreign coast, and also accepted a scheme for submarine sanctuaries in the Arctic – both in the name of confidence-building measures. Well, good luck if he can make superpowers play to such rules!

Meanwhile in June 1987 came the Defence White Paper, announcing plans to acquire ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines. We are all still wondering what they will do if they meet other countries' submarines under the Arctic ice. Department of National Defence strategists admit, in private, that the submarines make no sense militarily but have a political significance, presumably in this business of asserting sovereignty, in company with the Class 8 ice-breaker. The White Paper raises a concern about Soviet submarines using the Northwest Passage to break out into the Atlantic to attack convoys of other ships. David Cox says there is "not a shred of evidence" that Soviet submarines have yet gone through the Passage, but suggests that the Canadian military may need to familiarize itself with these waters in order to mine the egress into the Arctic Basin to stop westbound US submarines, which assuredly have gone through these waters without a word to their dearest ally.

The New Democratic Party policy statement this past April, *Canada's Stake in Common*

Security, argues that the Arctic is "a more volatile area" than Central Europe. An NDP government would "redeploy" our 7,200 troops now in Germany, but not necessarily in the Arctic. Who, after all, wants to fight on foot, or in tanks, there? Its main Arctic concern would be to build with Nordic neighbours a "cooperation and security regime," and lobby hard to control or eliminate the sophisticated generation of cruise missiles coming over the technological horizon. These are virtuous intentions, if a little vague.

Among other schemes for demilitarization, Franklyn Griffiths came up in 1979 with the idea of a demilitarized zone seaward of everyone's 200-mile economic zone. Purver, saying this was too modest, suggested it should be seaward of the 12-mile territorial sea.

And then there are Mikhail Gorbachev's six proposals in his speech of last October in Mursk. They are for (1) a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe; (2) an endorsement of the Finnish proposal to restrict naval activity "in the seas washing the shores of Northern Europe;" (3) peaceful co-operation in developing the resources of the North, the Arctic; (4) a conference in 1988 to co-ordinate scientific research in the Arctic; (5) co-operation of the northern countries in environmental protection; and (6) depending on a political thaw, the opening up of what he calls the North Sea Route (i.e. the Northeast Passage) to foreign ships, with the aid of Soviet ice-breakers.

At the Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues in Tromsø in December 1987,

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark criticized the first two points in these words: "Mr. Gorbachev appears to focus exclusively on the Western Arctic without discussing the Barents Sea or other waters adjacent to the USSR. He does not offer any detail as to how a ban on naval activity would be verified or enforced." So he said Canada had asked the Soviet authorities for clarification on these points.

Mr. Clark did, however, welcome all the ideas about co-operation, and indeed ended his own speech with a page about co-operation – in sharing information, experience and technology, in learning lessons from the Inuit and the Saami, and so on. Earlier, he had repeated the government's "four broad themes" of its comprehensive northern foreign policy: affirming Canadian sovereignty, modernizing defences, extending circumpolar co-operation and preparing for the commercial use of the Northwest Passage.

SO WE COME TO THE ISSUE OF THE Northwest Passage. Throughout the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS-3) Canada managed to stay out of the discussion on international straits. It now says that the Passage runs through internal waters. In an article in the *Globe and Mail* of 10 November 1987 Franklyn Griffiths produced a scheme for winning US acknowledgement of Canadian sovereignty over the surface waters of the archipelago, in order to create "an international regime for safe and efficient commercial navigation in the Arctic waters of North America." The agreement would make no mention of activities below the surface, so that Canada

could go on claiming exclusive jurisdiction while the US submarines went freely (and secretly) to and fro. Canada would have sensors at chokepoints to monitor what was around, and would have barriers of some sort ready to stop "hostile submarine activity in crisis or war."


The Canadian government has fallen short of even this position. In the agreement signed in mid-January Washington does not acknowledge Canadian sovereignty even over the surface waters, but will merely seek Canada's consent for any transit by its ice-breakers. In fact, that is almost identical to practice in any so-called "international straits" or, in UNCLOS parlance, "straits used for international navigation" where the passage runs between two or more states (Malacca, Gibraltar, Tiran or wherever). So, in preparing for the commercial use of the Northwest Passage, Joe Clark appears simply to be turning it into an international strait. His first "broad theme" of affirming Canadian sovereignty is therefore being discarded in the very part of the Arctic most likely to be visited frequently by foreign vessels (or any foreigners).

At least, Joe Clark is discarding it as far as the Americans are concerned. My own idea would be to pick up from his apparently "continentalist" stance and make it truly internationalist.

I SUGGEST THAT WE OFFER TO THE United Nations all of the Arctic archipelago north of the Parry Channel (a sea channel that bisects the Arctic from east to west at about 74 degrees north) to be International Territory, just as Antarctica has always been. This is the ultimate gesture in co-operation, to give up claims of sovereignty while assuring everybody that we will take part in positive activities of scientific research, environmental protection and ecologically sound development.

The friendlier critics will say: why not bargain with other countries to do something similar at the same time? Why throw away a strong card in the diplomatic game? Well, it would be great if

some other country were inspired to make a similar move – but we could also just wait forever, and miss the opportunity. The fact is, we can do something about this archipelago and we cannot expect to achieve a demilitarized zone over other peoples' territory by drawing circles and making nice speeches. Demilitarization has to start somewhere, and why not with us, who happen to be blessed with a big enough chunk of terri-



Marcel Dunoyer

tory we can "give away" to make a splash in the world?

To address the critics who think always of "bottom lines," what actually do we lose by offering it to the United Nations? Of course, there are minerals in the High Arctic – we have (at enormous cost) extracted some oil, and there is the Polaris lead-zinc mine, and the town of Resolute (now called Qausuittuq). And we would lose the right to draw a 200-mile economic zone around the whole archipelago. But why do we feel the need to claim all this sea-area? Again, in 1920 Norway signed a treaty with eight other countries allowing them (and the Soviet Union after 1925) to exploit minerals on Svalbard (formerly Spitsbergen). We would just be going one step further than Norway, in disclaiming sovereignty.

On the other side of the ledger, we would not feel obliged to defend it militarily against any invader or encroacher. We could share other costs – such as environmental protection measures – with a group of states interested in the area.

The important advantages, however, are not cuts in the budget of DND or Environment Canada. Here are a few of the real gains:

The move would strengthen the position of internationalists when the Antarctic Treaty comes up for review in 1990 and that continent is in danger of a carve-up.

It would present the United Nations with a splendid problem: how to maintain as demilitarized a zone which is under its own con-

the United Nations proved to be hopelessly disorganized or unready, we could withdraw the offer just before the date for handing over.

Pessimists will say: "Well, obviously the UN can't handle it. Look what happened over Namibia." It's true that 112 countries, including Canada and the United States, voted in 1966 to terminate South Africa's mandate over South West Africa and make it the "direct responsibility" of the UN to lead that country to independence. But it was a quite different line-up then from today on Arctica: South Africa was determined to remain in possession, Britain was preoccupied with the Rhodesian rebellion and the United States and Canada soon cooled off the issue and refused to become members of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

We might, just might, start a fashion for handing over bits of territory, which could then be demilitarized. Denmark might quickly follow with northern Greenland. More fanciful are thoughts about the United Kingdom shedding Northern Ireland... or the Falklands.

control and is much more strategically located than Antarctica? Is it so unlikely that the two superpowers would decide it was in their mutual interest to devise a set of measures for verifying that it continues to be demilitarized? Could this also include the Northwest Passage? Why ever not? Disarmament Ambassador Doug Roche has been talking about an International Verification Organization. Maybe this new UN territory of (let's call it) Arctica could provide the start of his IVO.

It would give the United Nations a kick-start in the business of co-operation over an area of "commons." We all thought the Seabed in "the area beyond national jurisdiction" was going to be the part of the globe where this would begin, but the International Seabed Authority is still waiting in the wings (or on the Jamaican water-front). The Seabed Authority will not come into being until after sixty countries have ratified the Law of the Sea Convention and, after five years, only thirty-five countries have done so. Canada can give a deadline to co-operation over Arctica simply by announcing a handover date. Of course, we could add a "fail-safe" device: if

HOW, FINALLY, WOULD THE UNITED Nations administer Arctica? Well, there still exists the underemployed Trusteeship Council, comprising all member states. Or it could have a special trusteeship committee of a smaller number of states. These could be the seven states with territory north of the 60th parallel, or the seven member states with the highest population density (Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Malta, Mauritius, the Netherlands and Singapore, since you ask), or any appropriate mixture.

So that's it: I suggest that Canada, with its long-held commitment to internationalism, should be the first country to offer to the United Nations a substantial part of its territory. (I don't count the US gift of the property now occupied by UN headquarters on Turtle Bay in Manhattan. Maybe I should. So we would be the second.) I believe I have made my point. □

NATO FISSURES

After almost forty years, cracks are appearing in the North Atlantic alliance. Unlike all previous crises this one is about basic values and beliefs.

BY FEN OSLER HAMPSON

IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR THE heads of government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met to reaffirm Alliance unity and reassert support for strategic arms reductions with the Soviet Union, the elimination of chemical weapons, and negotiations with the Soviets on conventional arms reductions in Europe. The communique issued by the leaders expressed continued support for policies that were first enunciated in the mid-1960s: the future of NATO must be based on an "appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary." The summit failed to come to grips with the tough issues facing the Alliance such as whether and how to modernize NATO short-range tactical nuclear weapons. The shop-worn rhetoric about "Alliance unity" and a "watershed" in East-West relations, served merely as a reminder that the rifts in the Alliance are widening in the absence of strong leadership, imagination, and political foresight.

There have been crises and then there have been crises in NATO. In the mid-1960s, there was the crisis over the ill-fated Multi-lateral Force – essentially a fight between Americans and some European allies over who got to control US nuclear weapons based in Europe. More recently there was the crisis over what to do about the growing number of Soviet SS-20 missiles. And then there was another crisis when the Alliance finally decided to respond by deploying its own intermediate-range missiles – Cruise and Pershing II.

These past crises were mostly over means: how to implement

already agreed NATO strategy and how to respond to the Soviet threat. They never really threatened the unity of the Alliance because there was always general agreement about the ends and goals. The Alliance was held together by a kind of political glue or articles of faith shared by all of its members. What were they?

THE FIRST ARTICLE OF FAITH WAS a shared belief in the severity of "the Soviet threat." As long as Brezhnev and Gromyko were in charge, the anti-Western orientation of Soviet policy kept NATO together. The Soviets helped create this sense of threat with their conventional force buildup and modernization in the 1970s and the deployment of their SS-20s. Most Europeans believed that the Soviets would cross the inter-German border and invade Western Europe if they had half a chance and that the Warsaw Pact had the "overwhelming conventional superiority" necessary to do so. Soviet actions in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere reinforced NATO's fears even though NATO's members were not united about what to do in response.

The second article of faith was enshrined in the doctrine of "flexible response." Although NATO thinking began to move away from the doctrine of "massive retaliation" in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the new approach was not formally expressed until 1967. Flexible response meant that NATO would respond to a Warsaw Pact attack initially with conventional forces and then, if necessary, with nuclear weapons. It was a doctrine which recognized the

need for "proportionality" – fitting the level of retaliation to the level of attack – if NATO had to defend itself against invasion.

Flexible response meant different things to different people, however. To Europeans, it meant "go nuclear early" because that was good for deterrence – keeping the Soviets from attacking in the first place. To Americans, it meant "don't go nuclear early and leave yourself enough time to think about it." Flexible response was cloaked in ambiguity but it was an ambiguity that everyone could live with.

The third article of faith was that the United States would use nuclear weapons in Western Europe's defence; in this way, America's national fortunes were inextricably tied to Europe's. Some had reservations about the credibility of the American guarantee to risk all-out nuclear war with the Soviets in order to defend Europe, but they were a minority.

THESE ARTICLES OF FAITH ARE NOW seriously eroded. The current crisis is not a political crisis like the others. It is an internal crisis of values and beliefs. NATO's political glue is drying out and the cracks are beginning to appear.

In the first place, the Gorbachev revolution is undermining NATO's shared perception of the Soviet threat. Its most visible manifestation is the great change in Soviet political rhetoric. The Soviets now talk about "global interdependence," "reasonable sufficiency," and "non-provocative defence" when referring to matters of security in Europe. It is seductive talk to the Europeans and we are witnessing a new and extremely vigorous round of *Ostpolitik* (West

Germany's early 1970s initiative for better political and trade relations with Eastern Europe and the USSR) as the Soviets press for closer trade and economic links with Western Europe. It is surely a sign that times are changing when Bavarian leader Franz Josef Strauss, one of West Germany's staunchest cold warriors, returns from Moscow, as he did recently, singing Gorbachev's praises while saying that President Reagan is "unpredictable." Washington is slower to see change and more skeptical of Gorbachev than Europe. But the intermediate-range missile treaty has reinforced Western European perceptions that Gorbachev is serious about arms



control and perhaps even limited or partial disarmament.

The second article of faith, "flexible response," is also coming under serious question. The allergy to nuclear weapons has grown enormously in the past decade among America's political elites. The intermediate-range forces agreement per se does not make much of a difference to the overall strategic equation or to the

doctrine of flexible response. (NATO will still be able to attack targets in the Soviet Union with its F-111 bombers based in Britain. US submarine-launched ballistic missiles committed to NATO also provide an invulnerable retaliatory force.) But at the level of perceptions, the treaty does matter.

Nuclear weapons are in the process of being de-legitimized and some view the recent agreement on European missiles as further confirmation that nuclear weapons are not viable instruments of military force. It is unprecedented to see former American secretaries of state and defence, and former national security advisers saying that no president would ever authorize a first-use of nuclear weapons. Ronald Reagan's strategic defence initiative is, among other things, an attempt to develop a technological fix to this dilemma.

All of this has made some Europeans very nervous. Traditionally, Western Europeans have placed great stock in nuclear weapons because they have made up for perceived deficiencies in

cess of nuclear disarmament to go even further.

In Germany, a variety of politicians, including Christian Democrats and right-wing leaders, would like arms control to extend to the third category of nuclear weapons, the short-range systems under 500 kilometres. Others, especially moderates, are saying "enough is enough"; NATO should keep its short-range nuclear forces (like the Lance missile) and deploy new missiles in the 300-400 kilometre range.

The British are divided along party lines. Labour would like to rid nuclear weapons from British soil. The Conservatives want to halt nuclear reductions.

Among the smaller NATO countries, Denmark is actively flirting with a policy that would ban visits in peacetime by ships carrying nuclear weapons. Both the UK and the US have warned Denmark that this would undermine the unity of the Alliance. A similar step two years ago taken by New Zealand caused the United States to sever its defence relations with New Zealand enshrined in the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US) agreement.

The French are openly hostile to current developments. President Mitterand was cautiously favourable about the treaty, and only former President Giscard d'Estaing has openly embraced it. France worries deeply that the superpowers will make further deals behind Europe's back. The French are perhaps the only unconditional believers in nuclear deterrence. They maintain that conventional deterrence never has and never will work; nuclear weapons have preserved the peace in Europe and as they see it, the only way to keep the peace in the future is to have more.

On the conventional forces side the picture is not much clearer. There is a lot of talk on both sides of the Atlantic about improving conventional forces and combining this with reductions in nuclear weapons through arms control, as a solution to perceived Soviet superiority. But where will the money come from for more tanks, aircraft, and soldiers? With the existing American budget deficit any sort of ambitious conventional force

modernization programme led by the US is simply unaffordable.

In Europe, in addition to budgetary problems, declining birthrates will mean less manpower for defence as we go into the 1990s. Measures to increase short-term volunteers, lengthen terms of enlistment, and extend the time of conscript service will be politically and fiscally troublesome. The demographics are better in the United States, however, the policy of the all-volunteer army makes it difficult to expand the size of forces beyond current levels. In short, conventional forces are part of the problem not the solution.

The failure of fifteen years of mutual and balanced force reduction talks to produce an agreement does not augur well for a coherent NATO policy on conventional forces. In the absence of new ideas, the danger grows that Gorbachev will seize the political (and propaganda) initiative with his own proposals.

WITHOUT A RENEWED VISION FOR NATO what fundamental changes brought on through sheer political inertia can we expect to see in the Alliance? First, some reduction in the American troop commitment to Europe is inevitable. American elites and the public increasingly believe (rightly or wrongly) they are being taken for a ride by the European allies. Under growing budgetary pressures it will become increasingly difficult to maintain US forces at their current levels in Europe unless Americans are persuaded that Europeans are doing more for their own defence.

Second, the old trans-Atlantic consensus will be profoundly tested by growing economic protectionism in the United States and the possibility of trade restrictions. In the past, the political and military coherence of the Alliance in the face of the Soviet threat, moderated economic grievances and tendencies to mud-slinging. With this political glue cracking, economic stresses and strains will only make these cracks bigger.

Third, American interests and priorities are shifting toward the Pacific. The recently released report of a high-level US commis-

sion on long-term strategic planning (*Discriminate Deterrence* by Fred Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter) emphasizes the growing importance of US national interests in the Pacific and other regions outside of Europe. It reflects a broad consensus among US foreign-policy elites that the risks of war in Central Europe are no longer what they once were and that the arena of East-West competition has shifted elsewhere.

Fourth, trans-Atlantic divisions are bound to be accentuated as a new generation comes to power in Europe. The best and brightest of Western Europe's "Vietnam generation" are much less enamoured with America than their parents. In recent polls taken in West Germany about fifty-five percent of highly educated West Germans under the age of thirty-five held a low opinion of the United States while this unfavourable opinion was shared by only fifteen to thirty percent of all other age groups and educational levels.

Fifth, the levels of co-operation on defence matters among the European allies will grow as they lose confidence in American leadership. The Alliance is not about to disintegrate. But we may well see the so-called European pillar strengthen while trans-Atlantic ties fray and weaken.

FOR A COUNTRY LIKE CANADA THIS will create special problems. If the US begins to reduce the size of its ground forces in Europe, there may well be public pressure in Canada to do the same. But this is only one of several possibilities: we may want to keep things the way they are; or perhaps even increase the size of our commitment. Another option – especially if we increase the size of our reserves as contemplated by the government's White Paper on Defence – would be to dedicate a portion of those reserves for Europe and NATO. But if we do that we will have to think about how we could get them over there quickly in times of crisis.

Whatever we do, it will matter. And it will matter more in the current environment because of increasing tensions and sensitivity on both sides of the Atlantic about NATO's future. □



the conventional balance of forces, and now they see the nuclear rug being pulled out from under them.

With the intermediate-range missiles out of the way, sights are once again turning to the balance of conventional forces in Central Europe and how the rest of NATO's nuclear forces fit in. It is striking how little consensus there is on this issue. Some, like the NATO defence ministers, favour continued modernization of NATO's remaining nuclear assets. Others challenge modernization on the grounds that it will create more domestic political trouble than it's worth. Some would like the pro-

LETTER FROM JERUSALEM BY VÉRA MURRAY



One has only to climb the hill of Abu Tor, ten minutes from the centre of Jerusalem, to see in a single glance one of the most memorable landscapes in the world...

In the distance lie the mountains of Moab, the hollow of the Dead Sea, and the desert of Judea; closer at hand can be seen the valley of Cedron, the Mount of Olives, the Garden of Gethsemane and the al-Aqsa Mosque. The ramparts of the old city are in a "no man's land"; here, from 1948 to 1967 lay the frontier between two enemy states – Jordan and the young Jewish state of Israel.

It was as impenetrable a frontier as that which still exists in Berlin. No Israeli had access to the Wailing Wall, Jewry's most venerated site, until the end of the Six Day War in June 1967; a hysterical crowd rushed towards it. Israel conquered and occupied the whole of the West Bank, including the Old City which had been in the hands of the Palestinians.

Israel's territory is very small – in some spots only twenty kilometres wide. And for a few years after the war these areas of biblical beauty were part of what Israelis considered their home. Israelis went there for picnics and to make exotic purchases – and they often behaved not as visitors but as if they owned the place. But little by little, as Palestinian resistance grew, the Israelis began once again to draw back into their territory and their claustrophobia. Today, after six months of violent uprisings in the occupied territories, the imaginary frontier is back in place.

In the Abu Tor district, the Jews living on En Rogel street, in the former no man's land, never set foot in the Arab village three hundred metres down the road.

Every day, from the terrace of the cinema built on the side of Abu Tor, Jewish intellectuals admire the magnificent panorama of the Old City as if it were the backdrop in a theatre. Most of them have not been there for years. It is only the Orthodox Jews who still visit the Wailing Wall. Obligated by religious duty, they go by the safest possible route. Near the ramparts a group of Israeli schoolchildren goes for a walk in the direction of the Arab villages; they are accompanied by guards armed with sub-machine guns. As a foreigner I visit the Old City regularly without ever encountering any danger, and my Israeli acquaintances treat me as either a fool or a heroine for doing so.

One can easily live in Jerusalem – and this is even truer of Tel Aviv – without having to concern oneself with what goes on in the occupied territories. Many Israelis have never set foot in them.

One can easily live in Jerusalem – and this is even truer of Tel Aviv – without having to concern oneself with what goes on in the occupied territories. Many Israelis have never set foot in them. An Israeli journalist confided to me that "In their minds it's as far away as the Himalayas." They keep to pre-1967 Israel, and with a greater feeling of security because their country is now protected by a buffer controlled by the Israeli army. Those who do go regularly to the West Bank admire the space and the beauty, without paying any attention to the inhabitants or ever really talking to one of them. Others live there and buy a low-priced bungalow, but act as if the

local population didn't exist. Still others, with Bible in hand as if it were a kind of property deed become outright colonizers and arrogant neighbours for the Arab villagers. In their own eyes all they are doing is reclaiming Jewish land which their ancestors cultivated more than two thousand years ago.

After six months of *intifadah* it is no longer possible to ignore the Palestinians. First adolescents and then women and children have taken to throwing stones at Israeli soldiers and at the armed settlers. They have even killed some. A single Israeli death weighs heavily in the balance compared to dozens of Palestinian deaths. That number rises daily, but it is an abstract figure which arouses little emotion in Israel.

As far as Israelis are concerned, it is quite simply a matter of their survival. The death of one Jew provokes a national psychosis, a deep-seated feeling of insecurity.

A minority of left-wing intellectuals asks disturbing questions for which they have no answers. Encounters with my Israeli friends are no longer enjoyable, for inevitably they pour out to strangers their depression and their guilt. They take part in demonstrations and they sign petitions; the men await with profound distress their annual call-up as army reservists. What if they find themselves holding a loaded machine gun facing a group of Palestinians?

According to public opinion polls Israelis fall into two groups. One half, like Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, is not willing to yield an inch and refuses to negotiate with the Palestinians. The other half supports the plan put forward by US Secretary of State George Shultz, which involves negotiating with the Palestinians to partition the territories. But what sort of solution is this? The most that the Israeli doves are willing to concede does not come close to the basic minimum demanded by the Palestinians. There can be no question of giving back all the territory that was taken in 1967, particularly the Golan, or of returning to the previous state of insecurity, to sleepless nights in the frontier kibbutzim subject to attacks by Palestinian commandos.

In their camps in the West Bank, in Gaza, or in Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees pass on to their children and grandchildren the legend of the old country; they dream of their orange groves and the homes left in Israel, and of places where in fact every trace of their existence has long since been obliterated. Two peoples lay claim to the same land and violence widens the gap between them still further. □

(Translation by Mary Taylor)

Véra Murray has been Paris correspondent for L'Actualité, since 1983. She now lives in Jerusalem.

REPORT FROM THE HILL



Submarines

The single most contentious peace and security issue on the Hill continued to be the government's planned purchase of nuclear-powered submarines – with almost everyone having an opinion.

In mid-February the Canadian Council of Churches released a letter to the Prime Minister signed by twelve religious leaders including representatives of the Roman Catholic, United, Anglican, Lutheran and Presbyterian churches. The letter said the submarines were a violation of Canada's own trade policy in nuclear materials and that their purchase threatened to pull Canada into "a dangerous and provocative maritime strategy." The letter was denounced by *Montreal Gazette* columnist William Johnson as "moralistic rubbish."

The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (CCACD) released a study at the end of February which concluded that operating costs could drive total spending for the submarine project far beyond the official estimate of \$8 billion. This complemented concerns expressed in another Centre report that building a nuclear-powered submarine fleet would threaten the spirit of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The report said that fuel for the submarines would not be subject to verification or inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is charged with administering the treaty. In a *Globe and Mail* article of 12 May the two authors of the CCACD report maintained that while Canada has no intention of diverting nuclear material to making bombs, by taking advantage of a weakness in the Non-proliferation Treaty and keeping the arrangement for the materials strictly

between itself and its eventual partner in the submarine deal (UK or France), Canada is setting a bad precedent.

In an address to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs on 26 March, a former Chief of Defence Staff, General Gérard Thériault, while noting that the acquisition of nuclear submarines would greatly enhance Canada's maritime defence capability, went on to say that, "it could turn out to be an unaffordable extravagance in a defence budget that is very modest. It's not the only requirement we have."

Even the British weekly *The Economist* had a view. Quoted in a Canadian Press item of 12 May, *The Economist* called the planned purchase "astonishing" and suggested that a buildup of its land and air forces in West Germany would be a more valuable contribution to NATO.

Not all the opinion was negative. Testifying before the House Committee on Defence, Rod Byers of the York University Centre for International and Strategic Studies, supported the planned submarine purchase because it would give Canada the ability to "operate independently in a high-threat maritime environment." According to the *Globe and Mail* of 6 May, Mr. Byers went on to stress that Canada should be able to operate its naval forces independently from those of its NATO allies. And writing also in the *Globe and Mail*, this time on 12 May, retired Vice-Admiral D. N. Mainguy (Vice-Chief of Defence Staff until 1985) maintained that much of the information employed by various groups participating in the public discussion of the submarines was technically incorrect. "The federal Government is choosing between two good submarines that have proved themselves at sea . . . And we need them."

In an appearance before the House Defence Committee on

7 March, Perrin Beatty, the Minister of National Defence, stoutly defended the government's \$8 billion estimate for the project. He said there had been "rather misinformed reporting on the subject of costs"; that the submarines are affordable and would "not detract from projects being proposed by the army and the air force"; and that the \$8 billion figure does not include operating and maintenance costs in as much as it is standard practice that announcements for Crown projects to "specify the costs of acquiring the equipment."

In the matter of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Mr. Beatty said that Canadian handling of the submarines' nuclear materials "would be entirely consistent with our non-proliferation obligations." In response to questions from Liberal MP Douglas Frith Mr. Beatty replied: "If the NPT had been designed, . . . to outlaw in some way the use of nuclear propulsion for military vessels it would have said so . . . What we will demonstrate is that a country that . . . uses nuclear energy for both civil and military purposes is capable of using them consistent with the spirit of the NPT . . ."

NDP Defence Policy

On 16 April the New Democratic Party Federal Council adopted a report of the party's international affairs committee as an official expression of party policy. The NDP maintained its plan to withdraw from NATO should it become the government, but promised to delay a pullout until a second term of office. Other major elements of the policy included a significant restructuring of Canadian land forces and a substitution of diesel-electric submarines for the government's plans for nuclear-powered subs.

Press reaction to the new approach was mixed. James Bagnall, defence correspondent for the *Financial Post*, said the new policy contrasted sharply with the Party's response last summer to the gov-

ernment's defence white paper mainly in substantial defence expenditures the NDP now proposes. The *Toronto Star* and *Winnipeg Free Press* accused the party of "fudging" its stand on NATO while Lysiane Gagnon writing in *La Presse* called it "another good case of electoral opportunism." The *Edmonton Journal*, however, commented that the new policy "sheds the cloak of idealism; it moves away from the starry-eyed resolutions of the past and toward reality." (For more on nuclear-powered submarines and Opposition defence policies, see "Defence Notes" – page 16)

Short Notes from the Hill

On 29 January the House of Commons agreed to form a Special Committee to examine and report on the Central American peace process. The committee, headed by former Speaker of the House John Bosley, began hearings in March charged with finding a way for Canada to help sustain the momentum of the Arias Peace Plan by assisting "in the design and possibly implementation of verification and control mechanisms or through other confidence-building measures." The Committee visited the region from 8 to 18 May and is expected to issue an interim report by the end of June.

The government agreed on 28 April to send five officers from the Canadian Armed Forces for up to one year as part of a multinational UN team of some fifty military personnel that will observe the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The United Nations Good Offices Mission (UNGOMAP) is expected to watch peacefully from the sidelines the withdrawal of 150,000 Soviet troops by the end of 1988, in accordance with a UN-mediated agreement signed 14 April in Geneva by Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States. □

– GREGORY WIRICK

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Spring began with reaffirmations of the hope, expressed at the December Washington Summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, that a START Treaty could be readied in time for signature at the June Summit in Moscow. However, by the end of April, little progress had been made and officials had all but ruled out the signing of a formal treaty at the Moscow Summit.

The joint draft texts of two protocols, one on inspection and one on weapons conversion or elimination, and a memorandum of understanding on data exchange were prepared in time for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in late March. However, according to US Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway, the number of brackets (indicating points of disagreement) was "almost beyond counting." On other outstanding issues, there were the following developments:

SLCM verification: senior Soviet officials have described controls on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) as the key remaining obstacle to an agreement. In March the Soviets proposed a joint test in the Mediterranean of a "remote-sensing" system to detect the presence of nuclear-armed SLCMs aboard ships. The US refused, on the grounds that such a system "simply won't work";

Mobile ICBMs: the Soviets have proposed a sub-limit of 800 warheads to be carried on such missiles, as compared to continued US insistence on an outright ban. As a means of verifying the numbers of mobile ICBMs, the Soviets

have proposed limiting their operating areas and production, as well as periodically displaying them for satellite observation;

ALCM limits: the US is now willing to attribute ten (rather than six) air-launched cruise missiles to each cruise missile-equipped bomber, for purposes of counting under the overall ceiling of 6,000 strategic warheads. The USSR continues to insist on counting the number actually carried, which, in the case of American aircraft, ranges from twelve for the B-52G to as many as 22 for the B-1B. As for the difficulty of distinguishing between nuclear- and conventionally armed versions of the ALCM, the US has proposed that all existing long-range ALCMs be considered nuclear, while new types of ALCMs incorporate features (so-called "functionally related observable differences," or FRODs) to distinguish between nuclear and conventional versions. Under the US plan, nuclear ALCM-carrying aircraft would also have to have distinguishable features and be kept at separate bases. The initial Soviet reaction to the proposal, made at the April meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze, was reported as "skeptical."

Considering the slow pace of the negotiations, senior Soviet officials in late April were predicting that a START Treaty would not be signed until after a new American Administration takes over in early 1989.

(See the cover story in this issue of *Peace&Security* for more on the strategic arms talks.)

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Ratification

As the date of the Moscow Summit fast approached, ratification of the INF Treaty signed at last December's Washington Summit ran into some unexpected roadblocks. The US Administration had been strongly urging the Senate to approve the Treaty before the Moscow Summit. President Reagan warning that it would otherwise "put a strain on" that

meeting. Attempts led by Senator Jesse Helms to add so-called "killer amendments" to the Treaty – requiring renegotiation with the USSR – were defeated at the Committee stage. All three Senate committees that have held hearings on the Treaty (Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence) voted overwhelmingly to approve it, as did the House of Representatives – a purely symbolic move, as it has no formal role in treaty ratification.

At one point it appeared that Committee chairmen had agreed that the only "condition" to accompany ratification was one which would prohibit the President from reinterpreting the treaty in the future without Senate approval. The condition would be binding on the US administration but would not require Soviet agreement. This issue arose as a result of the Reagan Administration's attempt to "reinterpret" the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.

In addition, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn, raised the issue of whether the treaty's prohibitions would apply to so-called "futuristic" technologies, e.g., intermediate- or shorter-range weapons that would destroy their targets by means of lasers, particle-beams, microwaves, or kinetic kill, rather than nuclear or conventional explosives. The Administration succeeded in obtaining a letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze affirming that the USSR shared the US interpretation that such weapons were indeed banned. However, this failed to satisfy Senator Nunn who, as late as 29 April was still proposing that an amendment be attached to the treaty for this purpose.

Meanwhile, differences over the treaty's detailed verification provisions arose in April during technical talks between the two countries on implementation of

the agreement. The most important issues were said to be:

(1) whether Americans would be allowed to inspect structures and vehicles large enough to conceal small rocket stages, but not entire missiles; (2) whether inspectors would be allowed access to the entire area within boundaries drawn around Soviet installations, or only to designated buildings within the area; (3) whether one side would have a right of veto over the use of certain monitoring equipment at inspection sites, such as cameras; and (4) the nature of US inspection rights outside the Soviet missile assembly plant at Votkinsk.

On April 29 Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd announced that he was willing to bring the treaty to the Senate floor on 11 May, provided that the Administration could resolve four outstanding issues: (1) the differences over verification provisions; (2) written clarification from the USSR that the ban applied to futuristic weapons, as well as a more precise definition of "weapon"; (3) the verifiability of a ban on "futuristics"; and (4) an Administration commitment to upgrade the satellite surveillance systems used in verification of the Treaty.

On 8 May Soviet Ambassador Dubinin delivered a formal response to nine separate verification issues raised by the State Department. The next day, after members of the Intelligence Committee had been briefed on the response, they described it as "unsatisfactory." Apart from failing to endorse the US interpretation on every issue, the Soviets had reportedly made entirely new demands, such as the right to inspect old West German Pershing IA missiles stored in the US but not mentioned in the Treaty. As this column was going to press, Senate floor action on the Treaty had been postponed once again, this time with White House approval.

Nevertheless, early news from the final pre-summit meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze in Geneva May 11 and 12 indicated that remaining differences between the superpowers had been resolved. Shultz is quoted as saying: "I think when the Senators see it [the agreement] they will see we've answered the questions properly."

Defence and Space Arms

By the beginning of May, no progress had been reported on the critical question of limiting the testing of ballistic missile defences in outer space. Following each of the monthly Shultz-Shevardnadze ministerial meetings, negotiators were instructed to accelerate efforts to draft a joint text of a separate agreement based loosely on the December 1987 Washington summit communique. The problem was then, and continues to be, that the two sides cannot agree on precisely what is permitted by the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In particular, the Reagan Administration has adopted, but not yet put into effect, a controversial reinterpretation of the treaty that would permit unrestricted testing in outer space of so-called "exotic" defences, such as lasers.

The US was reported to have rejected Soviet proposals to carry over the vague language of the December 1987 communique, on the grounds that "reasonable clarity" was necessary to avoid future misunderstandings. At the March ministerial meeting in Washington, the US proposed a number of new ideas on space testing, including exempting space-based sensors from the ABM Treaty and permitting the testing of a limited number of space weapons within a designated "space testing range." However, the latter idea was later reported to have been dropped, in favour of a "less restrictive approach" requiring each side simply to "give the other side notice about the nature of the test after launching a missile carrying test devices."

On 31 March the USSR introduced a detailed proposal on inspection of space launches to verify

a ban on weapons in space. It included provision of advance information to an International Space Inspectorate; the "permanent presence of inspector groups at all sites for the launching of space objects to verify all such objects irrespective of launch vehicles"; inspections at "agreed-upon depots, industrial enterprises, in laboratories and test centres"; and "verification of unannounced launchings from undeclared launch sites through snap on-site inspections."

Early Warning

June-August:	Summer session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Geneva
July 25 - August 5:	CD Group of Seismic Experts' meeting
Before October 2:	Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty Review Conference

As this column was going to press, US officials indicated that they did not intend to present any new proposals of their own at the final pre-summit meeting in mid-May.

Nuclear Testing

Following their February meeting in Washington, Shultz and Shevardnadze called on their negotiators to complete the drafting of verification protocols for the 1974 Threshold Test Ban (TTB) and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) treaties for consideration at the next ministerial meeting. The treaties, imposing a limit of 150 kilotons on underground nuclear explosions, have never been ratified. The US has insisted that their verification provisions be improved, and last year the USSR agreed to do so in the context of talks looking to a total ban on nuclear testing.

Early hopes that Gorbachev and Reagan would be able to exchange instruments of ratification during the Moscow Summit were soon dashed. On 9 March, the US was reported to have introduced more stringent verification requirements for the TTBT than previously, including a right to on-site observation of all tests over 50 kilotons or, if no tests were conducted above that level, to inspect the two largest tests below 50 kilotons. Each side

would be permitted, prior to detonation, to observe the excavation of holes, placement of canisters, and sealing of holes with approved material.

Another contentious issue concerned whether detailed verification provisions would have to be accepted before, or after, the planned joint verification experiment (described in the last issue of *Peace&Security*). The US believed that the USSR had agreed to the former during the February ministerial meeting, but this was denied

by the Soviets, who preferred to conduct the experiment first and take it into account in finalizing the verification provisions. The March ministerial meeting resolved this issue through an agreement to prepare a joint draft of the TTBT protocol "by the time of the joint verification experiment, to be finalized through the conduct and analysis of the joint verification experiment."

At their April meeting, the ministers approved the text of an agreement on the holding of the joint verification experiment, but noted that a supplement to the agreement still had to be concluded before it and the agreement itself could be signed. They also instructed their negotiators to prepare an "appropriate protocol" to the PNET "for signing at the Moscow Summit."

Naval Arms Control

In a speech to the Yugoslav Federal Assembly on 16 March, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev proposed that the USSR and US: (1) freeze the number of their ships and "the potential of the[ir] naval forces" in the Mediterranean, beginning 1 July, 1988, and (2) provide each other,

as well as all Mediterranean countries, with advance notice of, and invitations to observe, "the sending of naval ships and military exercises." He also called for "the development by Mediterranean and other interested countries of principles and methods of ensuring the safety of lanes of intensive shipping, especially in international straits," suggesting a conference of Mediterranean states "and other interested countries" to "put all these proposals together, bring them to a system, [and] determine the rational sequence and order of their implementation." The NATO countries have staunchly resisted similar proposals in the past, including recent Gorbachev initiatives on the Arctic and Pacific, arguing that unrestricted naval mobility is essential to Western defence.

A week later, after meeting with US Secretary of State Shultz in Washington, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze revealed that the USSR had called for an international naval conference, initially involving only the US, USSR, UK, and France, to discuss a treaty on reducing naval forces worldwide.

Surprisingly, it was reported in the *New York Times* of 6 April that US arms control adviser Paul Nitze had proposed the abolition of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, nuclear depth charges, and nuclear torpedoes, as well as, possibly, nuclear bombs carried by carrier-borne aircraft. His reasoning was said to be that Soviet naval tactical nuclear weapons threatened what would otherwise be the unquestioned superiority of the US Navy at sea. However, strong opposition to the idea was reported from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with doubts that it would ever be tabled as a formal proposal.

According to William Arkin of the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies, each of the superpowers maintains about 2,000 sea-based nuclear weapons, not including submarine-launched ballistic missiles. □

- RON PURVER

DEFENCE NOTES



American Views of Canadian Nuclear Subs

In October 1987, Congressman Charles Bennet, Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Sea Power, wrote an article for the *Globe and Mail* criticizing the decision to purchase nuclear submarines, and suggesting that the US Congress had an independent power to review the prospective transfer of nuclear technology for the British designed Trafalgar submarine regardless of any agreement entered into between the US Administration and the British government. Recently, Senator John Warner, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and former Secretary of the Navy, also indicated that a Canadian purchase of the Trafalgar would be a subject of Senate hearings.

More stridently, Frank Gaffney, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, has accused the Canadian Government of increasing the risk of accident by trying to buy nuclear submarines on the cheap. Gaffney claims in a 12 April article in the *Globe and Mail* that Canada is unwilling to face the real costs of developing the infrastructure, expertise, and regulatory measures necessary for a national nuclear submarine programme.

Despite these objections, the news from the Washington summit of 27 April was that President Reagan promised Prime Minister Mulroney he would not block a British sale. In the *Washington Post* of 28 April, a State Department spokesman stressed that Reagan approved such a purchase "because of the unique circumstances involving... two of our oldest and closest allies. The

United States remains opposed to the transfer of nuclear submarines to other nations."

Withdrawal from Norway

In a speech to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, former Chief of Defence Staff General Gérard Thériault made it clear that he disagreed with the government decision outlined in last summer's White Paper on Defence to withdraw from Norway and consolidate Canada's forces in Germany. Placing the Canadian forces in the context of NATO's full military strength, Thériault described them as "next to nothing in military terms," and argued that the commitment to send a brigade to Norway in time of crisis was a valued NATO asset.

Other sources have now apparently confirmed that an earlier version of the Defence White Paper proposed to withdraw Canadian forces from Central Europe, and to strengthen the commitment to Norway. Defence analyst Gwynne Dyer (*Globe and Mail* 22 April) maintains that former Defence Minister Erik Neilsen developed the plan in 1985, and received a favorable reception in Washington, but was subject to such severe criticism by the German and British Governments that the plan was withdrawn. The Neilsen plan allegedly called for the pre-positioning of heavy equipment in Norway, a transit base in Scotland, and air transportation of the entire brigade in time of crisis.

Patrolling Pacific Airspace

Recent newspaper reports have drawn attention to the increasing number of cruise missile carrying Soviet Bear bombers making practice runs against Alaska and the US-Canadian West coast. According to NORAD, the number of interceptions by Canadian and US fighters has increased significantly in the last year. However, all accounts refer to Soviet approaches to US or Canadian airspace: there

are no reports of actual intrusions into national airspace.

Interviews with air force commanders suggest that NORAD interceptors are highly successful in detecting and intercepting Soviet flights. But, it is also apparent that the peacetime interception of the large, slow Bear bombers has little relevance to the likely sequence of events in hostilities. Testifying before the Standing Committee on National Defence in late March, Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty conceded that the North Warning System, like any ground-based radar, might not be able to detect low-flying cruise missiles. (See *Peace&Security*, Spring 1988 for similar problems associated with the Over-the-Horizon radars now being deployed.)

In the event of hostilities, cruise or ballistic missiles would first

attack the radar installations of NORAD, and then the interceptor bases. Only then would the large slow Bears penetrate North American airspace in search of their targets. NORAD has no defences against ballistic missile attack, and little or no capability against cruise missiles once they have been released.

Opposition Party Defence Policies

In 1987, under the authorship of defence critic Derek Blackburn, the NDP issued a policy statement re-affirming the long-standing party policy to withdraw from NATO and NORAD. In April 1988 the International Affairs Committee of the NDP published a longer report, entitled *Canada's Stake in Common Security*, dealing with both defence and arms con-

ALLIANCE NEWS

Denmark and Nuclear Weapons

Following a snap election on 10 May called for the purposes of deciding whether the country should enforce a ban on entry of ships carrying nuclear weapons, the issue remains unresolved as of the time this issue of *Peace&Security* goes to press. The election was forced when, contrary to the wishes of the Danish Prime Minister, parliament passed a resolution forcing all visiting ships – including ships of Denmark's NATO allies – to declare whether or not they were carrying nuclear weapons. The resolution caused sharp comment from both the British and the Americans; both countries regularly arm their vessels with nuclear weapons and both refuse to divulge which ships are carrying them. The resolution, if enforced, would have the effect of barring the visits of American and British ships.

After meeting in Brussels on 27 April the NATO defence ministers warned Denmark that such a move would undermine the unity of the Alliance. British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe said the consequences would be "extremely serious," and US Secretary of State George Shultz was reported (*Toronto Star*, 29 April) to have told the Danish Foreign Minister: "If you like the benefits [of belonging to NATO] you ought to accept the responsibilities." Following the election in which neither of the major political blocs made notable gains in parliament, Prime Minister Paul Schluter said: "The parties who voted for the Social Democratic motion on NATO [barring nuclear-weapon carrying ships] have been weakened... I expect the result will ease our relationship with NATO."

NATO Military Doctrine and Conventional Weapons

After the 2-3 March meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, the Communiqué issued by the heads of state re-asserted

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broader approach to Arctic security.

In regard to maritime forces, the party would cancel the nuclear submarine programme, but replace the Oberon-class diesel submarines. In other respects, its

how much the NDP would be willing to spend on defence.

The Liberal Party has not produced as detailed a statement on defence policy, but in a February speech to the party's Vancouver

lage of Halabja.

It is estimated that thirty or more countries have stockpiles of chemical weapons, which can be made by any country with a basic chemicals industry and are cheap

to produce. Negotiations continue in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a convention banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Soviet Arctic Base

A report from Norway in *Jane's Defence Weekly* indicates that a new Soviet naval base for Typhoon and Delta class ballistic missile submarines has been established fifty kilometres from the Norwegian border. The base, on a Kola peninsula fjord at Zapadnaya Litsa, was previously thought to be for Soviet attack submarines. Both Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark and Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty have stressed that if the Soviets are interested in constraints on the militarization of the North, the concentration of force in the Kola peninsula must be included in proposals to limit military deployments. □

- DAVID COX

NATO's position on nuclear weapons, and the relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization superiority in conventional weapons, combined with the Soviet capability for surprise attack, said the communiqué, "remains at the core of Europe's security concerns." Although the Council regards progress towards a conventional balance as bringing important benefits for stability, it emphasised that deterrence for the foreseeable future would require a mix of conventional and nuclear forces: "...only the nuclear element can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk; therefore for the foreseeable future deterrence will continue to require an adequate mix of nuclear as well as conventional forces...[NATO] will neither make nor accept proposals which would involve an erosion of the Allies' nuclear deterrent capability." The Communiqué stressed that tanks and artillery were the most threatening weapons in a surprise attack scenario. While indicating that these would be the principal focus of negotiations to reduce asymmetries, the Council also declared its support for initiatives "designed to foster co-operation in the area of conventional armaments, especially research, development, production and procurement."

Discriminate Deterrence?

The theme of improved conventional weapons was central to a report produced by a blue ribbon US defence commission. Chaired by Albert Wohlstetter and former Assistant Secretary of Defence Fred Iklé, the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy was mandated by the Pentagon and presented its final report, entitled *Discriminate Deterrence* to the Secretary of Defense in early January. The Commission took the view that while "apocalyptic" scenarios (including a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe) could not be ruled out, the more probable dangers came from Soviet pressure on the southern and northern flanks of NATO, as well from "out of area" regional conflicts.

Central to its prescriptions was the proposal that over the next decade the Pentagon should give priority to "more mobile and versatile forces," and that NATO should "reassert its technological superiority." In particular, the Commission argued, the strengthening of conventional defence in Europe "should be centered on the vigorous procurement of advanced conventional weapons." Specifically, the report stressed accurate "stand-off" (long-range) weapons using advanced micro-processors, and "low-observable" (invisible to radar, Stealth) systems for aircraft and other vehicles. Such advanced weaponry would allow NATO forces to strike at massed Soviet armoured formations deep behind enemy lines, and the Commission argued, to launch counter-attacks into Warsaw Pact territory.

However, although the Commission stressed the potential transformation of the battlefield through these new technologies, like the NATO Council, it also foresaw the continued need for nuclear deterrence. Unlike NATO nuclear doctrines which seek to emphasize the linkage between nuclear war in Europe and a broader intercontinental nuclear exchange, *Discriminate Deterrence* argues that the Alliance should use nuclear weapons "not as a link to a wider and more devastating war," but discriminately, targeting Soviet command centres and troop concentrations in order to block a Soviet invading force while seeking to prevent the further expansion of the conflict. To date there has been no official reaction to the report, either from Washington or from Brussels.

New NATO Secretary General

On 1 July former West German Defence Minister Manfred Wörner assumes his new duties as NATO Secretary General. Replacing Wörner as the Federal Republic's Defence Minister is Rupert Scholz, currently the head of West Berlin's departments of justice and federal affairs.

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Denmark and Nuclear Weapons

Following a snap election on 10 May called for the purposes of deciding whether the country should enforce a ban on entry of ships carrying nuclear weapons, the issue remains unresolved as of the time this issue of *Peace&Security* goes to press. The election was forced when, contrary to the wishes of the Danish Prime Minister, parliament passed a resolution forcing all visiting ships – including ships of Denmark's NATO allies – to declare whether or not they were carrying nuclear weapons. The resolution caused sharp comment from both the British and the Americans; both countries regularly arm their vessels with nuclear weapons and both refuse to divulge which ships are carrying them. The resolution, if enforced, would have the effect of barring the visits of American and British ships.

After meeting in Brussels on 27 April the NATO defence ministers warned Denmark that such a move would undermine the unity of the Alliance. British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe said the consequences would be "extremely serious," and US Secretary of State George Shultz was reported (*Toronto Star*, 29 April) to have told the Danish Foreign Minister: "If you like the benefits [of belonging to NATO] you ought to accept the responsibilities." Following the election in which neither of the major political blocs made notable gains in parliament, Prime Minister Paul Schluter said: "The parties who voted for the Social Democratic motion on NATO [barring nuclear-weapon carrying ships] have been weakened... I expect the result will ease our relationship with NATO."

NATO Military Doctrine and Conventional Weapons

After the 2-3 March meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, the Communiqué issued by the heads of state re-asserted

trol. The report identified two themes: the defence of Canada, and the building of a global system of common security, although at a later point it notes that "common security has to take precedence over sovereignty."

The report confirmed the NDP decision to withdraw from NATO, but stressed that this would be a gradual process conducted in consultation with the NATO allies. In speaking to the report, party leader Ed Broadbent stated that the NDP would not withdraw during a first term in office, but would use the time to work for changes in NATO policy, such as "no first use" of nuclear weapons and other arms control measures. The NDP proposes to bring back the Canadian forces from West Germany, and possibly undertake a commitment to support Norway as part of a broader approach to Arctic security.

In regard to maritime forces, the party would cancel the nuclear submarine programme, but replace the Oberon-class diesel submarines. In other respects, its

programme for the navy is similar to that of the Conservative government. In terms of air defence, however, the Report states that the NDP would not renew the NORAD agreement in 1991. It would in the meantime develop "some other agreement" with the United States which would dissociate Canada from any involvement in nuclear war-fighting strategies and ballistic missile defence, and increase the capability for peacetime surveillance.

Finally, the report proposes withdrawal from the Defence Production Sharing Agreement with the US and its replacement by the development of a Canadian defence industry capable of building the weapons systems required by the Canadian Armed Forces. The report does not estimate the cost of the programme, or indicate how much the NDP would be willing to spend on defence.

The Liberal Party has not produced as detailed a statement on defence policy, but in a February speech to the party's Vancouver

policy conference in February, leader John Turner re-affirmed party support for Canada's continued participation in both NATO and NORAD. On the other hand, like the NDP the Liberals would cancel the nuclear submarine programme and cruise missile testing. Turner emphasized non-military means as the best way to protect Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

Chemical Weapons

In early April there were more confirmed reports of the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. US State Department officials believe that although Iraq was the first to use chemical weapons, Iran has now also used them in retaliation. Large numbers of civilians – possibly between five and ten thousand – appear to have been killed in the Iranian-occupied village of Halabja.

It is estimated that thirty or more countries have stockpiles of chemical weapons, which can be made by any country with a basic chemicals industry and are cheap

to produce. Negotiations continue in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a convention banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Soviet Arctic Base

A report from Norway in *Jane's Defence Weekly* indicates that a new Soviet naval base for Typhoon and Delta class ballistic missile submarines has been established fifty kilometres from the Norwegian border. The base, on a Kola peninsula fjord at Zapadnaya Litsa, was previously thought to be for Soviet attack submarines. Both Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark and Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty have stressed that if the Soviets are interested in constraints on the militarization of the North, the concentration of force in the Kola peninsula must be included in proposals to limit military deployments. □

- DAVID COX

NATO's position on nuclear weapons, and the relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization superiority in conventional weapons, combined with the Soviet capability for surprise attack, said the communiqué, "remains at the core of Europe's security concerns." Although the Council regards progress towards a conventional balance as bringing important benefits for stability, it emphasised that deterrence for the foreseeable future would require a mix of conventional and nuclear forces: "...only the nuclear element can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk; therefore for the foreseeable future deterrence will continue to require an adequate mix of nuclear as well as conventional forces...[NATO] will neither make nor accept proposals which would involve an erosion of the Allies' nuclear deterrent capability." The Communiqué stressed that tanks and artillery were the most threatening weapons in a surprise attack scenario. While indicating that these would be the principal focus of negotiations to reduce asymmetries, the Council also declared its support for initiatives "designed to foster co-operation in the area of conventional armaments, especially research, development, production and procurement."

Discriminate Deterrence?

The theme of improved conventional weapons was central to a report produced by a blue ribbon US defence commission. Chaired by Albert Wohlstetter and former Assistant Secretary of Defence Fred Iklé, the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy was mandated by the Pentagon and presented its final report, entitled *Discriminate Deterrence* to the Secretary of Defense in early January. The Commission took the view that while "apocalyptic" scenarios (including a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe) could not be ruled out, the more probable dangers came from Soviet pressure on the southern and northern flanks of NATO, as well from "out of area" regional conflicts.


Central to its prescriptions was the proposal that over the next decade the Pentagon should give priority to "more mobile and versatile forces," and that NATO should "reassert its technological superiority." In particular, the Commission argued, the strengthening of conventional defence in Europe "should be centered on the vigorous procurement of advanced conventional weapons." Specifically, the report stressed accurate "stand-off" (long-range) weapons using advanced micro-processors, and "low-observable" (invisible to radar, Stealth) systems for aircraft and other vehicles. Such advanced weaponry would allow NATO forces to strike at massed Soviet armoured formations deep behind enemy lines, and the Commission argued, to launch counter-attacks into Warsaw Pact territory.

However, although the Commission stressed the potential transformation of the battlefield through these new technologies, like the NATO Council, it also foresaw the continued need for nuclear deterrence. Unlike NATO nuclear doctrines which seek to emphasize the linkage between nuclear war in Europe and a broader intercontinental nuclear exchange, *Discriminate Deterrence* argues that the Alliance should use nuclear weapons "not as a link to a wider and more devastating war," but discriminately, targeting Soviet command centres and troop concentrations in order to block a Soviet invading force while seeking to prevent the further expansion of the conflict. To date there has been no official reaction to the report, either from Washington or from Brussels.

New NATO Secretary General

On 1 July former West German Defence Minister Manfred Wörner assumes his new duties as NATO Secretary General. Replacing Wörner as the Federal Republic's Defence Minister is Rupert Scholz, currently the head of West Berlin's departments of justice and federal affairs.

REVIEWS



Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance

Richard K. Betts

Washington D.C.: *The Brookings
Institution*, 1987, 240 pgs.,
US \$28.95 cloth

Of what use are nuclear weapons in deciding confrontations involving the great powers? Does the nuclear balance of power play a role in deciding the outcome of these confrontations? How does the balance influence the propensity of decision-makers to consider using nuclear weapons or to threaten adversaries with their use? These questions lie at the heart of this study of nuclear diplomacy by Richard Betts. For answers, Betts draws on recently de-classified US government documents, and surveys over a dozen cases in which the superpowers considered using nuclear weapons or engaged in nuclear brinkmanship. The results are often surprising as well as sobering.

Betts finds that the inclinations of US leaders or their chief advisors to introduce nuclear threats into military confrontations have never been strongly tied to whatever the nuclear balance was at the time. He points out that US officials have never been confident that the balance was so favourable as to prevent the enemy from inflicting crippling damage on the West if nuclear war started. In general, US decision-makers have been unwilling to think through whether they would escalate to nuclear conflict much less address the consequences if they did. Nevertheless, the importance of the political stakes and interests perceived to be involved in such conflicts has often prompted these same leaders to resort to nuclear threats.

This uneasy combination of vulnerability and political necessity has conditioned US nuclear brinkmanship – giving it a hesitant, often tentative quality. Frequently vague and elliptical in character, US nuclear threats often fall, according to the author, “halfway between shifty bluff and stark blackmail.”

Whether American nuclear diplomacy was effective, and whether the nuclear balance influenced the behaviour of US adversaries, are questions which the author concedes defy strong conclusions – particularly in the absence of data on Soviet and Chinese decision-making. Still, Betts indicates that both Chinese and Soviet leaders seem to have placed greater importance on the balance than their American counterparts, and have behaved accordingly. Particularly noteworthy is his observation that while Soviet stakes in many of the conflicts surveyed were not necessarily inferior to those of the US, the relatively “accommodative” tendencies which the Soviets displayed in crisis situations began to wane only with the passing of US nuclear superiority in the early 1970s. Indeed, Betts sees far less evidence of the Soviets being impressed with US nuclear leverage since that time.

Betts’ findings are clearly disturbing. Parity in nuclear capability seems to have instilled greater confidence in Soviet leaders to stand firm in confrontations, but has failed to eliminate the possibility of the US resorting to nuclear threats to protect interests it sees as vital. Not only does this hold open the possibility of a future superpower confrontation, but also the danger that when it occurs neither side will back down easily and accept defeat – particularly if the relative stakes involved are unclear. Consequently, Betts recommends that in future, the US nuclear sword must be used more sparingly, and only in the most

dire circumstances. Although American nuclear guarantees to NATO and Japan are still acceptable, military confrontation in all other regions should be dealt with largely through the use of improved conventional capabilities.

While Betts has done well in examining the efficacy of nuclear threats in securing immediate foreign policy objectives, he has unduly neglected the possible effects which superpower nuclear diplomacy may have had on longer-term goals. How, for instance, have examples of superpower nuclear brinkmanship influenced other states on the question of whether to acquire their own nuclear arsenals? The answer to such a question would add a great deal to the author’s already incisive observations regarding the dangers of nuclear diplomacy.

– Peter Gizewski

*Mr. Gizewski is research assistant at the
Institute and a doctoral candidate at
Columbia University.*

A General for Peace

Leonard V. Johnson

Toronto: *James Lorimer*, 1987,
176 pgs., \$16.95 paper

Len Johnson, retired major-general and recently declared contender for a New Democratic Party nomination in the next Federal election, has written a book about how sweet it is to make a living flying airplanes, how frustrating to be a staff officer in the military, and how important to find a better system for international security than nuclear deterrence.

It is the last topic that gives the book its authority but the author’s early life and military career comprise more than half its content. His delight in flying is frequently in evidence, including later years when the reader encounters such statements of quiet pride as “I flew all the airplanes in [my] command.”

Like most career officers he roundly castigates Paul Hellyer for the damage done to the services by unification. Later, when the risk of Canadian troops being used in combat increased as a result of the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Major-General (as he was by then) Johnson was probably the only military officer whose frustration over inadequate measures to improve the sad state of the forces led him to write personally to political party leaders, MPs, relatives, friends, retired officers and everyone else he could think of, urging a substantial and immediate increase in defence spending. Canadian military officers just don’t do that sort of thing – the maverick streak was already in evidence.

His views on purely military matters have not changed very much; it is on deeper issues of policy and strategic security that he has since broken ranks with many of his peers although even here some nuances have apparently been missed by his critics.

I was one of his three directors at the National Defence College when, as Commandant, Johnson was undergoing the private soul searching that led to his decision to become a full-time peace worker upon retirement. One of the central messages we attempted to impart to course members at the College was the dangers of what we termed ethnocentrism: the inevitable distortions that come from seeing the world entirely from a Canadian perspective. We didn’t know then that the most apt student was our own leader.

Johnson now believes that the military confrontation between East and West is caused primarily by misperceptions on both sides and true security can only result from better mutual understanding. Those who already realize that there is no deliberate threat either way can confidently call for measures of arms reduction, disarmament and exclusively defensive military doctrine such as no-first-use of nuclear weapons, the removal of foreign-based troops and abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Johnson’s programme for Canada is described briefly in the last pages of the book. He calls for a

much more active Canadian role in arms control within NATO as long as we remain a member, and a more independent military posture in North America. His views need not be described in detail here because by no coincidence, I am sure, the NDP defence policy statement of April 1988 and the Johnson recommendations written in July 1987 are remarkably similar.

There are some irritating lapses in this book – the world really does have states proud to call themselves communist, not “so-called” communist – and some serious gaps in substance such as the absence of any serious consideration of the potential for international instability if radical disarmament steps are taken. But the book deserves to be read with care (and enjoyment) by every military officer, especially fliers, and all who are interested in issues of peace and security regardless of where they fit in the spectrum of attitudes.

General Johnson reveals himself as a deeply caring person and we can all share his desire for a better world and greater understanding. Many of us are more cautious and conservative in our beliefs about how to get there from here, but no one can responsibly deny that the author has contributed in a timely and useful way to the national debate about great issues of our time and Canada's part in them.

– *John Toogood*

Mr. Toogood is Secretary-Treasurer of CIIPS.

Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight

Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass (eds.)

Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987, 380 pgs., US \$34.95 cloth, US \$14.95 paper

This book, by a Harvard research team, begins by positing a long list of common hypotheses about arms control, which are then “tested” against a series of seven case studies of actual arms control treaties or negotiations. In some ways, the book is a useful guide to the Soviet-American experience with arms control over the past couple of decades. It should, however, be emphasized

that coverage for the most part ends with the SALT II Treaty of 1979, thus missing both the early frustrations of Soviet-American negotiations under President Reagan and their more recent successes.

The case studies that are included – as well as several “cross-cutting analyses” of common themes – are generally informative, well-written, balanced in their judgments, and well-documented, being especially useful for those wishing to pursue the respective topics in greater detail on their own. Nevertheless, the study is strangely unsatisfying in the end. Perhaps the editors have bitten off more than they can chew. Evaluating no fewer than twenty-five hypotheses as applied to seven case studies, some of which extend over a number of years, may be too great a task for any single study. It is certainly too much to be adequately summarized in a conclusion of just twenty-seven pages.

The book is most useful in laying to rest a number of myths that have arisen in regard to arms control in recent years, particularly those propounded by the right-wing. Perhaps the best example is the alleged “lulling effect” of arms control, in inducing a false sense of security within the American public and causing it to neglect adequate defences. In virtually every case, the Harvard group found this not to be the case. In the years after SALT I, for example, polls showed the American public to be increasingly concerned about the Soviet “threat,” while support for defence spending remained constant for the first few years, before rising to new heights in the late 1970s.

The study does provide some support to left-wing critics who argue that arms control actually stimulates the arms race. However, it concludes that such stimulation is generally confined to specific programmes related to the negotiations or agreement, rather than affecting overall defence spending.

On other matters, the study concludes that arms control tends to succeed only where neither side has an “appreciable advantage,” and generally dismisses the view that unilateral restraint by one side

will induce reciprocal restraint by the other, or that gains in arms control lead to an improvement in overall relations between adversaries. Unfortunately, the study is not without the kind of truism that often afflicts social science, such as the observation that “militarily significant constraints on any particular category of weapons eludes negotiations if either side strongly prefers unfettered freedom of action with regard to the weapon in question.”

Strangely, while explaining in considerable detail how arms control to date has benefitted both the US and Soviet Union, and how the US has succeeded in largely avoiding the putative “lulling effects,” the editors judge that the evidence is “inadequate” to determine whether arms control has “serve[d] Soviet interests more than US interests.”

The most disturbing aspect of the book is to be found at the very end. Here the editors belittle the accomplishments of arms control, despite the evidence from the case studies themselves that those accomplishments have in fact been substantial. For example, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is derided for perhaps having “merely... codified the postponement of a race in defensive systems until advancing technologies made effective defenses possible” [emphasis added]. Even if the treaty does ultimately fall victim to advancing technology (by no means a sure thing) its contribution to strategic stability and to a dampening of expenditures on strategic arms in the meantime surely deserves greater recognition than this.

What is sorely lacking in the conclusion is an attempt at a sustained, balanced evaluation of arms control's accomplishments. Rather, we are offered a few, seemingly offhand comments that appear largely to denigrate the arms control enterprise, when the bulk of the book demonstrates, to this reader at least, that the enterprise has been immensely profitable in terms of enhancing international security. – *Ronald G. Purver*

Mr. Purver is a research associate at CIIPS.

BRIEFLY NOTED

In the Eye of the Storm

Fred Gaffen

Toronto: Duneau & Wayne, 1987, 302 pgs., \$24.95 cloth

This book is a welcome addition to the literature of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Not only is it the first to focus on the Canadian contribution across the forty-year history of modern peacekeeping, but it also provides a human dimension which complements existing analytical or theoretical studies. The book reads easily and is well supported by outline maps, index and bibliography.

Concise history is substantially supported by anecdotal and personal accounts which give a feel for both the satisfaction and frustration which accompany peacekeeping. The anecdotal format carries with it risks of error due to context, perspective and personal involvement. In this book the risk is justified because the individual contribution of the men and women of Canada's peacekeeping forces is well highlighted.

Bibliography of Nuclear Age Educational Resources

Prepared by the International Security and Arms Control Project of the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education

Stanford, CA: Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees, 1987, 111 pgs., US \$8.95 paper.

This bibliography is a review of educational materials available in the field of international security education. Although most of the sources listed are American there is an obvious effort to maintain editorial and ideological balance in the selections. Listed and annotated are textbooks and curriculum materials, games and simulations, as well as other bibliographies and filmographies. The project which produced this book has as its aim, “improving the quality of precollegiate education about international conflict and security affairs.” □

Reviews of French language publications can found in *Paix et Sécurité* ‘Livres’ section.

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



"Teaching Issues of Peace and Security" was the title of a conference organized by CIIPS in co-operation with the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education in Toronto in April. Participants included high school teachers from the metropolitan Toronto area. They were introduced to a new CIIPS publication, *Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security*, a curriculum support document which focusses on the international components of high school history courses. The handbook is in a preliminary stage, and during the meeting its authors, **Brad Feasey** and **Geoff Irvine**, explained its focus and contents. Other speakers at the conference included **Peter Richardson**, Principal of University College at the University of Toronto, **Geoffrey Pearson** and **Nancy Gordon** of CIIPS, **Walter Pitman** of OISE, **John Sigler** of Carleton University, **David Cox** of Queen's University, **Brian MacDonald** of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, **Joanna Miller** of the Group of 78 and the National Survival Institute. In addition to Brad Feasey and Geoff Irvine, workshop leaders were **Dianne DeMille** of CIIPS; **James Baker**, **Madan Handa** and **Ed Sullivan** of OISE; and **Stephanie McCandless-Reford** and **Robert Rford**.

Near the end of April, the Institute at the request of and in co-operation with the Department of External Affairs, organized a meeting at Montebello of representatives of the Jewish and Arab-Palestinian communities in Canada. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, **Joe Clark**, hosted a dinner to welcome the participants. Also attending the dinner was **Robert Stanfield**: his report in 1980 on Canada's rela-

tions with the Middle East contained a recommendation that a dialogue between Jewish and Arab groups in Canada would be highly desirable. The participants agreed that the opportunity to exchange views, under Institute auspices, had been useful and should be repeated.

Geoffrey Pearson spoke to an ecumenical peace gathering in Richmond Hill, Ontario in late April on world peace and security, emphasizing the dynamic nature of East-West relations, and expressing hope that government leaders in both East and West were learning the necessity of co-operation to manage the plethora of security problems in today's world. The next day he attended the Quadrangular Forum in Toronto – a meeting organized by the Institute for Research on Public Policy. **Roger Hill** also attended this pre-economic summit discussion amongst government officials, business leaders and academics. Earlier in April, Mr. Pearson participated in a seminar at Cornell University as the guest of **Richard Ned Lebow**, Director of Peace Studies at the University. In mid-May Mr. Pearson spoke at a University of Calgary conference on Canada-India Opportunities for Co-operation. In Ottawa, he chaired a meeting on "The UN in Negotiations" at the annual conference of Canadian Professors for Peace in the Middle East.

"Regional Security and Conflict Management: The Gulf War" was the topic of a seminar organized in April by the Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, in co-operation with CIIPS. **Fen Hampson** and **Francine Lecours** of the Institute staff attended the meeting.

John Wright has joined the staff of the Information Services section as an indexer. Mr. Wright specialized in Soviet and East

European Studies, earning a M.A., as well as a Masters of Library Science degree from the University of Western Ontario. Summer students at the Institute this year include **Heidi Behrendt** in the Public Programmes section, **Ken Bush** and **Jutta Paczulla** in the Research section, and **Régis Côté** in the library.

Roger Hill spoke to the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament, an advisory group convened by the Department of External Affairs. The agenda of the Group's deliberations focussed on the upcoming UN Special Session on Disarmament, scheduled to begin in New York on 29 May. **Brad Feasey**, who has been seconded to the Department of External Affairs to assist in preparations for and activities at UNSOD III, also attended the consultative group meeting as a rapporteur.

John Halstead, a member of the Institute's Board of Directors, attended meetings of the Trilateral Commission in Tokyo as a representative of the Institute. He delivered a paper entitled "East-West Security Issues: A Canadian Perspective."

Ron Purver delivered a paper at the International Studies Association meeting in St. Louis in the spring on "Arms Control in the Far North." He also spoke at an Ocean's Policy Workshop at the University of British Columbia on "Aspects of Arctic Sovereignty and Security," and at another Conference at U.B.C. co-sponsored by CIIPS on "International Security in the Pacific Basin."

Five members of the Chinese People's Institute on Foreign Affairs visited CIIPS in April. The Chinese delegation was led by **Chai Zemin**, a Vice-President of the Institute, and former Chinese ambassador to Washington. The current Chinese ambassador to Canada, **Zhang Wenpu** accom-

panied the delegation. Mr. Zemin spoke of the need for increased contacts between China and the West, saying that differences in social systems should not affect foreign policy considerations. He spoke of the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, saying that there were still three major problems with that relationship, namely Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and border problems. The recent agreement in Geneva on Afghanistan was an encouraging sign, he said. The subject of the Korean peninsula was raised, and Mr. Zemin spoke of the need for direct negotiations between the two Koreas. He did not favour simultaneous recognition of both Koreas and their membership in the UN – in his view unification was the ultimate answer and needed to be negotiated. He spoke of his hope that the number of forces in both Koreas could be reduced, but said that because the US will not negotiate directly with North Korea, progress on this front was not likely. China, he added, has no troops in North Korea and few on the border, while the US maintains large numbers of men and equipment in the area.

K. Subrahmanyam, former Director of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis in Delhi, visited the Institute in April. He was in Canada as a guest of the Canadian International Development Agency. Another visitor was **Hans-Friederick von Ploetz**, Minister in the West German Foreign Office, who came to the Institute for an informal exchange of views which centred on the current situation in East-West relations.

John J. Mearsheimer of the political science department of the University of Chicago led a seminar co-sponsored by CIIPS and the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament on US Maritime Strategy and Strategic Stability. Professor Mearsheimer

discussed current US naval policy and explored possible implications for Canada.

The final seminar in the Challenges to Canadian Security series focussed on international institutions and their capacity to manage global conflict in the next twenty years. **Juergen Dedring** from the UN Secretariat spoke of the role of the Security Council, and of the establishment of an information gathering and analysis section within the UN which can alert the Secretary-General to potential crisis areas. **David DeWitt** of York University talked about regional associations and their capacity to manage localized disagreements.

Yellowknife, NWT, was the location of the annual meeting of the Canadian Commission of UNESCO. CIIPS is an institutional member-at-large of the Commission, and was represented at the meeting by **Nancy Gordon**. The programme focussed on the educational and cultural evolution of the north, with discussion of circumpolar issues and presentations from representatives of other Nordic countries.

"Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third Party Medi-

ators" was the topic of a workshop held in early May and sponsored by CIIPS in co-operation with the Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. This was the second in a series sponsored by the two organizations. The aim is to develop a framework for analyzing the potential role third-party countries might play in regional conflict management and resolution, either directly or indirectly through regional and international institutions. The focus of the second workshop was to identify specifically those conditions which have led to or impeded the development of regional co-operation. The workshop was led by **Fen Hampson** of the Institute and **Brian Mandel** of Carleton University and included presentations by **Ron Fisher**, **Dan O'Meara**, **Christopher Brown**, **Douglas Anglin**, **Liisa North**, **Ashok Kapur**, **Robert Matthews**, **Louis Kriesberg**, **Keith Krause**, and **Lauraleigh Keashley**. At the conclusion of the workshop, **Bob Mitchell** and **Roger Hill** of the CIIPS Research section discussed on-going CIIPS work on Cyprus.

Geoffrey Pearson participated in the opening ceremonies of Expo Science 88, a science fair for students in the Outaouais. The

theme this year was science and peace, and the Institute was a co-sponsor of the event. Judges included **Hélène Samson** and **Margaret Bourgeault** of the Public Programmes staff. **Roger Hill** presented two peace prizes; **Katherine Laundy** and **Susan Connell** supervised a CIIPS display of publications.

At the conclusion of a Round-table between members of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs and the Institute of US and Canadian Studies, of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, CIIPS organized a programme for the Soviet delegation in Ottawa. The Soviet delegates included **Georgy Arbatov**, head of the Institute, **Leon Bagramov**, **General Mikhail Milstein**, **Sergei Plekhanov**, **Nikolai Schmelyov**, **Henry Trofimenko** and **S. F. Molochkov**. They spoke at a seminar for interested Canadians, met officials at the Department of External Affairs, attended a dinner sponsored by the Ottawa branch of the CIIA, and met with CIIPS staff at the Institute. In their meetings, they emphasized the changes in thinking taking place in the Soviet Union, and the need for a re-assessment of East-West relations. Regional conflicts need to be addressed in a serious way, and in most cases, the US and the USSR should stay out of local disputes. They also spoke of the need for revitalizing international institutions, particularly the UN, and for all permanent members of the Security Council to play their full role in collective security systems. In the discussion of Canadian-Soviet relations they drew attention to their Arctic proposals, and expressed dismay at the "Cold War" posture of the 1987 Defence White Paper.

In early June the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War met in Montreal: CIIPS was a contributor to the conference and a co-sponsor of some of the sessions. **Geoffrey Pearson** chaired a session on a Comprehensive Test Ban, and one on Canada's Role in the Peace Process. Following the meeting,

Mr. Pearson was a keynote speaker at a conference at Dalhousie University on "Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Canada and the United Nations - Moving to the 21st Century." He also attended the annual meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies in Potsdam, G.D.R., on "New Approaches to East-West Security." The conference was attended by key political figures from East and West Europe and academics from Europe and North America.

In mid-June the Information Services section of the Institute organized a half-day conference in Halifax for librarians and others involved in information collection and distribution in the peace and security field. **Katherine Laundy** and **Susan Connell** of the Information Services staff gave presentations, as did **Margaret Bourgeault** of the Public Programmes staff. Guests were welcomed by Vice-Admiral **Harry Porter**, a member of the CIIPS Board of Directors.

Michael Bryans and **Ron Purver** attended a conference in Kingston on Canada-US Security. The meetings, sponsored by the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University dealt with both current and historical issues prominent in the Canada-US defence relationship.

Ten participants from the Student Commonwealth Conference visited the Institute in early May. Following a briefing by CIIPS staff members on the role and function of the Institute, the students, under the direction of **Brad Feasey** and **Margaret Bourgeault**, organized and presented a series of panel discussions on the meaning of peace, deterrence, and the possibilities for reducing the number of nuclear weapons.

In May, the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament published as part of its *Aurora Papers* a study by CIIPS Director of Research **Roger Hill**. The 47-page study is titled "Are Major Conventional Force Reductions in Europe Possible." □

The Institute Moves to New Quarters

Effective 6 June 1988, the Institute's new mailing address is:

Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security
Constitution Square
360 Albert Street, Suite 900
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7
(telephone and fax numbers remain unchanged)

New Publications from the Institute

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

4. **From Lenin to Gorbachev: Changing Soviet Perspectives on East-West Relations**, by Paul Marantz, May 1988.
5. **The Debate About Nuclear Weapon Tests**, by Jozef Goldblat and David Cox, June 1988.

WORKING PAPERS

8. **Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third-Party Mediators**, a report on a workshop November 1987 by Robert Miller, May 1988.

9. **East-West Relations in the 1980s**, by Adam Bromke, May 1988.
10. **The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament 1988: Peace Proposals Since 1982**, by Hanna Newcombe, May 1988.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

19. **The War in the Gulf**, by Francine Lecours, May 1988.
20. **Destabilization of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, 1980-1987**, by Dan O'Meara, June 1988.

FOURTH QUARTER GRANTS

GRANTS

Fourth Quarter 1987-88

RESEARCH			
Avery, Donald	\$ 9,300	Canadian Disarmament Information Service (Toronto) Publication of <i>Peace Magazine</i>	12,000
University of Western Ontario (London) Research and Its Uses: The Dilemma of Canadian Scientists in an Age of Conflict, 1939-1988		The Canadian Peace Alliance (Toronto) Publication of <i>Canadian Peace Alliance News</i>	10,000
Buo, Sammy Kum	30,000	Canadian School Trustees' Association (Ottawa) Workshop on Peace and Security Debate	850
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament (Lomé, Togo) Programme and Training on Conflict Resolution, Crisis Prevention and Management and Confidence-Building Among African States		Conference of Defence Associations (Ottawa) Publication of <i>Forum</i> magazine	25,000
Cooper, Fraser B.	9,400	Institute for Research on Public Policy (Ottawa) Special issue of <i>Policy Options</i>	25,000
University of Calgary (Calgary) Television Coverage of Peace and Security Issues in Canada		The International Youth for Peace and Justice Tour, Inc. (Montreal) The International North-South Peace Exchange 1988	16,000
David, Charles-Philippe	20,000	Loyalist Collegiate Vocational Institute (Kingston) A Peaceful Day (meetings and other activities)	1,000
Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean (Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu) L'état des connaissances dans la discipline des études stratégiques		NGO Committee on Disarmament, Inc. (New York, USA) Publication of special issue of <i>Disarmament Times</i> for UNSSOD III	5,000
Kapur, Ashok	5,000	Office national du film (Montréal) "Menace de paix" (film)	20,000
University of Waterloo (Waterloo) Canada/South Asia Political and Strategic Relations: A Historical Analysis		Operation Dismantle (Ottawa) Publication of syndicated column "The Peace Race: Development" Part II	5,000
Lakos, Amos	6,200	Option Paix (Hull) Publication de la revue <i>Option Paix</i>	10,000
University of Waterloo (Waterloo) International Negotiations - Bibliography		Ottawa Peace Resource Centre (Ottawa) Ottawa Peace Calendar	2,500
Lamb, John	50,000	OXFAM-Canada (Ottawa) National Seminars, Militarism Campaign	9,500
Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (Ottawa)		PACIFJOU , Collectif pour la production de jeux et jouets pour la paix (Montréal) Les jouets de guerre et les jouets de paix	20,000
Rezun, Miron	15,000	Peace Parties Network/Peace Exchange Network (Ottawa) Peace Exchanges Project (educational events)	5,400
University of New Brunswick (Fredericton) International Conference on Iran		University of Alberta , Department of Secondary Education (Edmonton) International Institute for Peace Education 1988	15,000
Stein, Janice	27,400	University of Manitoba (Winnipeg) Political Studies Students' Conference "Disarmament and Development"	4,500
University of Toronto (Toronto) Deterrence and Reassurance: Approaches to Conflict Management		Waterloo County Board of Education (Kitchener) Nuclear Awareness "War and Peace in a Nuclear Age: Teachers' Resource Booklet	10,000
PUBLIC PROGRAMMES		World Federalists of Canada , Kingston Branch (Kingston) Conference "Loving This Planet - Establishing Global Priorities"	900
Association des politologues étudiants de l'Université Laval (Ste-Foy) Colloque "Bilan et perspectives du renouveau politique en URSS"	7,000	World Without War Research and Education Network (Belleville) Community Awareness Project (Part II)	3,900
Brasset, David (Ottawa) Private Initiative in International Relations (book)	5,000		
Butler, Geoff (Charlottetown) The Art of War: Paintings	2,500		
Caldwell, Douglas (Chicago, USA) Radio documentary "Inside a Nuclear Weapons Lab: Science, Politics and the Arms Race"	2,500		
Canadian Association of Municipal Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (Dundas) Conference of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Municipalities	5,000		
Canadian Council for International Cooperation (Ottawa) Canadian Directory of Women Specializing in Foreign Policy, Security and Development	10,000		
		TOTAL	\$405,850

CIIPS Awards Programme

The Institute invites applications for the CIIPS Awards Programme. The programme is open to both academics and non-academics who wish to enter or continue their work in the field of international peace and security. The programme is intended to encourage expertise and scholarship in questions of international peace and security and to develop contacts with the international com-

munity by supporting Canadians who wish to pursue their studies at institutions abroad, or exceptionally, in Canada.

Applicants must be Canadian citizens and hold at minimum a first degree or equivalent experience.

The Institute has set aside \$173,000 to award ten scholarships; three of which will be valued at \$25,000 and seven at \$14,000. Applications will be assessed by an independent selection committee and decisions will be announced in May 1989.

The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada administers the programme on behalf of the Institute. The deadline for applications for the 1989-1990 academic year is 1 February 1989.

For further information and application forms please write to:

The Awards Division
Association of Universities
and Colleges of Canada
151 Slater Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5V1

Grant Procedures and Deadlines

The Institute allocates grants twice a year. Contact the Institute for a copy of updated criteria and applications forms. Please note the following deadlines:

30 June for an October decision

31 December for a March decision

SUBVENTIONS – QUATRIÈME TRIMESTRE

SUBVENTIONS

Quatrième trimestre 1987-1988

RECHERCHE

Àvery, Donald
University of Western Ontario (London)
Research and Its Uses: The Dilemma of Canadian Scientists in an Age of Conflict, 1939-1988

Buo, Sammy Kum
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament (Lomé, Togo)

Cooper, Fraser B.
Management and Confidence-Building Among African States
Programme and Training on Conflict Resolution, Crisis Prevention and

Television Coverage of Peace and Security Issues in Canada
University of Calgary (Calgary)

David, Charles-Philippe
Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean (Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu)
L'état des connaissances dans la discipline des études stratégiques

Kapur, Ashok
University of Waterloo (Waterloo)
Canada/South Asia Political and Strategic Relations: A Historical Analysis

Lakos, Amos
University of Waterloo (Waterloo)
International Negotiations – Bibliography

Lamb, John
Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (Ottawa)

Rezun, Miron
University of New Brunswick (Fredericton)
International Conference on Iran

Stein, Janice
University of Toronto (Toronto)
Deterrence and Reassurance: Approaches to Conflict Management

PROGRAMMES PUBLICS

Association des politologues étudiants de l'Université Laval (Ste-Foy)
Colloque «Bilan et perspectives du renouvellement politique en URSS»

Brassett, David (Ottawa)
Private Initiative in International Relations (book)

Butler, Geoff (Charlottetown)
The Art of War: Paintings
Caldwell, Douglas (Chicago, USA)
Radio documentary «Inside a Nuclear Weapons Lab: Science, Politics and the Arms Race»

Canadian Association of Municipal Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (Dundas)
Conference of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Municipalities

Canadian Council for International Cooperation (Ottawa)
Canadian Directory of Women Specializing in Foreign Policy, Security and Development

diennes qui veulent poursuivre leurs études dans des institutions étrangères, ou exceptionnellement, au Canada.

Le candidat(e)s doivent être citoyens(nes) canadiens(nes) et être au minimum un diplôme universitaire de premier cycle ou montrer qu'ils possèdent une expérience équivalente.

L'Institut a constitué un fonds de 173 000 \$ devant servir à attribuer dix bourses, soit trois d'une valeur maximale de 25 000 \$ et sept d'une valeur maximale de 14 000 \$. Les demandes seront étudiées par un comité de sélection indépendant, et les décisions seront annoncées en mai 1989.

Programme de bourses de l'ICPSI

L'Institut invite les personnes intéressées à lui faire parvenir des demandes dans le cadre de son programme de bourses. Le programme est ouvert tant aux universitaires qu'aux non-universitaires qui désirent entreprendre ou continuer des travaux dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationale. Par la recherche et l'approfondissement des connaissances dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationale, et à favoriser l'établissement de contacts avec la collectivité internationale, en appuyant des Canadiens et des Cana-

12 000	Canadian Disarmament Information Service (Toronto)
10 000	The Canadian Peace Alliance (Toronto)
850	Publication of <i>Peace Magazine</i>
25 000	Canadian School Trustees' Association (Ottawa)
25 000	Workshop on Peace and Security Debate
25 000	Conference of Defence Associations (Ottawa)
25 000	Publication of <i>Forum</i> magazine
25 000	Institute for Research on Public Policy (Ottawa)
25 000	Special Issue of <i>Policy Options</i>
16 000	The International North-South Peace Exchange 1988
1 000	Loyalist Collegiate Vocational Institute (Kingston)
5 000	A Peaceful Day (meetings and other activities)
20 000	NGO Committee on Disarmament, Inc. (New York, USA)
20 000	Publication of special issue of <i>Disarmament Times</i> for UNSSOD III
5 000	Office national du film (Montréal)
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5 000	Operation Dismantle (Ottawa)
5 000	Publication of syndicated column «The Peace Race: Development» Part II
10 000	Option Paix (Hull)
10 000	Publication de la revue <i>Option Paix</i>
2 500	Ottawa Peace Resource Centre (Ottawa)
9 500	OXFAM-Canada (Ottawa)
20 000	National Seminars, Militarism Campaign
20 000	PACIFLOU, Collectif pour la production de jeux et jouets pour la paix (Montréal)
5 400	Peace Parties Network/Peace Exchange Network (Ottawa)
15 000	Peace Exchanges Project (educational events)
15 000	University of Alberta, Department of Secondary Education (Edmonton)
4 500	International Institute for Peace Education 1988
10 000	University of Manitoba (Winnipeg)
4 500	Political Studies Students' Conference «Disarmament and Development»
900	Waterloo County Board of Education (Kitchener)
3 900	Nuclear Awareness «War and Peace in a Nuclear Age: Teachers' Resource Booklet
405 850	World Federalists of Canada, Kingston Branch (Kingston)
	Conference «Loving This Planet – Establishing Global Priorities»
	World Without War Research and Education Network (Belleville)
	Community Awareness Project (Part II)
	TOTAL

Attribution des subventions – Modalités et dates limites

L'Institut étudie les demandes de subventions deux fois par année. Veuillez vous adresser à l'Institut pour obtenir une liste des critères d'admissibilité et les formulaires de demande. On est prié de noter les dates limites suivantes :

30 juin 1988	décision prise en octobre 1988
31 décembre 1988	décision prise en mars 1989



américaine et la stabilité stratégique, celle du Nord, et les participants ont discuté de questions intéressantes la région circumpolaire et écoute des exposités de représentants d'autres pays nordiques.

«La gestion des conflits régionaux : régimes et tierces parties médiatrices», tel était le thème d'un atelier qui s'est tenu au début de mai grâce au coparrainage de l'ICPSI et de la Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Université Carleton). C'était le deuxième atelier du genre à être organisé par les deux institutions. L'objectif consiste à constituer un cadre de travail pour réguler les conflits régionaux, soit directement, soit indirectement par l'entremise d'institutions régionales et internationales. Le deuxième atelier visait à définir précisément les conditions qui ont favorisé la coopération régionale ou qui en entravent le développement. Fen Hampson, de l'Institut, et Brian Mandel, de l'Université Carleton, ont dirigé l'atelier. Ron Fisher, Dan O'Meara, Christopher Brown, Douglas Anglin, Lisa North, Ashok Kapur, Robert Matthews, Louis Kriesberg, Keith Krause et Lauraleigh Keashley ont présenté des exposés. À la fin de l'atelier, Bob Mitchell et Roger Hill, de la Direction de la

initulée «La sécurité canadienne menacée» a porté sur les institutions internationales et sur leur capacité de gérer les conflits mondiaux au cours des vingt prochaines années. M. Juergen Dedering, du Secrétariat de l'ONU, a parlé du rôle du Conseil de sécurité et il a aussi consacré du temps à l'établissement d'une section de collecte et d'analyse d'information au sein de l'ONU, section qui peut signaler au Secrétaire général les crises risquant de se produire. David DeWitt, de l'Université York, a discuté sur les associations régionales et leur capacité de régler les différends localisés.

La Commission canadienne de l'UNESCO a tenu son assemblée annuelle à Yellowknife (T.N.-O.). L'ICPSI est membre institutionnel de la Commission, et Nancy Gordon l'a représentée à l'assemblée. L'ordre du jour a mis l'accent sur l'évolution éducationnelle et culturelle du monde.

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À compter du 6 juin 1988, la nouvelle adresse de l'Institut sera : Institut Canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales 360, rue Albert, Bureau 900 Ottawa (Ontario) K1R 7X7

(Les numéros de téléphone et de télécopieur resteront les mêmes.)

Publications nouvelles de l'Institut

CAHIERS DE L'INSTITUT

4. De Lénine à Gorbatchev : l'évolution des perspectives soviétiques sur les relations Est-Ouest par Paul Marantz, mai 1988.

5. Le débat sur les essais d'armes nucléaires par Josef Goldblat et David Cox, juin 1988.

EXPOSÉS

19. La guerre du Golfe par Francine Lecours, mai 1988.

20. La désattribution des États de la ligne de front, en Afrique Australe (1980-1987) par Dan O'Meara, mai 1988.

DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAIL

8. «Managing Regional Conflict : Regimes and Third-Party Mediators», Compte rendu d'un atelier (novembre 1987) par Robert Miller, mai 1988.

9. «East-West Relations in the 1980s» par Adam Bromke, mai 1988.

10. «The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament 1988 : Peace Proposals since 1982» par Hanna Newcombe, mai 1988.

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
20. La désattribution des États de la ligne de front, en Afrique Australe (1980-1987) par Dan O'Meara, mai 1988.

En mai, le Centre canadien pour la gestion des armements et le désarmement a publié sous la co-vedure de ses *Aurora Papers*, une étude de Roger Hill, Directeur de la recherche à l'Institut. Le document de 47 pages s'intitule *Are Major Conventional Force Reductions in Europe Possible?*

M. Geoffrey Pearson a assisté aux cérémonies d'ouverture d'Expo Science 1988, un salon scientifique organisé à l'intention des étudiants de l'Outaouais. Cette année, le thème était «La science et la paix», et l'Institut coparrainait l'activité. Un nombre de juges figuraient Héloïse Samson et Margaret Bourgeault (Programmes publics). Roger Hill a présenté des prix : Katherine Laundry et Susan Connell ont supervisé un kiosque où des publications de l'Institut étaient exposées.

À l'issue d'une table ronde ayant réuni des membres de l'Institut canadien des affaires internationales (ICAI) et de l'Institut soviétique des sciences de Moscou, l'ICPSI a mis sur pied à Ottawa un programme à l'intention de la délégation soviétique. Celle-ci comprenait George Arbatov, chef de l'Institut, Leon Bagramov, le général Mikhail Milstein, Sergei Pikhonov, Nikolai Shmelyov, Henri Trofimenko et S. P. Molochkov. Ils ont pris la parole lors d'un colloque privé auquel divers Canadiens et Canadiennes ont assisté sur invitation, se sont réunis avec des dignitaires du ministère des Affaires étrangères, ont assisté à un dîner offert par le bureau d'Ottawa de l'ICAI, et ont rencontré des membres du personnel de l'ICPSI au siège de ce dernier. Pendant les divers entretiens, ils ont insisté sur les changements qui se produisent dans la pensée soviétique et sur la nécessité de réévaluer les relations Est-Ouest. Il importe d'examiner sérieusement les conflits régionaux; dans la plupart des cas, les États-Unis et l'URSS devraient s'abstenir d'intervenir dans les différends locaux. La délégation soviétique a par ailleurs souligné qu'il fallait réviser les institutions internationales, notamment l'ONU, et que tous les membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité se devaient de jouer pleinement leur rôle dans les systèmes de sécurité collective.

NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



relations que le Canada entretenait avec le Moyen-Orient, il recommandait notamment qu'un dialogue s'établisse entre les groupes juif et arabe au Canada. Les participants ont dû avoir apprécié l'occasion qui leur avait été donnée d'échanger des opinions dans le contexte offert par l'Institut, et ils ont souhaité que la chose se reproduise.

M. Geoffrey Pearson a pris la parole devant une assemblée occupée par la paix et de la sécurité en tant que l'ONU sur la nature dynamique des relations Est-Ouest et en exprimant l'espoir que les chefs d'Etat tant à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest se rendent compte de la nécessité de coopérer entre eux pour régler la pléthore de problèmes intéressant la sécurité dans le monde d'aujourd'hui. Le lendemain, M. Pearson a assisté au *Quadrangular Forum*, à Toronto; c'était une réunion que l'Institut de **Roger Hill** était lui aussi présent à ce débat préalable au sommet économique, débat auquel ont participé des fonctionnaires de l'Etat, des chefs d'entreprise et des universitaires. Plus tôt en avril, M. Pearson a pris part à un colloque à l'Université Cornell où il était l'invité de **Richard Ned Lebow**, Directeur des études sur la paix à cette institution. À la mi-mai, M. Pearson a pris la parole dans le cadre d'une conférence organisée par l'Université de Calgary sur la coopération entre le Canada et l'Inde. A Ottawa, il a présidé une assemblée sur le rôle de l'ONU joué dans les diverses négociations, pendant la conférence annuelle de l'Alliance des professeurs canadiens pour la paix au Moyen-Orient.

Cinq membres de l'Institut des affaires étrangères de la République populaire de Chine ont visité l'ICPSI en avril. La délégation chinoise était dirigée par **Chai Zemin**, un des vice-présidents de l'Institut et ancien ambassadeur de la Chine à Washington. M. **Zhang Wenpu**, actuellement ambassadeur de la Chine au Canada, a accompagné la délégation. M. Zemin a souligné la nécessité d'intensifier les contacts entre la Chine et l'Occident, et il a déclaré que les différences existant entre les régimes sociaux ne

John Halstead, membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut, a représenté l'Institut à des réunions de la Commission trilatérale à Tokyo. Il a exposé le point de vue canadien sur les questions intéressant la sécurité Est-Ouest.

Ron Purver a présenté un exposé sur la limitation des armements dans le Grand Nord, pendant la réunion de l'*International Studies Association*, à St. Louis, il a par ailleurs pris la parole à deux autres occasions.

soit un atelier organisé par l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique sur le site de la Colombie-Britannique et de la sécurité dans l'Arctique, et une autre conférence coparrainée par la même université et l'ICPSI et ayant pour thème la sécurité internationale dans le bassin du Pacifique.

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En avril, **Vasil Tupurkovski** (Présidence du Parti yougoslave) a dirigé un colloque coparrainé par l'ICPSI et l'Institut Nord-Sud. Il a pris part à l'ordre des priorités que la Yougoslavie suit actuellement en matière de politique intérieure et étrangère, et il s'est entretenu avec divers experts et dignitaires.

M. **K. Subrahmanyam**, ancien Directeur de l'Institut indien des études et analyses de défense à Delhi, a rendu visite à l'ICPSI en avril. Il avait été invité au Canada par l'Agence canadienne de développement international. M. **Hans-Friederick von Ploetz**, ministre ouest-allemand des Affaires étrangères; ce dernier a échangé des opinions sur l'état actuel des relations Est-Ouest.

M. **John J. Mearsheimer**, du département des sciences politiques de l'Université de Chicago, a dirigé un colloque sur la stratégie maritime

Teaching Issues of Peace and Security, tel était le titre d'une conférence que l'ICPSI a organisée de concert avec l'Institut d'études pédagogiques de l'Ontario (OISE), à Toronto, en avril. Parmi les participants, on comptait des enseignants et des professeurs de la région métropolitaine de Toronto. On leur a présenté une nouvelle publication de l'ICPSI intitulée *Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security*; il s'agit d'un outil didactique qui met l'accent sur la composante internationale des cours d'histoire se donnant au niveau secondaire.

L'ouvrage en est encore au stade préliminaire; pendant la conférence, les auteurs **Brad Feasey** et **Geoff Irvine** en ont expliqué l'objectif principal et le contenu. Parmi les autres orateurs ayant alors pris la parole, citons **Peter Richardson**, recteur du Collège universitaire de l'Université de Toronto, **Geoffrey Pearson** et **Nancy Gordon**, de l'ICPSI, **Walter Pitman**, de l'OISE, **John Sigler**, de l'Université Carleton, **David Cox**, de l'Université Queen's, **Brian MacDonald**, de l'Institut canadien des études stratégiques, et **Joanna Miller**, du Groupe des 78 et de l'Institut national pour la sauvegarde de l'environnement. Mis à part **Brad Feasey** et **Geoff Irvine**, les animateurs de l'atelier étaient **Dianne**


Madan Handa et **Ed Sullivan** (OISE), **Stephanie McCandless-Reford** et **Robert Reford**.

À la fin d'avril, l'Institut a, à la demande du ministre des Affaires extérieures et en coopération avec lui, organisé à Montebello une réunion à l'intention de représentants des collectivités juive et arabo-palestinienne vivant au Canada.

M. **Joe Clark**, secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures, a offert un dîner pour accueillir les participants.

M. **Robert Stanfield** était égalemment présent; on se rappellera que dans son rapport de 1980 sur les

LIVRES



Pionniers de l'atome

Bertrand Goldschmidt
Stock, Paris, 1987.
484 pages, 34,95 \$.

L'auteur explique comment les dirigeants américains et anglais ont mis les Français à l'écart, profitant du fait que la France était subjuguée par l'Allemagne durant la période allant de 1940 à 1944. Il raconte comment ces mêmes dirigeants n'ont pas respecté les brevets français, et comment ils ont monopolisé le phénomène nucléaire pour renforcer la puissance de leur pays. Sous le couvert de la politique de non-prolifération, ils ont tout fait pour maintenir la France à l'écart. L'auteur met l'accent sur l'excuse utilisée sur tout par les Américains, concernant une fuite possible d'information aux Soviétiques par les pionniers atomiques français. Il ne peut s'empêcher de remarquer que les fuites qui eurent lieu ne furent pas impuissables aux Français, mais plutôt à des Américains et à des Anglais d'ailleurs. Les sagas de Bertrand Goldschmidt n'est pas ennuyeuse, au contraire. L'auteur passe bien son message, l'entourant d'anecdotes concernant sa vie privée et celles d'autres pionniers de l'atome qu'il a connu en France et à l'étranger. Ces détails sont intéressants et le livre se lit avec plaisir. Même qu'à certains moments l'auteur prend le cachet d'un roman policier, lorsque, par exemple, Goldschmidt raconte les efforts entrepris par les Français afin de soustraire clandestinement aux Allemands, non seulement des scientifiques renommés, mais de l'uranium et de l'eau lourde. Du côté technique, l'auteur a su ne pas alourdir son texte par des descriptions techniques trop détaillées.

Après toute une vie consacrée à l'atome, l'auteur est-il pour ou contre le nucléaire? À le lire, on perçoit qu'il est fier de sa contribution dans ce domaine et on a l'impression qu'il est pour le nucléaire mais sans oublier pour l'utilisation du nucléaire comme source d'énergie pacifique. D'un autre côté, il a participé à plusieurs efforts en vue d'établir un

sur l'atome. dilué dans la littérature anglophone paton française est pour le moins atomique. Cet aspect de la participation d'énergie utile dans une pile source en chaîne pour en faire une réaction en chaîne pour en faire une sur la façon pratique de contrôler la ils avaient aussi déposé des brevets seulement élaboré la théorie, mais chaîne avec laquelle l'atome devient source d'énergie. Ils avaient non mais ils avaient conçu la réaction en soient la radioactivité et la fission, les principes de l'énergie atomique, Non seulement ils avaient reconnu de file dans le domaine nucléaire. chercheurs français étaient les chefs des années 1940, un petit noyau de Selon M. Goldschmidt, au début à l'ère nucléaire.

grandes découvertes qui conduisirent française ne fut qu'en marge des livres, le lecteur est laissé avec Pierre Curie. Dans la plupart des découverte du radium par Marie et rôle joué par la France, si ce n'est la tuellement, on y fait peu mention du Seconde Guerre mondiale. Habitué Breagne et au Canada durant la atomique aux États-Unis, en Grande-Il existe un très grand nombre de livres racontant les débuts de l'ère l'aventure nucléaire mondiale. pionniers français de l'atome dans part du véritable rôle joué par les M. Goldschmidt, il veut nous faire prend vite conscience du message de Comissariat français à l'énergie atomique. Mais ceci n'est qu'un superbe camoufflage. Le lecteur atomique. Mais ceci n'est qu'un Comissariat français à l'énergie atomique. Mais ceci n'est qu'un livre remarquable. À première vue, Bertrand Goldschmidt a écrit un

contrôle international sur les armes nucléaires et même leur abolition. Il ne lui reste cependant que peu d'illusions sur ce sujet. L'auteur est convaincu que les dirigeants des grandes puissances ne sont pas encore prêts à renoncer aux armes nucléaires comme moyens d'affirmer leur puissance, et qu'ils tolèrent un mouvement en faveur du contrôle de ces armes tant que celui-ci ne menacera marginalement mondial. Compte tenu de sa longue expérience dans le domaine nucléaire, il est peut-être bien placé pour en arriver à cette conclusion.

- Roger Favreau

Roger Favreau est professeur de physique au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean.

Le système militaire soviétique

Jacques Sapir
Editions La Découverte, Paris, 1988.
344 pages, 44,95 \$.

Dans la grisaille des nouvelles parutions, il est parfois de très heureuses rencontres. L'ouvrage de Jacques Sapir est de celles-là. En effet, nous ne surprenons pas le lecteur averti en rappelant que les recherches françaises dans le domaine de la défense, se sont caractérisées, pendant plusieurs décennies, par leur isolement et leur ignorance des grands débats internationaux. Depuis parutions anglo-saxonnes.

Dans cet ouvrage, Jacques Sapir étudie à fond le système militaire soviétique et dénonce, ce faisant, les faiblesses et les déformations qui caractérisent bien souvent d'autres analyses faites sur le sujet. En substance, la démarche de l'auteur est la suivante. Dans un premier temps, il nous propose d'examiner ce qu'il est convenable pour l'utilisation du nucléaire vraiment d'autres choix réalistes. La principale étant qu'il n'y a pas plusieurs efforts en vue d'établir un

Finallement, l'auteur aborde les rapports entre le système militaire et la société soviétique. Sapir y dé- monce, en particulier, l'idée d'une militarisation du système politique en URSS. Pour expliquer le surdév- loppement de l'appareil militaire, il fait appel à la notion de «militarisme paradoxal», selon laquelle le pouvoir politique chercherait à équilibrer, par la puissance militaire apparente, les faiblesses économiques, politiques et sociales du pays.

À l'issue de ce raisonnement fondamentalement iconoclaste, les

venu d'appeler les paramètres de l'équilibre des forces entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Ceci lui permet, en particulier, de démontrer le caractère primitif des indicateurs utilisés couramment pour mesurer cet équilibre. Pousant le raisonnement plus loin, il montre que l'analyse qualitative des technologies et l'examen du système militaire soviétique débouchent sur des conclusions plus nuancées qu'un simple rapport comptable. En second lieu, l'auteur, dépassant la simple analyse technico-militaire, tente d'évaluer la réalité de la menace soviétique, particulièrement sur le plan de la stratégie. En d'autres termes, la «quincallierie» n'est pas tout, et l'aspect le plus menaçant de l'URSS est «sa propension avérée à l'usage de la force autant en Europe qu'à la périphérie».

Dans un troisième temps, l'auteur

On estime qu'une trentaine de pays possèdent des armes chimiques; n'importe quel pays doté d'une industrie chimique rudimentaire peut fabriquer de tels engins dont la production est d'ailleurs peu coûteuse. À Genève, la Conférence du désarmement poursuit ses négociations sur une convention qui interdirait d'armes chimiques.

Une nouvelle base soviétique dans l'Arctique

D'après un rapport provenant de *Defence Weekly*, l'URSS a établi une nouvelle base navale pour les sous-marins des classes *Typhoon* et *Della*, à Zapadnaya Liza. Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, et le ministre de la Défense nationale, M. Perrin Beatty, ont tous deux souligné que, si les Soviétiques veulent restreindre la militarisation du Nord, il leur faudra mentionner, dans leurs propositions concernant la limitation des déploiements militaires, les forces concentrées dans la péninsule de Kola. □

- D A V I D C O X

Le rapport ne précise pas quel serait le coût du programme canadiennes. Les armes chimiques, en particulier, sont considérées comme des armes de destruction massive. Le Parti Libéral n'a pas présenté un énoncé de politique aussi détaillé en matière de défense, mais dans un discours qu'il a prononcé en février pendant une conférence consacrée aux politiques du Parti, le chef John Turner a réaffirmé que, si les Libéraux prenaient le pouvoir, le Canada resterait membre de l'OTAN comme le NPD, le Parti Libéral annulerait le programme d'acquisition des sous-marins nucléaires et il mettrait fin aux essais des missiles de croisière. M. Turner a dit que l'on pouvait mieux protéger la souveraineté du Canada dans l'Arctique en recourant à des moyens non militaires.

Les armes chimiques

Au début d'avril, on a de nouveau affirmé que des armes chimiques avaient été employées par les bellégérants dans le conflit irano-irakien. De très nombreux civils (entre cinq et dix mille, dit-on) auraient été tués dans le village de Halabjah occupé par l'Iran.

Place de la Constitution
360, rue Albert, Bureau 900
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1R 7X7

Le ministre ouest-allemand de la Justice, Hans Dietrich Genscher, a déclaré que les services de la Justice et de la Défense, sous la direction de M. Wörner, ont une responsabilité importante à jouer dans la mise en œuvre de la Convention sur les armes chimiques.



Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales

La doctrine militaire de l'OTAN et les armes classiques

Après s'être réuni à Bruxelles les 2 et 3 mars, le Conseil de l'Atlantique-Nord a émis un communiqué dans lequel les chefs d'État réitérent la position de l'OTAN sur les armes nucléaires et le rapport existant entre la dissuasion nucléaire et la dissuasion classique.

D'après le communiqué, la supériorité que l'Organisation du Pacte de

l'Ouest et s'engagerait probablement à soutenir la Norvège dans le contexte plus large de la sécurité de l'Arctique.

Relativement aux forces maritimes, le NPD annulerait le programme d'acquisition des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire, mais il remplacerait les sous-marins diesel de la classe *Oberon*. À d'autres égards, son programme concernant la marine s'assimile à celui du gouvernement conservateur. Au chapitre de la défense aérienne, cependant, le rapport précise que le NPD ne renouvellerait pas l'accord du NORAD en 1991. Il chercherait plutôt à conclure avec les États-Unis une autre entente qui éviterait au Canada de participer aux stratégies de guerre nucléaire et au programme de défense contre les missiles balistiques, et qui accroîtrait la capacité de deux pays d'exercer une surveillance en temps de paix.


Enfin, le rapport recommande que le Canada renonce à l'Accord sur le partage de la production de défense liant aux États-Unis et qu'il se doie plutôt d'une industrie de défense capable de fabriquer les systèmes d'armes nécessaires aux Forces

énoncé de politique signé par Derek Blackburn, critique du Parti pour la défense; le document réaffirme que, sous un gouvernement néo-démocrate, le Canada se retirerait de l'OTAN et du NORAD. En avril 1988, le Comité des affaires internationales (NPD) a publié sur la défense et la limitation des armements un rapport plus long intitulé *Les enjeux du Canada dans la sécurité commune*.

Le rapport confirme la décision du NPD selon laquelle le Canada quitterait l'OTAN sous un régime néo-démocrate, mais il y est précis que ce serait là une démarche progressive que notre pays suivrait en consultation avec les alliés de l'OTAN. Parlant du rapport, le chef du Parti, M. Ed Broadbent a déclaré qu'un gouvernement néo-démocrate n'opérerait pas ce changement pén-

NPD rapatrierait les troupes canadiennes basées en Allemagne de

CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



Que pensent les Américains de nos sous-marins nucléaires ?

En octobre 1987, M. Charles Bennett, membre du Congrès américain et président du Sous-comité des forces armées concernant la puissance navale (Chambre des représentants), a fait paraître dans le *Globe and Mail* un article où il critiquait la décision d'acheter des sous-marins nucléaires et où il donnait à entendre que le Congrès avait le pouvoir d'examiner les modalités d'un transfert possible de technologie nucléaire dans le cas des sous-marins *Trident* pour le gouvernement américain et Londres. Récemment, le sénateur John Warner, membre du Comité sénatorial des forces armées et ancien Secrétaire à la Marine, a lui aussi déclaré que le Sénat tiendrait des audiences avant que le Canada puisse acheter des sous-marins *Trident*.

Ne machant pas ses mots, M. Frank Gaffney, ancien Secrétaire adjoint à la Défense, a accusé le gouvernement canadien d'accroître les risques d'accident en se procurant des sous-marins nucléaires à partir de frais. Dans un article paru le 12 avril dans le *Globe and Mail*, il a prétendu que le Canada n'était pas disposé à assumer les coûts réels que supposent la mise au point de l'infrastructure, l'acquisition des compétences et l'élaboration des règlements nécessaires à un programme national d'achat de sous-marins nucléaires.

En dépit de ces objections, le président Reagan a promis au premier ministre Mulroney, lors du sommet de Washington, le 27 avril dernier, qu'il ne s'opposerait pas à la conclusion d'un marché avec les Britanniques. Dans le *Washington Post* du 28 avril, un porte-parole du Département d'Etat a précisé que M. Reagan avait approuvé le marché à cause des conditions uniques

s'appliquant dans le cas de... «deux Etats-Unis s'opposent toujours à la vente de sous-marins nucléaires à d'autres nations.»

Le retrait des troupes canadiennes présentes en Norvège

Dans un discours prononcé à l'Institut canadien des affaires internationales, le général Gérard Thériault, ancien Chef de l'Etat-major de la Défense, a précisé qu'il n'épousait pas la décision énoncée dans le Livre blanc sur la défense par lequel le gouvernement canadien a décidé de retirer les troupes canadiennes présentes en Norvège et renforcer les effectifs de notre pays en Allemagne.

Comparant les troupes canadiennes aux effectifs totaux de l'OTAN, le général Thériault a dit qu'il n'était pas «insignifiantes du point de vue militaire», mais il a soutenu que l'Alliance accordait une énorme importance à l'engagement suivant lequel le Canada doit envoyer une brigade en Norvège en temps de crise.

D'autres sources auraient maintenu au contraire que, dans une version antérieure du Livre blanc sur la défense, on avait proposé de retirer les éléments canadiens de l'Europe centrale pour renforcer le flanc norvégien. Gwynne Dyer, analyste des questions de défense, a soutenu dans le *Globe and Mail* du 22 avril que l'ancien ministre de la Défense Erik Neilsen avait élaboré le plan en 1985, que ce dernier avait été bien accueilli à Washington, mais que les gouvernements allemand et britannique l'avaient tellement critiqué qu'on l'avait retiré. Le plan Neilsen aurait préconisé la mise en place préalable de matériel lourd en Norvège, l'établissement d'une base par avion de toute la brigade en temps de crise.

Des reportages publiés récemment dans les journaux ont signalé que des bombardiers soviétiques *Bea* porteurs de missiles de croisière s'aventurent de plus en plus souvent dans l'espace aérien voisin de l'Alaska et des côtes occidentales du Canada et des Etats-Unis. Selon

Patrouille dans le Pacifique

Après s'être réunis à Bruxelles le 27 avril, les ministres de la Défense de l'OTAN ont signalé au Danemark qu'une telle mesure porterait atteinte à l'unité de l'Alliance. Le Secrétaire d'Etat américain George Shultz aurait dit (*Toronto Star*, 29 avril) à son homologue danois : «Si vous profitez des avantages que cela suppose.» Le premier ministre danois Paul Schlüter a déclaré : «Les partis qui ont voté pour la motion sociale-démocrate sur l'OTAN (interdire aux navires porteurs d'armes nucléaires l'accès aux ports danois) ont été

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Le Danemark et les armes nucléaires

Après une élection surprise tenue le 10 mai pour permettre au Danemark de décider s'il devait effectivement interdire aux navires porteurs d'armes nucléaires l'accès à ses ports, la question n'était toujours pas réglée au moment de mettre sous presse. En admettant, contrairement aux volontés du premier ministre du Danemark, une résolution qui oblige tous les navires visiteurs (y compris ceux des alliés du Danemark) à déclarer s'ils transportent des engins nucléaires, le Parlement de ce pays a précipité la tenue d'une élection. La résolution a suscité des propos acerbes de la part de la Grande-Bretagne et des Etats-Unis; les deux pays équipent régulièrement leurs navires d'armes nucléaires et ils refusent de faire savoir quels bâtiments en sont munis. Ils ne pourront plus mouiller dans les ports danois.

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- R O N P U R V E R

région, qu'ils informent de même les pays méditerranéens, et qu'ils invitent tous les intéressés à assister aux dites manœuvres. M. Gorbatchev a par ailleurs demandé aux pays de la Méditerranée et aux autres pays concernés d'élaborer des principes et des méthodes pour garantir la sécurité des voies de navigation très fréquentées, surtout dans les détroits internationaux; il a proposé à ces mêmes pays de tenir une conférence pour formuler les propositions pertinentes, en faire un régime et définir l'ordre logique suivant lequel il conviendrait de les mettre en oeuvre. Les pays de l'OTAN ont loyalement rejeté des propositions semblables dans le passé, y compris celles que M. Gorbatchev a récemment mises de l'avant au sujet de l'Arctique et du Pacifique, et ils ont fait valoir que la mobilité navale illimitée était essentielle à la sécurité de l'Occident. Une semaine plus tard, après s'être entretenu avec le Secrétaire d'Etat Shultz à Washington, son homologue, M. Chevachnadze, a révélé que l'URSS avait proposé de tenir une conférence navale internationale après avoir effectué l'expérience et l'essai de la version finale à laquelle participeraient tout d'abord les États-Unis, la France, le Royaume-Uni et l'URSS pour discuter d'un traité dont l'objet serait de réduire les forces navales dans le monde. Fait surprenant, on a signalé au début d'avril que M. Paul Nitze, conseiller des États-Unis en matière de limitation des armements, avait proposé d'abolir les SLCM, charges de profondeur et torpilles nucléaires, ainsi que (peut-être) les bombes nucléaires montées sur les avions embarqués. Sa proposition aurait été fondée sur l'hypothèse que les armes nucléaires navales tactiques de l'URSS menaçaient la supériorité américaine. Cependant, le Comité conjoint des chefs d'état-major américains se serait fortement opposé à l'idée, et beaucoup ont dit douter qu'elle évolue jamais au point de devenir une proposition officielle. Selon M. William Arkin, représentant de l'*Institute for Policy Studies* basé à Washington, chaque superpuissance déploie environ 2 000 armes nucléaires en mer, sans compter les missiles balistiques équipant les sous-marins. □

La limitation des armements navals Dans un discours prononcé le 16 mars devant l'Assemblée fédérale yougoslave, le secrétaire général Gorbatchev a proposé que l'URSS et les États-Unis (1) gèlent le nombre de leurs navires et le potentiel de leurs flottes en Méditerranée, à partir du 1^{er} juillet 1988, et (2) qu'ils annoncent l'un à l'autre l'envoi de navires de guerre et la tenue de manœuvres militaires dans cette zone. Dans un discours prononcé le 16 mars devant l'Assemblée fédérale yougoslave, le secrétaire général Gorbatchev a proposé que l'URSS et les États-Unis (1) gèlent le nombre de leurs navires et le potentiel de leurs flottes en Méditerranée, à partir du 1^{er} juillet 1988, et (2) qu'ils annoncent l'un à l'autre l'envoi de navires de guerre et la tenue de manœuvres militaires dans cette zone. Dans un discours prononcé le 16 mars devant l'Assemblée fédérale yougoslave, le secrétaire général Gorbatchev a proposé que l'URSS et les États-Unis (1) gèlent le nombre de leurs navires et le potentiel de leurs flottes en Méditerranée, à partir du 1^{er} juillet 1988, et (2) qu'ils annoncent l'un à l'autre l'envoi de navires de guerre et la tenue de manœuvres militaires dans cette zone.

Bureau international d'inspection de l'espace; la présence permanente de groupes d'inspecteurs à toutes les bases de lancement pour examiner tous les objets mis en orbite, quel que soit le vecteur employé; des inspections effectuées à des dépôts, des industries, des laboratoires et des centres d'essais choisis d'un commun accord; et la vérification, grâce à des inspections-surprises sur place, de l'absence de bases non déclarées. Au moment où nous mettons sous presse, les États-Unis ont fait savoir qu'ils ne comptaient pas déposer de nouvelles propositions à la dernière réunion préalable au sommet, à la fin de mai, on n'avait enregistré aucun progrès sur la question critique de la limitation des essais des systèmes de défense contre les missiles balistiques dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique. Après chacune de ces réunions mensuelles tenues par MM. Shultz et Chevachnadze, les négociateurs ont reçu pour consigne d'intensifier leurs efforts pour rédiger l'ébauche d'un accord dis-

calendrier

Date	Événement
25 juillet au 5 août	Réunion du Groupe d'experts sismologiques (CD)
Avant le 2 octobre	Conférence d'examen du Traité sur les missiles anti-missiles balistiques
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Le 29 avril, j'ai proposé encore aux exigences du sénateur Nunn qu'un système. Mais cela n'a pas satisfait les pourparlers d'ordre technique menés entre les deux pays sur la mise en oeuvre de l'accord. Les questions les plus importantes étaient les suivantes : (1) Les Américains seraient-ils autorisés à inspecter les structures et les véhicules assez gros pour contenir de petites pièces de missiles, mais non des missiles entiers ? (2) Les inspecteurs auraient-ils accès à toute la zone des installations soviétiques, ou seulement à des immenses désignés dans cette zone ? (3) Chaque bloc aurait-il le droit d'interdire l'emploi de certains appareils de surveillance (des caméras par exemple) aux emplacements assujettis aux inspections ? Et (4) quels seraient les droits d'inspection des Etats-Unis en dehors de l'usine de missiles située à Voroninsk ? Le 29 avril, M. Robert Byrd, chef de la majorité au Sénat, a annoncé qu'il était disposé à soumettre le Traité au Sénat le 11 mai, à condition que le gouvernement règle quatre points encore en litige : (1) Les divergences de vues subsistant au sujet des clauses sur la vérification ; (2) l'obtention de la part de l'URSS d'une confirmation écrite attestant que les armes futures seront également interdites, et l'établissement d'une définition plus précise du mot « armes » ; (3) la vérifiabilité d'un régime qui interdirait les systèmes futurs ; (4) une promesse du gouvernement par laquelle il s'engagerait à moderniser les systèmes de surveillance par satellite employés au cours de la vérification dans le cadre du Traité.

Le 8 mai, l'ambassadeur soviétique Doubinine a présenté une réponse officielle aux neuf questions discutées soulevées par le Département d'Etat relativement à la vérification. Le lendemain, après que les membres du Comité du renseignement

der FNI signé en décembre dernier pendant le sommet de Washington se sont présidents. Le gouvernement américain avait exhorté le Sénat à approuver le Traité avant le sommet de Moscou, le président Reagan ayant souligné qu'autrement, le succès de ces efforts dirigés par le sénateur Jesse Helms pour ajouter des modifications qui auraient en fait «torpillé» le traité (elles auraient supposé de nouvelles négociations avec l'URSS) ont été contraires au niveau des comités. Les trois comités sénatoriaux qui ont tenu des audiences sur le Traité (Relations extérieures, Forces armées, et Renseignement) l'ont approuvé en grande majorité, tout comme la Chambre des représentants (c'était pour elle un geste purement symbolique, car elle n'a aucun rôle formel à jouer relativement à la ratification des traités).

Les présidents des comités ont semblé convenir que la seule «réserve» qu'il fallait exprimer au moment de la ratification était une qui n'exigeait pas l'accord de l'URSS mais qui interdirait dans l'avenir au président de réinterpréter le Traité sans l'approbation du Sénat. Cet aspect a été mis en lumière par suite des tentatives que le gouvernement Reagan a faites pour réinterpréter le Traité ABM de 1972.

Par ailleurs, M. Sam Nunn, président du Comité sénatorial des Forces armées, «C'est dénotant si le Traité interdirait aussi les systèmes dits «futuristes» (par exemple, les armes à courte portée ou à portée intermédiaire qui détruiraient leurs objectifs au moyen d'un laser, d'un faisceau de particules, de micro-ondes, ou d'énergie cinétique, au lieu d'employer des explosions nucléaires ou classiques). La Maison-Blanche a réussi à obtenir du ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Chervomazhe, une lettre affirmant que l'URSS épousait l'interprétation américaine selon laquelle il fallait effectivement interdire ces

des sur ces missiles; quant à eux, les Etats-Unis continuent à réclamer l'interdiction complète de ces engins. Pour qu'il soit possible de vérifier le nombre des ICBM mobiles, l'URSS a proposé de restreindre les zones opérationnelles et la production, et de les exposer périodiquement à l'observation des satellites.

Le nombre limite d'ALCM : Aux fins du calcul à faire pour en arriver à la limite totale de 6 000 ogives stratégiques, les Etats-Unis sont maintenant disposés à attribuer dix (au lieu de six) engins de croisière aéroporés (ALCM) à chaque bombardier capable d'en porter. L'URSS continue d'insister pour compter le nombre d'engins effectivement transportés, lequel, dans le cas des avions américains, varie de douze (à bord des B-52G) à vingt-deux au plus (à bord des B-1B). En ce qui concerne la difficulté qu'il y a à faire la distinction entre les ALCM munis d'ogives nucléaires et ceux qui portent des munitions classiques, les Etats-Unis ont proposé, pour la résoudre, que tous les ALCM à longue portée existants soient considérés comme étant nucléaires; par ailleurs, nous les nouveaux types d'ALCM devraient avoir des caractéristiques (ce qu'on appelle les différences fonctionnelles observables, ou FROD) qui permettraient de distinguer les engins nucléaires des autres. Selon le plan américain, les avions porteurs d'ALCM nucléaires devraient aussi posséder des traits particuliers et être affectés à des bases distinctes. La première réaction soviétique exprimée en avril, lors de la réunion de MM. Shultz et Chervomaz, était empreinte de scepticisme.

Comme les négociations progressent lentement, les dignitaires soviétiques prédisaient à la fin d'avril qu'un traité START ne serait pas conclu avant l'arrivée d'un nouveau président à la Maison-Blanche, au début de 1989.


(Voir l'article thème du présent numéro sur le pourparler concernant les armements stratégiques.)

La ratification du Traité sur les

des pour parler sur la réduction des armements stratégiques (START) à Washington ayant réuni le président Reagan et le secrétaire général Gorbatchev en décembre, on avait exprimé l'espoir qu'un traité sur les armements stratégiques pourrait être prêt à temps pour être signé au sommet de Moscou devant avoir lieu en juin, et cet espoir subsistait encore au début du printemps. A la fin d'avril toutefois, on n'avait pas beaucoup progressé, et les porteurs officiels avaient à toutes fins utiles écarté la possibilité qu'un traité soit signé en bonne et due forme au sommet de Moscou. L'ébauche conjointe du texte de deux protocoles, l'un sur l'inspection et l'autre sur la conversion ou l'élimination des armes, et une convention sur l'échange de données ont été préparées à temps pour la réunion de M. Shultz et Chevradnadze de M. Rozanov, secrétaire d'Etat adjoint des Etats-Unis, les deux représentants des Etats-Unis, et l'évidence des points encore en litige) était quasi incommensurable. A d'autres égards, la conjoncture a évolué comme il suit :

Aux yeux des dignitaires soviétiques, la limitation des missiles de croisière (SLCM) demeure le principal obstacle à la conclusion d'un accord. En mars, les Soviétiques ont proposé d'exécuter un essai conjoint en Méditerranée pour vérifier le fonctionnement d'un télé-détecteur qui repèrerait la présence de SLCM munis d'ogives nucléaires bord des navires. Les Etats-Unis ont refusé en alléguant qu'un tel système ne marcherait tout simplement pas.

Les ICBM mobiles : Les Soviétiques ont proposé de limiter à 800 le nombre d'ogives pouvant être mon-



Tandis que la date du sommet de Moscou approchait, des obstacles imprévus à la ratification du Traité

La ratification du Traité sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire (FNI)

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Le nombre limite d'ALCM : Aux

En bref...
Le 29 janvier, la Chambre des communes a convenu de former un Comité spécial pour examiner le processus de paix en Amérique centrale et faire rapport sur cette question. Le Comité, dirigé par John Bosley, ancien orateur de la Chambre, a commencé à tenir des audiences en mars; il lui incombe de trouver des moyens par lesquels le

Canada pourrait aider à conserver sa vigueur au plan Africain et participer à la conception, voire à la mise en oeuvre de mécanismes de vérification et de contrôle ou d'autres mesures propres à accroître la confiance. Le Comité s'est rendu dans la

Le gouvernement a accepté, le 28 avril, de détacher cinq officiers des Forces canadiennes pendant un an au maximum auprès d'une équipe multinationale de l'ONU qui comprendra cinq militaires enven- et qui observera le retrait des troupes soviétiques de l'Afghanistan. La

Mission des bons offices des Nations-Unies en Afghanistan et au Pakistan (UNGOMAP) surveillera paisiblement et sans intervenir le retrait des 150 000 soldats soviétiques, retrait qui s'opèrera d'ici la fin de 1988, conformément à un accord négocié par l'ONU et signé le 14 avril à Genève par l'Afghanistan,

les Etats-Unis, le Pakistan et l'Union soviétique. Les rebelles musulmans afghan appuyé par l'URSS depuis 1979 ont juré de passer outre au traité et de poursuivre leur lutte contre les Soviétiques. □

- GREGORY WIRICK

projet ne [nourrit] en aucune façon à forceurs [téléastes] et par les «garimmes». Il a ajouté que le chiffre de huit milliards de dollars ne comprend pas les frais de fonctionnement et d'entretien, car «il est d'usage courant, lorsque l'on annonce le lancement de projets de la Couronne... de préciser le coût

« Relativement au Traité sur la non-prolifération nucléaire, M. Beatty a déclaré que le Japon dont le Canada envisageait d'utiliser les matières nucléaires destinées aux sous-marins respecterait en tous points ses obligations concernant la non-prolifération. Répondant à des questions que lui adressait le député libéral Douglas Ritch, M. Beatty a dit: « Si... ce Traité avait été conçu pour interdire d'une certaine façon l'utilisation de la propulsion nucléaire pour des bâtiments militaires, il l'aurait précisément... Ce que nous allons prouver, c'est qu'un pays qui... utilise

La politique de défense du Nouveau Parti Démocratique (NPD)

Le 16 avril, le Conseil fédéral du Nouveau Parti Démocratique a adopté un rapport de son Comité des affaires internationales qui exprimait en fait officiellement la politique du Parti. Celui-ci continue de dire que, sous un gouvernement néo-démocrate, le Canada se retirerait de l'O.N.A., mais il promet d'attendre son deuxième mandat avant d'agir en ce sens. Parmi les autres volets importants de la politique de défense

canapifrons et l'achat de sous-marins à propulsion diesel-électrique au lieu des sousmersibles nucléaires que le gouvernement compte se procurer. Les opinions de la presse étaient partagées. James Bagnall, spécialiste de la défense au *Financial Post*, a

déclare que la nouvelle politique
contrasta beaucoup avec la réaction
que le Parti avait affichée l'été dernier
face au Livre blanc sur la défense,
notamment parce qu'il propose
maintenant d'engager des dépenses
importantes en matière de défense.

malgré tout un tacheux précédent en profitant d'une lacune du TNP et en se révélant à personne d'autre qu'à son éventuel partenaire dans le marché des sous-marins (la France no le Royaume-Uni) les modalités de l'accord relatif aux matières nucléaires. John Lamb et Tariq Rauf ont affirmé que ce marché risquait de miner la crédibilité du Canada en tant qu'avocat de la non-prolifération nucléaire.

devenir l'Institut canadien des affaires internationales le 26 mars, le général Gerard Theriault, autrefois Chef de l'état-major de la Défense, a déclaré que l'acquisition de sous-marins énormément les moyens de défense maritime du Canada, mais qu'elle pourrait bien représenter une extravagance que le pays ne peut se permettre, vu son budget de défense très modeste. «Après tout, nous avons d'autres besoins, hormis celui-là!», Toutes les opinions n'étaient pas

devant le Comité de la défense internationale et stratégiques (Université York), s'est dit favorable à l'achat des sous-marins, car le Canada acquerrait ainsi la capacité d'agir librement dans un milieu maritime fort dangereux. Selon le *Globe and Mail* du mai, M. Byers a poursuivi en soulignant que le Canada doit pouvoir utiliser ses forces navales indépendamment de l'avis des États-Unis.

endamment de celles de ses alliés de l'OTAN. Le 12 mai, toujours dans la robe et *Mail*, le vice-amiral (à la retraite) D. N. Mainguy, qui a été Vice-chef de l'état-major de la Défense jusqu'en 1985, a fait valoir qu'une bonne partie de l'information employée par divers groupes participant au débat public sur les sous-marins était inexacte. «Le gouvernement fédéral va choisir entre deux bons sous-marins qui ont

« Nous en avons besoin. »
Le 7 mars, alors qu'il prenait la
parole devant le Comité de la défense,
M. Perrin Beatty, ministre de la
Défense nationale, a vaillamment
défendu les estimations gouverne-
mentales qui fixent le coût du projet
à huit milliards de dollars. Il a dit
qu'il y avait eu des « reportages plutôt
exagérés sur la question des coûts »,
ce qui était « une dépense que nous ne
[pouvions] nous permettre ni que le

Les sous-marins
Le gouvernement a toujours
l'intention d'acheter des sous-marins
à propulsion nucléaire, et cela con-
tinue d'alimenter sur la colline par-
lementaire le débat le plus animé qui
soit en matière de paix et de sécurité;
presque tout le monde a une opinion;

À la mi-février, le Conseil canadien des églises a publié une lettre dans laquelle il avait fait paraître au premier ministre, elle avait été signée par onze chefs religieux, y compris des représentants des Églises catholique romaine, Unité, Anglicane, luthérienne et Presbytérienne. Il y avait dit qu'en achetant des sous-marins nucléaires, le Canada violerait la propre politique sur le commerce des matières nucléaires et qu'il n'

William Johnson de la *Montreal Gazette* a condamné la lettre en la qualifiant d'« inepte moralisante ».

Dans une étude rendue publique à la fin de février, le Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement (CCCAD) a conclu que les frais de fonctionnement pourraient porter le coût total du

Le rapport du Centre qui précède, sur la construction d'une zone de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire menacerait l'esprit du traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP). Dans le rapport, on soutient que le carburant destiné aux sous-marins ne sera pas assésé aux clauses de certification d'inspection appli-

quées par l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) à qui il a demandé de suspendre le nombre de administrer le Traité. Dans un article paru le 12 mai dans le *Globe and Mail*, les deux auteurs du rapport du CCCAD ont affirmé que le Canada n'avait de toute évidence pas l'intention d'utiliser les matières nucléaires pour fabriquer des bombes, mais qu'il établissait

LETTRE DE JÉRUSALEM PAR VÉRA MURRAY



Il suffit de gravir la colline d'Abou Thor, à dix minutes du centre de Jérusalem, pour embrasser d'un seul regard l'un des paysages les plus mémorables du monde...

Au loin, les monts de Moab, la dépression de la mer Morte, le désert de Judée, plus près, la vallée du Cédron, le mont des Oliviers, le cimetière de Gethsémani et le dôme de la mosquée d'al-Aqsa. Les remparts, un groupe d'écoliers israéliens faisant une promenade en direction des villages arabes est accompagné par des gardes armés de mitrailleuses. Moi, qui en tant qu'Israélienne, je rends régulièrement étranger dans la vieille ville, me fais traiter de «folle», ou de «courageuse» par des connaissances de la ville. Le lieu le plus vénéré des Juifs, jusqu'en juin 1967, après la guerre des Six jours, lors de la conquête et d'occuper toute Jérusalem, et à plus forte raison à Tel Aviv, sans occuper de ce qui se passe dans les territoires occupés. Beaucoup d'Israéliens n'y ont jamais mis les pieds. «Dans leur tête, c'est certain endroit que vingt kilomètres de large, allait inclure ces nouveaux espaces d'une beauté biblique. C'est là que les Israéliens allaient faire leurs pique-niques, leurs em-pêtes exotiques, et ils s'y comportaient souvent en maîtres.

Mais petit à petit, avec la montée de la résistance palestinienne, les Israéliens recommencèrent à se retrancher sur leur territoire, à souffrir de claustrophobie. Aujourd'hui, après six mois d'un soulèvement violent dans les territoires occupés par Israël, la frontière, sans exister dans la réalité, est réinstallée. Dans le quartier d'Abou Thor, des Juifs habitant dans l'ancien *no man's land*, sur la rue Ein Rogel, ne mettent jamais les pieds au village arabe, à 300 mètres au bout de la rue. De la terrasse de la cinémathèque, cons-truite sur le versant de la colline d'Abou Thor, des intellectuels juifs contemplent quotidiennement le magnifique panorama de la ville à la manière d'un décor de théâtre. La plupart n'y ont pas mis

Les Israéliens se comportent comme un peuple encerclé, minoritaire, menacé de mort, bien qu'en réalité, dans le conflit actuel avec les Palestiniens, ils sont en possession de tous les atouts militaires.

fatisme de celle qui a tout vu et a raison après tout, une vieille Juive polonaise, rescapée d'un camp de concentration nazi. Le sentiment est très enraciné, même chez les *sabras*, nés au pays. Les Israéliens se comportent comme un peuple encerclé, minoritaire, menacé de mort, bien qu'en réalité, dans le conflit actuel avec les Palestiniens, ils sont en possession de tous les atouts militaires. Une minorité d'intellectuels de gauche se pose des questions déchirantes et ne voit pas d'issue. Mes rencontres avec des amis israéliens sont devenues bien peu amusantes :

ne faisaient que revenir sur des ter-labourées il y a plus de 2000 ans. Après six mois d'*intifadah*, impossible de continuer à ignorer l'existence des Palestiniens. D'abord des adolescents, puis, des femmes et pierres contre des soldats et des même tués. Un seul mort israélien pesé lourd dans la balance en comparaison avec des dizaines de morts palestiniens. Ces derniers augmentent avec une régularité quotidienne, tout simplement de leur *survie*. Car, pour les Israéliens, il s'agit la mort d'un Juif provoque une psychotique nationale, un profond sentiment d'insécurité. «Ce n'est pas la première fois que c'est difficile pour Israël, pour les Juifs», m'a dit avec le

les pieds depuis des années. Il n'y a que les Juifs orthodoxes qui continuent à se rendre au mur des Lamentations en choisissant desor-mais le parcours le plus sécuritaire : le devoir religieux oblige. Près des remparts, un groupe d'écoliers israéliens faisant une promenade en direction des villages arabes est accompagné par des gardes armés de mitrailleuses. Moi, qui en tant qu'Israélienne, je rends régulièrement étranger dans la vieille ville, me fais traiter de «folle», ou de «courageuse» par des connaissances de la ville. Le lieu le plus vénéré des Juifs, jusqu'en juin 1967, après la guerre des Six jours, lors de la conquête et d'occuper toute Jérusalem, et à plus forte raison à Tel Aviv, sans occuper de ce qui se passe dans les territoires occupés. Beaucoup d'Israéliens n'y ont jamais mis les pieds. «Dans leur tête, c'est certain endroit que vingt kilomètres de large, allait inclure ces nouveaux espaces d'une beauté biblique. C'est là que les Israéliens allaient faire leurs pique-niques, leurs em-pêtes exotiques, et ils s'y comportaient souvent en maîtres.

Mais petit à petit, avec la montée de la résistance palestinienne, les Israéliens recommencèrent à se retrancher sur leur territoire, à souffrir de claustrophobie. Aujourd'hui, après six mois d'un soulèvement violent dans les territoires occupés par Israël, la frontière, sans exister dans la réalité, est réinstallée. Dans le quartier d'Abou Thor, des Juifs habitant dans l'ancien *no man's land*, sur la rue Ein Rogel, ne mettent jamais les pieds au village arabe, à 300 mètres au bout de la rue. De la terrasse de la cinémathèque, construite sur le versant de la colline d'Abou Thor, des intellectuels juifs contemplent quotidiennement le magnifique panorama de la ville à la manière d'un décor de théâtre. La plupart n'y ont pas mis

Vera Murray est correspondante de L'actualité à Paris depuis 1988. Elle habite maintenant à Jérusalem.

Deux peuples se disputent la même terre. La violence ne fait que creuser le fossé entre eux. □

correspond même pas au strict mini-mum qu'exigent les Palestiniens. Il est hors de question de rendre tous les territoires occupés en 1967, le Golan en particulier, et pas question de retourner à l'insécurité antérieure, aux nuits sans sommeil dans les kibboutzim situés près la frontière et soumis aux attaques des commandos de Gaza ou du Liban, les réfugiés palestiniens, eux, transmettent à leurs enfants et petits-enfants le mythe du vieux pays, ils rêvent aux oranges et aux maisons abandonnées sur le territoire d'Israël, aux lieux où toute trace de leur existence a été, en réalité, effacée depuis des années.

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Le maximum que les «colonnes» israéliennes sont prêtes à céder ne correspond même pas au strict minimum qu'exigent les Palestiniens. Il est hors de question de rendre tous les territoires occupés en 1967, le Golan en particulier, et pas question de retourner à l'insécurité antérieure, aux nuits sans sommeil dans les kibboutzim situés près la frontière et soumis aux attaques des commandos de Gaza ou du Liban, les réfugiés palestiniens, eux, transmettent à leurs enfants et petits-enfants le mythe du vieux pays, ils rêvent aux oranges et aux maisons abandonnées sur le territoire d'Israël, aux lieux où toute trace de leur existence a été, en réalité, effacée depuis des années.

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à la disposition exclusive de l'OTAN
s'inclinent une force de représailles
inutilisable. Cependant, si l'on
s'en tient aux perceptions, le Traité a
effectivement de l'importance.
Les armes nucléaires sont en train
de perdre leur légitimité, et aux yeux
de certains, l'entente intervenue
Europe confirme encore davantage
l'attachement sur les missiles basés en
terre, jamais auparavant on n'a vu
des Etats-Unis d'anciens secrétaires
d'Etat, d'anciens secrétaires à la
Défense et aussi d'anciens consuls-
général, aucun président n'aurait
déclaré qu'aucun président n'aurait
sera jamais le recours en premier
aux armes nucléaires. L'initiative de
défense stratégique, lancée par
Ronald Reagan, vise, entre autres
choses, à offrir une issue technolo-
gique à ce dilemme nucléaire.
Tout cela a rendu certains Euro-
peens très nerveux. L'Europe occi-
dentale a toujours misé beaucoup sur
les armes nucléaires, car celles-ci
compensent les lacunes perçues
dans le domaine des forces classi-
ques; aujourd'hui, on lui retire d'un
seul coup ce bouclier protecteur.
Maintenant que les missiles à
portée intermédiaire ont été éliminés,
l'attention se tourne de nouveau vers
l'équilibre des forces classiques en
Europe centrale, et l'on s'interroge
aussi quant à savoir comment le reste



Mike Gombale

des forces nucléaires de l'OTAN va
s'intégrer au tout. Les divergences
d'opinions existant sur cette question
sont frappantes. Certains, dont les
ministres de la Défense de l'Alliance,
penchent pour la modernisation con-
tinue des autres volets de l'arsenal
nucléaire de l'OTAN. D'autres,
s'opposent à cette option en faisant
valoir qu'elle susciterait une kyrielle
de difficultés politiques dans les
divers pays. D'autres encore vou-
draient pousser plus loin le proces-
sus du désarmement nucléaire.
En Allemagne, toute une gamme
de politiciens, dont les Chrétiens-

démocrates et les dirigeants de la
droite, aimeraient que la limitation
des armements s'étende aussi à la
troisième catégorie des armes
nucléaires, à savoir les systèmes
dont la portée est inférieure à
500 kilomètres. D'autres, surtout
parmi les modérés trouvent qu'on est
allé assez loin; selon eux, l'OTAN
doit conserver ses forces nucléaires
à courte portée (les missiles *Lance*,
armées ouest-allemandes tombera à
arsenal en déployant de nouveaux
1990; or, il se situe maintenant à
495 000. Les mesures qui auront
pour but d'accroître le nombre de
volontaires enrôlés pour une courte
période et de prolonger les périodes
d'engagement ainsi que la durée du
service obligatoire risquent d'être
coûteuses sur les plans politique et
fiscal. Les facteurs démographiques
sont plus encourageants aux Etats-
Unis, mais comme le service mili-
taire obligatoire n'existe plus dans ce
pays, il y sera difficile de porter les
efforts des forces armées au-delà
du niveau actuel. Bref, les forces
classiques constituent un des volets
du problème, et non de la solution.
Après quinze ans, les pourparlers
sur la réduction mutuelle et équil-
brée des forces n'ont abouti à rien,
ce qui ne va pas faciliter l'élaboration
d'une politique cohérente sur les
forces classiques au sein de l'OTAN.
Faute de nouvelles idées, les chances
pour que Gorbatchev prenne l'initia-
tive politique (et exploite la propa-
gande à ses fins) avec ses propres
propositions continuent de croître.
SI L'OTAN NE SE DOTE PAS D'UNE
vision renouvelée, à quels chan-
gements, dus à la seule inertie politique,
pour-on s'attendre dans l'Alliance?
D'abord, une réduction des troupes
américaines affectées en Europe est
inévitabile. Aux Etats-Unis, les élites
et le public croient de plus en plus
(à tort ou à raison) que les alliés
européens se paient leur tôte. Vu les
pressions financières et budgétaires
toujours plus fortes, il sera toujours
plus difficile de garder en Europe
les contingents américains actuels,
à moins que les Européens convai-
quent les Américains qu'ils font
eux-mêmes plus pour assurer leur
propre défense.
En second lieu, le vœux consen-
sus américano-européen sera mis à
rude épreuve par le protectionnisme
économique grandissant aux Etats-
Unis et par la perspective des res-
trictions commerciales.
Troisièmement, le Pacifique
régiment de plus en plus l'attention des
Etats-Unis. Une commission supé-

rieure américaine vient de publier
un rapport sur la planification strate-
gique à long terme (*Discrimina-
tion*, par Fred Kile et Albert
Wohlstetter), et elle y souligne
l'importance grandissante des intérêts
nationaux américains dans le Paci-
fique et d'autres régions en dehors
de l'Europe. Parcellée conclusion
traduit une opinion fort répandue
parmi les spécialistes américains de
la politique étrangère, à savoir que
les risques de guerre en Europe cen-
trale ne sont pas ce qu'ils étaient et
que l'objet de la rivalité Est-Ouest
est maintenant ailleurs.
Quatrièmement, ces divisions
vont certainement s'accroître avec
l'arrivée de la nouvelle génération au
pouvoir en Europe. Les membres
ouest-européens les plus brillants de
la «génération du Vietnam» sont
beaucoup moins entichés de
l'Amérique que leurs parents.
En dernier lieu, la coopération
entre les alliés européens en matière
de défense s'intensifiera à mesure
qu'ils perdront confiance dans les
dirigeants américains. L'Alliance
n'est pas sur le point d'être déclarée
européenne sans doute le «pilier»
européen se renforcer tandis que les
liens entre l'Europe et l'Amérique
s'affaibliront et s'affaibliront.
CETTE CONJONCTURE CRÉERA DES
problèmes pour le Canada. Si
l'effectif de ses forces terrestres en
Europe, l'option publique cana-
dienne exigera sans doute de son
gouvernement qu'il fasse de même.
Ce n'est là qu'une éventuelle pos-
sible; nous voudrions peut-être nous
en tenir au statu quo, ou stationner
plus de troupes là-bas. Une autre
option, surtout si nous augmentons
l'effectif de nos réserves, comme le
gouvernement l'envisage dans le
livre blanc sur la défense, consis-
terait à affecter une partie de ces
dernières en Europe, auprès de
l'OTAN. Mais si tel est notre choix,
nous devons aussi concevoir des
moyens pour les envoyer là-bas
rapidement en période de crise.
Peu importe l'option que nous
retiendrons, elle aura de l'importan-
ce, surtout au vu des tensions et
des préoccupations grandissantes
des côtés de l'OTAN suscite des
que Canadiens et Canadiennes, nous
serions commencer à réfléchir plus
sérieusement sur la place que nous
entendons occuper dans ce monde
en changement et sur la façon dont
nous envisageons l'avenir de l'Améri-
que dans le contexte de nos propres
priorités stratégiques. □

TIRAILLEMENTS AU SEIN DE L'OTAN

Les articles de foi qui unifiaient jadis l'OTAN s'érodent gravement et, contrairement à ce qui a été le cas de toutes les crises antérieures, celle-ci concerne des valeurs et des convictions profondes.

PAR FEN OSLER HAMPTON

EN MARS DERNIER, LES CHEFS

de gouvernement de l'Organi-

sation du Traité de l'Atlantique-

Nord (OTAN) se sont réunis

pour réaffirmer l'unité de l'Alliance

et pour sanctionner de nouveau les

efforts faits en vue de réduire les

armements stratégiques avec l'Union

soviétique, d'éliminer les armes

chimiques et de mener des négocia-

tions avec Moscou au sujet des ré-

ductions des armements classiques

en Europe. Dans leur communiqué,

les chefs d'Etat ont réitéré leur

adhésion aux politiques qui furent

énoncées pour la première fois vers

le milieu des années 1960 : l'OTAN

doit fonder son avenir «sur une

combinaison appropriée de forces

nucieles et classiques suffisantes

et efficaces, forces qu'elle continuera

à moderniser dans les domaines où

cela s'imposera». Le sommet n'a pas

permis aux participants de régler les

questions difficiles auxquelles

l'Alliance fait face, par exemple celle

de savoir si elle doit moderniser ses

en déployant ses propres missiles à

portée intermédiaire, à savoir les

Cruise et les *Pershing 2*.

Dans le passé, les crises con-

cernaient surtout les méthodes :

comment appliquer une stratégie

que l'OTAN avait déjà arrêtée et

comment réagir face à la menace

soviétique. Elles n'ont jamais mis

l'unité de l'Alliance en péril, car on

s'entendait toujours sur l'objectif

final à atteindre. Des articles de foi

les gardaient ensemble, comme une

sorte de «colle» politique. Mais

quels étaient ces fameux articles ?

EN PREMIER LIEU, NOUS CROYAIENT

en la gravité de «la menace sovié-

tique». Tant que Brejnev et Gromyko

furent à la tête du Kremlin, l'orienta-

tion anti-occidentale de la politique

soviétique cimenta l'OTAN. L'URSS

continua à créer ce sentiment de

menace en accroissant et en moder-

nisant ses forces classiques au cours

des années 1970 et en déployant ses

SS-20. La plupart des Européens

croyaient que l'URSS franchirait la

frontière séparant les deux Alle-

Cependant, les mots «riposte

graduée» ne signifiaient pas la même

chose pour tout le monde. Pour les

Européens, la doctrine de la riposte

graduée préconisait de recourir tôt

aux armes nucléaires, car cela favo-

risait la dissuasion (empêcher les

Soviétiques d'attaquer). Quant à

eux, les Américains pensaient qu'il

d'utiliser les armes atomiques. La

riposte graduée était donc envelop-

pée d'ambiguïté, mais c'était une am-

bigüité que tout le monde acceptait.

Selon le troisième article de foi,

les Etats-Unis recourraient aux

armes nucléaires pour défendre

l'Europe occidentale, de cette façon,

le sort de l'Amérique était inextri-

cablement lié à celui de l'Europe.

Une minorité doutait de la garantie

selon laquelle les Etats-Unis risque-

raient de déclencher une guerre

nucléaire généralisée avec l'URSS

pour défendre l'Europe.

CES ARTICLES DE FOI ONT AUJOURD'HUI

perdu beaucoup de leur force. La

crise actuelle, contrairement aux

autres, n'est pas d'ordre politique.

Il s'agit d'une crise interne portant

sur des valeurs et des convictions

profondes. Le ciment politique liant

entre eux les membres de l'OTAN

est en train de se fissurer, et des

fissures commencent à apparaître

dans l'Organisation.

Tout d'abord, tous les membres de

l'OTAN ne perçoivent plus la menace

soviétique de la même manière,

à cause de la révolution gorbache-

vienne. La manifestation la plus

évidente de cette dernière est l'évolu-

sion marquée du discours politique

soviétique. Quand elle parle de la

sécurité en Europe, l'URSS emploie

maintenant des expressions telles

que «interdépendance mondiale»

ou «quantités raisonnables», et «défense

non provocatrice». Aux oreilles des

Européens, ce sont des propos sédui-

sants, et nous assistons à une vigou-

reuse renaissance de l'*Osipolitik*

(mot désignant les efforts déployés

par l'Allemagne de l'Ouest au début

des années 1970 pour améliorer ses

relations politiques et commerciales

avec l'URSS fait des pieds et

des mains pour accroître ses liens

commerciaux et économiques avec

l'Europe occidentale. La Maison-

Blanche met plus de temps à recon-

naître le changement et elle est plus

sceptique que l'Europe face à

Gorbachev. Mais le Traité à

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l'Ouest l'idée que Gorbachev veut

vraiment limiter les armements,

voire aussi en arriver à un désarme-

ment partiel.

Par ailleurs, on met sérieusement

en doute le deuxième article de foi,

celui concernant la «riposte graduée».

Les élites politiques américaines

sont devenues de plus en plus aller-

cours de la dernière décennie. En

soi, l'entente sur les forces nucléaires

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HAÏTI: UNE SOCIÉTÉ EN

ÉTAT DE CRISE

Cinq mois après l'accession de Leslie Manigat à la présidence, quelles sont les chances de la démocratie en Haïti ?

PAR CARY HECTOR

LA Fuite de Jean-Claude Duvalier aux petites heures du 7 février 1986, facilitée par les bons offices conjugués de

Washington et de Paris, a symbolisé l'effondrement de presque trente ans de dictature duvaliériste : une dictature «héréditaire» depuis 1971 (année de la mort du père), soumise, à partir de 1974 et 1975, à des pressions internes et externes de «libéralisation», puis fortement ébranlée, au cours des années 1980, par la montée des résistances et revendications populaires et aussi par des conflits internes.

On a assisté à une crise de pouvoir entre 1983 et 1985, alimentée par une double dynamique : celle des contradictions inextricables dans lesquelles ce pouvoir s'est trouvé empêtré dès la mi-70 à cause de sa prétendue politique de «libéralisation-démocratisation», et celle de l'anti-duvaliérisme de masse, accompagné de demandes autonomes de démocratie et de sec-

teurs de plus en plus larges de la population. Cette crise de pouvoir a culminé à l'été 1985 quand, pratiquement à bout de souffle, le régime a convoqué un référendum populaire pour instituer un soi-disant nouveau gouvernement mi-parlementaire mi-présidentiel (avec maintien de la «présidence à vie»), rendu possible par une «révision constitutionnelle» de la «présidence à vie», elle-même rendue possible par une «révision constitutionnelle» antérieure (1983) : la manœuvre a fait boommerang à cause de sa transparence grossière et a accéléré en fait la désintégration de la dictature. En général, on admet que «le compte à rebours» *stricto sensu* a commencé à la fin de novembre 1985 avec les soulèvements populaires successifs, déclenchés par la mort de quatre écoliers lors de manifestations dans la ville

La suite de l'histoire est bien connue : les jeux sont faits fin janvier-début février 1986, notamment avec la volte-face politique du

gouvernement américain qui, accablant ses pressions sur Duvalier, décide de retirer la moitié de l'aide économique totale destinée à Haïti, soit 26 millions de dollars.

Mais il y a plus. En fait, le fond de l'histoire est celui d'une crise de société. Pour avoir été contenue durant de longues années par le balancement collectif institutionnalisé et par le terrorisme d'État, la société haïtienne a fini par exploser.

On connaît la rengaine usée par laquelles Haïti est habituellement caractérisée : «le pays le plus pauvre de l'hémisphère occidental». Puis suit l'alignement des indicateurs socio-économiques conventionnels : 80 p.100; espérance de vie à la naissance : 54 ans; mortalité infantile : 120 p.1000; revenu national par habitant : environ 300 \$ par an; etc. Ces indicateurs confirment l'apparence d'Haïti au groupe dit des PMA (pays les moins avancés). Par

contre, il est autrement significatif que le mouvement populaire du 7 février 1986 se soit d'emblée inscrit au-delà d'un simple redressement économique. Il y a eu certes «les actions ponctuelles, etc. ; l'auto-érosion de l'édifice duvaliériste qu'entraînent les rivalités de clans, d'orientations et de générations ; l'action permanente de contestation et de dénonciation par les groupes «d'opposition extrême» en diaspora, laquelle a eu pour effet cumulatifs de maintenir l'opinion publique internationale en alerte et de saper la crédibilité politique du régime duvaliériste.

Cela dit, on sait maintenant que les Forces Armées d'Haïti (les FAD'H) ont été un acteur déterminant dans le processus de transition. Les FAD'H ont joué un rôle prépondérant pour amorcer la transition («opération-départ» mais aussi pour mettre en place le Conseil national de gouvernement provisoire (CNG).

Enfin, d'autres acteurs politiques occuperont subséquemment, c'est-à-dire deux ou trois mois plus tard, voire même après cela, le premier plan de la scène politique comme

cumulatifs de forces principales déterminantes : le soulèvement populaire généralisé qui s'est réalisé par vagues successives depuis les «émeutes de la faim» de 1984 ; l'Eglise catholique, surtout par l'entremise des *Ti-Légiz* (communautés ecclésiales), comme force de conscientisation et d'encadrement, et comme caisse de résonance du mouvement de masse ; le mouvement des jeunes comme force d'interpellation et de défrance du pouvoir (marches, protestations, lettres ouvertes, grèves, etc.).

En complément de ces forces principales, il convient de signaler : les chefs de file de «l'opposition intérieure» à partir de 1978-1979 (Grégoire Eugène, Sylvio Claude, Hubert de Ronceray), lesquels se révélèrent incapables de prise en charge effective du mouvement de masses en développement, compte tenu de la dynamique spécifique de ce dernier : leadership diffus, mouvement régional et local autonome, actions ponctuelles, etc. ;

l'auto-érosion de l'édifice duvaliériste qu'entraînent les rivalités de clans, d'orientations et de générations ; l'action permanente de contestation et de dénonciation par les groupes «d'opposition extrême» en diaspora, laquelle a eu pour effet cumulatifs de maintenir l'opinion publique internationale en alerte et de saper la crédibilité politique du régime duvaliériste.

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
aspirants au nouveau pouvoir : il s'agit de chefs de parti ou de mouvement politique revenus d'exil ou de diaspora (Marc Bazin, Leslie Manigat, Louis Déjoie II, François Laortuc, Thomas Désulmé, etc.) ;

Une fois le gouvernement de transition mis en place, il fait face aux principales revendications suivantes : la mise au rancart des principaux responsables de l'ancien pouvoir dans les institutions-clés de l'État et leur mise en accusation éventuelle pour corruption, malversation, etc. ; la démacoutisation, c'est-à-dire la dissolution légale et effective des VSN (Volontaires de la sécurité nationale) ;

l'amélioration des conditions de vie de la grande majorité par des actions et programmes d'urgence (baisse des prix des produits de première nécessité, augmentation des salaires de base, réduction des taxes, création d'emplois, etc.) ; la démocratisation, c'est-à-dire la mise en place des conditions institutionnelles permettant l'avènement d'un gouvernement légitime élu au suffrage universel.

Sous l'empire et le poids de ces revendications fondamentalistes, le processus de transition se fera particulièrement laborieux. Le heurt savèrera inévitable entre la gestion de ces revendications et la «mission» implicite du CNG perçu comme étant le produit de l'effondrement de la dictature.

TELS SONT LES ENJEUX QUI ONT balisé les deux premières années de la période de transition. Sans prétendre à l'exhaustivité, nous pose-



PAR SUITE DE CETTE ATTITUDE PER-
missives, les deux camps améliorèrent
en fait la qualité de leurs arsenaux
nucléaires. Des armes aéroportées
et des lanceurs plus rapides, plus
précis et plus meurtriers. On cherche
donc à réduire les arsenaux tout en
les rendant plus dévastateurs. Les
pourparlers START percheront,
pour accélérer, la recherche
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ment elles pourraient favoriser la
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déjà énoncé un ? Personne ne s'éton-
nera sans doute d'apprendre que le
secrétaire général Gorbatchev s'est
soucié de le faire.

Dans son programme de désarme-
ment qu'il a présenté le 15 janvier
1988, Gorbatchev a déclaré qu'il
voulait éliminer toutes les armes
nucléaires avant l'an 2000, après
quoi un traité international les déclai-
rerait illégales. Il est même allé plus
loin en se fixant un échéancier et en
définissant trois étapes chevauchan-
tes. Dans la première, qui trait de
1986 à 1992, les superpuissances
mettraient fin à toutes les explosions
nucléaires, elles réduiraient de
moitié le nombre de leurs vecteurs
nucléaires, elles ne conserveraient
pas plus de 6 000 ogives chacune, et
elles élimineraient tous les missiles à
portée intermédiaire en Europe. En
outre, elles renonceraient à mettre
au point, à mettre à l'essai et à dé-
ployer des « armes de frappe spatiales »
(expression soviétique désignant les
engins de la Guerre des étoiles). En
un deuxième temps, soit de 1990 à
1996, d'autres États « nucléaires »
adhéreraient à un régime de gel des
armes atomiques et mettraient fin
à 2000, finalement, les superpui-
sances et toutes les autres puissances

nucléaires détruiront au complet
leurs arsenaux nucléaires.
Ce plan gigantesque tient uniquement
de la propagande, sauf qu'il faut bien
avouer que Gorbatchev conserve une
excellente moyenne au bâton en ce
début de saison : les missiles à por-
tée intermédiaire ont été éliminés, et
la formule de réduction des arme-
ments stratégiques a été définie.
Aucune vision analogue n'existe
du côté occidental. Les alliés ne ven-
lent pas abolir les armes nucléaires,
mais ils se disent prêts à réduire les
arsenaux – en vue de quel objectif,
cependant ? On n'a pas encore ré-
pondu à la question. À un niveau
non officiel, l'URSS semble offrir
une aide non sollicitée. Le Comité
des scientifiques soviétiques pour la
paix a conclu qu'en fonction du prin-
cipe de « la dissuasion minimale », il
suffirait de 600 ogives nucléaires
montées sur des missiles mobiles à
une seule tête pour garantir la sécu-
rité mutuelle. Il faut, soutiennent-ils,
abolir toutes les autres armes
nucléaires. Comme les gouverne-
ments des pays de l'OTAN ne veulent
pas éliminer les armes nucléaires,
une telle analyse se rapproche
davantage du point de vue occidental.
Il n'est pas nécessaire non plus de
contester les chiffres soviétiques.
La dissuasion minimale fondée sur
1 000 ou même 3 000 ogives présen-
terait un attrait certain, surtout
quand on pense au plafond de 8 000
ogives qui sera sans doute fixé à
l'issue des négociations START.

MAIS QUI DOIT SATISFAIRE À LA TÂCHE
d'élaborer certaines des propositions
de base sur la dissuasion minimale ?
Rien ne sert de se fier entièrement
aux dirigeants américains. Le
Canada adhère depuis longtemps
à six principes de désarmement,
dont l'un concerne la réduction
radicale des forces nucléaires et
l'annihilation de la stabilité strate-
gique. Mais que voulons-nous dire
au juste par « réduction radicale »,
et quels niveaux radicalement plus
bas seraient compatibles avec la
« stabilité stratégique » ?
Incapable ou refusant de répondre
à ces questions, la politique cana-
dienne en matière de limitation des
armements paraît de limitation des
problème de front, le Canada contri-
buerait à une discussion on peut
occidentale. Voilà un excellent thème
que le premier ministre aurait pu
aborder cet été à l'occasion de la
Session extraordinaire des Nations-

Unies sur le désarmement ! □

principal, à savoir les réductions des
armes stratégiques. Aux yeux des
partisans optimistes de la limitation
des armements, le Traité sur les FNI
a établi un précédent, et il s'agit
maintenant de définir davantage les
moyens d'en arriver à la vérification
coopérative sur place.

En dépit de l'espoir que les pour-
parlers FNI-START fount naïtre, on
précise et plus meurtriers. On cherche
donc à réduire les arsenaux tout en
les rendant plus dévastateurs. Les
pourparlers START percheront,
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soucié de le faire.

Une fois que l'on aura ajouté ces
deux catégories d'armes aux 6 000
ogives autorisées, il est raisonnable
de supposer qu'à l'issue d'un traité
sur les armes stratégiques, les deux
blocs se retrouveront avec environ
8 000 engins chacun, ce qui donne à
penser qu'en réalité, les arsenaux
actuels ne seront pas réduits de plus
de 30 p. 100.

Même ces réductions seraient les
bienvenues si les négociateurs se
souciaient aussi d'essayer de limiter
la modernisation. En fait, comme
les critiques l'ont fait observer, tous
les systèmes d'armes déjà au stade
de la mise au point seront autorisés
par le nouveau traité, tel qu'il est
actuellement envisagé, à la seule
exception, peut-être, des missiles
mobiles. Dans le cas des États-Unis,
cela signifie que les travaux concer-
nant le *Thident D-5*, le missile *MX*
monté sur rails et le missile de croi-
sière perfectionné iront de l'avant,
tandis que la mise à l'essai de nou-
velles armes telles que les ogives à
nucléaires à effets spéciaux, et
d'autres engins nucléaires dits « de la
troisième génération » continueront
libres d'effectuer des travaux de mise
au point d'une envergure comparable.

Comme les questions de ce genre
sont désormais au coeur des négocia-
tions sur les armes classiques et
les questions des raisons pour
lesquelles les milieux militaires
aimeraient enrayé le mouvement en
faveur de la limitation des arme-
ments. Faire confiance, mais vérifier,
voilà un slogan plus exigeant que le
président Reagan l'avait imaginé !
Les vérifications impuissantes n'étaient
une condition *sine qua non* que dans
la mesure où les Soviétiques s'y op-
posaient. Dès que la limitation des
armements vise de précieuses forces
militaires, elle devient une menace,
et c'est en faisant traîner les négocia-
tions que l'on parvient le mieux à
l'écartier.

LES PARTISANS DE LA LIMITATION DES
armements éprouvent les craintes in-
verses. Dans le Traité sur les forces
à portée intermédiaire, les disposi-
tions sur la vérification sont loin
d'être complètes, mais elles sont
impressionnantes malgré tout. Pour
la première fois de l'histoire, des
inspecteurs soviétiques et américains
examineraient des rampes de lance-
ment et des entrepôts d'armes. Ils
auraient, dans une certaine mesure,
le droit d'obliger le bloc adverse à
subir des inspections. Par ailleurs,
l'existence de classes limitées qui n'en
créent pas moins un précédent rela-
tivement à la surveillance péripétré-
rique des usines d'armements, clauses
pourront examiner littéralement tout
ce qui franchira la porte des usines.
Mais le Traité sur les FNI est seule-

LA MAGIE DES MOTS

PAR DAVID COX



Les réductions des arsenaux nucléaires négociées par les superpuissances : illusion ou réalité ?

ES NEGOCIATIONS AMERICANO-soviétiques sur la réduction des armements stratégiques (START) progressent lentement, comme on s'y attendait, mais tout compte fait, le président Reagan quitte la Maison Blanche avec un dossier assez impressionnant au chapitre de la limitation des armements. L'accord historique sur les armes à portée intermédiaire est déjà dans le sac ; c'est non seulement la réalisation de la double option zéro que le président Reagan avait proposée pour la première fois en 1982, grâce à ses dispositions concernant la vérification sur place. Et dans le contexte des négociations START, même un accord can-can, qui sera complet par son successeur, sera perçu comme étant l'aplat de Reagan, puisque les plateformes tendent à se rapprocher (1 600 vecteurs stratégiques et 6 000 ogives) sont très près des réductions qu'il avait prévues au début de sa présidence. L'image du président aux yeux du public est encore meilleure, car les médias et l'opinion publique semblent persuadés que le traité se sol-dera par une réduction de 50 p. 100 des arsenaux stratégiques.

Cela étant dit, pourquoi alors ex-primer des réserves ? Celles des analystes des questions de défense découlent surtout de leur inquiétude au sujet des classes concernant la

l'effort dans la même direction, on adhérer à l'idée de plus en plus affirmée que les forces nucléaires seront meilleures que jamais une fois le traité START signé et que, de tout façon, les réductions seront loin d'approcher les 50 p. 100.

Dans ce débat, l'observateur intéressé doit avancer et circonspecter et toujours faire preuve d'une saine méfiance. Ce n'est pas le moment de se mettre à penser que les grandes puissances ont enfin réussi à assouvir leur faim nucléaire; il faut accueillir avec un scepticisme poli toutes les expressions telles que «réduire les arsenaux nucléaires de moitié». D'un autre côté, l'occasion est présente de faire progresser la limitation des armements comme jamais auparavant. Maintenir le mouvement amorcé par le Traité sur les forces à portée intermédiaire, les forces à portée intermédiaire,

pour en évitant de susciter de faux espoirs au sujet de réductions vraiment marquées dans les arsenaux nucléaires, voilà le premier engagement que nous devons attendre du nouveau gouvernement.

En 1984, LE VICE-PRÉSIDENT GEORGE Bush a présenté l'ébauche d'un traité sur les armes chimiques à la Conférence du désarmement, à Genève. Le document engageait des clauses si rigoureuses sur la vérification que peu d'observateurs s'attendaient à ce qu'elles fussent accueillies sérieusement. "N'importe quand, n'importe où", telles étaient les conditions qui devaient régir les inspections sur place, d'après M. Bush. Jusqu'alors, les Soviétiques s'étaient opposés à tout accord en ce sens, et c'est pourquoi les chances de succès paraissaient plutôt minces.

Au début des négociations sur les forces à porter intérimairement, Caspar Weinberger avait adopté une position semblable. L'inspecteur désigné en vertu de l'accord sur les armes FNI, soutenait-il, doit s'apparenter à l'inspecteur des banques : il doit pouvoir circuler librement, épier et fureter un peu partout. Mais au printemps de 1987, les Soviétiques surprirent tout le monde : ils firent savoir qu'ils acceptaient le principe des inspections impromptues et que, conformément à l'accord

Des lors, le gouvernement américain. Traitait-il les Etats-Unis pourrait venir inspecter les usines. Bien sûr, d'ajouter le porte-parole soviétique, Yuli Vorontsov, les Etats-Unis devraient rendre la pareille, et il émit avec obéissance l'idée que le président Reagan devrait sans doute obtenir l'assentiment du Congrès soviétique à pénétrer dans les usines américaines.

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Illustration de la page couverture : Bob Fortier

David Cox est membre du département de sciences politiques à l'Université Queen's, et il a déjà été directeur de la Recherche à l'ICPSI; **Geoffrey Pearson** est directeur général de l'ICPSI et a été ambassadeur du Canada en URSS de 1980 à 1983; **Cary Hector** est professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université du Québec à Montréal; **Clyde Sanger** est journaliste pigiste basé à Ottawa; **Fen Hampson** est membre associé (Recherche) à l'Institut et il enseigne les affaires internationales à l'Université Carleton; **Véra Murray** est correspondante de *L'Actualité* à Paris depuis 1983 et elle vit actuellement à Jérusalem.

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«Prenez votre temps et lisez ce document avant de le signer». Voilà une consigne très sage que nous oublions souvent dans la vie de tous les jours. Vous rappelez-vous avoir réellement pris le temps de lire le texte imprimé à l'endroit du contrat que vous avez signé la dernière fois que vous avez loué une voiture ? Vous auriez probablement des surprises !

Que penser alors des accords signés entre les superpuissances ? L'état d'emballage et d'allégresse présent à l'approche ou à la suite de la signature d'une entente entre les deux Grands nous fait souvent oublier de lire le texte imprimé en «petits caractères».

À preuve, les médias et l'opinion publique semblent persuadés que le traité START se soldera par une réduction de 50 p. 100 des arsenaux nucléaires. Il faut faire preuve de méfiance lorsqu'on lit ou lorsqu'on entend de telles affirmations, surtout David Cox dans l'article principal du présent numéro de *Paix et Sécurité*. Selon lui, il y a raison de croire que les arsenaux actuels ne seront pas réduits de plus de 30 p. 100. En fait, les deux camps amélioreront leurs arsenaux nucléaires ! Des armes anciennes seront retirées de la circulation

et, aujourd'hui, plus de cinq mois

élections ratées de novembre dernier

électoral qui s'est terminée avec les

Il était sur place lors de la campagne

Haiti depuis la chute de Baby Doc.

Montréal nous brosse un tableau des

événements qui sont survenus en

à l'Université du Québec à

tenant professeur de science poli-

ti que à l'Université du Québec à

qui se trame donc en Haiti ? Cary

avortées de novembre 1987. Qu'est-ce

1986 et la violence lors des élections

Jean-Claude Duvalier en février

départ précipité du président haïtien

Vous vous rappelez sans doute le

coopération.

pourraient aboutir au respect et à

soient en train d'évoluer, et elles

possible que les relations Est-Ouest

à exercer son influence. Il est donc

plutôt qu'à obtenir des avantages ou

nant à conclure des accords durables

que cette dernière cherche mainte-

orientation adoptée par l'URSS, c'est

y a d'intéressant dans la nouvelle

URSS. Selon M. Pearson, ce qu'il

principaux avantages que le Canada

gagnerait à poser un tel geste.

Les désaccords s'accroissent au

sein de l'OTAN. Fen Hampson af-

firme que la crise actuelle porte sur

fondes. Il estime que l'Alliance n'est

pas encore sur le point d'écarter,

mais que sa composante européenne

prendra de l'ampleur tandis que les

liens entre l'Europe et l'Amérique

s'affaibliront à l'avenir.

Enfin, Vera Murray nous trans-

porte à Jérusalem et nous y fait vivre

la réalité quotidienne. Avec la montée

de la résistance palestinienne, les

Israéliens commencent à souffrir de

clausrophobie. Bien peu fréquemment

maintenant la vieille ville, et soule-

ment les juifs orthodoxes se rendent,

à leurs risques et périls, au mur

des Lamentations.

– Hélène Samson

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POUR LA PAIX ET
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Place de la Constitution
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Ottawa (Ontario) K1R 7X7
(613) 990-1593
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des livres français :
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PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

LA MAGIE DES MOTS

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les superpuissances:
illusion ou réalité ?
PAR DAVID COX



Dans le présent numéro:

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semblent accepter le
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sont prêts à remédier.

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PEACE & SECURITY

THIS LABRADOR BUSINESS ...

The players in the game

BY JOCELYN COULON

What do the Innu want?

BY MARIE WADDEN

The use of airspace over a large portion of the Labrador peninsula by air forces of our NATO allies has created a complex and impassioned dispute.



Gregory Trevorton

The role of Europe bashing in US presidential politics.

Fen Hampson

As the planet heats up so will international tensions.

Henry Trofimenko
An Interview.

A Soviet expert on the West speaks his mind.

Bradley Feasey

UNSSOD III did one good thing; it didn't schedule UNSSOD IV.

Madeleine Poulin

As the Soviets retreat, a letter from Afghanistan.

Also in this issue:

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

3. **Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities**, by Ronald G. Purver, February 1988, 80 pages.

4. **From Lenin to Gorbachev: Changing Soviet Perspectives on East-West Relations**, by Paul Marantz, May 1988, 89 pages.

5. **The Debate About Nuclear Weapon Tests**, by Jozef Goldblat and David Cox, August 1988.

ANNUAL GUIDE

A Guide to Canadian Policies and Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1987-88.

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22. **The NATO Nuclear Planning Group**, by Jocelyn Coulon, August 1988.

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3. **Canadian Press Coverage of Arms Control and Disarmament Issues**, by John R. Walker, March 1987.

4. **Maintaining Peace with Freedom: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control**, by Lorne Green, March 1987.

5. **Towards a World Space Organization**, by Elisabeth Mann Borgese, November 1987.

CONFERENCE REPORTS

4. **Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean: Perspectives to the Year 2000**, Proceedings of a Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 22-25 March 1987, by Lloyd Searwar, 36 pages.

5. **Measures for Peace in Central America, 8-9 May 1987**, by Liisa North, December 1987, 76 pages.

6. **The International Trade in Arms: Problems and Prospects**, 21-22 October 1987, by Keith Krause, March 1988, 47 pages.

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

It is a safe bet that when the final chapter of the Labrador low-level air training story is written, it will be used as a case study to try the patience of public policy students across the country. Here is a classic public policy dilemma, rich in all the intractable problems that make civil servants sometimes think about another line of work. The competing interests are many and varied: there are at least three federal government departments, two provincial governments, the air forces of three foreign countries, the divergent views of local inhabitants, as well as numerous contractors, private consultants, interested outside parties and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

A couple of short articles cannot deal with all the issues a controversy like this one raises, so the pieces by **Jocelyn Coulon** and **Marie Wadden** concentrate on two questions: if one is going to have an air force capable of fighting wars (or belong to an alliance that does) one needs a place for it to practice, so the issue is not, "Are we going to have low-level air training?" It is rather, "Where is it going to be?" and even more important, "How are we going to decide?" Another

part of the problem these pieces make explicit is that low-level military flying, like any other moderately complicated industrial activity, has costs as well as benefits, and that weighing them up is not easy. While some factors are easy to grasp — new jobs on one hand, a reduction in caribou fertility rates on the other — others equally compelling are contained in vague notions like "national security," "loss of cultural identity" and "alliance solidarity."

The Innu of Labrador seem not very interested in the tangible economic benefits of the project and the intangible ones probably don't mean very much to them either. But *their* concerns and worries about what is going on are not the kind of factors *our* decision-making process had traditionally taken very seriously — especially when weighed against the promise of jobs and a little prosperity in a chronically poor region. The danger is that we will repeat past errors; while mainstream Canada will deal with the negative parts of an activity it deems important by dumping them onto people it has already marginalized.

It is interesting to speculate on what might happen if the govern-

ment decided that Algonquin Park in central Ontario was the only place to conduct allied air training. One sure result is that the minds of mainstream Canadians would focus on the problem. This will not happen, of course; all the more reason, therefore, to listen very carefully to what the Innu have to say.

If there are any doubts that environment and economic development issues are vital to international security, they are dispelled in the article by **Fen Osler Hampson** on the potential role of climatic change in international tension. Also in this issue, **Gregory Treverton**, of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, comments on how the US presidential candidates will come to grips with the domestic politics of the US-Europe defence partnership; **Bradley Feasey**, an advisor on the Canadian delegation to UNSSOD III gives us his perspective on the month-long session; **Madeleine Poulin** reports back from Kabul, Afghanistan about the peace agreement that isn't; and we present a wide-ranging interview with Soviet "Westernologist" **Henry Trofimenko**.

— Michael Bryans

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360 Albert Street
Suite 900
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7
(613) 990-1593

Editorial Board:

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Editor:

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Associate Editors:

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French Review Editor:

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Design and Production:

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Jocelyn Coulon is international affairs editor for *Le Devoir* and French review page editor for *Peace&Security*; Marie Wadden is a reporter for CBC television in Montreal currently on leave writing a book on the Innu of Labrador; Gregory F. Treverton is Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York; Fen Osler Hampson is a research associate at the Institute and teaches international affairs at Carleton University; Henry Trofimenko is the head of the foreign policy department of the Institute of US and Canadian Studies, USSR; Bradley Feasey is a member of the Public Programmes staff at CIIPS and was an advisor on the Canadian delegation to the third UN Special Session on Disarmament; Madeleine Poulin is co-host of Radio-Canada's public affairs television programme *Le Point*.

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BY THE END OF 1989, NATO MUST DECIDE where to locate a major tactical fighter training centre: in Canada or in Turkey. If Canadian Forces Base Goose Bay is chosen, it will become the target of protests by Canadian peace and ecology groups that for several years have condemned low-level flights in Labrador.

Military activities are by no means a new development at Goose Bay, but their growth in recent years has increasingly concerned natives as well as the peace and ecology movements, who argue that low-level flights have negative effects on fauna,

and NATO's new military strategy. Western armed forces maintain more than 3,000 combat aircraft in European NATO member countries, with many of these stationed in West Germany. Pilots must train daily to prepare for possible attack. Day and night, more than 100,000 low-level flights are conducted each year in West Germany, to the great consternation of the public. Restrictions on these flights, however, are numerous. Pilots must stay clear of large cities, civilian structures (dams, power plants, towers, etc.) and commercial air lanes, and cannot fly at low altitudes, for more than ten minutes or so. Accidents are frequent nevertheless; so far this year, about fifteen military aircraft have crashed, two of them near nuclear power stations, triggering public demands for even tighter restrictions.


In addition, NATO has adopted a new defence strategy to halt an enemy attack. The Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) favours a deep strike against the military forces and support infrastructure in the enemy's rear sector, charged with reinforcing front-line troops. This tactic relies on air power, with fast attack planes flying at more than 900 kilometres an hour at altitudes below 300 metres in all weather conditions, and on the ability to avoid enemy anti-aircraft defences. To master this type of mission, pilots require intensive training over long distances.

Canada's Department of National Defence believes Goose Bay is well-suited to this type of exercise and offers ideal training conditions for pilots. The West German, British and Dutch air forces already use this base for air training, and with a few modifications, the Labrador base could easily meet NATO's requirements.

CFB GOOSE BAY WAS CREATED IN 1941 FOR USE IN the Second World War, and served as a stopover and transit base for more than 24,000 planes. After the war, the United States used it as a Strategic Air Command support base until the late 1960s. Britain's Royal Air Force pilots trained at Goose Bay in Vulcan nuclear bombers until 1984. Today, an international agreement between Canada, the United States, West Germany, Britain and the Netherlands governs military activities there. The last three countries have conducted low-level flights in the area for several years, and maintain forty-two Tornados, Alpha-Jets, F-4 Phantoms and F-16 fighters at the base. The agreement allows each country to send twenty-five fighters to Goose Bay, thus limiting the total to 125 aircraft. Neither the United States nor Canada conduct low-level flights, although Canada has assigned four F-18 fighters to the base to strengthen the defence of the Far North. In June 1985, the federal government also announced a \$93 million modernization plan for Goose Bay.

According to Major Dave McCabe of DND's Directorate of Air Operations and Training, some changes will be necessary if NATO chooses Goose

THIS LABRADOR BUSINESS ...



flora and inhabitants of the surrounding area. The Canadian government, especially the Department of National Defence (DND), sees things quite differently.

In its view, not only does the base provide jobs without disturbing local life, but its location is ideal. Therefore they have invited NATO to set up a military air base at Goose Bay. Amid a jumble of native land claims, demilitarization and environmental problems on the one hand, and jobs, economic development and military commitments on the other, the two camps are locked in a fierce struggle.

THE WHOLE CONTROVERSY BEGAN IN JULY 1984, when Canada proposed CFB Goose Bay as the site of the Tactical Fighter Training Centre. NATO had actually begun feasibility studies for such a centre in 1980. It was searching for a very large area, uninhabited if possible, with geographic conditions resembling those found in central Europe, and with few climatic, technical and human restrictions. In 1985, two potential sites were selected: Konya, Turkey and Goose Bay, Canada. After a preliminary assessment, the NATO task force recommended the Turkish site in September 1986, primarily for political reasons. Turkey was to be given the base in order to strengthen its ties with NATO, and to make amends of sorts for its on-going dispute with Greece and strained military relations with Washington. Canadian objections over the method for estimating the cost of setting up the base (costs had been over-estimated) convinced NATO to cancel this decision and review the matter. According to Robert Fowler, Assistant Deputy Minister of Defence, the NATO Defence Planning Committee must reach a decision by December 1989.

NATO needs this training base for two reasons: the problems posed by air traffic in central Europe,

The Players in the Game

Amid a jumble of land claims and environmental issues on one hand, and military commitments and economic development on the other, a complex process of public hearings and scientific studies runs its course.

BY JOCELYN COULON

Bay. A second landing strip will be built parallel to the main strip, and new buildings will be needed for an operations centre and for housing. Each country stationing planes at the base will build its own protective hangars and pilot-support infrastructure. The cost of major work is estimated at about \$500 million, with part to be paid by NATO.

The setting up of the NATO Tactical Fighter Training Centre would increase low-level flights and activities at the base considerably. The number of flights in 1987 topped 6,300. DND estimates that 140 to 170 combat aircraft from eight countries would take part in this type of activity between February and October each year, and that the base would record 40,000 sorties, with low-level flights accounting for 60 percent of the total. If DND forecasts are accurate, 3,500 employees and their families would be based at Goose Bay, and 500 pilots would train there each year.

Canada's proposed low-level flight and tactical training range covers 100,000 square kilometres in two tracts that contain no permanent settlements. The northern and larger tract is divided into three sectors straddling the Quebec-Labrador border, just to the north of Goose Bay, while the second also straddles the border, lying mostly in Quebec. In these vast areas, pilots can fly at about 30 metres (100 feet) for more than an hour, hugging tree tops and following the contours of the land. Restrictions will be very few, except those respecting wildlife and humans. Pilots may engage in simulated aerial combat and naval attacks. Finally, one or more firing ranges will probably be set up, although DND is quick to note that talks with NATO on this matter are not complete and techniques for simulating combat may eliminate the need for these ranges.

Major McCabe explains that DND is currently taking all necessary steps to avoid disturbing caribou herds and fishing and hunting camps. As a further precaution, anyone wanting to travel in these areas is asked to notify the base, so flight paths can be re-routed. These measures will be augmented if the centre is established.

NATIVES AND THE PEACE AND ECOLOGY GROUPS dispute the Canadian Forces' arguments. They claim that low-level flights are already harming the environment and affecting native lifestyle, and an increase in flights would endanger the ecology and inhabitants of the entire region. At this stage in the debate, the two sides are trading conflicting figures, evidence and statements, all of which are difficult to judge.

Opponents of the project make claims of frightened animals abandoning their natural habitat, disintegration of native culture, and the destruction of native lands over which jurisdiction has not yet been established. Supporters of the base argue virtually the opposite. More than twenty-five years of military activities at CFB Cold Lake in Alberta have demonstrated that wildlife does not disappear. In fact, the caribou population in Labrador has grown to almost 600,000 today (from 60,000 25 years ago), making it the largest herd in the world. The native population has been settled for several decades, and most of the Innu (Labrador), Inuit and Montagnais (Quebec and North Shore) live very far from the area used for low-level flights. A small number continue traditional activities and travel into "military" zones, but Major McCabe claims that flights cease or diminish in an area as soon as natives are observed. The natives' land claims, however, are not yet settled, and this appears to pose the greatest problem.

The natives are divided over the entire issue. The Innu are fiercely opposed to the project, especially because land claims negotiations continue to drag. The Montagnais (as the Innu are called in Quebec) and the Inuit, however, appear to be more flexible and willing to compromise, provided that their land claims are settled. They appear to view the militarization of their lands as secondary.


In an attempt to clear up the whole issue of present and future activities at CFB Goose Bay, Environment Canada created an Environmental Assessment Panel in July 1986, which held public hearings on the matter, then issued strict directives to be observed by DND in the environmental impact study it must produce to justify the NATO project. The study was contracted to a subsidiary of Lavalin Corporation, a company with a potential interest in building and equipping the centre. When this study is completed in November 1988, the Panel will examine the findings, hold new public hearings and, by September 1989, will make final recommendations to the two government departments involved.

Opponents of the NATO project consider the Panel a farce because, like all federal environmental review boards, it can only make recommendations. However, as the Panel's executive secretary, Carol Martin, points out, it can ultimately recommend that the NATO base not be established. The final decision will have to be made by the government.

Regardless of the outcome, Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty has already

stated that the base will not halt present operations, since Canada has commitments to several NATO countries under the Goose Bay international agreement.

A SOLUTION MIGHT BE FOUND QUICKLY IF THE parties involved begin to negotiate seriously. Native land claims would have to be settled first to avoid political and jurisdictional problems. Then, safety measures would have to be strengthened, the extent of area used for low-



Source: Environmental Assessment Panel, Newsletter #1, November 1987.

level flights would have to be reviewed, and penalties would have to be introduced for pilots who violate these regulations.

Canadian and NATO military authorities can cite no military or technical justification for using such a vast area (equal to about forty percent of the area of West Germany) for flights and tactical training. Military sources admit that the southern range is needed only as a reserve in the event weather conditions prevented certain operations in the northern range. The latter is divided into three sectors, two of which may be closed at any moment; a fact that gives some indication of the military's real needs. In strengthening safety measures to prevent harmful effects on the environment and local residents, military authorities need to demonstrate beyond all doubt that violations of the regulations will be severely punished, otherwise it will be impossible to gain the co-operation of the inhabitants.

Low-level flights have become intolerable to the public in central Europe, and Canadians certainly would not want such flights over their towns and villages either. In solving this dilemma, every attempt must be made to respect Canada's commitments to both Western defence, and native rights.

THIS TIME OF THE YEAR, HUNDREDS OF INNU (Naskapi-Montagnais Indians) are doing what they know and love best. They are scattered throughout Labrador's vast interior, hunting and fishing, as they have done for thousands of years. At a military co-ordination centre in Goose Bay, there is frustration. The Innu won't tell the Canadian Armed Forces where they are, so they risk being over-flown by low flying jets.

The Department of National Defence (DND) is trying to avoid more confrontation with the Innu, who have drawn international attention by their

caribou. Innu hunters now use Skidoos to bring provisions into the camp to make their families more comfortable.

The former commander at Goose Bay, Colonel John David, says it is an unrealistic way of life for the Innu to hold on to: "For the old people, it's important to return to the bush," he says, "but it can't be kept up for the young people, its just not economically feasible anymore."

"It's not for the military to decide whether our way of life is economically feasible," says Peter Penashue, a young Innu leader.

The Chief of Sheshatshit, Daniel Ashini, told the Environmental Assessment Panel studying the effects of flight and weapons training in Labrador:

We may be interested in integrating aspects of your culture into our own...some of us may want to take up wage employment in the renewable resource sector, but many of us will want to continue to hunt, trap, fish and gather as a primary occupation, permitting us to pass on to future generations the great wealth of knowledge about the animals and the land that is our heritage.

Another expert on Innu culture, José Mailhot, spoke at the same hearings:

They [the Innu] hold, with reason, a conviction that if the possibility of going to the bush no longer exists, they will be nothing but a diminished and conquered people. We will have dispossessed them of everything, and they will have nothing to pass on to future generations.

The Innu see the government subsidies for their transportation into the bush as compensation for the development that has already taken place on their lands; lands which have never been ceded by treaty or land claims agreement. Those developments include construction of the Goose Bay airport by the Americans during World War II, iron ore mining at Schefferville and Labrador City, logging operations associated with the Labrador Lumberboard Mill, and the development of Churchill Falls Hydro in the late 1950s.

The development of Churchill Falls was a bitter experience for the Innu who traditionally camped and hunted in the area now known as the Smallwood Reservoir (a man-made lake created by water diversion from the falls). These families lost canoes, traps, and hunting equipment because they were not warned about the flooding. As compensation, they were given houses, which were little more than shacks built for about \$2,000. Those that still stand give the village a slum-like appearance.

INNU VILLAGES ARE POOR AND MOST INHABITANTS ARE on welfare. They are plagued with social problems common to most native communities in this country; alcoholism, domestic violence, and suicide. Innu health has suffered for other reasons. There is obesity and disease because of the change in diet since the Innu became sedentary, and vegetables and fruit from the south are too expensive for most Innu families. It is because the Federal government recognizes the benefit life in the bush has on Innu mental and

THIS LABRADOR BUSINESS ...

What do the Innu want?

Many Native people feel they are without real power and believe the cards are stacked against them. "We can't fight NATO; we'll be wiped off the map."

BY MARIE WADDEN

opposition to military activity in Labrador. Last year Innu representatives spoke before the United Nations Human Rights Commission. They told the Commission that NATO countries are conducting flight training on Innu territory without Innu consent, that this is a violation of their human rights, and threatens their cultural survival. And further, the Innu believe activities associated with a planned NATO tactical fighter weapons training centre will have disastrous consequences for them.

Many Innu families have been traumatized by the low flying jets and say they may not go back to the country. The Innu are worried about damage to the environment, about what pollution from jet exhaust may do to aquatic life and how noise will affect the migrating habits of waterfowl and caribou. They fear that the cornerstone of their culture, their hunting and trapping life in the bush, will be destroyed by military activity.

THERE ARE TEN THOUSAND INNU ON THE QUEBEC Labrador peninsula living in eleven villages along Quebec's northeast coast and in two settlements on the Newfoundland side of the Labrador border. Canada's last nomads, the Innu of Davis Inlet, a village in Northern Labrador, moved from tents to houses for the first time in 1967. However, according to Laval University anthropologist Paul Charest, it is Innu life in the bush that is most at risk:

If the level of military activity increases considerably after the promotion of Goose Bay as an official NATO base, we can expect the very foundations of the Montagnais [Innu] culture, their life in the bush, to be irreversibly compromised.

Proponents of military expansion in Labrador say Innu life in the bush today is little more than a holiday at taxpayers' expense. Aircraft fly Innu families into the country, twice a year, at government cost. In the past, the Innu travelled these long distances on foot, moving camp as they followed the migrating

physical health that the bush programme, as the air transport into the country is known, is subsidized.

But life in the bush has become intolerable, the Innu claim, since the war planes came. While there has been low level flight training in Labrador since the 1970s, the flights were less frequent than they are now. The number of flights will rise steeply if the NATO centre is established, and even if the NATO centre goes to Turkey, the Canadian government has committed itself, through bilateral agreements, to dramatically increasing the number of aircraft training in Labrador.

The Innu say it will be impossible to escape the noise and startle effect of an aircraft travelling seven hundred kilometres an hour passing overhead, just thirty metres above the ground. And they don't believe the jets can avoid them, even if the military air controllers know where their camps are. The possibility that the Innu might give up going into the bush altogether worries Father Jim Roche, an Oblate priest who has lived with the Sheshatshit Innu for the last four years: "There's already a big problem with alcohol among the Innu and a further erosion of their culture will exacerbate it. We're talking about the physical and mental health of a lot of people."

"They're just using this issue to force settlement of their land claims," says Major David McCabe, of DND's air operations and training directorate. He is partly right; the Innu want their indigenous rights to this area recognized, but they're not willing to sell out those rights, especially if doing so compromises their relationship with the land that has sustained their culture. Peter Penashue says the day a land claims deal is signed will be one of the saddest days for his people. "The land claims process does little more than legitimize the theft of native land."

BECAUSE OF THE SUPPORT THEY HAVE RECEIVED outside of Labrador the Innu have become a political force to be reckoned with. "Without the Innu, there would have been no environmental assessment," says Robert Ferrari, an employee of Lavalin, the company preparing DND's report. The multi-million dollar study has been looking at the effects of low-level flying on animals and people in Labrador. The independent panel, set up by the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office will hold public hearings on the proposed increase in flight and weapons training early in 1989. While the Innu have refused to co-operate with Lavalin researchers because the study is being conducted for DND, they will participate in the public hearings. However, they

have little faith that the project will be halted because of their objection to it.

Many of the Innu want the low-level flights to be totally abolished, and want no more talk of a NATO centre for the region. Others, who say there must be compromise, ask that a just land claims agreement be reached before there is any more expansion in flight training. Even with an agreement, however, most Innu feel they cannot share the land with the planned NATO weapons training centre.

"We are interested in negotiating political rights that will give us meaningful jurisdiction over the lands under our control," says Chief Ashini. "But it will be impossible for us to exercise such political rights if significant portions of this territory have been taken from us for military expansion."

FLIGHT TRAINING OVER INNU LAND IN LABRADOR raises disturbing new legal questions for aboriginal title claims. "Who owns the airspace a hundred feet above the ground?" asks Lavalin's Ferrari, who will address this issue in his study. The Innu argue that what happens in the air, whether it is air-to-air combat, low-level flying, or practice bombing, will affect the environment on the ground. They are not sure how a Canadian court of law would decide on this matter, and in any event, will not be reassured if the study establishes that low-level flying has little adverse effect on caribou and other animals.

"They won't know for at least ten years how the flying will effect these creatures, and then it may be too late," says Innu hunter Ben Andrew. "Our findings won't be conclusive," says Ferrari, "we'll have to recommend on-going studies." DND and its environmental experts say the caribou don't seem overly bothered by the noise.

Can the NATO centre and low-level flying carry on without threatening Innu health, and way of life? The Indians certainly don't think so; DND believes otherwise. While he was commander, Colonel David tried to foster good relations with the Innu at Sheshatshit, attending community events and hiring two Innu to work as base firefighters. The Innu view this with some suspicion, and fear the military is trying to divide and mislead the community with promises that cannot be kept.

DND's efforts to appease the Innu have largely failed because they have come too late. The climate of fear and distrust that now exists between the Innu and the white supporters of military expansion in Labrador may never be broken. Its legacy will be bitterness and perhaps a more rapid deterioration of Innu society. "We're a dying breed," says Peter

Penashue. "We can't fight NATO; we'll be wiped off the map."

IS IT SIMPLY A QUESTION OF SACRIFICING AN indigenous culture for the sake of national security? The Newfoundland government has never hidden its wish for the Innu to be integrated as quickly as possible into the mainstream of Newfoundland life. The most powerful provincial administrator in Labrador is John McGrath, the assistant deputy minister for agriculture, rural and northern development. He says there is no commitment from his government to help the Innu preserve their language or culture. "Cultures and languages disappear all the time," he says, citing his loss of his own ancestral language as an example.



Volaine Sinclair

Goose Bay businessmen, needed by continuous Innu opposition to something they wholeheartedly endorse, ask what the Innu have done with the land to make it their own. The Innu have not built on it or made any money from its resources. The Innu respond that they have simply taken from the land what was needed, and in return, obeyed and respected nature's "masters." The Innu have always perceived themselves as caretakers of their homeland, which they call Nitassinan.

A 1985 issue of the *Royal Air Force News* paid a great compliment to Innu stewardship of Labrador: "The real beauty of this place is that quite simply the land is just as God left it." Nitassinan will never be the same, the Innu say, once the war games start. □

EUROPE-BASHING IN U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS

The next president of the United States will inherit some difficult puzzles that spell trouble with the European allies.

BY GREGORY F. TREVERTON

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE United States and its European allies are serious but not bad, as Ernest Hemingway, who was fond of Spanish *doble dichos*, or reversible double-sayings, might have put it. On the surface, the next president will inherit smooth relations, ones symbolized by the Toronto summit, Mr. Reagan's valedictory. Yet beneath the surface and beyond the first few months, the new president will inherit several puzzles that bear directly on the long-term shape of the trans-Atlantic alliance.

One issue has been surprisingly absent from the early campaigning – burden-sharing, that hardy perennial. Yet for either George Bush or Michael Dukakis as president, the task will be managing the American politics of the issue. Members of Congress have thrust forward a number of calls in recent years for Europe to do more in its own defence; they have accompanied those calls by more or less disguised coercion. There is nothing new about all this: Congressional exhortations to the Europeans to pull up their socks go back at least to the initiatives associated with Senator Mike Mansfield in the last 1960s. If anything is different now, it is who does the exhorting. In the 1960s, pressure on the Europeans came mostly from the political left, people who thought that the US had too many commitments in too many places or that 300,000 American troops in Europe were even then an anachronism. Now, however, the pressure is spread across the political spectrum but is most powerful on the political right.

In particular, it is now in fashion to argue that given its twin budget and trade deficits and its lagging productivity, the United States can no longer afford its global commitments. Paul Kennedy is the name most associated with that view, and David Calleo applies it specifically to the Atlantic Alliance. This "we-can't-afford-it" view is economic nonsense, for with decent economic management there is no reason why the United States cannot afford to spend six percent of its gross national product on defence and increase living standards at the same time; after all, historically six is not a high number for the United States. It is about what the country spends on education and two-thirds what it lays out for health care. Moreover, during the period 1980 to 1986, while defence was growing as a share of GNP, from 5.2 to 6.6 percent, real per capita consumption rose by 15 percent.

In any event, now as in the past, the real debate is about how many troops the United States has, not where they are located. Analytically, American forces are not much more expensive to maintain in Europe. They certainly would be more expensive to move, for new facilities in the US would have to be prepared for them. So there is money to be saved by withdrawing troops from Europe only if those forces are then demobilized – removed from the force structure.

Yet that analysis does not drive the politics of the issue, nor has it in the past. The latest procurement scandal notwithstanding,

weapons get built in some Congress members' districts. So, too, bases provide jobs where they are located. By contrast, there is little constituency for troops stationed abroad; the soldiers can vote, but most would not vote to remain abroad. And so those troops are a tempting target of budget cutters, never mind the economic facts. One question for the new administration, will be how much it feels that specific pressure, especially from Congress.

IF THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE EUROPE-bashing so far, that would be little consolation if America's commitment to Europe were tugged down in general defence budget-cutting. So a second question is, economics aside, how much political heat will the next administration feel to cut Pentagon spending. Defence spending has been declining at two to three percent a year in real terms, so a baseline guess would be a continuation of that trend. Cuts of that order would constrain modernization and, if history is any guide, diminish readiness but would not require cuts in European forces.

Before the end of a first Bush or Dukakis Administration, based on historical patterns, defence spending will turn upward again, in response to some specific event or to the broad feeling in the body politic that the US is letting down its guard. Hopes for arms control, abetted by the "Gorbie factor," may upset that historical pattern, but history also suggests a paradoxical conclusion of a partisan sort: defence spending may be lower in a Bush administration

than in one led by Mr. Dukakis. Dukakis will be vulnerable to charges of softness, especially if he pursues far-reaching strategic arms control and carries out his declared intentions to cancel major nuclear programs, and so he will need to prove that he is serious about defence.

A third question is whether the defence burden will become intertwined with economic dealings across the Atlantic. In his ill-fated 1973 "Year of Europe" speech, Henry Kissinger asserted that "political, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other." At the time, Europeans feared he meant just the opposite of what he said: that Washington was going to use its leverage in the security domain to extract economic concessions from its partners.

So far, interestingly, it mostly has not happened. Economics and defence have been dealt with among the allies along separate tracks dominated by separate sets of experts. On balance, the separation has served the alliance well. The allies have argued about security or economics but mostly on their separate merits. Both the issues and their domestic politics have been more manageable than if explicit linkages had been drawn. In the process, Europeans have come to take the tacit link to American forces in Europe half seriously: normally it seems an intramural drama played out between the US Executive and Congress, while on occasion it has moved them to increase their own defence effort, at least symbolically.

Now, Representative Patricia Schroeder has turned the usual rhetoric into a proposal. "We are subsidizing the security of our major trading partners," she said, "while they are cleaning up in international markets." The proposal is to retaliate against the trade of allies if they do not spend more on defence. It does not seem likely to succeed; declining US defence outlays would seem an unpromising base from which to lecture allies, although in politics, as in football, the best defence often is a good offense. But the temptation to link will be part of the politics of burden-sharing in the alliance.


The possibility of linkage leads to the pressing trade issues that will confront the new president. The trade deficit, now larger than the national incomes of all but twelve countries in the world, is running at about \$150 billion per year. Still, despite deficits, protectionism in the United States has advanced on the creep, not the bound.

The fate of presidential candidate, Richard Gephardt, who sought to ride the protectionist tiger is instructive: if Americans are concerned about losing jobs to other countries, so are they attached to their Toyotas and Sonys. And so the Administration negotiated the free trade agreement with Canada even as it acted protectionist on other issues.

THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL CONFRONT one specific European – for which read "German" – issue in all this. If the US is to move from trade deficit toward balance, other countries will have to contemplate lower surpluses, even deficits. At present, the two largest surplus countries by far are Japan (\$80-100 billion) and the Federal Republic (\$40-50 billion). The new president thus will continue the Reagan administration's pressure on Germany to pump up its domestic demand, and so consume more at home while exporting less. On the face of it, the case for German reflation is strong: growth estimates are less than two percent per year, while unemployment re-

mains in the high single digits – unprecedented since World War II. Japan has taken steps to boost its domestic demand, but the Federal Republic has done much less.

Yet it is a curious kind of Puritan irony that the international financial systems glorifies surpluses and vilifies deficits. In Germany, surpluses are prized only slightly less than soccer, and the mere mention of inflation horrifies, so history suggests that the new American president will get less than he wants from the Federal Republic.



A final set of teasers facing the new president falls out of the treaty banning Soviet and American long-range and short-range intermediate nuclear forces (INF). These questions also bear most heavily on the Federal Republic.

The idea of a "zero-zero" INF treaty was hard to resist: public opinion was for it, and, after all, the single zero option (a ban on long-range INF) originally was an American idea embraced by the allies. Reagan's "zero option" of 1981 was regarded as a political masterstroke not least because no one expected the Soviet Union ever to agree to it.

Yet for all its political attractions, the strategic logic of double zero was troubling. NATO had gone into nuclear arms control strategically backwards: leaving in place those short-range sys-

tems its defence planners had long since despaired of justifying – and which would explode on German territory – while removing its most modern, most survivable, most flexible weapons.

These strategic concerns would have been muted had not the 1986 Reykjavik summit intervened. That Mikhail Gorbachev would contemplate scrapping all (offensive) strategic nuclear weapons was only surprising; that Ronald Reagan would do so as well, and apparently rather casually, was incomprehensible to

Those missiles, with a range of about one hundred kilometres, most deployed on West German soil, are aging and need to be replaced. Flexibility argues for increasing the range of their replacements somewhat; the INF treaty (which prohibits missiles with a range greater than five hundred kilometres) strengthens that argument. Yet that same INF treaty means that any modernization of Lance will bring forth cries of "circumvention" from Moscow, a cry that some in the Federal Republic will echo.

The Lance issue will pose a special problem for Mr. Dukakis: having talked so much about reducing nuclear weapons, will he want to inaugurate his presidency by pressing reluctant Germans to take a new nuclear system? Either Bush or Dukakis is likely to read the history of INF's double track – which made deployments hostage to the vagaries of arms control – as an example to avoid. Better to simply go ahead and modernize, while trying to handle the public ruckus with unilateral gestures, such as reducing further the 4,000-odd nuclear warheads NATO still has in Europe.

So far, however, Germans have shown little interest in such a tack. The government argues that the question should not be rushed, and it hints that perhaps short-range negotiations should come first. But the simple obsolescence of Lance argues against deferring the decision for long.

For connoisseurs of alliance history, all this sounds like *plus ça change*: what could be more familiar than a series of German-American dust-ups? And perhaps it will turn out to be business as usual for an alliance whose demise, to paraphrase Mark Twain, has been regularly – and prematurely – predicted for forty years. So a betting man would wager. Yet I cannot escape the feeling that trends afoot, particularly in German politics, mean that historians will look back on this period perhaps not as the beginning of the end of the alliance, but as the beginning of a new pattern. □

most European leaders and not a few Americans as well. The process of the meeting seemed naive, and the idea threatened to upset a forty-year history of NATO reliance on nuclear deterrence.

The current administration position – with zero-zero marking the end of nuclear arms control in Europe – will do for now but cannot hold. Even German conservatives will find it hard to resist Soviet calls and their own public pressure for negotiations to reduce battlefield nuclear weapons.

BEFORE A NEW PRESIDENT CONFRONTS the puzzle of short-range INF negotiations, however, he will face another nuclear question: whether and how to modernize the existing Lance short-range missiles deployed in Europe.

THE CLIMATE FOR WAR

The economic and political consequences of climatic change will be a new source of conflict among nations.

BY FEN OSLER HAMPSON

SECOND ONLY TO NUCLEAR war, the greatest threat facing the human species is the unprecedented rate of climatic change that will occur during the next century. This was one of the major conclusions of an international conference on *The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security* held in Toronto, this past June. Involving more than three hundred scientists and policy makers from forty-eight countries, United Nations organizations, other international bodies, and non-governmental organizations; the conference was sponsored by the Government of Canada with the support of the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization. The forerunners of the Toronto meeting were the publication of the Brundtland Commission Report on *Our Common Future* and the Ozone Protocol, signed by twenty-four countries in Montreal in September 1987.

The purpose of the conference was to discuss how climatic change will affect the future of humanity and to set policy goals based on scientific findings that could serve as a basis for urgent political decisions. The conference reaffirmed a growing consensus among scientists and environmental experts about man-made impacts on the atmospheric chemistry that increasingly threaten the survival of the species: the Earth's atmosphere is rapidly being polluted by the burning of fossil fuels, which emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, and the buildup of

other gases including ozone, nitrous oxides, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and methane. The growing concentration of these "greenhouse gases" – which trap the Sun's radiation and raise surface temperatures – will result in a probable rise in the mean surface temperature of the Earth anywhere from 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Celsius before the middle of the next century. Pronounced regional variations in the level of warming are likely to be experienced. At higher latitudes the level of warming will be double that experienced in the tropics. Warming will also be accompanied "by changes in the amount and distribution of rainfall and in changes in atmospheric and ocean circulation patterns." The depletion of the ozone layer shield in the upper stratosphere from CFCs will also increase levels of damaging ultraviolet radiation, thus posing a direct threat to many biological species including humans who will suffer increased risk of skin cancer and eye damage.

The conference affirmed that the most far-reaching effects of global warming and ozone depletion will be changing precipitation patterns and a rise in sea levels which will threaten global security, the world economy, and the natural environment. The final conference report concluded that these changes, coupled with the effects of rapid population growth in many regions of the world, will:

Imperil human health and welfare;

Diminish global food security, through greater shifts and uncertainties in agricultural produc-

tion, particularly for many vulnerable regions;

Increase political instability and the potential for international conflict;

Jeopardize prospects for sustainable economic development and reduction of poverty;

Threaten extinction of animal and plant species upon which human survival depends.

IT IS CLEAR THAT NOTHING SHORT of a new global ethic and an international mobilization of resources are required to deal with the looming threat of climatic change. Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland expressed the challenge to the delegates this way:

We need a new political approach to environment and development, where economic and fiscal policies, trade and foreign policies, energy, agriculture, industry and other sectoral policies aim to induce development that is not only economically but also ecologically sustainable.... There is need for a fresh impetus in international cooperation. Development aid and lending must be increased, and the debt crisis resolved. The ultimate goal must be to forge an economic partnership based on equitable trade and to achieve a new era of growth, one which enhances the resource base rather than degrades it. The mission must be to make nations return to negotiations on global issues after years of decline in real multilateralism.

Some of the immediate actions recommended by the conference were:

Immediate ratification by all signatories of the Montreal Proto-

col on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and additional measures to limit other ozone-destroying halocarbons;

Energy policies to reduce markedly CO₂ emissions with an initial goal of CO₂ reductions by the wealthy industrialized countries of 20 percent of 1988 levels by the year 2005;

Initiated development of a comprehensive global convention as a framework for protocols on the protection of the atmosphere;

Increased funding for research on climatic change and for research, development and transfer of information on renewable energy sources particularly for developing countries;

Policies to reduce deforestation and funds to ensure that the economic penalties of environmental change are not absorbed by developing countries

HOWEVER, THERE WAS A BIGGER message that came out of the conference. It was that climatic change represents a major threat to international security. The socioeconomic and political consequences of environmental change are such that they may well increase political and military conflict not only within states but also internationally. In papers prepared for the meeting and in conference working groups, some of the possible paths to conflict were identified.

This first is that environmental degradation in such forms as desertification, deforestation, and flooding will increase dramatically the number, as well as the social, political, and economic impact, of environmental refugees worldwide. Entire landmasses,

including nations, may disappear with rising sea levels. It is estimated, for example, that a sea level rise of one metre or three metres may displace as many as nine million or twenty-seven million people respectively in the country of Bangladesh alone. Where will these people go? The mind boggles at the thought of the cumulative effect of a simultaneous explosion in the number of refugees around the globe due to rapid and substantial environmental change.

Second, resource conflicts within and among nations are likely to increase with the loss of basic food and fresh water supplies. Increasing climatic variability will diminish agricultural productivity, especially in marginal producing areas, and lead to further conflict over access to other vital resources like fresh water. On-going disputes over freshwater resources, the Indo-Pakistani water-boundary dispute is but one example, may well be aggravated by atmospheric change. Some 214 river basins are shared by two or more countries and twelve river basins are shared by five or more countries. Even in the absence of climatic change, pressure on these resources from rising population will grow.

Third, global power balances may well be affected by environmental change. Major grain importers, like the Soviet Union, could find their dependence on international markets increasing because of adverse climatic developments. Similarly, traditional grain exporters, like the United States, could find their surpluses diminishing with the loss of arable land because of environmental change. These scarcities may increase internal instability within the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, or weaken the economic capacity of the United States. Diminished access to scarce resources like food and energy may also encourage presently demilitarized states,

like Japan, to acquire military capabilities to ensure access to increasingly scarce resources.

Fourth, changing climatic conditions may also increase international conflict in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, especially in those areas where sovereignty claims are unresolved. The possible withdrawal of summer pack ice because of atmospheric warming would leave much of the Arctic Ocean ice-free. While this would offer new opportunities for marine transportation and increased use of the Northeast and Northwest passages, greater accessibility could encourage challenges to Canada's sovereignty in its northern territory. Unresolved sovereignty claims in Antarctica might also be exacerbated if this region became more accessible because of climatic change. The military-strategic importance of both these regions might also increase with greater access because of warmer weather.

THE CONFERENCE UNDERScored the need for governments to re-define their national security and military spending priorities, and to address the geopolitical dimensions of climatic change in resource allocation decisions. The

conference statement quotes the UN Report on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, "... It must be acknowledged that the arms race and development are in a competitive relationship, particularly in terms of resources, but also in the vital dimension of attitudes and perceptions." It goes on to say that the same consideration applies "to the vital issue of protecting the global atmospheric commons from the growing peril of climate change."

At the same time, it acknowledged that climatic change presents new opportunities for international co-operation straddling East-West, North-South divisions. The atmosphere is a "commons" and must be treated as such. An international co-ordinated effort will be required to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases and climatic effects. Although a "law of the atmosphere" is needed to help govern and care for this global commons, governmental and non-governmental, individual and group actions are also required in the interim. We must do what we can now, rather than wait for an all-encompassing agreement.



In addition, special attention

will have to be paid to the needs of the developing countries and resources transferred from rich to poor. As Emil Salim, Indonesia's Environment and Population Minister explained, "The poorer nations by force of their lower state of economic development have applied the greatest restraint in their contribution to the problem of global climate change. Yet given the pattern of population increases projected into the next century, and the continued dependence of these populations on natural resources for livelihood and survival, the developing nations may well sustain the heaviest losses as a result of atmospheric deterioration."

Moreover, developing countries will have difficulty assuming their fair share of the burden in efforts to prevent global atmospheric change. For them to forego the use of fossil fuels in their industrial development or the use of other fuels such as wood for domestic purposes will be expensive. Development assistance will therefore have to respond to both the immediate and long-term consequences of climatic change in the Third World.

The geopolitical working group of the conference summarized the global challenge:

The steps required to prevent damaging changes to the atmosphere - slowing the release of pollutants and eventual stabilization of the composition of the atmosphere - must be international in scope. As such, they bring us face-to-face with longstanding global needs: stabilization of the world's population size, relaxation of military tensions and disarmament, and a decrease in the disparity of wealth consumption, and opportunity within and among nations.... Perhaps the newly recognized imperatives for cooperation on crucial climate problems will provide new avenues for consideration of the older issues.



HENRY TROFIMENKO: AN INTERVIEW

A Soviet academic who makes his living studying the foreign policies of Western countries, has strong opinions on everything from Canadian submarines to the state of Kremlinology in America.

Henry A. Trofimenko is the head of the foreign policy department of the Institute of US and Canadian Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR. He specializes in analysis of Western and more specifically US arms control policy. The interview was conducted by *Peace&Security* in May of this year during a visit to Ottawa by Professor Trofimenko. His visit was part of a Soviet-Canadian round table organized by the Canadian Institute for International Affairs and the Institute of US and Canadian Studies. The wide-ranging interview — an edited version of which is presented below — was conducted by Nancy Gordon, Director of Public Programmes and Michael Bryans, Editor of *Peace&Security*.

P&S: What are the problems outstanding in the START [Strategic Arms Reduction] negotiations.

TROFIMENKO: First of all, the problem of the START treaty itself — it will probably be tackled again by the Soviet Union and the United States after a new President has been installed in the United States and a new Congress convenes. Whoever might be the US President I expect that they would be positive towards continuing this process. But probably any new president who would come to the White House in January 1989 would say that he wanted a better deal than has been outlined in the previous negotiations. And some of these problems that have been obstacles to the negotiations throughout 1988 will still be outstanding.

One of those problems is verification. The INF Treaty deals with control of weaponry that has been totally eliminated as a class. In the START treaty you will have some missilery that is left and some missilery that has been eliminated.... We have to have some control over the weapons that are left over. The second thing is the very well known problem of sea-based cruise missiles. My understanding is that the United States stressed the problems of verifying sea-based cruise missiles exactly because they were hoping to leave them totally out of control. Now they have agreed to have a ceiling on these weapons, but the methods of verification have not been decided.

P&S: Perhaps we could switch to the question of conventional arms. What was the cause of the log jam in the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR] talks?

TROFIMENKO: The MBFR talks are dead.... There was no log jam; it was simply a device that was useful to both sides.

P&S: What did the Soviet Union get out of them?

TROFIMENKO: It was a prerequisite of the American side to start these negotiations, before they would start dealing with the Soviet Union on a wider basis, before they would start summit talks, before they would start negotiating a general memorandum of understanding ... before they would start detente ... Both sides had some interest in starting and though the talks continued to have some interest, they boiled down to an absolutely unprofitable discussion of numbers. They are going on now for how long.... for fifteen years?

... the only profitable thing that we got from MBFR, is that we polished our methods of discussion. People know, more or less, about the other side, about its preferences and interests and so on....

I remember how many Americans would come and tell us, "let's stop haggling about the numbers, let's do it another way, let's agree on a 900,000 ceiling." We balked at accepting this idea. But in a year or two we accepted and said all right we will come to two ceilings for numbers of general troops and for ground troops. And the moment we accepted this brilliant American idea, which was sold to us unofficially as the possible way to untie the knot, the West ceased to be interested in it.

To cut a long story short, MBFR is a vivid example of un-

productive negotiations from the point of view of arriving at essential solutions.

P&S: But is the Soviet Government prepared to address the widespread perception in the West that the Soviet Union has more conventional arms in Europe?

TROFIMENKO: The Soviet Union is prepared to accept that there are asymmetries in the balance. You asked me why it is that these negotiations dragged on for so long, and I guess one of the reasons is that while NATO is claiming that the Soviet Union has some preponderance in Europe, the sixteen nations of NATO cannot agree what the preponderance is. They understand that for a public relations purpose, or as the Russians would call it, a propaganda purpose, it's good to claim that Russians have a six-to-one or a five-to-one ratio in their favour; that is not actually the case.

... If the West says you have to cut your forces six times more than we do, it is non-negotiable because it's sheer nonsense.... So you can't be that outrageous to say six-to-one. You, of course, cannot say one-to-one. So I guess NATO is negotiating between itself about what would be a more realistic position to adopt vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Of course there are asymmetries, we recognize that the Warsaw Pact has more tanks than the other side has. Though this statistic is also not very clear because NATO doesn't count all the American tanks in storage. It doesn't count the quality of the tanks.... In order to come to some realistic agreement, we

should not only eliminate very big asymmetries, but also – and this is my personal view – agree on the remaining asymmetries that would be satisfactory to both sides.

P&S: Regarding the Arctic zone of peace proposal made last fall in Murmansk: what was the motivation for including items that made a serious proposal seem like a joke. For example, it excludes the Barents Sea but includes places like the English Channel?

TROFIMENKO: It is the fault of both our countries. No country makes proposals for disarmament which are initially harmful to its own interests ... let's start talking. Let's see what's really feasible. If your side would make some really appealing move for us, we might yield on something else, but initially Gorbachev described the situation as he saw it. And you understand that Murmansk is a very important nuclear submarine base for the Soviet Union, and it's the only really open port from which we can get into the Atlantic ocean.

... The idea of the peaceful Arctic is very good idea, but we are now starting a conventional arms race in this part of the world. Your country is thinking about doing something, we will have to do something, not because we are really eager for a new naval buildup, but because of the new military strategy of the United States, which is to press on the flanks in the north Atlantic bordering the Arctic and in the north Pacific.

... We've made the Antarctic a peaceful continent. Can we make the North Polar Ocean a peaceful area? When I look at the map in polar projection I see your north passage and our northern maritime passage; I see a large round transportation belt at the edges of the Arctic Ocean, touching on the littoral states and perhaps spreading into the North Pacific and North Atlantic. Maybe this would be a much better use for our efforts, than for you to build nine or twelve nuclear submarines, which would be no good for anything.

P&S: Are you frightened?

TROFIMENKO: I'm not frightened; twelve submarines on the Canadian side would not make a difference, especially when you consider that if we conclude a START agreement we would have to cut something like fifty to sixty submarines from our navy.

The Arctic Ocean is not only important for the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean – but it's a tremendous climate generating factor worldwide. And by polluting it – and another arms race in this region would definitely have adverse ecological consequences – we would be really doing damage not only to our northern lands but to the health of the world. So it is very important that we talk about this.... The initiative of Comrade Gorbachev in Murmansk was the first ball thrown out.

P&S: During the dark days of the Vietnam War there was a US Senator who said what the US should do is declare the war won and leave, is that what Gorbachev did in Afghanistan, let's say we won it, and we'll go home?

TROFIMENKO: How we will explain this to ourselves and to our population is another story, but I accept what you're saying.

P&S: Was it a bad idea, Afghanistan?

TROFIMENKO: There is no very simple answer to that. If you think about what the situation was in 1979 when the United States really started to pressure us from different angles – when they were making military preparations against Iran, increasing the military budget, ganging up with China which was at that time very hostile to us, and many other factors – you should understand that the situation in Afghanistan, the foreign interference, and the pleading of the local government for help, all combined together. I am not saying that because we are now withdrawing troops that the original decision was unacceptable. But even at that time there were people who were thinking that we really should not do this thing. There were differences of opinion. And of

course from the historical perspective it would have been better had we not deployed our forces in Afghanistan.... The main thing is that now we are withdrawing from Afghanistan, whatever were the initial merits and non-merits of going into it militarily.

P&S: Regarding *glasnost* and *perestroika* and how it influences your East European allies: will the East European countries be allowed to interpret these ideas in their own way, and to go their own way; to structure their economies the way they see fit? Or are we going to see a clampdown like we did in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968?

TROFIMENKO: No. The answer is no. We are now saying that the model of socialism that we inherited from the thirties and forties is not sacrosanct, because nobody said that whatever Stalin did was the ultimate in Marxist thinking. We are now talking about our own model. Even before the change of leadership in the Soviet Union, we looked with quite a neutral eye on all the experiments going on in Hungary, in Poland, and in D.D.R. They have their own ways of developing their economies, and now in the period of *glasnost* and *perestroika* they have still more possibilities. We will not be interfering in their affairs ...

P&S: Including how they make their foreign policies?


TROFIMENKO: The thing is that these countries are in the Warsaw treaty alliance, so there are consultations and some common goals on foreign policy. We paid with our blood for this "cordon sanitaire" that was absolutely hostile to the Soviet Union in the 1930s. It was built as a staging ground for anti-Soviet military moves, and now has been turned into a

belt of friendly states. So of course the foreign policies of those countries are not irrelevant to us, but so far the alliance gives our side the assurance that we have a common foreign policy.

P&S: You are a Soviet expert on the West and there's a growth industry in the west in Sovietology. Everybody wants to learn Russian to become a Sovietologist. What do you think of how the West understands the Soviet Union?

TROFIMENKO: It's a joke you see. I would say to become a Sovietologist in the United States, first of all, you don't have to learn Russian. That's the main prerequisite, then you are good Sovietologist; if you know Russian, you are a bad one. I don't say there are some of them who don't know Russian, but those who know Russian are usually of some East European extraction. But they say, you know, Mr. Trofimenko, you don't express your thoughts correctly; they are always beating up on us for our poor English. So I say, all right if you want to hear all the nuances let's talk Russian for a change. With all our colleagues on the other side of the table, the top Sovietologists in America, why should we always talk English? I have never succeeded to have a conference on Soviet matters with American Sovietologists in Russian.

... It is paradoxical that, for instance, all American Sinologists love China and have treated China from this perspective. The bulk of American Sovietologists or Kremlinologists have hated the Soviet Union from the start, and developed their theories from this attitude. And so it's very difficult to have any dealings with them. □



UNSSOD'S UNDOING

One of the few positive outcomes of the Third UN Special Session on Disarmament is that it did not call for a fourth. It's time to re-think the UN's role in disarmament.

BY BRADLEY FEASEY

MEETING IN THE SHADOW of the Moscow summit, the Third Special Session of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III) should have been able to tap into recent positive developments in Soviet-American relations and express a new multilateral consensus on priorities and principles in arms control and disarmament – or so one might have thought. Instead, UNSSOD III met for four weeks (31 May to 25 June) only to emerge with no agreed consensus document or even a concluding statement; a lesser achievement even than the Second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982. How could the conference have failed so completely? Are there lessons to be learned? To understand the failure of UNSSOD III, it is important to step back for a moment for a brief look at its predecessors, UNSSOD I and II.

THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL UN SESSION devoted to disarmament predated the first UNSSOD by some twenty years. A resolution urging the consideration of such a session was passed by the General Assembly in 1957 but a resolution calling for such a session did not attract consensus until 1976. UNSSOD I was an assertion of the importance of multilateral approaches to arms control and disarmament, at a time when bilateral US-Soviet efforts were faltering, and detente was becoming more tenuous.

UNSSOD I began with a draft final document in hand (containing many sections still not agreed upon) that had been produced earlier by the Preparatory Com-

mittee of the session. Meeting for six weeks in 1978, the Special Session overcame disagreements in the draft language and adopted the Final Document of the Special Session. Consisting of one hundred and twenty-nine paragraphs, the clear emphasis of the document was on the threat posed to mankind by the existence of nuclear weapons and the need to take measures to secure general and complete disarmament. It also asserted that the UN "has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament." This statement would, in different ways, have a hollow ring ten years later at UNSSOD III.

The Final Document called for the convening of a Second Special Session on Disarmament. The General Assembly later set 1982 as the date, putting the Second Special Session on a collision course with the breakdown in East-West relations which occurred in the early 1980s.

UNSSOD II was marked by public expressions of support for disarmament the likes of which had never before been seen in North America; almost one million people marched for disarmament through the streets of New York in June 1982. This was in contrast to the paralysis and recriminatory tone which gripped the Session itself. There was no agreement on an assessment of UNSSOD I and no agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. On matters of substance, multilateral disarmament was frozen in its tracks.

The Second Special Session was, however, able to patch together what became known as its

"Concluding Document." It essentially acknowledged the failure of the session, taking time to note that there was agreement on the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign and the UN programme of fellowships on disarmament. The document also called for a Third Special Session on Disarmament.

SETTING THE AGENDA FOR UNSSOD III proved to be a contentious matter. After three meetings of the Preparatory Committee, what emerged was described as a "conceptual statement" which would guide the work of the Special Session. Its substantive agenda items called for: an assessment of the implementation of the recommendations of the previous two UNSSODs, a forward assessment of developments and trends relevant to disarmament, and the role of the UN in disarmament and its disarmament machinery and public education activities. Unlike previous preparatory committees, the UNSSOD III Committee was unable to provide any draft language for consideration of the Special Session.

The Special Session began with two weeks of plenary; the time during which heads of state, government, foreign ministers and the like address the General Assembly. For some of the smaller member states, it would be their only appearance at the UNSSOD; not all can afford to tie up personnel in New York for four weeks to discuss disarmament. Since no draft language emerged from the Preparatory Committee, the plenary addresses were watched carefully for clues as to how the session might un-

fold. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's address set a positive and pragmatic tone for the session, calling for imagination and realism in disarmament approaches, and pointing out the need to address all aspects of disarmament, including conventional disarmament and local conflicts. References to "confidence-building measures," "verification" and "positive change in international relations" crept into many of the plenary addresses. Developments such as these, and the clear blunting of the rhetoric which dominated the Second Special Session, created a cautious sense of optimism by the time plenary addresses ended.

The days of 8 and 9 June were set aside to let various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from around the world address the Committee of the Whole. While hundreds of NGOs came to New York for the UNSSOD, there existed a curious gulf between official delegations to the Special Session and NGOs. For the most part, the public gallery in the General Assembly was empty during plenary, meaning delegates addressed delegates. In turn, very few delegations took the time to send members to the NGO speeches at the Committee of the Whole – the NGOs addressed each other. The stated purpose of measures to accommodate the NGOs at each UNSSOD is "to allow for some direct input by those organizations in the special sessions." This is not likely to happen, however, until both sides see the value in talking to each other, and not just to themselves.

The Committee of the Whole

is the business end of the Special Session and is given the task of drafting an expression of the Session's views, which the General Assembly, setting in plenary, then ratifies. During the second week of UNSSOD, it broke into three working groups to discuss the substantive agenda items. In the best of all worlds, each working group would forward consensus papers to the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole who would then plug them into the final document of the Special Session. After two weeks of effort, however, consensus eluded each working group and there was a clear change in the prospects for the conference. The burden of drafting final language then fell to the Mansur Ahmad, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole.

AS THE WORKING GROUPS DREW to a close, rumour had it that Chairman Ahmad, reading the situation accurately, had already begun drafting a paper on his own. The chairman's paper was released to the Committee of the Whole with only four days remaining. Presumably, Chairman Ahmad sought to introduce an element of time pressure to the conference. The Committee did not meet again until the last day of the session. In the intervening time, there occurred two and a half days of consultations with two dozen or so "friends of the chair." The friends were representatives of the regional groupings at the UN and brought together the major players from these groups. These meetings were to build a consensus which could then be carried into a formal meeting of the Committee of the Whole.

What emerged, however, was a continual reassertion of national positions which had been, by this time, well aired. In addition, numerous amendments and proposals were put forward which called into question the seriousness some states attached to the process. An especially rich example was Iraq (recently implicated in the use of chemical weapons in the war against Iran) putting forward

new language on the Secretary General's role in investigating incidents of chemical weapons use in war.

The meeting of the friends became a drafting and redrafting exercise which substituted for the work of the Committee of the Whole. This approach was a break with traditional UN procedure which angered those not invited to participate.

The Committee of the Whole met on 25 June and once again the Chairman's paper was scruti-

nized paragraph by paragraph. By early evening, Chairman Ahmad's paper was unrecognizable, with much of it set aside due to disagreement. The committee adjourned for consultations. At 11:30 pm, the General Assembly stopped the clock to allow for more time, but the cause was lost; the Special Session ended in the early morning of 26 June without a statement to make to the world.

TO WHAT CAN ONE ATTRIBUTE the collapse of UNSSOD III? Three factors stand out: the position of the United States; the position of the Neutral and Non-Aligned states; and the procedures of Chairman Ahmad.

The United States has clearly placed its disarmament eggs in the bilateral basket. Secretary of State Shultz's plenary address represented an accounting of recent, and hoped-for bilateral successes, with mention of multilateral approaches added as an afterthought. The US simply does not see a role for the UN in many substantive issues in disarmament. In the matter of naval disarmament, the US insisted there be no reference at all. It also rejected the proposal for a UN study on verification – the product of extensive consultations between the two main proponents of the idea, Canada and the Netherlands (later joined by France) on the one hand; and the Group of Six Nations/Five Continent Initiative (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania) on the other. A paragraph on the "importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer

space ..." which called for intensified negotiations to deal with the issue, was rejected as well.

On the part of the Non-Aligned states, early indications of a more moderate stance were replaced by efforts to keep the burden of disarmament on nuclear weapons states. The Non-Aligned were unwilling to countenance any shift in responsibility for disarmament which would require them to face up to their own spending on arms and involvement in local conflicts. When France suggested that the elimination of all war, both nuclear and conventional, be the objective of disarmament efforts, a flurry of Non-Aligned delegates took to the floor to condemn the proposal. The Non-Aligned continued to pursue broad political and declaratory approaches to arms control – rhetoric in other words – rather than commit themselves to dealing with concrete measures. This difference in philosophy between Western countries and the Non-

Aligned will continue to bedevil efforts at multilateral arms control.

Lastly, Chairman Ahmad's strategy of holding back his paper, and his heavy reliance on informal consultations was not helpful. Allowing the meeting of the friends to become a redrafting exercise negated the benefits to be gained by moving to a smaller group. Those who were not "friends" justly felt excluded from the process and took full advantage of the final meeting of the Committee of the Whole to insert their preferred words and punctuation into the Chair's paper. The "friends" process would only have worked had there been a spirit of consensus and urgency among the participants and a chairman who had the ability to pull together the threads of consensus; UNSSOD III lacked both.

ONE OF THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS to emerge from UNSSOD III is that it did not call for UNSSOD IV. What is needed is time for sober reflection and consideration as to the purpose, value and relevance of the UNSSOD process. Looking back, UNSSOD I represents a remarkable statement of international concern and priorities with regard to disarmament. Having made that statement in 1978, the international community has failed twice to improve upon it or agree to changes – perhaps it shouldn't try. It is time to consider other means of asserting the "central role and primary responsibility" of the UN in the field of disarmament, which, while less ambitious than the current UNSSOD approach, might lend themselves to greater success.

In trying to address the entire spectrum of disarmament issues in one fell swoop, the UNSSOD process has proved unwieldy and incapable of forward movement. Rather than uniting the international community in the cause of disarmament, it has served to challenge the relevance of multilateral, particularly UN, approaches to disarmament. Reclaiming that relevance will be that much more difficult in the aftermath of UNSSOD III.



Wile Constable

REPORT FROM THE HILL



In the House

Opposition questions about the government's planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines persisted in the Commons throughout the spring and into the summer. On 6 June Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy raised the fact that UN Ambassador Stephen Lewis had condemned the submarine purchase at a Montreal conference. In responding, the government made it clear that Mr. Lewis, who left his post on 1 August, was speaking for himself. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's endorsement of the government's proposed free trade deal with the United States in an address before a joint session of Parliament on 22 June, prompted Liberal MP Len Hopkins to inquire on the 23rd whether the price of her support was the choice of the British over the French submarine. Mrs. Thatcher referred to the purchase in a passage praising Canada's contribution to NATO. British submarines she declared, "are quite the best, and Canada must have the best."

On 4 and 5 July, Question Period was dominated by the news of the destruction of an Iranian passenger plane by the US Navy. The government rejected opposition calls for an international inquiry into the incident through the United Nations, while supporting the convening of an extraordinary session of the International Civil Aviation Organization to consider the matter. In a heated exchange, Minister of International Trade John Crosbie, rejecting the NDP's call for support of a UN naval peacekeeping force in the Persian Gulf, made it clear that the government fully supported the efforts of the US

and other Western allies "to protect international shipping and freedom of navigation in the Gulf."

Parliamentary Committees

The most substantial Parliamentary report to appear during the summer was titled "Supporting the Five: Canada and the Central American Peace Process." Issued on 5 July, it was the first report of the five-member Special House Committee on the Peace Process in Central America that had been set up on 29 January. Apart from the normal hearings, the Committee's study had included an intense ten-day visit to all five countries in the region, plus a trip to Washington and New York to consult with key players in the US Congress and at the United Nations.

The main thrust of the report is found in the first two recommendations: "Canada should do everything in its power to support the Central American five in their own search for peace, in ways they deem useful"; and, "Canada should play an important role in helping to mobilize the international community – in particular, multilateral institutions and a wide range of middle powers – in support of peace, democracy and development." The Committee's conclusion was that Canada should do its utmost to foster the tendencies to regional co-operation that the agreement represented.

Among the other recommendations were: that Canada pledge \$100 million over a five-year period as an incentive to a larger multilateral economic development effort; that Canada strongly support regional efforts to create a Central American Parliament; that Canadian diplomatic representation in the region be enhanced to ensure a presence on the ground in all five countries; and that Canada favourably consider any request to participate in a verification or peacekeeping force even if it "pertained to only some or even one of the five

countries, provided that none of the five formally opposed Canada's participation." In the latter case, the Canadian government has already accepted a provisional request from the five countries on 7 April to participate, along with Spain and the Federal Republic of Germany, in an "auxiliary technical group" to design a verification and control mechanism that would meet regional security requirements. Despite several efforts, however, the Central American foreign ministers have been unable to confirm this request and the three outside governments cannot proceed until they do so.

In June the House Standing Committee on National Defence issued a report on the Armed Forces Reserves. It reiterated the calls for support to upgrade the Reserves that have been heard for some years from both the House and Senate Defence Committees. Last year's Defence White Paper announced a new Total Force Concept that would effectively integrate Reserve with Regular forces, rather than maintain the Reserves as a separate and subordinate element. The report warned, however, that while the Committee endorsed the Total Force Concept, it urged National Defence to "re-examine its overall manpower targets with the aim of providing the necessary human and material infrastructure to sustain our Forces for at least the first 120 days from the outbreak of hostilities." National Defence's current target is a Total Force of 180,000 (90,000 Regulars, 65,000 Primary Reservists and 25,000 Supplementary Ready Reservists) by the year 2002. The Committee's concern was that, given a casualty rate estimate of one to three percent per day on Europe's Central Front, the totals currently planned for 2002 could be "disastrously low with the quantum leap in the destructive potential of conven-

tional weapons since the Second World War."

Short Notes from the Hill

On 11 July Parliament adopted a new Emergencies Act which will replace the 1914 War Measures Act. The Act saw various changes since it was first introduced into the House, the most important of which denies Cabinet any power to make rules "providing for the detention, imprisonment or internment of Canadian citizens or permanent residents ... on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."

In June the House Standing Committee on Human Rights issued its first report entitled, "Human Rights Behind the Iron Curtain" based on a series of meetings with interested parties across Canada. It recommended that Canada continue a vigorous policy of human rights advocacy with respect to "Iron Curtain" countries, insisting that the government only support the Soviet Union's proposal for a Moscow conference on humanitarian co-operation if certain conditions are met such as the release of imprisoned members of Helsinki monitoring groups.

On 14 June the House Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade presented a report on the military conflict in Ethiopia with particular reference to the impact on aid delivery. It included recommendations aimed at ensuring that the benefits of humanitarian assistance are reaching the people and not the government of Ethiopia.

On 20 June, following the military coup in Haiti, Mr. Hudon, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, reiterated the government's policy of recognizing the state of Haiti rather than any particular government and said Canada would maintain its present level of diplomatic representation. □

DEFENCE NOTES



Canadian Forces in Europe

In testimony to the Commons Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND), Defence officials have revealed more details about the White Paper plan to augment Canada's land commitment to Europe. The commitment to reinforce to divisional strength means that by the end of the White Paper planning period (2002), Canadian Forces Europe (CFE) will be able to deploy 16,500 personnel. The division will include two infantry heavy mechanized brigades each with 4,500 personnel. One of these will be the brigade currently in Europe (4 CMBG), while the other will be the brigade hitherto committed to the defence of northern Norway (5 Brigade), which will be reequipped with tanks and artillery to constitute a mechanized brigade. 5 Brigade will continue to be based in Canada, but only the equipment required for training will be retained at its home base, with most heavy equipment repositioned in Europe.

The division will also include various support elements, including an artillery brigade deploying the new low-level air defence system, combat support engineering units, etc. Some of these elements will be based in Europe and some in Canada. Of the 16,500 divisional personnel, about 9,500 will be regulars, and the rest reserves.

The first major step in the consolidation is due shortly with the beginning of the project definition phase of the new tank for the mechanized brigades. It is expected that the division will need up to three hundred new tanks at a cost currently estimated by DND to be approximately \$2.4 billion. DND officials have stated that they are not yet able to identify the overall cost of the divisional

commitment to NATO. The 1988-89 Main Estimates reveal an increase of twenty-two percent in the cost of maintaining the current Canadian Forces Europe, which accounts for about ten percent of the total defence budget.

Weapons Procurement

The Department of National Defence made two announcements in July concerning new equipment. First, the Canadian Armed Forces will receive 820 all-terrain tracked vehicles, to be delivered between 1992 and 1997. The vehicles will be built by a joint-venture company formed by Hagglunds Vehicle AB of Sweden and Canadian Foremost Ltd. of Calgary. Including inflation over the life of the contract, spares, ammunition, and logistics, DND estimates the value of the contract to be \$420 million.

Second, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced a plan to build twelve large coastal patrol vessels equipped for minesweeping. Crewed by reservists, the vessels will patrol the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. They will be delivered between 1992 and 1998. According to the *Globe and Mail* (26 July 1988), the cost in 1988-89 dollars will be \$550 million, but the official announcement cited the year-over-year total programme cost, including inflation, as \$750 million. This is a departure from standard practice, since most major programmes such as the submarine purchase, are quoted in constant dollars in the year of the decision to purchase.

Slowing Star Wars

In May the Defense Science Board, a top-level Pentagon advisory panel, submitted a report to Defense Secretary Carlucci recommending the slowing down of plans to deploy an anti-missile defence. The panel was asked to consider the future development of the programme given the reduced budgets imposed by Congress. While endorsing the SDI goal of a layered, space-based defence against ICBMs, the Board

has recommended a phased development which would concentrate in the first instance on the deployment of one hundred ground-based interceptors to protect missile sites, bomber bases and command centres. It might also provide some defence against accidental missile launches. Only in the later phases of the programme – meaning well into the next century – would space-based systems be deployed.

US Stealth Bombers

In May the US Air Force released information about the B-2, the advanced technology bomber whose "stealth" characteristics will make it almost "invisible" to currently deployed Soviet radars. The B-2 is built of composites which absorb rather than reflect radar signals, and has the shape of a crescent or "flying wing."

The B-2 will be subsonic, with a top speed of 750 mph (1,200 kph), and a range of 7,500 miles (12,000 kilometres). Its mission is to fly deep into the USSR, searching out mobile missile bases, command centres and other elusive targets. In the event of a nuclear war, Strategic Air Command envisages an integrated bomber attack: the oldest aircraft, the B-52s, would fly towards the Soviet Union and release cruise missiles aimed at Soviet airfields and radars; the Stealth bombers would penetrate and launch a combination of short-range attack missiles (the SRAM 2) and gravity bombs at remaining Soviet ICBMs and command centres; and the B-1Bs would then attack in a third wave aiming for military installations, production facilities, and, if required, population centres. The SAC concept for the use of strategic bombers appears to be based on the view that a strategic nuclear exchange might take place over a number of days, or even weeks.

The Air Force has ordered 132 B-2s at a cost which has yet to be disclosed, but is reported to

approach US \$500 million per aircraft.

Proliferating Technologies

In a speech to the UN Special Session on Disarmament in May, US Secretary of State George Shultz called on Third World countries to co-operate in limiting the spread not only of nuclear weapon technology, but also of other advanced military systems. Within days, reports from Pakistan indicated that it has tested one or possibly two ballistic missiles with ranges between 85 and 290 kilometres. Analysts have speculated variously that Pakistan may have obtained and modified Soviet SCUD missiles, or that their ballistic missile programme has been conducted with technological support from China. Iraq is known to have used modified SCUD missiles against Iran, achieving a range of 965 kilometres. Earlier this year India reported testing a ballistic missile with a range of 240 kilometres. Both India and Pakistan deny that they are manufacturing nuclear weapons which might be used with such missiles.

Shultz's appeal, however, is undermined somewhat by the declared policy of the US administration to promote greater arms exports in order to offset the costs of weapons production.

Soviet Casualties in Afghanistan

According to Western diplomats, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has been accompanied by fierce fighting along the Pakistan-Afghan border. Mujahideen guerrillas have made dramatic gains at the expense of the Afghan army, which assumed responsibility for key garrisons in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. On 25 May the Soviets officially announced their war losses in Afghanistan: 13,310 soldiers killed, 35,478 wounded, and 311 missing in action. □

— DAVID COX

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



Moscow Summit

Although it did not prove possible to finalize a strategic arms reduction (START) agreement at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Moscow (29 May to 2 June), progress was recorded on a number of arms control issues. To begin with, the two leaders exchanged the instruments of ratification of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (signed at last December's summit), formally bringing it into force. The US Senate had approved the Treaty by a vote of ninety-three to five on 27 May; the USSR Supreme Soviet had unanimously endorsed it four days earlier.

Also at the Moscow summit, US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed an agreement on advance notification of all ballistic missile launches, providing at least twenty-four hours notice and specifying both the launching and impact areas.

Regarding the START agreement, the two sides reported progress on the issues of mobile ICBMs and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). On the key issues of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and the future of the ABM Treaty, however, little or no progress was reported, leading many observers to believe that a completed START agreement will have to wait the coming of a new administration in Washington.

Nuclear Testing Talks

In Moscow on 31 May, Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed a 160-page Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) agreement. Under it, Soviet specialists will monitor a US nuclear test in Nevada on 17 August, and US officials a Soviet test at Semipalatinsk on 14 Sep-

tember, in order to help pave the way for ratification of the US-Soviet Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 (which limits underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons in yield).

Subsequently, on 28 June, the two governments exchanged seismic data on their previous tests within a range of 100-150 kilotons, marking the first time that the USSR had ever disclosed the size of its nuclear explosions. The same day, at the end of the second round of their bilateral Nuclear Testing Talks in Geneva, the US announced that the two sides were "close to agreement" on a verification protocol for the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty of 1976, a companion agreement of TTBT. This protocol was originally expected to have been ready for signing at the Moscow summit. The Soviets have insisted that finalization of a similar protocol for the TTBT will have to await the results of the Verification Experiment. The US hopes that the latter will convince them of the utility of the US "CORRTEX" method of measurement for the verification of nuclear test limitations.

UNSSOD III

The Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSOD III) broke up on 26 June without agreement on a thirteen-page draft final document setting out aims and priorities for the next five to eight years. The delegates proved unable to agree on a number of issues, including support for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban (opposed by the US), endorsement of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (opposed by India), authorizing the UN Secretary-General to investigate alleged non-compliance with the 1925 Geneva Convention banning the first use of chemical weapons (opposed by Iraq), enhancing the UN role in the verification of arms control agreements

(opposed by the US and many of its allies), promoting naval arms control (rejected by the US), and condemning reported Israeli and South African nuclear weapons programmes. Despite the failure to achieve a final document, US and Soviet representatives described the conference as "useful" for demonstrating a new understanding of the issues.

Conventional Arms Control in Europe

In a speech to UNSSOD III on 8 June, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze described a new Soviet proposal for European conventional arms control, which he said had been made by General Secretary Gorbachev at the Moscow summit a week earlier. It calls for a formal exchange of official data even before new negotiations begin, with verification by on-site inspection once talks are underway. The first stage of the actual negotiations would concentrate on eliminating imbalances and asymmetries identified as a result of the data exchange. The second stage would see reductions on each side of approximately 500,000 men, while in the third stage, apart from further reductions, "the armed forces on both sides would be given a defensive character, and their offensive nucleus would be dismantled."

At a conference in Potsdam two days later, West German Foreign Minister Genscher welcomed the new proposal, but other NATO delegates criticized it, noting that the East had blocked a meaningful data exchange fourteen years at the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. Similarly, on 24 June, a US State Department spokesman called the proposed data exchange a "fruitless" exercise which would perpetuate the stalemate at MBFR. Instead, both sides should clear away the hurdles at the Group 23 and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] talks.

The "Group 23" or "Mandate

Talks," also taking place in Vienna, are negotiating a mandate for an entirely new set of negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, commonly referred to as the Conventional Stability Talks (CST), which most observers expect to begin later this year. US Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway stated on 23 June that two-thirds of the negotiating mandate had already been agreed upon, including the objective of eliminating, "as a matter of priority, ... the capability to launch surprise attack and large-scale offensive action." However, differences remain over the precise relationship of the new talks to the CSCE (with the US emphasizing their autonomy), and also over Soviet attempts to include references to tactical nuclear weapons or dual-capable systems (opposed by the West). Moreover, the US insists that the CST cannot begin until after the CSCE Review Conference, also underway in Vienna, has been successfully concluded. It is being held up by Romanian opposition to efforts at improving human rights practices.

During a visit to Poland on 11 July, General Secretary Gorbachev called for a "pan-European" summit conference to discuss conventional arms control in Europe, as well as the creation of a "European risk-of-war reduction centre" (presumably analogous to the recently established Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in Washington and Moscow). He also offered to withdraw "matching aircraft from forward deployment sites in Eastern Europe" if NATO agreed to forego the planned basing of seventy-two US F-16 aircraft in Italy, following their expulsion from Spain. The latter proposal was rejected by NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner, who argued that the priority in arms control talks should be on land, rather than air, forces. □

— RONALD PURVER

REVIEWS



Canada's Defence Industrial Base: The Political Economy of Preparedness and Procurement

David G. Haglund (ed.)

Kingston, Ontario: Ronald Frye, 261 pgs., \$24.95 paper

A healthy defence industrial base should adequately furnish a country's defence needs in a cost efficient manner. It must possess the technological capability necessary to meet the perceived security threat in times of peace and the flexibility to increase production rates quickly in times of crisis.

This view of modern war fighting and industrial capacity is based on several factors. The complexity and cost of modern weapon systems have risen at exponential rates. Coinciding with the evolution in technology is a change in strategic thinking. Scenarios of short-lived military confrontations in Central Europe quickly passing the nuclear threshold, have given way to expectations that a conventional war in Europe will be protracted. NATO, for its part, wants to lessen its dependence on the early use of nuclear weapons as the pillar of its deterrence posture – hence the need to strengthen its conventional forces and increase the potential of member nations to mobilize resources rapidly in the event of war.

In light of these changes, this collection of essays edited by David Haglund is particularly timely. Canada's spending on military hardware has skyrocketed from the lean years of the mid-1970s. Eleven social scientists and experienced defence bureaucrats have collaborated on the first book in Canada to accord a thorough treatment of the defence industry, government procurement practices and the integration

of Canada into the North American defence market.

Canada's most prolific defence economist Jack Treddenick gives a clear introduction to the basic theoretical issues in defence economics. He goes on to survey data broken down by industry, region, exports and imports, and concludes that Canada's defence sector occupies a relatively insignificant part of the economy (less than one percent of gross domestic product). He implies that problems that may afflict countries with proportionately larger defence industries do not affect Canada.

But problems do occur, as is amply illustrated in the chapters on three individual case histories of weapons procurement. The picture presented is a complicated one of interservice rivalry; competing objectives of separate government departments; pressure from industry; as well as the political influence of the provinces. "Defence as economics" seems to take such precedence in peacetime, it is a wonder that real military security needs are actually met at all.

However, William Fox indicates in another chapter that the procurement procedure employed in the recent selection of the Oerlikon-Bührle company of Switzerland for the low-level air defence project turned out to be very successful in terms of management and cost effectiveness, and has been studied by several different countries.

As with any ambitious book on contemporary policy issues, this one sometimes ventures too far and sometimes not far enough. On occasion conclusions are drawn that are not supported by the data presented, such as the view offered by L. John Leggat that military high technology has a beneficial effect on economic growth and employment. Most of the contributing authors believe that the present defence production and sharing arrangements with the US are beneficial and

should be further developed. Yet questions about the challenges to Canada's autonomy and sovereignty resulting from these arrangements are raised but never treated at length. Given that these issues may eventually bear on Canada's security, this is unfortunate. Otherwise this collection of papers is an excellent introduction to the subject. – Erik Poole

Mr. Poole studies Economics at Laval University

Philosophical Perspectives on Peace

Howard P. Kainz (ed.)

Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1987, 315 pgs., US \$39.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper

Those of us who, at one time or another, have concocted our own prescription for eliminating the "scourge of war" should make this book required reading. The search for the right recipe is millennia-old. Recurring themes are discernible; it is revealing to see which formulae have been proposed repeatedly and yet have failed to elicit support over the centuries. In spite of an air of unreality these writings are both instructive and amusing.

The subtitle of this volume is "An Anthology of Classical and Modern Sources." It is a range of philosophical analyses of the problem of war and proposed solutions. Some are essays, some extracts from longer works.

The first two chapters feature writers who have recommended world government as a method of ensuring peace, from Aristotle, laying out his argument in a letter to Alexander the Great, to Bertrand Russell, responding to the modern fear of global nuclear war.

Writing at the end of the eighteenth century, Kant observed that: "The state of peace must be founded." What was needed was a federation of nations operating under a well-crafted constitution. And, of course, once the supranational government was established, the leaders should employ philosophers as advisers.

Chapter 4 pulls together the works of four writers who put their faith in the triumph of spiritual values. Erasmus, writing in the late fifteenth century, calls on European citizens to remember the precepts of their Christian heritage, although he is at some pains to reconcile the vengeful, war-like Jehovah of the Old Testament with the forgiving Father-God of the New.

The authors presented in Chapter 5 judge that the heart of the problem is mankind's aggressive tendencies, and that this aggression must somehow be sublimated. Konrad Lorenz, a specialist in animal behaviour, believes that sport "educates man to a conscious and responsible control of his own fighting-behaviour." Obviously Lorenz had never been exposed to British soccer fans.


In T.H. White's satirical piece, "The Passing of Camelot," Merlyn suggests a substitute for war in a testimony before Arthur's Privy Council. The canny old magician is convinced that humans are suffering from some form of glandular deficiency: they require, from time to time, a massive injection of adrenalin; they need fear and the chance of death. He suggests setting up a fair with tilt-o-whirls and roller-coasters, and a death rate of about one in a hundred. Participation would, of course, be voluntary; conscription was insupportable. After one hundred visits, a fair-goer would receive the Victoria Cross. The Privy Council did not find this to be a practical suggestion.

Some philosophers, like Kant, might want to be political advisers, hoping to guide their countrymen away from war. But others might shrug their shoulders and say, with Rousseau, "to be sane in the midst of madmen is a sort of folly." – Dianne DeMille

Ms. DeMille is an editor at the Institute.

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* 'Livres' section.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



"Moral mothers" – Silly?

Shannon Selin's treatment of the question: "Could women really do a better job?" (*Peace & Security*, Spring 1988) makes some long assumptions and comes to unfortunate conclusions.

Selin names a number of activist women's groups in Canada and elsewhere to attest to the involvement of the women's movement in the field of peace and security. Unfortunately, she goes on to address unsubstantiated demands of feminists in general, caricaturizing them as the "moral mothers." It's a pity to see trivialized, a field which has a long historical tradition.

Selin correctly suggests that the issue for feminists is much more broad than mere equality of representation and opportunities. It centres, rather, on the claim "that women have something unique to offer to the policy process." However, she concludes that much of this claim to uniqueness is misguided if not dangerous, by supposedly creating as she puts it, a dichotomy between women/peace and men/war, by ignoring the seriousness of male security dilemmas, by creating false expectations of what women can do and by provoking a confrontation with men and with other women.

These conclusions are an unfortunate misreading of the feminist agenda for peace. Where is the evidence that individuals within this broad movement or groups like Voice of Women make claims only for their own sake, as against men, or against non-feminist women? In fact, most feminists describe the agenda for peace in inclusive terms, seeking social justice for all and shared decision-making, not the substitution of a new breed of female "heroes."

A key to a feminist approach is to look at systemic discrimination of women, not individual discrimination. Filmmaker Bonnie Sherr Klein, whose film *Speaking Our Peace* deals with women, and the twin goals of peace and empowerment, has described well the feminist agenda using sociological not individualistic terms. Selin fails to include such a sociopolitical analysis which goes beyond the "nature" and "nurture" discussion.

While Selin is within her prerogative as a researcher trained and professionally employed within the more traditionally defined field of arms control to accept the patriarchal security paradigm, it is indeed ironic that she blames feminists for increasing,

the likelihood that women ... will be sidelined into investigating "soft" topics such as peace education or the social consequences on increased military spending ...

Selin makes no shattering disclosures to the feminist constituency in bemoaning "the old boy's club" in the arms control business. It would be more useful if she pursued the feminist agenda to challenge existing social structures of domination at every level, including one's place of work.

While feeling great sympathy for Shannon Selin's dilemma in the jaws of the male establishment, we also feel it is ultimately the responsibility of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security to deal with this issue more seriously than by publishing an essay that invokes a silly image of "moral mothers." Janis Alton, Hania M. Fedorowicz, and Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg, Ottawa

Distortions For The Unwary

Regarding the "Letter from Jerusalem" by Véra Murray (*Peace & Security* Summer 1988): On the surface, it appears to be an objective report from a Jerusalem

resident. For the unversed and unwary, though, it contains many distortions:

The Old City was stated to have been in the hands of the Palestinians before the Six Day War of 1967. It was, in fact, in the hands of the Jordanians, who invaded and captured it in 1948. (Admittedly, a very large number of Jordanians are Palestinians, conventional usage, however, is not to refer to them as "Palestinians").

In dealing with the Old City of Jerusalem, Ms. Murray makes the staggering two statements that most Israelis have not been there for years, and that only Orthodox Jews still visit the Wailing Wall! Not only is there a heavily populated, rebuilt Jewish Quarter there but the Old City has been for twenty-one years a bustling area where many Israeli Jerusalemites shop and Israelis from all over the country visit. (There certainly has been some falling off of this since the recent "uprising, but I assume that the author was not referring to the past few months). As for the visits to the Wailing Wall, it is either ignorance or deliberate distortion to assert that only the Orthodox visit it. Jews from around the world and from Israel itself are constant visitors.

Ms. Murray alleges that many Israelis have never set foot in the occupied territories. It has been the daily habit of thousands of Israelis to travel regularly all through the occupied territories.

The author mistakenly states that half the Israelis, represented by Prime Minister Shamir, refuse to negotiate with the Palestinians. He has refused to negotiate with the PLO – a major distinction. The "other half" of the Israelis, represented by Foreign Minister Peres also refuse to negotiate with the PLO. Both of the "halves" referred to by Ms. Murray are ready and willing to negotiate with Palestinians and/or any other Arabs (apart from the PLO) who are willing to negotiate with them. Alas, except for the Egyptians, all have refused.

Finally, it is sad to read that Ms. Murray finds that "encounters" with her Israeli friends are no longer enjoyable. Sad, but considering her outlook, understandable!

Donald Carr, Toronto

Sanger's Scary Proposal

Clyde Sanger's idea (*Peace & Security*, Summer 1988) of giving ownership in the Arctic archipelago to the United Nations really scares me. The other UN trust territories are Namibia, which he concedes did not work out as planned, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In the latter case, the Americans assumed responsibility for looking after these Pacific people for the UN. In the process they deliberately tested the effects of radiation on them, and kept them in poverty.

The Americans would, I believe, jump at the chance to administer the Arctic for the UN. Think of all the problems it would solve for them, including not having to worry about negotiating a plutonium flight pathway from Europe to Japan.

Canada has already given notice that sovereign base lines have been drawn around the Arctic archipelago. Presumably, this was the first step in asserting that these are Canadian archipelagic waters. This would seem to be the reasonable approach to take. This would mean that Canada would define a sea lane through the North West Passage, and other states would have the right to use that sea lane providing they passed through it in an expeditious, non-polluting way.

Their submarines could pass through submerged providing Canada was notified of their presence and they were kept within the sea lane.

I do not believe that a more peaceful, secure world would result from acting on Sanger's Gift of the North imaginings.

Isabelle George,
Arcola, Saskatchewan □

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



The terms of office of four members of the Board of Directors expired August 1988:

Christoph Bertram, John Sigler, Paul Warnke, and Lois Wilson. New Directors were announced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark. They are: **Edward Green**, Director of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica; **Orest Cochkanoff**, consulting engineer and former Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Technical University of Nova Scotia, Halifax, Nova Scotia; and **Mary Simon**, President of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Kuujuaq, Quebec.

"Canada, Sanctions and the Soviet Union: Lessons from Experience," was the subject of a series of workshops organized by the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto in mid-July. **Geoffrey Pearson** and **Roger Hill** participated in the meetings. Mr. Pearson also spoke to a group of young Canadians and Soviets who were part of an exchange sponsored by the Quakers.

Fauzya Moore, a member of the Grants Administration section, chaired a session on the security arrangements of Cuba and Jamaica at a conference on "Peace and Development in the Caribbean." The conference was held at the University of the West Indies and was jointly sponsored by the International Peace Research Association, the Jamaica Peace Committee and the Institute for Social and Economic Research.

Brad Feasey of the Public Programmes staff and **Geoff Irvine** a consultant with the Institute, co-authors of the *Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security*, participated in a summer institute in Edmonton sponsored by the International Institute for Peace Education. **Geoffrey Pearson** spoke on peace and security education at a meeting of the Canadian School Trustees Association in Ottawa.

During the summer and early fall there were several staff changes at the Institute. **Rychard Brûlé**, Senior Grants Officer, took a leave to attend the National Defence College for a year. **Francine Lecours**, a Research Assistant, left the Institute after two years: her replacement is **Annie Leblanc** who studied most

recently at Carleton University. **Harald von Riekhoff**, a Fellow for the past two years, has returned to Carleton University; **Robert Mitchell**, a Fellow for the past year, has returned to the Department of National Defence. **Bruno Munier**, most recently of the Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales in Geneva, and **Douglas Hamlin**, of the Department of External Affairs will both take up a year's appointment as Fellows. **Norma Salem** joined the Institute staff in September as a Research Associate. She received a Ph.D. from McGill in Islamic Studies, and comes to the Institute from the Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture in Montreal. Other new appointments are the following: **Eva Bild** is an Editor in the Public Programmes section; **Marie-Andrée**

Lalonde-Morisset is a Grants Officer, **Marilyn Miller** is a Clerk in the Library; and **Suzanne Payant** is the Receptionist.

Ron Purver, Fen Hampson, Harald von Riekhoff, and Carl Jacobsen presented a seminar at the Learned Societies meeting in Windsor on the future of arms control. Mr. Jacobsen and Mr. Purver attended a workshop in Norway sponsored by the Peace Research Institute, Oslo, on Arctic Security, where Mr. Purver presented a paper on confidence-building and arms control arrangements at sea. Mr. Jacobsen went on to Moscow as part of the CIIPS exchange programme with the Institute for USA and Canada, where he conducted research for his work on "Strategic Power - US and USSR."

Fen Hampson and Ken Bush prepared two background papers for the conference in Toronto on "The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security." Their papers focussed on the problem from a Canadian perspective, and on the impact of the changing atmosphere on social and political conflict. Mr. Hampson was also a panelist at the 1988 Summer Seminar on global security at the University of California, Santa Cruz. His topic was "Applied Deterrence."

Early in September **Geoffrey Pearson** attended a symposium entitled "The Future of the United Nations in an Interdependent World," sponsored and organized by UNITAR, in Moscow. Following the Moscow meetings he spoke in Bucharest to the Association for International Law and International Relations on strengthening the role of the UN in the field of disarmament and alternative security. □

Scholarships Awarded

The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security recently awarded eight scholarships to Canadians who wish to further their studies in the subject areas of international peace and security. The scholarships are awarded annually as part of the CIIPS Awards Programme.

The award holders come from different disciplines and will pursue a variety of studies.

David Angell is a native of Montreal, Quebec. He is pursuing his studies at the University of Cambridge in England for a Ph.D. in Political Science, concentrating on Strategic Command-and-Control and the evolution of West European Nuclear Force Structures and Strategies. Awarded \$25,000

Christine Ball is a native of Toronto, Ontario. She is presently at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education pursuing a Ph.D. Her research will focus on the role of the Voice of Women and deployment of nuclear weapons. Awarded \$14,000

Terrence Carson is a native of Edmonton, Alberta. He intends to conduct research in Peace Education at the Centre for Peace Studies in Lancaster England. Awarded \$14,000

Cynthia Chataway is a native of Mississauga, Ontario. She plans to pursue her studies in social psychology and conflict management at Harvard University. Awarded \$5,000

Laurent Frappe is a native of Québec City. He will be pursuing his Ph.D. (doctorat) in International Relations at Laval. His research deals with Conflict and International Relations in Latin America. Awarded \$9,000

Manon Hogue is a native of Montreal, Quebec. She plans to focus on Militarization and Development, at the University of Montreal. Awarded \$14,000

Howard Peter Langille is a native of Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia. He is pursuing his studies at Bradford University in Ontario towards a Ph.D. in Philosophy, concentrating in Peace Studies. He will examine the factors which influence the formulation of contemporary Canadian defence policy. Awarded \$25,000

Leigh Sarty is a native of Toronto, Ontario. He is completing a Ph.D. in Political Science (International Relations) at Columbia University in New York City, specializing in the fields of International Politics, International Security, and Soviet Foreign Policy. Awarded \$14,000

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A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1985-86, 285 pages. (out of print)

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stitute's mandate: arms control, disarmament, defence and conflict resolution.

1. Superpower Rivalry and Soviet Policy in the Caribbean Basin, by S. Neil MacFarlane, June 1986, 70 pages.

2. Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective, by David Cox, December 1986, 50 pages.

3. Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities, by Ronald G. Purver, February 1988, 80 pages.

4. From Lenin to Gorbachev: Changing Soviet Perspectives on East-West Relations, by Paul Marantz, May 1988, 89 pages.

5. The Debate About Nuclear Weapon Tests, by Jozef Goldblat and David Cox, August 1988.

CONFERENCE REPORTS

One of the ways CIIPS seeks to encourage public discussion of issues of peace and security is to sponsor and, on occasion, organize conferences which address these subjects. From time to time the

Institute publishes a report of conference proceedings in order to make the matters discussed available to a much wider audience.

1. Negotiations for Peace in Central America, Proceedings of the Round-table on Negotiations in Central America, Ottawa, 27-28 September, 1985, by Liisa North, 59 pages. (out of print)

2. Challenges to Deterrence: Doctrines, Technologies and Public Concerns, Proceedings of the Conference on Challenges to Deterrence, Ottawa, 17-19 October 1985, by Dianne DeMille, 69 pages.

3. The Risk of Accidental Nuclear War, Proceedings of the Conference on the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War, Vancouver, 26-30 May 1986, by Andrea Demchuk, 38 pages. (out of print)

4. Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean: Perspectives to the Year 2000, Proceedings of a Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 22-25 March 1987, by Lloyd Searwar, 36 pages.

5. Measures for Peace in Central America, 8-9 May 1987, by Liisa North, December 1987, 76 pages.

6. The International Trade in Arms: Problems and Prospects, 21-22 October 1987, by Keith Krause, March 1988, 47 pages.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

This series is intended for readers interested in issues of peace and security, but who have neither the time nor the expertise to read long papers on them. The series explores fundamental aspects of peace, conflict and international relations, and is a medium for timely analysis of major events and emerging issues that fall within CIIPS mandate.

1. Canadian Responses to the Strategic Defense Initiative, by Gregory Wirick, October 1985. (out of print)


2. A Nuclear Freeze? by David Cox, January 1986.

3. Nuclear Winter, by Leonard Bertin, March 1986. (out of print)

4. Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by William Epstein, March 1986. (out of print)

5. Conventional Arms Control Negotiations in Europe, by John Toogood, April 1986.

6. The Origins of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, by Gilles Grondin, August 1986.



Rory Blair

7. **Satellite Surveillance and Canadian Capabilities**, by Ron Buckingham, September 1986.
8. **Peace in Central America?** by Steven Baranyi, October 1986.
9. **A Second Look at No First Use**, by Fen Osler Hampson, November 1986.
10. **The Debate About Peace Education**, by Elizabeth Richards, December

19. **The War in the Gulf**, by Francine Lecours, May 1988.
20. **Destabilization of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, 1980-1987**, by Dan O'Meara, June 1988
21. **The Conventional Military Balance in Europe**, by Roger Hill, July 1988.
22. **The NATO Nuclear Planning Group**, by Jocelyn Coulon, August 1988.

POINTS OF VIEW

Points of View are the same length as Background Papers, however, authors are encouraged to write more of a personal essay than a factual description.

1. **East/West Relations: Values, Interests and Perceptions**, by Geoffrey Pearson, March 1986.
2. **Nuclear Weapons and the Averting of War**, by Robert W. Malcolmson, October 1986.
3. **Canadian Press Coverage of Arms Control and Disarmament Issues**, by John R. Walker, March 1987.
4. **Maintaining Peace with Freedom: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control**, by Lorne Green, March 1987.
5. **Towards a World Space Organization**, by Elisabeth Mann Borgese, November 1987.

WORKING PAPERS

Working Papers are the result of research work in progress, often intended for later publication by the Institute or another publication, and are regarded by CIIPS to be of immediate value for distribution in limited numbers – mostly to specialists in the field. Unlike all other Institute

5. **Conference on Militarization in the Third World, papers** by Paul Rogers, Michael Klare and Dan O'Meara presented at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, January 1987, 83 pages.

6. **The Conventional Force Balance in Europe: Understanding the Numbers**, by James Moore, January 1988, 15 pages.

7. **Peace and Security in the 1980s: The View of Canadians**, by Don Munton, January 1988, 86 pages.

8. **Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third-Party Mediators**, Proceedings of a Workshop held in Ottawa 19-20 November 1987, by Robert Miller, May 1988, 59 pages.

9. **East-West Relations in the 1980s**, by Adam Bromke, May 1988, 103 pages.

10. **The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament 1988: Peace Proposals Since 1982**, by Hanna Newcombe, May 1988, 59 pages.

11. **International Security and Canadian Interests**, Report of a Working Group, June 1988, 38 pages.

12. **Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third Party Mediators (#2)**, Proceedings of a Workshop held in Ottawa 6-7 May 1988, by Kenneth D. Bush and Richard Price, August 1988.

FACTSHEETS

The factsheet series is intended to provide short synopses of current issues in arms control, disarmament, defence and conflict resolution, and to outline the historical context for contemporary events. The series is primarily intended for senior and secondary students and teachers.

1. **NORAD (North American Aerospace Defence Command)**, March 1988.
2. **NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Or-**

CIIPS Awards Programme

The Institute invites applications for the CIIPS Awards Programme, which is now in its third year. The programme is open to both academics and non-academics who wish to enter or continue their work in the field of international peace and security. The programme is intended to encourage expertise and scholarship in questions of international peace and security and to develop contacts with the international community by supporting Canadians who wish to pursue their studies at institutions abroad, or exceptionally, in Canada.

Applicants must be Canadian citizens and hold at minimum a first degree or equivalent experience in order to apply.

The Institute has set aside \$173,000 to award ten scholarships; three of which will be valued at \$25,000 and seven at \$14,000. Applications will be assessed by an independent selection committee and decisions will be announced in May 1989.

The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada administers the programme on behalf of the Institute. The deadline for applications for the 1989-1990 academic year is 1 February 1989.

For further information and application forms please write to:

The Awards Division
Association of
Universities and
Colleges of Canada
151 Slater Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5V1

Grants Procedures and Deadlines

The Institute allocates grants twice a year. Contact the Institute for a copy of updated criteria and application forms. Please note the following deadlines:

30 June for an October decision

31 December for a March decision

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
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20. **Destabilization of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, 1980-1987**, by Dan O'Meara, June 1988.
21. **The Conventional Military Balance in Europe**, by Roger Hill, July 1988.
22. **The NATO Nuclear Planning Group**, by Jocelyn Coulon, August 1988.

POINTS OF VIEW

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1. **East/West Relations: Values, Interests and Perceptions**, by Geoffrey Pearson, March 1986.
2. **Nuclear Weapons and the Averting of War**, by Robert W. Malcolmson, October 1986.
3. **Canadian Press Coverage of Arms Control and Disarmament Issues**, by John R. Walker, March 1987.
4. **Maintaining Peace with Freedom: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control**, by Lorne Green, March 1987.
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LETTER FROM KABUL BY MADELEINE POULIN



"The Afghans are like journalists ... they are not very disciplined." In an offhand manner – it being strictly a formality – the Soviet official gives a warning. "It's twenty-nine degrees in Kabul," he says ...

"and the situation is dangerous. We cannot guarantee your safety. If you're afraid, don't go." The trip to Kabul, for about a dozen of us, really begins in Moscow. We have to endure the derision which press attachés reserve for reporters. While we are only a stone's throw from the Kremlin, it could just as well be Ottawa or Washington.

We arrive in Kabul in the early hours of the morning. At the last second the plane plunges toward the airport amidst a shower of tracer shells. A Japanese reporter explains to me that the tracers are white hot pieces of metal. Whatever they are, the objective is clear: to decoy any US-made heat-seeking Stinger missiles that the Mujahideen, lying in ambush in the mountains, might fire at us. Inside the cabin all is quiet, except for the engines and a melodic piece of music by Grieg – "Solvieg's Song." Once we are safely on the ground, the Japanese journalist gives the thumbs-up in a sign of victory.

The display of tracers and the ballet of Soviet helicopter gunships around each airplane paint an undeniable message in the sky over Kabul: the war is not over. The real originality of the accord signed in Geneva is that it was not accompanied by a ceasefire. And the irony of our presence is that some two hundred journalists have been invited to attend a sort of peace celebration. The occasion marks both the coming into effect of the international accords signed by Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and the USSR; as well as the withdrawal of the Red Army. Moreover, everything will proceed as if the war were over. The Soviet Army will parade before us covered with flowers thrown by "grateful" Afghans. But for

the scene to be truly believable you have to plug your ears, because the Mujahideen have signed nothing at all and these strange celebrations are marked periodically by the explosions of rockets and booby-trapped trucks.

Exactly what is being celebrated here? If there is any unofficial happiness in the air, it stems from the relief of a proud and independent people seeing the backs of domineering and often scornful foreigners. And it is pre-

Even those closest to the regime want the Soviets to go. Then their attention will turn to defending Kabul against the Mujahideen.

cisely at this point that the situation becomes complicated for an outsider. "What's that? You're a party member and you're happy to see the Soviets leave?" Even those closest to the regime want the Soviets to go. Then their attention will turn to defending Kabul against the Mujahideen. These same Afghans admit, in private, that calling on the Soviets for help in the first place was a mistake; just as Moscow now officially acknowledges that it was wrong to have intervened.

But who are these Afghan communists? They are engineers, technicians and educated people wishing for progress at any price – like the veterinarian who, having studied in and been enchanted by Hungary, was shocked on his return home by the state of underdevelopment of his country. In a nation where the life expectancy is thirty-eight years, the communists are physicians like Dr. Najibullah, current President of a regime the Americans predict will collapse very soon after the Soviet withdrawal.

Dr. Najibullah granted us an interview in a small room in the presidential palace. Tall, heavy-set, and sporting a mustache, the President, dressed in sports clothes, looks more like a young entrepreneur than a statesman. He says that one day the Afghan people will realize that the Soviet presence was beneficial. He does not deny that for a moment it is a political burden. He knows the Americans are predicting his rapid demise but believes that Kabul can survive if the Geneva accords, aimed at ending outside interference, are respected. But the accords are vague on the provision of arms to the Mujahideen by the Americans, a fact that clearly worries the President. He wants the time to effect a national

have yet to advance beyond the guerilla stage militarily. Moreover, while they are brave, they are also divided. This naturally gives rise to questions as to what would become of Afghanistan after an eventual victory by Gulbuddin Heckmatyar, the most powerful of the Mujahideen leaders, who, although Sunnite rather than Shiite, in many ways resembles a young Khomeini. Not a reassuring prospect.

Friday at the mosque for prayers there are only men. I enter, head wrapped in a scarf, and draw only a few furtive glances. Afghans are courteous to foreigners. At the front of the mosque a man is speaking. At my side a venerable old French professor whispers a translation. The man at the front with the white beard is saying, "We don't support the [communist] revolution." Nor does he support the Mujahideen. He was one of them, in Pakistan. But, he says, they indulge in endless discussions and always end up where they started. Now that the Russians are leaving, the goal has been achieved and the opportunity for national reconciliation must be seized. That evening I saw him again at a reception given by Americans of Afghan descent. Sayed Abdoul Wakil Sadaquat left the country after the Communist coup in 1978. He believes that the bloodbath predicted by the Americans can be avoided and that national reconciliation is possible, but that Najibullah should resign.

Saturday finds us back aboard a Tupulov jet, once again enveloped in the same soft music of Grieg. This time it is an Afghan plane taking us not to Moscow, but to New Delhi. India, as a non-aligned Asian country, has problems, but works them out in its own way, according to democratic principles. So it is not impossible. □

reconciliation, and has already invited all Afghans, including his enemies the Mujahideen, to join a coalition government. While he has already received some response from the unarmed opposition, the adversary that counts – the leaders of which are currently ensconced in Peshawar, Pakistan – continues to say no. The guerillas will keep on fighting until victory is achieved.

"They are driven by hate," says Najibullah, "whereas we are willing to share power." Would he resign if he thought it were helpful to national reconciliation? If the *Loya Jirgah*, the national assembly, asked him to step down, he would. But I wonder what this means in a country that appears to be ruled by a powerful secret police resembling the KGB, of which Najibullah was himself both founder and chief.

The Najibullah regime is still able to keep the "useful" thirty percent of Afghanistan under its control because the Mujahideen

Madeleine Poulin is co-host of Radio-Canada's public affairs television programme Le Point.

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
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
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- Rapport annuel 1986-1987.
- Rapport annuel 1987-1988. □

L'Institut invite les personnes intéressées à lui faire parvenir des demandes dans le cadre de son programme de bourses, qui en est à sa troisième année d'existence. Peuvent présenter une demande des universitaires et d'autres chercheurs souhaitant amorcer ou poursuivre des travaux dans le domaine de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Le Programme vise plus particulièrement à encourager la recherche et l'approfondissement des connaissances à établir des rapports avec la collectivité internationale en soutenant des Canadiens et Canadiennes qui veulent poursuivre des études dans des institutions étrangères, ou, exceptionnellement, au Canada. Les candidat(e)s doivent posséder la citoyenneté canadienne et au moins un diplôme universitaire de premier cycle, ou montrer qu'ils ont une expérience équivalente. L'Institut dispose de 173 000 \$ pour le Programme et il compte attribuer dix bourses; trois vaudront 25 000 \$ chacune, et sept, 14 000 \$. Un comité de sélection indépendant examinera les demandes, et les noms des lauréats seront annoncés en mai 1989. L'Association des universités et collèges du Canada administratifs et collèges du Canada administratifs. Pour l'année universitaire 1989-1990, la date limite de réception des demandes a été fixée au 1er février 1989.

Pour obtenir plus de détails et des formulaires de demande, prière d'écrire à :

Association des universités et collèges du Canada
Services d'administration des bourses d'étude
151, rue Slater
Ottawa (Ontario) K1P 5V1

Attribution des subventions et écheancier

L'Institut attribue des bourses deux fois par année. Prière de communiquer avec l'ICPSI pour obtenir des formulaires de demande et un exemplaire du texte (non-gant les critères mis à jour. Prière également de prendre note des dates limites suivantes :

30 juin, pour les décisions prises en octobre

31 décembre, pour les décisions prises en mars

RÉPERTOIRE DES PUBLICATIONS DE L'INSTITUT

Pour obtenir l'une ou l'autre de ces publications, veuillez utiliser la carte-réponse que vous trouverez au centre du présent numéro de Paix et Sécurité.

Le Guide

Le Guide est publié une fois par année, et il a pour objectif de fournir aux lecteurs canadiens de l'information générale et aisément accessible sur les politiques canadiennes en matière de paix et de sécurité. Il vise à cerner les principales questions d'actualité auxquelles le Canada a réagi dans le courant de l'année, à les situer dans leur contexte et le cas échéant, à donner un certain nombre de commentaires formulés sur ces sujets dans le cadre du débat parlementaire.

Introduction aux politiques canadiennes relatives à la limitation des armements, au désarmement, à la défense et à la solution des conflits, 1983-1986, 300 pages.

Introduction aux politiques canadiennes relatives à la limitation des armements, au désarmement, à la défense et à la solution des conflits, 1985-1987, 271 pages.

Introduction aux politiques canadiennes relatives à la limitation des armements, au désarmement, à la défense et à la solution des conflits, 1987-1988.

PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

Paix et Sécurité est une revue trimestrielle publiée depuis le printemps 1986; elle vise à informer la population canadienne et d'autres lecteurs sur les activités de l'Institut et à favoriser l'expression de toutes les opinions ayant cours au pays sur les questions intéressant la paix et la sécurité.

REVUE ANNUELLE

Paix et sécurité : évolution de la conjonction en 1987 et réactions du Canada, par Geoffrey Pearson, janvier 1988, 30 pages.

LES CAHIERS DE L'INSTITUT

L'ICPSI compte publier entre six et huit Cahiers chaque année. Ces monographies, qui se veulent à la fois des documents d'érudition et

des études sur des sujets d'actualité, aborderont des thèmes relevant des domaines définis dans le mandat de l'Institut : la limitation des armements, le désarmement, la défense et la solution des conflits.

1. La rivalité entre les superpuissances et la politique soviétique dans le Bassin des Caraïbes, par S. Neil MacFarlane, juin 1986, 74 pages.
2. La défense continentale : analyse des tendances et perspective canadienne, par David Cox, décembre 1986, 64 pages.
3. La limitation des armements dans l'Arctique : contraintes et perspectives, par Ronald G. Purven, février 1988, 93 pages.
4. De Léline à Gorbatchev : l'évolution des perspectives soviétiques sur les relations Est-Ouest, par Paul Marantz, mai 1988, 100 pages.
5. Le débat sur les essais d'armes nucléaires, par Jozef Goldblat et David Cox, août 1988.

RAPPORTS DE CONFÉRENCE

L'une des manières dont l'ICPSI s'efforce de favoriser la discussion publique sur les questions de la paix et de la sécurité consiste à commander et, à l'occasion, à organiser des conférences portant précisément sur ces sujets. De temps


en temps, l'Institut publie un compte rendu des délibérations d'une conférence donnée, en vue d'informer le grand public sur les sujets qui y ont été évoqués.

1. Négociations pour la paix en Amérique centrale, Compte rendu de la Table ronde sur les négociations pour la paix en Amérique centrale, Ottawa, les 27 et 28 septembre 1985, par Lisa North, 69 pages.
2. La dissuasion remise en question : Doctrines, technologies et questions d'intérêt public, Compte rendu de la Table ronde sur la dissuasion remise en question, Ottawa, les 17, 18 et 19 octobre 1985, par Dianne DeMille, 73 pages.
3. Les risques de guerre nucléaire accidentelle, Compte rendu de la Conférence sur les risques de guerre nucléaire accidentelle, Vancouver, du 26 au 30 mai 1986, par Andrea Demchuk, 44 pages.
4. Paix, développement et sécurité dans le Bassin des Caraïbes : perspectives d'évolution d'ici l'an 2000, délibérations d'une conférence, 1987, par Lloyd Scarwar, 41 pages.
5. Vers l'instauration de la paix en Amérique centrale, 8 et 9 mai 1987, par Lisa North, décembre 1987, 83 pages.
6. Le commerce international des armes : problèmes et perspectives, par Keith Krause, mars 1988, 53 pages.


Exposés

Ces publications s'adressent aux lecteurs qui s'intéressent aux questions de la paix et de la sécurité, mais qui n'ont ni le temps, ni les connaissances nécessaires pour lire la fois d'aborder des aspects fondamentaux de la paix, des conflits et des relations internationales et d'analyser, au fil de l'actualité, les principaux événements et tendances nouvelles se rapportant au mandat de l'ICPSI.

1. L'Initiative de défense stratégique : Qu'en pense le Canada? par Gregory Winick, octobre 1985.
2. Un gel nucléaire? par David Cox, janvier 1986. (Épuisé)
3. L'hiver nucléaire par Leonard Bertin, mars 1986. (Épuisé)
4. La non-prolifération des armes nucléaires par William Epstein, mai 1986.
5. Négociations sur la limitation des armes classiques en Europe par John Toogood, juin 1986. (Épuisé)
6. Les origines de l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales par Gilles Groudin, août 1986. (Épuisé)
7. La surveillance par satellite et les capacités du Canada dans ce domaine par Ron Buckingham, décembre 1986.



NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



Quatre membres du conseil d'ad-

ministration de l'Institut, nommé-

ment Christoph Bertram, John

Sigler, Paul Warnke et Lois Wil-

son, ont terminé leur mandat en

avril 1988. M. Joe Clark, secrétaire

d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures, a an-

noncé les noms de leurs rempla-

çants. Ce sont Edward Green,

Directeur de l'Institute of Social and

Economic Research, à l'University

of the West Indies, à Kingston en

Jamaïque; Orest Cochranoff,

ingénieur-conseil et ancien doyen

de la faculté de génie de la Techni-

cal University of Nova Scotia, à Ha-

ifax (Nouvelle-Ecosse), et Mary

Simon, présidente de la Conférence

circumpolaire inuit, à Kuujuaq

(Québec).

«Le Canada, les sanctions et

l'Union soviétique : les leçons de

l'expérience», tel était le thème

d'une série d'ateliers organisés par

le Centre for Russian and East Eu-

ropean Studies, à l'Université de

Toronto, à la mi-juillet. Geoffrey

Pearson et Roger Hill y ont as-

sisté. M. Pearson a également pris

la parole devant un groupe de jeu-

nes Canadiennes et Sovétiques qui

participaient à un échange parrainé

par les Quakers.

Fauzya Moore, membre de la

section de l'administration des sub-

ventions à l'ICPSI, a présidé une

séance sur les mécanismes de sécu-

rité de Cuba et de la Jamaïque, dans

le cadre d'une conférence sur la

paix et le développement dans les

Antilles. Celle-ci a eu lieu à l'Uni-

versity of the West Indies, sous le

parrainage conjoint de l'Internat-

ional Peace Research Association,

du Comité jamaïcain pour la paix,

et de l'Institute for Social and Eco-

nomie Research.

Brad Feseay (Programmes

publics) et Geoff Irvine, expert-

conseil embauché par l'Institut, ont

assisté à Edmonton cet été à un at-

lier organisé par l'International In-

stitute for Peace Education. MM.

Feseay et Irvine sont les deux au-

teurs de l'ouvrage intitulé Teach-

ers' Handbook on Peace and

Security. Geoffrey Pearson a abor-

dé le thème de l'éducation à la paix

et la sécurité, lors d'une assem-

blée que l'Association canadienne

des conseils scolaires a tenue à Ot-

tawa.

Pendant l'été et au début de

l'automne, plusieurs changements

ont été apportés à l'effectif de l'In-

stitut. Richard Brûlé, agent prin-

cipal des subventions, a pris un

congé d'études d'un an pour aller

se perfectionner au Collège de la

Défense nationale. Francine

Leccours, assistante de recherche, a

quitté l'Institut après y avoir tra-

vallé pendant deux ans; elle a été

remplacée par Annie Leblanc qui a

récemment étudié à l'Université

Carleton. Harald von Rikchhoff,

qui a été membre associé de l'Insti-

tut au cours des deux dernières an-

nées, est retourné à l'Université

Attribution de bourses d'études

Carleton; Robert Mitchell, lui

aussi membre associé de l'ICPSI

depuis deux ans, a réintégré le mi-

nistère de la Défense nationale.

Bruno Munier, jusqu'à récemment

membre de l'Institut universitaire

de hautes études internationales à

Génève, et Douglas Hamlin, du

ministère des Affaires extérieures,

ont tous deux commencé une affec-

tation d'un an en tant que membres

associés. Norma Saleem est dev-

enue chargée de recherche en

septembre. Elle détient un doctorat

en études islamiques, décroché par

l'Université McGill, et elle nous ar-

rive de l'Institut québécois de

recherche sur la culture, à Mon-

tréal. Au nombre des nouveaux

des programmes publics, Marie-

Andrée Lalonde-Morisset, agent

des subventions, Marilyn Miller,

préposée à la bibliothèque, et

Suzanne Payant, réceptionniste.

À la réunion des Sociétés sa-

vantes, qui s'est tenue à Windsor,

Les récipiendaires appartenant à diverses disciplines et effectueront des

études dans des secteurs variés.

David Angell est nommé de Toronto (Ontario). Elle étudie actuellement à l'Institut d'études pédagogiques

de l'Ontario, où elle espère obtenir un doctorat. Ses recherches porteront sur le rôle de la voix des

fermes et sur le déploiement des armes nucléaires. Bourse de 14 000 \$.

Terrance Carson est né à Edmonton (Alberta). Il a l'intention d'effectuer des recherches sur l'éducation

concernant la paix, au Centre for Peace Studies, à Londres (Angleterre). Bourse de 14 000 \$.

Cynthia Chaitow est née à Mississauga (Ontario). Elle envisage de poursuivre des études en socio-psy-

chologie et sur la gestion des conflits à l'Université de Harvard. Bourse de 5 000 \$.

Laurent Frappé est nommé de Québec (Québec). Il va poursuivre ses études doctorales en relations interna-

tionales à l'Université Laval. Ses recherches concernent les conflits et les relations internationales en

Amérique latine. Bourse de 9 000 \$.

Manon Hogue est née à Montréal (Québec). Elle a l'intention de s'intéresser à la militarisation et au

développement, à l'Université de Montréal. Bourse de 14 000 \$.

Howard Peter Langille est né à Annapolis Royal (Nouvelle-Ecosse). Il poursuit des études à la Bradford

University, en Angleterre, en vue d'obtenir un doctorat en philosophie; il s'intéressera surtout aux études

sur la paix et il examinera les facteurs qui influent sur la formulation de la politique canadienne contempo-

Leigh Sarty est nommé de Toronto (Ontario). Il termine un doctorat en sciences politiques (Relations interna-

tionales) à l'Université Colombie à New York; il se spécialise dans les domaines de la politique interna-

tionale, de la sécurité internationale et de la politique étrangère soviétique. Bourse de 14 000 \$.

Ron Purver, Ken Hampson, Har-

ald von Rikchhoff et Carl Jacob-

sen ont présenté un atelier sur

l'avenir de la limitation des arme-

ments. MM. Jacobsen et Purver ont

assisté en Norvège à un atelier par-

tenue par l'Institut de recherches

sur la paix (Oslo), atelier qui a

porté sur la sécurité dans l'Arc-

enise rendu à Moscou, dans le

cadre d'un programme d'échange

mis sur pied par l'ICPSI et l'Insti-

tut des études canado-américaines à

Moscou; il a alors effectué des

recherches pour son travail sur la

puissance stratégique des Etats-

Unis et de l'URSS.

Fen Hampson et Ken Bush ont

préparé deux exposés pour une

conférence qui a eu lieu à Toronto

et qui s'intitulait L'atmosphère en

évolution : implications pour la

sécurité du globe. Ils ont princi-

palement traité de la perspective

canadienne sur la question de

l'évolution climatique et ils se sont

interrogés sur les effets que cette

dernière pourrait avoir sur les con-

ditions socio-politiques. M. Hampson

loque qui s'est tenu cet été sur la

paix internationale et les relations inter-

nationales; il a alors parlé du ren-

forcement de l'ONU dans les

domaines du désarmement et de la

sécurité collective.

Fen Hampson et John Too-

good ont participé à la conférence

annuelle de l'Institut international

(Angleterre); le thème était Stra-


tegic Landscape: Lessons from the

Past, Prospects and the Future.

□

19

PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ



Les conclusions de Shannon Selin sont stupides

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En cherchant sur un ton plûlot

En sa qualité de chercheuse et de non féministes ?

qu'à leurs fins propres, contre les hommes et contre leurs consœurs

des femmes ne revendiquent

tant de dire que des individus de

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En sa qualité de chercheuse et de

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sont stupides

Les conclusions de Shannon Selin

A stylized illustration in a sketchy, hand-drawn style. A hand is shown holding a document with some text on it. In the background, there is a typewriter on a surface. The overall tone is somewhat somber or serious, matching the text's critique.

provocateur à répondre à la question : « Les femmes pourraient-elles vraiment mieux y faire à la tête du monde ? » (*Paix et Sécurité*, printemps 1988), Shannon Seifin formule certaines hypothèses farfelues et en arrive à des conclusions pas

Mme Selin nomme divers groupes de femmes actifs au Canada et ailleurs pour attester que le mouvement féministe agit dans le domaine de la paix et de la sécurité. Malheureusement, elle s'intéresse ensuite à des exigences non fondées formulées par les féministes en

général et elle recourt à l'expression «*mères pharaïennes*» pour caractériser ces dernières. Il est dommage qu'on ait ainsi banalisé un mouvement féministe possédant une longue tradition de pacifisme qui remonte à l'époque de femmes remarquables telles que Vera Brittain, plus tôt dans notre siècle, et Bertha von Suttner, au siècle

Mme Selin a raison de penser que, pour les féministes, la question dépasse largement le cadre de la simple égalité au chapitre de la représentation numérique. En effet, le débat repose plutôt sur l'argument que «les femmes ont quelque chose d'unique à offrir au processus d'élaboration des politiques». Cependant, Mme Selin conclut que cette affirmation est en grande partie erronée, sinon dangereuse, car elle crée, comme le dit Mme Selin, «une dichotomie entre les femmes et la paix, d'une part,

« Pour ce qui est de la guerre, d'autre part, elle n'accorde pas beaucoup d'opportunité aux hommes et aux femmes pour faire face en matière de sécurité, elle suscite de faux espoirs au sujet de ce que les femmes peuvent accomplir, et elle provoque un affrontement avec les hommes (et avec d'autres femmes) ».

Ces conclusions traduisent une
gramme d'action féministe pour la
paix. Où sont les preuves permet-
tant de dire que des individus de
ce vaste mouvement qui est la Voix
des femmes ne revendiquent
qu'à leurs fins propres, contre les
hommes et contre leurs consœurs
non féministes ?
En sa qualité de chercheuse et de

spécialiste de la limitation des ar-
mements, domaine défini en termes
plus traditionnels, Mme Selin est
tout à fait autorisée à accepter le
paradigme patrimonial de la sécurité,
mais il est on ne peut plus ironique
de l'entendre dire ce qui suit :

À cause (des mères pharisiennes), en fait, les femmes auront plus de chances, à mesure qu'elles entreront dans le domaine, d'être affectées à l'étude de thèmes «légers» comme l'éducation sur la paix ou les conséquences sociales de l'aérosolissement des budgets militaires...

Mme Selin ne nous apprend rien quand elle dénonce l'existence d'une chaine-garde-misceline dans le domaine de la limitation des armements. Sa démarche serait plus valable si elle adoptait le programme d'action féministe qui consiste à contester les structures sociales existantes, lesquelles favorisent la domination masculine à

lieu de travail.
tous les niveaux, y compris le mi-
Nous sympathisons beaucoup
avec Shannon Selim, prise au piège
dans l'*«islaabism»* masculin, mais
nous pensons qu'en fin de compte,
il incarne à l'Institut canadien
pour la paix et la sécurité interna-
tionale d'approfondir la question,
au lieu de se contenter de publier
un article dépeignant stupéfiement
les féministes comme étant des

«meres pharisiennes».
Hania M. Fedorowicz, Janis Alton
et Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg,
Ottawa

La lettre de Mme Murray dénature les faits

De prime abord, la Lettre de

Jerusalem rédigée par Vera Murray (Paix et Sécurité, été 1988) semble être un rapport objectif émanant d'une personne habitant dans cette ville. Mais le profane qui ne se mettie de rien risque d'être induit en

Mme Murray dit que la Vieille Ville était aux mains des Palestiniens avant la Guerre des Six Jours en 1967. Elle était plutôt sous la domination des Jordaniens qui l'avaient envahie et prise en 1948. (Il est vrai qu'un très grand nombre de Jordaniens sont Palestiniens, car la Jordanie fut créée à même l'an-

cienne Palestinienne sous mandat britannique. Il n'est cependant pas d'usage de les décrire comme étant des « Palestiniens ».)

Parlant de la Vieille Ville de Jérusalem, Mme Murray fait deux déclarations stupéfiantes : la plupart

des Israéliens ne s'y sont pas rendus depuis des années, et seuls les juifs orthodoxes visitent le Mur des lamentations. Non seulement il y a à cet endroit un quartier juif reconstruit et très peuplé (quartier qui avait été détruit pendant l'occupation jordanienne), mais encore la Vieille Ville est, depuis vingt et un

ans, un secteur très animé où de nombreux juifs habitent constamment leurs achats et où les Israéliens de tous les coins du pays se rendent en visite. Quant au Mur des larmes, c'est là que se trouvent la plupart des synagogues, c'est là qu'on peut constater le rôle important joué par les Juifs orthodoxes et y

rendent. Des Juifs du monde entier, et même d'Israël, qu'ils soient orthodoxes, conservateurs, réformistes ou séculaires, y sont constamment présents. Mme Murray affirme que de nombreux Israéliens n'ont jamais mis les pieds dans les territoires occupés. Or, des milliers d'entre eux circulent régulièrement dans tous les territoires occupés. L'auteur déclare à tort que la

le premier ministre Shamir représente, refuse de négocier avec les Palestiniens. M. Shamir a refusé de négocier avec l'O.L.P. Nuance importante: L'«autre-moitie», celle dont le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Peres, est le porte-parole, refuse elle aussi de négocier avec

l'OLP. Les deux « moitiés » sont disposées à négocier avec les Palestiniens, ou avec tout autre groupe arabe (sauf l'OLP) qui serait prêt à dialoguer avec elles. Hélas, tous ont

Donald Carr, Toronto

Dans son article intitulé «Don-
nez à l'ONU un territoire à gou-
verner» (*Paix et Sécurité*, éti-
1988), M. Sanger propose de placer
l'Archipel arctique sous la gou-

autres territoires sous tutelle de l'ONU sont la Namibie, endroit où, il l'admet, la formule n'a pas donné les résultats escomptés, et le Territoire des îles du Pacifique. Dans ce dernier cas, les Américains se sont chargés de s'occuper des peuples

de cet archipel pour le compte de l'UNO. Mais ils en ont profité pour vérifier les effets des radiations en se servant de ces gens comme cobayes et pour les tenir dans la pauvreté.


Et je suis certain que les Américains ne manqueraient pas la chance qu'il leur serait offerte d'ad- ministrer l'Archipel au nom de

l'ONU. Imaginez tous les problèmes qu'ils régleraient ainsi d'un seul coup; en particulier, ils n'auraient plus à se soucier de négocier l'établissement d'un itinéraire aérien pour l'acheminement du pétrole entre l'Europe et le Japon. Le Canada a déjà fait savoir qu'il avait délimité le territoire souverain de l'Archipel arctique. Notre pays définit une voie maritime dans le Passage du Nord-Ouest et les

autres États auraient le droit de l'emprunter à condition d'y passer rapidement et de ne pas la polluer. Les sous-marins de ces pays pourraient naviguer en immersion pourvu que le Canada soit informé de leur présence et qu'ils ne s'écartent pas de la voie tracée. Quoi qu'il en soit, je ne pense

pas que l'on accroîtrait la sécurité du monde en faisant don de l'Arc-tique à l'ONU, comme M. Sanger le propose.

LIVRES



Gorbatchev, l'URSS va-t-elle changer ?

Le Centurion, Paris, 1987. 270 pages, 47 \$

Michael Tatu

rection du Parti. À l'aide de son équipe de chercheurs, Tatu a pu retracer les activités du dirigeant soviétique au sein des *komsomols*, à l'université de Moscou, et le début de son ascension dans la hiérarchie à Stavropol. Cadre du Parti, efficace et apprécié, Gorbatchev a réussi à se concilier les bonnes grâces de Mikhaïl Sousslov, responsable de l'idéologie sous Brejnev, de Iouri Andropov, originaire de la même région que lui, et d'autres *apparatchiks* régionaux importants. La seconde moitié de l'ouvrage est consacrée à l'analyse de Gorbatchev en tant que secrétaire général. On découvre un homme pragmatique, parfois calculateur, qui n'hésite pas à se défaire de rivaux potentiels. Il aime s'enlourdir de collaborateurs qu'il a connus à l'université ou dans ses fonctions antérieures. Étant familier avec presque tous les rouages de l'appareil du Parti, il a tenté, peu de temps après son arrivée au pouvoir, de remplacer les cadres brejnéviens par ses propres collaborateurs afin d'être capable de mettre en branle ses réformes. À l'aide de statistiques, l'auteur démontre qu'« il subsistait beaucoup de cadres appartenant à la vieille garde du Parti, surtout dans les régions ». Pour Tatu, l'Occident doit voir d'un oeil positif les efforts entrepris par le dirigeant soviétique pour transformer le système. Pour ce qui est de l'aider et de tenter d'influencer l'évolution interne de l'URSS, l'auteur remarque que le « système soviétique a été bâti pour ne dépendre de rien, ni de sa propre population ni des pressions ou stimulations extérieures ».

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subject sur lequel l'auteur se penche. Car, si l'est question des Américains, les réflexions de l'auteur concernent d'abord et avant tout la politique extérieure des États-Unis qui se sont imposées en tant que superpuissance après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cependant, le regard qu'il jette sur la politique étrangère américaine reste bien plus celui d'un observateur éclairé, tenté par une approche inspirée, que celui d'un spécialiste acharné à poursuivre toutes les variations de son sujet à l'aide d'un modèle défini. Son approche se distingue par l'énoncé de quelques hypothèses laissées un peu à elles-mêmes tout au long du texte. L'une de ces hypothèses — si ce n'est la principale — qui sous-tend l'ensemble du livre met en évidence le rapport étroit qui existe entre l'esprit religieux dont témoignent la société américaine et la conduite de la politique étrangère, depuis les origines de ce pays jusqu'à nos jours. Dès le début, la démocratie américaine fut marquée par un imaginaire social où la religion, la morale et la politique sont apparues indissociables. C'est là, sans conteste, une différence substantielle entre la pensée et les courants libéraux européens, pour la plupart laïcs et antichrétiens, et leurs homologues nord-américains chez qui les idées démocratiques eurent — et conservent — un fondement religieux le plus souvent explicite. D'où cette question que pose Michel Robert dans le premier chapitre de son livre: « Pourquoi la politique étrangère ne serait-elle pas abordée, par conséquent, en termes religieux? ».

De la doctrine de Monroe à la guerre contre l'Espagne à la fin du siècle dernier, du *Manifest Destiny* au projet de Wilson dans la foulée de la Première Guerre mondiale, lequel avait la conviction qu'il était possible de bâtir un monde de liberté, de paix et de justice, tout laisse croire à un lien consubstantiel entre la mission que l'Amérique croit devoir accomplir et les réussites de ses entreprises. Une seule ombre au tableau, et elle est de taille puisqu'elle laisse deviner un essoufflement certain de cette puissance impériale: l'échec victo-

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Université Libre de Bruxelles.

— Pierre Yves Soucy,

verser dans la critique dévastatrice.

Michel Jobert reste stimulant. Sa

À plus d'un titre, le livre de

et la démocratie. Cet aspect est trop

tradition qui existe entre l'empire

américain et qui traduisent la con-

que connaît la politique étrangère

raît lieu d'analyser les incohérences

pective adoptée par Jobert, il y au-

Sans nier la fertilité de la pers-

mondiale.

la suite de la Seconde Guerre

soutien décisif à leur relève à

coloniaux, tout en apportant un

sivement contre les ex-empires

tutaire qui s'est affirmée succès-

l'Europe face à une puissance

général. Il y a là certes le regard de

Etats-Unis un cynisme quasi con-

à la politique internationale des

raisons qui incitent l'auteur à précé-

Sans doute existe-t-il plusieurs

qu'un « mouvement de cœur ».

étrangère « cohérente et froide »

dénotent bien plus une politique

morales puisque, selon Jobert, elles

moment invoker des prétentions

au XXe siècle ne peuvent en aucun

l'Europe face à une puissance


général. Il y a là certes le regard de

Etats-Unis un cynisme quasi con-

Voit l'analyse sommaire d'ouvrages publiés en anglais dans la rubrique

Reviews de Peace&Security.

CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



Forces canadiennes en Europe

Témoignant devant le Comité permanent de la Défense nationale, à la Chambre des communes, des porte-parole de la Défense ont

révélé d'autres détails sur le plan énoncé dans le Livre blanc et con-

firmant l'augmentation des effectifs des forces terrestres du Canada

présentes en Europe. Le gouverne-

ment s'est engagé à porter ces ef-

fectifs au niveau de ceux d'une

division d'ici la fin de la période

visée par le Livre blanc (d'ici l'an

2002), de sorte que les Forces cana-

diennes en Europe (FCBE) pourront

alors déployer 16 500 militaires. La

division comprendra deux brigades

mécanisées lourdes d'infanterie, qui

compteront 4 500 membres cha-

cune. L'une d'elles sera celle qui

est déjà en poste en Europe (4

GBMC), tandis que la seconde sera

celle qui était jusqu'ici chargée

d'assurer la défense du nord de la

Norvège (5e Brigade). Cette der-

nière formation sera rééquipée avec

des chars et de l'artillerie pour de-

venir une brigade mécanisée; elle

continuera d'être basée au Canada,

mais elle ne gardera avec elle, au

lieu, que le matériel nécessaire à

l'entraînement, car la majeure par-

tie de son gros équipement aura

déjà été transportée et mise en place

en Europe.

La division comprendra aussi di-

vers éléments de soutien, dont une

brigade d'artillerie munie du nou-

veau système de défense aérienne à

bas altitude, des unités techniques

de soutien au combat, etc. Certains

de ces éléments seront basés en Eu-

rope, et d'autres au Canada. Des

16 500 membres de la division,

9 500 apparteniront à la Force

régulière, et les autres à la Réserve.

La première grande étape de ce

programme sera de commencer bien-

regarder la définition du projet d'acquisition

des nouveaux chars destinés aux

brigades mécanisées. On pense que

la division aura besoin d'au plus

300 nouveaux chars, dont le MDN

estime actuellement le coût à 2,4

milliards de dollars. Des porte-pa-

role du ministère de la Défense na-

Acquisition d'armes

Le ministère de la Défense na-

tionale a émis deux communiqués

en juillet au sujet de l'achat de

diennes. Ces dernières recevront

tout d'abord 820 véhicules chenil-

liés tous terrains, qui leur seront

livrés entre 1992 et 1997. Les véhi-

cules seront construits au Canada,

dans le cadre d'une coentreprise

réunissant la *Hagglunds Vehicle AB*

de Suède et la *Canadian Foremost*

Ltd. de Calgary. Si l'on prend en

compte l'inflation au cours de la du-

rée du contrat ainsi que le coût des

munitions, les services de logistique, la valeur

estimative du contrat atteint 420 mil-

liards de dollars, d'après le MDN.

En deuxième lieu, le ministère de

la Défense, M. Pétin Beatty, a an-

noncé que le gouvernement compte

construire douze navires de pa-

trouille côtiers qui seront équipés

pour le dragage de mines. Les

navires patrouilleront le long des

côtes Est et Ouest, et leurs équi-

pages se composeront de réser-

vistas. Les dragueurs-patrouilleurs

seront livrés entre 1992 et 1998.

D'après le *Globe and Mail* (26 juil-

let 1988), il s'agit d'un contrat

de 550 millions de dollars en dol-

lars de 1988-1989. Cependant, le

total du programme comme étant

750 millions (y compris l'inflation)

si on le calcule sur une base an-

nuelle. C'est là quelque chose de

nouveau, car pour la plupart des

grands programmes tels que celui

concernant l'achat des sous-marins,

les chiffres sont donnés en dollars

constants de l'année où la décision

de faire l'achat est prise.

Mise en veilleuse de l'IDS

En mai, le *Defense Science*

Board, une commission consulta-

tive supérieure du Pentagone, a

présenté à M. Carlucci, Secrétaire à

la Défense, un rapport qui recomman-

deit de ralentir la mise en oeuvre

des plans concernant le déploiement

des défenses anti-missiles balistiques.

On avait demandé à la commission

de s'interroger sur la réalisation fu-

ture du programme en prenant en

compte les restrictions budgétaires

imposées par le Congrès. Tout en

discutant des systèmes spatiaux qu'au

delà de l'information sur le

super-bombardier avancé B-2, dont

les caractéristiques le rendront quasi

invisible aux radars soviétiques

actuellement en service.

Le bombardier B-2 sera un avion

subsonique qui aura une vitesse

maximale de 750 milles à l'heure et

un rayon d'action de 7 500 milles.

Sa mission consistera à pénétrer

profondément en territoire sovié-

tique pour y repérer les bases

mobiles de missiles, les centres de

commandement et d'autres objectifs

«insaisissables». Advenant une

guerre nucléaire, le *Strategic Air*

Command (SAC) déclencherait

contre l'URSS une attaque dirigée

avec ses bombardiers : les plus

soviétiques et largueraient des mis-

siles de croisière programmes pour

trapper les aérodomes et les radars

ennemis; les bombardiers furtifs

avanceraient loin dans l'espace

missiles d'attaque à courte portée

(les *SRAM-2*) et des bombes ordi-

naires contre les bases de l'ICBM et

les centres de commandement qui

fonctionneraient encore; enfin, les

B-1B s'amèneraient en troisième

phase de commandement

des centres de commandement

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La prolifération des technologies

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que le Canada n'adhère pas à sa représentation diplomatique au niveau actuel. ☐ - GREGORY WIRICK

ment à l'objet, à l'utilité et à l'attribut. On maintient un riche et sérieux propos des sessions extraordinaires sur le désarmement. En retrospectif, l'UNSSOD I a traduit d'une façon remarquable les préoccupations de la collectivité internationale au sujet du désarmement. Après avoir ainsi posé des jalons en 1978, cette même collectivité n'a pas réussi, dans ses deux tentatives ultérieures, à améliorer sa déclaration ni à convenir des changements à apporter. Peut-être vaudrait-il mieux qu'elle cesse d'essayer! Le moment est venu de chercher d'autres moyens par lesquels l'ONU pourrait assumer son rôle central et sa responsabilité première dans le domaine du désarmement; il serait peut-être moins ambitieux que la formule actuelle con-créée par les UNSSOD, mais ils produiraient sans doute de meilleurs résultats.

En essayant de s'attaquer d'un

TANDIS QUE LES GROUPES DE TRA-
vail achevaient leurs débats, la
rumour se répandit que le président
Ahmad, ayant bien pressenti ce qui
se passait, avait déjà commencé à
rédiger un document final. Quand il
le présenta au Comité plénier, il ne
restait plus que quatre jours avant
la fin de la Session. On peut en dé-
duire que M. Ahmad cherchait
à presser les délais de 2 en
venant à une entente. Le Comité ne
se réunit pas de nouveau avant le
dernier jour de la Session. Entre
temps, il y avait eu deux jours et
demi de consultations entre le
président et un «club» réduit d'une
vingtaine de personnes. Celles-ci
représentaient les divers groupes
régionaux à l'ONU et étaient les
derniers. Les consultations avaient
pour objet de façonner un consen-
sus qui pourrait ensuite être sanc-
tionné dans une réunion officielle

c'est mon avis personnel, nous en-
tendre sur les autres asymétriques qui
seraient acceptables aux yeux des
deux camps.

P et S : Dans la proposition qui a
été formulée à Moumansk l'au-

tomne dernier et qui préconisait la
constitution d'une zone de paix
dans l'Arctique, pourquoi a-t-on in-

clus des éléments qui contenaient
un caractère loufoque à une idée
par ailleurs sérieuse ? Pourquoi, par

exemple, avoir exclu la mer de
Barents et avoir inclus la Manche ?

TROFIMENKO : Aucun pays ne fait
des propositions de désarmement
dont la mise en oeuvre risquerait,

de prime abord, de lui nuire ...

amorcions le dialogue. Voyons ce
si l'il est vraiment possible de faire.

Si votre camp propose des élé-
ments de discussion vraiment in-
téressants, nous céderons peut-être

sur d'autres plans. En un premier
temps, M. Gorbachev a décidé la

conjoncture telle qu'il la voyait. Et
l'Arctique n'est pas sous-marins nu-

est une base de sous-marins nu-
clicaires très importante pour
l'Union soviétique et que c'est le

seul port véritablement ouvert
après lequel nos navires peuvent
atteindre l'Atlantique.

... L'idée de faire de l'Arctique
une zone de paix est très valable,
mais nous sommes en train

d'amorcer une course aux arme-
ments classiques dans cette partie
du monde. Votre pays songe à y

faire quelque chose, et nous de-
vrons donc en tenir compte, non
pas réaliser que nous souhaitons vrai-

ment réaliser un nouvel accroisse-
ment des forces navales, mais à
causer de la nouvelle stratégie mili-

exercer des pressions sur les flancs
dans l'Atlantique-Nord confinant à
l'Arctique et dans le Pacifique-

Nord.
... Tous ensemble, nous avons
fait de l'Antarctique un continent

de paix. Pourquoi-nous réaliser le
même exploit dans l'Arctique ?
Quand je jette un coup d'oeil sur la

carte, je vois votre Passage du
Nord et je vois le nôtre; j'aperçois
aussi un vaste itinéraire circulaire

de transport aux limites de l'océan
d'Archipel, un itinéraire qui longe les
Etats du littoral et qui s'étend peut-

être jusqu'au Pacifique-Nord et à
l'Atlantique-Nord. Peut-être aur-
ons-nous avantage à poursuivre une

telles options, et peut-être devriez-
vous y songer d'avantage au lieu de
construire de neuf à douze sous-

préférable de ne pas
tions qu'il aurait été
pective, nous consta-
Et, bien sûr, en retros-
divergences d'opinions.
tre l'invasion. Il y avait des
instances chez nous étaient con-
Même à ce moment-là, diverses
comme nous l'avons fait en 1979.

TROFIMENKO : Je ne suis pas
P et S : Cela vous effraie-t-il ?

effrayé; l'addition de douze sous-

marins du côté canadien ne chan-
géral pas grand-chose, surtout que
un accord START est conclu, nous

si nous éliminer de cinquante à so-
xante sous-marins de notre marine.
L'océan Arctique est important

pour les pays qu'il borde, mais il
influence aussi énormément sur le cli-
mat de la planète. En le polluant (et

une autre course aux armements
dans cette région aurait à coup sûr
des conséquences écologiques

negatives), nous causerions vrai-
ment des dommages non seulement
à nos terres septentrionales, mais

aussi à la santé du monde entier. Il
est donc très important que nous
amorçons un dialogue ... et c'était

la l'objet de l'initiative du cama-
rade Gorbachev à Moumansk.

P et S : Pendant les jours sombres
de la Guerre du Vietnam, un séna-
teur américain a déclaré : « Les

Etats-Unis devraient tout simple-
ment dire qu'ils ont gagné la guerre
et partir. » Est-ce un peu la formule

que M. Gorbachev a appliquée en
Afghanistan ?

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devenue un corridor pro-soviétique.
Il est donc évident que la politique
existence adoptée par ces pays

nous intéresse, mais jusqu'ici l'ex-
istence d'un accord START est conclu, nous

si nous éliminer de cinquante à so-
xante sous-marins de notre marine.
L'océan Arctique est important

pour les pays qu'il borde, mais il
influence aussi énormément sur le cli-
mat de la planète. En le polluant (et

une autre course aux armements
dans cette région aurait à coup sûr
des conséquences écologiques

negatives), nous causerions vrai-
ment des dommages non seulement
à nos terres septentrionales, mais

aussi à la santé du monde entier. Il
est donc très important que nous
amorçons un dialogue ... et c'était

la l'objet de l'initiative du cama-
rade Gorbachev à Moumansk.

P et S : Pendant les jours sombres
de la Guerre du Vietnam, un séna-
teur américain a déclaré : « Les

Etats-Unis devraient tout simple-
ment dire qu'ils ont gagné la guerre
et partir. » Est-ce un peu la formule

que M. Gorbachev a appliquée en
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UNE ENTREVUE AVEC HENRI TROFIMENKO

Un expert soviétique qui gagne sa vie en étudiant la politique étrangère des pays occidentaux a des opinions bien arrêtées sur une vaste gamme de sujets, depuis les sous-marins canadiens jusqu'à l'état de la krebmlnologie aux Etats-Unis.

Henri A. Trofimenko est chef du département de la politique étrangère à l'Institut des études canado-américaines, à l'Académie des sciences de l'URSS. Il se spécialise dans l'analyse des politiques occidentales sur la limitation des armements, en mettant particulièrement l'accent sur celle des Etats-Unis. Le professeur Trofimenko a accordé l'entrevue à *Paix et Sécurité* en mai 1988 tandis qu'il était en visite à Ottawa, à l'occasion d'une table ronde canado-soviétique organisée par l'Institut

canadien des affaires internationales et par l'Institut des études canado-américaines. L'entrevue, qui a couvert toute une série de sujets (des extraits en sont donnés ci-après), a été menée par Nancy Gordon, Directrice des programmes publics, et Michael Bryans, rédacteur en chef du magazine *Paix et Sécurité*.

P et S : Quels sont les écueils qui subsistent encore dans les pourparlers START (Réduction des armes-ments stratégiques) ?

TROFIMENKO : Les pourparlers MBFR sont terminés... Il n'y avait pas d'impasse; c'était uniquement un instrument qui a été utile aux deux camps.

P et S : Pourquoi l'Union soviétique s'en est-elle retirée ?

TROFIMENKO : Sans ces pourparlers, les Etats-Unis n'auraient pas envisagé de négocier avec l'URSS dans un contexte plus large, ils n'auraient pas accepté de participer à des réunions au sommet, ils n'auraient pas amorcé la négociation d'un protocole d'entente général... Les deux camps avaient intérêt à ce que ces pourparlers commencent; même si ces derniers ont continué de présenter effective-ment un certain intérêt, ils se sont transformés en une discussion totalement stérile au sujet de chiffres. Ils se poursuivraient maintenant depuis... environ quinze ans, si je ne me trompe ?

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montrent fort bien ce à quoi ressemblaient des négociations im-productives, pour ce qui est d'en arriver à régler des questions essen-tielles.

P et S : Mais le Kremlin est-il dis-posé à essayer d'infirmer l'opinion très répandue en Occident que l'Union soviétique possède plus d'armes classiques en Europe que l'OTAN ?

TROFIMENKO : L'Union soviétique est prête à admettre l'existence d'asymétries. Vous me demandez pourquoi ces négociations ont cela s'expliquent notamment par le fait suivant : l'OTAN prétendait que l'URSS avait un certain avan-tage en Europe, mais les seize pays qui la composent ne pouvaient s'entendre quant à savoir sur quel plan cet avantage existait. Aux fins des relations publiques ou, comme les Russes le diraient, de la propa-gande, l'Alliance estime utile de soutenir que l'URSS jouit d'un avantage de dix ou de cinq contre nous, mais en réalité, ce n'est pas le cas.

P et S : Si l'Occident nous disait que nous devons réduire nos forces six fois plus que nous sommes dis-posés à le faire, aucune négociation ne serait possible puisque une telle demande serait absurde... Par consé-quent, les pays de l'OTAN discu-tent entre eux pour définir une position plus réaliste à adopter face à l'Union soviétique et au Pacte de Varsovie. Il existe des asymétries, certes; nous reconnaissons que ce dernier possède plus de chars que l'OTAN. Cependant, même cette affirmation est à confirmer, car l'OTAN ne compte pas les chars américains entreposés. Et elle ne prend pas en considération la qua-lité des chars... Afin d'en arriver à un accord réaliste, nous devons non seulement éliminer les asymétries les plus frappantes, mais aussi, et

P et S : Peut-être pourrions-nous passer maintenant à la question des armes classiques. Quelle était la cause de l'impasse dans les pour-parlers sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces (MBFR) ?

TROFIMENKO : Les deux camps avaient intérêt à ce que ces pourparlers commencent; même si ces derniers ont continué de présenter effective-ment un certain intérêt, ils se sont transformés en une discussion totalement stérile au sujet de chiffres. Ils se poursuivraient maintenant depuis... environ quinze ans, si je ne me trompe ?

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UN CLIMAT DE GUERRE

Les conséquences économiques et politiques des changements climatiques peuvent devenir de nouveaux motifs de conflit entre les nations.

PAR FEN OSLER HAMPSON

LE 1^{ER} JOUR DE LA GUERRE NUCLÉAIRE, le rythme sans précédent des changements climatiques qui se produiront au cours du prochain siècle constituera la pire des menaces pour l'humanité. Telle était la principale conclusion formulée à l'issue d'une conférence internationale intitulée *L'atmosphère en évolution : implications pour la sécurité du globe*, qui s'est tenue à Toronto en juin dernier. Plus de

trois cents scientifiques et délégués qui représentaient quarante-huit pays, des organismes de l'ONU, d'autres instances internationales et des organisations gouvernementales ont assisté à la conférence qui était patronnée par le gouvernement du Canada, lequel bénéficiait en cela de l'appui du Programme des Nations-Unies pour l'environnement et de la météorologie. Avant la conférence de Toronto, la Commission Brundtland avait publié un rapport intitulé *Our Common Future*, et le Protocole sur la couche d'ozone avait été signé à Montréal par vingt-quatre pays en septembre 1987.

La conférence portait sur les façons dont les changements climatiques influeront sur l'avenir de l'humanité et elle visait à définir des objectifs fondamentaux à partir desquelles scientifiques, ob-jets de la recherche, pourraient servir de points de repère lorsque des décisions politiques urgentes s'imposeront. La conférence a réaffirmé l'option de plus en plus répandue chez les scientifiques et les écologistes relativement à l'influence que l'être humain exerce sur l'équilibre chimique de l'atmosphère et qui menace sa survie même : à cause de l'usage de combustibles fossiles, qui rejettent du gaz carbonique dans l'atmosphère, et de l'accumulation d'autres gaz, dont l'ozone, les oxydes azotés,

méthane, l'atmosphère terrestre se pollue rapidement. La concentration grandissante de ces gaz, qui créent un effet de serre en emprisonnant les radiations solaires et en soulevant les températures à la surface de la terre, causera probablement une hausse de la température superficielle moyenne de la planète d'environ 1,5 à 4,5 degrés centigrades d'ici le milieu du prochain siècle. On observe sans doute des variations régionales prononcées du degré de réchauffement. Aux latitudes plus élevées, le phénomène sera deux fois plus marqué qu'à la hauteur des tropiques. Par ailleurs, le réchauffement modifiera la quantité et la répartition des précipitations ainsi que les mouvements marins et la circulation des courants atmosphériques. L'usure de la couche d'ozone causée par les fluorocarbures chlorés dans la haute stratosphère donnera lieu à une intensification des rayons ultraviolets nuisibles, ce qui menacera directement de nombreuses espèces biologiques, dont les humains qui souffriront davantage du cancer de la peau et de dommages aux yeux. D'après les faits établis à la conférence, le réchauffement de la planète et l'usure de la couche d'ozone modifieront le niveau des précipitations et entraîneront une hausse du niveau de la mer; ce sont là les pires effets à prévoir, et ils menaceront la sécurité mondiale, l'économie internationale et l'environnement naturel. Le compte rendu final de la conférence conclut que ces changements, combinés aux effets de la croissance démographique rapide dans de nombreuses régions du globe; mettront en péril la santé et le bien-être de la race humaine;

aliments de la planète en faisant fluctuer encore davantage la production agricole et en accroissant

l'incertitude à cet égard, notamment dans de nombreuses régions vulnérables; aggraveront l'instabilité politique et les risques de conflits internationaux; d'en arriver à un développement économique soutenu et de réduire la pauvreté; risquent d'entraîner l'extinction d'espèces animales et végétales dont l'être humain dépend pour sa survie. IL EST CLAIR QU'UNE NOUVELLE

It faut aborder les questions propres à l'environnement et au développement dans une nouvelle perspective politique, en vertu de laquelle les programmes économiques et financiers, commerciaux et existentiels, ceux concernant l'énergie, l'agriculture, l'industrie et d'autres secteurs viseront à favoriser un développement viable non seulement du point de vue économique, mais aussi sur le plan écologique... Il faut redonner de la vigueur à la coopération internationale. Il importe d'accroître l'aide au développement et les prêts consentis au tiers-monde, et de résoudre la crise de la dette

être de façonner de nouveaux rapports économiques fondés sur des échanges commerciaux équitables, et d'amorcer une nouvelle ère de croissance axée sur l'amélioration des ressources, et non sur leur détérioration. Il faut amener les nations à repenser les négociations sur les questions d'intérêt mondial, les questions d'intérêt mondial, les questions d'intérêt mondial,

après des années où le véritable multilatéralisme a été laissé pour compte. Parmi les mesures immédiates que les participants à la conférence ont recommandé de prendre, citons les suivantes : Protocole de Montréal sur les substances détruisant la couche d'ozone ratifier immédiatement cet instrument, et que l'on prenne d'autres mesures pour limiter les halocarbures qui portent atteinte à la couche d'ozone; que l'on adopte des politiques énergétiques pour réduire considérablement les émissions de gaz carbonique et que les pays industrialisés riches se fixent comme premier objectif de réduire de 20 p. 100 d'ici 2005 les niveaux de pollution observés en 1988; que l'on entreprenne la rédaction d'une convention-cadre qui pourra servir de modèle pour l'élaboration de protocoles sur la protection de l'atmosphère; que l'on accroisse les budgets consacrés à la recherche sur les changements climatiques ainsi qu'à l'accumulation et au transfert des connaissances sur les sources d'énergie renouvelables, notamment pour aider les pays en développement; que l'on adopte des politiques pour réduire le déboisement et que l'on voie des crédits pour soutenir les pays en développement aux effets économiques néfastes des changements environnementaux.

Cependant, un message encore plus important s'est dégagé de la conférence, à savoir que les changements climatiques représentent une menace de taille pour la sécurité internationale. Les conséquences socio-économiques et politiques des changements environnementaux risqueront d'intensifier les conflits politiques et militaires non seule-

porter la décision à plus tard.

L'Alliance, tout cela rappelez sans doute le fameux dicton « plus ça change, plus c'est pareil ». Quel de crochages germano-américains ? Et qui sait ? Peut-être que les choses suivront leur train habituel pour une alliance dont la disparition, pour paraphraser Mark Twain, est prédite régulièrement (et prématurément) depuis quarante ans. C'est en tout cas ce qu'un parteur paraitel. Je ne peux pourtant pas étouffer en moi le sentiment que, si l'on se fie aux tendances qui s'amorcent, notamment sur la scène politique ouest-allemande, les historiens décriront cette période non pas comme étant le début de la fin de l'Alliance, mais plutôt comme l'amorce d'une nouvelle orientation. []

en finissant des gestes unilatéraux, par exemple en retirant certaines des 4 000 ogives nucléaires que l'O.T.A.N. possède encore en Europe. Jusqu'ici, cependant, une telle perspective n'a pas semblé plaire beaucoup aux Allemands. « Bon, tant qu'à pas presser les choses, et il ne donne à entendre qu'il conviendrait peut-être d'amorcer tout d'abord les négociations sur les systèmes à courte portée. Mais la vétille même des *Lance* inflirme la position de quiconque préconiserait de re-


La *Lance* poserait un problème spécial à M. Dukakis : après avoir tant parlé de la nécessité de réduire les arsenaux nucléaires, voudrait-il, les Allemands hésitants d'accepter ceux d'un nouveau système nucléaire ? Il est fort probable que MM. Bush et Dukakis verront un exemple à éviter dans l'histoire des FNI (histoire qui est axée sur la double décision de l'OTAN et où le déploiement des engins est à la merci des fluctuations inhérentes aux négociations sur la limitation des armements). Mieux vaudrait tout simplement aller de l'avant et modifier les systèmes, tout en essayant de calmer l'opinion publique.

il faudrait y substituer des systèmes dotés d'un seul un ou deux missiles (qui interdisent les missiles dont la portée dépasse 500 kilomètres) renforcés cet argument. En revanche, en vertu de ce même traité, toute modernisation des engins *Lance* provoquera des hauts cris à Moscou. RFA, accusera alors Washington de «contourner» les dispositions du

clame des négociations en ce sens. AVANT QUE LE NOUVEAU PRÉSIDENT n'entre dans le détail des négociations sur les FNI, il devra cependant répondre à une autre question dans le domaine nucléaire, à savoir s'il faut moderniser les missiles *Lance* à courte portée actuellement déployés en Europe, et comment. Ces engins qui ont une portée d'environ 100 kilomètres et dont la plupart se trouvent en territoire ouest-allemand vieillissent et doivent être remplacés. Au nom de la souplesse,

La position actuelle de la Maison-Blanche (avec l'option «double zéro» qui signale la fin des concessions américaines relatives à la limitation des armements nucléaires en Europe) suffit pour l'instant, mais elle ne tiendra pas longtemps. Même les considérables allemands ont du mal à résister à l'appel des Soviétiques desirant de réduire les armes nucléaires de l'État, surtout que l'opinion publique nationale ré-

développée en apparence, voilà qui était incompréhensible aux yeux de la plupart des observateurs européens et à ceux d'un bon nombre d'Américains. Le sommet avait été préparé et conduit avec une certaine naïveté, et l'idée proposée menaçait de mettre un terme à une période de quarante ans où l'ONVLO s'était flé-



Mike Constable


TOYAN s'y est prise à l'envers, du point de vue stratégique : elle a consacré les systèmes à courte portée, depuis longtemps de pouvoir justifier et qui explosaient en territoire allemand, et elle a enlevé ses armements les plus modernes, les plus surtables et les plus souples. Ces préoccupations d'ordre stratégique auraient été mises en sourdine, n'eût été du moins sur-Reykjavik. Il était à peine surprenant que Mikhaïl Gorbatchev envisagea de renoncer à toutes les armes nucléaires stratégiques (offensives), mais que Ronald Reagan fassse de même, et de façon plutôt

LE TRAITE AMERICANO-SOVIETIQUE

interdisant les FNI à longue et à courte portée engendrera d'autres écarts sur la route du nouveau présent. Il sous-tend des questions qui intéressent énormément la RFA. Il était difficile de résister à l'idée d'un trait sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire (FNI) axé sur l'option «double zéro» : l'option n'importe laquelle était d'accord et, après tout, l'option zéro (interdiction des FNI à longue portée) avait été une proposition américaine que les alliés avaient épousée par la suite. On avait estimé que l'«option zéro» préconisée par M. Reagan en 1981 constituait un trait de génie politique, notamment parce que personne ne s'attendait à ce que les Soviétiques acceptassent jamais.

Pourtant, en dépit de tous ses attraits politiques, la logique stratégique de l'option «double zéro» était troublante. Pour réaliser

donne autant de mal. L'erreur, mais la RFA ne s'est pas Les systèmes financiers inter- nationaux glorifient les excédents et foulaient au pied les déficits. En Allemagne, on vénérait les excédents à peine moins que le soccer, et la «simple mention du mot «inflation» horrifie. L'historien donne à penser que le nouveau président américain n'obtiendra pas tout ce qu'il voudra de la RFA.



Le Japon (de 80 à 100 milliards de dollars) et la République fédérale d'Allemagne (de 40 à 50 milliards de dollars). Le nouveau président continuera donc, à l'instar du gouvernement Reagan, à exercer des pressions sur l'Allemagne pour l'amener à accroître sa consommation intérieure et à exporter moins. Mais en RFA, la réflation a de nombreux partisans : on estime que le taux de croissance y est inférieur à 2 p. 100 par année, tandis que le taux de chômage est supérieur à dix, ce qui ne s'est jamais vu depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Le Japon a pris des mesures pour accroître la demande in-

Le sort qu'a connu le candidat à la présidence Richard Gephardt, lui qui avait choisi de porter la bannière du protectionnisme, est instructif : les Américains craignent effectivement de perdre des emplois au profit d'autres pays, mais ils tiennent part ailleurs à leur Toyota et à leurs appareils Sony. Et c'est ainsi que le gouvernement américain a négocié l'accord sur le libre-échange avec le Canada, tout en adoptant une attitude protectionniste à d'autres égards.

Dans toute cette conjoncture, le nouveau président fera face à un obstacle européen (lire ici « une-stalagme ») bien particulier. Pour que les Etats-Unis rétablissent l'équilibre de leur balance commerciale, d'autres pays devront réduire leurs excédents, voire accumuler des déficits. À l'heure actuelle, les deux pays accusant de loin les plus forts excédents commerciaux sont

La possibilité que de tels liens s'établissent nous amène aux questions commerciales pressantes qui se posent au nouveau président. Le déficit commercial, qui est maintenant plus élevé que le PNB de tous les pays du monde sauf douze, atteint environ 150 milliards de dollars par année. Malgré un tel déficit, c'est à peine si la cause du protectionnisme a gagné du terrain.

« Nous assurons à nos frères la sécurité de nos principaux partenaires commerciaux », a-t-elle déclaré, « tandis qu'ils font la pluie et le beau temps sur les marchés internationaux. » Elle voudrait donc que les Etats-Unis usent de représailles commerciales contre les alliés qui ne consacrent pas assez de crédits à la défense. La proposition sera sans doute rejetée : les budgets militaires américains sont à la baisse, dans une position de force pour faire la morale aux alliés, bien qu'en politique, tout comme au football, la meilleure défense consiste souvent à attaquer solidement. Quoi qu'il en soit, la tentation d'établir ainsi des liens sous-jacents dans tout débat politique sur le partage du fardeau au sein de l'Alliance.

LA DÉFENSE DE L'EUROPE : DILEMME POUR BUSH ET DUKAKIS

Le prochain président des Etats-Unis héritera de dilemmes compliqués n'annonçant rien de bon pour les alliés européens.
PAR GREGORY F. TREVERTON

Les relations entre les Etats-Unis et leurs alliés européens ne sont pas au beau fixe, mais elles ne sont pas mauvaises. Au premier coup d'oeil, on pourrait penser que le prochain président bénéficiera de relations harmonieuses avec l'Europe de l'Ouest. Mais si l'on va au-delà des apparences, on verra surgir, après quelques mois, plusieurs dilemmes qui influenceront directement sur l'avenir à long terme de l'Alliance atlantique.

Au tout début de la campagne électorale, on a constaté avec surprise que les candidats s'abstenaient de parler du partage du fardeau que représente la défense de l'Europe; c'est pourtant un thème qui n'est pas récent. Peu importe que la présidence aille à George Bush ou à Michael Dukakis, le problème consistera à répondre environ à ce que le pays réserve à l'éducation et aux deux tiers de ce qu'il consacre aux soins de santé. En outre, de 1980 à 1986, tandis que le budget de la défense grandissait par rapport au PNB et passait de 5,2 à 6,6 p. 100 de ce dernier, le taux de consommation réel par habitant s'est élevé à 15 p. 100. A l'analyse, on constate que les forces américaines ne coûtent pas beaucoup plus cher à maintenir en Europe; il en coûterait certainement beaucoup plus pour les rapatrier, car il faudrait alors aménager des installations pour les accueillir aux Etats-Unis. Par conséquent, on ne ferait des économies en retirant les troupes d'Europe que si elles étaient démobilisées purement et simplement.

Pourtant, cette analyse n'a rien à voir avec la dimension politique de la question. N'obstant le dernier scandale relatif aux contrats d'acquisition, des armes sont fabriquées dans les districts de certains membres du Congrès. Et les bases militaires offrent des emplois là où elles existent. En revanche, les Etats-Unis et leurs alliés européens venaient à se disputer, c'est-à-dire à se disputer la présidence de la défense, on ne pourrait pas dire que les exhortations n'étaient pas des mêmes sources. Dans les années 1960, les pressions exercées sur les Européens visaient surtout la gauche; c'est-à-dire les gens selon qui les Etats-Unis avaient contracté trop d'engagements dans trop d'endroits différents, ou pour qui la présence de 300 000 soldats américains en Europe était anachronique, même alors. Aujourd'hui, cependant, toutes les formations politiques élèvent la voix, notamment celles de la droite.

Plus particulièrement, il est maintenant de mise de faire valoir qu'étant donné leurs déficits budgétaires et commercial et leur productivité fléchissante, les Etats-Unis ne peuvent plus se permettre de respecter leurs engagements à l'égard de la planète. Paul Kennedy est le principal avocat de ce point de vue, et David Calleo l'apôtre le plus expressément à l'Alliance atlantique. Cette attitude égoïste n'a aucun sens sur le plan économique, car moyennant une bonne gestion financière, rien ne peut expliquer pourquoi les Etats-Unis ne sont pas en mesure de consacrer 6 p. 100 de leur produit national brut (PNB) à la défense, tout en améliorant la qualité de vie. Après tout, ce pourcentage n'est pas élevé pour ce pays, si l'on se fie aux données historiques; il correspond environ à ce que le pays réserve à l'éducation et aux deux tiers de ce qu'il consacre aux soins de santé. En outre, de 1980 à 1986, tandis que le budget de la défense grandissait par rapport au PNB et passait de 5,2 à 6,6 p. 100 de ce dernier, le taux de consommation réel par habitant s'est élevé à 15 p. 100. A l'analyse, on constate que les forces américaines ne coûtent pas beaucoup plus cher à maintenir en Europe; il en coûterait certainement beaucoup plus pour les rapatrier, car il faudrait alors aménager des installations pour les accueillir aux Etats-Unis. Par conséquent, on ne ferait des économies en retirant les troupes d'Europe que si elles étaient démobilisées purement et simplement.

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Une deuxième question se pose, toute considération économique mise à part : jusqu'à quel point exercera-t-on des pressions politiques sur le prochain gouvernement pour qu'il réduise le budget du Pentagone ? Depuis quelques années, les dépenses militaires diminuent de 2 à 3 p. 100 par année en termes réels; on peut donc en déduire que cette tendance se maintiendra. Des coupures de cette envergure limiteraient la modernisation et, si l'on se fie à l'histoire, elles porteraient atteinte à l'état de préparation, mais elles n'obligerait pas les Etats-Unis à diminuer leurs effectifs en Europe.

Avant la fin du premier mandat d'un gouvernement Bush ou Dukakis, nous serons bien tenus d'encourager les dépenses militaires augmentant de nouveau par suite d'un événement quelconque ou parce que, dans les milieux politiques, on éprouvera le sentiment que les Etats-Unis baissent leur garde. Les perspectives encourageantes de limitation des armements, renforcées par le fait que l'histoire, mais celle-ci n'offre aussi une conclusion paradoxale à caractère partisan : les budgets de défense risquent d'être moins élevés si M. Bush, et non M. Dukakis, accède à la présidence. Ce dernier devra essayer les attaques de ceux qui critiqueront

son manque de fermeté, surtout s'il favorise à fond la limitation des armements stratégiques et donne suite à ses intentions déclarées d'annuler de grands programmes nucléaires; il devra dès lors prouver que la défense lui tient vraiment à coeur.

Une troisième question se pose : la défense et le commerce entre l'Amérique et l'Europe ? Dans son malencontreux discours de 1973 sur l'«Année de l'Europe», Henry Kissinger affirmait que les dimensions politique, militaire et économique des relations transatlantiques sont liées entre elles par la réalité, et non par nos choix ou parce qu'à des fins tactiques on cherche à troquer tel aspect pour tel autre. A cette époque-là, les Européens ont pensé qu'il voulait dire le contraire de ce qu'il énonçait, à savoir que Washington allait user de son influence dans le domaine de la sécurité pour arracher des concessions économiques à ses partenaires.

Jusqu'ici, et c'est un aspect intéressant, ces recoupements ne se sont pas produits. Les alliés se sont préoccupés séparément des réalités économiques et des questions de défense, et des groupes distincts d'experts ont été affectés à chaque domaine. Tout compte fait, ce cloisonnement a bien servi les intérêts de l'Alliance. Les alliés ont discuté ou de la sécurité, ou de l'économie, mais surtout en fonction des mérites propres à chacune. Ils ont mieux réussi à comprendre les questions débattues et à mener leur propre baraque politique que si des liens explicites avaient été créés entre la défense et l'économie. Au fil du processus, les Européens en fait du processus, les Européens en fait l'existence d'un lien facile entre la dimension économique et la présence des forces américaines en Europe; normalement, cette relation semble correspondre à un

vitamines et pauvre en matières grasses et en hy-
drates de carbone. Les légumes et les fruits pro-
venant du Sud sont trop chers pour la plupart des
familles innues. C'est parce que le gouvernement
brousses présente pour la santé mentale et phy-
sique des Innus qu'il subventionne les séjours dans
la nature.

Mais la vie dans la nature est devenue in-
tolérable depuis la venue des avions militaires,
affirment les Innus. Les pilotes s'entraînent au
vol à basse altitude au Labrador depuis les an-
nées 1970, mais les survols étaient alors beau-
coup moins fréquents qu'aujourd'hui. Même si
l'Alliance opte pour la Turquie, l'entraînemen-
t des pilotes d'avion au Labrador s'intensifiera
considérablement, car le gouvernement canadien
a pris des engagements bilatéraux en ce sens.
Les Innus soutiennent qu'il leur sera impossi-
ble d'échapper au bruit et à l'effet d'abaisse-
ment que produit un avion volant à 100 pieds
d'altitude et filant à 700 kilomètres à l'heure.
Selon eux, les avions ne sont pas capables d'éviter
les camps, même quand les pilotes savent où ces
derniers sont dressés. Les Innus envisageront
peut-être de ne plus se rendre dans la nature.

D'après le père Jim Roche, un prêtre oblat
qui vit avec les Innus de Sheshatshih depuis qua-
tre ans, la qualité de vie de ces derniers en souf-
frit si cela se produit : « L'alcooolisme mine déjà
énormément les collectivités innues, et une éro-
sion encore plus poussée de leur culture ne fera
qu'aggraver le problème. Il y va de la santé men-
tale et physique d'un grand nombre de gens. »
« Ils exploitent cette question pour accélérer le
régime de leurs revendications territoriales, »
dit le major David McCabe de la Direction
des opérations aériennes et de l'entraînement au
ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN). Il a
partiellement raison; les Innus veulent que leurs
droits sur la région soient reconnus, mais ils ne
sont pas disposés à accepter un marché qui met-
trait en péril leur lien avec le territoire qui nourrit
leur culture depuis si longtemps. Le processus de
réglementation des revendications territoriales ne fait
que légitimer le vol des terres autochtones, » de
dire Peter Penashue. Selon le jeune chef innu, le
jour où un marché sera signé à cet égard sera
l'un des jours les plus tristes de toute l'histoire
de son peuple.

À CAUSE DE L'APPUÏ QU'ILS ONT REÇU D'EN-
dehors du Labrador, les Innus constituent désor-
mais une force politique avec laquelle il faut
compter. « Sans l'intervention des Innus, aucune
étude de ce genre n'aurait été faite, » d'affirmer
M. Robert Ferrari, porte-parole de la société
Lavallin, qui a été chargée de rédiger le rapport
du MDN. Dans le cadre de l'étude, qui a coûté
plusieurs millions de dollars, on a examiné les
effets que les vols à basse altitude ont sur la
faune et les habitants du Labrador.

Une commission indépendante, mise sur pied
par le Bureau fédéral d'examen des évaluations
environnementales, tiendra des audiences pub-
liques au début de 1989 sur l'augmentation pro-
posée du nombre des vols d'entraînement et des

exercices aériens de tir. Les Innus ont refusé
de collaborer avec les chercheurs du groupe
du MDN. Ils participent aux audiences, mais
ils n'ont pas vraiment espoir que leurs objections
arrêteront le projet de la Défense. Beaucoup
d'Innus savent que les vols à basse altitude ces-
sent complètement et que l'on renonce une fois
pour toutes à construire un centre de l'OTAN
dans la région. D'autres, selon qui il faut en ar-
river à un compromis, demandent que soit con-
clue une entente équitable sur les droits fonciers,
avant toute autre intensification de l'entraîne-
ment aérien. Mais même si une telle entente était
signée, la plupart des Innus estiment qu'ils ne
pourraient accepter sur leurs terres la présence du
centre d'entraînement tactique de l'OTAN dont
on envisage la construction.

« Nous voulons obtenir des droits politiques
qui nous donneront effectivement pleine juridi-
ction sur nos terres ancestrales, » affirme le chef
Ashini. « Mais il nous serait impossible d'exercer
de tels droits politiques si des parties importantes
du territoire nous étaient enlevées aux fins de
l'accroissement des activités militaires. »

L'excécution des vols d'entraînement au-dessus
du territoire innu au Labrador suscite de nouvelles
questions juridiques relatives relativement aux
revendications territoriales des autochtones. « À
qui appartient l'espace aérien à cent pieds au des-
sus du sol ? », demande M. Ferrari, qui va s'inter-
roger sur ce thème dans son étude. D'après les
Innus, quelle que soit l'activité menée au des-
sus du sol, qu'il s'agisse de combats aériens,
de vols à basse altitude ou d'exercices de bom-
bardement, elle influera sur l'environnement
terrestre. Ils ne sont pas sûrs, cependant,
de la décision qu'un tribunal canadien
prendra à ce sujet.

Et les Innus ne seront pas rassurés si
l'étude établit que les vols à basse altitude ont
peu d'effets négatifs sur les caribous et les autres
animaux. « Il faudra au moins dix ans avant que
l'on sache comment les vols influent sur ces
créatures, et alors, il sera peut-être trop tard, » de
souligner le chasseur innu Ben Andrew. « Nos
conclusions ne seront pas définitives, » d'ajouter
M. Ferrari. Nous recommanderons que des études
se poursuivent en permanence sur la question. »

Le MDN et ses écologistes disent que les car-
ibous ne semblent pas terriblement gênés par le
bruit des avions. « Aucune étude n'a cependant été
faite pour connaître la réaction des animaux aux
bangs soniques qui se produiraient dans des com-
bats aériens simulés.


La mise en place du centre de l'OTAN et les
vols à basse altitude peuvent-ils se poursuivre
sans menacer la santé et le mode de vie des
Innus ? Ces derniers ne le pensent certainement
pas, mais le MDN est persuadé du contraire. Pen-
dant qu'il était commandant le colonel David
Innu : « Ce qui donne une telle beauté à cet en-
vironnement, c'est qu'il a conservé son caractère origi-
nel. » Sheshatshih. Il a participé à des activi-
tés communautaires et il a embauché deux Innus
comme pompiers de la base. Les Innus voient
tout cela d'un oeil suspicieux, car ils craignent
que les militaires n'essaient de diviser et de trom-
per la collectivité en lui faisant des promesses
qu'ils ne pourront pas tenir.

Dans l'ensemble, les efforts que le MDN a dé-
ployés pour apaiser les Innus ont échoué, car ce
dernier s'y est pris trop tard. Le climat de peur et
de méfiance qui existe maintenant entre les
Innus et les partisans blancs de l'expansion mili-
taire au Labrador risque de perdurer à jamais.
L'armement prévautra à demeure, et la société
innue se détériorera sans doute encore plus rap-
idement. « Nous sommes une race en voie de
disparition, de dire Peter Penashue. Nous ne
pouvons combattre l'OTAN; nous sommes donc
condamnés à l'annihilation. »

Le sacrifice d'une culture autochtone au
profit de la sécurité nationale est-il vraiment le
seul objet du litige? Le gouvernement de Terre-
Neuve n'a jamais nié qu'il voulait intégrer le
plus vite possible les Innus à la vie de la pro-
vince. L'administrateur provincial le plus puis-
sant au Labrador est M. John McGrath, sous-
ministre adjoint de l'Agriculture et du Déve-
loppement des régions rurales et du Nord. Selon
lui, son gouvernement ne s'est aucunement en-
gagé à élaborer un programme dont l'objet serait
d'aider les Innus à préserver

leur langue ou leur culture. « Des cultures et des
langues s'éteignent régulièrement, » déclare-t-il.
en citant le cas de sa propre langue ancestrale.
Les gens d'affaires de Goose Bay, agacés par
l'opposition continue des Innus à un projet qu'ils
favorisent entièrement, demandent ce que les
Innus ont fait du territoire pour le réclamer
comme étant leur. Ils n'y ont rien construit, ils
n'ont pas exploité les ressources. Les Innus
répondent qu'ils y ont simplement pris ce qu'il
leur fallait et qu'ils se sont souciés de respecter
la nature et d'obéir à ses lois. Ils se sont toujours
perçus comme étant les gardiens de leur terri-
toire, qu'ils ont baptisé *Niissinan*.
Dans un numéro de 1985, la revue *Royal Air
Force News* a fait un compliment sublime aux
Innus : « Ce qui donne une telle beauté à cet en-
vironnement, c'est qu'il a conservé son caractère origi-
nel. » *Niissinan* ne sera plus jamais ce qu'il a
été, de dire les Innus, une fois que les jeux de
guerre y auront commencé. □

per la collectivité en lui faisant des promesses
qu'ils ne pourront pas tenir.





CETTE ÉPOQUE DE L'ANNÉE, DES CENTAINES

d'Innus (Indiens naskapi et montagnais vivants au Labrador) s'adonnent à l'activité qu'ils

préfèrent à toute autre et à celle qu'ils connaissent le mieux : ils se dispersent dans le vaste territoire

du Labrador pour chasser et pêcher, comme leur peuple le fait depuis des milliers d'années. Au centre de

coordination des activités militaires à Goose Bay, la formation est grande : les porte-parole innus refusent

d'indiquer aux Forces canadiennes où les leurs se trouvent exactement, de sorte que l'ennemi risque d'être

survolé par des avions à réaction effectuant des passages à basse altitude.

Le ministère de la Défense nationale essaie d'éviter tout autre affrontement avec les Innus, qui ont attiré

l'attention de la collectivité internationale en s'opposant aux activités militaires dans le Labrador. L'année

dernière, des représentants innus ont pris la parole devant la Commission des droits de l'homme, aux

Nations-Unies, pour l'informer que les pays de l'OTAN

forment leurs pilotes au-dessus du territoire des Innus

LE DOSSIER DU LABRADOR...

Que veulent les autochtones ?

Beaucoup d'autoch-

tones pensent qu'ils

n'ont aucun pouvoir

réel et que leurs

chances de l'emporter

sont minces. "Nous ne

pouvons combattre

l'OTAN; nous sommes

donc condamnés à

l'annihilation."

PAR MARIE WADDEN

Le fait est que la vie innue dans la nature n'est rien de plus aujourd'hui qu'une coûteuse vacance aux dépens

du contribuable. Ils tiennent ces propos parce que des

avions transportent maintenant les familles innues à

l'intérieur des terres, deux fois par année, aux frais de

l'État. Dans le passé, les Innus franchissaient ces

longues distances à pied et levaient plusieurs fois le

camp pour suivre les troupes de caribous pendant

leur migration. Les chasseurs innus employaient au-

jourd'hui des moteurs et apportent plus de provi-

sions au camp pour y accroître le confort de leurs fami-

les. Selon l'ancien commandant de la base de Goose Bay,

le colonel John David, les Innus manquent de réalisme

en s'approchant de ce mode de vie : "Pour les anciens, il

est important de retourner dans la nature, déclare-t-il,

mais ce n'est plus un objectif viable pour les jeunes."

"Il n'appartiendrait pas aux militaires de décider si notre

mode de vie est viable ou non," de rétorquer Peter Re-

nash, jeune chef innu.

Le chef de Sheshashit, Daniel Ashini, a tenu les pro-

pos suivants à la Commission créée par le Bureau fédé-

ral d'examen des évaluations environnementales, qui

étudie les effets de l'entraînement aérien et des ma-

noeuvres de tir et de bombardement au Labrador :

"Nous voudrions peut-être intégrer certains aspects

de votre culture à la nôtre... certains d'entre nous

accepteront peut-être un emploi rémunéré dans le

secteur des ressources renouvelables, mais bon nom-

bre voudront, comme principale occupation, conti-

nuer à chasser, à trapper, à pêcher et à se réunir pour

transmettre aux générations à venir les connaissances

abandonnées qu'ils possèdent sur les animaux et le

territoire qui constitue notre patrimoine.

José Mailhot, expert de la culture innue, a aussi pris

la parole aux mêmes audiences :

"[Les Innus] sont conscients, et avec raison, que

s'ils n'ont plus la possibilité de se rendre dans la na-

-ture, ils ne formeront plus qu'un peuple diminué et

conquis. Nous les aurons dépossédés de tout, et ils

n'auront plus rien à léguer aux générations à venir.

Aux yeux des Innus, les subsides accordés par le

gouvernement pour leurs séjours dans la nature repré-

-sentent une compensation pour les travaux de dévelop-

pement déjà effectués sur leurs terres, lesquelles n'ont

jamais été cédées par traité ou par une quelconque autre

entente. Parmi ces travaux, on peut citer la construction

de l'aéroport de Goose Bay par les Américains pendant

la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l'extraction de minerai de

fer à Schafferville et à Labrador City, la coupe du bois

effectuée pour alimenter le moulin de la Labrador

Lineboard, et la construction du complexe hydroélec-

-trique de Churchill Falls à la fin des années 1950.

L'aménagement de Churchill Falls a l'air de l'innu

-ité de Churchill Falls à la fin des années 1950.

Les familles touchées ont perdu canots, trappes et maie-

-riel de chasses parce qu'elles n'ont pas été averties à

temps de l'inondation. En guise de compensation, on

leur a donné des maisons qui n'étaient guère plus que

des cabanes. Celles de Sheshashit furent construites au

-côté de 2 000 \$ chacune et elles se détériorèrent rapide-

-ment. Celles qui existent encore donnent au village l'al-

-lure d'un bidonville.

Les villages innus sont pauvres, et la plupart des

habitants sont des assistés sociaux. Ils sont en butte aux

problèmes sociaux communs à la majorité des collec-

-tivités autochtones du pays : alcoolisme, violence au

-foyer, et suicide. La santé des Innus s'est dégradée pour

d'autres raisons. Les gens sont obèses et malades à

cause du nouveau régime alimentaire qui est le leur

-depuis qu'ils sont devenus sédentaires. Les nutrition-

-nistes disent que la nourriture trouvée dans la nature est

-beaucoup plus saine, car elle est riche en protéines et en

base ne cessiterait pas ses activites actuelles, le Canada etant lie avec plusieurs pays de l'OTAN par la convention internationale sur Goose Bay. UNE SOLUTION POURRAIT BIEN SE DEGAGER rapidement si les parties en presence negociaient versensement. D'abord, il faudrait regler les revendications territoriales des autochtones afin d'eviter les problemes politiques et les problemes de juridiction. Ensuite, il faudrait renforcer les mesures de securite et s'interroger

Source : Commission d'évaluation environnementale, bulletin d'information, no. 1, novembre 1987.

de nouveau sur l'étendue du territoire servant aux vols à basse altitude, en plus d'instaurer des sanctions contre les pilotes qui violeraient les règlements.

Les autorités militaires du Canada et de

l'OTAN sont incapables de justifier, militaire-
territoire (qui équivalait à environ 40 p. 100 du
territoire ouest allemand) pour les vols et l'en-
traînement tactique. En fait, on reconnaît même

que la région sud ne sert que de lieu de réserve au cas où les conditions atmosphériques, par exemple, ne permettraient pas certaines activités dans la région nord. Quant à cette dernière, sa di-

vision en trois secteurs, dont deux peuvent être fermés à tout moment, illustre bien la flexibilité de son utilisation et les besoins des militaires. En renforçant les mesures de sécurité pour éviter de

et les autorités militaires et les peuples de la région, nous devons nous assurer que les violations ne se reproduisent pas et que les violations ne se reproduisent pas.

tion des habitants.
Les vols à basse altitude sont devenus intolérables pour la population d'Europe centrale, et les Canadiens n'aimeraient certainement pas

qu'ils aient lieu non loin de leurs villes et villages. Tout doit donc être tenu, dans cette affaire, pour respecter, d'une part, les engagements du Canada envers la défense occidentale et

☐ à autre part, les droits des autochtones.

Les opposants au projet d'amaux effrayés, qui quittent leur habitat naturel de destruction de la culture des autochtones et de l'éclatement de leur mode de vie; de pollution par le bruit et l'essence; et de spoliation des terres autochtones dont le statut juridique n'est pas encore établi. Pour les partisans de la base, le discours est presque à l'antithèse. Plus de vingt-cinq ans d'activités militaires à la base de Cold Lake en Alberta ont prouvé que la rumeur n'existe pas. Au contraire. En ce qui concerne les caribous du Labrador, leur nombre atteint presque 600 000 aujourd'hui (60 000 il y a vingt-cinq ans), ce qui en fait le plus grand troupeau au monde. Les autochtones sont sésédatristes depuis plusieurs décennies, et la majorité des Innus (Labrador), Inuit et Montagnais (Québec et Côte Nord) vivent très loin de la région qui sert aux vols à basse altitude. Une minorité a maintenu ses activités traditionnelles et se rend dans les zones «militaires», où selon le major McCabe, les vols cessent ou ralentissent dès que les autochtones sont repérés. Quant aux revendications territoriales des autochtones, elles ne sont pas encore réglées, et c'est cette question qui semble poser le plus de problèmes.

chtones sont divisés. Les Innu s'opposent à toute cette controverse. Les autochtones ont des projets, surtout à cause des négociations territoriales qui traînent en longueur. Pour leur part, les Inuit et les Montagnais (nom des Innu au Québec) semblent plus flexibles et prêts à un compromis, là encore si l'on satisfait à leurs revendications territoriales. La question de la militarisation du territoire semble tout à fait secondaire pour eux.

Pour tenter de faire toute la lumière sur les ac-

tivités actuelles et futures de la base de Goose Bay, le ministère de l'Environnement du Canada a créé, en juillet 1986, une Commission d'évaluation environnementale qui a tenu des audiences

La Commission a en-

L'OTAN. L'étude a été confiée à une filiale de Lavallin, société qui serait aussi intéressée par l'aménagement du centre. Lorsque cette étude sera terminée, en novembre 1988, la Commis-

sion en prendra connaissance et tiendra de nouvelles audiences publiques. Enfin, elle fera ses recommandations aux deux ministères concernés vers septembre 1989.

Les opposants au projet de l'OTAN considèrent cette commission comme étant une farce parce qu'elle n'a qu'un pouvoir de recommandation, comme toute les commissions d'enquête.

Le secrétaire général de la Commission, M. Carol Martin, il peut recommander ultimement que la base de l'OTAN ne soit pas établie. Il restera au gouvernement à prendre la décision finale.

gouvernement à prendre la décision finale. Quoi qu'il en soit, le ministre de la Défense nationale, M. Perrin Beatty, a déjà indiqué que la

ministère de la Défense nationale, la base devra subir quelques modifications, si l'OTAN la choisit. On construira une seconde piste d'atterrissage, parallèle à la piste principale, et de nouveaux bâtiments, qui serviront de centre d'opérations et de logements. Chaque pays stationnant des avions à la base devra toutois prendre en charge la construction des hangars de protection et l'infrastructure de soutien pour ses pilotes. On estime que les travaux principaux coûteront environ 500 millions de dollars, dont une partie proviendra d'un fonds de l'OTAN.

La venue du centre d'entraînement de chasse tactique va nécessairement occasionner une augmentation considérable des vols à basse altitude et des activités de la base. En 1987, plus de 6 300 vols ont été enregistrés. Le MDN estime que 140 à 170 avions de combat provenant de huit pays prendront part à ce genre d'activités chaque année, entre février et octobre, et que la base enregistrera 40 000 sorties dont 60 p. 100 seront des vols à basse altitude. Si les prévisions du Ministère se révèlent justes, 3 500 emplois de leurs familles habiteront à Goose Bay, et 500 pilotes s'y entraîneront chaque année. Le site offert par le Canada pour les vols à basse altitude et l'entraînement tactique couvre une superficie de 100 000 kilomètres carrés répartis en dix-sept territoires où il n'y a aucune habitation permanente.

L'abord et le Québec, et il se situe juste au nord de Goose Bay. Le second, au sud, chevauche aussi les deux provinces, mais c'est le Québec qui en détient la presque totalité.

Dans ces vastes régions, les pilotes pourront voler à moins de trente mètres (100 pieds) d'altitude pendant plus d'une heure et raser de près les cimes des arbres, les montagnes, les vallées et les lacs. Les restrictions seront très peu nombreuses, sauf celles concernant la faune et les

humains. Les pilotes pourront se livrer à des combats aériens et à des attaques maritimes stimulées. Enfin, une ou plusieurs zones de tir seront sans doute aménagées, mais au ministère

de la Deltense, on s'empresse de dire que les négociations avec l'OTAN là-dessus ne sont pas terminées et que les techniques modernes de combat simulé sont telles que ces zones pourraient s'avérer inutiles.

Le major McCabe affirme que le Ministère prend actuellement toutes les mesures nécessaires afin d'éviter de perturber les troupeaux de caribous et les campements de pêche et de chasse.


se. Les pilotes ne peuvent survoler ces troupes
ou ces camps, et pour plus de précaution, les
Forces canadiennes (FC) demandent à tous ceux
qui veulent se rendre dans ces régions d'en in-

former la base afin que les avions puissent les éviter. Ces mesures seront renforcées si le centre est mis sur pied.

LES AUTOCHTONES ET LES GROUPE PACIFISTES ET
écologistes contestent les arguments des Forces
océanographiques. Pour eux, les vols à basse altitude,
au-delà des effets néfastes sur

leur augmentation menace l'écologie et les habi-

LE DOSSIER DU LABRADOR...



A LA FIN DE L'ANNÉE 1989, L'OTAN DEVRA DÉCIDER DE L'EMPLACEMENT D'UN IMPORTANT CENTRE d'entraînement de la chasse tactique. Ce dernier sera situé soit au Canada, soit en Turquie. Si la base canadienne de Goose Bay est choisie, elle deviendra le point de mire des protestations des groupes pacifistes et écologistes canadiens qui dénoncent depuis plusieurs années les vols à basse altitude dans cette région. Il n'y a rien de nouveau dans les activités militaires de la base de Goose Bay au Labrador, mais, depuis quelques années, leur croissance inquiète de plus en plus les autochtones et les mouvements pacifistes et écologistes. Ceux-ci font valoir que les vols à basse altitude ont des effets négatifs sur la faune, la flore et les habitants du territoire environnant. Le gouvernement canadien et surtout le ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN) ne voient pas les choses de la même manière. Non seulement ils estiment que la base fournit des emplois et que ses activités ne perturbent en rien la vie locale, mais ils soutiennent aussi que son emplacement est idéal; c'est ainsi qu'ils ont décidé d'inviter l'OTAN à venir y installer une base militaire pour l'aviation de l'Alliance atlantique. Mélangé à l'allégement des droits territoriaux des autochtones, démilitarisation et problèmes environnementaux d'un côté, emplois, développement économique et engagements militaires de l'autre, les deux camps sont engagés dans une lutte féroce. Toute la polémique a éclaté lorsque le Canada a proposé, en juillet 1984, le site de la Base des Forces canadiennes de Goose Bay comme centre d'entraînement de la chasse tactique. De fait, l'OTAN avait déjà commandé des études de faisabilité sur la création d'un tel centre en 1980. Elle cherchait un territoire, si possible inhabité, très vaste, aux conditions géographiques similaires à celles que l'on retrouve en Europe centrale et qui ne serait pas soumis à de multiples restrictions climatiques et humaines. En 1985, deux sites furent retenus: Konya en Turquie et Goose Bay au Canada. Après une première évaluation, le Groupe de travail de l'OTAN a, en septembre 1986, recommandé de choisir la base turque, surtout pour des raisons politiques. En effet, à cause de son différend avec la Grèce et de ses relations militaires tendues avec Washington, la Turquie obtenait ainsi la base de l'OTAN à titre de compensation. On voulait renforcer le lien entre la Turquie et l'Organisation atlantique. Les protestations canadiennes, qui concernaient la façon dont on avait évalué le coût de l'aménagement de la base (on l'avait surestimé) ont convaincu l'OTAN d'annuler cette décision et d'étudier à nouveau la question. Selon un sous-ministre adjoint de la Défense, M. Robert Fowler, le Comité de planification de défense de l'OTAN doit prendre une décision en décembre 1989.

L'OTAN A BESOIN DE CETTE BASE D'ENTRAÎNEMENT pour deux raisons: les problèmes posés par la circulation aérienne en Europe centrale, et la nouvelle stratégie militaire de l'OTAN. Les forces militaires

PAR JOCELYN COULON

suit son cours.

*et d'études scientifiques
d'audiences publiques
processus complexe
milieu de tout cela, un
ment économique: au
taires et le développe-
des engagements mili-
mentaux et de l'autre,
problèmes environne-
tions territoriales et de
panoplie de réclama-
D'une part, toute une
enjeux?*

Quels sont les

occidentales maintiennent plus de 3 000 avions de combat dans les pays européens membres de l'OTAN, dont une grande partie est stationnée en Allemagne de l'Ouest. Les pilotes de ces avions doivent s'entraîner quotidiennement en vue de pouvoir faire face à une éventuelle attaque. En République fédérale, plus de 100 000 vols à basse altitude, de jour comme de nuit, ont lieu chaque année au grand désespoir de la population. Les restrictions concernant ces vols sont cependant nombreuses. Les pilotes doivent éviter les grandes agglomérations civiles (batteries, centrales, etc.) et les voies aériennes commerciales, et ils ne peuvent voler plus d'une dizaine de minutes à une altitude de quatre-vingt mètres. Malgré cela, les accidents sont nombreux. Depuis le début de l'année, une quinzaine d'avions de combat se sont écrasés, et deux d'entre eux près de centrales nucléaires, ce qui a provoqué des demandes de restrictions encore plus fortes de la part de la population. Dans sa stratégie de défense, l'Alliance atlantique a adopté un nouveau concept en vue d'arrêter une attaque ennemie. Le FOFA (Follow on Forces Attack) ou attaque des forces d'exploitation et de remplacement prévoit une frappe en profondeur contre le dispositif militaire et les infrastructures de soutien, situées dans les zones arrière de l'ennemi et chargées de renforcer les forces de tête ou de premier échelon. Ce concept nécessite l'utilisation de forces aériennes, et les avions de combat se doivent d'être rapides (plus de 900 km à l'heure), de voler à basse altitude (moins de 300 mètres) dans toutes les conditions météorologiques, et d'éviter les défenses anti-aériennes adverses. Pour que les pilotes maîtrisent bien ce genre de mission, ils ont besoin d'un entraînement intensif sur de longues distances. Le ministère canadien de la Défense nationale estime que Goose Bay est l'endroit approprié pour ce genre d'exercices et qu'il offre toutes les conditions idéales d'entraînement pour les pilotes. De plus, les forces aériennes de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, la Grande Bretagne et des Pays-Bas utilisent déjà cette base pour leur base du Labrador pourrait facilement répondre aux exigences de l'OTAN.

LA BASE DE GOOSE BAY A ÉTÉ CRÉÉE EN 1941 AFIN d'être utilisée pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, et plus de 24 000 avions y ont transité. Après le conflit, les Américains en ont fait un point d'appui du *Strategic Air Command* jusqu'à la fin des années 1960. La *Royal Air Force* britannique y a mené jusqu'en 1984, l'entraînement de ses pilotes sur des bombardiers nucléaires *Vulcan*. Actuellement, une convention internationale, signée par le Canada, les États-Unis, l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, la Grande Bretagne et les Pays-Bas, régit les activités militaires de Goose Bay. Ces trois derniers pays effectuent des vols à basse altitude dans la région depuis plusieurs années. Ils y entretiennent quarante-deux avions de combat *Tornado*, *Alpha Jet*, *F-4 Phantom* et *F-16*. La convention veut que chaque pays ne puisse envoyer à Goose Bay plus de vingt-cinq chasseurs, le total ne pouvant donc dépasser 125 appareils. Les États-Unis n'effectuent pas de vols à basse altitude, ni le Canada, qui a installé à la base quatre chasseurs *F-18* dans le cadre du renforcement de la défense du Grand Nord. De plus, le gouvernement canadien a annoncé, en juin 1985, un plan de modernisation de Goose Bay, qui coûtera 93 millions de dollars. Selon le major Dave McCabe de la Direction des

TABLES DES MATIÈRES

LE DOSSIER DU LABRADOR...

Les forces aériennes de nos alliés de l'OTAN emploient une grande partie de l'espace aérien du Labrador. Cela fait l'affaire de certains habitants de la région, mais d'autres sont loin de trouver cela drôle

QUELS SONT LES ENJEUX ? PAR JOCELYN COULON

QUE VEULENT LES AUTOCHTONES ? PAR MARIE WADDEN

LA DÉFENSE DE L'EUROPE: DILEMME POUR BUSH ET DUKAKIS

PAR GREGORY F. TREVERTON Depuis toujours, les politiciens américains aiment bien répéter que l'Europe ne fait pas assez pour assurer sa propre défense.

UN CLIMAT DE GUERRE

PAR FEN OSLER HAMPSON Des scientifiques réunis récemment à Toronto ont montré comment les changements climatiques risquent d'accroître les tensions internationales.

UNE ENTREVEUE AVEC HENRI TROFIMENKO

Un «occidentologue» soviétique a des opinions bien arrêtées sur des sujets très variés, depuis les sous-marins canadiens jusqu'à l'état de la kremlinologie aux Etats-Unis.

L'UNSSOD III N'A RIEN PRODUIT DE BON !

PAR BRADLEY FEASEY Le moment est venu de repenser le rôle que l'ONU joue dans le domaine du désarmement. La Session extraordinaire de juin a été un fiasco.

LETTRE DE KABOUL

PAR MADELEINE POULIN

Compte rendu sur le retrait des troupes soviétiques d'Afghanistan.

14 EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE

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19 NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT

16 CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS

20 RÉPERTOIRE DES PUBLICATIONS DE L'INSTITUT

17 LIVRES

Si l'on demandait aux personnes

de la rue: «Auriez-vous des objec-

tions à ce que certains pays de

l'OTAN fassent des vols d'essais à

basse altitude au Labrador?» La

plupart diraient non, car elles

pensent que le Labrador est une ré-

gion presque inhabitée. Il en serait

autrement cependant si on planifiait

de faire ces vols au-dessus de zones

médionales, où l'on retrouve beau-

coup d'endroits de villégiature!

Pourtant les autochtones vivent

au Labrador et seront affectés par

les vols à basse altitude, de même

que la faune et la flore de la région.

D'un autre côté, si nous voulons

maintenir l'Alliance atlantique et

une solide défense aérienne, les pi-

loies doivent faire leurs essais

quelque part.

C'est une situation en effet très

complexe que tentent de nous ex-

pliquer Jocelyn Coulton et Marie

Wadden. M. Coulton décrit les dif-

férents intervenants dans le projet

de l'OTAN. Madame Wadden, qui

a vécu au Labrador, nous présente

le point de vue des autochtones.

Le présent numéro de *Paix et*

Sécurité contient aussi un article de

Gregory Treverton, qui fait état

des nombreux problèmes auxquels

le nouveau président des Etats-Unis

Les CAMIERS DE L'INSTITUT

3. La limitation des arme-

ments dans l'Arctique:

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1988, 93 pages.

4. De Lénine à Gorbatchev:

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4. Sauvegarder la paix et la

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PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

LE DOSSIER DU LABRADOR...

Quels sont les enjeux ?
PAR JOCELYN COULON

Que veulent les autochtones ?
PAR MARIE WADDEN

Les forces aériennes de nos alliés de l'OTAN emploient une grande partie de l'espace aérien du Labrador. Cela fait l'affaire de certains habitants de la région, mais d'autres sont loin de trouver cela drôle



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CANADIEN POUR
LA PAIX ET
LA SÉCURITÉ
INTERNATIONALES

AUTOMNE 1988
VOLUME 3 NUMÉRO 3

Dans le présent numéro :

Gregory Trevorton
Les présidentielles
américaines et
l'art de critiquer
l'Europe.

Fen Hampson
À mesure que la
planète se réchauffe,
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Henri Trofimenko
Une entrevue. Un
«occidentologue»
soviétique parle sans
retenue.

Bradley Feasey
À l'issue de
l'UNSSOD III, on a
eu le bon sens de ne
pas prévoir une
UNSSOD IV.

Madeleine Poulin
Compte rendu sur le
retrait des troupes
soviétiques
d'Afghanistan.

PEACE & SECURITY

CAI
IPS
- P27

THE 1988 CIIPS PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

*How much do Canadians
want to spend on defence?
What do they want to
spend it on?*

AN ANALYSIS
BY DON MUNTON



Alain Borgognon
The grim but
profitable interna-
tional traffic in
toxic waste.

**Bissonnette, Cox
and Pearson**
The Institute five
years on.

Sharon Hobson
What to do about
the submarines
and why it
matters.

King Gordon
A friend pays
tribute to
John Holmes.

Michael Constable
From the toy store
front lines, a letter
from Moscow.

Also in this issue:

Institute Publications 1987-1988

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

4. **From Lenin to Gorbachev: Changing Soviet Perspectives on East-West Relations**, by Paul Marantz, May 1988, 89 pages.

5. **The Debate About Nuclear Weapon Tests**, by Jozef Goldblat and David Cox, August 1988, 86 pages.

6. **The Return of Vietnam to the International System**, by Gérard Hervouet, November 1988.

ANNUAL GUIDE

A **Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1987-1988**, 327 pages.

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16. **Accidental Nuclear War: Reducing the Risks**, by Dianne DeMille, January 1988.

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

4. **Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean: Perspectives to the Year 2000**, Proceedings of a Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 22-25 March 1987, by Lloyd Searwar, 36 pages.

5. **Measures for Peace in Central America, 8-9 May 1987**, by Liisa North, December 1987, 76 pages.

6. **The International Trade in Arms: Problems and Prospects, 21-22 October 1987**, by Keith Krause, March 1988, 47 pages.

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

There is little doubt that issues of international peace and security played no obvious role in deciding the recent election. This might be because there is not a great deal to argue about.

There is a remarkable convergence of policy among the three major parties on Canada's role in the world regarding defence and international security. They all support peacekeeping, the UN, a more or less vigorous anti-apartheid stance, aid to developing countries, pressure on the superpowers toward nuclear disarmament, partnership of some sort with like-minded western powers, and a moderate increase in defence spending. They might argue during Question Period about when we should break off diplomatic relations with South Africa, or about the number of frigates the navy should get, but this is small change as far as controversy over public policy goes. Nobody with a reasonable prospect of gaining office is proposing we join the Warsaw Pact, invade Cuba or run guns to the Contras.

What differences there are have been deliberately muted: the Conservatives have deferred the po-

tentially divisive question of nuclear-powered submarines until who knows when; the NDP's proposal to have Canada leave the North Atlantic Alliance was not very subtly fudged by a statement that it would not leave NATO during its first term in office.

As **Don Munton's** analysis of this year's survey results shows, Canadians have definite and quite nuanced views of international and defence policy issues. What is also clear from the survey is that Canadians don't want very much to change. Perhaps this reflects a widespread view that insofar as issues of war and peace can be "managed," and to the extent that Canada has influence on these matters, we are doing about as well as we can.

What this survey does not reflect - others have - is the deep-rooted concern about other international problems: economic decline, environmental catastrophe, overpopulation and so on. At least one recent survey has Canadians much more worried about these challenges to their security and well-being than they are about war - a startling shift from only a few years ago. The important difference between the war and peace problem and the other questions,

is that we have only just begun to comprehend the dimensions of the challenges we face and they are not being managed at all.

In other articles, **Alain Borognon** looks at the apparently lucrative international trade in toxic waste and what various international organizations are trying to do to regulate the practice; the controversial question of nuclear-powered submarines, and the political and diplomatic implications of Canada's decision, are examined by **Sharon Hobson**; and we present a tribute to the life and career of the late John Holmes by **King Gordon**.

Last, *Peace & Security* indulges in some (we hope) constructive navel gazing in the form of a roundtable discussion on the past and future of the Institute. This issue of *Peace & Security* also marks the departure of CIIPS founding and current Executive Director **Geoffrey Pearson**. He will be succeeded for a five-year term on 1 February 1989 by **Bernard Wood**, formerly founding Director of the non-profit policy research centre, the North-South Institute.

- Michael Bryans

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Don Munton is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia; **Alain Borgognon** is a television journalist with Radio-Canada in Montreal; **David Cox** is a member of the department of Political Studies, Queen's University; **Lise Bissonnette** is a journalist; **Geoffrey Pearson** is Executive Director of CIIPS; **Sharon Hobson** is Canadian correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*; **King Gordon** is a consultant in international relations and development; **Michael Constable** is a professional illustrator.

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The 1988

CIIPS

Public Opinion

Survey

INTEREST IN CANADA ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE issues, it has often been charged, is virtually non-existent. As a result, there is little informed opinion or discussion about these issues and no tradition of consistent commitment to a strong defence. Canada, according to C. P. Stacey, the country's most eminent military historian, is an "unmilitary community." Canadians, he asserts, have "an apparently deep-rooted reluctance to spend money on military preparation in time of peace."

The results of a new public opinion survey sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security might seem at first glance to bear out the argument that Canadians neither care about,

of an ally desirous of influencing the course of both its bilateral defence arrangements and its multilateral alliance, or at the very least provide for a right of consultation. In the case of NATO they reinforce a linkage with Europe, providing a small but concrete symbol of a Canadian commitment to those countries. If there is no military rationale for deciding, say, the number of Canadian troops that should be deployed on the Rhine, such calculations necessarily become essentially political-diplomatic in character. If this is the case then it surely sheds important light on how Canadians can be expected to view many defence and security issues. It is simply unreasonable to expect Canadians to regard their own defence preparedness in the same manner in which, for example, Israelis regard theirs.

THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE PUBLIC OPINION DATA considered here that Canadians do, in fact, apply a rough political-strategic logic to their views on defence and security policy. Their attitudes on these issues cluster around four main questions: (1) What alignment or defence arrangements are most desirable? (2) What level of defence expenditures is necessary? (3) What military capabilities are possible and appropriate? and (4) What general policies ought to be followed?

Current Canadian opinion can be considered with respect to each question. First, it is useful to examine attitudes on a number of background factors: The 1988 CIIPS poll confirms what the 1987 one suggested, that Canadians' attitudes on peace and security have undergone some substantial changes since the 1960s. There is clear evidence that perceptions of friends and foes have shifted and that perceptions of threat no longer correspond with standard cold war scenarios.

Overall, Canadian confidence in the ability of the US to deal with world problems is only very slightly greater than that in the ability of the Soviet Union. Neither superpower, majorities say, genuinely wants disarmament and neither, near majorities say, can be trusted entirely to keep its part of any arms control bargain.

While half of the Canadian public agrees with the statement that "the Soviet military threat is constantly growing and represents a real, immediate danger to the West," half also disagrees. A bare 5% perceive the USSR to be the greatest threat to world peace; most point to the arms race, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and non-European regional conflicts such as the Middle East.

Moreover, most (75%) think a Soviet attack on Western Europe in the next ten years is unlikely or very unlikely; almost 80% similarly regard the chances of such an attack on North America. At the very least, the security threat perceived by Canadians is no longer simply or even mainly Moscow.

None of this change, fundamental and long-term

CANADIANS AND THEIR DEFENCE

Despite the fact that most Canadians no longer harbour cold war views, most are still committed to the Western alliance and conventional defence.

BY DON MUNTON

nor care for, defence and security. For example, they approve continued membership in NATO but reject its basic doctrine for defending Europe. They claim to support present or greater levels of defence spending but reject tax increases for this purpose and believe arms reductions will increase, not decrease, security.

Closer examination of the poll results suggests, however, that neither the assumed ignorance and inconsistency nor this "unmilitary" label are accurate characterizations, especially in the context of Canada's security situation. While it is certainly true that there is less public debate about defence and security in Canada than many other countries, it does not necessarily follow that Canadians have uninformed or random views about military matters.

It is widely recognized that the security of Canada cannot be assured by its own, autonomous effort. This stems not merely from the impossibility of defence in the age of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads, but also because of the country's large territory and relatively limited human and economic resources. Coupled with these factors are Canada's particular geographic position and the near certainty of American involvement in the case of any attack on Canada. The possible contribution to Canadian security of Canadian military forces, is, as one writer among many has noted, "no more than marginal."

Given this situation, defence analysts argue, the Canadian armed forces represent the dues expected

The survey, the second in an annual series of such surveys, was commissioned by CIIPS and designed by the author and Institute staff. This article represents the first public release of the results. It was conducted in June-July 1988 by the Longwoods Research Group with a national sample selected randomly to be representative of Canadian households and chosen from a panel of 30,000 households maintained by Market Facts Ltd. The survey was conducted by mail and comprised 1002 respondents in all, 573 of whom also participated in the 1987 survey. The response rate to the 1988 survey was 63%. The margin of error with a sample of this size is approximately $\pm 3\%$, 95 times out of 100. The full descriptive results of the survey and technical information on sampling, etc., are available in a CIIPS Working Paper by Michael Driedger and Don Munton.

though it seems to be, has shaken Canadians' convictions about the first question, Canada's international alignment. Support for continued NATO membership appears as strong as ever. Indeed, few Canadians (20%) want to reduce that role, let alone withdraw from the alliance. Most (80%) reject the idea of any reduction. This compares with the 89% who opted, in a 1984 United States Information Agency (USIA) poll conducted in Canada, for continued membership rather than withdrawal.

Most Canadians, furthermore, clearly believe in the basic "power politics" principle of maintaining a military balance in Europe. About seven out of every ten (70%) agree or strongly agree with the statement on the 1987 CIIPS survey that "Although it's been over 40 years since we have had a World War, it is still necessary to maintain a military balance in Europe to prevent open aggression and hostilities."

Consistent with this principle, Canadians support maintaining if not increasing the country's military contribution to NATO. The same 1987 poll found half wanted Canada's force level in Europe maintained while almost one-quarter preferred to increase it. (These figures are little changed from the early 1960s when the question was last asked. About 10% thought the forces should be reduced and slightly less than 25% opted for outright withdrawal of the troops.)

These figures are all the more remarkable when juxtaposed with the strong tendency to regard the protection of Canadian territory and sovereignty as the best reason for any possible increase in Canadian defence forces. Fully three-quarters offer this rationale in the 1988 survey, rather than the promotion of Western defence or increased influence in NATO.

The vast majority of Canadians generally understand what NATO is and does. Gallup surveys through the 1960s found about 75% could provide a reasonable description of NATO objectives in response to an open-ended question. A 1984 survey found 78% knew Canada had armed forces in Europe; less than 10% incorrectly thought it did not.

ALLIANCE SUPPORT DOES NOT, OF COURSE, NECESSARILY translate into support for a continued defence effort. On the contrary, it might be expected, particularly in a lesser power such as Canada, to reduce that level of support. This is because of the so-called "free rider" phenomenon: A common observation about "collective goods" such as collective defence is that those who have less to contribute tend to contribute even less than they might because they realize that the benefits of the organization will accrue whether or not they exert themselves. The size of Canada's defence effort – on a per capita or per dollar of GNP basis, let alone on its totality – has often been criticized by observers, and some suggest Canada is a classic alliance "free rider."

Whether or not that charge is justified in terms of effort, relative or otherwise, the idea is not a line of thinking to which Canadians seem prone. On the second major question we are considering here – what level of defence spending is necessary? – over 40% agree or strongly agree in the CIIPS poll that the

Canadian government should spend more on defence. While this figure means, of course, that about six in ten disagree, most of these almost certainly want defence spending to remain at about the present level.

Moreover, support has increased in recent decades for enlarging the armed forces. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, a height of the cold war period, Canadians were evenly divided between those who wanted to maintain the forces at existing levels and those who wanted to increase their size. In the 1987 CIIPS poll, when the same question was asked, respondents favoured, by a 2 to 1 ratio, increasing the size of the forces over maintaining them at the same level. The proportion in favour of decreasing their size was unchanged and almost negligible (See figure 1).

One of the factors operating here is undoubtedly the public acceptance of the validity of ministerial statements and a litany of criticisms in the media regarding the poor condition of much of the Canadian armed forces' equipment. But another factor is also at work.

In the USIA poll, conducted a month after the Mulroney government won the 1984 election, Canadians were asked whether or not their country was contributing its fair share toward Western defence. Given that the average person tends to be a little hesitant about admitting to be a shirker, it is revealing that 44% accepted the idea that Canada was not doing its fair share. Only 25% insisted that their country was doing enough.

There is an important caveat to note: what support exists for increased defence spending appears to be, in the pollsters' term, "soft." The CIIPS respondents were asked immediately subsequently to the question on defence spending levels, whether or not the Canadian government should increase taxes to provide the funds necessary for increased defence spending. Of those who had said defence expenditures ought to be increased, about one-third (32%) agreed that a tax increase would be acceptable.

There is at the same time a group of approximately three in ten Canadians overall who profess to want a greater defence effort but say they are not prepared to bite the hard bullet of higher taxes to pay for it (See Figure 2). Alternate means exist, of course, by ▷

Figure 1

From what you know or have read, do you think the Canadian defence forces should be larger, about the present size, or smaller.





Figure 2

The Canadian government ought to spend significantly more on defence – strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.

The Canadian government should raise taxes to increase its spending on defence – strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.



which increased defence expenditures might be met. Compared to cuts in other spending programs, for example, increased taxes are distinctly unpopular. Cutting social services appears the least palatable option, according to the 1984 Goldfarb poll, but almost three times as many Canadians would be willing to reduce foreign aid to pay for a larger defence budget as would accept cuts in pensions and family allowance.

In sum, the apparent softness in support for increased defence expenditures must be balanced against the unpopularity of the revenue options. One proposal certain to generate more opposition than higher government spending seems to be higher government taxes. This apparent softness must also be balanced against the fact that when it comes to raising revenues, there is often less public acceptance, especially of higher taxes, on public opinion polls than there is in reality. Moreover, the popularity of increased defence expenditures is underscored by the fact that all three major political parties promised more defence spending in the recent election and none seems to have suffered from advancing that position.

THE THIRD AND FOURTH QUESTIONS ARE CONSIDERED together: What military capabilities are possible and appropriate, and what general policies ought to be

followed? Most clearly and unambiguously, those polled reject nuclear weapons for Canada. Only a small minority (14%) agree Canada should equip its armed forces with nuclear weapons. This result corresponds with a 1985 CBC poll which found roughly a third willing to have nuclear weapons "on Canadian soil." The subtle distinction here, between having such weapons in Canada's own arsenal and having someone else's weapons in Canada, is apparently not lost on the public.

An anti-nuclear stand, however, does not translate into automatic opposition to the Mulroney government's proposal to purchase a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. In response to the question "The Canadian government recently announced its intention to purchase ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines to enable the armed forces to patrol Canada's three oceans. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposed plan?" 55% of the CIIPS respondents approve or strongly approve. Indeed, as many approve of the submarine acquisition while disapproving of Canada having nuclear weapons (44% overall) as disapprove of both (42%) (See Figure 3).

These two positions are nevertheless related: the small minority in favour of a nuclear capability are almost universally in favour of the submarines; those

opposed to a nuclear capability, much the larger group, still tend more than those in favour to oppose the submarine purchase. This is not at all to say that Canadians confuse the nuclear propulsion with nuclear weapons; previous polls suggest little such confusion. It is to say that the association, the fact that Canada would be joining an exclusive "nuclear club" of sorts, leads to opposition.

Lower levels of support for the subs have been found in other surveys with different question wording. Questions asked by the CBC and the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament do not mention the "three oceans" role and instead emphasize the multi-billion dollar cost. Such wording seems to lower the level of support to around 40% or less. Price tags, however, like the prospect of higher taxes, reduce the attractiveness of many potential purchases. The policy problem in the case of the submarine proposal, unlike that for defence spending in general, is that opposition is clearly based on more than the high price tag.

If there is clearly a strong consensus that Canada's defence capabilities ought to be conventional rather than involving nuclear weapons, there is less consensus on the specific defence policies that ought to be followed. Particularly striking is the lack of support for the use of nuclear weapons by NATO if conventional defence measures prove inadequate against a Soviet attack into Western Europe. Only about one-third of Canadians approve despite the fact that such a first-use of nuclear weapons is a basic doctrine of the alliance. While most Europeans are understandably opposed to first-use, Canadians might have been expected to have fewer compunctions about the use of nuclear weapons on European territory.


THERE IS SCANT EVIDENCE IN ALL OF THIS FOR CONCLUDING that Canadians are anti-military and little that they are even "unmilitary," if by that label is meant a reluctance to maintain defence expenditures in peace time. Canadians are certainly not "unmilitary" in the sense that they have no coherent attitudes on defence and security. In fact, what emerges from these polls are two reasonably consistent defence policy "logics" on the part of the Canadian public. Those who support a greater defence effort also tend more than those who don't, to support increased taxes to pay the bill, a greater NATO commitment, and the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines; those who do not support one of these measures tend not to support the others.

But perhaps most interesting is Canadians' continued commitment to an alliance and to conventional defence despite their substantially altered perceptions of the traditional enemy and lack of a perceived immediate threat. Given this lack of a psychological foundation, that commitment could easily weaken. A major policy dilemma for the newly elected government may, therefore, be maintaining existing support for a defence effort in the face of further improvements in superpower relations, and further progress in East-West arms control leading possibly to reductions in conventional as well as nuclear weapons. □

Figure 3

Canada ought to equip its Armed Forces with nuclear weapons – strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.

The Canadian government recently announced its intention to purchase ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines, to enable the armed forces to patrol Canada's three oceans – strongly disapprove, disapprove, approve, strongly approve.



The Superpowers and International Security

Results of a three-country comparative survey

THE PUBLICS IN THREE KEY WESTERN COUNTRIES — CANADA, THE UK AND THE Federal Republic of Germany — continue to exhibit a broad wariness of both superpowers, despite the Washington and Moscow summit meetings, the recent improvement in US-USSR relations, and the ratification of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty.

These are some of the results of cooperative public opinion surveys carried out recently in all three countries, the first time coordinated polling on this topic has been done in these three nations. The new multinational results strongly back up those of the earlier CIIPS poll (See *Peace&Security*, Winter 1987/1988).

Canadians, Germans and Britons in the late 1980s see less of a serious military threat from the Soviet Union. They are as skeptical of the policies of the US as those of the USSR. The common problem they perceive is not the USSR but both superpowers. And the degree of commonality seems as striking as the opinions, especially given the different geographic positions of the three allies.

Asked what is the greatest threat to world peace, only a very few Canadians, Britons and Germans chose the Soviet Union (see figure 4). As many or more in each country chose the United States, the leader of the Western alliance, as the greatest threat. (In Canada, the ratio was 11% to 5%; in the UK, 16% vs. 2%; and in Germany, 4% and 4%). More Germans, in particular, regard the superpowers' arms race as the major problem. Nuclear proliferation and regional conflicts, such as the Middle East, however, seem to most people to be the greatest threats to world peace. Consistent with this picture, overwhelming majorities (more than 85%) in all three allied countries regard a Soviet attack on Western Europe, the standard NATO war scenario, as unlikely or very unlikely. As large or larger majorities see little chance of a Soviet attack on North America, Japan or China.

The black-white, cold war perspective has clearly diminished, perhaps almost disappeared. Only a minority in each country regards the USSR as aiming at world domination. Canadians and Germans though, are more likely than Britons to believe the Soviets are more interested in domination.

Most in the three countries seem cool about the policies of both superpowers. A majority of Canadians, Britons and Germans express little, very little or no confidence "in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems." While a majority of those in

all three countries have low confidence in the USSR as well, four in ten Canadians and Britons (40%) and one in three Germans (33%) express very great or considerable confidence in the ability of the Soviet Union to deal wisely with present world problems.

Despite the recent superpower summit meetings and the improvement in US-USSR relations, more than one in every four in Canada and Britain still believe a nuclear war to be likely or very likely. One explanation of this level of concern may be that relatively few expect such a war, if it occurred, to be the result of a deliberate attack.


The most likely scenarios in most people's minds are not the usually discussed problems of Western security. Over six in every ten Canadians, Britons and Germans think it more likely that a nuclear attack would be triggered by accident than by a deliberate, aggressive action. Notably, many (around 40% in each of the nations surveyed) fear some other country in the world, rather than one of the superpowers, would be responsible, especially in the case of a deliberate attack.

One prescription for security seems clear: reduce nuclear weapons stocks. Over three-quarters in all three countries agree or strongly agree with the statement that "the security of Western countries could best be increased by substantial reductions in both American and Soviet nuclear weapons."

Despite being American allies, strikingly few in Canada, the UK or the Federal Republic would prefer to have a world in which the US was the predominant military power. The vast majority — over 80% — in each of these western countries would prefer the two superpowers to be about equal in total military strength. □

Figure 4

Which of the following situations do you think poses the greatest threat to world peace ...



The public opinion data presented here are the product of the International Security Project, a cooperative effort of three national survey organizations and the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS). Like the larger domestic survey referred to in this issue of *Peace&Security*, it was coordinated by Professor Don Munton of the University of British Columbia. Results of the comparative survey were first released in August 1988. The British poll was carried out by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd. It was based on interviews with a national sample of 819 adults, aged 18 years and over, conducted during the period 7–12 July 1988. The German poll was carried out by the Institute für Angewandte Sozialwissenschaft (INFAAS). It was based on a national sample of 1473 adults, 18 years and over, interviewed during the period 11–23 July 1988. Percentage results from samples of this size are generally accurate to within +/– 3%, 95 times out of 100.

GARBAGE DUMP FOR THE WEST

The business of exporting toxic waste from rich, industrial countries to poor, debt-ridden ones is almost as profitable – and a lot less risky – than either drug trafficking or the arms trade.

BY ALAIN BORGOGNON

IT IS NOTHING NEW FOR WESTERN developed countries to get rid of whatever is dangerous or undesirable by sending it as far away as possible. As long ago as the eighteenth-century, France was sending convicts to Devil's Island, and England was sending them to Australia. So far as the disposal of toxic waste is concerned, history is only repeating itself.

It has been known for some years that rich countries were disposing of toxic waste by sending it to "Garbage Can States." However, apart from a few incidents, things had gone fairly well for both the exporters and importers. The scandal finally broke in 1988.

Karim B, Khian Sea, Bark, and Lynx among others, are the names of cursed cargo ships the media has brought to the attention of the whole world. The tribulations of these ships, some with sick crew members on board, made front-page news as they sailed from port to port in search of a place to drop anchor. Suddenly, no one wanted anything to do with the noxious cargoes which, until then, had attracted scant attention.

Too many countries, too much garbage, too many middlemen, too much money, too many accidents – this "trade" could no longer be kept a secret. As a result of pressure from the media and from certain courageous politicians, tongues began to wag and the truth came out: the South was being used as a garbage dump for the industrial pollution of the North. Put more charitably, one could say that the West was purging itself of toxic waste that was beginning to choke it while at the same time showering money on debt-ridden poor countries.

It is estimated that every year the industrialized countries have to dispose of 400 million tons of dangerous industrial waste. Almost all the industrialized countries – with the United States clearly in the lead – have exported or tried to export their toxic waste; an activity carried on by corporations with the more or less tacit approval of national governments. The list of those which import this waste is also very long. It includes many countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Certain states in Eastern Europe also accept large quantities of waste from the capitalist West in order to satisfy their need for hard currency. The trade between the two Germanies is as impressive as it is discreet since it involves the transfer of 700,000 tons of waste from the West to the East every year.

THIS COMMERCE, WIDELY REGARDED as immoral, has arisen partly out of political expediency, but above all in response to the economic needs of Western industry. The latter pays between US \$2.50 and \$40 a ton for the waste it sends to Africa, compared to the \$75 to \$300 it would take to deal with at home. According to another estimate it costs approximately \$2,400 to "detoxify" a ton of this waste in the US, Europe or Japan. From an economic point of view, therefore, it is much more profitable to send it South.

Apart from the financial considerations there are important political factors at work: First, the ecological movement is gaining support in the developed world; and second, as a result of this con-

cern, industry is faced with increasingly rigorous national regulations which forbid the dumping of almost anything, anywhere in their home territories.

It is important to note that none of the recent scandals have come to light through the actions of Western governments. Usually the administrations involved do no more than note the intentions of those exporting the waste. Most frequently, and this is true in the US, officials check that the export documents are in order – that the country to which "the goods" are being sent is prepared to receive them. After all, there is nothing illegal about such deals if both countries have agreed to it. That is how, last year alone, four-hundred ships laden with toxic waste legally left US ports bound for Canada, Europe, Asia and Africa.

How many of these ships did in fact unload their cargo at their destination? How many dumped their loads at sea and paid their crews to keep quiet? How many secret dumps for toxic waste are there in West Africa alone? How many people have suffered or are still suffering from contact with products which have been stored near them and which they know nothing about? There are no figures available; the recent scandals may well be only the tip of the iceberg.

Guinea Bissau. About a year ago a company based in the Isle of Man contacted the Minister for Natural Resources in Guinea Bissau concerning the possibility of storing US pharmaceutical waste at Binta. The deal involved three million tons a year for five years at \$40 a ton. That added up to \$600 million for Guinea Bissau – twice its external debt, three times

its gross domestic product and twenty-five times its annual export earnings. It was the deal of the century. On 9 February 1988 a preliminary agreement was signed. But in April, as a result of a leak, the source of which remains unknown, the affair was reported by the Portuguese newspaper *Lusa* and the project was abandoned.

Guinea. On 16 February of this year the cargo ship *Bark* unloaded 14,500 tons of ashes, which had come from an incinerator in Philadelphia, on the island of Kassa opposite Conakry. Apparently the local authorities were unaware of what was happening and the question of toxic waste was never raised. The talk was of ashes and construction material. However, the appalling odour which soon arose, and the fact that the surrounding vegetation was dying, led the local population to protest. In the resulting uproar, the President of Guinea imprisoned the officials concerned for corruption and complicity. The Norwegian Consul in Conakry was also implicated. It was ultimately revealed that 85,000 tons of ashes – previously refused entry by Panama because they were hazardous – were to be stored at Kassa at the cost of \$12 a ton. In June, Norway sent a cargo ship to take back this waste and clean up the site in Guinea. The waste in question is now being stored in Ohio.

Benin. On 12 January 1988 a Gibraltar firm signed a contract with four government ministers from Benin. The project involved storing hundreds of thousands of tons of industrial sludge, polymerized material, mineral waste, and of other substances "to be agreed upon as the need arose." Benin

would receive \$2.50 a ton together with an investment of 50 cents per ton in its agricultural development and tourist industry. It was only when the Minister of Health – who had not been informed of the proposal – joined local ecologists in lodging strong protests with the President, that the deal was abandoned.


Nigeria. On 2 June of this year the Rome newspaper *Il Mondo* ran stories on the traffic in toxic waste between Italy and Nigeria. Its claims were proved accurate when 2,000 barrels were discovered in the Nigerian port of Koko; two hundred barrels contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and traces of radioactivity were also detected. A Danish cargo ship had unloaded the barrels in October and November 1987. Loaded in Pisa, this cargo had originally been refused entry by Romania. The affair led to a diplomatic crisis between Lagos and Rome and fifteen people were arrested in Nigeria, including two Italians. The Nigerian government has subsequently announced that it may impose capital punishment. In the meantime, dozens of inhabitants of Koko are in hospital undergoing treatment for nervous disorders – just a coincidence?

Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Mauritania, Haiti, Venezuela, Brazil, Syria, Lebanon, the Bahamas, Panama, Guatemala, India, South Korea – in the last two years these and many other countries have been front-page news because of attempts to unload hazardous waste originating in the West. In most of these instances the exporters seem to have been foiled in their attempts, however, experts estimate that for every failed attempt at least seven other cargoes have been delivered without difficulty.

WHAT IS ESPECIALLY SERIOUS, if not criminal, is the fact that the countries receiving this toxic waste usually lack the technical means to handle the goods they are getting. There is rarely any study of the geology of the waste storage sites, so that toxic material may well contaminate drinking water and fishing resources. It is conceivable that the substances being transported will remain haz-

ardous for decades, centuries in the case of certain organic materials. As for medical problems, these countries are in no way prepared to deal with what lies ahead, especially if they do not know the exact nature of the substances involved.

Seveso (Italy), Love Canal (the United States), Lekkerkerk (Netherlands), the metallurgical factory Hoboken-Overpelt (Belgium), Georgswerder (West Germany), St-Basile-le-Grand (Canada), Los Alfaques (Spain) – these names and others are evidence of the



West's failure to get its act together as far as toxic waste is concerned. In 1985 the US Environmental Protection Agency listed 21,512 sites as potentially dangerous. In Britain the government estimates 10,000 hectares of land are contaminated. The situation is almost as bad in Europe and Japan. In 1983 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that 5,000 loads of toxic waste had gone between Canada and the US during the course of the year, and that 100,000 had been transferred from one European member to another.

In addition, there are the problems not fully understood by scientists connected with synergistic reactions (chemical interactions) of various waste products stored together. And the problem is made worse by the fact that industry introduces approximately 2,000 new substances every year, making it impossible to chart the extent of the hazard.

Nonetheless, the scandals and the spectacle of ships wandering the globe have had some positive effects. The populations most at risk, particularly those on the coast of West Africa, are now aware of the danger. Legal actions now underway, for example in Guinea and Nigeria, are likely to prove a deterrent, particularly if European or American middlemen are found guilty or worse still condemned to death. Several of the countries which have been used as garbage dumps are now trying to

announce that five of its cargo ships which had spent months looking for somewhere to dump their waste had returned to Italian ports. Several other countries including Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and France have announced that they are tightening up their regulations. At the international level the OECD, the European Economic Community, the Organization for African Unity and the United Nations Environment Programme are now trying to draw up statutes to deal with the problem.

There is no inclination to place an outright ban on the export of toxic waste. Rather, what is under consideration is the imposition of much stricter controls. Exporters would have to provide a clear description of the substances involved and would be required to prove not only that the importer had agreed to accept the materials, but that it also possessed the technical means required to store or destroy them. Under the aegis of the United Nations, an international toxic waste convention may be signed in March 1989 in Basel, Switzerland – an international centre of the chemical industry. Eastern Bloc countries have begun to realize that their own waste, when added to that transferred from the West at a handsome price, is likely to prove perilous; they also are playing an active part in preparing this document.

protect themselves through stricter international regulations. At a meeting of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) early in 1988 there was talk of an all-out effort to halt "toxic terrorism."

But we should have no illusions. The West's export of toxic waste to poor countries is, at the moment, almost as profitable – and less risky – than either the arms trade or the drug trade. This year's scandals have also shown that there is a whole network – a toxic waste "Mafia" – at work, often with the paid connivance of officials and leaders in the importing countries.

WHAT IS THE SOLUTION? Obviously the industries concerned will have to deal with these problems by themselves or at least among themselves. There must be much more emphasis on treating waste rather than storing it, however expensive such a change in strategy may prove. In September 1988, Italy – one of the largest exporters of waste after the United States –

The West must take some action, for the present situation is destabilizing. Apart from the fact that it involves flagrant political and economic injustice and endangers the health of entire populations, this issue has serious implications for international relations. With this traffic in waste, the rift between the North and the South grows deeper. Trust between nations, an essential requirement for peace and security, is reduced to a meaningless concept. □

(Translation by Mary Taylor)

For Further Reading:


J.P. Hannequart, "La politique de gestion des déchets," Institut pour une politique européenne de l'environnement, Berlin, 1983.

Jeune Afrique, Enquête, July 1988.

New York Times, "Waste Dumpers Turning to West Africa," 17 July 1988.

THE INSTITUTE FIVE YEARS ON

A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION



BISSONNETTE: Geoffrey, maybe you could begin with a summary of your personal thoughts after the five years you have spent at the Institute...

PEARSON: I think that in the future we are going to have to try to come to some conclusions about whether we ought to select more carefully what we do, and how, in particular to mix Canadian interests with international questions....


The meaning of security is now so blurred that it can be stretched to cover almost anything. The Prime Minister was talking yesterday, at the United Nations, mainly about poverty and the environment and setting up a new centre on the environment. Well, who knows, five years from now there may be a dozen Canadian institutes dealing with various aspects of international security. So what will we do then? Will we be compelled to concentrate on more traditional definitions of security – of military questions primarily – and leave the other aspects of security to more specialized bodies. I hope not.

COX: Do you feel that the Institute needs to be bound by the intention of the creators?

PEARSON: I think that the Act creating the Institute is wide enough to encompass, or to justify, whatever we want to do. Conflict resolution can be interpreted to mean conflicts created by environmental problems, poverty problems, any problems leading to conflicts. So I don't think that the Act inhibits us. It is rather the nature of the selection process about what we do, given the various alternatives.

In June 1984, the House of Commons adopted, in a unanimous vote, Bill C-32, an act creating the *Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security*. In the years since, what has been accomplished? Does CIIPS suffer from being located in Ottawa? Is it too anglophone? How will CIIPS adapt its mandate to a rapidly changing world?

To reflect on these and other questions, at the end of September *Peace & Security* invited three individuals with varying connections to CIIPS to a roundtable discussion. The participants are **Lise Bissonnette**, journalist and since 1986 a member of CIIPS Board of Directors; **David Cox**, member of the department of Political Studies at Queen's University and former CIIPS Director of Research; and **Geoffrey Pearson**, departing Executive Director of CIIPS and former Canadian ambassador to the USSR.



BISSONNETTE: As far as the Institute's role on the international scene is concerned – I know I'm being provocative here – I have always been under the impression that we're simply trying to position ourselves in the arena of large international conferences. To achieve that, we conduct research on just about anything, as you say – the Middle East here, South-East Asia there – since the objective is to be invited to Moscow one day, the next day to Stockholm and the day after to Washington, and later to Pakistan. I think we've done it, it's been accomplished, the Institute is known, I should imagine, all over the world. But the Institute has no "Canadian specificity," to use a Quebecois term, on the international scene, and that is the dimension I would like to see grow. What subjects should we be working on? Is it because Canada is a specialist in verification that the

Institute must necessarily do research on verification?

PEARSON: I haven't, in my own mind, decided what is the best approach. Our mandate is also to educate, and it is primarily to educate and inform Canadians, not Swedes, Norwegians, or Palestinians. And therefore, we are responsive to the interests of Canadians from whatever point of view. Whether, for example, they want to know about cruise missiles, on the one hand, or about what is going on in Namibia on the other. In both cases, Canada's interests are involved. So a shotgun approach can be defended. But I think it is something we have to decide; whether we want to pursue that shotgun approach, responding to people's interests, or whether we want to concentrate

on particular things, as other institutes have done and have gained their reputation from doing.

The IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies] in London is known for the East-West orientation of its studies and has gained a reputation, globally. The Soviets used to quote IISS statistics to me, when I asked about Soviet arms questions. So, will there come a time when they quote CIIPS views? Do we want to have a flagship project of some kind, which would give us a particular profile internationally? I think my view is "no," because, again, we are oriented towards Canadians.

BISSONNETTE: Fine, but if that is true, Geoffrey, how do you justify all the international activities of the Institute?

PEARSON: Well, we are invited to conferences because Canada is a respected country, and in that sense, we reflect our foreign policy. Mr. Clark goes to all kinds of meetings that he might rather not go to....

Canada has close political ties with at least half the world's nation states, through the Commonwealth, and la Francophonie and so on. The Institute is more or less in that situation, so I think that it is probably inevitable that we should be present at many of these international meetings. We can go to these meetings, bring back what we learn, and digest it for Canadian purposes, so that it becomes understandable to Canadian journalists and Canadians who are interested in these matters. But we don't have to study all questions.

COX: Is the answer not that you can do both? You respond, with all the dangers of dispersal, to the

external community and then sharply focus the internal activities of the Institute.

PEARSON: Whatever we choose to do, should we try to give the Canadian audience and any international audience that is looking on, a balanced view of every question, or should we encourage our scholars and others, to give a particular view based on advocacy of particular solutions? That is a question that will continue to face us as well, and I guess that we will probably not come to final conclusions on policy because we are not a pressure group; we are not a lobby; we don't have a mandate to persuade the government to do certain things. I expect we will continue to emphasize the balanced view, whether it is because we publish various points of view, and you have that balance, or whether we publish impartial studies. It doesn't matter, as long as the views are well expressed and well based. We should publish what we think are valid contributions to the debate. But we won't normally express a point of view as an institute. But that will always be a subject of some controversy because the media, in particular, looks for, as you know Lise, a "yes" or "no" answer.



BISSONNETTE: People rely on the Institute to get reference material. But as far as Canadian problems are concerned, people would certainly like someone to tell them, for example, whether or not the idea of getting nuclear submarines is crazy or if it's a great idea. That's what is hard to find in the Institute's documentation, something that will enlighten us. That brings us to the whole question of the relationship, the connection the Institute has, with the Canadian government. Is it supposed to evaluate the performance of government? Is it supposed to follow the government's agenda? Should we be quite close to it or should we deal with it at arm's length? That question is not yet resolved as far as I'm concerned ... as a member of the Board, who sees things somewhat from the outside. It's not clear.

PEARSON: I started last year the writing of an annual report on the international situation and the Canadian government's response to it, and we will continue that this year, and I hope that it continues as a regular Institute publication. It is an end of the year review of what the government has been saying and doing. It may be critical, or it can be supportive; it depends on what the author thinks the government has been doing. But that is in the name of the Executive Director, and I think we all agree that it doesn't necessarily represent the views of the Board of Directors. It could become an important annual document – who knows – a key document in foreign policy debates over the next few years. That is one way of establishing our bona fides if you like. I think the government will come to look forward to this, perhaps be slightly apprehensive about it, because it will be critical of some of the things that are done.

COX: I must say, that I find that some things which are relatively small are enormously gratifying. One that comes immediately to mind is that the study undertaken for External Affairs on the arms control register, and the conference that was held, are having an effect. I believe, in fact, that the entire process has helped the people, who were interested in the idea to begin with, to present their views to External.

PEARSON: As another example, Mr. Clark asked the Institute to organize a meeting between Canadians of Arab and Jewish origin. We did that at Montebello. It stirred up all kinds of controversy, but nevertheless, it was the first time that there had been an organized meeting of this kind in which public funds had been used. So it was an important breakthrough and has definitely led to a greater sensitivity on both sides to the need to understand each other better. The Institute can be a kind of catalyst for such things, if we look for these opportunities and are re-

sponsive to the government's concerns. However, we must never be regarded as speaking for the government. But we can act as a catalyst, an intermediary, an objective source of knowledge, and so on. I think that is as important a role as any.



COX: What did you think the Institute would be like? Has what's happened been what you expected to happen? Is it what you wanted to happen?

PEARSON: I think when it was first proposed, nobody quite knew what it was supposed to be. It was a vague idea in the Speech From the Throne. There was really no more to it than that the Canadian public needed to know more about these issues. It was thought that the information we were getting from the States through the media was not always accurate or didn't always reflect Canadian concerns and interests. Therefore, we needed something of our own, which is a very Canadian idea; we are always creating corporations which are designed to do that – to clarify or reinforce our own identity. So, I accepted that. I was also very conscious of the fact, having just come back from Moscow, that much of the information being published on East-West relations was not only inaccurate, but deliberately distorted by certain sources. This was during the height of the Reagan administration, so that was understandable....

What I did not expect was that we would get into this whole grants business. The word "grant" is not mentioned in the Act. This was a Board decision, that we needed to help voluntary organizations that didn't have funds to pursue their interests, because the government or the private sector wouldn't help them for one reason or another. I accept that now. I think that was the right thing to do, but I don't think that it has to be permanent. I don't think that we have to go on forever writing cheques for NGOs.

BISSONNETTE: I speak as a Quebecker, but I'm sure that if I were from Halifax or Vancouver. I would react in the same way. It

has a very distinctive "Ottawa institute" flavour. It might be very convenient as far as research goes, but if we consider public programmes, the education of Canadians and so on. I think it definitely creates a problem. From Quebec's point of view there's a gap, even though we're not very far away. Over the years the relationship between the Institute and Quebec has improved dramatically. But this sort of incestuous relationship between the federal government and the Institute is a pity. It was inevitable, mind you, given the circumstances, but ... I'm not sure how we would go about dissociating ourselves a bit from the government.



PEARSON: There is a language barrier, that's certain. I don't know if the fact that the Institute is in Ottawa has anything to do with it. Even in Montreal, I don't think that we would have found a lot of francophone researchers who could have or would have worked at the Institute.

BISSONNETTE: I beg to differ. It's really too bad that the great tradition of Canadian foreign policy has evolved without the participation of francophones. This tradition must be developed among francophones. The international Francophonie is a reality.

PEARSON: We are supposed to be global in our interests. And the advantage of being in Ottawa is that you have access to information – not classified information, which we do not have access to and have not asked for and do not want – but information which is available through official documents and other sources which you couldn't find easily outside Ottawa. You have to balance that advantage against what Lise has been saying. And I don't know what the answer is. It would be very useful for someone to look at the record of Ottawa-based institutions. Ottawa tends to be dominated by a kind of anglophone view of the world despite bilingualism. I hope we continue to be sensitive to that question. ▬

WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE SUBMARINES

Canada has invested a lot of diplomatic capital in its plans to purchase nuclear-powered submarines from either France or Britain. Choosing between them is proving difficult; choosing neither will leave Western allies distinctly unhappy.

BY SHARON HOBSON

ONE OF THE TOP ITEMS ON the new government's agenda is the nuclear-powered submarine. The \$8 billion mega-project has already been delayed nearly nine months – in part because the political stakes are so high. Canada is the first to buy a complete nuclear-powered submarine design from another country, and further delays would raise eyebrows in the international community.

This is not a simple matter of deciding whether the French or British design is best suited to the navy's requirements; the government's decision also has to take into account other factors, diplomatic and economic. Britain and France, for example, are two of Canada's most important trading partners. Last year, two-way trade with Britain was \$7.2 billion, and \$2.5 billion with France. Canada and France also have negotiations underway that could be affected by the outcome of the submarine competition. For example, Canadair Limited is trying to sell water-bombers to the French government. Also, France and Canada are negotiating over fishing rights in the vicinity of St. Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland's coast.

But Canada owes Britain a favour. The British have cancelled plans to impose legislation calling for all fur products to carry a label stating if the animal involved was caught in a leg-hold trap. Ottawa feared the repercussions for its fur industry, and especially the effects on Canada's native people, if Britain passed that legislation. Just before Prime Minister Thatcher attended the seven-nation economic summit in Toronto, her government dropped the proposal.

Canada and Britain have close naval ties: their submarine officers train together, and Canada's current fleet of three Oberon-class subs was designed and built in Britain. Both navies operate in the North Atlantic and both specialize in anti-submarine warfare. Within NATO, a British and an American commander coordinate all submarine movements in the North Atlantic and Canadian subs work closely with these two main players. France is not integrated into the alliance's military structure. These differences in alliance participation have been exploited by the British in their lobbying for the Canadian contract.

BRITAIN'S VICKERS SHIPBUILDING and Engineering Ltd. (VSEL) has proposed its Trafalgar-class nuclear-powered submarine design for the Canadian fleet. The Trafalgar is generally acknowledged as the most effective nuclear-powered attack submarine currently in operation, and has a proven under-ice capability, but it will not necessarily win the design competition.

It is up against the Amethyste-class boat being offered by French companies under the auspices of SNA Canada Inc. The Amethyste is seen as a more modern, automated submarine, incorporating new silencing techniques and advanced operating technologies. That does not necessarily make the Amethyste a better submarine. It would have to go a long way to beat the large, fast, silent, and deep-diving Trafalgar. But the Amethyste does have an edge – the French government owns the tech-

nology and none of it has to be approved for sale by a third country.

Because the Trafalgar's reactor is based on US technology transferred to Britain in 1958, and despite the fact that the 1980s reactor bears little resemblance to the original design, the US, through two bilateral agreements, holds a veto over whether or not Britain can sell the Trafalgar design to Canada. A 1958 agreement between the US and Britain has been amended to allow Vickers to sell nuclear-powered subs to Canada, but a 1959 agreement between Canada and the US still threatens to nix the sale. The 1959 agreement prohibits the export of US nuclear fuel and technology to Canada – and the British submarine uses nuclear fuel enriched in the US. (Trafalgar uses ninety-five percent enriched uranium. Britain is not able to enrich it to that level so it buys that service from the US.)

This past June, Canadian and American representatives negotiated an amendment to the 1959 Treaty which does not put any extra constraints on Canada's purchase of Trafalgar-class submarines, other than those imposed by Britain. Now the amendment has to be passed by Congress. Not all members of that institution are happy at the thought of Canada acquiring nuclear submarines, and it is widely expected that hearings will be held on the issue. In essence, there will be an American investigation of Canadian defence policy – something Ottawa would find galling.

France not only owns the technology in its Amethyste-class submarine, but is also able to provide Canada with the enriched uranium fuel. The Amethyste's reactor uses only six percent enriched uranium,

and France has the enrichment facilities to do this for Canada, thus cutting the US out of the fuel-cycle loop. Buying the French boat would not leave Canada hostile to American whims or pique.

The Amethyste is also cheaper. However, the design will have to be modified to Canadian specifications – lengthened by seven metres to accommodate the navy's weapons system of choice, the Mark 48 torpedo; and ice-strengthened and equipped with an "ice-pick" in order to meet the Canadian requirement of being able to break through up to one metre of ice.

WHAT REMAINS AN UNKNOWN, is how much all these changes will push up the unit price. At the moment, the French estimate the new, modified Amethyste will cost approximately \$380 million per boat. That compares favourably to the \$453 million estimated cost of a Trafalgar-class submarine. With a project ceiling cost of \$8 billion (all figures in 1986-87 dollars), the Department of National Defence (DND) would be able to buy twelve French submarines as compared to a maximum of ten British.

The Trafalgar is of an earlier design than the Amethyste, but both boats will have to undergo various, expensive updates over the coming years if Canada's submarine fleet is to be effective into the twenty-first century. Although the project budget of \$8 billion includes some money for technological upgrades, it is likely that sum will be insufficient and DND will be faced with some unpleasant choices as technological need runs up against budgetary constraints.

Moreover, the agreement negotiated so far with the British only gives Canada the nuclear technology which is in the Trafalgar today. The French, on the other hand, have proposed joint development of reactor technology. All this puts the French proposal in a better light than expected when it entered the competition as the perceived underdog.

Ottawa knows it cannot please everyone in its design choice; the challenge will be to keep the diplomatic damage to a minimum. One way of doing that is to direct other defence contracts to the losing country. For example, both Britain and France have companies involved in the \$2-billion-plus Tactical Command, Control, and Communications programme. Also, the French are likely to put in a bid for the \$2.5 billion tank replacement programme.

REGARDLESS OF THE DESIGN choice, the Canadian shipbuilding, nuclear, and associated industries all stand to benefit greatly from the government's proposed acquisition of nuclear-powered subs. Jim Clarke, President of the Canadian Maritime Industries Association, says there is a vast difference in benefits for industry between building diesel-electric and nuclear-powered submarines. He says the technology already exists in Canada for diesels, but the nuclear programme "would introduce a whole new generation of technology into Canada."

The government's proposed programme is an economic lifesaver for the shipbuilding and nuclear industries, for which orders have plummeted in recent years. Clarke says cancelling the plan and replacing it with one for diesel-electric boats and surface ships, will not bestow the same benefits. Not surprisingly, his organization strongly supports the decision to buy nuclear-powered submarines. So does a group of businesspeople and academics who have formed a group specifically to promote the acquisition of nuclear-powered subs. The Committee for a Sovereign and Effective Naval Defence includes former Liberal defence minister

Jean-Jacques Blais, academics Harriet Critchley and Joel Sokolsky, and businessmen Conrad Black and Jim Clarke.

Some have questioned the credibility of the Committee because a couple of its members could benefit directly from the programme. Blais, for example, is acting on behalf of Thomson-CSF, one of the key suppliers to the French Navy. But the Committee was not formed purely out of self-interest; the members believe acquiring a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines is Canada's best naval option.

Apart from the Liberals and NDP, the most vocal opposition to the purchase comes from the non-governmental "peace movement" and the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. Representatives of the Centre have dispensed their views to newspapers across Canada and have appeared before the Standing Committee on National Defence.

If the nay-sayers in Canada and the US convince Ottawa to drop its plans, the after-effects will be felt at home and abroad. Such a decision would amount to a repudiation of the 1987 defence white paper. The proposal to acquire a fleet of ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines was the centrepiece of the Conservative government's policy paper. That document painted a picture of a bipolar world in which Canada would willingly shoulder the military burden of being a reliable member of the western alliance. To that end, Canada would do more in its own defence, and rationalize its alliance commitments.

The government, recognizing Canada as a maritime nation, put as its first priority the rebuilding

of the navy; the heart of that plan was to acquire a nuclear-powered submarine fleet. The navy was elated. Plans to buy fourteen more frigates and four new diesel-electric submarines were cancelled and instead the navy would receive six more frigates and ten to twelve nuclear-powered subs.

The change of plan fits in nicely with one of the government's top priorities – deficit reduction. Based on the government's estimated cost of \$8 billion (critics expect the cost to be much higher) the annual expenditures will average \$300 million over twenty-seven years. The programme to buy the first six patrol frigates, in comparison, has annual expenditures as high as \$800 million. The annual expenditures for the cancelled eight anti-air warfare frigates and four diesel-electric subs would have been even higher. By buying nuclear-powered subs instead and spreading the purchase over almost three decades the government is freeing up hundreds of millions of dollars which could be used to reduce the deficit in the near term.

CANCELLING THE PROGRAMME FOR nuclear-powered submarines will not solve the government's deficit problem; it will likely make it worse as Ottawa struggles to come up with the money for shorter-term naval projects to maintain an effective fleet. Internationally, a cancellation could irreparably harm Canada's reputation. Britain and France have provided large amounts of extremely sensitive information in good faith that Ottawa intends to proceed with its plans. If the Canadian government


now turns around and drops the programme, it will have received that information for absolutely no (financial) cost. Neither France nor Britain will acquiesce quietly; other allies will wonder whether or not Canada can be trusted again.

Canada has invested a lot of diplomatic capital in the submarine programme. Ottawa has worked hard to convince NATO that a Canadian nuclear-powered submarine fleet will strengthen the alliance. And in the United States, President Reagan went against the advice of the US Navy and others to back Canada's decision to acquire the subs. Still, the allies have remained skeptical of Canada's commitment to carrying through: as strategic analyst Joel Sokolsky says "they're waiting for Canada to be Canada." Only by going ahead with the programme, will Canada gain NATO's respect.

The task force assigned to evaluate the competing submarine design proposals has not formally finished its evaluation. The evaluation was broken down into ever smaller groups studying finer and finer details. The areas looked at included operational characteristics (the submarines were not compared to each other but to the navy's requirements), cost, international implications, and industrial benefits.

The teams have now completed their work but what remains to be done is the final "roll up" – bringing it all together. Once "rolled up," the evaluation goes to the Senior Review Board (an inter-departmental board) and the Minister of Defence. He will then present it to Cabinet. Given the political will, this could all be accomplished within a number of days.

For the past nine months, that will has been lacking. Aware that an election was to be called this summer or fall, Cabinet has been reticent to make a decision on an \$8 billion programme, especially one with the word "nuclear" in it. Especially worrying were some public opinion polls which showed that support for the project was waning, although DND's own polls did not show this. With the election over, the government must now decide.



JOHN W. HOLMES

CANADIAN PEACE-SHAPER

1910-1988

JOHN HOLMES' MAJOR WRITING work appeared in two volumes under the title: *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957*. It is a brilliant piece of writing based on scrupulous research covering many events in which John Holmes had participated. I recently read his gripping account of those tense days when Pearson and Hammarskjöld together produced the formula that brought into being the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which effectively ended the Suez Crisis. And I was taken back to Cairo and the long night in which a group of us tried to follow those events on radio. In the morning we came out and against a bright blue sky a British Canberra bomber was describing a figure eight but no bombs were being dropped. Ten days later I was establishing the information office of the UNEF HQ camp at El Balah on the Suez Canal and beginning a seven-month assignment to report on the successful operation of the United Nations' peacekeeping force. *The Shaping of Peace*, should be required reading for every politician, teacher and community leader in Canada.

John Wendell Holmes was born in 1910. After his graduation from the University of Western Ontario, he took his M.A. degree at the University of Toronto. He taught for several years at a progressive boys school, Pickering College, and proceeded to the University of London for further graduate studies. The war came and he returned to Canada. Discovering that the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) was looking for a National Secretary, he applied for the job and, somewhat to his surprise, was accepted.

John Holmes discovered that a prevailing theme of CIIA discussions – Canada's status as a Commonwealth and North American nation – had now been rendered more specific: Canada in a post-war world. It also prepared John for the job he was handed when in

On 13 August 1988 John Holmes, a preeminent figure in both the study of Canadian political and foreign affairs and in formulation of foreign policy, died at the age of seventy-eight. King Gordon was a long-time friend of Holmes and worked for the United Nations in various capacities including that of Director of the UN Information Centre for the Middle East during the Suez Crisis in 1956.

BY KING GORDON

1943 he was asked to join the Department of External Affairs. That job was as Secretary of the Working Commission on Post-Hostilities Planning.

Two events sharpened the focus of the planners. In October 1943, representatives of four great powers in the wartime alliance – the US, the USSR, Great Britain and China – met in Moscow to set in motion a plan to create a post-war international organization to guarantee the peace. The following year the Dumbarton Oaks Conference met in Washington. Representatives of the US, the USSR and Great Britain reached agreement on a draft text of a constitution for the United Nations Organization. It is important to note that the distinctively big-power document that came from Dumbarton Oaks underwent significant change at the subsequent San Francisco Conference. A Charter with an almost exclusive emphasis on the collective responsibility of the great powers to maintain the peace, was broadened to assert the concern of the new world organization to promote and protect human rights, foster programmes to promote more just economic and social development and initiate a cooperative effort to replace a colonial system with free and independent states. In producing these fundamental changes, Canada and other Commonwealth countries had exerted a decisive influence.

In 1948, John Holmes attended the Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris. He was then posted to Ottawa to head the United Nations Division of the Department of External Affairs. Far from confining his activities to Ottawa, the new position brought him into direct involvement with UN activities in New York: twice as acting head of the Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN, active on numerous Canadian delegations in UN sessions and frequent advisor to Canadian officials, including Lester Pearson, then Secretary of State for External Affairs.

When John Holmes retired from External Affairs in 1960, to become President and then Director General of the CIIA, he carried with him certain firm ideas about Canada's position in the post-war world and the foreign policy that would make that position clear and effective.

In the first place he believed that Canada's security must be sought and found in a secure international community. A threat to Canadian security called for combined action to resolve conflict through mediatory or peacekeeping measures. The alternative, which Holmes rejected, is an extended version of the medieval armed city state, where the prince, sheltered behind fortified walls, guarantees security to all within range of his artillery. The concept has carried over into the nuclear age; Reagan and Bush refer to it as "peace through strength."

Secondly, in an international community, Canada has a special role to play as a middle power. It is not sufficient to shelter under the protection of a great power nor to make futile attempts to match its strength. But Canada has resources which exceed those of the majority of other states that can be applied to achieve effective results. In the third place, the UN must be seen as occupying a key role in Canada's post-war position in the international order.


These were the ideas John Holmes' life gave testimony to during the last three decades in the CIIA and as a teacher, writer and consultant to government and non-government organizations. He had a literal belief – perhaps the adjective should be "realistic" – in the first seven words of the UN Charter: "We the peoples of the United Nations..." Not just governments but peoples, who have a direct interest in a just and peaceful community, have an important role in bringing it into being.

When I think of John Holmes, I think of the words of Dag Hammarskjöld in his Swedish Academy lecture on Linnaeus:

Only those who do not want to see can deny that we are moving these days in the direction of a new community of nations, however far away we may be from its full realization, however often we may seem to have chosen the wrong path, however numerous the setbacks and disappointments have been. Could it be otherwise, when no other road appears to open out of the dangers a new era has created?

John Holmes was so contemporary, so sensitive to the important changes in the pattern of the global society. Just the other evening I mentioned his name to a visiting Soviet scholar. His eyes lit up. "John Holmes!" he said. "He spent a week with me in Moscow just a year ago. He was so excited, so happy!" New hope in a new age. □

DEFENCE NOTES



Star Wars Developments

In late September, General Abrahamson announced his intention to resign as director of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to take a position in the private sector. Earlier that month, Abrahamson presented revised cost estimates for a "Phase I" SDI deployment of a system to destroy ballistic missiles launched against the US. The Phase I plan called for the deployment of 3,000 space-based interceptors carried on 300 satellites, with up to 2,000 ground-based interceptors in support. It would require a combination of space-based and ground-based surveillance systems.

The official costs of this system, planned for deployment in 1998, went from an estimated US \$60 billion in early 1987 to \$120 billion in early 1988. In June the Defense Department asked Abrahamson to reassess the programme. By reducing the number of interceptors and making the sensors less complex, the new proposal recalculates the cost at close to the original estimate of \$60 billion. It is not clear how the changes will affect the original Department of Defense requirement that the Phase I system be capable of intercepting thirty per cent of a 5,000 warhead Soviet attack.

However, a recent study by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) suggested that a Phase I type system might destroy anywhere from "a few to a modest fraction" of the warheads in a large Soviet attack. The OTA study, part of which was declassified and released in June, considered that the system might be technically deployable in the

1995–2000 period. However, the study suggested that it would only make sense to deploy if there were high confidence in the technologies required in Phase 2 – in the period 2000–2010 – when the defence would need to employ directed-energy weapons, and measures to counter probable improvements in Soviet offensive forces.

Sharing SDI With the Allies

While doubts mount that SDI budgets will be sufficient to maintain the pace required for the first phase of deployment, it has become clear that earlier promises of extensive allied participation in SDI research have not materialized. By the end of 1987 about US \$127 million in contracts had been awarded to foreign firms. When the British government signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the US in 1985, they hoped for more than \$2 billion in contracts over a five-year period; by the end of 1987 British firms had obtained only \$30 million worth.

Canada did not sign a Memorandum of Understanding, and there has been little commercial interest in the SDI programme. A report in the *Globe and Mail* (10 October) suggested that SDI contracts to Canadian firms totalled less than \$1 million.

New Bombers and Air Defences

In August, at Kubinka airbase outside Moscow, US Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci sat in the cockpit of the most modern Soviet bomber, the Blackjack. Close-up views of the Blackjack confirmed that its dimensions and probable range were exactly as described in releases by the Pentagon. The Pentagon accounts were reportedly based on US reconnaissance satellite photographs dating from the early 1980s. Twelve Black-

jacks may now be deployed, with the expectation that the aircraft – which resembles the US B-1 – will replace about a hundred older Bear bombers dating from the mid-1950s.

As new combinations of penetrating bombers and long-range cruise missiles enter the arsenals of the superpowers – including the US B-2 "stealth" bomber scheduled for public unveiling in mid-November – the problems of early warning and defence against cruise missiles are being taken more seriously. Although still very small by comparison with SDI, the Air Defence Initiative (ADI) has a budget of US \$200 million for 1989. The US Navy appears to be emerging as a prominent participant in the programme. The Navy is researching passive and active acoustic sensors to improve the detection of cruise-missile submarines in coastal waters. More generally, the ADI research programme appears to be concentrating on technologies for airborne surveillance systems that would eventually replace the North Warning System in Canada and other ground-based radars. According to the 1987 Defence White Paper, Canada is participating in the ADI programme.

US Bases Overseas

During the past several months the United States has discussed the renewal of agreements on military bases with three allies: the Philippines, Spain and Greece. In the Philippines, where the US operates Clark air force base, Subic naval base and other facilities, it has agreed to a substantial increase in direct payments to Manila (from US\$ 180 million to \$481 million per year), as well as to other financial subsidies. The agreement is expected to lead to further talks on the status of the bases after the leases expire in 1991.

Spain, having previously refused to extend the lease of a US air force F-16 base, has agreed to

the continuation of three other US bases on Spanish territory. Greece, however, has confirmed that a US air force base at Hellenikon, near Athens, will be closed when a defence agreement expires at the end of 1988. There are three other major US military installations in Greece, the future of which are now under negotiation.

Finally, reports from Iceland indicate that NATO is seeking a second air base in that country to reduce pressure on the existing US base at Keflavik. In the event that the request is refused, a location in Greenland is also said to be under consideration.

UN Peacekeeping

The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to UN peacekeeping has renewed interest in both peacekeeping and the United Nations. The mediating role of the Secretary-General in the Afghan and Iran-Iraq cease-fires is generally seen to have restored credibility to the organization, which nevertheless continues to suffer from serious financial deficits. In an unexpected move, President Reagan signalled a change of heart towards the UN by offering to pay US \$144 million out of the total US deficit of \$520 million.

The Soviet Union has also discovered the value of peacekeeping. In early October Vladimir Petrovski, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, proposed in New York that a permanent UN peacekeeping force be established, and offered Soviet support in its creation. In response, the Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark, declined to comment directly on the Soviet proposal, but affirmed Canada's interest in establishing peacekeeping on "a more professional and broader basis." □

— DAVID COX

ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



ABM Treaty

The long-awaited third Review Conference of the US-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 took place in Geneva from 24 to 31 August. It was preceded by a sharp debate within the US administration over whether or not to charge the USSR with a "material breach" of the Treaty because of the construction of a large radar complex near the central Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk. The US government (as well as most private arms control experts) have long contended that the radar, because it is not situated on the periphery of the USSR nor facing outward, violates a key provision of the Treaty meant to prevent early-warning radars from being used in a nationwide ballistic missile defence. The USSR continues to insist that the radar is for space-tracking, not covered by the ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, in response to US concerns, in October 1987 it imposed a moratorium on further construction of the radar, which US intelligence sources estimate is still three or four years from completion. These sources also belittle the radar's military significance, given its vulnerability to attack.

Declaring the radar to be a "material breach" of the Treaty would lay the groundwork for US abrogation of the agreement, as desired by many advocates of the US Strategic Defense Initiative. The US State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff were reported to be resisting such a move, partly on the grounds that the USSR would be in a better position than the US to build, relatively quickly, a nationwide defence.

While the debate was going on in Washington, on 19 July the USSR announced its willingness

to "dismantle the equipment of the Krasnoyarsk radar in a verifiable way that would leave no doubts on the part of the United States," conditional on agreement "to abide by the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972." The Soviets had previously offered to dismantle the radar, but only if the US did likewise with two of its new radars in Greenland and Britain, which the Soviets (backed by some arms control experts) charge are themselves violations of the Treaty. Disagreement over the interpretation of the ABM Treaty has been one of the chief stumbling blocks to a new strategic arms reduction (START) agreement. The US State Department welcomed the new Soviet proposal as a "positive step," but continued to insist on the radar's dismantling "without delay and without conditions." The US debate over the "material breach" issue was temporarily resolved on 8 August, when the White House announced that the decision would be deferred until after the Review Conference.

Unlike the previous two review conferences (in 1977 and 1982), the meeting at the end of August failed to produce a joint communiqué reaffirming the Treaty's aims and purposes. The US delegation afterwards stated that it had made clear to the Soviets that the US would not sign a START agreement if the radar were not dismantled. The Soviet delegation, in turn, threatened to withdraw from the START talks if the US abrogated the ABM Treaty. It revealed that, at the meeting, the USSR had proposed such measures as advance notification of the building of new radars, agreement on ways to distinguish missile defence radars from other kinds, and mutual inspection of disputed radars. Later, it was reported that the Soviets had sug-

gested the possibility of joint manning of the Krasnoyarsk radar, but that this had been rejected by the US for fear that its personnel could be expelled in a crisis. The Soviets were also reported to have informally suggested replacing the radar's large, sophisticated transmitter with a less-capable, mechanically-steered dish (also rejected by the US as insufficient).

On 16 September, in a speech in Krasnoyarsk, Soviet leader Gorbachev publicly offered to turn the radar into a "centre of international cooperation for peaceful uses of outer space," under the control of a proposed World Space Organization. This offer was apparently unconditional, although Gorbachev, referring to the disputed US radars in Greenland and Britain, stated that "We expect Washington to take corresponding steps in reply to our new initiative." US officials reportedly said the proposal would be acceptable to the US if it involved dismantling the radar or converting it into a new type, but not if it amounted simply to "legitimizing" its completion and operation.

On 6 October, it was reported that Soviet officials had called for technical experts from the two sides to review the details of a Soviet plan to dismantle or modify the radar. The US was said to have agreed in principle to such a meeting.

At the end of October, the Soviet government announced that the radar would indeed be turned into a civilian-run space research centre and that the USSR expected the US to take similar measures with its UK and Greenland sites. At the time *Peace & Security* went to press there had been no reaction from the United States.

Nuclear Test Limitations

The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, or underwater. On 4 August, its 25th anniversary, five countries at the

Conference on Disarmament in Geneva began an effort to transform the Treaty into a comprehensive test ban by submitting to Britain, the US, and the USSR (its "depository governments") an amendment to prohibit underground testing as well. If the proposed amendment gains the support of a third of the Treaty's parties – as appears certain, since one hundred countries approved the idea at last year's UN General Assembly – this will force the depository governments to convene a conference of all parties next year to consider the amendment. However, actual amendment of the Treaty requires support from a majority of its parties, including all three depository governments. Of the latter, both the US and UK continue to oppose a comprehensive test ban at this time. Advocates of the amending conference are hoping that it will at least put pressure on them to change their position.

As agreed in their on-going Nuclear Test Talks in Geneva, the US and USSR this summer conducted a Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) at each other's underground nuclear test sites – at the US site in Nevada on 17 August, and at the Soviet site near Semipalatinsk on 14 September. For the first time ever, scientists, technicians, and observers from each side participated in an actual underground nuclear test by the other, by monitoring the explosions through a combination of seismic and hydrodynamic means (the former favoured by the USSR, the latter by the US).

Initial results from the Nevada test were controversial, with some geologists insisting that it proved seismic methods to be at least as good as hydrodynamic, and others disagreeing. The USSR has long

favoured seismic methods, since they are less "intrusive," not requiring the presence of inspectors at the actual test site. However, the USSR has also indicated its willingness to accept a small number of on-site inspections, if necessary, to calibrate seismic equipment.

American critics of their government's position on nuclear testing charge that the US is biased against seismic methods because, unlike hydrodynamic measurements, they could be used to monitor a comprehensive test ban — a goal which the Reagan administration has relegated to the distant future.

The results of the experiment will be analyzed and taken into account in completing verification protocols to the US-Soviet Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties of 1974 and 1976, respectively. These treaties, which limit underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons in yield, have yet to be ratified because of US insistence on first strengthening their verification provisions. According to a year-old agreement, the next step will be to negotiate "intermediate limitations" on nuclear testing, such as further reductions in their yield or number. However, a report by President Reagan to Congress in late September cast doubt on the US administration's previously expressed commitment to reduce testing in parallel with nuclear arms reductions. The report denied that there was any "direct technical relationship" between the number of tests needed and the size of nuclear arsenals. It also maintained that the need for testing could actually rise in the context of arms reductions, to ensure that the remaining weapons were reliable. And it stated that any new limits on testing would be acceptable only in the context of a "major reduction in the threat to the US and our allies brought about by a significant alteration in the international environment."

Chemical Weapons Control

Reports of the use of chemical weapons (CW) by Iraq in its war against Iran, and also against its

own Kurdish insurgency, persisted throughout the summer. On 1 August, a UN team sent to the area reported that Iraqi use of such weapons, in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical

dorsed three days later by French President Mitterand, who also called for an "embargo on all deliveries of products, technologies and more generally, weapons" to any state using chemical weapons.

Early Warning

29 November 1988:	three-week session of CD's ad hoc committee on chemical weapons begins, Geneva.
7 to 11 January 1989:	conference on the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons, Paris.
February 1989:	Spring session of the CD begins, Geneva.

weapons, had become "more intense and more frequent." Since 1984, six different UN fact-finding teams have confirmed chemical weapons use in the Gulf War. Iraq did not admit such use against Iran until July, and has never acknowledged using chemical weapons against its own Kurdish rebels. On 26 August, the UN Security Council condemned the use of chemical weapons in the war and asked the UN Secretary-General to investigate promptly any future allegations. It also pledged to take "effective and appropriate measures" when allegations are confirmed. However, on 16 September, Iraq refused a request by Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar to admit a UN team to investigate Kurdish allegations. Both houses of the US Congress have voted overwhelmingly to impose sanctions on Iraq unless the US President certifies that Iraq has ceased using chemical weapons and will allow on-site inspections by impartial observers.

In his farewell speech to the UN on 26 September, President Reagan called on the parties to the Geneva Protocol, as well as other states, to convene a conference "to consider actions that we can take together to reverse the serious erosion of this treaty." Examples later given by the US State Department were the drafting of detailed provisions for UN investigations of alleged violations, and protocols for controlling the sale of chemicals to states violating the agreement. The proposed conference was en-

On 20 October, France announced that, as the depositary of the Geneva Protocol, it would hold a conference of foreign ministers in Paris from 7 to 11 January to reaffirm and strengthen the agreement.

Meanwhile, efforts continue in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to conclude a global Convention banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. At the CD on 28 July, in what it described as "another major step toward greater openness," the US for the first time identified its five past and present chemical weapons production sites, including the types of chemicals produced at each plant and the procedures for destroying the installations under a Convention. It also endorsed a Soviet proposal for a multilateral experiment to conduct trial inspections of civilian chemical plants. By the end of the summer, a number of states, including East and West Germany and Japan, had joined with the superpowers in agreeing to begin trial inspections on a national basis before the end of the year, as a prelude to an international exchange of inspectors. The chief US delegate, noting that the CD was now spending about ninety percent of its time on the chemical weapons negotiations, predicted on 16 September that they "could move very close to concluding a treaty next year."

Brief Notes

The first of 1,752 Soviet and 859 US intermediate-range missiles to be eliminated under the

INF Treaty were destroyed on 22 July and 8 September, respectively. Also in accordance with the agreement, "baseline inspections" of all missile operating bases and support facilities to verify the initial exchange of data were completed by 1 September. Soviet inspectors had visited twenty-six installations in the US and Western Europe, US inspectors 133 installations in the USSR, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

In a speech to the UN General Assembly on 27 September, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed a number of measures for strengthening the UN's role in arms control, including an international monitoring and verification agency and a conventional arms transfers register. He also called for a multilateral agreement to limit the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. US and Soviet officials held their first bilateral meeting on the latter subject, as called for at the Moscow Summit, in Washington on 26 September.

In a speech in Krasnoyarsk on 16 September, Mikhail Gorbachev reaffirmed a Soviet pledge not to increase the number of its nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region, calling on others to do likewise. He also proposed a freeze on naval forces in the region; reducing naval and air force activity in the Yellow and Japan Seas; a multilateral, regional Incidents-at-Sea agreement; and the creation of a negotiating mechanism for Asian-Pacific security. Finally, he offered to give up the Soviet Navy's "material and technical supply station" at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, if the US agreed to eliminate its military bases in the Philippines. The latter proposal was immediately rejected by the US, in the midst of negotiations (successfully concluded in October) with the Philippine government over the future of the bases. □

— RON PURVER

REPORT FROM THE HILL



Editor's Note: The 33rd Parliament came to an end on 1 October when Prime Minister Brian Mulroney called an election for 21 November. The new Parliament is expected to be called into session early in December. Because of the timing of the election and Peace & Security's production schedule, election results are not reflected in this issue of the magazine.

Southern Africa Policy

A Commonwealth committee on Southern Africa consisting of eight foreign ministers under the chairmanship of Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark met in Toronto on 2 and 3 August. The committee had been created at last October's Commonwealth summit in Vancouver to develop plans to combat *apartheid*. Its end-of-meeting report contained suggestions to Commonwealth and other governments about how to widen and tighten economic and other sanctions. Yet the opposition in Parliament appeared to judge the results of the meeting disappointing.

On 10 August Liberal MP Bob Kaplan demanded to know if the government planned to invoke total sanctions against the South African regime, citing remarks the Prime Minister had made before the UN General Assembly in October 1985 that Canada would sever relations absolutely if no progress were made in dismantling *apartheid*. Similar questions persisted from both Liberal and NDP members in the weeks leading up to the Prime Minister's address to the UN General Assembly on 29 September. In that speech, Mr. Mulroney referred to "specific new measures [announced earlier in the week] to tighten the ban on government contracts with South African com-

panies and a further ban on high technology." This did not prevent Liberal leader John Turner from criticizing the Prime Minister in the House the following day for his failure to use the occasion to break off both diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa.

UN Peacekeeping

On 9 August Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced that Canada had agreed to provide troops as part of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) set up to monitor the ceasefire in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. An initial force of about 850 is being provided by twenty-four countries. Only fifteen Canadians will serve in the eventual force of 350 unarmed military observers who will patrol the ceasefire zone along the 1,200 kilometre border between the countries. In the first six months, however, Canada is providing 495 additional troops to set up a communications infrastructure for UNIIMOG. On 24 August Mr. Beatty moved a resolution of support in the Commons for Canadian participation in UNIIMOG which prompted an extended debate on peacekeeping before all-party consent was obtained.

Central America Policy

On 23 September External Affairs Minister Joe Clark released a copy of a letter he had sent to John Bosley, chairman of the Special House Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, in response to the recommendations that committee had made to the government on 5 July. The chief news was the government's agreement to provide \$100 million in addition to currently planned expenditures to assist Central American reconstruction and economic development efforts over a six-year period, 1988 through 1994. This represents substantially more than a doubling of bilateral assistance to the region over the previous five-year period.

In principle, the Minister ac-

cepted the importance of strengthening Canadian diplomatic representation in the region, while rejecting the idea of opening mini-posts in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. Mr. Clark indicated that he hoped to be able to upgrade the position of chargé d'affaires in Guatemala to the level of ambassador. The government also accepted the committee's recommendations concerning technical assistance in human rights and democratic development, and with regard to verification and control measures to buttress the peace accord signed by the five Central American powers in August 1987. However, Canadian assistance would depend on a request by the five countries which, in the latter case, has been stymied by a protracted dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua that has reduced cooperation in the region to a minimum.

The government had already moved on another recommendation of the committee in favour of the creation of an International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Bill C-147, an Act to establish such a centre was introduced in the House on 15 August and Royal Assent was given on 30 September. The centre, which will be established in Montreal, is similar to the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security insofar as it is a crown corporation which has assured funding for the first five years of its existence. Its mandate will be to provide technical assistance, training, and resources for the development of electoral, legislative, judicial and legal systems both in Canada and abroad.

Short Notes from the Hill

The second report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, entitled "The Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project," was tabled in the House on 18 August. It provides an overview of testimony heard by the committee, largely from defence officials, but

also from outside analysts and critics, on the initial stage of the submarine acquisition programme. No recommendations were made.

On 14 August, Yves Fortier was named by External Affairs Minister Joe Clark to replace Stephen Lewis as Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations. Mr. Fortier was a partner in one of Canada's largest law firms and a director of the Royal Bank of Canada. A former president of the Canadian Bar Association and a member of the permanent Court of Arbitration, he has also represented Canada at the Hague in bilateral disputes with the United States and France over territorial and fishing rights. On 26 October it became clear that he would be representing Canada on the UN Security Council when Canada won the election for a two-year term to one of the non-permanent seats reserved for Western countries on the fifteen-member council.

On 29 September it was noted in the House that the Ministers responsible for Science and Technology, Robert de Cotret and Frank Oberle would that day sign an intergovernmental agreement with the United States, nine European countries and Japan governing international participation in the US space station project over the next thirty years. A major point of contention during three years of difficult negotiations was national security use of the station. The compromise reached mandates peaceful use, but does not attempt to define or interpret that phrase. Canada will receive three percent of the use of all station elements in return for providing the servicing equipment for station repair and maintenance.

In September, the United Nations General Assembly elected Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, as chairperson of the First Committee for the 43rd session. □

— GREGORY WIRICK

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



Naïve About US Influence in Haiti

I looked forward to and enjoyed reading Cary Hector's article (*Peace&Security*, Summer 1988) on Haiti. I was dismayed, though, at the seeming naïveté that was indicated by the scant reference to the part played by the US in the recent history of that country.... Their [US] interests were manifest in the fact that they supported Duvalier for many years and had not one word of condemnation about the deplorable working and living conditions that prevailed during his and his father's regimes.... I have been aware for many years of how many companies send goods to countries with poor or non-existent labour legislation and certainly Haiti was a favourite with many of them. Proof of that appeared in the Report on Business section of the *Globe and Mail*, 30 January 1988. In "Haiti retrenches as international aid cut off" we read that: "Many U.S. and international companies send electronics and textiles for assembly to Haiti, where the minimum wage is \$3.00 a day, thus lowering their labor costs. Haiti worked hard to attract these companies but recent political instability has frightened off some investment...." Apparently ... during those earlier, stable times, the US supported Duvalier while people who opposed him were imprisoned, tortured and murdered by the Ton Ton Macoutes. The general population was weakened by poverty, illiteracy and political powerlessness. The US looked on, as the dream of a democratically

elected government was shattered by violence and bloodshed. They have therefore ensured that the misery of the Duvalier times will return to Haiti, cheap labour will continue to be available and yet another country will have been saved from the democratic control of its own destiny. Cary Hector, how could you not have commented on such a negative influence when it played such an important role in the affairs of your country?

Jean Smith, Toronto

Selin's Critique of Feminist Peace Activists Blames the Victims

As a doctoral candidate in international politics who happens to be a woman, I can sympathize with the situation discussed by Shannon Selin in: "Could Women Really do a Better Job?" (*Peace&Security*, Spring 1988). She rightly contrasts the richness of the feminist peace movement with the relative dearth of women in responsible foreign policy positions and the strategic community in general. I was sorry to see that rather than addressing the structural causes for this phenomenon, or trying to find ways of bridging these two communities, Ms. Selin preferred not only to obscure the positions of feminist peace activists but to blame them, rather than the difficulties posed by what she admits is a male-dominated arms control establishment, for the lack of women in positions of power and influence.

... Selin notes, with no little condescension, the proliferation of feminist peace groups, while lumping them all together as a monolithic "women's movement." I would like to think that the diversity of the movement entails a certain respect for the potential for variation and sophistication of positions. Yet, Selin chooses to lump us all together in a single, uneducated mass.

The strategic community, concedes Selin, is male-dominated and would benefit from women's participation. But she fails to consider the possibility that there may be social and structural reasons why women do not enter peace and security fields. As a woman who has studied security and arms control extensively I have found that few women have had encouragement to study in military fields, and many women lack the confidence to feel that understanding strategic issues is within their competence. It is also a fact that many women, as well as many men, are alienated by the tendency of strategic studies to focus on the mechanics of violence rather than to question its use and abuse as an instrument of power. Many women find that the strategic community itself is not hospitable to people with alternative ideas on peace and security, and there exist those few who will seek to discredit a woman who questions the basic tenets of strategic thought, by slurring her competence as a woman.

Selin attacks the credibility of those with whom she disagrees by calling them "moral mothers," rather than treating them as colleagues who have their particular views on issues.... Not only does this attack the seriousness of the women's movement, but it also blames women for the fact that they are left out of political decision-making, an issue that Selin herself laments earlier in her article. This technique is known as blaming the victim.

Similarly, in dismissing feminist holistic views of politics – which see disarmament issues and social welfare issues as integrally related – as "utopian," Selin chooses to focus on what she perceives as the lunacy of the desire for profound social change, rather than to make the simple equation that since, as she herself admits,


this is a male-dominated world, politics tend to address male priorities. Selin asserts that feminists have a biologically determinist position that women are nicer human beings and thus would rule better, implying that the women's movement is chauvinist. The issue is not whether women are better fit to rule than men. The issue is that women, who have been, and continue to be, left out of positions of power and influence, might, if [they were] in power in large numbers, have the leverage to devote more resources to female policy concerns, such as child care and health.

Selin's article points to a broader problem. One of the ways in which advocates of arms control criticize peace activists, who disagree with their positions, is to belittle them as ignorant, naïve and utopian. It is implied that only those with a thorough education in international security and arms control are qualified to discuss such serious political matters as disarmament. The result of such an elitist position is that peace activists say, quite rightly, that the "bombs-and-rockets" people cannot talk to anybody who doesn't "speak their language." In such a climate, yes, Ms. Selin, ending the arms race is utopian. And whose fault is that?

Governments, not peace groups, have control over weapons. And if those in government do not allow disarmament to enter the range of possibilities, then disarmament is unrealistic. But to say that we cannot have disarmament is to say that human beings do not control this planet and do not control their own destiny. Technological determinism does not run this world – people do. And if arms control advocates disagree with that, so be it. But it is a valid viewpoint, and the cause of political stability is not served by discrediting peace activists as naïve.

Andrea Chandler, New York □

REVIEWS



Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies

Matthew Evangelista

*Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1988, 300 pgs., US \$32.95*

Matthew Evangelista, a political scientist at the University of Michigan, begins this important book by asserting that "the relationship between technological innovation and the accumulation of new weapons lies at the core of the Soviet-American arms race." Indeed the dangers of the technological arms race have never been more apparent. As the United States and the Soviet Union continue negotiations to reduce nuclear arsenals, they are both proceeding with long-term plans to "modernize" their nuclear weapons.

Evangelista challenges the popular action-reaction cycle theory of the US-Soviet military innovation with a detailed examination of a multitude of factors which fuel the arms race: technological imperatives, threat perceptions, interservice rivalries, military doctrines and economic and bureaucratic interests being the most prominent.

The result – based on a thorough review of the literature, primary documents, military memoirs and a case study of the development of tactical nuclear weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union – is a new account of the causes and mechanisms of the technological arms race. This conclusion is that the processes of weapons innovations in the two superpowers differ fun-

damentally: in the US, impetus for innovation comes "from the bottom," at the initiative of corporate or government researchers and military officials, whereas the centralized Soviet system produces innovation "from the top," in response to foreign (in other words Western) developments. Evangelista divides the modernization process into five stages in order to see which factors come into play at any given time and his methodology and analysis are convincing. He is both wary of forced generalizations and a simple accounting of "everything" that plays a role in weapon innovation. Nor does he claim too much, as he acknowledges that the evolution of "Star Wars" does not easily fit his model. The book, in my opinion, is by far the most extensive treatment available of the various factors which account for nuclear weapons modernization. My only criticism is that his analysis of American weapons innovation may somewhat understate the importance of US strategic nuclear doctrine (strategic superiority, extended deterrence, counterforce, and so on) in influencing which nuclear weapons innovations are encouraged.

Whether it be in regard to strategic nuclear arms or conventional forces in Europe, the arms race is proceeding with almost unchecked technological "advances." Evangelista recognizes this ongoing weapons modernization as a Pandora's Box which most often results in greater instability. The present period offers an opportunity to put a lid on the technological arms race and makes it all the more necessary to reflect and act upon Matthew Evangelista's final sentences: "In acknowledging the counterproductive nature of the techno-

logical arms race, the US and the USSR would open the way to cooperative agreements aimed at ending it. Both sides would fall under the shadow of the future instead of falling for the fallacy of the last move."

– Simon Rosenblum

*Mr. Rosenblum is the Political
Affairs Coordinator for Project
Ploughshares*

Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability

Donald C. Daniel

*Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1986, 240 pgs., US \$32.50*

Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy

Tom Stefanick

*Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987,
416 pgs., US \$49.95*

For those interested in "strategic anti-submarine warfare (ASW)," it is a treat to have two comprehensive studies of this arcane subject published virtually simultaneously. The only other book-length studies appeared almost a decade and a half ago. Strategic ASW is directed at strategic, ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs) – usually considered the most "secure" (because least vulnerable to attack) leg of the strategic nuclear triad of each superpower. Considered "destabilizing" by many analysts because it threatens to deprive the other side of its ability to retaliate against – and thus deter – a first strike, strategic ASW is the centrepiece of the controversial new American naval doctrine known as the Maritime Strategy.

Of the two books under review, Stefanick's is the more detailed and technical. In fact, the bulk of it consists of eight appendices, on topics ranging from submarine design to "submarine detection in the Arctic Ocean and Northern Seas" (the latter, of course, being of special interest to Canadians). Daniel's book is a good, basic introduction for the general reader.

It is also useful for the specialist, not least because of its excellent documentation. Daniel's book is more narrowly focused on ASW; Stefanick puts it in the context of broader nuclear strategy and naval doctrine, including a trenchant critique of the Maritime Strategy, which had not yet been enunciated at the time of Daniel's writing.

The basic conclusions of the two works are quite similar: neither side's SSBNs are vulnerable to a surprise attack or very rapid attrition during a conventional war, now or for the foreseeable future; "barrage attacks" by ballistic missiles on wide expanses of the ocean to "kill" SSBNs are infeasible, given the area to be covered and the relatively limited number of attacking warheads; and a breakthrough in non-acoustic means of detection (such as the surface detection of submarine wakes) is unlikely. Daniel points out that, even if the latter were to occur, converting it into an operational system would be a slow and readily detectable process, providing ample time for relatively simple countermeasures to be developed.

Both authors discuss the SSBN vulnerability question in terms of two scenarios: (1) a surprise, all-out, first-strike attack; and (2) gradual attrition during a lengthy conventional war. The feasibility of the first is rightly dismissed by both. As for the second, Daniel argues convincingly that the Soviets would not be likely to unleash their submarine-launched ballistic missiles against the continental US for fear of otherwise "losing" them, as this would invite full-scale nuclear retaliation. However, he fails to address the possibility that, in responding to US attacks on their SSBNs, the Soviets might breach the nuclear "threshold" at sea, by attacking US carrier battle groups with nuclear weapons, which could lead to wider nuclear

escalation. Stefanick does consider this possibility, concluding that nuclear retaliation against carriers would be unlikely, but against attack submarines themselves quite likely. The thrust of his critique of the Maritime Strategy is that it would be practically impossible to execute as intended, and could disadvantage the US in a conventional war by tying up too many of its attack submarines in hunting down Soviet SSBNs.

Unfortunately, neither of the books spends much time assessing the prospects for arms control in this area – Daniel devotes only five pages out of 214, and Stefanick fewer than two out of 370! Both authors are pessimistic about arms control, although Daniel endorses a ban on “plunging” ballistic missiles (suitable for barrage attack); while Stefanick notes that limits on the number of attack submarines might benefit the US, and concedes that SSBN “sanctuaries” (areas within which an opponent’s ASW activity is prohibited) might become more attractive in the future. It is true that a substantial literature on ASW controls exists, mainly from the 1970s. However, in view of rapid changes in technology, doctrine (such as the Maritime Strategy itself), and politics (such as the sharp drop in numbers of SSBNs expected to result from a START agreement), greater attention to the issue of strategic ASW controls would have been warranted.

– Ron Purver

Mr. Purver is a research associate at CIIPS

The Future of Immortality and Other Essays for a Nuclear Age

Robert Jay Lifton

New York: Basic Books Ltd., 1987, 368 pgs., US \$21.95 cloth, US \$10.95 paper

In this collection of essays, Robert Lifton explores the pain, confusion, and destruction of recent holocausts of our past (Nazi Germany, Hiroshima, and My Lai)

in an effort to develop an understanding of the “human potential for evil” and its implications for the all-too-possible future holocaust of nuclear destruction. He asserts that this painful and frightening confrontation of our collective responsibilities for past and future events is an essential means through which we can bring about changes necessary to ensure human survival in this nuclear age of “total universal vulnerability.” His initial discussion of the future of immortality, the continuity of the human race, is overwhelming in its use of heavily philosophical and symbolic terminology which may turn off some readers and, hence, reduce the broader impact of this book. But I encourage people to read on, for this book is not just an intellectual exercise. It is a passionate, challenging and hopeful effort to address human destructiveness.

What makes Lifton’s approach different and, hence, enlightening is his linking of psychological theory to social and historical context. He has taken some of the classic psychoanalytic concepts such as guilt, death anxiety, and psychic numbing and connected them to human behaviour in “atrocities producing situations” – situations which create “collective disturbance and mass murder.”

One of the psychological mechanisms Lifton invokes as “an important clue for understanding the psychological behaviour of people who have become associated with actual or potential mass killing” is doubling. This is process by which a relatively autonomous second self emerges and is the one involved in atrocities. This permits the individual to be able to see himself or herself as a normal person – a parent, spouse, and member of the community. This doubling is encouraged by situations of inescapable moral contradiction which transform killing, in the case of Nazi Germany, into a healing process for the group, or in the case of My Lai, into a way of assuring continuity with fallen comrades.

For this reviewer, the process of reading this book was often pain-

ful and depressing. In it, one faces the enormity of human destructiveness and an analysis which makes it all so understandable, and, hence, all the more frightening. And yet, in Lifton’s writing one is able to envision ways to challenge what some see as an inevitable and irreversible path to human destruction. In his final essay, Lifton suggests principles for change, always focussing on the influence of each of us, as individuals and collectively, in the maintenance of life. One comes away from Lifton’s writing with an optimism grounded in some very harsh realities.

– Loreleigh Keashly

Ms. Keashly is an assistant professor of psychology at the University of New Brunswick.

The Road to Peace

Ernie Regehr and
Simon Rosenblum (editors)

Toronto: James Lorimer, 1988, 206 pgs., \$12.95 paper, \$24.95 cloth

The editors of this useful guide to strategies for disarmament in the era of *glasnost* work for Project Ploughshares. They have a genuine concern that the recently signed Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty “will become a symbol of false hope if the momentum for disarmament and the fires of public opinion that produced it are not maintained.”

With eight authors involved, there is some overlapping in the coverage of the various fields of arms control and disarmament reviewed, but generally this study is fairly concise, informative, and free from most of the emotive jargon that passes for commentary on peace issues.

Retired General Leonard V. Johnson, in reviewing the evolution of nuclear war-fighting strategies and their proponents, says Canada has been drawn into a partnership with such strategists, but

he has little to say about similar Soviet strategies. He argues that as a condition for continued membership in NATO, Canada should insist on a nuclear no-first-use policy and a non-offensive defence policy in Europe. A more detailed discussion of this non-provocative defence idea is included in Rosenblum’s chapter on proposals for European disarmament.

Two interesting chapters deal with how increased knowledge has changed our vision of what nuclear war would really be like, written by Don Bates, and a thorough review of verification techniques, their possibilities and political limitations, by Gary Marchant and Al Banner.


John Barrett sums up a study of Canada’s arms control and disarmament policies by suggesting that the Mulroney government, for reasons connected with promoting the free trade deal and high technology research, has undermined Canada’s arms control policies by its cautious reluctance to spell out forthright views on the American strategic defence initiative.

Bill Robinson argues the dangers of the militarization of space and urges ways to produce common security in space through treaties banning space weapons and cooperative programmes for space monitoring. The two editors conclude this volume with a call for making Canada a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This controversial proposal is not to seek immunity from nuclear war, but “is a peacetime measure to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons, to withdraw political and technical support from the nuclear arms race, and to build trust between nations and regions of the globe.” The list of actions required of Canada are detailed. They may be more easily spelled out than acted upon in today’s world, but they are worth discussing, along with the other proposals made in this slim volume. – John R. Walker

Mr. Walker writes a column on international affairs for Southam News. □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* “Livres” section.

NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



Judith Padua, Executive Director of the Clifford E. Lee Foundation in Edmonton, Alberta, was named in October to the Board of Directors of the Institute. Her appointment was announced by Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

"Challenges to Canadian Security in the Year 2000" was the title of the Institute's annual conference, held this year in Winnipeg. Participants looked at subjects ranging from poverty, population and environment to disarmament, arms control and regional conflict. Possible Canadian responses were forecast and examined. Speakers included **Stephen Lewis**, former Ambassador to the UN; **Jim MacNeill**, a staff member with the Brundtland Commission and now with the Institute for Research on Public Policy; **Richard Ned Lebow** of Cornell University; **Jean-Pierre Derriennic** of Laval University; **Douglas Lindores**, Vice-President of CIDA; and **Geoffrey Pearson**.

Prior to the conference the Information Services section of the Institute organized a half-day session for librarians and resource centre personnel in Manitoba and North-Western Ontario on peace and security information resources.

Nikita Bantsekin and **Eugenia Issraelyan** of the Institute for the USA and Canada in the Soviet Union were in Ottawa at different times for several weeks during September and October as part of an exchange agreement between

CIIPS Awards Programme

The Institute invites applications for the CIIPS Awards Programme, open to both academics and non-academics who wish to enter or continue work in the field of international peace and security. Applicants must be Canadian citizens and hold at minimum a first degree or equivalent experience. The Institute has set aside \$173,000 for ten awards, three at \$25,000 and seven at \$14,000. Applica-

tions will be assessed by an independent selection committee and decisions announced in May 1989. The deadline for applications for the 1988-1989 academic year is 1 February 1989. For further information and application forms please write to:

The Awards Division
Association of Universities
and Colleges of Canada
151 Slater Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5V1

their Institute and CIIPS. They travelled to Montreal, Quebec City, Kingston and Toronto to interview Canadians who specialize in their areas of interest - French-English relations, regional conflicts, disarmament and arms control policies of the Canadian government and non-governmental sector, and women's issues.

Ron Purver, **Roger Hill** and **Nancy Gordon** spent several weeks in the Soviet Union at different times during the fall, talking to and working with scholars there on matters of mutual interest.

Geoffrey Pearson spoke at a colloquium organized by students at Laval in September on the new leadership in the Soviet Union. Earlier that month he led a seminar at the Journalism School at Carleton University on East/West relations. **Carl Jacobsen**, a Fellow at the Institute and a member of the faculty at Carleton University, organized a seminar in late September entitled "Soviet Foreign Policy at the Crossroads." Among the people who spoke were **Jerry Hough** of Duke University, **Paul Marantz** of UBC, **Jacques Lévesque** of UQAM, and **Ron Purver** of the Institute.

"The Reduction of the Risk of War Through Multilateral Means"

technical and cultural cooperation. It brought together physical and social scientists, representatives of the indigenous peoples, and policy-makers. Organized by a group including **Franklyn Griffiths** of the University of Toronto and **Ron Purver** of the Institute, the conference attracted an impressive array of international and Canadian speakers. Proceedings of the conference will be available next year.

Chai Chengwen, Deputy Chairman of the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies in China, led a delegation from his Institute which visited CIIPS in September, and took part in a seminar on East/West relations, Sino-Soviet relations, developments within the USSR, and Sino-American relations.

Dietrich Stobbe, member of the Bundestag in West Germany and former mayor of Berlin, addressed a seminar at CIIPS on 25 October on "SPD Views of Gorbachev's Reform System: Opportunities for East/West Cooperation" to a group of officials, academics and M.P.s at the Institute in October. Early in November, **Thomas Kielinger**, editor in chief of the German weekly *Rheinischer Merkur* led a discussion on "Europe in the year 1992."

In mid-October, "In recognition of his distinguished service to Canada, his promotion of international development and disarmament and his many contributions to the scholarly study of international affairs," Dalhousie University conferred upon **Geoffrey Pearson**, Executive Director of CIIPS, the degree of Doctor of Laws, *honoris causa*. □

is the title of a conference sponsored by the Yale University Program for International Security and Arms Control, and CIIPS. The conference, organized by **David Cox**, former Director of Research at the Institute and now a professor of political studies at Queen's University and **James Sutterlin** of Yale, took place in Kingston in early October and discussed multilateral war risk reduction centres, their utility, structure, scope, and feasibility. Participants also focussed on the necessity for improved UN peacekeeping capabilities, and the role of multilateral organizations in dealing with conflicts stemming from social or domestic political tensions. The keynote address was given by **Vladimir Petrovski**, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, who spoke of new ideas for UN action in the field of conflict resolution. The conference agreed to establish a series of small study groups to work on concrete proposals to put to the United Nations.

In late October, CIIPS and Science for Peace co-sponsored an international conference on arctic cooperation. Held in Toronto, the conference focussed on four major areas: the regional and global context, the arms race and arms control, science and cooperation,

PUBLIC PROGRAMMES GRANTS – First Half 1988–1989

Les Ami-e-s de la Terre Québec , Québec Désarmement et action pacifique (Série d'émissions, articles et mini-colloques)	\$ 5,000
Canadian Forces Logistics Association , Ottawa, Ontario Canada's New Field Army (Conference)	4,000
Canadian University Press , Ottawa, Ontario Improving CUP Coverage of International Peace and Security Issues	5,000
Centre d'animation St-Pierre de Montréal Inc , Montréal, Québec Formation aux questions de paix et de désarmement (série d'ateliers)	2,150
Centre for Education, Law & Society Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia Human Rights and the Disappeared: A Canada Latin-America Consultation	5,000
Cinéfort Inc , Montréal, Québec Peace is More than the Absence of War (Film)	10,000
Conference of Defence Associations Institute , Ottawa, Ontario Documentary Film "Canada's Military Heritage"	5,000
Conseil estrien pour la paix , Sherbrooke, Québec Forum "La paix et sécurité" (Atelier)	600
Dalhousie University , Halifax, Nova Scotia Pacem in Maribus XVII (Conference)	10,000
Dalhousie University , Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Halifax, Nova Scotia The Undersea Dimension of Maritime Strategy (Conference)	18,000
Face to Face Media Society , Vancouver, British Columbia Living in the Nuclear Age (Teachers' Guide)	10,000
Global Education Workshops , Stanstead, Quebec Global Education Workshops	1,500
Global Village Sudbury , Sudbury, Ontario Global Village News, Phase II	1,600
Groupe de recherche et de réflexion sur la paix et la sécurité internationales , Outremont, Québec Séminaires et présentations de notes de recherche sur la paix et la sécurité internationales	1,300
The Group of 78 , Ottawa, Ontario Canada and Her Neighbours (Conference)	10,000
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies , Waterloo, Ontario Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa: Envisioning Alternative Future (Consultation)	5,000
International Council for Adult Education , Toronto, Ontario Consultation of Funding Agencies for Peace and Security Issues	1,200
Jarvis, Michael , Ottawa, Ontario A Canadian Journal on Soviet Affairs and Canadian-Soviet Relations	5,000
The Marquis Project , Brandon, Manitoba Rural Schools Peace Education Project	3,900
Monet-Chartrand, Simonne , Richelieu, Québec En route vers la paix	5,700
The National Council on Canada-Arab Relations , Ottawa, Ontario Seeking Peace in the Middle East: Toward A UN International Peace Conference	15,000
Network for Community Justice and Conflict Resolution Kitchener, Ontario North American Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution	5,000
Peace Coalition Committee – Mississauga , Mississauga, Ontario "What is Security?" – The Peace Imperative (Film Festival)	1,000
Peacefund Canada , Ottawa, Ontario Newsletter	5,000
Progress Pictures , Montreal, Quebec Peace Talk Travels: The Arctic Youth Tour 1988 (Film)	9,400
Projects Peacemakers , Winnipeg, Manitoba Peace Projections (Newsletter)	1,000
Project Ploughshares Calgary , Calgary, Alberta Southern Alberta Peace Education Project – 1988	10,000
Queen's University , Centre for International Relations, Kingston, Ontario The US-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy and Technology of Defence (Proceedings)	3,000
Royal Society of Canada , Ottawa, Ontario To Know this Planet: Global Change, A Canadian Challenge	15,000
Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia , Halifax, Nova Scotia The Canadian Army in the Twenty-First Century (Seminar)	3,000
Science for Peace , Toronto, Ontario Publication of the Canadian Papers in Peace Studies	6,000
St. Mary's Secondary School , Cobourg, Ontario Speakers Forum – Canada and the Islamic World	2,000

Terra Nova Integrated School Board , Peace Education Committee Gander, Newfoundland Development of Instructional Units and Materials	8,750
The True North Strong and Free , Inquiry Society, Edmonton, Alberta A Public Inquiry into – The Arctic: Choices for Peace and Security	20,000
The University of Lethbridge , Division of Continuing Education Lethbridge, Alberta Beyond the INF Treaty: Toward International Security and Peace (Conference)	5,000
University of Manitoba , Department of Political Studies Students Conference, Winnipeg, Manitoba Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control: the Forgotten Link	4,500
University of Toronto , University College, Toronto, Ontario Third Inter-University Seminar on Peace Studies	5,000
TOTAL	\$228,600

RESEARCH GRANTS – First Half 1988–1989

Adelman, Howard York University The Global Crisis in Refugee Migration: The Security Problems that Arise in Countries of First Asylum	\$ 7,500
Dhanapala, Jayantha United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Conference on Conventional Disarmament in Europe	10,000
Duhamel, Luc Centre interuniversitaire d'études européennes Les relations sino-soviétiques en 1978–1988 : leur évolution vue à travers les médias locaux dans la région frontalière	10,000
Hervouet, Gérard S. Université Laval, Centre québécois de relations internationales Transformations et équilibre dans la région Asie-Pacifique : une analyse du réajustement de la politique étrangère de quatre états régionaux à l'endroit des États-Unis	10,000
MacDonald, Brian S. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Canada, China and North Pacific Security	5,000
Opazo Bernales, Andres Centam University Confederation (CSUCA) Book on Central America Peace Process	40,000
Pfefferblit, Irving Committee for the Erice Group A Possible Security Regime for the Year 2000	15,000
Rikhye, Indar Jit International Peace Academy The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations and Prospects – Lessons from 40 Years of Experience	20,000
Ross, Douglas Langdon, Frank University of British Columbia, Institute of International Relations Dialogue on Peace and Security in East Asia: Steps towards the Resolution of the Korean and Kampuchean Security Dilemmas	10,000
Rubinoff, Arthur G. University of Toronto Canada-South Asia Political and Strategic Relations: Issues and Perspectives	5,000
Scheinberg, Stephen J. Concordia University, Department of History Civil Aviation and the Failure of Internationalism 1942–1944	2,400
Zureik, Elia Queen's University, Department of Sociology Attitudes to the Israeli Criminal Justice System: An Arab-Jewish Comparison	10,000
TOTAL	\$144,900


Grants Procedures and Deadlines

*The Institute allocates grants twice a year. Contact the Institute
for a copy of updated criteria and application forms. Please note the
following deadlines:*

30 June for an October decision

31 December for a March decision

LETTER FROM MOSCOW BY MICHAEL CONSTABLE



**There's no
Xmas shop-
ping in**

**Moscow, no Xmas trees,
no Xmas lights, no Xmas
presents. There is none of
that here....**

Here it's called New Years – New Years shopping, New Years trees, New Years lights, New Years presents.

Nevermind, it rang my Pavlovian bell anyway; I went shopping.

I found myself pressed in the crowd at Detskymir (Children's World) Department Store, shouldering towards a first floor toy counter.

I shuffled closer, shoulders parted to reveal something olive drab on the counter, shoulders closed. Shoulders parted again, a Babooshka shoved me through the gap and there on the counter, its muzzle staring me in the eye, was the cannon I wanted for Christmas in 1953.

Cast metal, rubber tires, worm gears, cocking lever, magazine – it could lob a fire cracker thirty feet, it was the one all right and I wanted it.... The cash registers whirled, the muzak blared, the slush melted through my boots.... It's a war toy, I do cartoons about war toys, war toys are bad, I left the store. No cannon.

I went back after New Years to examine the arsenal.

I counted twenty toys: sets of plastic soldiers at the cheap end of the scale, 1 ruble; a battery-powered life-size AK-47 rifle at the top end, 20 rubles.

There were no Sci-Fi warriors, or changebots of superhero action dolls.

The play weapons are patterned mainly on World War II equipment reflecting the many WWII movies on TV and at the cinema. The war toys don't have their own TV programmes here like the Rambo and G.I. Joe cartoons.

The package is simple, a box that contains a cannon, shows a cannon. No "enemy" is depicted.

War toys are not advertised here. Shoes, soap and tooth paste aren't advertised either. There is no advertising. But this may be changing. The economy is being restructured. Instead of central direction and subsidy, manufacturing is being put on a profit-loss basis. If a toy company is going to succeed it's going to have to do it on sales alone. Sales orientation means advertising and new products.








For the Soviet toy industry it means an enterprising management team may put out a line of *Action Ivan*® and his mortal enemy *Jihad Joe*®. Research may already be underway for a planet-zapping space walker.

I think it's time for mutual arms reduction in the play room. What Soviet toys lack in electronic sophistication they make up for in cast iron durability. I think parity does exist, particularly in the USSR-USA toy tank forces (see diagram)


I would suggest the elimination of categories A, B and E and the phasing out of C and D as their batteries run down.

The Soviets should be allowed research and experiment in the action figure and planet blaster sectors pending a comprehensive war toy elimination agreement. This will only happen when we get rid of the real stuff that toys are but a reflection of. □

Michael Constable is a professional illustrator and lives in Toronto. He was in Moscow last December.

	U S S R	U S A
A	FLASHING LASER RADIO GUIDED	NONE 
B	RADIO GUIDED	NONE 
C	WIRE GUIDED 	
D	BATTERY POWERED 	
E	WIND - UP 	DISCONTINUED

LETTRE DE MOSCOU PAR MICHAEL CONSTABLE



À Moscou, il n'y a ni em-
plètes de
Noël, ni arbres de Noël,
ni lumières de Noël, ni
cadeaux de Noël! Rien de
tout cela...

Ici, c'est le Nouvel An qui compte; on a donc des emplètes du Nouvel An, des lumières et des cadeaux du Nouvel An. Et puis zut! Le réfrexe de Pavlov s'est déclenché, et je suis parti magasinier. Je me suis retrouvé ballotté par la foule au magasin Deiskymir (L'univers des enfants), m'efforçant, en dominant du coude, d'arriver à un comptoir de jouets, au premier étage. J'ai poussé encore un peu pour finalement apercevoir brièvement, entre les têtes et les épaules, quelque chose de vert olive sur le comptoir. Mais les têtes et les épaules se sont resserrées, et j'ai perdu l'objet de vue. Puis, je l'ai de nouveau entrevu, j'ai reçu une bonne poussée de *babooshka*, et me voilà au comptoir, face au canon que je voulais tant avoir à Noël en 1953. L'«engin» fait de métal coulé, avec des pneus de caoutchouc, des engrenages vrillés, un cran d'armement et un magasin, était capable de lancer un pétard à trente pieds. C'était bien celui que je voulais en 1953... La caisse vrombit, la musique se mit à jouer à tue-tête et la neige sale maculant mes bottes fondues sauta dans mes souliers... «Mais c'est un jouet de guerre; or, je fais des bandes dessinées au sujet des jouets de guerre, les jouets de guerre ne sont pas de bons jouets.» Je quittai le magasin, sans canon.

URSS

A	Laser éclatant Téléguide	Aucun	
B	Téléguide	Aucun	
C	Filoguide		
D	À piles		
E	À remontage		

Après le Nouvel An, je suis retourné au magasin pour examiner l'«arsenal». J'ai compté vingt jouets : des jeux de soldats de plastique, au bas de l'échelle (1 rouble), et à l'autre extrême, un fusil AK-47 grandeur réelle à piles (20 roubles). Aucun guerrier de l'espace, ni transformateurs, ni répliques miniatures de superhéros. Les jouets de guerre reproduisent surtout du matériel de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, car à la télévision et au cinéma, on montre beaucoup de films sur cette période. Ici, il n'existe pas de séries télévisées mettant en vedette, dans des bandes dessinées, des Rambo ou encore des G.I. Joe. L'emballage est fort simple : une boîte contenant un canon montre un canon, un point c'est tout. On n'y dépeint aucun «ennemi». On ne fait aucune publicité sur les jouets de guerre. Pas plus d'ailleurs que sur les souliers, le savon et la pâte dentifrice. Mais les choses vont peut-être changer. On est en train de restructuring l'économie. Au lieu de mettre l'accent sur une direction centrale et sur le versement de subsides, on instaure un régime de profits et pertes dans le secteur manufacturier. Si une compagnie de jouets veut réussir, elle devra le faire uniquement grâce à ses ventes.

États-Unis

A	Laser éclatant Téléguide		
B	Téléguide		
C	Filoguide		
D	À piles		
E	À remontage		

Cette formule supposera donc de la publicité et la mise en marché de nouveaux produits. Dans le contexte soviétique, cela signifie que, dans l'industrie des jouets, un gérant éclairé cherchera sans doute à créer un «Super-Ivan» et son ennemi mortel «Jihad Joe». Le moment est venu, je pense, de prôner la réduction mutuelle des armes dans la salle de jeux. Les jouets soviétiques n'ont pas atteint un degré de perfectionnement électronique aussi élevé qu'ailleurs dans le monde, mais en revanche, ils sont très durables. La parité existe vraiment, à mon avis, notamment au chapitre des chars jouets américains et soviétiques (voir le diagramme). Je propose d'éliminer les catégories A, B et E, et le retrait progressif des catégories C et D, à mesure que les piles s'épuiseront. Il conviendrait d'autoriser les Soviétiques à mener des recherches et des expériences dans le domaine des «superhéros» en attendant la conclusion d'un accord sur l'élimination complète des jouets de guerre. Mais cela ne se produira que quand nous serons débarrassés des véritables armes dont les jouets ne sont, somme toute, que des répliques. ☐ Michael Constable est illustrateur professionnel; il vit à Toronto. Il se trouvait à Moscou l'an dernier, pendant la période de Noël et du Nouvel An.

8 750	Terra Nova Integrated School Board, Peace Education Committee
20 000	The True North Strong and Free, Inquiry Society, Edmonton, Alberta
5 000	The University of Lethbridge, Division of Continuing Education
4 500	University of Manitoba, Department of Political Studies
5 000	Students Conference, Winnipeg, Manitoba
5 000	Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control: the Forgiven Link
5 000	University of Toronto, University College, Toronto, Ontario
228 600 \$	Third Inter-University Seminar on Peace Studies
TOTAL	

SUBVENTIONS À LA RECHERCHE –
Premier semestre 1988-1989

7 500 \$	Adelman, Howard
10 000	York University
10 000	The Global Crisis in Refugee Migration: The Security Problems that Arise in Countries of First Asylum
18 000	Dhanapala, Jayantha
10 000	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
10 000	Conference on Conventional Disarmament in Europe
10 000	Dunham, Luc
10 000	Centre interuniversitaire d'études européennes
10 000	Les relations sino-soviétiques en 1978-1988 : leur évolution vue à travers les médias locaux dans la région frontalière
10 000	Hervouet, Gérard S.
10 000	Transformations et équilibre dans la région Asie-Pacifique : une analyse du réajustement de la politique étrangère de quatre états régionaux à l'endroit des États-Unis
5 000	MacDonald, Brian S.
5 000	Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
40 000	Opazo Bernales, Andres
15 000	Centam University Confederation (CSUCA)
15 000	Book on Central America Peace Process
15 000	Pfefferblit, Irving
15 000	Committee for the Eerie Group
20 000	Rikhye, Indarjit
20 000	A Possible Security Regime for the Year 2000
20 000	International Peace Academy
20 000	Limitations and Prospects - Lessons from 40 Years of Experience
10 000	Ross, Douglas
10 000	University of British Columbia, Institute of International Relations
2 400	Dialogue on Peace and Security in East Asia: Steps towards the Resolution of the Korean and Kampuchean Security Dilemmas
5 000	Rubinoff, Arthur G.
5 000	University of Toronto
2 400	Canada-South Asia Political and Strategic Relations: Issues and Perspectives
2 400	Scheinberg, Stephen J.
2 400	Concordia University, Department of History
10 000	Civil Aviation and the Failure of Internationalism 1942-1944
10 000	Zureik, Elia
10 000	Queen's University, Department of Sociology
10 000	Attitudes to the Israeli Criminal Justice System: An Arab-Jewish Comparison
144 900 \$	TOTAL

Attribution des subventions et échéancier

L'Institut attribue des bourses deux fois par année. Prière de communiquer avec l'ICPSI pour obtenir des formules de demande et un exemplaire du texte énonçant les critères mis à jour. Prière également de prendre note des dates limites suivantes :


30 juin, pour les décisions prises en octobre

31 décembre, pour les décisions prises en mars.

SUBVENTIONS AUX PROGRAMMES PUBLICS –
Premier semestre 1988-1989

5 000 \$	Les Amis de la Terre Québec, Québec
4 000	Canadian Forces Logistics Association, Ottawa, Ontario
5 000	Canada's New Field Army (Conference)
5 000	Canadian University Press, Ottawa, Ontario
5 000	Improving CLP Coverage of International Peace and Security Issues
2 150	Centre d'animation St-Pierre de Montréal Inc, Montréal, Québec
5 000	Formation aux questions de paix et de désarmement (série d'ateliers)
5 000	Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia
5 000	Centre for Education, Law & Society
5 000	Human Rights and the Disappeared: A Canada Latin-America Consultation
10 000	Cinefort Inc, Montréal, Québec
10 000	Peace is More than the Absence of War (Film)
5 000	Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Ottawa, Ontario
600	Forum «La paix et sécurité» (atelier)
10 000	Congress of the Americas, Sherbrooke, Québec
10 000	Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia
18 000	Pacem in Maribus XVIII (Conference)
18 000	Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
18 000	The Undersea Dimension of Maritime Strategy (Conference)
10 000	Halifax, Nova Scotia
10 000	Face to Face Media Society, Vancouver, British Columbia
10 000	Living in the Nuclear Age (Teachers' Guide)
1 500	Global Education Workshops, Stanstead, Québec
1 600	Global Village Sudbury, Sudbury, Ontario
1 300	Global Village News, Phase II
1 300	Groupe de recherche et de réflexion sur la paix et la sécurité
1 300	Séminaires et présentations de notes de recherche sur la paix et la sécurité internationales, Québec
10 000	The Group of 78, Ottawa, Ontario
10 000	Canada and Her Neighbours (Conference)
5 000	Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Waterloo, Ontario
5 000	Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa: Envisioning Alternative Future (Consultation)
1 200	International Council for Adult Education, Toronto, Ontario
1 200	Consultation of Funding Agencies for Peace and Security Issues
5 000	Jarvis, Michael, Ottawa, Ontario
5 000	A Canadian Journal on Soviet Affairs and Canadian-Soviet Relations
3 900	The Marquis Project, Brandon, Manitoba
3 900	Rural Schools Peace Education Project
5 700	Monet-Chartrand, Simone, Richelieu, Québec
15 000	The National Council on Canada-Arab Relations, Ottawa, Ontario
15 000	Seeking Peace in the Middle East: Toward A UN International Peace Conference
5 000	Network for Community Justice and Conflict Resolution
5 000	Kitchener, Ontario
5 000	North American Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution
1 000	Peace Coalition Committee - Mississauga, Mississauga, Ontario
1 000	«What is Security?» - The Peace Imperative (Film Festival)
5 000	Peacefund Canada, Ottawa, Ontario
9 400	Progress Pictures, Montréal, Québec
9 400	Peace Talk Travels: The Arctic Youth Tour 1988 (Film)
1 000	Projects Peacemakers, Winnipeg, Manitoba
1 000	Peace Projections (Newsletter)
10 000	Project Poughshares Calgary, Calgary, Alberta
10 000	Southern Alberta Peace Education Project - 1988
3 000	Queen's University, Centre for International Relations, Kingston, Ontario
3 000	The US-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy and Technology of Defence (Proceedings)
15 000	Royal Society of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario
15 000	To Know this Planet: Global Change, A Canadian Challenge
3 000	Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, Halifax, Nova Scotia
6 000	The Canadian Army in the Twenty-First Century (Seminar)
6 000	Science for Peace, Toronto, Ontario
2 000	St. Mary's Secondary School, Cobourg, Ontario
2 000	Speakers Forum - Canada and the Islamic World

NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



Judith Padua, directrice générale du *Clifford E. Lee Foundation* à Edmonton, en Alberta, a été nommée au Conseil d'administration de l'Institut. Sa nomination a été annoncée par M. Joe Clark, secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures.

«La sécurité canadienne face aux

défis du XXI^e siècle», tel était le

thème de la conférence annuelle de

l'Institut, convoquée cette année à

Winnipeg. Les participants ont

abordé un éventail de sujets, allant

de la pauvreté à la population et

l'environnement en passant par le

désarmement, la limitation des

armements et les conflits régionaux.

Ils ont anticipé et analysé les réac-

tions possibles du Canada. Parmi les

orateurs, mentionnons l'ancien

ambassadeur du Canada à l'ONU,

Stephen Lewis, **Jim MacNeill**,

membre de la Commission Brunt-

land et, actuellement membre de

l'Institut de recherches politiques,

Richard Ned Lebow, de l'Univer-

sité Cornell, **Jean-Pierre Derrien-**

Lindores, vice-président de

l'ACDI, et **Geoffrey Pearson**.

L'Institut invite les personnes intéressées à lui faire parvenir des demandes dans le cadre de son programme de bourses. Peuvent présenter une demande des universitaires et d'autres chercheurs souhaitant amorcer ou poursuivre des travaux dans le domaine de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Les candidat(e)s doivent posséder la citoyenneté canadienne et au moins un diplôme universitaire de premier cycle, ou montrer qu'ils ont une expérience équivalente. L'Institut dispose de 173 000 \$ pour le Programme et il compte attribuer dix bourses; trois vau-

Programmes de bourses de l'ICPSI

dront 25 000 \$ chacune, et sept, 14 000 \$. Un comité de sélection indépendant examinera les demandes, et les noms des lauréats seront annoncés en mai 1989. Pour l'année universitaire 1988-1990, la date limite de réception des demandes a été fixée au 1^{er} février 1989. Pour obtenir plus de détails et des formules de demande, prière d'écrire à : Association des universités et collèges du Canada Services d'administration des bourses d'étude 151, rue Slater Ottawa (Ontario) K1P 5V1.

conférence internationale sur la coopération dans l'Arctique. Convoquée à Toronto, cette conférence portait sur quatre domaines principaux : la configuration régionale et mondiale, la course aux armements et la limitation des armements, la science et la coopération, et, enfin, la coopération technique et culturelle. Cet événement a regroupli des spécialistes des sciences physiques et sociales, des représentants des autochtones et des responsables politiques. Organisé par un groupe comprenant **Franklyn Griffiths**, de l'Université de Toronto, et **Ron Purver**, de l'Institut, cet événement a attiré une foule impressionnante d'orateurs internationaux et canadiens. Un rapport sera publié l'an prochain.

Chai Chengwen, vice-président de l'Institut de Beijing des études stratégiques internationales, en Chine, est venu visiter l'ICPSI en septembre dernier, accompagné d'autres membres de son Institut. Il a participé à un colloque sur les relations Est-Ouest, les relations sino-soviétiques, les événements récents en URSS et les relations sino-américaines.

Dietrich Stobbe, membre de l'Assemblée nationale ouest-allemande, le *Bundestag*, et ancien cours de l'ICPSI le 25 octobre sur le thème : «Le point de vue du Parti socialiste de Berlin, une occasion de Corbachev : une occasion de faire voriser la coopération Est-Ouest». Il s'adressait à un groupe de hauts fonctionnaires, d'universitaires et de députés. Au début du mois de novembre, **Thomas Klingner**, rédacteur en chef du quotidien allemand *Rheinischer Merkur*, a dirigé un débat sur l'Europe de 1992.

À la mi-octobre, «en reconnaissance des services remarquables qu'il a rendus au Canada, de ses efforts pour promouvoir le développement international et le désarmement et de ses nombreuses contributions à la saine étude des affaires internationales», l'Université **Pearson** le titre de Docteur en droit, honoris causa. □

Canadiennes qui se spécialisent dans les domaines que les intérêts, soit les relations entre francophones et anglophones, les conflits régionaux, le désarmement et les politiques de limitation des armements du gouvernement canadien et du secteur non gouvernemental, ainsi que les questions concernant les femmes.

Geoffrey Pearson a pris la parole à l'occasion du colloque organisé par des étudiants de l'Université Laval en septembre dernier sur la nouvelle direction en Union soviétique. Il avait déjà dirigé un séminaire sur les relations Est-Ouest, plus tôt au cours de ce même mois, à l'École de journalisme de l'Université Carleton. **Carl Jacobsen**, membre associé à l'Institut et professeur à l'Université Carleton, a fessé vers la fin du mois de septembre un séminaire à l'université sur le thème : «Soviet Foreign Policy at the Crossroads». Parmi les orateurs, on retrouvait **Jerry Hough**, de l'Université Duke, **Paul Marantz** de l'Université de Colombie-Britannique, **Jacques Lévesque** de l'Université du Québec à Montréal et **Ron Purver**, de l'Institut.

«The Reduction of the Risk of War Through Multilateral Means», tel était le thème de la conférence commanditée par l'Université Yale dans le cadre de son programme pour la sécurité internationale et la limitation des armements, ainsi que

L'Holocauste pour la région alors que Stéphane Yerasimos donne un aperçu historique des problèmes politiques et nationaux dans les Balkans depuis 1683. Il y a lieu de croire que certains subsistent comme le souligne Michel Roux dans son analyse des trois crises de la Yougoslavie. Thomas Schreiber présente ensuite quelques aspects du problème national en Europe centrale et orientale alors que Stéphane Rosière examine la situation des minorités magyares. Ces deux articles font le point entre les problèmes du passé et les questions encore à résoudre avant qu'un projet d'unification puisse vraiment être envisagé. Aussi important que le poids du passé est la question des acteurs. Qui formerait cette Europe médiane et qui gouvernerait? La réponse à ces questions nous dirait aussi quelle forme elle prendrait. Questions spéculatives, évidemment, mais importantes parce qu'elles portent également le poids du passé. Contrairement à Versailles, ne faudrait-il peut-être pas penser en termes de nations pluriel que d'États? C'est avec une prudence intelligente que la revue n'examine pas ces questions. Il n'en reste pas moins qu'il faudra un jour les poser à toutes les nations de la région. Quelle que soit leur réponse, le moment est venu de prendre au sérieux cette idée. Ce numéro de la revue *Hérodote*, qui contient aussi des articles sur Chypre, le Karabagh et la géographie soviétique, a le mérite de vouloir encourager le débat.

— Stanislaw Kirschbaum
Stanislaw Kirschbaum est professeur de science politique à l'Université York, Collège Glendon à Toronto. □

Voir l'analyse sommaire d'ouvrages publiés en anglais dans la rubrique Reviews de Peace&Security.


chevaucher la ligne fortifiée qui coupe l'Europe en deux et comprend des États d'Europe occidentale comme l'Autriche et l'Allemagne de l'Ouest», écrit Yves Lacoste, directeur de la revue. La majorité des articles publiés dans ce numéro d'*Hérodote* examinent les aspects de ce que Lacoste appelle «l'Europe médiane». L'éditorial de Lacoste, en fait, donne le ton à l'analyse de cette idée qu'un «grand flou entoure encore». Sous-entendus sont les questions suivantes : Quelle est son origine ? Quels ont été les problèmes dans le passé susceptibles de l'influencer ? Quels sont les problèmes actuels qu'il faudrait peut-être résoudre d'abord et qui en seraient les acteurs ? C'est Michel Korfman qui répond à la première question dans un excellent exposé. Tout comme dans l'éditorial, le point central est le rôle joué par les Allemands. Un Allemand, Friedrich Naumann a été à l'origine en 1915 du concept de *Mittel Europa* que la politique allemande détourna à d'autres fins. Il y a donc un legs historique à surmonter ainsi que le problème de l'unification des deux Allemagnes que le projet sous-tend. Lacoste pose cette question d'unification, mais sa réponse revêt toutefois une ambiguïté : «Assurément, cette Europe médiane qui pourrait progressivement s'établir de la Baltique à la Méditerranée, apparaît pour une Allemagne plus ou moins réunifiée comme une aire de plus grande influence et un facteur de plus grande puissance. Cependant, l'expansion de l'Allemagne — tout comme celle du Japon, nouvelle superpuissance, — sera freinée, dans les vingt ans à venir, par son déclin démographique, la grave réduction du nombre des naissances et le vieillissement accru de sa population». Mais il n'y a pas que les Allemands. Dans un entretien sur le rôle historien, Edgar Morin souligne un autre aspect de la tragédie de

d'informations qui constituent un enjeu stratégique permettant des innovations particulières. À la conquête des matières premières se substitue discrètement la conquête des formules. Mais, le développement de ces nouveaux matériaux nécessite des investissements énormes qui ne peuvent être à la portée que de quelques pays industrialisés. Aussi, les matières premières restent pour longtemps le destin des pays du tiers monde. Malgré l'absence de cartes et d'illustrations, cet ouvrage vulgarisateur et avant tout destiné au grand public, mérite une large diffusion. — Claude Contois Université de Montréal

Depuis la paix de Versailles, les pays de l'Europe de l'Est fascinent les Occidentaux. Ils avaient été créés en vue de satisfaire le principe d'autodétermination énoncé par le président américain Woodrow Wilson dans ses «quatorze points». Ces petits États, coincés entre deux géants, l'Allemagne vaincue et la Russie bolchévique, remplaçaient l'empire des Habsbourg dont l'existence avait rendu plus ou moins possible un équilibre géopolitique dans la région. Cependant, méfiantes des envahisseurs, les autres, hésitants devant les efforts de la France à les unir dans la Petite Entente, ils succombèrent d'abord à l'expansionnisme de l'Allemagne puis à celui de l'Union soviétique. Le marxisme du Krenin sur la région eut des conséquences unificatrices, notamment sur le plan politique. Or voici que près d'un demi-siècle plus tard, certains indices suggèrent que cette unité est fragile, non seulement du fait d'avoir été imposée et maintenue par la division de l'Europe en deux camps, mais aussi parce qu'il y a prise de conscience de l'intérêt de former un troisième ensemble en Europe. «Pour l'heure, il n'est pas question de son statut politique, mais seulement d'échanges culturels et économiques qui concerneraient des États situés, disons pour le moment... à l'Ouest de la Russie. Cet ensemble, selon certains, pourrait

rupture de source d'approvisionnement occasionnée par un conflit armé. Dans la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage, l'auteur procède à des études de cas. Les considérations stratégiques derrière l'exploitation du cuivre chilien sont examinées et nous permettent de comprendre les intérêts majeurs de l'industrie et du gouvernement américain dans le renversement du régime Allende en 1973. Les pages suivantes sont consacrées à l'Union soviétique. Fortorno y décrit intelligemment l'usage de l'arme alimentaire, l'échec des embargos et les moyens avec lesquels l'URSS soumet les grands exportateurs de grain au jeu de la concurrence et déclenche entre les Américains, Australiens, Canadiens et Européens une bataille pour la conquête de marchés. L'importancer des minerais stratégiques que renferme le territoire sud-africain est explorée. On y constate que les États se soucient plus de la sécurité des approvisionnement que de la défense des droits de l'Homme. L'auteur enchaîne sur les jeux de coulis du marché du thé et du café ainsi que sur un bref historique de la politique française d'approvisionnement en uranium du Niger, en Nouvelle-Calédonie. L'importance des marchands n'a pas échappé à Fortorno. Par leur fonction d'intermédiaires, par les échanges et les liens qu'ils tissent à travers le globe, ils contrôlent les moyens de distribution, l'accès des marchés mondiaux et de ce fait assurent la mobilité géographique des matières premières. La quatrième partie porte sur l'exploitation humaine. L'auteur y décrit les conditions qui s'apparentent à

LIVRES



La victoire des vaincus.

Jean Ziegler
Oppression et résistance culturelle
Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1988.
250 pages, 29,95 \$

Je n'ai pas aimé ce livre et je

dirai pourquoi. Il fait partie de la

longue liste des ouvrages faits de

sentiments, d'anecdotes et de

quelques réflexions.

Jean Ziegler est bien connu et on

pouvait s'attendre à mieux. La page

couverture du livre annonce « un

grand reportage sociologique et un

essai flamboyant »; on nous sort

plutôt « un bon reportage et un essai

qui tourne au feu de paille ». La

thèse de l'auteur, qui repose sur un

vernon pas ici d'argumentation

à les exploiter jusque dans leurs

symboles? Et puis enfin quelle

grossière analyse de l'Occident. On

se croirait dans un scénario des bons

et des méchants dans lequel un

sociologue missionnaire tient plus à

s'indigner qu'à réfléchir.

La thèse de Ziegler contribue-t-

elle au discernement des enjeux? Je

ne le pense pas. Il faudrait en dire

beaucoup plus long. Il n'est pas

étonnant qu'au moment d'analyser

les politiques de San kara et les diffi-

cultes qu'il rencontre du côté des

traditions, sans compter celles pro-

pres aux contextes économique et

politique, Ziegler accumule les no-

lutions qui montent bien à quel

point la réalité sociale est multiori-

entée pour mille raisons, entraînant

des situations dont les paradoxes ne

Pour les Occidentaux aliénés, privés

des sociétés neuves du tiers monde

prend ainsi la dimension d'un salut

et d'un recours ». D'où le titre du

livre. La victoire des vaincus.

Entre un bref avant-propos et une

encore plus brève conclusion, le

livre présente les impressions de

voyage et les comparaisons d'un

humaniste sensible à la misère des

planètes. Il nous fait voyager en

Amérique latine (Nicaragua, Cuba),

en Union soviétique et surtout en

Afrique (îles du Cap Vert, Éthiopie

et Burkina Faso), présentant un tissu

d'anecdotes plus ou moins dévelop-

pées dont beaucoup n'ont vraiment

rien à voir avec la thèse du livre.

Les pensées élevées de Ziegler

sont desservies par un ouvrage hâtif,

quasiment bâclé. Ceux qui cherche-

ront à comprendre la thèse de

l'auteur devront être croyants ou

disciples de Ziegler, car ils ne trou-

veront pas ici d'argumentation

crédible. Comme toujours dans ce

genre de livres, les paradoxes abon-

dent et l'on perçoit vite les limites

d'une thèse par trop simpliste.

Prenons le cas du Burkina Faso que

l'auteur a le plus développé. On

nous présente l'époque où Thomas

Sankara était président (du 4 août

1983 au 15 octobre 1987, date où il

a été assassiné). Ziegler nous fait

faire le tour du pays et des diversités

communaires des grands ensembles

Mossi, Peul et Touareg qui forment

la grande majorité de la population.

On perçoit immédiatement l'am-

pleur des contraintes dont le gou-

vernement doit tenir compte et la

sympathie de l'auteur pour les poli-

suivons. Mais pas un moment nous

ne voyons pourquoi il enodosse cette

incroyable idée que le salut de l'Occ-

cident se trouve parmi les peuples

exploités. Ziegler se rend-il compte

que les esclaves (chez les Touaregs)

et les chets de terre (chez les Mos-

s) sont une partie intégrante de la

tradition? Qui évidemment. Alors

comment parler des traditions en-

suite comme si en déca d'elles se

trouvait une mystérieuse pureté

qu'il s'agitrait de retrouver?

Selon le cas, Ziegler parle de la

tradition qui violente ou de la tradi-

tion qui entretient la solidarité. C'est

trop facile et cela laisse entier le

problème de savoir ce qu'il faut

conserver ou retrouver. Nous avons

affaire à une ébauche d'interpré-

lation, le court chemin qui nous est

proposé laisse en suspens trop d'im-

portance de la matière. Les relations

entre l'homme et la matière sont

complexes et ont des incidences

politiques et économiques variées.

Bénéficiant d'une bonne crédibi-

lité journalistique, Eric Fottorino

nous invite dans l'univers sans fron-

tières des matières premières. Di-

visé en quatre parties d'inégale

longueur, l'ouvrage compte une bi-

bliographie et des annexes sur les

principaux producteurs de matières

premières, les réserves minières du

globe, l'importance de l'Afrique du

Sud, les relations entre métaux,

céramiques et plastiques, et un do-

cument sur le germanium.

Après un bref survol des légendes

associées aux matières premières,

l'auteur souligne de façon habile

que la répartition inégale des

matériau et le repas. Il tend à nous

faire un bon repas. Malheureusement

ment manger le menu à la place du

indigestions. — *Vyan Simonis*

Vyan Simonis est professeur au départe-

ment d'anthropologie à l'université

Laval.

Le festin de la terre. L'histoire

secrète des matières premières

Eric Fottorino

Éditions Lien Commun, Paris, 1988.

354 pages, 31,50 \$

Nombre des événements qui

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plusieurs des stratégies territoriales

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
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Le festin de

TRIBUNE



Une analyse naïve de la situation en Haïti

J'attendais avec impatience de lire le très bon article de Cary Hector sur Haïti (*Paix et Sécurité*, été 1988), et je n'ai pas été déçu. J'ai toutefois été consterné par l'apparente naïveté qui ressortait de son commentaire trop court sur le rôle joué par les États-Unis dans le passé récent de ce pays... Washington a révélé ces intérêts en appuyant le gouvernement d'Haïti pendant de nombreuses années, sans une seule parole de condamnation à l'égard des conditions de vie et de travail de millions de Haïtiens qui ont prédominé sous les régimes Duvalier, père et fils... Je sais, depuis de nombreuses années, qu'un grand nombre de femmes dans les postes-clés de politique étrangère, ainsi que parmi les spécialistes des questions stratégiques en général (politologues),... j'ai été déçu de l'attitude de Madame Selin : au lieu d'étudier les causes structurelles de ce problème, ou d'essayer d'établir un pont entre les deux groupes dont il est question, elle a non seulement choisi d'obscurcir les positions des militantes féministes pour la paix, mais aussi de rendre ces dernières responsables du manque de femmes dans les postes de pouvoir et d'influence, plutôt que de blâmer les difficultés créées par le fait, comme j'admets l'auteur, que l'on a affaire, en matière de limitation des armements, à des institutions dominées par des hommes... Madame Selin remarque, à grands renforts de conscience, la prolifération de groupes féministes pour la paix, allant même jusqu'à les regrouper dans un « mouvement féminin » (traduction) ! Pour-on prétendre que l'ancienne époque était stable alors que les États-Unis appuyaient Duvalier pendant que les opposants au régime étaient emprisonnés, torturés ou assassinés par les « institutions macoutées », et que la majorité de la population était frappée par la pauvreté et l'analphabétisme, et dépourvue de tout pouvoir politique ?

Les États-Unis se sont contentés de regarder le rêve d'un gouvernement élu démocratiquement s'effondrer dans la violence et dans le sang.

Shannon Selin n'a pas raison

Jean Smith, Toronto

Étant à la fois femme et candidate au doctorat en politique internationale, je comprends très bien la situation dont parle Shannon Selin (« Les femmes étaient-elles mieux ? »), j'ai établi un contraste pertinent entre d'une part, la richesse du mouvement féministe pour la paix et d'autre part, la relative pénurie de femmes dans les postes-clés de politique étrangère, ainsi que parmi les spécialistes des questions stratégiques en général (politologues),... j'ai été déçu de l'attitude de Madame Selin : au lieu d'étudier les causes structurelles de ce problème, ou d'essayer d'établir un pont entre les deux groupes dont il est question, elle a non seulement choisi d'obscurcir les positions des militantes féministes pour la paix, mais aussi de rendre ces dernières responsables du manque de femmes dans les postes de pouvoir et d'influence, plutôt que de blâmer les difficultés créées par le fait, comme j'admets l'auteur, que l'on a affaire, en matière de limitation des armements, à des institutions dominées par des hommes... Madame Selin remarque, à grands renforts de conscience, la prolifération de groupes féministes pour la paix, allant même jusqu'à les regrouper dans un « mouvement féminin » (traduction) ! Pour-on prétendre que l'ancienne époque était stable alors que les États-Unis appuyaient Duvalier pendant que les opposants au régime étaient emprisonnés, torturés ou assassinés par les « institutions macoutées », et que la majorité de la population était frappée par la pauvreté et l'analphabétisme, et dépourvue de tout pouvoir politique ?

Il n'est pas étonnant que le sort de Cary Hector, comment avez-vous pu ne rien dire au sujet d'une influence déterminante pour le sort de notre pays ?

Shannon Selin, sont dominés par les hommes, et une participation féminine leur serait profitable. Madame Selin néglige toutefois d'envisager que les raisons pour lesquelles les femmes ne se lancent pas dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité sont plus complexes que les études approfondies en matière de sécurité et de limitation des armements, j'ai toujours trouvé qu'on encourageait traditionnellement très peu les femmes à se lancer dans les domaines militaires, par conséquent, celles-ci manquent d'assurance et ne croient pas avoir les aptitudes nécessaires pour comprendre les questions stratégiques. Il convient aussi d'ajouter qu'un grand nombre de femmes, comme beaucoup d'hommes, sont rebutées par les méthodes d'analyses stratégiques, qui insistent trop sur l'étude des mécanismes de la violence au lieu de remettre en question l'usage et l'abus de la violence comme instrument de pouvoir.


Beaucoup de femmes pensent que les spécialistes sont eux-mêmes réticents aux nouvelles idées en matière de paix et de sécurité. Certains disent que les femmes qui s'interrogent sur le bien-fondé des principes fondamentaux de la pensée stratégique en portant atteinte à leurs compétences en tant que femmes, atteinte à la crédibilité du mouvement féministe, mais elle laisse entendre que ce sont les femmes qui sont responsables de leur peu de poids en matière de décision politique, situation déplorable par l'ailleurs, elle-même en début d'article. On appelle cette technique « la condamnation des victimes ». De même, en rejetant les positions holistiques des militantes féministes sur la politique — post-tions qui établissent une relation totale entre le désarmement et le bien-être social — parce qu'elles sont présument « utopiques », Madame Selin choisit d'insister sur ce qu'elle perçoit comme étant le désir fantasque d'un changement social profond plutôt que d'admettre simplement que, puisque notre

monde est dominé par les hommes, les politiques tendent à satisfaire aux priorités des hommes. En affirmant que les militantes ont une opinion déterminante selon laquelle les femmes sont, de par nature, des êtres moins violents que les hommes, et par conséquent, qu'elles gouverneraient mieux qu'eux, Madame Selin suppose que le mouvement féministe est chaviré. La question ne consiste pas à savoir si les femmes sont plus aptes à gouverner que les hommes; on doit plutôt se demander si les femmes, toujours tenues à l'écart des postes de pouvoir et d'influence, et qui continuent de l'être, pourrissent, si elles étaient en grand nombre au pouvoir, avoir assez de force pour accroître les ressources affectées aux questions qui les touchent, dont la garde des enfants et la santé. L'article de Madame Selin soulève un problème plus vaste. L'un des moyens utilisés par les défenseurs de la limitation des armements pour critiquer les militantes pour la paix consiste à les diminuer en les traitant d'ignorantes et de naïfs et de rêveuses. Cela suppose que seules les personnes jouissant d'une vaste culture en matière de sécurité internationale sont compétentes pour débattre de questions politiques aussi graves que le désarmement. Cette conception élitiste justifie les observations des militants pour la paix, selon lesquelles les partisans « des bombes et des roquettes » sont incapables de discuter avec quiconque ne « parle pas leur langue ». Oui, Madame Selin, dans ces circonstances, mettre un terme à la course aux armements est une utopie. Et à qui la faute ?

C'est les gouvernements, et non les groupes pacifistes, qui ont le dernier mot en matière d'armements. Si les gouvernants n'entrevoient pas la possibilité de réaliser le désarmement, ce projet n'est donc pas réaliste. Mais admettre que le désarmement est impossible, c'est admettre que l'humanité n'est maîtresse ni de la planète, ni de son destin. Le monde n'est pas gouverné par le déterminisme technologique, mais par le peuple. Et si les partisans de la limitation des armements ne sont pas d'accord avec cet énoncé, soit, mais ils ne sont pas la cause de la instabilité politique en traitant les militaires pour la paix de naïfs.

Andrea Chandlen, New York

CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



Le Traité ABM

La troisième conférence d'examen du Traité américano-soviétique sur les missiles anti-missiles balistiques (ABM) signé en 1972, laquelle on attendait depuis longtemps, s'est tenue à Genève du 24 au 31 août. Elle avait été précédée par un débat accepté, au sein du gouvernement américain, quant à savoir s'il fallait accuser l'URSS d'avoir violé le Traité de façon détermi-nante en construisant une vaste installation radar près de Krassnoyarsk, ville de la Sibérie centrale. Washington (tout comme la plupart des experts indépendants de la limitation des armements) soutient depuis longtemps que le radar, qui n'est pas situé à la périphérie de l'URSS et n'est pas orienté vers l'extérieur du pays, viole une clause fondamentale du Traité, dont l'objet est d'empêcher que des radars d'alerte lointaine soient intégrés à un réseau national de défenses contre les missiles balistiques. L'URSS affirme toujours que le radar est un système de poursuite spatiale, aspect qui n'est pas visé par le Traité. Pourtant malgré tout attention aux préoccupations américaines, elle a interrompu en octobre 1987 la construction du radar, dont l'achèvement exigera encore trois ou quatre ans, renversant ainsi, selon ces derniers, le radar n'a pas une grande importance militaire, étant donné sa vulnérabilité.

Si la mise en place du radar est considérée comme une violation déterminante du Traité, les Américains auraient la un bon motif pour abroger l'accord, ce que souhaite de nombreux partisans de l'Initiative de défense stratégique (IDS). Le Département d'Etat américain et le Comité mixte des chefs d'état-major seraient, dit-on, opposés à une telle mesure, notamment parce que l'URSS serait des lors mieux placée que les États-Unis pour construire, relativement rapidement, un réseau de défense à l'échelle du pays.

Tandis que le débat se poursuivait à Washington, l'URSS a annoncé le 19 juillet qu'elle était disposée à démanteler l'installation radar de Krassnoyarsk selon un processus vérifiable qui dissiperait tout doute dans l'esprit des États-Unis, à condition que ces derniers conviennent de respecter le Traité ABM tel qu'il a été signé en 1972. Les Soviétiques avaient offert auparavant de démanteler le radar, mais seulement si les États-Unis acceptaient de leur côté de démolir deux de leurs nouveaux radars au Groënland et en Grande-Bretagne, lesquels, selon Moscou (et certains experts de la limitation des armements), constituent eux-mêmes des violations du Traité. Le désaccord subsistant au sujet de l'interprétation du Traité ABM, compte parmi les principaux obstacles à la conclusion d'un nouvel accord sur la réduction des armements stratégiques (START). Le Département d'Etat américain a fait valoir que le radar, qui n'est pas orienté vers l'URSS, n'est pas situé à la périphérie de l'URSS et n'est pas orienté vers l'URSS, mais il a continué d'exiger qu'elle représentait «un pas en avant», mais il a continué d'exiger le démantèlement immédiat et inconditionnel du radar. Le débat sur la question des «violations déterminantes» a été interrompu provisoirement aux États-Unis le 8 août, quand la Maison-Blanche a annoncé que la décision ne serait prise qu'après la conférence d'examen. Contrairement aux deux conférences d'examen antérieures (1977 et 1982), celle qui s'est tenue à la fin d'août n'a pas abouti à un communiqué conjoint réaffirmant les objectifs et les fins du Traité. La délégation américaine a par la suite dit avoir bien précisé aux Soviétiques que Washington ne signerait aucun traité START tant que le radar n'aurait pas été démantelé. De son côté, la délégation soviétique a menacé de se retirer des négociations START si les États-Unis abandonnaient le Traité ABM. Elle a révoqué cet avertissement à la réunion des mesures telles que la notification de la construction de nouveaux radars, l'établissement d'un consensus sur les moyens de distinguer entre eux les radars de mesure, notamment parce que l'URSS serait des lors mieux placée que les États-Unis pour construire, relativement rapidement, un réseau de défense à l'échelle du pays.

Plus tard, on a appris que les Soviétiques avaient évoqué la possibilité de doter en personnel, conjointement avec l'Ouest, la station radar de Krassnoyarsk, mais que les États-Unis, craignant que leurs effectifs soient expédiés de l'URSS en temps de crise, avaient rejeté cette solution. Moscou aurait également proposé officiellement de remplacer le gros émetteur très perfectionné du radar par une antenne parabolique moins puissante et orientée mécaniquement (les Américains ont également rejeté cette idée, en disant qu'elle était insuffisante). Le 16 septembre, dans un discours prononcé à Krassnoyarsk, le secrétaire général Gorbatchev a publié un communiqué officiel de conversion de l'installation radar en un «centre de coopération internationale pour les utilisations pacifiques de l'espace extratmosphérique», centre qui relèverait d'une organisation mondiale de l'espace. L'offre ne s'accompagne-t-elle d'aucune condition, mais M. Gorbatchev, faisant allusion aux radars que les États-Unis ont construits au Groënland et en Grande-Bretagne et dont son pays conteste la légitimité, a déclaré que l'URSS s'attendait à ce que Washington lui emboîtât le pas par suite de l'Initiative susmentionnée. Les porte-parole américains ont répondu que la proposition serait acceptable aux yeux de Washington, à condition qu'elle aboutisse au démantèlement du radar ou à sa conversion en un autre genre de système, et non à une «légitimisation pure et simple de son achèvement et de sa mise en service.

Le 6 octobre, les autorités soviétiques auraient proposé que des experts techniques des deux blocs se réunissent pour examiner les détails d'un plan soviétique portant sur le démantèlement ou la modification du radar. Les États-Unis auraient accepté en principe la tenue d'une telle réunion.


À la fin d'octobre, le gouvernement soviétique a annoncé que le radar serait effectivement converti en un centre de recherche spatiale

dirigé par des civils, et qu'il s'attacherait à ce que les Américains rassent de même pour leurs installations au Groënland et au Royaume-Uni. Au moment d'aller sous presse, les États-Unis n'avaient pas encore répondu.

La limitation des essais nucléaires

Le Traité sur la limitation partielle des essais, adopté en 1969, interdit la mise à l'essai d'engins atomiques dans l'atmosphère, dans l'espace extratmosphérique, ou sous l'eau. Le 4 août, date du 25^e anniversaire du Traité, cinq pays siégeant à la Conférence du désarmement à Genève ont amorcé une campagne en vue de le transformer en un accord d'interdiction totale des essais, pour cela, ils ont présenté au Royaume-Uni, aux États-Unis et à l'URSS (les «trois grands») le texte d'une modification visant à interdire aussi les essais souterrains. Si un tiers des parties au Traité appuie la modification proposée, ce qui semble certain puisque cent pays ont sanctionné l'idée l'année dernière à l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, les pays depositaires seront tenus de convoquer l'an prochain une conférence de toutes les parties signataires pour étudier le libellé de la modification. Cependant, pour amender effectivement le Traité, il faudra l'assentiment d'une majorité des parties, y compris les trois gouvernements depositaires. Or, les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni sont toujours opposés à une interdiction totale des essais. Les partisans de la tenue d'une conférence espèrent que cette dernière incitera ces deux pays au moins à envisager de changer leur position.

Comme ils en ont convenu pendant leurs pourparlers qui se poursuivent sur les essais nucléaires à Genève, les États-Unis et l'URSS ont mené cet été une expérience conjointe de vérification (ECV) à deux polygones d'essais nucléaires souterrains, l'un au Nevada, le 17 août, et l'autre à l'emplacement



La guerre des étoiles

À la fin de septembre, le général Abrahamson a annoncé qu'il allait faire échec aux améliorations que les Soviétiques auraient sans doute apportées à leurs forces offensives.

Partager l'IDS avec les Alliés

On doute de plus en plus que les budgets de l'IDS suffiront pour continuer la première étape, mais il est desormais clair qu'en dépit de leurs promesses, les États-Unis n'ont pas fait beaucoup participer leurs Alliés à la recherche sur l'IDS. À la fin de 1987, les Américains avaient accordé à des entreprises étrangères des contrats valant environ 127 millions de dollars US. Quand le gouvernement britannique a signé un accord de collaboration avec les États-Unis en 1985, il avait espéré que le pays obtiendrait des contrats d'une valeur supérieure à 2 milliards au cours des cinq années ultérieures; or, à la fin de 1987, les entreprises britanniques n'avaient reçu que des contrats évalués en tout à 30 millions.

De nouveaux bombardiers et systèmes de défense aérienne

En août, à la base de Koubinka à l'extérieur de Moscou, le Secrétaire américain à la Défense, M. Frank Carlucci, a pris place dans le cockpit d'un *Blackjack*, le plus moderne des bombardiers soviétiques. Il a ainsi été confirmé que les dimensions et l'autonomie probable de l'appareil correspondaient exactement à celles indiquées dans les descriptions rendues publiques par le Pentagone. Ces dernières étaient-elles fondées sur des photographies que des satellites américains de reconnaissance avaient prises au début de la décennie.

Soviétiques

Cependant, si l'on en croit une étude récente de l'*Office of Technology Assessment* (OTA), un système analogue à celui décrit plus haut pourrait détruire quelques-uns, et au mieux une modeste partie, des ogives que les Soviétiques utiliseraient dans une attaque d'envergure. Toujours d'après la même étude, dont une partie a été déclassifiée et rendue publique en juin, il serait possible, techniquement parlant, de déployer le système entre 1995 et l'an 2000. Le rapport donne par ailleurs à penser qu'il ne serait utile de ce faire que si l'on avait alors énormément confiance dans la technologie nécessaire pour réaliser la deuxième étape (de l'an 2000 à l'an 2010), quand la Défense aurait besoin d'armes à énergie dirigée et d'autres moyens pour faire échec aux améliorations que les Soviétiques auraient sans doute apportées à leurs forces offensives.

Douze Blackback peuvent maintenir

Tandis que les deux superpuissances ajoutent de plus en plus à leurs arsenaux des bombardiers de longue portée (il faut aussi tenir compte de la mi-mouvement), des États-Unis, qui doit être prêt à inclure le bombardier «furtif» *B-2* dans sa stratégie de défense, la Grande-Bretagne a confirmé qu'une base aérienne américaine située à Helix, près d'Athènes, fermerait à la fin de 1988, à l'expiration d'un accord de défense conclu entre les deux pays. Il existe trois autres grandes installations militaires américaines en Grèce, et leur avenir fait maintenant l'objet de négociations. Enfin, des rapports émanant de l'Islande révèlent que l'OTAN cherche à établir une seconde base aérienne de défense contre les missiles de croisière et la détection lointaine de ces derniers. Bien qu'elle soit encore fort limitée par rapport à l'IDS, l'initiative de défense aérienne (IDA) dispose d'un budget de 200 millions de dollars US pour 1988. La Marine américaine s'affirme, semble-t-il, comme un intervenant de taille dans le programme. Elle mène des recherches sur les détecteurs acoustiques passifs et actifs afin d'améliorer la capacité de détection des sous-marins porteurs de missiles de croisière dans les eaux côtières. De façon plus générale, le programme de recherches de l'IDA semble continuer principalement les technologies nécessaires aux systèmes aéroportés de surveillance appelés un jour à remplacer le Système d'alerte du Nord au Canada et d'autres radars terrestres. D'après le Livre blanc sur la défense, publié en juin 1987, notre pays participe au programme de l'IDA.

Les bases américaines outre-mer

À la fin de l'année dernière, les États-Unis ont amorcé des pourparlers sur le renouvellement des accords avec trois de leurs alliés au sujet de bases militaires; il s'agit de la Grèce. Aux Philippines, où les Américains utilisent la base aérienne Clark, la base navale Subic et d'autres installations, ils ont convenu d'accroître les paiements directs versés à Manille (le montant passe de 180 à 481 millions de dollars US par année) et de lui consentir d'autres subsides. L'accord est entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 1991.

Les opérations de maintien de la paix de l'ONU

La remise du prix Nobel de la paix aux Bérés bleus a fait renaitre l'intérêt pour ces derniers et les Nations-Unies en général. On estime en général que le rôle de médiateur qu'a joué le Secrétaire général pour favoriser l'instauration d'un cessez-le-feu en Afghanistan et dans le conflit irano-iraquien a été très apprécié de l'Organisation, qui continue cependant d'accuser de graves déficits. Dans un geste inhabituel, le président Reagan a annoncé un changement d'attitude de son pays envers l'ONU en offrant de payer 144 des 520 millions de dollars que les États-Unis devaient à cette dernière.

L'Union soviétique a elle aussi découvert la valeur des opérations de maintien de la paix. Au début d'octobre, M. Vladimir Petrovski, sous-ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, a proposé à New York de créer une force onusienne permanente de maintien de la paix, et il a offert le soutien de son pays à la proposition soviétique, mais s'est abstenu de comment directement. Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères, M. Joe Clark, a déclaré que le Canada souhaitait la paix un mandat plus professionnel et plus étendu. □

Holmes ont paru dans deux volumes publiés sous le titre :

The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957. Il s'agit d'un ouvrage brillant, fruit d'un scrupuleux travail de recherche portant sur de nom-

breux événements auxquels John Holmes a participé. J'ai récemment eu l'occasion de lire le palpitant récit qu'il a fait de ces journées de tension vécues par Pearson et Ham-

marjold quand ils ont, ensemble, mis au point la formule qui allait donner naissance à la Force d'urgence des Nations-Unies (FNU).

Cette Force a permis de mettre fin définitivement à la crise de Suez. En 1956, je me suis tout à coup revu au Caire, pendant cette

longue nuit au cours de laquelle j'avais essayé, avec un groupe d'amis, de survivre à la paléo le dérou-

lement des événements. Le lendemain matin, nous avons vu, en

sortant, se découper dans le bleu du ciel de dégage, la silhouette d'un bom-

barrier britannique *Camber*, qui décrivait dans le ciel la forme d'un

nuit mais sans lâcher de bombes. Dix jours plus tard, j'ouvrais un bu-

reau d'information au camp du

quartier général de la FNU, à Ei-

Ballah, j'entreprenais alors une mis-

sion de sept mois au cours de la-

quelle j'allais devoir rendre compte

des succès de la Force de maintien

de la paix des Nations-Unies. *The*

Shaping of Peace est un ouvrage

que tout politicien, enseignant ou in-

dividu jouant un rôle de direction au

sein d'une collectivité au Canada se

doit de lire.

John Wendell Holmes est né en

1910. Après son diplôme de l'Uni-

versité Western Ontario, il a obtenu

une maîtrise ès lettres de l'Univer-

sité de Toronto. Il a enseigné pen-

dant plusieurs années au *Pickering*

College, une école progressiste pour

garçons. Il a ensuite entrepris de

nouvelles études supérieures à

Brétagne. Il est entré au Canada au

moment où la guerre s'est déclarée.

Apprenant que l'Institut canadien

des affaires internationales (ICAI)

à présent sa candidature et a été

embauché, ce qui l'a quelque peu

surpris.

John Holmes a découvert au mo-

ment de son arrivée que l'un des

principaux thèmes de discussion de

Le 13 août 1988, John Holmes, renommé tant pour son étude de la politique étrangère du pays, est décédé à l'âge de 78 ans. Ami de longue date de M. Holmes, M. King Gordon a occupé divers postes au sein des Nations-Unies dont celui de Directeur du Centre d'information de l'ONU pour le Moyen-Orient pendant la crise de Suez en 1956.

PAR KING GORDON

1910-1988

UN CANADIEN ARTISAN DE PAIX

JOHN W. HOLMES

canadienne et des affaires extérieures que pour sa contribution à la poli-

tique étirangère du pays, est décédé à l'âge de 78 ans. Ami de longue date de M. Holmes, M. King Gordon a occupé divers postes au sein des Nations-

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de ces modifications.

En 1948, John Holmes assistait à la troisième session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies tenue à Paris. Il a ensuite été nommé à Ottawa où il a été nommé chef de la divi-

sion des Nations-Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures. Loïn de le

caïnonner à Ottawa, son nouvel em-

pioi l'a amené à participer directe-

ment aux activités de l'ONU à New York. Il a été deux fois directeur suppléant de la Mission permanente du Canada auprès des Nations-Unies, il a fait partie de nombreuses délégations canadiennes dans le

cadre de sessions de l'ONU et, à

maintes reprises, il a conseillé de

hauts responsables canadiens dont

M. Lester Pearson, alors secrétaire

d'État aux Affaires extérieures.

Au moment de quitter les Af-

faïres extérieures en 1960 pour de-

venir président, puis directeur

général de l'ICAI, John Holmes

s'était fait au sujet de la position du

Canada dans le contexte d'après-

guerre et de sa politique extérieure,

un certain nombre d'opinions ar-

rièrees, qui allaient lui permettre de

donner suite à ses intentions.

Premièrement, Holmes pensait

que le Canada devait chercher et

trouver sa sécurité dans le contexte

d'une collectivité internationale

bien établie. Toute menace à la

sécurité canadienne devait faire

l'objet d'une action concertée en

conflict par la médiation ou des

opérations de maintien de la paix.

Si non, on n'aurait d'autre choix, et

Holmes se refusait à cette solution.

que de revenir à l'époque du prince barti-

cadé derrière des murailles fortifiées

qui assuraient la sécurité de tous ses

sujets, dans un rayon équivalent à la

portée de son artillerie. Cette con-

ception prévalait encore à notre ère

nucéaire puisque Reagan et Bush

parlent de "paix par la force".

Deuxièmement, le Canada doit

jouer, au sein d'une collectivité in-

ternationale, le rôle d'une puissance

modérée. Il ne lui suffit pas de

s'abriter derrière la protection d'une

garantie de puissance; rien ne sert non

plus de faire des efforts pour rivali-

ser avec cette dernière. Mais le Ca-

nada a plus de ressources que la

majorité des autres pays, et il peut

avec succès les mettre au service

d'objectifs concrets.

Troisièmement, il faut voir dans

les Nations-Unies un élément-clé de

la position du Canada dans l'ordre

international, dans un contexte

d'après-guerre.

Telles ont été les idées défendues

par John Holmes au cours des trente

dernières années, pas uniquement à

l'ICAI mais aussi dans sa carrière

d'enseignant, d'écrivain ou de con-

seiller de gouvernements et d'or-

ganisations non gouvernementales.

Il avait une confiance "littérale"

(l'adjectif "réaliste" conviendrait

peut-être mieux) dans les cinq pre-

mières mois de la Charte des Nations-

Unies : "Nous, peuples des Nations-

Unies ...". Les peuples, et pas

seulement les gouvernements, ont

directement intérêt à créer une com-

munaute juste et paisible, et ils ont

un important rôle à jouer dans ce

processus.

John Holmes avait une façon de

peuser très modeste; il était on ne

peut plus conscient de l'importance

des changements survenus dans la

configuration de la société mon-

diale. L'autre soir encore, je parlais

de lui un universitaire soviétique

en visite au Canada. Ses yeux se

dit, "Il a passé une semaine avec

moi à Moscou il y a de cela tout

juste un an. Il était tellement en-

thousiasme, tellement heureux!"

Une vraie source d'espoir à une

époque nouvelle. □

canadien décide maintenant de faire marche arrière et de tout abandonner, il se sera procuré gracieusement tous ces renseignements, ce que ni le Royaume-Uni, ni la France ne vont accepter sans broncher, et à l'avenir, nos autres alliés vont certainement se demander dans quelle mesure ils peuvent nous faire Ottawa a déployé d'importants efforts pour convaincre l'OTAN de l'OTAN serait de mettre son projet à exécution.


Le groupe de travail chargé de comparer les sous-marins en lice n'a pas officiellement terminé son évaluation. On a étudié ainsi les caractéristiques opérationnelles des bâtiments rivaux (sans comparer les sous-marins entre eux, mais en fonction des exigences de la marine canadienne), le coût des différents modèles proposés, les répercussions possibles des différents choix à l'échelle internationale et les retombées industrielles de chaque projet.

À l'heure qu'il est, les équipes ont terminé leur travail, mais il reste à faire le grand assemblage, c'est-à-dire «recoller» tous les morceaux. Une fois cette étape franchie, l'évaluation sera présentée au Comité supérieur de révision (un conseil interministériel) et au ministre de la Défense nationale, qui la soumettra alors au Cabinet. Tout dépendant de la volonté politique manifestée alors, ce pourrait n'être qu'une question de quelques jours.

Or, cette volonté ne s'est pas manifestée au cours des neuf derniers mois. N'ignorant pas que des élections allaient être déclenchées à l'été ou à l'automne, le Cabinet n'a pas voulu se prononcer au sujet d'un programme de 8 milliards de dollars, à plus forte raison lorsque ce dernier est qualifié de «nucélaire».

Les résultats de certains sondages d'opinion menés récemment sont assez inquiétants puisqu'ils montrent que l'enthousiasme de la population canadienne pour ledit projet commence à fléchir, une tendance que ne confirment pas les sondages effectués par le ministère de la Défense nationale. Maintenant que les élections sont terminées, le gouvernement doit statuer sur la question. □

Bob Foran



Reconnaissant que le Canada est un Etat maritime, le gouvernement a fait de la reconstruction de la flotte sa première priorité. Le gouvernement a annulé le projet qu'il avait fait de se procurer quatorze autres frégates et quatre nouveaux sous-marins diesel-électriques; préférerait plutôt équiper la flotte de six nouvelles frégates et de dix à douze sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire.

Ce changement d'orientation va tout à fait dans le sens d'une autre priorité gouvernementale, à savoir la réduction du déficit. Si l'on s'en tient à l'estimation gouvernementale qui fixe le coût des sous-marins à 8 milliards de dollars (les critiques pensent qu'il sera beaucoup plus élevé), le budget atteint à cet égard 300 millions par année en moyenne au cours des vingt-sept prochaines années. L'achat des six premiers frégates de patrouille suppose, quant à lui, une dépense maximale de 800 millions de dollars par an. Or, dans le cas de l'ancien plan annulé, qui prévoyait l'acquisition de huit frégates de lutte anti-aérienne et de quatre sous-marins diesel-électriques, il aurait fallu prévoir une dépense annuelle encore plus importante. En choisissant plutôt les sous-marins nucléaires et en éliminant la dépense sur près de trois décennies, le gouvernement se procurerait des centaines de millions de dollars qu'il pourrait, à court terme, affecter à la réduction du déficit.

À L'ÉCHELLE INTERNATIONALE, l'annulation de l'achat de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire porterait irrémédiablement atteinte à la crédibilité du Canada. En effet, le Royaume-Uni comme la France lui ont livré une quantité impressionnante de renseignements extrêmement confidentiels, croyant sincèrement qu'Ottawa avait effectivement l'intention de donner suite à son projet. Si le gouvernement

fautes et d'universitaires qui a pour seule vocation de défendre le projet. Le Comité pour une défense navale autonome et efficace (Committee for a Sovereign and Effective Naval Defence) comprend notamment M. Jean-Jacques Blais, ancien ministre libéral de la Défense, les universitaires Harriet Crichtley et Joel Sokolsky, et les hommes d'affaires Conrad Black et Jim Clarke.

Daucuns ont mis en doute la crédibilité de ce Comité, prétendant que certains de ses membres avaient directement intérêt à ce que le gouvernement opte pour le programme nucléaire. M. Blais, par exemple, CSF, un des principaux fournisseurs de la Marine française. Mais le Comité n'a pas été formé uniquement pour des raisons d'intérêt personnel, car ses membres sont intimement convaincus que l'acquisition de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire constitue pour la flotte canadienne la meilleure option possible.

Hormis les Libéraux et les Néo-Démocrates, ce sont essentiellement les membres du mouvement dit «pacifiste» et le Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement qui manifestent le plus bruyamment leur opposition au projet. Les porte-parole du Centre ont diffusé leurs opinions auprès de nombreux journaux, et ils ont comparu devant le Comité permanent de la défense nationale.

Si les détracteurs du projet, au Canada ou aux États-Unis, persuadent Ottawa d'y renoncer, les répercussions de cette décision risquent de se faire sentir tant au pays qu'à l'étranger. Cela équivaudrait en fait à un désaveu du Livre blanc sur la défense de 1987. Le projet d'achat de dix à douze sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire était en effet le pivot de la politique de défense exposée dans ce document par le gouvernement conservateur.

tamiques donne au Canada l'accès à l'option française se présente aujourd'hui sous un jour plus favorable qu'au début de la lutte, où on la donnait d'ores et déjà perdante.

Le GOUVERNEMENT CANADIEN SAIT bien qu'il ne pourra pas plaider à tout question est de savoir comment la France ont tous deux des compétences s'intéressant au programme du système tactique de commandement, de contrôle et de communications, d'une valeur de 2 milliards de dollars, si ce n'est plus. Il est probable par ailleurs que les Français vont faire une soumission pour le contrat de remplissage des chars (2,5 milliards).

Quel que soit le modèle retenu, le projet gouvernemental d'acquisition de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire pourrait grandement profiter à l'industrie canadienne de la construction navale et à toutes les industries qui lui sont reliées. M. Jim Clarke, président de l'Association canadienne des industries maritimes, précise cependant que les avantages pour l'industrie varieront largement selon que l'on choisira les sous-marins diesel-électriques ou les sous-marins nucléaires. Il prétend que le Canada dispose déjà de la technologie pour construire les bateaux de surface à propulsion diesel-électrique, les avantages économiques pour l'industrie nucléaire, dont pour le secteur de la construction navale et l'industrie nucléaire, les commandes dégringolent depuis quelques années. M. Clarke affirme à ce propos que si l'on annulait le programme nucléaire pour choisir plutôt des sous-marins et des bateaux de surface à propulsion diesel-électrique, les avantages économiques pour l'industrie ne seraient pas les mêmes. Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, l'organisation à laquelle appartient M. Clarke préfère certainement l'option des sous-marins nucléaires, tout comme d'ailleurs un groupe de gens d'al-

les dangers d'éparpillément que cela

comporte, les intérêts de la collectivité extérieure, puis il met carrément l'accent sur ses activités internes.

PEARSON : Peu importe ce que nous choisissons de faire, devons-nous essayer de donner à la population canadienne, et à tout groupe international qui pourrait s'intéresser à nos travaux, un point de vue équilibré sur chaque question, ou devons-nous plutôt encourager nos universitaires et d'autres spécialistes à présenter une opinion précise pré-

consistant des solutions particulières ? Voilà une question qui continuera de se poser à nous également, et je suppose que nous n'en arriverons sans doute pas à des conclusions finales en matière de lignes directrices, car l'Institut n'est pas un groupe de pression, il n'a pas le mandat d'interférer sur le gouvernement, d'une façon ou d'une autre, je pense que l'Institut continuera à favoriser la présentation de points de vue équilibrés, que ce soit en publiant diverses opinions pour en arriver ainsi à une perspective objective, ou en diffusant des études impartiales. Quel que soit le procédé, ce qui importe, c'est que les points de vue soient bien exprimés et fondés. L'Institut devrait publier ce qui, à ses yeux, constitue une contribution valable au débat. Mais règle générale, il n'exprimera pas une opinion en tant qu'organisme. Cela demeurera toujours une source de controverses, cependant, car les médias, en particulier, cherchent constamment, comme vous le savez, Lise, une réponse catégorique.



BISSONNETTE : On compte sur l'Institut pour obtenir des documents de référence. Mais en ce qui concerne les problèmes canadiens, il est certain que l'on aimerait bien que quelqu'un nous dise — est-ce que oui ou non, par exemple, l'idée de sous-marins nucléaires est folle ou si elle est intelligente en fait. Et là, ça devient difficile de trouver dans la documentation de l'Institut, quelque chose qui nous éclaire vraiment. Cela pose toute la question des relations, du rapport de l'Institut avec le gouvernement canadien... Est-ce qu'on doit évaluer le gouvernement canadien ? Est-ce qu'on doit le suivre dans son programme de

gouvernement ? Est-ce qu'on doit être assez proche du gouvernement ou est-ce qu'on doit prendre nos distances ? Cela ne m'apparaît pas résolu, à moi comme membre du conseil qui voit cela un peu de l'extérieur. Ce n'est pas clair.

PEARSON : L'an dernier, j'ai rédigé pour la première fois un rapport annuel sur la conjoncture internationale et sur l'attitude du gouvernement canadien face à elle. L'Institut fera de même cette année, et j'espère que cette activité demeurera dans l'avenir. Il s'agit d'une analyse de fin d'année sur ce que le gouvernement a dit et fait. L'analyse peut avoir un ton soit critique, soit approuvateur, tout dépendant de l'opinion qu'a l'auteur sur les réalisations du gouvernement. Mais cet ouvrage est signé par le directeur général, et nous sommes tous d'accord, je pense, pour dire que son opinion n'est pas nécessairement celle du conseil d'administration. Ce rapport pourrait devenir un important document annuel, qui sait, un document clef dans les débats sur la politique extérieure au cours des prochaines années. C'est là une façon d'établir notre bonne foi, si vous voulez. À mon avis, le gouvernement en viendra à attendre ce rapport avec impatience et peut-être aussi avec un peu d'appréhension, car le document critiquera certaines des décisions que l'État aura prises.

COX : Selon moi, certaines activités ayant relativement peu d'envergure sont très enrichissantes. Je pense en particulier que l'étude entreprise pour les Affaires extérieures sur le registre des transferts d'armes et la conférence qu'on a tenue à ce sujet ont produit un effet. Je crois, en fait, qu'il s'intéressera à aide les gens, qui s'intéressent à l'idée au départ, à faire connaître leurs points de vue au ministère des Affaires extérieures.

PEARSON : Autre exemple, M. Clark a demandé à l'Institut d'organiser une réunion entre des Canadiens et Canadiennes d'origine arabe et juive. Cela s'est passé à Montebello et a suscité toutes sortes de controverses ; malgré tout, c'était la première fois qu'une réunion de ce genre était organisée avec des Fondations. C'est une importante perspective, et elle a certainement sensibilisé les deux groupes en présence de la nécessité de se mieux comprendre l'un l'autre. L'Institut peut être une sorte de catalyseur dans les situations de ce genre, s'il sait les re-

pérer, en profiter et réagir face aux préoccupations du gouvernement. Il importe toutefois que l'Institut ne soit jamais perçu comme un porte-parole de l'État. Il peut en revanche servir de catalyseur, d'intermédiaire, de source objective de connaissances, et le reste. À mon avis, c'est là un rôle tout aussi important que n'importe quel autre.



COX : Au départ, comment imaginer-vous l'Institut ? Ce qui s'est passé a-t-il correspondu à vos attentes ? Est-ce ce que vous espérez ?

PEARSON : Quand l'idée de créer l'Institut a été formulée pour la première fois, personne, à mon avis, ne savait exactement ce qu'il devait être. C'était une vague idée énoncée dans le Discours du Trône. Tout ce qui était clair, c'était que le public canadien avait besoin d'en savoir davantage sur ces questions. D'aucuns pensaient que l'information nous provenant des États-Unis par l'entremise des médias n'était pas toujours exacte, ou ne traduisait pas toujours les préoccupations et les intérêts du Canada. Il nous fallait donc quelque chose d'authentiquement canadien, ce qui est en soi une idée bien typique de chez nous ; nous sommes constamment en train de fonder des sociétés dont le rôle est de clarifier ou de renforcer notre identité nationale. J'ai donc accepté ce point de vue. Comme je retrarais de Moscou, j'étais par ailleurs très conscient du fait qu'une bonne partie de l'information publiée sur les relations Est-Ouest était inexacte, voire délibérément déformée par certaines sources. Le gouvernement Reagan attribuait alors son appogé, de sorte que cette réalité était incomplète.

... Mais je ne m'attendais pas à ce que l'Institut se mit à verser des subventions. Le mot «subvention» ne figure pas dans la Loi. C'est le conseil d'administration qui a choisi cette voie. Il a décidé que l'Institut devait aider les organismes bénévoles afin de poursuivre leurs objectifs, parce que pour une raison ou pour une autre ni l'État, ni le secteur privé n'étaient disposés à les aider.

Je ne crois pas que l'Institut ait pu obtenir une fonction performante, mais à mon avis, ce n'est pas la obligation d'une fonction performante. Je ne crois pas que l'Institut ait pu obtenir une fonction performante, mais à mon avis, ce n'est pas la obligation d'une fonction performante.

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lui doit continuer à jamais à financer les ONG.

BISSONNETTE : Je parle d'un point de vue québécois, mais je suis sûr que, si je venais d'Hatfield ou de Vancouver, je réagissais de la même façon — c'est que l'ICPSI projette l'image d'un institut d'«Ottawa».

C'est peut-être commode sur le plan de la recherche, mais du côté des programmes publics, de l'éducation des Canadiens, etc., je pense que ça crée certainement un problème. Du côté du Québec, ça crée une distorsion ; pourtant, nous ne sommes pas très loin. Au cours des années, j'ai vu un progrès marqué des relations de l'Institut avec le Québec. Mais je trouve un peu dommage cette espèce de relation incestueuse entre le gouvernement fédéral et l'Institut.

C'était inévitable, remarquiez, dans les circonstances, mais... je ne sais pas comment on pouvait trouver un moyen de nous dissocier un peu.

PEARSON : Il y a un problème de langage, ça c'est certain. Je ne sais pas si c'est un facteur qui peut s'expliquer parce que nous sommes à Ottawa. Même à Montréal, je ne crois pas qu'on aurait trouvé beaucoup de chercheurs francophones coup de chercheurs francophones qui auraient pu ou auraient voulu travailler à l'Institut.

BISSONNETTE : Moi, je suis convaincue du contraire. Il est malheureux que la grande tradition de la politique extérieure canadienne se soit faite à l'écart des francophones. Il faut développer cette tradition, chez les francophones. La francophonie internationale est une réalité. PEARSON : L'Institut est censé avoir une perspective globale et une perspective internationale et une réalité. PEARSON : L'Institut est censé avoir une perspective globale et une perspective internationale et une réalité.

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L'INSTITUT A CINQ ANS DÉJÀ!

UNE ENTREVUE-DISCUSSION

En juin 1984, la Chambre des communes a adopté à l'unanimité le projet de loi C-32, qui créait l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales (ICPSI). Depuis, quelles ont été les réalisations de ce dernier ? Le fait qu'il soit situé à Ottawa nuit-il à l'Institut ? Est-ce un organisme trop anglophone ? Comment l'ICPSI adapte-t-il son mandat à un monde où s'opèrent des changements rapides ?

Pour réfléchir à ces questions et à d'autres encore, le magazine *Paix et Sécurité* a invité trois

personnes ayant divers rapports avec l'Institut à participer à une discussion à bâtons rompus le

30 septembre dernier. C'était Lise Bissonnette, journaliste et membre du conseil d'administration de

l'ICPSI depuis 1986. David Cox, membre du département des Études politiques à l'Université

Queen's et ancien directeur de la Recherche à l'Institut, et Geoffrey Pearson, directeur général sor-

tant de l'ICPSI et ancien ambassadeur du Canada en URSS.



BOB COLE

j'aimerais voir se développer. Sur

quel sujet devrait-on travailler ?

Effectivement, est-ce que, parce que

le Canada est spécialiste en vérifica-

tion, l'Institut doit faire des recher-

ches du côté de la vérification ?

PEARSON : Je n'ai pas encore décidé

personnellement quelle était la

meilleure voie à suivre. L'Institut a

aussi pour mandat d'éduquer, et

d'éduquer principalement la popula-

tion canadienne, et non les Suédois.

Et c'est pourquoi il se préoccupe

des intérêts des Canadiens et Cana-

diennes. Peu importe qu'ils veulent

en savoir davantage sur les missiles

de croisière ou sur la conjoncture

namibienne, ce sont deux questions

politique du coup par coup. Il nous

incombe, à mon avis, de décider si

nous voulons continuer dans cette

voie et travailler en fonction des in-

térêts de la population, ou si nous

voulons nous concentrer sur des

thèmes particuliers, comme d'autres

instituts l'ont fait, ce qui leur a valu

leur réputation.

Bissonnette : Geoffrey, peut-être voudriez-vous commencer par une synthèse personnelle de ce que vous pensez après ces années passées à l'Institut.

PEARSON : Dans l'avenir, nous allons devoir essayer de décider si l'

nous faut choisir plus soigneuse-

ment nos tâches, et comment il con-

vient de procéder, en particulier,

pour étudier à la fois les questions

nationales et internationales... La

signification du mot «sécurité» est

aujourd'hui tellement vague qu'elle

peut englober presque n'importe

quo. Hier, devant les Nations-

Unies, le premier ministre a parlé

sur tout de la pauvreté et de l'envi-

ronnement, et il a évoqué la néces-

sité de créer un nouveau centre

d'études sur l'environnement. Et

bien, qui sait, dans cinq ans d'ici, il

existera peut-être une dizaine d'ins-

tituts canadiens qui se pencheront

plus expressément sur divers aspects

de la sécurité internationale. Que

ferons-nous alors ? L'ICPSI sera-t-il

obligé de se concentrer sur les défi-

missions plus traditionnelles de la

sécurité, sur des questions militaires

principalement, et de laisser les

autres volets de la sécurité à des or-

ganismes plus spécialisés ? J'espère

que non.

Cox : À votre avis, l'Institut doit-il

s'en tenir à ce à quoi ses créateurs le

destinaient ?

PEARSON : Selon moi, le texte de la

Loi portant création de l'Institut a

une connotation assez vaste qui peut

designer ou justifier tout ce que

nous pourrions vouloir faire. Dans

l'expression «solution des conflits»,

par exemple, on peut très bien en-

tendre par ce dernier mot les conflits

découlant de problèmes environ-

nementaux ou de la pauvreté, ou

tout autre dilemme conduisant à la

guerre. Je ne pense donc pas que la

Loi soit restrictive. C'est plutôt la

nature du processus de sélection de

nos activités qui l'est, vu les di-

verses voies possibles.

Bissonnette : Pour ce qui est de la

place de l'Institut sur la scène inter-

national (je vais faire de la provo-

cation ici), j'ai toujours l'impression

que l'on est tout simplement en train

d'essayer de se positionner dans

l'univers international des grandes

conférences. Pour être là, on fait de

la recherche sur n'importe quel,

comme vous dites : le Moyen-

Orient ici, l'Asie du Sud-Est là.

puisqu'il s'agit d'être invité un jour

à Moscou, le lendemain à Stock-

holm, le surlendemain à Washing-

ton, après un Pakistan. Je pense que

c'est déjà fait, c'est déjà gagné, on

connaît l'Institut, j'imagine, à tra-

vers le monde. Mais il n'y a pas de

je vais même employer un mot

d'«spécificité» cana-

dienne pour l'Institut sur la scène

internationale, et c'est cela que

L'IISS (International Institute for

Strategic Studies), à Londres, est

connu pour l'orientation Est-Ouest

de ses études, et c'est par elles qu'il

a acquis une réputation mondiale.

Les Soviétiques me citaient des

chiffres de l'IISS quand je leur po-

sais des questions sur leurs arme-

ments. Est-ce que le jour viendra où

l'ICPSI ? Voulons-nous entrepren-

dre un projet quelconque qui servi-

rait à nous identifier à l'échelle

internationale ? Je ne le crois pas,

car, je le répète, l'Institut est tourné

vers la population canadienne.

Bissonnette : Oui, mais si cela est

vrai, Geoffrey, comment justifiez-

vous alors toutes les activités inter-

nationales de l'Institut ?

PEARSON : Et bien, on nous invite à

des conférences, parce que le Ca-

nada est respecté et, en ce sens,

nous sommes, si l'on peut dire, l'ex-

pression de la politique extérieure

de notre pays. M. Clark assiste à

toutes sortes de réunions auxquelles

il préférerait sans doute ne pas aller.

... Le Canada entretient des rela-

tions politiques avec au moins la

même situation, et c'est pourquoi il

est sans doute inévitable, à mon

avis, qu'il doive assister à bon nom-

bre de ces réunions internationales.

Nous pouvons y aller, en rapporter

des connaissances et les digérer de

manière à les rendre accessibles aux

journalistes canadiens et aux per-

sonnes qui, dans notre pays, s'in-

teressaient à ces questions. Mais nous

ne sommes pas tenus de les étudier

toutes.

Cox : Est-ce que la réponse n'est

pas que l'Institut peut faire les

deux ? Il prend en compte, avec tous

les

8 HIVER 1988/1989

Koko sont traités à l'hôpital pour des troubles nerveux...

ZAIRE, GUINÉE ÉQUATORIALE, ZIMBABWE, SÉNÉGAL, MAURITANIE, HAÏTI, VENEZUELA, BRÉSIL, SYRIE, LIBAN, BAHAMAS, PANAMA, GUALEMAL, IND, CORÉE DU SUD, etc... autant de pays, déchirements de produits toxiques occidentaux qui, depuis vingt-quatre mois, ont fait la «une» des médias locaux ou internationaux. Dans la plupart de ces cas, les visées des exportateurs sont – apparemment – étonnantes. Mais combien d'autres initiatives ont réussi depuis dix ans ? Où sont les déchets toxiques qui ont quitté les ports occidentaux et que les cargos n'ont pas ramené ? Quels sont les produits en cause ? Il est impossible de répondre à ces questions. Dans les milieux spécialisés, on estime que, pour un essai qui échoue, il y en a au moins sept qui aboutissent sans problème quelquel part en Afrique, en Asie, en Amérique du Sud ou dans les Caraïbes !

Le cas de la compagnie américaine *Nedlog* est un bon exemple de ce qui s'est passé jusqu'à ce jour. En 1979 déjà, elle signait un contrat de 25 millions de dollars avec la Sierra Leone pour l'entreposage de déchets. À partir de 1980, elle a continué toute une série d'ententes avec Haïti, les Bahamas, le Mexique, le Honduras, la République dominicaine, le Costa Rica et la Corée du Sud...


Ce qui est particulièrement grave – pour ne pas dire criminel – avec les produits toxiques, c'est que les pays qui les reçoivent n'ont généralement aucun moyen technique de vérifier les cargaisons. De plus, la structure géographique des lieux d'entreposage fait rarement l'objet d'études, si bien que des nappes d'eau potable ou des zones de pêche peuvent facilement être contaminées. Il faut également envisager la possibilité que le niveau de toxicité des cargaisons reste élevé durant des dizaines d'années, voire des siècles dans le cas de certains composés organiques. Sur le plan médical enfin, ces pays ne peuvent d'aucune façon faire face à d'éventuels drames, d'autant plus s'ils ignorent la composition exacte des substances dangereuses.

Le désarroi des pays occidentaux vis-à-vis des déchets toxiques est presque aussi total. Sevoles (Italie), Love Canal (États-Unis), Lekkerkerk (Pays-Bas), Usine métallurgique Hoboken-Oberpeil (Bel-

gique), Georgswerder (Allemagne de l'Ouest), St-Basile-le-Grand (Canada), Los Altiagos (Espagne), etc... sont là pour le prouver, tout comme les terres, les mers, les rivières et les lacs intoxiqués. L'Environnemental Protection Agency (EPA), aux États-Unis, a dénombré, en 1985, 21 512 sites potentiellement dangereux. En Angleterre, le gouvernement évalue à 10 000 hectares la superficie des sols contaminés. Au rythme auquel on produit des déchets toxiques aux États-Unis (plus de 300 millions de tonnes par année), on estime que

d'ici dix ans la moitié des déchets industriels du pays afficheront «complet». Et la situation n'est guère meilleure en Europe et au Japon. En 1983, l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économique (OCDE) évaluait à 5 000 le nombre de cargaisons de produits toxiques qui avaient voyagé entre le Canada et les États-Unis cette année-là, et à 100 000, celles qui avaient voyagé entre les pays européens membres de l'Organisation internationale.

En outre, les problèmes de synergies (mélanges, interactions) entre les substances sont peu connus et donc encore mal maîtrisés. Sur le plan médical aussi, l'Occident est démuné devant les maladies causées par la présence dans l'environnement de produits toxiques. Et, ce qui n'arrange rien, environ 2 000 nouvelles substances sont introduites chaque année par les industries, ce qui rend la carte de la toxicité presque impossible à dessiner. Les scandales de ces derniers mois et la



Montréal (Canada)

valse des bateaux errant à la recherche de «États poubelles» ont tout de même eu quelque chose de bon. Les populations potentiellement victimes, surtout le long des côtes d'Afrique de l'Ouest, sont maintenant alertées. Les procès qui s'amorcent, par exemple en Guinée et au Nigeria, risquent d'avoir un effet de dissuasion, surtout s'il y a des condamnations, voire des exécution. d'intermédiaires européens ou américains. Par ailleurs, plusieurs pays qui ont servi de «poubelles toxiques» vont maintenant chercher à mieux se protéger par le

biais d'une réglementation internationale plus sévère. À une réunion de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA), début 1988, on a parlé de tout mettre en oeuvre pour stopper le «terrorisme toxique». Mais il ne faut pas se faire d'illusions ! L'exportation des déchets toxiques occidentaux vers des pays économiquement pauvres est, à l'heure actuelle, presque aussi rentable – et moins risquée – que les ventes d'armes ou le trafic de la drogue. Les scandales de cette année ont d'ailleurs révélé que des réseaux sont en place. Une véritable «pègre toxique» opère, le plus souvent avec la complicité monnayée de fonctionnaires ou de dirigeants dans les pays importateurs. Il convient d'apprécier, pour juger de la rentabilité de ce commerce de déchets, que les intermédiaires sont peu coûteux et que les frais sont assésés par les géants mondiaux des mines, des fondries, des laminières, de la chimie et de l'électronique.

LA SOLUTION ? IL FAUT BIEN SUR que les industries coupables règlent leurs problèmes chez elles, ou du

moins entre elles. Il faut également penser de plus en plus «rétaire» et de moins en moins «stock-changement de stratégie. Le 22 septembre dernier, l'Italie – un des plus gros exportateurs après les États-Unis – annonçait le retour dans ses ports de cinq cargos qui parcourent le monde depuis des mois à la recherche d'un «État poubelle». Plusieurs autres pays ont annoncé un resserrement de leurs contrôles (Belgique, Danemark, Grèce, Pays-Bas, France). Au niveau international, l'OCDE, la Communauté économique européenne, l'Organisation de l'unité africaine et le Programme des Nations-Unies pour l'environnement tentent actuellement de statuer juridiquement sur ce grave problème.

La tendance ne va pas vers une interdiction pure et simple des exportations de déchets toxiques. Les propositions à l'étude vont plutôt vers une réglementation plus sévère de ce commerce. Avant tout envoi, l'exportateur devra ainsi faire clair-ement état des substances en question, il devra prouver que l'importateur est non seulement d'accord mais qu'il dispose de tous les moyens techniques pour entreposer ou détruire les matières en question. Une convention internationale – sous l'égide des Nations-Unies – pourrait être signée le 21 mars 1989 à Bâle, en Suisse, un haut lieu de la chimie internationale. Les pays de l'Est, qui réalisent petit à petit que leurs déchets – ajoutés à ceux que l'Ouest entrepose chez eux contre forte rémunération – présentent des risques à très long terme, participent activement à la préparation de ce document.

L'Occident se doit de réagir car la présente situation a quelque chose de désolant. Outre des injustices politiques et économiques flagrantes et les risques élevés pour la santé de la population, c'est la qualité des rapports entre les peuples qui est en cause. Par ce commerce, le fossé Nord-Sud s'élargit, s'aggrave, et la confiance entre les nations, ingrédi-ent pour tant essentiel à long terme à la paix et à la sécurité, n'est plus qu'une valeur dénuée de sens...

Pour en savoir plus

J.-P. Hannequart, «La politique de gestion des déchets», Institut pour une politique européenne de l'environnement, Berne, 1983.
Jeanne Afrique, Enquête, juillet 1988.
New York Times, «Waste Dumpers Turn- ing to West Africa», 17 juillet 1988.

Les superpuissances et la sécurité internationale

Les résultats d'un sondage comparatif mené dans trois pays différents.

Dans trois grands pays occidentaux, soit le Canada, le Royaume-Uni et la République fédérale d'Allemagne, le public continue de nourrir une méfiance généralisée à l'égard des deux superpuissances, et ce en dépit des récentes améliorations de la situation en Afghanistan et de la récente amélioration des relations entre les États-Unis et l'URSS et de la ratification du traité sur les forces nucléaires intermédiaires (FNI).

Tels sont les résultats d'un sondage d'opinion publique mené en coopération récemment dans ces trois pays. Il s'agit du premier sondage réalisé simultanément sur ce sujet dans ces trois nations. Les résultats de ce sondage

«multinationale» corroborent très nettement ceux du sondage réalisé antérieurement par l'ICPSI. (Voir *Paix et Sécurité*, hiver 1987-1988).

À la fin des années 1980, les populations canadiennes, ouest-allemandes et britanniques craignent moins qu'avant la menace militaire de l'Union soviétique.

Elles considèrent avec autant de scepticisme les politiques des États-Unis que celles de l'URSS, et estiment que le problème ne vient pas de l'URSS en tant que telle mais des deux superpuissances. Et le consensus sur ce point est d'autant plus frappant qu'il est exprimé par trois pays alliés géographiquement éloignés.

À la question de savoir quelle était, à leur avis, la plus grave menace pour la paix mondiale, seuls quelques répondants canadiens, britanniques et ouest-

allemands ont nommé l'URSS (voir le diagramme 3). Il y a eu autant, sinon plus, de répondants qui ont cité le chef de file de l'alliance onctieuse, soit les États-Unis, comme constituant la plus grave menace. (Le rapport a été de 11 p. 100 contre 5 p. 100 au Canada, de 16 p. 100 contre 2 p. 100 au Royaume-Uni et de 4 p. 100 dans les deux cas en République fédérale d'Allemagne.) On remarque en particulier que la proportion de ceux qui voient dans la course aux armements entre les superpuissances la plus sérieuse problème est plus importante en République fédérale d'Allemagne. Pour la plupart des gens, ce sont la prolifération nucléaire et les conflits régionaux comme celui du Moyen-Orient qui constituent les plus graves dangers pour la paix mondiale.

De la même façon, une écrasante majorité de répondants dans les trois pays alliés, soit plus de 85 p. 100 d'entre eux, estime improbable, voire tout à fait improbable, l'éventualité d'une attaque soviétique contre l'Europe de l'Ouest, ce qui est le scénario de guerre classique de l'OTAN. Des majorités aussi importantes, voire plus importantes encore, considéraient qu'il y a peu de risques de voir les Soviétiques attaquer l'Amérique du Nord, le Japon ou la Chine.

Dans les trois pays interrogés, la plupart des répondants semblaient peu encline à croire que les Soviétiques poursuivent cet objectif d'hégémonie canadienne et ouest-allemande soient plus enclins que les Britanniques à croire l'URSS vise à la domination du monde. Il semble cependant que les répondants des pays ayant pris part au sondage, seule une minorité de répondants pense que l'évidence obtenue, quand elle n'a pas complètement disparu. Dans chacun des pays, la perception manichéenne de l'époque de la guerre froide s'est de toute évidence atténuée, mais les Soviétiques restent la menace la plus importante. Les Soviétiques ont toujours été la menace la plus importante, mais les Soviétiques ont toujours été la menace la plus importante.

mondiaux actuels. » Même si dans les trois pays interrogés, la majorité de ces personnes dit n'avoir pas plus confiance dans l'URSS à cet égard, quatre personnes sur dix (40 p. 100), et un répondant ouest-allemand sur trois (33 p. 100) ont très confiance, voire extrêmement confiance, dans la capacité de l'Union soviétique de faire face aux problèmes actuels du monde.

En dépit des sommets tenus par les superpuissances et de l'amélioration des relations entre ces deux nations, plus d'une personne sur quatre, au Canada comme au Royaume-Uni, croit toujours au risque d'une guerre nucléaire, estimée probable, sinon très probable. Pour expliquer un tel pourcentage de répondants «inquiets», on peut peut-être préciser qu'un petit nombre seulement de répondants pense que la guerre, si elle devait éclater, résulterait d'une attaque délibérée.

Pour la plupart des gens, les scénarios les plus probables ne sont pas ceux qui sont habituellement évoqués dans les médias par la sécurité des pays occidentaux. Dans les trois pays interrogés, soit le Canada, le Royaume-Uni et la République fédérale d'Allemagne, plus de six personnes sur dix sont d'avis qu'il est plus plausible de croire que, s'il devait y avoir attaque nucléaire, elle serait accidentelle, et non le résultat d'une agression préméditée. Quand on a demandé aux participants de dire quel était le pays qu'ils craignent le plus, relativement en particulier à une attaque nucléaire, 40 p. 100 de tous les répondants, dans l'ensemble des nations interrogées, ont cité un autre pays que l'URSS ou les États-Unis.

Il semble qu'il y ait en matière de sécurité un impératif absolu : réduire les stocks d'armes nucléaires. Dans les trois pays ayant participé au sondage, plus des trois quarts des personnes interrogées sont d'accord, voire tout à fait d'accord, avec l'énoncé suivant : « Le meilleur moyen de renforcer la sécurité des pays occidentaux consisterait à réduire de façon significative les armes nucléaires, tout aux États-Unis qu'en URSS ».

En dépit du fait que le Canada, le Royaume-Uni et la République fédérale d'Allemagne, sont tous trois des alliés des États-Unis, il est surprenant de constater que très peu de personnes interrogées ont indiqué qu'elles voudraient vivre dans un monde caractérisé par une suprématie militaire américaine. Dans chacun de ces pays occidentaux, une grande majorité de répondants, soit plus de 80 p. 100 d'entre eux, préférerait que les deux superpuissances aient une puissance militaire globale à peu près équivalente. □

Les résultats des sondages d'opinion publique présentés ici sont le fruit du International Security Project, une initiative conjointe de trois organisations nationales de sondage et de cette enquête multinationale a été coordonnée par le professeur Don Munton, de l'Université de Colombie-Britannique. Les résultats de cette étude comparée ont été publiés pour la première fois en août 1988. Au Royaume-Uni, le sondage a été confié à la Social Surveys Ltd (Sondages Gallup). Il a été mené sous forme d'entrevues, avec un échantillon national de 819 adultes âgés de 18 ans ou moins. En Allemagne de l'Ouest, le sondage a été effectué par l'Institut für Angewandte Sozialwissenschaft (IINAS), d'après un échantillon national de 1 473 adultes âgés de 18 ans ou moins. 18 ans, interrogés entre le 11 et le 23 juillet 1988. Les pourcentages obtenus avec des échantillons de cette taille sont en général exacts, compte tenu d'une marge d'erreur de plus ou moins 3 p. 100, 95 fois sur 100.




Diagramme 3
Laquelle des situations suivantes constitue à votre avis la menace la plus grande à la paix mondiale?

[X] La situation prévaut au Moyen-Orient
 [X] La course aux armements des superpuissances
 [X] Le déploiement des armes nucléaires dans les pays plus petits
 [X] Les actions des États-Unis sur la scène internationale
 [X] Les conflits ailleurs dans le monde

qu'il s'agit d'augmenter les revenus, on constate sou-

vent que les Canadiens et les Canadiennes se disent plus opposés à toute augmentation quelle qu'elle soit, en particulier à une augmentation des impôts, dans les sondages d'opinion, qu'ils ne le sont en réalité.

Les troisième et quatrième questions ont été analysées conjointement : quels moyens militaires le Canada peut-il et doit-il avoir? Quelles devraient être les grandes orientations de la politique à suivre dans ce domaine? D'une façon on ne peut plus claire et sans aucune équivoque, les répondants ont rejeté la solution des armes nucléaires pour le Canada. Seule une faible proportion des personnes interrogées, soit 14 p. 100, a indiqué que le Canada devrait équiper ses Forces armées d'armes nucléaires. Ce résultat est comparable à celui obtenu dans le cadre du sondage réalisé en 1985 par Radio-Canada, où un tiers environ des personnes interrogées ont déclaré envisager la possibilité que le Canada ait des armes nucléaires. Il semble que la subtile distinction à faire entre le fait, pour le Canada, d'avoir de telles armes dans son arsenal ou d'avoir sur son territoire les armes nucléaires d'autres pays n'ait pas échappé au public canadien.

Toutefois, cette position anti-nucléaire ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une opposition au projet du gouvernement Mulroney d'acheter une flotte de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire.

À la question : «Le gouvernement canadien a-t-il l'intention de faire l'achat de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire afin de permettre aux Forces armées de patrouiller les trois océans entourant le Canada. Approuvez-vous ou désapprouvez-vous ce projet?», afin de permettre aux Forces armées de patrouiller les trois océans entourant le Canada. Approuvez-vous ce projet – désapprouve complètement, désapprouve, approuve, approuve complètement.




Diagramme 2

Le Canada devrait doter ses Forces armées d'armes nucléaires – vraiment en désaccord, en désaccord, d'accord, vraiment d'accord.

Le gouvernement canadien a récemment fait part de son intention de faire l'achat de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire afin de permettre aux Forces armées de patrouiller les trois océans entourant le Canada. Approuvez-vous ce projet – désapprouve complètement, désapprouve, approuve, approuve complètement.

celle des répondants qui sont contre les deux options (44 p. 100 contre 42 p. 100; voir le diagramme 2). Ces deux positions sont tout de même interdépendantes : parmi la majorité de personnes en faveur d'une force nucléaire pour le Canada, la quasi-totalité d'entre elles sont aussi favorables aux sous-marins nucléaires. Par contre, celles qui sont contre les armes nucléaires et qui constituent la majorité sont, dans une large mesure, contre l'achat par le Canada de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. Il ne faut pas en conclure pour autant que le public canadien confond le concept de propulsion nucléaire avec les armes nucléaires en tant que telles; les résultats de sondages antérieurs montrent d'ailleurs peu d'exemples de pareille confusion. L'opposition vient surtout du fait que le Canada entrerait, en se dotant d'armes nucléaires, dans une sorte de «club nucléaire» exclusif.

Dans d'autres sondages où les questions étaient formulées différemment, l'acquisition par le Canada de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire a semblé recueillir moins de suffrages favorables. Dans les questions posées par Radio-Canada et par le Centre canadien pour

le contrôle des armements et le désarmement, le rôle destiné à ces sous-marins dans les «trois océans» n'est pas mentionné, et on met plutôt l'accent sur les quelques milliards de dollars que va coûter le programme. Il semble que cette formulation contribue à faire tomber à 40 p. 100 environ ou moins le pourcentage de répondants qui sont en faveur de cet achat. Il faut dire cependant que la mention d'un coût a souvent pour effet de rendre tout achat beaucoup moins tentant. Il en va de même pour la perspective d'une augmentation des impôts. Dans le cas de la proposition des sous-marins, il est évident, contrairement à ce qui se passe pour le budget de la défense en général, que l'opposition du public ne vient pas uniquement du prix élevé de l'achat envisagé.

Si le public canadien semble de toute évidence d'accorder pour tout dire que les moyens de défense du Canada devraient être des moyens traditionnels, et non nucléaires, vraiement être des moyens traditionnels, et non nucléaires, la question de savoir quelles devraient être les grandes politiques d'ensemble en la matière est loin, quant à elle, de faire l'objet d'un pareil consensus. Il est particulièrement surprenant de constater que les Canadiens et les Canadiennes ne sont pas particulièrement en faveur d'un recours par l'OTAN aux armes nucléaires, en cas d'attaque soviétique contre l'Europe occidentale, si les moyens de défense traditionnels devaient s'avérer inefficaces. Un tiers seulement d'entre eux sont en faveur de cette option, même si le recours en premier aux armes nucléaires est une des doctrines fondamentales de l'Alliance. Si la plupart des Européens sont, on ne peut le comprendre, contre le recours en premier, dix à douze sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire afin de permettre aux Forces armées de patrouiller les trois océans entourant le Canada. Approuvez-vous ou désapprouvez-vous ce projet?

Approuvez-vous ou désapprouvez-vous ce projet? 55 p. 100 des personnes interrogées par l'ICPSI ont voté tout à fait favorables, indiquant être favorables. En fait, la proportion de ceux qui approuvent l'acquisition de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire tout en se déclarant contre les armes nucléaires pour le Canada est à peu près équivalente à celle des deux options (44 p. 100 contre 42 p. 100; voir le diagramme 2). Ces deux positions sont tout de même interdépendantes : parmi la majorité de personnes en faveur d'une force nucléaire pour le Canada, la quasi-totalité d'entre elles sont aussi favorables aux sous-marins nucléaires. Par contre, celles qui sont contre les armes nucléaires et qui constituent la majorité sont, dans une large mesure, contre l'achat par le Canada de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. Il ne faut pas en conclure pour autant que le public canadien confond le concept de propulsion nucléaire avec les armes nucléaires en tant que telles; les résultats de sondages antérieurs montrent d'ailleurs peu d'exemples de pareille confusion. L'opposition vient surtout du fait que le Canada entrerait, en se dotant d'armes nucléaires, dans une sorte de «club nucléaire» exclusif.

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Le sondage

d'opinion réalisés

par l'ICPSI

en 1988

LES CANADIENS ET LEUR DÉFENSE

La majorité des Canadiens et Canadiennes ne partagent plus des points de vue typiques de la guerre froide, mais ils sont malgré tout en faveur de l'Alliance occidentale et de la défense classique.

PAR DON MUNTON

ON A SOUVENT ALLÉGUÉ QUE LA POPULATION canadienne ne s'intéressait pour ainsi dire pas aux questions de sécurité et de défense. C'est la raison pour laquelle on n'entend que peu d'opinions ou de débats éclairés à ce sujet et que le pays n'a jamais vraiment eu pour tradition de vouloir se doter d'une défense forte. D'après C.P. Stacey, le plus éminent historien militaire de notre pays, le Canada est une nation «non-militaire». La population canadienne, affirmait-il, «semble répugner instinctivement à dépenser en temps de paix pour assurer sa préparation militaire.»

À première vue, les résultats du nouveau sondage d'opinion public que commande par l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales pourraient

En regardant d'un peu plus près les résultats du sondage, on ne peut pas vraiment parler, au sujet de la sécurité, d'ignorance ou d'incohérence, et encore moins de «non-militarisme», surtout dans le contexte de la situation du Canada en matière de sécurité. Si les questions de défense et de sécurité suscitent indéniablement beaucoup moins de controverse publique au Canada que dans de nombreux autres pays, cela ne veut pas nécessairement dire que la population canadienne ignore tout de ces questions ou que ses opinions en la matière se font au gré des événements.

Les résultats du sondage d'opinion public que dont il est ici question montrent qu'en fait, la population canadienne s'appuie, pour se faire une opinion en matière de défense et de sécurité, sur une certaine argumentation politique-co-stratégique. Ses attitudes dans ce domaine peuvent être analysées en fonction de quatre grandes questions : 1) Quelles sont les entités que le Canada devrait avoir en matière d'alliement ou de défense? 2) Quel devrait être le niveau des dépenses affectées à la défense? 3) Quels moyens militaires le Canada peut-il et

doit-il avoir? 4) Quelles devraient être les grandes orientations de la politique à suivre?

On peut se demander, pour chacune de ces questions, quelle est à l'heure actuelle la position de l'opinion publique canadienne. Premièrement, il est utile de savoir ce que pense la population canadienne au sujet de certains nombre de questions de fond. Le sondage mené par l'ICPSI en 1988 confirme ce que celui de 1987 avait laissé entrevoir, à savoir que l'attitude de la population canadienne face aux questions de paix et de sécurité a profondément changé depuis les années 1960. Certains signes montrent de façon patente que sa perception des pays «amis» et «ennemis» a changé, et que la menace «n'est plus ce qu'elle était dans les scénarios traditionnels de la guerre froide.

D'une façon générale, la population canadienne fait à peine plus confiance aux États-Unis qu'à l'Union soviétique lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer lequel des deux pays est le plus à même de faire face aux problèmes mondiaux. De l'avis de la majorité des répondants, aucune des deux superpuissances ne veut réellement le désarmement, et près de la majorité d'entre eux estime ne pouvoir faire confiance ni à l'une ni à l'autre pour ce qui est du respect d'un quelconque accord de limitation des armements.

Si la moitié du public canadien est d'accord pour dire que «la puissance militaire soviétique est de plus en plus menaçante et représente pour l'Occident un danger réel et immédiat», l'autre moitié est d'avis contraire. Interrogés sur la question de savoir quel était leur avis, les répondants ont nommé l'URSS, tandis que la majorité a cité la course aux armements, la prolifération des armes nucléaires et les conflits régionaux extérieurs à l'Europe, comme celui du Moyen-Orient.

En outre, la majorité des répondants, soit 75 p. 100 d'entre eux, estime improbable, voire très improbable, une attaque soviétique contre l'Europe occidentale au cours des dix prochaines années; près de 80 p. 100 des personnes interrogées partagent un point de vue semblable au sujet d'une telle attaque contre l'Amérique du Nord. Le moins que l'on puisse dire, c'est qu'en matière de sécurité, la population canadienne estime que le danger ne vient pas essentiellement de Moscou.

AUSSI FONDAMENTAL ET DURABLE QU'IL PUISSE PARAÎTRE, ce changement n'a en rien ébranlé les convictions de la population canadienne en ce qui a trait à l'alliement international de son pays, qui faisait l'objet de la première question. Elle semble en effet être plus favorable que jamais à l'appartenance du Canada à l'OTAN. En fait, la proportion de répondants qui souhaiterait voir ce rôle diminuer n'est que de 20 p. 100, et elle est encore plus faible pour ce qui est de ceux qui voudraient voir le pays se retirer complètement de l'Alliance. La plupart des répondants (80 p. 100) rejettent l'idée de toute diminution du rôle du Canada. On constate à une évolution par rapport au sondage mené au Canada en 1984 par la *United States Information Agency* (USIA), dans le cadre duquel 89 p. 100 des personnes interrogées s'étaient déclarées contre le retrait du Canada de l'OTAN.

La population canadienne se déclare favorable au maintien, voire à l'accroissement, de la contribution

Il s'agit du deuxième sondage dans une série de sondages commandés et financés chaque année par l'ICPSI. Celui-ci a été conçu par l'auteur. Le présent article récapitule les premiers résultats rendus publics. Le sondage a été proposé par le Longwoods Research Group au cours des mois de juin et juillet 1988 à un échantillon national qu'on a voulu représentatif, constitué à partir d'une liste de 30 000 ménages dressée par la société Market Facts Ltd. Le sondage a été réalisé par courrier, et on a eu au total 1 002 répondants dont 573 avaient déjà pris part au sondage de 1987. Le tour de réponses a été en 1988 de 63 p. 100. Le marginé d'erreur compris dans un échantillon de cette taille est de l'ordre de plus ou moins 3 p. cent, 95 fois sur 100. Pour les résultats complets du sondage et autres données techniques relatives notamment à l'échantillon, on se reportera au document de travail de l'ICPSI rédigé par Michael Driedger et Don Munton.

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Don Munton est professeur de science politique à l'Université de Colombie-Britannique, à Vancouver; Alain Borgognon est journaliste à la télévision de Radio-Canada, à Montréal; David Cox est membre du département des Etudes politiques, à l'Université Queen's; Lise Bissonnette est journaliste; Geoffrey Pearson est directeur général de l'ICPSI; Sharon Hobson est correspondante au Canada du *Jane's Defence Weekly*; King Gordon est spécialiste en matière de développement et de relations internationales; Michael Constable est un illustrateur professionnel.

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